1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use ln::channelmanager::{CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
35 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
36 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
37 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
38 use util::events::ClosureReason;
39 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
40 use util::logger::Logger;
41 use util::errors::APIError;
42 use util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
43 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
47 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
49 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
51 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
54 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
55 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
56 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
57 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
58 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
59 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
60 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
62 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
65 pub struct AvailableBalances {
66 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
67 pub balance_msat: u64,
68 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
69 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
71 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
73 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
78 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
80 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
81 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
82 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
83 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
84 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
85 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
87 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
91 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
92 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
93 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
94 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
97 enum InboundHTLCState {
98 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
99 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
100 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
101 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
102 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
103 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
104 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
105 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
106 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
107 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
108 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
109 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
110 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
111 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
112 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
114 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
115 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
116 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
117 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
118 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
119 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
120 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
122 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
123 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
124 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
125 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
126 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
127 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
129 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
130 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
131 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
132 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
133 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
134 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
135 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
136 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
138 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
139 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
141 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
142 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
143 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
144 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
145 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
146 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
147 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
148 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
151 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
155 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
156 state: InboundHTLCState,
159 enum OutboundHTLCState {
160 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
161 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
162 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
163 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
164 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
165 /// money back (though we won't), and,
166 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
167 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
168 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
169 /// we'll never get out of sync).
170 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
171 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
172 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
174 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
175 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
176 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
177 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
178 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
179 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
180 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
181 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
182 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
183 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
184 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
185 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
186 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
187 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
188 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
192 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
193 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
194 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
197 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
198 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
200 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
201 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
206 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
207 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
209 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
210 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
215 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
219 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
220 state: OutboundHTLCState,
224 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
225 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
226 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
230 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
232 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
235 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
240 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
244 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
245 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
246 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
247 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
248 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
249 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
250 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
252 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
253 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
254 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
255 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
256 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
257 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
258 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
260 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
261 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
262 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
264 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
265 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
266 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
267 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
268 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
269 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
271 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
272 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
274 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
275 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
276 /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
277 /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
278 MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
279 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
280 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
281 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
282 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
284 /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
285 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
286 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
287 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
288 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
289 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
290 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
291 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
292 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
293 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
294 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
295 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
297 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
298 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
300 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
302 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
303 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
304 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
305 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
306 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
307 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
308 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
309 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
311 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
313 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
315 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
319 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
321 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
322 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
323 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
325 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
326 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
328 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
329 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
330 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
331 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
332 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
334 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
335 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
339 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
345 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
348 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
349 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
350 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
351 holding_cell_msat: u64,
352 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
355 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
356 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
357 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
358 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
359 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
360 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
361 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
362 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
363 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
364 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
367 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
368 struct HTLCCandidate {
370 origin: HTLCInitiator,
374 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
382 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
384 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
386 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
387 htlc_value_msat: u64,
388 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
393 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
394 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
395 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
396 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
397 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
399 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
400 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
401 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
402 htlc_value_msat: u64,
403 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
404 /// in the holding cell).
405 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
407 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
408 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
412 /// The return value of `revoke_and_ack` on success, primarily updates to other channels or HTLC
414 pub(super) struct RAAUpdates {
415 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
416 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
417 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
418 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
419 pub monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
420 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
423 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
424 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
425 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
426 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
427 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
428 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
429 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
430 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
431 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
432 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
433 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
436 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
437 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
438 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
439 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
440 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
441 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
442 pub mon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>,
443 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
444 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
445 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
448 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
449 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
450 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
451 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
452 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
453 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
454 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
455 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
456 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
457 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
458 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
459 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
460 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
461 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
462 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
464 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
465 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
466 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
467 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
469 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
470 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
471 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
472 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
474 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
475 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
476 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
477 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
478 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
480 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
481 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
482 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
483 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
485 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
486 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
487 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
489 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
490 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
491 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
492 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
493 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
495 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
496 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
497 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
500 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
501 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
502 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
503 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
505 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
506 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
507 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
508 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
510 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
514 channel_id: [u8; 32],
517 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
518 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
520 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
521 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
522 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
524 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
525 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
526 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
527 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
529 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
530 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
532 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
534 holder_signer: Signer,
535 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
536 destination_script: Script,
538 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
539 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
540 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
542 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
543 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
544 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
545 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
546 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
547 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
549 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
550 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
551 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
552 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
553 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
554 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
556 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
558 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
559 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
560 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
561 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
562 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
563 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
565 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
567 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
568 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
569 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
570 // HTLCs with similar state.
571 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
572 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
573 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
574 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
575 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
576 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
577 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
578 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
579 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
582 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
583 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
584 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
586 update_time_counter: u32,
588 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
589 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
590 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
591 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
592 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
593 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
595 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
596 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
598 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
599 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
600 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
601 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
603 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
604 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
606 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
608 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
610 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
611 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
612 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
613 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
614 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
615 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
617 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
618 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
619 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
620 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
621 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
623 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
624 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
625 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
626 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
627 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
628 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
629 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
630 channel_creation_height: u32,
632 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
635 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
637 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
640 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
642 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
645 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
647 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
649 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
650 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
653 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
655 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
657 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
658 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
660 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
662 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
663 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
664 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
666 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
668 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
669 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
671 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
672 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
673 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
675 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
677 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
679 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
680 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
681 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
682 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
684 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
685 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
686 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
688 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
689 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
690 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
692 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
693 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
694 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
695 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
696 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
697 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
698 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
699 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
701 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
702 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
703 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
704 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
705 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
707 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
708 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
710 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
711 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
712 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
713 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
714 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
715 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
716 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
717 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
719 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
720 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
722 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
723 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
724 // the channel's funding UTXO.
726 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
727 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
728 // associated channel mapping.
730 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
731 // to store all of them.
732 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
734 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
735 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
736 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
737 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
738 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
741 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
742 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
744 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
745 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
746 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
750 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
752 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
753 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
754 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
755 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
759 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
761 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
763 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
765 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
766 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
767 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
768 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
769 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
771 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
772 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
774 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
776 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
777 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
779 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
780 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
781 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
782 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
783 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
784 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
786 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
787 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
789 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
790 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
791 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
792 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
793 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
795 /// See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905 for more details.
796 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
798 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
799 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
800 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
801 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
807 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
808 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
810 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
811 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
812 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
817 macro_rules! secp_check {
818 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
821 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
826 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
827 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
828 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
829 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
831 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
833 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
834 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
835 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
837 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
840 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
842 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
845 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
848 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
850 /// This is used both for new channels and to figure out what reserve value we sent to peers
851 /// for channels serialized before we included our selected reserve value in the serialized
853 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
854 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
855 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
858 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
859 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
862 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
863 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
864 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
865 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
866 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`
867 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
868 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel && config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy {
869 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
874 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
875 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
876 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
877 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
878 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
879 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
880 // We've exhausted our options
883 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(); // We only currently support two types
884 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
888 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(
889 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
890 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
891 outbound_scid_alias: u64
892 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
893 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
894 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
896 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
898 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
899 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
900 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
902 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
903 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
905 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
906 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
908 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
909 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
910 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
912 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
913 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
915 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis);
916 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
917 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
920 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
922 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
923 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors);
924 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
925 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
928 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
929 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
931 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
932 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
935 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
936 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
937 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
944 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
945 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
946 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
947 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
952 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
954 channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
955 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
956 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
958 channel_value_satoshis,
960 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
963 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
964 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
966 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
967 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
970 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
971 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
972 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
973 pending_update_fee: None,
974 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
975 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
976 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
977 update_time_counter: 1,
979 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
981 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
982 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
983 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
984 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
985 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
986 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
988 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
989 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
990 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
991 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
993 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
994 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
995 closing_fee_limits: None,
996 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
998 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1000 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1001 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1002 short_channel_id: None,
1003 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1005 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1006 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1007 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1008 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1009 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1010 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1011 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1012 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1013 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1014 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1015 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1017 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1019 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1020 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1021 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1022 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1023 counterparty_parameters: None,
1024 funding_outpoint: None,
1025 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1027 funding_transaction: None,
1029 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1030 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1031 counterparty_node_id,
1033 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1035 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1037 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1038 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1040 announcement_sigs: None,
1042 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1043 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1044 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1045 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1047 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1049 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1050 outbound_scid_alias,
1052 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1053 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1055 channel_type: Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config),
1059 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
1060 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1062 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1063 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1064 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1065 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1066 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1067 fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1068 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1069 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1071 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1072 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1073 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1074 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1075 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1076 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1077 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1082 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1083 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1084 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1085 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
1086 msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
1087 outbound_scid_alias: u64
1088 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1089 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1090 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1093 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
1094 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1096 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1097 // support this channel type.
1098 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1099 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1100 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1103 if channel_type.requires_unknown_bits() {
1104 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contains unknown bits".to_owned()));
1107 // We currently only allow four channel types, so write it all out here - we allow
1108 // `only_static_remote_key` or `static_remote_key | zero_conf` in all contexts, and
1109 // further allow `static_remote_key | scid_privacy` or
1110 // `static_remote_key | scid_privacy | zero_conf`, if the channel is not
1111 // publicly announced.
1112 if *channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1113 if !channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && !channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
1114 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood".to_owned()));
1117 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1118 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1121 channel_type.clone()
1123 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
1125 if !channel_type.supports_static_remote_key() {
1126 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1129 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
1130 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1131 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1132 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1133 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1134 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1135 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1136 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1139 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1140 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1143 // Check sanity of message fields:
1144 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1145 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1147 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1148 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1150 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1151 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1153 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1154 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1155 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1157 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1158 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1160 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1161 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1163 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
1165 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1166 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1167 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1169 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1170 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1172 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1173 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1176 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1177 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1178 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1180 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1181 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1183 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1184 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1186 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1187 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1189 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1190 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1192 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1193 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1195 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1196 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1199 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1201 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1202 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1203 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1207 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
1208 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1209 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1211 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1212 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). Channel value is ({} - {}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1214 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1215 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1216 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1218 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1219 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1222 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1223 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1224 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1225 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1226 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1227 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1230 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1231 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1232 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1233 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1234 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1237 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1238 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1239 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1240 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1241 if script.len() == 0 {
1244 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1245 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1247 Some(script.clone())
1250 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1251 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1252 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1257 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1258 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1261 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1262 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1263 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1267 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1268 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
1270 let chan = Channel {
1273 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1274 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1276 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1281 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1283 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1284 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1285 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1288 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1291 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1292 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
1294 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1295 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1296 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1298 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1299 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1300 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1301 pending_update_fee: None,
1302 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1303 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1304 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1305 update_time_counter: 1,
1307 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1309 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1310 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1311 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1312 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1313 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1314 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1316 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1317 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1318 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1319 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1321 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1322 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1323 closing_fee_limits: None,
1324 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1326 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1328 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1329 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1330 short_channel_id: None,
1331 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1333 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1334 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1335 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1336 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1337 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1338 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1339 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1340 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1341 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1342 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1343 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1344 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1346 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1348 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1349 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1350 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1351 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1352 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1353 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1354 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1356 funding_outpoint: None,
1357 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1359 funding_transaction: None,
1361 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1362 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1363 counterparty_node_id,
1365 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1367 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1369 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1370 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1372 announcement_sigs: None,
1374 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1375 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1376 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1377 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1379 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1381 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1382 outbound_scid_alias,
1384 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1385 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1393 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1394 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1395 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1396 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1397 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1399 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1400 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1401 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1402 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1403 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1404 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1405 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1407 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1408 where L::Target: Logger
1410 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1411 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1412 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1414 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1415 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1416 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1417 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1419 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1420 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1421 if match update_state {
1422 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1423 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1424 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1425 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1426 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1428 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1432 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1433 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1434 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1435 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1437 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1438 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1439 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1441 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1442 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1443 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1444 transaction_output_index: None
1449 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1450 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1451 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1452 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1453 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) {
1454 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1455 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1457 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1458 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1461 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1462 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) {
1463 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1464 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1466 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1467 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1473 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1474 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1475 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1476 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1477 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1478 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1479 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1483 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1484 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1486 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1488 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1489 if generated_by_local {
1490 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1491 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1500 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1502 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1503 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1504 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1505 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1506 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1507 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1508 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1511 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1512 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1513 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1514 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1518 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1519 preimages.push(preimage);
1523 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1524 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1526 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1528 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1529 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1531 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1532 if !generated_by_local {
1533 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1541 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1542 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1543 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1544 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1545 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1546 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1547 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1548 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1550 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1552 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1553 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1554 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1555 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1557 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1559 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1560 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1561 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1562 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1565 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1566 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1567 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1568 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1570 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1573 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1574 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1575 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1576 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1578 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1581 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1582 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1587 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1588 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1593 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1595 let channel_parameters =
1596 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1597 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1598 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1601 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1606 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1609 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1610 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1611 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1612 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1614 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1615 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1616 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1624 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1625 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1631 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1632 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1633 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1634 // outside of those situations will fail.
1635 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1639 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1644 1 + // script length (0)
1648 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1649 2 + // witness marker and flag
1650 1 + // witness element count
1651 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1652 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1653 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1654 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1655 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1656 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1658 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1659 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1660 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1666 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1667 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1668 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1669 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1671 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1672 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1673 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1675 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1676 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1677 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1678 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1679 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1680 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1683 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1684 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1687 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1688 value_to_holder = 0;
1691 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1692 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1693 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1694 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1696 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1697 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1700 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1701 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1705 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1706 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1707 /// our counterparty!)
1708 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1709 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1710 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1711 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1712 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1713 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1714 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1716 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1720 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1721 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1722 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1723 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1724 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1725 //may see payments to it!
1726 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1727 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1728 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1730 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1733 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1734 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1735 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1736 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1737 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1740 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1743 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1744 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1746 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1748 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1749 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1750 where L::Target: Logger {
1751 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1752 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1753 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0);
1754 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1755 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1756 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1757 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1758 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1762 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1763 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1764 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1765 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1767 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1768 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1770 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1772 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1774 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1775 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1776 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1778 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1779 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1780 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1781 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1782 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1784 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1785 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1786 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1788 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1789 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1791 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1794 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1795 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1799 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1803 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1804 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1805 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1806 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1807 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1808 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1811 // Now update local state:
1813 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1814 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1815 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1816 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1817 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1818 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1819 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1823 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1824 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1825 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1826 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1827 // do not not get into this branch.
1828 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1829 match pending_update {
1830 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1831 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1832 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1833 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1834 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1835 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1836 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1839 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1840 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1841 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1842 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1843 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1844 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1845 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1851 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1852 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1853 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1855 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1856 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1857 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1859 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1860 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1863 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1864 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1866 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1867 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1869 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1870 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1873 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1876 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1877 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1878 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1879 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1884 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1885 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1886 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1887 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1888 Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1891 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1892 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1893 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1894 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1895 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1897 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1898 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1899 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1903 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1904 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1905 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1906 /// before we fail backwards.
1907 /// If we do fail twice, we debug_assert!(false) and return Ok(None). Thus, will always return
1908 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1909 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1910 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1911 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1913 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1915 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1916 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1917 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1919 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1920 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1921 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1923 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1924 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1925 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1927 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1932 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1933 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1939 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1940 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1941 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
1942 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
1943 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1947 // Now update local state:
1948 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1949 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1950 match pending_update {
1951 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1952 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1953 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1954 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1958 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1959 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1960 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1961 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1967 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1968 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1969 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1975 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1977 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1978 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1981 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1982 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1983 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1988 // Message handlers:
1990 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1991 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
1993 // Check sanity of message fields:
1994 if !self.is_outbound() {
1995 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
1997 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1998 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2000 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2001 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2003 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2004 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2006 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2007 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2009 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2010 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2011 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2013 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2014 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2015 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2017 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2018 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2019 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2021 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2022 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2024 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2025 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2028 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2029 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2030 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2032 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2033 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2035 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2036 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2038 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2039 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2041 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2042 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2044 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2045 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2047 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2048 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2051 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2052 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2053 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2055 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2056 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2058 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
2061 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2062 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2063 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2064 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2065 if script.len() == 0 {
2068 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2069 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2071 Some(script.clone())
2074 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2075 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2076 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2081 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2082 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2083 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2084 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2085 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2087 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2088 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2090 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2093 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2094 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2095 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2096 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2097 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2098 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2101 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2102 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2103 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2106 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2107 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2109 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2110 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2115 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2116 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2118 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
2119 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2121 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2122 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2123 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2124 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2125 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2126 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2127 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2128 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2129 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2132 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
2133 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2135 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2136 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2137 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2138 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2140 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2141 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2143 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2144 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2147 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2148 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2151 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2152 if self.is_outbound() {
2153 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2155 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2156 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2157 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2159 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2161 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2162 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2164 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2165 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2166 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2167 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2170 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2171 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2172 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2173 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2174 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2176 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2178 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2179 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2180 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2183 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2184 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2185 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2189 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2190 initial_commitment_tx,
2193 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2194 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2197 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2198 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2200 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2202 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2203 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2204 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2205 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2206 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
2207 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2208 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2209 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2210 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2212 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2214 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2216 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2217 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2218 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2219 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2221 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2223 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2224 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2226 }, channel_monitor, self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2229 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2230 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2231 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2232 if !self.is_outbound() {
2233 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2235 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2236 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2238 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2239 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2240 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2241 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2244 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2246 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
2247 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2248 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2249 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2251 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2252 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2254 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
2255 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2257 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2258 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2259 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2260 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2261 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2262 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2266 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2267 initial_commitment_tx,
2270 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2271 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2274 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2275 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2278 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2279 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2280 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2281 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2282 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2283 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
2284 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2285 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2286 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2287 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2289 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2291 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2293 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2294 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2295 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2296 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2298 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2300 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap(), self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2303 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2304 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2306 pub fn channel_ready<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2307 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2308 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2309 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2312 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2313 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2314 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2315 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2316 // when routing outbound payments.
2317 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2321 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2323 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2324 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2325 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2326 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2327 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2328 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 ||
2329 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2330 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2331 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2333 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2334 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2335 let expected_point =
2336 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2337 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2339 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2341 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2342 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2343 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2344 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2345 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2347 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2348 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2352 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2355 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2356 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2358 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2360 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger))
2363 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2364 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2365 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2366 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2372 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2373 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2374 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2375 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2376 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2377 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2378 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2379 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2380 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2383 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2384 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2385 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2386 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2387 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2388 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2390 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2391 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2397 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2398 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2399 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2400 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2401 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2402 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2403 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2404 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2405 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2408 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2409 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2410 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2411 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2412 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2413 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2415 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2416 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2420 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2421 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2422 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2423 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2424 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2425 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2426 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2428 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2429 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2431 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2438 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2439 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2440 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2441 /// corner case properly.
2442 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2443 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2444 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2446 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2447 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2448 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2449 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2452 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2454 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2455 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2456 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2459 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2460 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2461 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2462 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2464 outbound_capacity_msat,
2465 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2466 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2467 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2473 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2474 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2477 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2478 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2479 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2480 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2481 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2482 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2485 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2486 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2488 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2489 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2492 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2493 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2494 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2496 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2497 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2499 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2500 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2502 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2503 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2505 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2506 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2510 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2511 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2517 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2518 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2519 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2522 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2523 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2524 included_htlcs += 1;
2527 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2528 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2532 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2533 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2534 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2535 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2536 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2537 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2542 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2544 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2545 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2550 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2551 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2555 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2556 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2557 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2560 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2561 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2563 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2564 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2565 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2567 total_pending_htlcs,
2568 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2569 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2570 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2572 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2573 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2574 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2576 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2578 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2583 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2584 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2585 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2587 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2588 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2590 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2591 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2593 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2594 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2596 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2597 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2601 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2602 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2608 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2609 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2610 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2611 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2612 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2613 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2616 included_htlcs += 1;
2619 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2620 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2623 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2624 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2626 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2627 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2628 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2633 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2634 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2635 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2638 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2639 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2641 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2642 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2644 total_pending_htlcs,
2645 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2646 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2647 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2649 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2650 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2651 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2653 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2655 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2660 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2661 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2662 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2663 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
2664 if local_sent_shutdown {
2665 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2667 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2668 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
2669 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2670 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2672 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2673 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2675 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2676 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2678 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2679 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2681 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2682 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2685 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2686 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2687 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2688 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2690 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2691 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2693 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2694 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2695 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2696 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2697 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2698 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2699 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2700 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2701 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2702 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2703 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2705 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2706 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2707 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2708 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2709 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2710 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2714 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2715 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2716 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2717 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2718 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2719 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2720 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2724 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2725 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2726 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2727 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2728 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2729 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2730 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2734 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2735 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2736 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2737 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2738 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2739 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2742 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2743 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2744 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2745 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2746 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2748 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2749 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2752 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2753 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2756 if !self.is_outbound() {
2757 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2758 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2759 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2760 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2761 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2762 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2763 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2764 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2765 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2766 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2767 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2768 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2769 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2770 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2771 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2774 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2775 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2776 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2777 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2778 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2781 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2782 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2784 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2785 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2788 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2789 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2790 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2794 // Now update local state:
2795 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2796 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2797 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2798 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2799 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2800 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2801 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2806 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2808 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2809 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2810 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2811 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2812 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2813 None => fail_reason.into(),
2814 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2815 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2816 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2817 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2819 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2823 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2824 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2825 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2826 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2828 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2829 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2834 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2837 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2838 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2839 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2841 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2842 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2845 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2848 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2849 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2850 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2852 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2853 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2856 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2860 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2861 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2862 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2864 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2865 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2868 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2872 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2873 where L::Target: Logger
2875 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2876 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2878 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2879 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2881 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2882 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2885 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2887 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2889 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2890 let commitment_txid = {
2891 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2892 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2893 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2895 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2896 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2897 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2898 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2899 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2900 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2904 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2906 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2907 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2908 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2909 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2912 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2913 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2914 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2915 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2918 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2920 if self.is_outbound() {
2921 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2922 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2923 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2924 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2925 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2926 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2927 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
2928 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2929 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2930 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2936 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2937 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs))));
2940 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
2941 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2942 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2943 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2944 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2945 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
2946 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2948 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
2949 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
2950 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
2951 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2952 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2953 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2954 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2955 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2957 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
2959 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
2963 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2964 commitment_stats.tx,
2966 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2967 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2968 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2971 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2972 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
2973 .map_err(|_| (None, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())))?;
2974 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
2976 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2977 let mut need_commitment = false;
2978 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
2979 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2980 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2981 need_commitment = true;
2985 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2986 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2987 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2988 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2989 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2990 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
2994 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2995 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2996 Some(forward_info.clone())
2998 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2999 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3000 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3001 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3002 need_commitment = true;
3005 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3006 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3007 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3008 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3009 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3010 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3011 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3012 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3013 need_commitment = true;
3017 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3018 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3019 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3020 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3022 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3023 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3024 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3025 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3026 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3027 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3028 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3029 // includes the right HTLCs.
3030 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3031 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3032 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3033 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3034 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3035 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3037 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3038 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3039 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
3042 let commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3043 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3044 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3045 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3046 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3047 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3048 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3049 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3050 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3054 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3055 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3057 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3058 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3059 per_commitment_secret,
3060 next_per_commitment_point,
3061 }, commitment_signed, monitor_update))
3064 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3065 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3066 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3067 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3068 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 &&
3069 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
3070 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3071 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3074 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
3075 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
3076 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3077 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
3078 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3079 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3080 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3082 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3083 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3084 updates: Vec::new(),
3087 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3088 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3089 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3090 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3091 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3092 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3093 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3094 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3095 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3096 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3097 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3098 // to rebalance channels.
3099 match &htlc_update {
3100 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3101 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), logger) {
3102 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3105 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3106 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3107 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3108 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3109 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3110 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3111 // into the holding cell without ever being
3112 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3113 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3114 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3117 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3123 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3124 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3125 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3126 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3127 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3128 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3129 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3130 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3131 (msg, monitor_update)
3132 } else { unreachable!() };
3133 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3134 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3136 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3137 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), logger) {
3138 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3139 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3140 // `get_update_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself
3141 // must not fail - we should never end up in a state where we
3142 // double-fail an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates
3143 // we didn't wait for a full revocation before failing.
3144 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3147 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3149 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3156 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3157 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
3159 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3160 self.send_update_fee(feerate, logger)
3165 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3166 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3167 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3168 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3169 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3171 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3172 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3173 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3175 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3177 update_fulfill_htlcs,
3179 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3182 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
3184 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
3188 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3189 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3190 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3191 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3192 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3193 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<RAAUpdates, ChannelError>
3194 where L::Target: Logger,
3196 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3197 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3199 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3200 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3202 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3203 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3206 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3208 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3209 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3210 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3214 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3215 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3216 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3217 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3218 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3219 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3220 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3221 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3222 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3225 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3227 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3228 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3231 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3232 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3234 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3236 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3237 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3238 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3239 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3240 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3241 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3242 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3243 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3247 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3248 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3249 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3250 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3251 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3252 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3253 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3254 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3256 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3257 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3260 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3261 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3262 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3263 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3264 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3265 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3266 let mut require_commitment = false;
3267 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3270 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3271 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3272 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3274 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3275 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3276 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3277 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3278 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3279 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3284 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3285 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3286 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3287 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3288 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3290 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3291 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3292 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3297 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3298 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3300 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3304 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3305 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3307 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3308 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3309 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3310 require_commitment = true;
3311 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3312 match forward_info {
3313 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3314 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3315 require_commitment = true;
3317 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3318 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3319 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3321 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3322 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3323 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3327 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3328 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3329 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3330 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3336 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3337 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3338 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3339 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3341 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3342 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3343 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3344 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3345 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3346 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3347 require_commitment = true;
3351 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3353 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3354 match update_state {
3355 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3356 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3357 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3358 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3359 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3361 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3362 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3363 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3364 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3365 require_commitment = true;
3366 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3367 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3372 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
3373 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3374 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3375 if require_commitment {
3376 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3377 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3378 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3379 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3380 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3381 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3382 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3383 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3384 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3386 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3387 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3388 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3389 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3390 return Ok(RAAUpdates {
3391 commitment_update: None, finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3392 accepted_htlcs: Vec::new(), failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3394 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new()
3398 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
3399 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3400 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
3401 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
3402 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3404 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3405 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3406 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3409 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3410 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3411 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3412 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3415 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
3416 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3417 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos,
3418 failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3420 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3423 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3424 if require_commitment {
3425 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3427 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3428 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3429 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3430 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3432 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3433 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3435 commitment_update: Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3436 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3437 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3439 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
3443 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3444 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3445 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3448 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3450 commitment_update: None,
3451 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3452 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3453 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3460 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3461 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3462 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3463 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3464 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3465 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3466 if !self.is_outbound() {
3467 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3469 if !self.is_usable() {
3470 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3472 if !self.is_live() {
3473 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3476 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3477 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3478 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3479 let keys = if let Ok(keys) = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number) { keys } else { return None; };
3480 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3481 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3482 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3483 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3484 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3485 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3489 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3490 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3491 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3492 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3493 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3496 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3497 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3501 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
3502 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3506 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3507 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3509 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3510 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3515 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3516 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, logger) {
3517 Some(update_fee) => {
3518 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3519 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
3525 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3526 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3528 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3530 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3531 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3532 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3533 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3537 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3538 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3541 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3542 // will be retransmitted.
3543 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3544 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3545 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3547 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3548 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3550 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3551 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3552 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3553 // this HTLC accordingly
3554 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3557 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3558 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3559 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3560 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3563 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3564 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3565 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3566 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3567 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3568 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3573 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3575 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3576 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3577 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3578 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3582 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3583 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3584 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3585 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3586 // the update upon reconnection.
3587 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3591 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3592 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3595 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
3596 /// updates are partially paused.
3597 /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
3598 /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
3599 /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
3600 /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
3601 pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3602 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3603 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3604 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3606 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3607 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3608 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3609 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3610 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3611 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3612 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
3615 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3616 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3617 /// to the remote side.
3618 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
3619 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
3620 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
3622 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3623 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3624 // first received the funding_signed.
3625 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3626 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3627 self.funding_transaction.take()
3629 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3630 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3631 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3632 funding_broadcastable = None;
3635 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateFailed (and
3636 // we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for us to
3637 // do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3638 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3639 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3640 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3641 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3642 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3643 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3644 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3645 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3646 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3647 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3648 next_per_commitment_point,
3649 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3653 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block_height, logger);
3655 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3656 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3657 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3658 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3659 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3660 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3662 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3663 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3664 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3665 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3666 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3667 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3671 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3672 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3674 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3675 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3678 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3679 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3680 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3681 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3682 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3683 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3684 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3685 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3686 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3690 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3691 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3693 if self.is_outbound() {
3694 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3696 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3697 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3699 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
3700 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3702 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3703 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3704 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3705 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3706 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3707 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3708 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3709 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3710 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3711 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3712 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3713 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3714 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3716 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3717 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3718 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3724 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3725 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3726 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3727 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3728 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3729 per_commitment_secret,
3730 next_per_commitment_point,
3734 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3735 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3736 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3737 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3738 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3740 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3741 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3742 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3743 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3744 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3745 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3746 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3747 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3748 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3753 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3754 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3756 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3757 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3758 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3759 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3760 reason: err_packet.clone()
3763 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3764 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3765 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3766 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3767 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3768 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3771 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3772 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3773 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3774 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3775 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3782 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3783 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3784 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3785 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3789 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3790 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3791 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3792 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3793 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3794 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3798 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3799 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3801 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3802 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3803 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3804 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3805 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L,
3806 node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock)
3807 -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3808 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3809 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3810 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3811 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3812 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3815 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3816 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3817 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3820 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3821 match msg.data_loss_protect {
3822 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3823 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3824 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3825 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3826 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3827 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3829 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3830 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3831 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3832 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3833 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3836 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3837 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3838 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3839 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3840 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3841 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3842 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3843 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3846 OptionalField::Absent => {}
3850 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3851 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3852 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3853 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3855 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3859 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3860 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3861 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3863 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3864 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3865 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3866 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3867 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3871 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger);
3873 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3874 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3875 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3876 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3877 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3878 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3880 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3881 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3882 channel_ready: None,
3883 raa: None, commitment_update: None, mon_update: None,
3884 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3885 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3886 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3890 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3891 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3892 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3893 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3894 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3895 next_per_commitment_point,
3896 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3898 raa: None, commitment_update: None, mon_update: None,
3899 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3900 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3901 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3905 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3906 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3907 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3909 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3910 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3911 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3914 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3917 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3920 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3921 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3922 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3923 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3924 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
3926 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3927 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending ChannelReady
3928 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3929 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3930 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3931 next_per_commitment_point,
3932 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3936 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3937 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3938 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3940 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3943 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
3944 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
3945 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
3946 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
3948 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3949 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
3950 Err(ChannelError::Warn(_)) | Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) =>
3951 panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
3952 Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
3953 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3954 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3955 raa: required_revoke,
3956 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
3957 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
3958 mon_update: Some(monitor_update),
3959 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
3962 Ok((None, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
3963 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3964 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3965 raa: required_revoke,
3966 commitment_update: None,
3967 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
3969 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
3974 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3975 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3976 raa: required_revoke,
3977 commitment_update: None,
3978 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
3980 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3983 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3984 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3985 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3987 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3990 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3991 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3992 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3993 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3994 commitment_update: None, raa: None, mon_update: None,
3995 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
3996 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3999 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4000 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4001 raa: required_revoke,
4002 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4003 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4005 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4009 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4013 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4014 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4015 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4016 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4018 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4020 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4022 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4023 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4024 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4025 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4026 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4027 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4029 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4030 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4031 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4032 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4033 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4035 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4036 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4037 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4038 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4041 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4042 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4043 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4044 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4045 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4046 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4047 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4048 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4049 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4050 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4051 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4052 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4053 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4054 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4055 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4057 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4060 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4061 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4064 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4065 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4066 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4067 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4068 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4069 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4070 self.channel_state &
4071 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4072 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)
4073 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4074 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4077 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4078 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4079 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4080 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4081 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4082 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4083 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4085 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4091 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4092 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4093 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4094 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4096 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4097 return Ok((None, None));
4100 if !self.is_outbound() {
4101 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4102 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4104 return Ok((None, None));
4107 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4109 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4110 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4111 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4112 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4114 let sig = self.holder_signer
4115 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4116 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4118 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4119 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4120 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4121 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4123 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4124 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4125 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4130 pub fn shutdown<K: Deref>(
4131 &mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4132 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4133 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
4135 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4136 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4138 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4139 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4140 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4141 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4142 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4144 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4145 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4146 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4149 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4151 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4152 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4155 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4156 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4157 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4160 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4163 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4164 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4165 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4166 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4168 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4171 assert!(send_shutdown);
4172 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4173 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4174 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4176 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4181 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4183 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4184 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4186 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4187 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4188 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4189 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4190 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4191 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4195 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4196 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4197 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4198 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4202 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4203 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4204 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4205 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4206 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4207 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4209 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4210 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4217 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4218 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4220 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4223 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4224 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4226 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4228 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4229 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4230 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4231 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4232 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4233 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4234 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4235 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4236 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4238 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4239 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4242 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4246 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4247 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4248 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4249 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4251 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4252 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4254 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4255 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4257 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4258 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4260 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4261 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4264 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4265 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4268 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 != 0 {
4269 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4270 return Ok((None, None));
4273 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4274 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4275 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4276 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4278 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4280 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4283 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4284 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4285 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4286 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4287 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4291 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4292 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4293 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4297 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4298 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4299 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4300 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4301 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4302 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4303 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4307 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4309 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4310 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4311 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4312 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4314 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4317 let sig = self.holder_signer
4318 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4319 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4321 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4322 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4323 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4324 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4328 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4329 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4330 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4331 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4333 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4334 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4335 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4341 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4342 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4343 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4345 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4346 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4348 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4349 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4352 if !self.is_outbound() {
4353 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4354 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4355 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4356 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4358 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4359 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4360 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4362 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4363 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4366 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4367 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4368 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4369 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4370 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4371 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4372 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4373 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4375 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4378 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4379 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4380 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4381 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4383 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4387 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4388 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4389 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4390 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4392 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4398 // Public utilities:
4400 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4404 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4408 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4409 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4410 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
4414 /// Gets the channel's type
4415 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4419 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4420 /// is_usable() returns true).
4421 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4422 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4423 self.short_channel_id
4426 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4427 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4428 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4431 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4432 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4433 self.outbound_scid_alias
4435 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4436 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4437 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4438 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4439 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4442 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4443 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4444 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4445 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4448 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4449 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4452 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4453 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4456 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4457 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4458 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4461 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4462 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4465 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4466 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4467 self.counterparty_node_id
4470 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4471 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4472 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4475 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4476 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4477 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4480 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4481 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4483 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4484 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4485 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4486 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4488 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4492 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4493 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4494 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4497 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4498 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4499 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4502 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4503 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4504 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4506 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4507 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4512 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4513 self.channel_value_satoshis
4516 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4517 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4520 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4521 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4524 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4525 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4528 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4529 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4530 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4533 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4534 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4535 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4536 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4537 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4540 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4542 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4543 self.prev_config = None;
4547 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4548 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4552 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4553 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4554 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4555 let did_channel_update =
4556 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4557 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4558 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4559 if did_channel_update {
4560 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4561 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4562 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4563 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4565 self.config.options = *config;
4569 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4570 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4571 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4572 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4573 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4574 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4575 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4577 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4578 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4581 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4583 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4584 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4590 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4591 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4592 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4593 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4594 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4595 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4596 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4598 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4599 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4606 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
4610 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4611 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4612 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4613 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4614 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4615 // which are near the dust limit.
4616 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4617 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4618 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4619 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4620 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4622 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4623 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4625 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4628 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4629 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4632 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4633 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4636 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4637 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4641 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4646 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4648 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4649 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4650 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4651 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4652 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4653 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4655 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4657 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4665 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4666 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4670 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4671 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4672 self.update_time_counter
4675 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4676 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4679 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4680 self.config.announced_channel
4683 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4684 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4687 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4688 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4689 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4690 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4693 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4694 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4695 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4698 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4699 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4700 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4701 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4702 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4705 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4706 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4707 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4708 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4709 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4712 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4713 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4714 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4715 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
4718 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4719 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4720 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4723 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4724 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4725 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32
4728 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4729 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4730 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4733 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4734 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4735 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4738 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4739 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4740 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4741 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4742 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4743 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4748 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4749 self.channel_update_status
4752 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4753 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4754 self.channel_update_status = status;
4757 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4758 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4762 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4763 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4764 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4767 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4771 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4772 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4773 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4775 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4776 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4777 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4779 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4780 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4783 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
4784 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4785 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4786 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4787 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4788 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4789 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4790 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4791 self.channel_state);
4793 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4797 if need_commitment_update {
4798 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
4799 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4800 let next_per_commitment_point =
4801 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4802 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4803 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4804 next_per_commitment_point,
4805 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4809 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4815 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4816 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4817 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4818 pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32,
4819 txdata: &TransactionData, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
4820 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4821 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4822 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4823 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4824 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4825 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4826 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4827 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4828 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4829 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
4830 if self.is_outbound() {
4831 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4832 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4833 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4834 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4835 // channel and move on.
4836 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4837 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4839 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4840 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4841 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4843 if self.is_outbound() {
4844 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4845 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4846 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4847 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4848 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4849 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4853 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4854 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4855 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4856 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4857 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4861 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4862 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4863 // may have already happened for this block).
4864 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4865 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
4866 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger);
4867 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4870 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4871 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4872 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4873 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4881 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4882 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4883 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4884 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4886 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4887 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4890 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4892 pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
4893 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4894 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)), logger)
4897 fn do_best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_node_pk: Option<(BlockHash, PublicKey)>, logger: &L)
4898 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4899 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4900 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4901 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4903 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4904 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4906 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4907 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4908 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4916 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4918 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4919 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
4920 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
4922 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
4923 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4926 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4927 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 ||
4928 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4929 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4930 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4931 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4932 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4933 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4934 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4937 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4938 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4939 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4940 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4942 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4943 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4944 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4946 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4947 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4948 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4949 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4951 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4952 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4953 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
4954 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4955 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
4956 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4957 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4960 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
4961 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
4963 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4966 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4967 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4968 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4969 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4970 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4971 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4972 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4973 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4974 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4975 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4976 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4977 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
4978 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None, logger) {
4979 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4980 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4981 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4982 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
4988 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4993 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4994 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4996 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
4997 if !self.is_outbound() {
4998 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5000 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5001 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5004 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5005 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5008 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5009 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5013 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5014 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5015 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5016 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5017 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5018 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5019 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5020 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5021 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5022 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5023 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5024 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5025 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5026 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5027 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5028 first_per_commitment_point,
5029 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5030 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5031 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5032 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5034 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5038 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5039 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5042 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5043 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5044 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5045 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5048 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5049 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5051 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5052 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u64) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5053 if self.is_outbound() {
5054 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5056 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5057 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5059 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5060 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5062 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5063 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5066 self.user_id = user_id;
5067 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5069 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5072 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5073 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5074 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5076 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5077 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5078 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5079 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5081 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5082 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5083 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5084 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5085 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5086 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5087 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5088 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5089 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5090 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5091 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5092 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5093 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5094 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5095 first_per_commitment_point,
5096 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5097 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5098 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5100 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5104 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5105 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5107 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5109 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5110 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5113 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5114 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5115 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
5116 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5117 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5118 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5121 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5122 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5123 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5124 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5125 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5126 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5127 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5128 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5129 if !self.is_outbound() {
5130 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5132 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5133 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5135 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5136 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5137 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5138 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5141 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5142 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5144 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5147 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5148 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5153 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5155 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5157 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5158 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5159 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5161 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5162 temporary_channel_id,
5163 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5164 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5169 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5170 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5171 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5172 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5174 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5177 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5178 fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5179 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5180 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5182 if !self.is_usable() {
5183 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5186 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
5188 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5189 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
5191 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5192 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
5193 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
5194 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
5195 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
5196 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5202 fn get_announcement_sigs<L: Deref>(&mut self, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, logger: &L)
5203 -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> where L::Target: Logger {
5204 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5208 if !self.is_usable() {
5212 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5213 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5217 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5221 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5222 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_pk, genesis_block_hash) {
5225 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as channel is not public.");
5229 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5231 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5236 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5238 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5239 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5240 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5241 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5242 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5246 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5248 fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5249 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5250 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
5252 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5253 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5254 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5255 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5256 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5257 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5258 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5259 contents: announcement,
5262 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5266 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5267 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5268 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5269 pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5270 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
5272 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5274 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5275 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5276 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5277 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5279 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5280 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5281 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5282 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5285 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5286 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5287 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5288 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5291 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement)
5294 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5295 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5296 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
5297 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5300 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) {
5302 Err(_) => return None,
5304 match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement) {
5305 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5310 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5311 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5312 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5313 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5314 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5315 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5316 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5317 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5318 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5319 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5320 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5321 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5322 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5323 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5324 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5325 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5326 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5327 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5328 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5331 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5332 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5333 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5334 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5337 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5338 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5339 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5340 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5341 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5342 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5343 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5344 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5346 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5347 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5348 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5349 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5350 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5351 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5352 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5353 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5354 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5356 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5362 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5364 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5365 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5367 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5369 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5370 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5372 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateFailed, we cannot commit to a new state as we
5373 /// may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to regenerate
5376 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to calling any other methods on this Channel!
5378 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
5379 pub fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5380 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
5381 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5383 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5384 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5385 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5388 if amount_msat == 0 {
5389 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5392 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5393 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5396 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5397 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5398 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5399 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5400 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5401 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5402 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5403 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5406 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5407 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5408 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5409 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5411 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5412 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5413 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5416 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
5417 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5418 if !self.is_outbound() {
5419 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5420 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5421 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5422 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5423 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5424 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5428 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5429 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5430 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5431 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5432 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5433 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5437 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5438 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5439 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5440 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5441 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5442 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5446 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5447 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5448 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5451 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5452 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5453 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5454 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5456 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5457 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5460 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5461 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5462 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5463 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5464 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5467 // Now update local state:
5468 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
5469 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5474 onion_routing_packet,
5479 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5480 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5482 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5484 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5488 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5489 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5490 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5494 onion_routing_packet,
5496 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5501 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
5502 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
5503 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
5504 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
5505 pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5506 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
5507 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
5509 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
5510 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
5512 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
5513 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
5515 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
5516 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
5518 let mut have_updates = self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
5519 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5520 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5521 have_updates = true;
5523 if have_updates { break; }
5525 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5526 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
5527 have_updates = true;
5529 if have_updates { break; }
5532 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
5534 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
5536 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
5537 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5538 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5539 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5540 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5542 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5543 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5544 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5546 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5547 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5551 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5552 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5553 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5554 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5555 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5556 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5557 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5560 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5561 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5562 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5563 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5564 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5565 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5568 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5570 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
5571 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
5572 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
5573 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5574 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5575 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
5577 Err(e) => return Err(e),
5580 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5581 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5584 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5585 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5586 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5587 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5588 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5589 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5590 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5591 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5594 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5595 Ok((res, monitor_update))
5598 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
5599 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5600 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5601 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
5602 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5603 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5604 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5606 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5608 if !self.is_outbound() {
5609 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5610 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5611 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5612 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5613 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5614 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5615 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5616 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5617 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5618 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5625 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5626 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5630 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5631 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5633 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5635 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5636 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5637 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5638 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5640 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5641 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5642 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5643 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5644 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5645 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5649 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5650 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5653 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5656 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
5657 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
5658 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
5660 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5661 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, logger)? {
5662 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
5663 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
5664 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
5670 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
5671 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
5672 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
5675 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5676 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5677 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5679 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5680 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5681 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5682 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5688 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5689 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5690 pub fn get_shutdown<K: Deref>(&mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
5691 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5692 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
5693 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5694 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5695 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5698 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5699 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5700 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5702 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5703 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5706 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5707 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
5708 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5711 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5714 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
5715 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5716 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5718 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5723 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5724 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5725 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5726 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5728 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5730 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5732 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5733 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5734 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5735 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5736 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5737 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5741 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5742 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5743 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5746 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5747 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5748 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5749 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5750 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5752 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5753 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5760 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5763 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
5764 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
5765 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
5766 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
5767 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
5768 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
5769 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
5770 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
5771 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
5772 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5773 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5775 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
5776 // return them to fail the payment.
5777 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5778 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
5780 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
5781 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
5786 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5787 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
5788 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
5789 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
5790 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
5791 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
5792 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
5793 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
5794 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
5795 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5796 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5797 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5798 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
5803 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5804 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5805 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
5809 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
5810 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
5812 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
5818 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5819 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5820 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
5821 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
5822 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
5824 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5825 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5826 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5827 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5833 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5834 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5835 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5836 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5837 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
5838 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5843 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
5844 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5845 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
5846 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
5848 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
5849 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
5850 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
5851 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
5856 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
5857 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5858 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5859 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5860 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
5861 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5866 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
5867 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5868 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
5871 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5873 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
5875 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
5876 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
5877 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
5878 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
5880 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
5881 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
5882 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
5884 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
5886 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
5887 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
5888 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
5889 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
5890 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
5891 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
5893 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
5894 // deserialized from that format.
5895 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
5896 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
5897 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
5899 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
5901 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
5902 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
5903 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
5905 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
5906 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5907 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5908 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
5911 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
5912 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5913 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
5916 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5917 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
5918 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
5919 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5921 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
5922 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
5924 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
5926 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
5928 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
5930 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
5933 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
5935 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
5940 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
5942 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5943 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5944 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5945 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
5946 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
5947 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5948 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
5950 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
5952 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
5954 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
5957 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
5958 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
5959 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
5962 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
5964 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
5965 preimages.push(preimage);
5967 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
5968 reason.write(writer)?;
5970 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
5972 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
5973 preimages.push(preimage);
5975 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
5976 reason.write(writer)?;
5981 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5982 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
5984 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
5986 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
5987 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
5988 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5989 source.write(writer)?;
5990 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
5992 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
5994 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
5995 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5997 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
5999 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6000 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6005 match self.resend_order {
6006 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6007 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6010 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6011 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6012 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6014 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6015 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6016 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6017 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6020 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6021 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6022 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6023 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6024 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6027 if self.is_outbound() {
6028 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6029 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6030 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6032 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6033 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6034 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6036 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6038 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6039 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6040 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6041 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6043 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6044 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6045 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6046 // consider the stale state on reload.
6049 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6050 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6051 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6053 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6054 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6055 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6057 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6058 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6060 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6061 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6062 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6064 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6065 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6067 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6070 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6071 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6072 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6074 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6077 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6078 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6080 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6081 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6082 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6084 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6086 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6088 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6090 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6091 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6092 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6093 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6094 htlc.write(writer)?;
6097 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6098 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6099 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6101 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6102 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6104 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6105 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6106 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6107 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6108 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6109 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6110 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6112 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6113 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6114 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6115 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6116 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6118 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6119 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6120 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6121 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6122 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6123 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6124 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6126 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6127 (2, chan_type, option),
6128 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6129 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6130 (5, self.config, required),
6131 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6132 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6133 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6134 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6135 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6136 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6137 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6138 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6139 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6146 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6147 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a K, u32)> for Channel<Signer>
6148 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
6149 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a K, u32)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6150 let (keys_source, serialized_height) = args;
6151 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6153 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6155 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6157 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6158 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6159 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6160 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6161 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6163 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6164 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6167 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6168 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6169 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6171 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6173 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6174 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
6175 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
6176 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6177 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6178 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
6179 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6180 keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6182 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6184 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6185 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6186 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6189 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6191 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6192 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6193 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6195 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6196 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6197 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6198 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6199 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6200 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6201 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6202 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6203 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6204 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6205 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6206 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6207 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6208 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6213 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6214 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6215 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6216 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6217 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6218 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6219 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6220 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6221 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6222 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6223 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6224 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6226 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6227 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6230 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6231 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6234 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6235 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6237 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6242 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6243 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6244 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6245 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6246 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6247 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6248 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6249 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6250 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6251 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6253 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6254 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6255 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6257 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6258 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6259 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6261 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6265 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6266 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6267 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6268 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6271 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6272 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6273 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6275 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6276 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6277 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6278 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6281 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6282 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6283 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6284 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6287 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6289 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6291 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6292 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6293 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6294 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6296 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6297 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6298 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6299 // consider the stale state on reload.
6300 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6303 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6304 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6305 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6307 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6310 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6311 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6312 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6314 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6315 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6316 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6317 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6319 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6320 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6322 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6323 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6325 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6326 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6327 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6329 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6331 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6332 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6334 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6335 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6338 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6340 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6341 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6342 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6343 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6345 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6348 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6349 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6351 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6353 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6354 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6356 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6357 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6359 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6361 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6362 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6363 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6365 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6366 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6367 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6371 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6372 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6373 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6375 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6381 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6382 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6383 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6384 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6385 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6386 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6387 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6388 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6389 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6390 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6392 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6393 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6394 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6395 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6396 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6398 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6399 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6400 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6401 (2, channel_type, option),
6402 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6403 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6404 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6405 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6406 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6407 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6408 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6409 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6410 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6411 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6412 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6413 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6416 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6417 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6418 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6420 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6421 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6423 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6424 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6429 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6430 if iter.next().is_some() {
6431 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6435 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6436 if chan_features.supports_unknown_bits() || chan_features.requires_unknown_bits() {
6437 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6438 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6439 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6442 if channel_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() {
6443 // Relax this check when ChannelTypeFeatures supports anchors.
6444 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6447 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6448 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6453 config: config.unwrap(),
6457 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6458 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6459 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6463 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6465 channel_value_satoshis,
6467 latest_monitor_update_id,
6470 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6473 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6474 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6477 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6478 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6479 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6483 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6484 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6485 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6486 monitor_pending_forwards,
6487 monitor_pending_failures,
6488 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6491 holding_cell_update_fee,
6492 next_holder_htlc_id,
6493 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6494 update_time_counter,
6497 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6498 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6499 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6500 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6502 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6503 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6504 closing_fee_limits: None,
6505 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6507 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6509 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6510 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6512 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6514 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6515 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6516 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6517 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6518 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6519 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6520 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6521 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6522 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6525 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6527 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6528 funding_transaction,
6530 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6531 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6532 counterparty_node_id,
6534 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6538 channel_update_status,
6539 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6543 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6544 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6545 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6546 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6548 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6550 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6551 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6552 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6554 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6555 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6557 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6564 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
6565 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
6566 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
6567 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
6568 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
6570 use ln::PaymentHash;
6571 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentId};
6572 use ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
6573 use ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS};
6574 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures};
6575 use ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate};
6576 use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
6578 use ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
6579 use chain::BestBlock;
6580 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
6581 use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, Recipient, KeyMaterial, KeysInterface};
6582 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
6583 use util::config::UserConfig;
6584 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
6585 use util::errors::APIError;
6586 use util::test_utils;
6587 use util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
6588 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
6589 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
6590 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
6591 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::RecoverableSignature;
6592 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6593 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6594 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
6595 use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
6596 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
6599 struct TestFeeEstimator {
6602 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
6603 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
6609 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
6610 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
6611 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
6612 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
6616 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
6617 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
6618 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
6619 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
6620 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6621 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator, u32::max_value()).is_err());
6625 signer: InMemorySigner,
6627 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
6628 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
6630 fn get_node_secret(&self, _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<SecretKey, ()> { panic!(); }
6631 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial { panic!(); }
6632 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
6633 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6634 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6635 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
6636 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
6639 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
6640 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6641 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6642 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
6645 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
6648 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
6649 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
6650 fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5], _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
6653 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
6654 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
6655 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
6659 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
6660 let features = InitFeatures::known().clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
6661 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
6662 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
6664 let seed = [42; 32];
6665 let network = Network::Testnet;
6666 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6667 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
6668 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
6671 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6672 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6673 let config = UserConfig::default();
6674 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
6675 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
6676 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
6678 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
6679 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
6683 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
6684 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
6686 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
6687 let original_fee = 253;
6688 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
6689 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6690 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6691 let seed = [42; 32];
6692 let network = Network::Testnet;
6693 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6695 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6696 let config = UserConfig::default();
6697 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6699 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
6700 // same as the old fee.
6701 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
6702 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6703 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
6707 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
6708 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
6709 // dust limits are used.
6710 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
6711 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6712 let seed = [42; 32];
6713 let network = Network::Testnet;
6714 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6715 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6717 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
6718 // they have different dust limits.
6720 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
6721 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6722 let config = UserConfig::default();
6723 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6725 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
6726 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
6727 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6728 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
6729 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6731 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
6732 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
6733 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
6734 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
6735 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
6737 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
6738 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
6739 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6741 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
6742 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
6743 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
6744 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6747 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6749 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
6750 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
6751 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
6752 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6753 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6755 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
6756 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
6757 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
6758 payment_secret: None,
6759 payment_params: None,
6763 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
6764 // the dust limit check.
6765 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6766 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6767 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
6768 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
6770 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
6771 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
6772 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
6773 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
6774 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6775 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6776 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
6780 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
6781 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
6782 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
6783 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
6784 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
6785 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
6786 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6787 let seed = [42; 32];
6788 let network = Network::Testnet;
6789 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6791 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6792 let config = UserConfig::default();
6793 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6795 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
6796 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
6798 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
6799 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
6800 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
6801 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6802 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6803 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
6805 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
6806 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
6807 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6808 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6809 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
6811 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
6813 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
6814 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
6815 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6816 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6817 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
6819 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
6820 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
6821 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6822 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6823 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
6827 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
6828 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
6829 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6830 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6831 let seed = [42; 32];
6832 let network = Network::Testnet;
6833 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
6834 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
6835 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6837 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
6839 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
6840 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6841 let config = UserConfig::default();
6842 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6844 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
6845 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
6846 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
6847 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6849 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
6850 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
6851 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
6853 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
6854 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
6855 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
6856 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
6858 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
6859 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
6860 let (funding_signed_msg, _, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
6862 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
6863 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
6865 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
6866 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
6867 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
6868 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
6869 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
6870 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
6871 match msg.data_loss_protect {
6872 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
6873 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
6878 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
6880 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
6881 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
6882 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
6883 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
6884 match msg.data_loss_protect {
6885 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
6886 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
6893 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6894 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
6895 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6896 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6897 let seed = [42; 32];
6898 let network = Network::Testnet;
6899 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6900 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6901 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
6903 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
6904 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
6905 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
6906 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
6907 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
6908 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
6909 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
6910 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
6912 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
6913 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
6914 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
6915 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
6916 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6917 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
6919 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
6920 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
6921 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6922 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
6924 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6926 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
6927 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
6928 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
6929 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6930 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6931 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
6933 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
6934 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6935 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6936 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
6938 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
6939 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
6940 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
6941 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6942 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
6944 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
6945 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
6947 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
6948 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6949 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
6951 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
6952 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
6953 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6954 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6955 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
6957 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
6958 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
6960 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6961 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6962 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
6966 fn channel_update() {
6967 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
6968 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6969 let seed = [42; 32];
6970 let network = Network::Testnet;
6971 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
6972 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6974 // Create a channel.
6975 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6976 let config = UserConfig::default();
6977 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6978 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
6979 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
6980 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
6982 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
6983 let update = ChannelUpdate {
6984 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
6986 short_channel_id: 0,
6989 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
6990 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
6991 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
6993 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
6994 excess_data: Vec::new(),
6996 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
6998 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7000 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7001 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7002 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7003 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7005 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7006 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7007 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7009 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7013 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7015 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7016 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7017 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7018 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7019 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7020 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7021 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7022 use chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
7023 use ln::PaymentPreimage;
7024 use ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7025 use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7026 use util::logger::Logger;
7029 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7030 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7031 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7032 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7034 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7036 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7037 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7038 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7039 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7040 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7041 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7043 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7044 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7049 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7050 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7051 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7053 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7054 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7055 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7056 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7057 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7058 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7060 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7062 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7063 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7064 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7065 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7066 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7067 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7069 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7070 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7071 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7072 selected_contest_delay: 144
7074 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7075 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7077 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7078 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7080 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7081 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7083 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7084 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7086 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7087 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7088 // build_commitment_transaction.
7089 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7090 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7091 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7092 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7093 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
7095 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7096 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7097 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7098 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7102 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7103 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7104 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7105 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7109 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7110 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7111 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7113 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7114 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7116 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7117 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7119 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7121 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7122 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7123 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7124 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7125 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7126 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7127 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7129 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7130 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7131 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7132 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7134 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7135 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7136 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7138 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7140 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7141 commitment_tx.clone(),
7142 counterparty_signature,
7143 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7144 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7145 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7147 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7148 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7150 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7151 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7152 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7154 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7155 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7158 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7159 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7161 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7162 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7163 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7164 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7165 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7166 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7167 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7168 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7170 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7173 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7174 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7175 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7179 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7182 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7183 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7184 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7186 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7187 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7188 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7189 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7190 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7191 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7192 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7193 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7195 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7199 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7200 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7202 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7203 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7204 "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", {});
7206 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7207 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7208 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7209 "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", {});
7211 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7212 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7214 amount_msat: 1000000,
7216 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7217 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7219 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7222 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7223 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7225 amount_msat: 2000000,
7227 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7228 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7230 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7233 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7234 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7236 amount_msat: 2000000,
7238 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7239 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7240 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7242 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7245 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7246 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7248 amount_msat: 3000000,
7250 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7251 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7252 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7254 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7257 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7258 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7260 amount_msat: 4000000,
7262 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7263 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7265 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7269 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7270 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7271 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7273 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7274 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7275 "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", {
7278 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7279 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7280 "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" },
7283 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7284 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7285 "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" },
7288 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7289 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7290 "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" },
7293 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7294 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7295 "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" },
7298 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7299 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7300 "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" }
7303 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7304 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7305 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7307 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7308 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7309 "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", {
7312 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7313 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7314 "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" },
7317 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7318 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7319 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe0100000000000000000124060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c014830450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
7322 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7323 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7324 "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" },
7327 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7328 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7329 "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" },
7332 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7333 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7334 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe04000000000000000001da0d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca01473044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
7337 // anchors: commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7338 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7339 chan.feerate_per_kw = 644;
7341 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e0106830467a558c07544a3de7715610c1147062e7d091deeebe8b5c661cda9402202ad049c1a6d04834317a78483f723c205c9f638d17222aafc620800cc1b6ae35",
7342 "3045022100ef82a405364bfc4007e63a7cc82925a513d79065bdbc216d60b6a4223a323f8a02200716730b8561f3c6d362eaf47f202e99fb30d0557b61b92b5f9134f8e2de3681",
7343 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80094a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994e80300000000000022002010f88bf09e56f14fb4543fd26e47b0db50ea5de9cf3fc46434792471082621aed0070000000000002200203e68115ae0b15b8de75b6c6bc9af5ac9f01391544e0870dae443a1e8fe7837ead007000000000000220020fe0598d74fee2205cc3672e6e6647706b4f3099713b4661b62482c3addd04a5eb80b000000000000220020f96d0334feb64a4f40eb272031d07afcb038db56aa57446d60308c9f8ccadef9a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994a4f996a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100ef82a405364bfc4007e63a7cc82925a513d79065bdbc216d60b6a4223a323f8a02200716730b8561f3c6d362eaf47f202e99fb30d0557b61b92b5f9134f8e2de368101483045022100e0106830467a558c07544a3de7715610c1147062e7d091deeebe8b5c661cda9402202ad049c1a6d04834317a78483f723c205c9f638d17222aafc620800cc1b6ae3501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7346 "304402205912d91c58016f593d9e46fefcdb6f4125055c41a17b03101eaaa034b9028ab60220520d4d239c85c66e4c75c5b413620b62736e227659d7821b308e2b8ced3e728e",
7347 "30440220473166a5adcca68550bab80403f410a726b5bd855030527e3fefa8c1e4b4fd7b02203b1dc91d8d69039473036cb5c34398b99e8eb90ae500c22130a557b62294b188",
7348 "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" },
7351 "3045022100c6b4113678039ee1e43a6cba5e3224ed2355ffc05e365a393afe8843dc9a76860220566d01fd52d65a89ba8595023884f9e8f2e9a310a6b9b85281c0bce06863430c",
7352 "3045022100d0d86307ea55d5daa80f453ad6d64b78fe8a6504aac25407c73e8502c0702c1602206a0809a02aa00c8dc4a53d976bb05d4605d8bb0b7b26b973a5c4e2734d8afbb4",
7353 "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" },
7356 "304402203c3a699fb80a38112aafd73d6e3a9b7d40bc2c3ed8b7fbc182a20f43b215172202204e71821b984d1af52c4b8e2cd4c572578c12a965866130c2345f61e4c2d3fef4",
7357 "304402205bcfa92f83c69289a412b0b6dd4f2a0fe0b0fc2d45bd74706e963257a09ea24902203783e47883e60b86240e877fcbf33d50b1742f65bc93b3162d1be26583b367ee",
7358 "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" },
7361 "304402200f089bcd20f25475216307d32aa5b6c857419624bfba1da07335f51f6ba4645b02206ce0f7153edfba23b0d4b2afc26bb3157d404368cb8ea0ca7cf78590dcdd28cf",
7362 "3045022100e4516da08f72c7a4f7b2f37aa84a0feb54ae2cc5b73f0da378e81ae0ca8119bf02207751b2628d8e2f62b4b9abccda4866246c1bfcc82e3d416ad562fd212102c28f",
7363 "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" },
7366 "3045022100aa72cfaf0965020c73a12c77276c6411ca68c4de36ac1998adf86c917a899a43022060da0a159fecfe0bed37c3962d767f12f90e30fed8a8f34b1301775c21a2bd3a",
7367 "304402203cd12065c2a42963c762e6b1a981e17695616ecb6f9fb33d8b0717cdd7ca0ee4022065500005c491c1dcf2fe9c4024f74b1c90785d572527055a491278f901143904",
7368 "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" }
7371 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7372 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7373 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7375 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7376 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7377 "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", {
7380 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7381 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7382 "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" },
7385 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7386 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7387 "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" },
7390 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7391 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7392 "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" },
7395 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7396 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7397 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf103000000000000000001d90d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be01483045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
7400 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7401 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7402 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7404 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7405 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7406 "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", {
7409 "30440220446f9e5c375db6a61d6eeee8b59219a30a4a37372afc2670a1a2889c78e9b943022061895f6088fb48b490ab2140a4842c277b64bf25ff591625dd0356e0c96ab7a8",
7410 "3045022100c1621ba26a99c263fd885feff5fda5ca2cc73df080b3a49ecf15164ee244d2a5022037f4cc7fd4441af39a83a0e44c3b1db7d64a4c8080e8697f9e952f85421a34d8",
7411 "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" },
7414 "3044022027a3ffcb8a007e3349d75382efbd4b3fb99fcbd479a18555e58697bd1278d5c402205c8303d46211c3ae8975fe84a0df08b4623119fecd03bc93b49d7f7a0c64c710",
7415 "3045022100b697aca55c6fb15e5348bb7387b584815fd15e8dd306afe0c477cb550d0c2d40022050b0f7e370f7604d2fec781fefe86715dbe95dff4dab88d628f509d62f854de1",
7416 "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" },
7419 "30440220013975ae356e6daf22a86a29f21c4f35aca82ed8f731a1103c60c74f5ed1c5aa02200350d4e5455cdbcacb7ccf174db5bed8286019e509a113f6b4c5e606ee12c9d7",
7420 "3045022100e69a29f78779577830e73f327073c93168896f1b89432124b7846f5def9cd9cb02204433db3697e6ed7ac89574ca066a749640e0c9e114ac2e0ee4545741fcf7b7e9",
7421 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b2853485613200040000000001000000010b0a0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220013975ae356e6daf22a86a29f21c4f35aca82ed8f731a1103c60c74f5ed1c5aa02200350d4e5455cdbcacb7ccf174db5bed8286019e509a113f6b4c5e606ee12c9d783483045022100e69a29f78779577830e73f327073c93168896f1b89432124b7846f5def9cd9cb02204433db3697e6ed7ac89574ca066a749640e0c9e114ac2e0ee4545741fcf7b7e901008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6851b27568f7010000" },
7424 "304402205257017423644c7e831f30bc0c334eecfe66e9a6d2e92d157c5bece576b2be4f022047b21cf8e955e22b7471940563922d1a5852fb95459ca32905c7d46a19141664",
7425 "304402204f5de65a624e3f757adffb678bd887eb4e656538c5ea7044922f6ee3eed8a06202206ff6f7bfe73b565343cae76131ac658f1a9c60d3ca2343358cda60b9e35f94c8",
7426 "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" }
7429 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7430 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7431 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7433 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7434 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7435 "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", {
7438 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7439 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7440 "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" },
7443 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7444 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7445 "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" },
7448 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7449 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7450 "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" },
7453 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7454 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7455 "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" }
7458 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7459 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7460 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2060;
7462 test_commitment_with_anchors!("304402206208aeb34e404bd052ce3f298dfa832891c9d42caec99fe2a0d2832e9690b94302201b034bfcc6fa9faec667a9b7cbfe0b8d85e954aa239b66277887b5088aff08c3",
7463 "304402201ce37a44b95213358c20f44404d6db7a6083bea6f58de6c46547ae41a47c9f8202206db1d45be41373e92f90d346381febbea8c78671b28c153e30ad1db3441a9497",
7464 "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", {
7467 "30440220011f999016570bbab9f3125377d0f35096b4dbe155f97c20f71829ead2817d1602201f23f7e17f6928734601c5d8613431eed5c90aa41c3106e8c1cb02ce32aacb5d",
7468 "3044022017da96dfb0eb4061fa0162dc6fa6b2e07ecc5040ab5e6cb07be59838460b3e58022079371ffc95002cc1dc2891ec38198c9c25aca8164304fe114f1b55e2ffd1ddd5",
7469 "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" },
7472 "304402202d2d9681409b0a0987bd4a268ffeb112df85c4c988ac2a3a2475cb00a61912c302206aa4f4d1388b7d3282bc847871af3cca30766cc8f1064e3a41ec7e82221e10f7",
7473 "304402206426d67911aa6ff9b1cb147b093f3f65a37831a86d7c741d999afc0666e1773d022000bb71821650c70ea58d9bcdd03af736c41a5a8159d436c3ee0408a07394dcce",
7474 "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" },
7477 "3045022100f51cdaa525b7d4304548c642bb7945215eb5ae7d32874517cde67ca23ab0a12202206286d59e4b19926c6ac844be6f3ab8149a1ddb9c70f5026b7e83e40a6c08e6e1",
7478 "304502210091b16b1ac63b867e7a5ca0344f7b2aa1cdd49d4b72eac86a31e7ec6f069e20640220402bfb571ba3a9c49e3b0061c89303453803d0241059d899222aaac4799b5076",
7479 "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" },
7482 "304402202f058d99cb5a54f90773d43ba4e7a0089efd9f8269ef2da1b85d48a3e230555402205acc4bd6561830867d45cd7b84bba9fa35ad2b345016471c1737142bc99782c4",
7483 "304402202913f9cacea54efd2316cffa91219def9e0e111977216c1e76e9da80befab14f022000a9a69e8f37ebe4a39107ab50fab0dde537334588f8f412bbaca57b179b87a6",
7484 "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" }
7487 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7488 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7489 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7491 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7492 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7493 "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", {
7496 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7497 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7498 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff0000000000000000000174020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b014730440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e501008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
7501 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7502 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7503 "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" },
7506 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7507 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7508 "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" }
7511 // anchors: commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7512 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7513 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2061;
7515 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100a2faf2ad7e323b2a82e07dc40b6847207ca6ad7b089f2c21dea9a4d37e52d59d02204c9480ce0358eb51d92a4342355a97e272e3cc45f86c612a76a3fe32fc3c4cb4",
7516 "304402204ab07c659412dd2cd6043b1ad811ab215e901b6b5653e08cb3d2fe63d3e3dc57022031c7b3d130f9380ef09581f4f5a15cb6f359a2e0a597146b96c3533a26d6f4cd",
7517 "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", {
7520 "3045022100e10744f572a2cd1d787c969e894b792afaed21217ee0480df0112d2fa3ef96ea02202af4f66eb6beebc36d8e98719ed6b4be1b181659fcb561fc491d8cfebff3aa85",
7521 "3045022100c3dc3ea50a0ca20e350f97b50c52c5514717cfa36cb9600918caac5cb556842b022049af018d676dde0c8e28ecf325f3ff5c1594261c4f7511d501f9d62d0594d2a2",
7522 "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" },
7525 "3045022100e1f51fb72fec604b029b348a3bb6363454e1869f5b1e24fd736f860c8039f8070220030a2c90186437d8c9b47d4897798c024521b1274991c4cdc125970b346094b1",
7526 "3045022100ec7ade6037e531629f24390ca9713782a04d648065d17fbe6b015981cdb296c202202d61049a6ecba2fb5314f3edcda2361cad187a89bea6e5d15185354d80c0c085",
7527 "02000000000101cf32732fe2d1387ed4e2335f69ddd3c0f337dabc03269e742531f89d35e161d1030000000001000000015c060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e1f51fb72fec604b029b348a3bb6363454e1869f5b1e24fd736f860c8039f8070220030a2c90186437d8c9b47d4897798c024521b1274991c4cdc125970b346094b183483045022100ec7ade6037e531629f24390ca9713782a04d648065d17fbe6b015981cdb296c202202d61049a6ecba2fb5314f3edcda2361cad187a89bea6e5d15185354d80c0c08501008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6851b27568f7010000" },
7530 "304402203479f81a1d83c516957679dc98bf91d35deada967739a8e3869e3e8db08246130220053c8e154b97e3019048dcec3d51bfaf396f36861fbda6d33f0e2a57155c8b9f",
7531 "3045022100a558eb5caa04e35a4417c1f0123ac12eec5f6badee28f5764dc6b69486e594f802201589b12784e242f205832d2d032149bd4e79433ec304c05394241fc7dcba5a71",
7532 "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" }
7535 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7536 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7537 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7539 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7540 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7541 "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", {
7544 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7545 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7546 "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" },
7549 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7550 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7551 "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" },
7554 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7555 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7556 "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" }
7559 // anchors: commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7560 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7561 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2184;
7563 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022013d326f80ff7607cf366c823fcbbcb7a2b10322484825f151e6c4c756af24b8f02201ba05b9d8beb7cea2947f9f4d9e03f90435e93db2dd48b32eb9ca3f3dd042c79",
7564 "30440220555c05261f72c5b4702d5c83a608630822b473048724b08640d6e75e345094250220448950b74a96a56963928ba5db8b457661a742c855e69d239b3b6ab73de307a3",
7565 "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", {
7568 "304402202e03ba1390998b3487e9a7fefcb66814c09abea0ef1bcc915dbaefbcf310569a02206bd10493a105ac69048e9bcedcb8e3301ef81b55018d911a4afd297297f98d30",
7569 "304402200c3952ca04be0c60dcc0b7873a0829f560607524943554ae4a27d8d967166199022021a68657b88e22f9bf9ac6065be412685aff643d17049f04f2e99e86197dabb1",
7570 "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" },
7573 "304402201f8a6adda2403bc400c919ea69d72d315337291e00d02cde085ea32953dbc50002202d65230da98df7af8ebefd2b60b457d0945232988ee2d7460a94a77d414a9acc",
7574 "3045022100ea69c9273b8914ac62b5b7082d6ac1da2b7b065ebf2ef3cd6403f5305ce3f26802203d98736ea97638895a898dfcc5ee0d0c55eb496b3964df0bb25d223688ea8b87",
7575 "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" },
7578 "3045022100ea6e4c9b8f56dd9cf5799492a201cdd65b8bc9bc089c3cff34107896ae313f90022034760f7760975cc68e8917a7f62894e25583da7be11af557c4fc402661d0cbf8",
7579 "30440220717012f2f7ef6cac590aaf66c2109132c93ffba245959ac62d82e394ba80191302203f00fd9cb37c92c6b0ad4b33e62c3e55b04e5c2cfa0adcca5a9bc49774eeca8a",
7580 "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" }
7583 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7584 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7585 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7587 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7588 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7589 "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", {
7592 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7593 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7594 "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" },
7597 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
7598 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
7599 "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" }
7602 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7603 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7604 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
7606 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
7607 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
7608 "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", {
7611 "304502210094480e38afb41d10fae299224872f19c53abe23c7033a1c0642c48713e7863a10220726dd9456407682667dc4bd9c66975acb3744961770b5002f7eb9c0df9ef2f3e",
7612 "304402203148dac61513dc0361738cba30cb341a1e580f8acd5ab0149bf65bd670688cf002207e5d9a0fcbbea2c263bc714fa9e9c44d7f582ea447f366119fc614a23de32f1f",
7613 "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" },
7616 "304402200dbde868dbc20c6a2433fe8979ba5e3f966b1c2d1aeb615f1c42e9c938b3495402202eec5f663c8b601c2061c1453d35de22597c137d1907a2feaf714d551035cb6e",
7617 "3045022100b896bded41d7feac7af25c19e35c53037c53b50e73cfd01eb4ba139c7fdf231602203a3be049d3d89396c4dc766d82ce31e237da8bc3a93e2c7d35992d1932d9cfeb",
7618 "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" }
7621 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7622 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7623 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
7625 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
7626 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
7627 "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", {
7630 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
7631 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
7632 "020000000001018db483bff65c70ee71d8282aeec5a880e2e2b39e45772bda5460403095c62e3f0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb890147304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
7635 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
7636 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
7637 "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" }
7640 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7641 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7642 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3686;
7644 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220784485cf7a0ad7979daf2c858ffdaf5298d0020cea7aea466843e7948223bd9902206031b81d25e02a178c64e62f843577fdcdfc7a1decbbfb54cd895de692df85ca",
7645 "3045022100c268496aad5c3f97f25cf41c1ba5483a12982de29b222051b6de3daa2229413b02207f3c82d77a2c14f0096ed9bb4c34649483bb20fa71f819f71af44de6593e8bb2",
7646 "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", {
7649 "304402202cfe6618926ca9f1574f8c4659b425e9790b4677ba2248d77901290806130ffe02204ab37bb0287abcdb8b750b018d41a09effe37cb65ff801fa70d3f1a416599841",
7650 "3044022030b318139715e3b34f19be852cc01c1c0e1599e8b926a73df2bfb70dd186ddee022062a2b7398aed9f563b4014da04a1a99debd0ff663ceece68a547df5982dc2d72",
7651 "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" },
7654 "30440220687af8544d335376620a6f4b5412bfd0da48de047c1785674f26e669d4a3ff82022058591c1e3a6c50017427d38a8f756eb685bdab88ec73838eed3530048861f9d5",
7655 "30440220109f1a62b5a13d28d5b7634dd7693b1d5994eb404c4bb4a9a80aa540d3984d170220307251107ff8499a23e99abce7dda4f1c707c98abddb9405a83de0081cde8ace",
7656 "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" }
7659 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7660 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7661 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
7663 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
7664 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
7665 "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", {
7668 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
7669 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
7670 "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" }
7673 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7674 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7675 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
7677 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
7678 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
7679 "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", {
7682 "3045022100b287bb8e079a62dcb3aaa8b6c67c0f434a87ebf64ab0bcfb2fc14b55576b859f02206d37c2eb5fd04cfc9eb0534c76a28a98da251b84a931377cce307af39dfaed74",
7683 "3045022100a497c64faea286ec4221f48628086dc6403fd7b60a23c4176e8ebbca15ae70dc0220754e20e968e96cf6421fd2a672c8c26d3bc6e19218cfc8fc2aa51fce026c14b1",
7684 "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" }
7687 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7688 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7689 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
7691 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
7692 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
7693 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8003a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484ae8f6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c1901483045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c9524401475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7696 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
7697 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
7698 "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" }
7701 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7702 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7703 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4893;
7705 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100a8771147109e4d3f44a5976c3c3de98732bbb77308d21444dbe0d76faf06480e02200b4e916e850c3d1f918de87bbbbb07843ffea1d4658dfe060b6f9ccd96d34be8",
7706 "30440220086288faceab47461eb2d808e9e9b0cb3ffc24a03c2f18db7198247d38f10e58022031d1c2782a58c8c6ce187d0019eb47a83babdf3040e2caff299ab48f7e12b1fa",
7707 "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", {
7710 "30450221008db80f8531104820b3e894492b4463f074f965b542e1b5c153ddfb108a5ea642022030b203d857a2b3581c2087a7bf17c95d04fadc1c6cdae88c620477f2dccb1ee4",
7711 "3045022100e5fbae857c47dbfc050a05924bd449fc9804798bd6442002c578437dc34450810220296589bc387645512345299e307116aaac4ce9fc752abcd1936b802d03526312",
7712 "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" }
7715 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7716 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7717 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
7719 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
7720 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
7721 "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", {});
7723 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7724 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7725 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
7727 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
7728 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
7729 "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", {});
7731 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7732 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7733 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
7735 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
7736 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
7737 "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", {});
7739 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7740 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7741 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
7743 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7744 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7745 "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", {});
7747 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7748 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7749 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
7751 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
7752 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
7753 "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", {});
7755 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
7756 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7757 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
7759 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7760 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7761 "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", {});
7763 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
7764 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
7765 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
7766 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
7767 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7768 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7770 amount_msat: 2000000,
7772 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7773 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7775 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7778 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
7779 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7780 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7782 amount_msat: 5000000,
7784 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7785 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7786 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7788 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7791 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7792 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7794 amount_msat: 5000000,
7796 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7797 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7798 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7800 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7804 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
7805 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
7806 "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", {
7809 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
7810 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
7811 "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" },
7813 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
7814 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
7815 "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" },
7817 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
7818 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
7819 "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" }
7822 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100c592f6b80d35b4f5d1e3bc9788f51141a0065be6013bad53a1977f7c444651660220278ac06ead9016bfb8dc476f186eabace2b02793b2f308442f5b0d5f24a68948",
7823 "3045022100c37ac4fc8538677631230c4b286f36b6f54c51fb4b34ef0bd0ba219ba47452630220278e09a745454ea380f3694392ed113762c68dd209b48360f547541088be9e45",
7824 "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", {
7827 "304402202060a5acb12105e92f27d7b86e6caf1e003d9d82068338e5a8a9a0d14cba11260220030ca4dba8fad24a2e395906220c991eccd5369bc4b0f216d217b5f86d1fc61d",
7828 "3044022044f5425fe630fa614f349f55642e4a0b76e2583054b21543821660d9e8f3735702207f70424835b541874ca8bf0443cca4028afa2f6c03a17b0688df85d5c44eeefc",
7829 "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" },
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7832 "3045022100ad0236a78dbd029d3a8f583f7f82ee62892273d45303d00ef5a03fecf8903a36022004b2db33f8ff2f4a08ca6127c9cbfd9144c691a2feb9287e36ae6bc7c83c5a5f",
7833 "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" },
7835 "304402205eebc78d8ae6a36c27ef80172359eb757fb18e99fa75b28c37ffe3444b967bc7022060a01c33398d4d8244c42c762fb699e9f61c1f034ff976df2c94350c5a6032a7",
7836 "3045022100ad3fd523594e1b876316401774a30ee6c48bb7fa0efd768bf9a2d022201311ff02207bed627ed8e01041137f03dbaf03c836970be27a4d50f69d90cf1282ff2815e3",
7837 "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" }
7842 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
7843 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
7845 let mut seed = [0; 32];
7846 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
7847 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
7848 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
7850 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
7851 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
7852 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
7854 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
7855 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
7857 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
7858 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
7860 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
7861 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
7862 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
7866 fn test_key_derivation() {
7867 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
7868 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7870 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7871 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7873 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
7874 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
7876 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7877 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
7879 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
7880 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
7882 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
7883 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
7885 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
7886 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
7888 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
7889 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
7893 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
7894 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7895 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7896 let seed = [42; 32];
7897 let network = Network::Testnet;
7898 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7899 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7901 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7902 let config = UserConfig::default();
7903 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider,
7904 node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7906 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
7907 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
7909 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7910 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
7911 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7912 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider,
7913 node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7914 assert!(res.is_ok());