1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
33 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
36 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
37 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
38 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
41 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
42 // construct one themselves.
43 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
44 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
45 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
46 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
47 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
48 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
49 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
50 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
53 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
54 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
57 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
58 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
59 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, OfferBuilder};
60 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
61 use crate::offers::refund::RefundBuilder;
62 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
63 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
64 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
65 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
66 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
67 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
68 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
69 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
71 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
74 use crate::prelude::*;
76 use core::cell::RefCell;
78 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
79 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
80 use core::time::Duration;
83 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
84 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
85 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
87 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
89 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
90 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
91 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
93 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
94 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
95 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
96 // before we forward it.
98 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
99 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
100 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
101 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
102 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
104 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
105 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
107 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
108 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
109 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
110 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
113 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
114 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
115 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
116 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
117 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
118 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
121 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
122 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
123 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
124 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
125 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
126 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
127 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
131 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
132 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
133 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
134 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
135 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
137 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
138 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
139 /// may overshoot this in either case)
140 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
141 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
142 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
143 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
144 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
147 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
148 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
149 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
150 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
153 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
154 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
155 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
156 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
157 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
160 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
161 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
163 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
164 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
165 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
168 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
169 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
171 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
172 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
175 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
176 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
179 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
183 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
184 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
185 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
186 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
187 short_channel_id: u64,
188 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
190 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
191 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
193 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
194 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
199 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
201 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
202 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
203 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
205 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
206 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
209 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
210 struct ClaimableHTLC {
211 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
213 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
215 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
216 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
217 sender_intended_value: u64,
218 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
220 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
221 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
222 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
223 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
225 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
226 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
229 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
230 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
231 events::ClaimedHTLC {
232 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
233 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
234 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
235 value_msat: val.value,
240 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
241 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
243 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
244 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
245 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
248 /// Number of bytes in the id.
249 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
252 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
253 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
258 impl Readable for PaymentId {
259 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
260 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
265 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
266 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
267 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
271 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
273 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
274 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
275 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
277 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
278 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
283 impl Readable for InterceptId {
284 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
285 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
290 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
291 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
292 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
293 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
294 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
297 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
299 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
300 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
301 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
303 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
304 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
308 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
309 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
310 (0, short_channel_id, required),
311 (2, htlc_id, required),
313 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
314 (0, session_priv, required),
319 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
320 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
321 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
322 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
323 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
326 session_priv: SecretKey,
327 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
328 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
329 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
330 payment_id: PaymentId,
333 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
334 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
335 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
337 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
339 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
341 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
344 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
345 payment_id.hash(hasher);
346 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
352 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
354 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
355 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
356 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
357 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
358 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
359 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
363 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
364 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
365 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
366 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
367 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
368 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
370 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
376 struct InboundOnionErr {
382 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
383 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
385 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
386 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
387 pub enum FailureCode {
388 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
389 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
390 TemporaryNodeFailure,
391 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
392 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
393 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
394 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
395 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
396 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
397 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
398 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
399 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
400 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
402 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
403 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
404 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
407 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
408 fn into(self) -> u16 {
410 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
411 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
412 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
413 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
418 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
419 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
420 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
421 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
422 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
424 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
425 err: msgs::LightningError,
426 chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
427 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
428 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
430 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
432 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
434 err: LightningError {
436 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
437 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
444 shutdown_finish: None,
445 channel_capacity: None,
449 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
450 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
453 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
454 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
455 let action = if let (Some(_), ..) = &shutdown_res {
456 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
457 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
458 // commitment upon reconnecting.
459 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
461 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
464 err: LightningError { err, action },
465 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
466 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
467 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
471 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
474 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
476 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
477 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
481 log_level: Level::Warn,
484 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
486 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
488 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
490 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
491 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
499 shutdown_finish: None,
500 channel_capacity: None,
504 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
505 self.chan_id.is_some()
509 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
510 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
511 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
512 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
513 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
515 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
516 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
517 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
518 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
519 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
520 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
521 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
523 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
527 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
528 struct ClaimingPayment {
530 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
531 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
532 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
533 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
535 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
536 (0, amount_msat, required),
537 (2, payment_purpose, required),
538 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
539 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
540 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
543 struct ClaimablePayment {
544 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
545 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
546 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
549 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
550 struct ClaimablePayments {
551 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
552 /// failed/claimed by the user.
554 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
555 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
557 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
558 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
559 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
561 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
562 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
563 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
564 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
567 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
568 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
569 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
570 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
571 enum BackgroundEvent {
572 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
573 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
574 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
575 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
577 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
578 /// are regenerated on startup.
579 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
580 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
581 /// channel to continue normal operation.
583 /// In general this should be used rather than
584 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
585 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
586 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
588 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
589 /// are regenerated on startup.
590 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
591 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
592 funding_txo: OutPoint,
593 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
595 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
596 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
598 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
599 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
600 channel_id: ChannelId,
605 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
606 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
607 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
608 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
609 /// event can be generated.
610 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
611 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
612 /// operation of another channel.
614 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
615 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
616 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
617 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
619 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
620 event: events::Event,
621 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
625 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
626 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
627 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
628 (0, event, upgradable_required),
629 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
630 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
631 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
632 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
633 // downgrades to prior versions.
634 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
638 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
639 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
640 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
641 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
642 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
645 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
646 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
647 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
648 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
652 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
653 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
654 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
655 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
656 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
657 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
659 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
660 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
661 channel_id: ChannelId,
662 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
667 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
668 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
669 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
670 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
671 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
676 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
677 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
681 /// State we hold per-peer.
682 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
683 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
685 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
686 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
687 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
689 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
690 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
691 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
692 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
693 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
694 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
695 latest_features: InitFeatures,
696 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
697 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
698 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
699 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
700 /// user but which have not yet completed.
702 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
703 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
704 /// for a missing channel.
705 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
706 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
707 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
709 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
710 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
711 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
712 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
714 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
715 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
716 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
717 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
718 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
719 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
720 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
721 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
722 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
723 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
724 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
725 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
726 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
727 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
728 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
732 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
733 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
734 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
735 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
736 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
737 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
740 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
741 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
742 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
745 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
746 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
747 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
750 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
751 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
752 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
753 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
757 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
758 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
759 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
760 /// The original OpenChannel message.
761 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
762 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
763 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
766 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
767 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
768 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
770 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
771 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
773 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
776 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
777 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
778 struct PendingInboundPayment {
779 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
780 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
781 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
782 /// this payment being removed.
784 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
785 user_payment_id: u64,
786 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
787 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
788 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
791 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
792 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
793 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
794 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
795 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
796 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
797 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
798 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
800 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
801 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
809 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
811 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
812 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
813 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
818 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
819 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
820 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
821 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
822 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
823 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
824 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
825 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
826 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
828 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
829 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
838 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
840 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
841 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
842 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
847 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
849 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
851 pub trait AChannelManager {
852 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
853 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
854 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
855 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
856 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
857 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
858 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
859 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
860 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
861 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
862 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
863 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
864 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
865 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
866 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
867 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
868 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
869 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
870 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
871 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
872 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
873 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
874 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
875 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
876 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
877 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
878 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
879 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
880 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
881 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
882 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
883 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
884 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
885 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
886 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
887 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
890 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
891 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
893 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
894 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
895 ES::Target: EntropySource,
896 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
897 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
898 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
902 type Watch = M::Target;
904 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
906 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
908 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
910 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
911 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
913 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
915 type Router = R::Target;
917 type Logger = L::Target;
919 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
922 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
923 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
925 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
926 /// to individual Channels.
928 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
929 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
930 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
931 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
933 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
934 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
935 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
936 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
937 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
938 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
939 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
940 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
941 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
943 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
944 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
945 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
947 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
948 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
949 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
950 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
951 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
953 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
954 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
955 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
956 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
958 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
959 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
960 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
962 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
963 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
964 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
965 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
966 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
968 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
969 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
970 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
971 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
972 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
973 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
974 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
975 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
978 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
979 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
980 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
981 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
982 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
986 // `total_consistency_lock`
988 // |__`forward_htlcs`
990 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
992 // |__`per_peer_state`
994 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
996 // | |__`claimable_payments`
998 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1000 // | |__`peer_state`
1002 // | |__`id_to_peer`
1004 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
1006 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1008 // | |__`best_block`
1010 // | |__`pending_events`
1012 // | |__`pending_background_events`
1014 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1016 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1017 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1018 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1019 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1020 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1021 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1025 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1026 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1027 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1033 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1035 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1037 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1038 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1040 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1041 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1042 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1043 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1045 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1046 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1048 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1049 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1050 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1051 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1052 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1053 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1054 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1055 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1057 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1059 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1060 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1062 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1064 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1065 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1066 /// and via the classic SCID.
1068 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1069 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1071 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1073 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1075 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1076 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1077 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1079 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1080 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1082 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1083 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1085 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1086 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1088 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1089 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1090 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1091 /// active channel list on load.
1093 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1094 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1096 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1098 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1099 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1100 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1102 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1103 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1104 /// the handling of the events.
1106 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1107 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1110 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1111 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1112 /// would break backwards compatability.
1113 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1114 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1115 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1117 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1118 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1120 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1122 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1123 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1124 /// confirmation depth.
1126 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1127 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1128 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1130 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1132 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1134 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1136 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1138 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1140 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1141 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1142 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1144 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1145 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1147 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1148 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1149 /// keeping additional state.
1150 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1152 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1153 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1154 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1155 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1157 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1158 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1160 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1161 /// are currently open with that peer.
1163 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1164 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1167 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1169 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1170 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1171 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1172 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1173 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1175 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1176 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1177 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1178 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1179 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1181 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1182 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1184 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1185 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1186 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1187 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1188 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1190 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1191 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1193 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1194 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1195 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1196 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1197 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1199 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1201 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1203 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1204 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1205 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1206 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1207 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1208 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1209 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1210 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1211 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1212 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1213 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1215 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1216 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1217 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1219 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1221 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1222 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1226 signer_provider: SP,
1231 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1233 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1234 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1235 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1236 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1237 pub struct ChainParameters {
1238 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1239 pub network: Network,
1241 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1243 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1244 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1247 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1251 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1252 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1255 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1256 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1257 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1258 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1259 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1260 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1262 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1263 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1264 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1265 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1266 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1267 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1269 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1270 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1273 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1274 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1275 /// events to handle.
1277 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1278 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1280 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1281 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1284 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1285 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1286 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1287 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1289 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1290 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1291 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1292 should_persist: move || {
1293 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1294 // processing and return that.
1295 let notify = persist_check();
1296 match (notify, force_notify) {
1297 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1298 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1299 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1300 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1301 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1304 _read_guard: read_guard,
1308 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1309 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1310 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1311 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1312 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1313 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1315 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1316 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1317 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1318 should_persist: persist_check,
1319 _read_guard: read_guard,
1324 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1325 fn drop(&mut self) {
1326 match (self.should_persist)() {
1327 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1328 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1329 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1331 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1332 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1333 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1338 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1339 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1341 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1343 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1344 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1345 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1346 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1347 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1349 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1350 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1352 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1354 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1355 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1356 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1357 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1358 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1359 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1360 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1361 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1362 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1363 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1364 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1365 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1366 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1368 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1369 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1371 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1372 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1373 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1374 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1376 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1377 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1378 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1379 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1380 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1381 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1384 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1386 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1387 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1390 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1392 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1393 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1395 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1396 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1397 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1399 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1400 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1401 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1403 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1404 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1405 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1406 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1408 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1409 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1410 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1412 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1413 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1414 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1416 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1417 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1418 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1419 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1420 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1421 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1422 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1423 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1424 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1425 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1426 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1429 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1430 /// to better separate parameters.
1431 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1432 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1433 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1434 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1435 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1436 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1437 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1438 pub features: InitFeatures,
1439 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1440 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1441 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1443 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1445 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1446 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1447 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1448 /// payments to us through this channel.
1449 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1450 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1451 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1452 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1453 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1454 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1455 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1458 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1459 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1460 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1461 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1462 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1463 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1464 /// lifetime of the channel.
1465 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1466 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1467 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1468 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1469 /// our counterparty already.
1471 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1472 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1473 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1474 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1476 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1477 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1478 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1479 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1481 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1482 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1484 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1485 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1487 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1488 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1489 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1490 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1491 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1492 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1493 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1494 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1495 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1498 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1500 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1501 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1502 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1503 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1504 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1505 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1506 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1508 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1509 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1511 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1512 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1513 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1514 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1515 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1516 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1517 /// this value on chain.
1519 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1521 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1523 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1524 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1525 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1526 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1527 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1528 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1529 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1531 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1532 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1533 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1534 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1535 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1536 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1538 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1539 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1540 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1541 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1542 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1544 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1545 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1546 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1547 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1549 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1550 pub balance_msat: u64,
1551 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1552 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1553 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1554 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1556 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1558 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1559 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1560 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1561 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1562 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1563 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1564 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1565 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1567 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1568 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1569 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1570 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1571 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1572 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1573 /// route which is valid.
1574 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1575 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1576 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1577 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1578 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1579 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1581 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1582 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1583 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1584 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1585 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1586 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1587 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1588 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1589 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1591 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1593 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1594 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1595 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1596 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1597 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1599 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1600 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1601 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1602 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1603 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1604 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1605 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1607 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1608 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1609 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1610 pub is_outbound: bool,
1611 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1612 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1613 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1614 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1615 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1617 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1618 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1619 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1620 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1621 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1622 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1623 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1625 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1626 pub is_usable: bool,
1627 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1628 pub is_public: bool,
1629 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1630 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1631 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1632 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1633 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1634 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1636 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1637 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1640 impl ChannelDetails {
1641 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1642 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1643 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1645 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1646 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1647 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1648 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1651 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1652 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1653 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1655 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1656 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1657 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1658 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1661 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1662 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1663 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1666 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1667 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1669 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1670 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1671 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1673 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1674 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1675 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1676 features: latest_features,
1677 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1678 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1679 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1680 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1681 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1682 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1683 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1684 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1685 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1686 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1688 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1689 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1690 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1691 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1692 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1693 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1694 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1695 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1696 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1697 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1698 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1699 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1700 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1701 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1702 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1703 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1704 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1705 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1706 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1707 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1708 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1709 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1710 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1711 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1712 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1713 config: Some(context.config()),
1714 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1719 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1720 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1721 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1722 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1723 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1724 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1725 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1726 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1727 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1729 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1731 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1732 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1734 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1735 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1736 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1737 /// to drop the channel.
1741 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1742 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1743 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1744 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1745 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1747 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1748 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1749 payment_id: PaymentId,
1751 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1753 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1754 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1755 payment_id: PaymentId,
1756 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1758 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1759 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1760 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1763 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1764 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1765 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1767 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1768 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1769 payment_id: PaymentId,
1770 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1771 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1772 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1774 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1775 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1776 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1778 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1779 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1780 payment_id: PaymentId,
1781 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1782 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1786 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1788 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1790 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1791 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1792 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1793 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1795 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1796 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1797 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1800 macro_rules! handle_error {
1801 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1802 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1803 // entering the macro.
1804 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1805 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1809 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1810 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1812 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1813 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1814 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1815 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1819 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1820 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1821 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1822 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1823 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1824 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1829 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1830 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1832 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1833 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1834 action: err.action.clone()
1838 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1839 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1840 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1841 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1842 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1846 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1851 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1854 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1855 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1856 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1862 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1863 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1864 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1865 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1866 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1867 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1869 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1870 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1871 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1872 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1873 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1875 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1876 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1878 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1882 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1883 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1884 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1886 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1887 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1889 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1890 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1892 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1893 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1894 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1895 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1896 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1897 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1899 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1900 shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1904 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1905 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1907 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1908 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
1910 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1911 match $channel_phase {
1912 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
1913 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
1915 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
1916 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1918 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
1919 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1925 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
1926 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1930 let key = *$entry.key();
1931 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1933 $entry.remove_entry();
1941 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
1942 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1946 let key = *$entry.key();
1947 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1949 $entry.remove_entry();
1957 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
1958 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1960 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1961 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
1967 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1968 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1969 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1970 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1971 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1973 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1974 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1975 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1976 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1977 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1978 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1979 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1980 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1981 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1982 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1987 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1988 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1989 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1990 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1991 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1992 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1993 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1994 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1995 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1997 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2002 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2003 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2004 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2005 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2006 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2007 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2008 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2009 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2010 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2012 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2017 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2018 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2019 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
2020 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2021 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2022 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2023 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2024 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2025 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2026 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2027 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2029 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2030 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2031 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2037 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2038 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2040 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2041 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2042 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2043 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2044 updates.announcement_sigs);
2045 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2046 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2049 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2050 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2051 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2052 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2054 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2055 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2056 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2057 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2058 let mut batch_completed = false;
2059 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2060 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2061 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2062 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2064 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2065 channel_state.2 = true;
2067 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2069 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2071 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2074 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2075 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2076 if batch_completed {
2077 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2078 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2079 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2080 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2081 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2082 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2083 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2084 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2085 chan.set_batch_ready();
2086 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2087 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2091 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2092 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2093 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2098 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2100 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2101 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2103 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2104 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2105 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2106 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2111 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2112 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2113 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2115 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2116 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2117 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err_str);
2118 panic!("{}", err_str);
2120 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2121 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2122 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2125 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2131 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2132 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2133 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2135 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2136 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2137 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2138 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2139 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2140 // filter for uniqueness here.
2141 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2142 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2143 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2144 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2146 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2147 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2149 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2150 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2151 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2157 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2158 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2159 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2160 while !processed_all_events {
2161 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2168 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2169 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2170 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2172 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2173 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2174 result = $self.process_background_events();
2176 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2177 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2178 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2179 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2183 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2184 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2185 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2186 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2189 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2191 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2192 $event_to_handle = event;
2194 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2195 post_event_actions.push(action);
2200 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2201 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2202 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2203 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2204 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2205 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2208 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2209 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2210 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2211 processed_all_events = false;
2215 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2216 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2217 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2219 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2220 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2221 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2227 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2229 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2230 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2231 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2232 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2233 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2234 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2238 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2240 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2242 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2243 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2245 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2247 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2248 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2249 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2252 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2253 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2254 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2256 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2257 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2258 current_timestamp: u32,
2260 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2261 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2262 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2263 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2265 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2266 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2267 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2272 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2274 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2275 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2276 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2277 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2278 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2279 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2280 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2281 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2283 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2286 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2287 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2289 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2291 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2293 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2295 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2296 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2297 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2298 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2299 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2300 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2301 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2302 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2312 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2313 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2314 &self.default_configuration
2317 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2318 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2319 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2322 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2323 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2325 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2327 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2331 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2336 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2338 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2339 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2340 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2341 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2342 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2344 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2345 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2347 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2348 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2349 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2351 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2352 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2353 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2355 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2356 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2357 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2358 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2359 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2360 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2362 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2363 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2364 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2365 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2366 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2367 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2370 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2371 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2372 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2374 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2376 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2377 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2379 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2381 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2382 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2383 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2384 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2385 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2386 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2390 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2395 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2397 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2398 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2399 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2401 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2403 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2406 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2409 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2410 node_id: their_network_key,
2413 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2416 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2417 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2418 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2419 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2420 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2421 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2422 // the same channel.
2423 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2425 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2426 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2427 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2428 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2429 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2430 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2431 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2432 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2433 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2437 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2438 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2439 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2447 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2448 /// more information.
2449 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2450 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2451 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2452 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2453 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2454 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2455 // the same channel.
2456 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2458 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2459 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2460 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2461 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2462 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2463 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2464 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2465 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2473 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2474 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2476 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2477 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2479 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2480 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2481 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2482 // really wanted anyway.
2483 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2486 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2487 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2488 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2489 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2491 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2492 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2493 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2494 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2495 let context_to_details = |context| {
2496 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2498 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2500 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2501 .map(context_to_details)
2507 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2508 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2510 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2511 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2512 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2514 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2515 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2516 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2517 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2518 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2519 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2521 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2522 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2523 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2525 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2526 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2527 payment_id: *payment_id,
2528 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2529 total_msat: *total_msat,
2532 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2533 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2535 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2536 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2538 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2543 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2544 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2545 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2546 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2547 Some(transaction) => {
2548 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2549 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2554 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2555 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2556 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2557 reason: closure_reason,
2558 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2559 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2563 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2564 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2566 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2567 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2569 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2571 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2572 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2574 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2575 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2577 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2578 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2579 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2580 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2581 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2582 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2583 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2584 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2585 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2587 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2588 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2589 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2590 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2591 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2595 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2596 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2598 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2599 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2600 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2601 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2605 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2606 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2607 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2608 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2612 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2613 shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
2619 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2620 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2621 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2623 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2624 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2625 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2626 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2631 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2632 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2633 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2634 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2637 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2638 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2644 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2645 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2646 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2648 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2649 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2651 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2652 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2653 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2654 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2656 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2658 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2659 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2660 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2663 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2664 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2665 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2666 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2667 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2668 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2671 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2672 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2673 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2675 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2676 /// the channel being closed or not:
2677 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2678 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2679 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2680 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2681 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2682 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2683 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2685 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2686 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2687 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2688 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2690 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2692 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2693 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2694 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2697 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2698 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2699 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2700 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2701 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2702 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2705 fn finish_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2706 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2707 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2708 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2709 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2712 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs, unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid) = shutdown_res;
2713 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2714 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2715 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2716 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2717 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2718 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2720 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2721 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2722 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2723 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2724 // ignore the result here.
2725 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2727 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2728 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2729 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2730 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2731 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2732 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2733 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2734 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2735 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2736 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2737 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2738 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
2739 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2742 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2745 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2746 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2749 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2750 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2754 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2755 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2756 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2757 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2758 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2759 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2760 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2761 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2762 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2763 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2764 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2766 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2768 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2769 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2770 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2771 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2772 mem::drop(peer_state);
2773 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2775 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2776 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2777 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2779 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2780 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2781 // Unfunded channel has no update
2782 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2785 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2786 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2787 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2788 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2790 (None, *peer_node_id)
2792 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2795 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2796 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2797 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2798 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2799 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2800 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2801 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2802 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2803 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2809 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2812 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2813 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2814 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2815 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2816 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2817 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2818 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2819 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2820 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2821 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2822 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2823 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2834 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2835 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2836 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2838 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2839 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2840 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2843 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2844 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2845 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2847 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2848 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2849 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2850 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2851 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2854 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2855 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2856 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2857 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2858 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2862 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2863 /// local transaction(s).
2864 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2865 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2866 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2870 fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2871 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2872 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2873 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2874 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2875 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2876 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2878 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2879 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2883 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2884 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2885 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2886 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } =>
2887 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2888 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2889 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2890 err_data: Vec::new(),
2894 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2895 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2896 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2899 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2900 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2901 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2902 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2903 outgoing_cltv_value,
2904 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2908 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2909 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2910 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2911 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2912 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2913 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2914 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2915 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2917 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2918 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive {
2919 amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, ..
2921 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat };
2922 (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None)
2924 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => {
2925 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2926 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2927 err_data: Vec::new(),
2928 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2932 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2933 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2934 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2935 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2937 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2940 // final_expiry_too_soon
2941 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2942 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2944 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2945 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2946 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2947 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2948 if cltv_expiry <= current_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 {
2949 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2950 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2951 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2952 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2953 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2954 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2957 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2958 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2959 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2961 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2963 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2964 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2968 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2969 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2970 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2971 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2972 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2973 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2974 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2975 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2976 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2977 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2978 err_data: Vec::new(),
2979 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2982 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2983 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2984 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2985 err_data: Vec::new(),
2986 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2989 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2993 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2996 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2997 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3000 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
3001 phantom_shared_secret,
3005 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3006 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
3007 err_data: Vec::new(),
3008 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
3011 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3014 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
3015 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
3016 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
3017 outgoing_cltv_value,
3018 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
3022 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3023 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
3024 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
3025 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
3026 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
3028 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3029 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3030 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3031 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3032 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
3033 failure_code: $err_code,
3039 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
3040 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
3043 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
3044 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
3045 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3047 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
3048 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
3049 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
3050 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
3051 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
3052 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
3053 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
3054 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
3056 macro_rules! return_err {
3057 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3059 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3060 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3061 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3062 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3063 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3064 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3070 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
3071 shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac,
3072 msg.payment_hash, &self.node_signer
3075 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3076 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
3078 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3079 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
3082 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
3083 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3084 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
3085 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
3088 let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
3089 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
3090 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk))
3092 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
3093 // inbound channel's state.
3094 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3095 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } |
3096 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } =>
3098 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
3102 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3103 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3104 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3105 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3106 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3107 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3108 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3109 // phantom or an intercept.
3110 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3111 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3112 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3116 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3119 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3121 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3122 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3123 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3124 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3125 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3127 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3128 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3129 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3130 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3133 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3134 // have no consistency guarantees.
3135 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3139 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3140 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3141 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3142 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3143 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3145 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3146 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3147 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3148 // we don't have the channel here.
3149 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3151 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3153 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3154 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3155 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3156 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3157 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3158 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3159 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3160 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3161 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3162 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3163 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3165 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3168 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3169 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3171 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3172 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3176 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
3177 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3178 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3179 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3181 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
3188 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3189 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
3190 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
3191 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
3192 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
3193 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3195 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3196 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3198 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3199 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3200 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3201 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3202 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3203 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3204 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3205 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3206 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3207 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3213 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3214 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3215 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3216 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3218 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3219 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3221 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3222 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3223 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3225 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3226 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3227 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3228 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3229 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3230 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3231 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3235 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3237 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3240 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3241 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3242 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3243 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3244 macro_rules! return_err {
3245 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3247 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3248 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3249 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3250 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3251 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3252 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3258 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3260 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3261 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3264 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3265 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3266 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3267 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3268 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3270 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3273 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3274 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3275 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3276 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3277 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3283 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3284 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3285 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3287 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3288 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3289 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3291 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3292 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3293 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3294 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3295 return Err(LightningError {
3296 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3297 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3300 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3301 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3303 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3304 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3307 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3308 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3309 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3310 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3312 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3313 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3314 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3316 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3317 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3318 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3319 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3320 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3321 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3325 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3328 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3329 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3330 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3332 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3333 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3334 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3335 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3336 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3339 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3340 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3342 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3343 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3344 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3345 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3346 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3347 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3348 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3349 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3351 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3352 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3353 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3355 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3357 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3364 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3365 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3366 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3367 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3372 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3373 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3374 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3377 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3378 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3380 log_trace!(self.logger,
3381 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3382 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3383 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3384 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3386 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3387 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3388 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3390 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3391 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3393 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3394 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3395 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3396 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3399 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3400 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3401 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3402 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3403 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3404 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3405 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3406 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3407 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3408 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3410 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3411 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3412 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3414 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3415 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3417 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3418 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3419 Some(monitor_update) => {
3420 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3422 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3423 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3424 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3425 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3426 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3427 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3428 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3436 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3439 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3440 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3441 // `channel_by_id` map.
3442 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3443 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3448 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3449 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3451 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3456 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3458 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3459 /// fields for more info.
3461 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3462 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3464 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3466 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3467 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3468 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3469 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3470 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3472 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3473 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3474 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3475 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3476 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3478 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3479 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3480 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3481 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3483 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3485 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3486 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3487 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3489 /// In general, a path may raise:
3490 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3491 /// node public key) is specified.
3492 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3493 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3494 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3495 /// relevant updates.
3497 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3498 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3499 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3501 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3502 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3503 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3504 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3505 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3506 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3507 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3508 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3509 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3510 self.pending_outbound_payments
3511 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3512 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3513 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3516 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3517 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3518 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3519 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3520 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3521 self.pending_outbound_payments
3522 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3523 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3524 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3525 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3529 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3530 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3531 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3532 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3533 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3534 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3538 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3539 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3540 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3544 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3545 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3549 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3550 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3551 /// retries are exhausted.
3553 /// # Event Generation
3555 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3556 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3558 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3559 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3560 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3562 /// # Restart Behavior
3564 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3565 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3566 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3567 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3568 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3571 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3572 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3573 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3574 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3575 /// never reach the recipient.
3577 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3578 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3580 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3581 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3583 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3584 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3585 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3586 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3587 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3588 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3589 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3592 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3593 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3595 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3598 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3599 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3600 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3601 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3602 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3603 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3604 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3605 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3608 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3609 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3610 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3611 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3612 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3613 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3614 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3615 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3616 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3619 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3622 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3623 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3626 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3627 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3629 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3630 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3631 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3632 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3633 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3634 let payment_params =
3635 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3637 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3639 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3642 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3643 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3645 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3646 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3647 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3648 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3650 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3651 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3652 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3653 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3654 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3655 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3656 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3657 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3658 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3659 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3661 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3662 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3663 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3664 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3668 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3670 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3671 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3674 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3676 let mut res = Vec::new();
3678 for mut path in route.paths {
3679 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3680 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3681 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3682 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3683 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3686 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3689 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3690 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3692 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3694 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3695 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3700 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3703 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3708 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3709 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3710 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3712 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3713 let used_liquidity =
3714 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3716 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3717 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3719 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3722 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3727 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3728 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3729 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3736 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3737 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3738 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3739 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3740 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3741 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3742 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3743 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3744 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3746 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3747 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3748 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3749 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3750 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3752 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &self.logger)
3753 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3754 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3755 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3756 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3757 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3758 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3759 } else { unreachable!(); });
3761 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3762 Err((chan, err)) => {
3763 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3764 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3766 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3767 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3768 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3774 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3775 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3777 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3778 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3781 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3782 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3783 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3787 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3788 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3791 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3792 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3793 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3795 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3796 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3797 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3798 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3800 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3807 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3808 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3809 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3813 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3815 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3816 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3818 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3819 /// across the p2p network.
3821 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3822 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3824 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3825 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3826 /// keys per-channel).
3828 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3829 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3830 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3832 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3833 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3834 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3836 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3837 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3838 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3839 /// for more details.
3841 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3842 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3843 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3844 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3847 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3849 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3850 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3852 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transcaction
3853 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3854 /// signature for each channel.
3856 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3857 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3858 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3859 let mut result = Ok(());
3861 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3862 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3863 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3864 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3865 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3870 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3871 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3872 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3876 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3877 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3878 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3879 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3880 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3881 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3882 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3883 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3888 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3889 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3890 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3891 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3895 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3896 match states.entry(txid) {
3897 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3898 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3899 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3903 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3906 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels.iter() {
3907 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3908 temporary_channel_id,
3909 counterparty_node_id,
3910 funding_transaction.clone(),
3913 let mut output_index = None;
3914 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3915 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3916 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3917 if output_index.is_some() {
3918 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3919 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3922 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3925 if output_index.is_none() {
3926 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3927 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3930 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3931 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3932 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3938 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3939 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3940 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3941 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3942 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3943 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3944 .into_iter().flatten()
3945 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3947 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3948 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3950 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3952 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3953 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3954 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3955 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3956 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3958 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3959 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
3960 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
3964 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3965 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3971 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3973 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3974 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3975 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3976 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3978 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3979 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3981 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3982 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3984 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3986 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3987 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3988 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3989 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3990 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3991 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3992 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3993 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3994 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3995 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3996 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3997 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3998 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4002 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4003 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4004 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4005 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4006 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4007 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4008 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4009 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4010 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4011 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4015 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4016 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4017 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4018 config.apply(config_update);
4019 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4022 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4023 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4024 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4025 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4026 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4027 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4034 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4035 debug_assert!(false);
4036 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4038 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4039 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4046 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4048 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4049 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4050 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4051 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4053 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4054 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4056 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4057 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4059 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4061 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4062 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4063 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4064 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4065 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4066 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4067 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4068 pub fn update_channel_config(
4069 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4070 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4071 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4074 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4075 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4077 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4078 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4080 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4081 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4082 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4083 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4084 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4086 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4087 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4088 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4091 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4094 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4095 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4096 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4097 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4098 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4099 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4100 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4102 let next_hop_scid = {
4103 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4104 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4105 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4106 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4107 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4108 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4109 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4110 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4111 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4112 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4115 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4117 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4118 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4119 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4121 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4122 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4123 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4128 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4129 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4130 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4133 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4134 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
4135 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
4137 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4139 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4140 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4141 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4142 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4143 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4146 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4147 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4148 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4149 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4150 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4152 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4156 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4157 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4159 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4162 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4163 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4164 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4166 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4167 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4168 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4171 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4172 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4173 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4174 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4175 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4176 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4177 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4178 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4181 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4182 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4183 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4184 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4189 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4191 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4192 /// Will likely generate further events.
4193 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4194 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4196 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4197 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4198 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4200 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4201 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4203 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4204 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4205 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4207 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4208 match forward_info {
4209 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4210 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4211 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4212 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4213 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4216 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4217 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4218 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4220 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4221 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4222 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4223 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4224 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4225 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4226 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4229 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4230 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4232 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4235 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4236 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4242 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4243 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4245 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4249 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4250 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4252 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4256 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4257 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4258 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4259 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4260 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4261 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4262 payment_hash, &self.node_signer
4265 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4266 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
4267 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4268 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4269 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4271 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4273 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4274 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4278 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4279 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4280 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4281 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
4283 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4284 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4290 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4293 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4296 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4297 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4298 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4299 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4300 // problem, not ours.
4306 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4307 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4308 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4310 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4314 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4315 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4316 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4317 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4320 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4321 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4322 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4323 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4324 match forward_info {
4325 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4326 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4327 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4328 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4329 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4332 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4333 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4334 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4335 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4336 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4337 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4338 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4339 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4340 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4342 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4343 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4344 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
4347 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4348 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4350 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4352 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4353 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4354 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4355 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4360 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4361 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4363 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4364 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4365 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4366 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4368 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4369 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4371 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4373 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4374 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4375 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4382 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4386 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4387 match forward_info {
4388 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4389 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4390 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4391 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4392 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4395 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4396 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4397 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4398 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4399 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4400 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4401 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4403 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4404 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4405 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4409 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4410 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4413 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4416 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4417 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4418 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4419 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4420 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4421 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4422 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4423 phantom_shared_secret,
4425 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4426 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4427 // if routing nodes overpay
4428 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4429 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4431 total_value_received: None,
4432 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4435 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4438 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4440 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4441 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4442 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4443 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4444 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4445 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4447 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4448 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4449 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4450 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4451 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4452 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4453 phantom_shared_secret,
4455 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4456 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4458 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4461 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4462 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4463 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4464 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4465 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4468 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4469 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4470 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4471 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4472 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4473 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4475 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4476 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4477 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4479 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4480 .entry(payment_hash)
4481 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4482 .or_insert_with(|| {
4483 committed_to_claimable = true;
4485 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4488 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4489 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4490 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4491 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4493 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4494 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4495 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4497 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4498 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4499 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4502 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4504 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4505 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4506 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4507 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4508 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4509 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4510 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4511 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4512 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4513 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4515 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4517 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4518 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4519 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4520 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4521 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4522 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4524 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4525 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4526 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4527 committed_to_claimable = true;
4529 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4530 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4531 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4532 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4533 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4534 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4535 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4536 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4537 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4538 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4542 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4543 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4544 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4545 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4546 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4548 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4550 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4551 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4553 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4554 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4555 committed_to_claimable = true;
4558 payment_claimable_generated
4562 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4563 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4564 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4565 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4566 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4567 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4568 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4569 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4570 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4571 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4572 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4573 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4574 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4575 Ok(result) => result,
4577 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4578 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4581 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4582 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4583 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4584 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4585 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4586 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4589 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4590 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4591 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4593 check_total_value!(purpose);
4595 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4596 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4597 check_total_value!(purpose);
4601 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4602 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4603 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4604 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4606 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4607 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4608 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4609 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4610 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4611 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4612 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4613 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4615 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4616 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4617 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4619 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4620 if payment_claimable_generated {
4621 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4627 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4628 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4636 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4637 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4638 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4639 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4641 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4642 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4644 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4646 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4647 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4648 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4650 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4652 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4653 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4654 events.append(&mut new_events);
4657 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4659 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4660 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4661 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4663 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4665 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4666 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4667 if background_events.is_empty() {
4668 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4671 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4673 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4674 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4675 // monitor updating completing.
4676 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4678 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4679 let mut updated_chan = false;
4681 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4682 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4683 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4684 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4685 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4686 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4687 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4688 updated_chan = true;
4689 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4690 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4692 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4695 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4700 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4701 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4704 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4705 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4706 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4707 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4708 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4709 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4710 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4712 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4713 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4714 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4715 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4716 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4722 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4725 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4726 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4727 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4728 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4729 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4732 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4733 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4734 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4735 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4736 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4737 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4738 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4740 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4742 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4743 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4744 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4745 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4747 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4748 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4750 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4751 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4755 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4756 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4757 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4758 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4759 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4760 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4761 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4763 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4764 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4766 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4767 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4768 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4769 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4770 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4771 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4773 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4778 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4779 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4787 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4789 /// This currently includes:
4790 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4791 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4792 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4794 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4795 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4796 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4797 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4798 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4799 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4800 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the block time minus two
4801 /// hours in `no-std`.
4803 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4804 /// estimate fetches.
4806 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4807 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4808 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4809 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4810 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4812 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4813 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4815 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4816 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4817 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4818 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4820 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4821 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4822 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4823 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4824 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4825 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4827 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4828 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4829 log_error!(self.logger,
4830 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4831 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4832 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4833 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4834 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4835 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4836 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4837 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4838 channel_id: *chan_id,
4839 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4850 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4851 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4852 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4853 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4854 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4855 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4856 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4858 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4859 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4864 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4865 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4867 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4868 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4869 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4870 if needs_close { return false; }
4873 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4874 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4875 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4876 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4877 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4878 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4879 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4880 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4882 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4883 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4884 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4885 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4889 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4891 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4894 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4896 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4897 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4898 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4899 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4903 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4905 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4911 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4913 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4914 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4915 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4916 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4917 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4918 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4919 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4920 channel_id: *chan_id,
4921 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4929 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4930 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4931 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4933 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4934 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4935 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4940 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4941 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4942 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4943 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4944 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4945 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4946 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4947 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4953 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4955 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4956 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4961 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4962 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4963 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4964 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4965 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4966 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4967 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4968 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4969 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4970 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4971 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4972 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4973 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4974 // have no channels to the peer.
4975 let remove_entry = {
4976 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4977 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4980 entry.remove_entry();
4983 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4988 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4989 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4990 // This should be unreachable
4991 debug_assert!(false);
4994 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4995 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4996 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4997 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4998 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4999 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5000 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5003 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5004 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5005 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5007 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5008 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5015 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5016 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5017 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5018 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5019 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5022 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5023 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5026 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5027 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5030 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5031 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5032 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5033 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5034 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5035 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5036 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5039 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5040 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5043 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5044 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5045 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5046 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5047 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5054 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5055 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5056 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5058 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5059 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5060 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5061 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5063 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5064 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5065 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5066 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5067 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5068 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5071 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5072 /// reason for the failure.
5074 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5075 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5076 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5078 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5079 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5080 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5081 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5082 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5083 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5084 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5089 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5090 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5091 match failure_code {
5092 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5093 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5094 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5095 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5096 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5097 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5099 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5100 let fail_data = match data {
5101 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5104 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5109 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5110 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5112 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5114 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5115 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5116 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5117 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5118 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5119 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5120 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5122 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5124 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5125 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5127 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5132 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5133 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5134 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5135 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5136 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5137 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5138 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5139 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5140 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5141 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5143 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5144 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5145 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5146 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5148 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5149 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5150 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5151 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5152 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5156 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5157 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5158 // be surfaced to the user.
5159 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5160 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5161 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5163 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5164 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5165 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5166 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5167 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5168 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5169 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5170 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5171 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5173 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5174 debug_assert!(false);
5175 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5178 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5180 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5183 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5184 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5185 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5186 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5190 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5191 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5192 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5193 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5194 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5195 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5196 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5197 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5198 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5199 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5202 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5203 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5204 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5207 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5208 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5209 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5211 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5212 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5213 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5214 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5215 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5217 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
5218 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
5219 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
5221 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5222 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5223 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5224 push_forward_ev = true;
5226 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5227 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5228 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5230 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5231 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5234 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5235 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5236 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5237 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5238 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5239 failed_next_destination: destination,
5245 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5246 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5248 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5249 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5250 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5251 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5253 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5254 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5255 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5256 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5258 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5259 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5260 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5262 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5263 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5264 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5265 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5266 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5267 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5268 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5269 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5270 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5273 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5274 /// even type numbers.
5278 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5279 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5281 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5282 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5283 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5286 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5287 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5289 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5292 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5293 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5294 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5295 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5296 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5297 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5298 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5299 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5304 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5305 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5306 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5307 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5308 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5310 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5311 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5312 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5316 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5317 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5318 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5319 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5320 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5321 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5322 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5323 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5324 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5325 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5326 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5335 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5337 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5338 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5339 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5340 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5341 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5342 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5343 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5344 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5345 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5346 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5347 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5348 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5349 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5350 debug_assert!(false);
5354 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5356 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5357 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5358 debug_assert!(false);
5362 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5363 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5365 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5366 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5367 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5368 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5371 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5372 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5373 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5374 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5378 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5379 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5380 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5381 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
5383 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5384 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5385 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5386 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5387 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5392 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5393 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5394 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5395 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5396 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5397 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5398 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5400 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5403 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5404 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5405 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5406 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5410 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5411 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5412 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5413 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5415 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5416 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5417 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5418 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5421 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5422 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5423 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5424 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5428 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5429 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5430 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5433 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5434 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5435 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5436 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5437 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5438 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5439 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5441 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
5442 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
5443 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5445 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5448 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5449 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5451 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5452 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5453 // monitor update as a background event.
5454 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5455 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5456 counterparty_node_id,
5457 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5458 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5467 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5468 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5469 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5475 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5476 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5477 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5478 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5479 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5480 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5481 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5482 // again on restart.
5483 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5484 payment_preimage, update_res);
5487 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5488 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5490 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5491 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5492 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5493 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5494 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5495 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5496 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5497 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5498 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5499 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5502 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5503 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5504 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5505 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5506 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5507 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
5511 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5512 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5515 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5516 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
5517 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5520 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5521 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5522 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5523 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5524 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5526 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5527 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5528 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5530 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5531 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5534 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5535 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5536 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5537 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5538 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
5539 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5540 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5541 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5544 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5545 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5547 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5548 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5549 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5550 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5552 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
5553 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5554 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5556 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5557 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5558 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5559 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5566 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5567 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5568 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5574 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5575 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5576 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5579 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5580 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5582 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5583 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5584 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5586 payment_purpose: purpose,
5589 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5591 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5595 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5597 sender_intended_total_msat,
5601 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5602 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5604 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5605 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5606 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5613 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5614 /// update completion.
5615 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5616 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5617 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5618 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5619 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5620 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5621 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5622 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5623 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5624 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5625 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5626 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5627 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5629 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5631 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5632 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5633 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5634 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5637 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5638 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5640 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5641 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5642 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5647 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5648 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5649 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5650 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5655 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5656 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5657 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5658 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5659 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5664 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5668 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5674 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5675 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5676 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5680 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5681 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5682 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5688 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5689 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5691 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5692 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5694 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5695 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5696 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5697 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5698 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5703 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5704 let mut peer_state_lock;
5705 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5706 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5707 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5708 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5710 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5713 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5714 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5715 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5716 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5717 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5720 let remaining_in_flight =
5721 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5722 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5725 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5726 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5727 remaining_in_flight);
5728 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5731 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5734 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5736 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5737 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5740 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5741 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5742 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5744 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5745 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5746 /// used to accept such channels.
5748 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5749 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5750 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5751 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5754 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5755 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5757 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5758 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5759 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5761 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5762 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5764 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5765 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5767 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5768 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5770 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5771 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5772 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5773 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5776 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5777 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5779 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5780 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5781 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5782 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5783 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5784 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5785 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5786 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5788 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5789 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5790 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5792 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5793 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5794 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5795 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5796 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5797 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5798 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5800 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5804 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5805 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5806 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5807 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5808 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5809 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5810 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5813 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5814 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5816 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5817 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5818 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5819 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5820 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5821 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5822 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5823 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5826 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5827 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5831 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5832 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5833 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5835 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5836 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5837 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5840 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5845 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5846 /// or 0-conf channels.
5848 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5849 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5850 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5851 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
5852 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5853 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5855 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5856 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5857 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5858 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5859 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5860 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5861 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5865 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5868 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5869 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
5871 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5872 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5874 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5875 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5876 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5877 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5878 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5880 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5883 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5884 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5885 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5888 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
5889 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
5894 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
5897 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5898 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
5899 // likely to be lost on restart!
5900 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
5901 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5904 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5905 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5908 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5909 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5910 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5911 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5912 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5914 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5915 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5917 debug_assert!(false);
5918 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5920 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5921 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5923 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5924 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5925 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5926 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5927 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5928 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5930 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5931 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5932 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5935 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5936 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5937 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5938 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5939 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5942 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
5943 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5945 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5948 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
5949 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5950 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5951 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5952 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5953 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5954 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5955 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5956 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
5958 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
5959 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
5960 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
5965 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
5966 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5967 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5968 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5969 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5970 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5971 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
5974 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5979 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5980 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5981 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5983 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5984 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5987 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5988 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5990 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5991 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5992 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5994 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5998 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5999 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6000 // likely to be lost on restart!
6001 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6002 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6003 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6005 debug_assert!(false);
6006 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6008 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6009 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6010 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6011 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6012 match phase.get_mut() {
6013 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6014 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6015 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6018 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6022 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6025 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6026 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6027 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6028 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6029 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6031 user_channel_id: user_id,
6036 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6037 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6039 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6040 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6042 debug_assert!(false);
6043 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6046 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6047 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6048 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
6049 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6050 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6051 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
6053 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
6054 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6055 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6056 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6057 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
6058 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
6059 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
6060 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
6061 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
6065 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
6066 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6068 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6071 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
6072 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6073 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
6075 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6076 let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6077 match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6078 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6079 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6080 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6081 funding_msg.channel_id))
6083 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6084 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6085 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6086 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6087 mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
6089 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6090 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6091 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6092 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6093 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6094 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6098 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6099 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6100 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6102 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6106 log_error!(self.logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6107 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6108 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6109 funding_msg.channel_id));
6117 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6118 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6119 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6120 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6122 debug_assert!(false);
6123 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6126 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6127 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6128 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6129 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6130 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6131 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
6132 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6133 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6134 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6135 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6138 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned())), chan_phase_entry)
6142 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6146 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6150 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6151 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6152 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6153 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6154 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6156 debug_assert!(false);
6157 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6159 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6160 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6161 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6162 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6163 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6164 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6165 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6166 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6167 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6168 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6169 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6170 msg: announcement_sigs,
6172 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6173 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6174 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6175 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6176 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6177 // announcement_signatures.
6178 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6179 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6180 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6181 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6188 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6189 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6194 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6195 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6198 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6199 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6204 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6205 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6206 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6208 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6209 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6211 debug_assert!(false);
6212 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6214 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6215 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6216 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6217 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6219 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6220 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6221 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6223 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6226 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6227 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6228 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6229 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6231 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6232 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6233 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6234 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6235 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6236 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6240 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6241 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6242 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6243 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6246 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6247 let context = phase.context_mut();
6248 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6249 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6250 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6251 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6255 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6258 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6259 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6260 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6261 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6263 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6264 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6270 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6271 let mut shutdown_result = None;
6272 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid;
6273 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6274 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6276 debug_assert!(false);
6277 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6279 let (tx, chan_option) = {
6280 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6281 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6282 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6283 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6284 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6285 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
6286 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6287 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6288 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6289 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6294 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6295 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6296 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6297 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6298 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6299 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)))
6300 } else { (tx, None) }
6302 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6303 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6306 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6309 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6310 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6311 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6313 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6314 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6315 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6316 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6317 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6321 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6322 shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
6324 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6325 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6326 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6331 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6332 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6333 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6334 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6336 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6337 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6338 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6339 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6341 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6342 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6344 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
6345 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6346 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6348 debug_assert!(false);
6349 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6351 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6352 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6353 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6354 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6355 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6356 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6357 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6358 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
6359 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
6360 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6362 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6363 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6364 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6365 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6366 match pending_forward_info {
6367 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
6368 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6369 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6370 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6372 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6373 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6374 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6375 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6376 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6379 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6381 _ => pending_forward_info
6384 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6386 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6387 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6390 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6395 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6397 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6398 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6399 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6401 debug_assert!(false);
6402 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6404 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6405 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6406 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6407 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6408 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6409 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6410 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6411 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6412 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6413 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6415 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6416 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6417 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6418 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6419 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6420 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6421 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6424 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6425 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6428 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6431 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6435 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6436 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6437 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6438 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6439 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6441 debug_assert!(false);
6442 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6444 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6445 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6446 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6447 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6448 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6449 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6451 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6452 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6455 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6460 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6461 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6462 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6463 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6464 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6466 debug_assert!(false);
6467 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6469 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6470 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6471 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6472 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6473 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6474 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6475 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6477 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6478 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6480 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6481 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6485 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6489 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6490 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6491 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6493 debug_assert!(false);
6494 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6496 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6497 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6498 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6499 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6500 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6501 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6502 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6503 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6504 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6505 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6509 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6510 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6513 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6518 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6519 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6520 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6521 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6522 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6523 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6524 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6525 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6526 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6527 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6528 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6530 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6531 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6533 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6534 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6535 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6536 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6537 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6538 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6540 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6541 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6542 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6544 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6545 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6546 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6547 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6548 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6549 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6550 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6551 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6552 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6555 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6556 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6558 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6559 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6560 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6561 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6562 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6563 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6564 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6565 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6566 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6569 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6570 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6571 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6576 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6577 // payments are being processed.
6578 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6579 push_forward_event = true;
6581 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6582 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6589 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6590 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6593 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6594 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6595 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6597 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6601 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6602 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6603 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6604 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6605 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6607 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6608 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6609 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6610 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6611 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6612 // real by taking more time.
6613 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6614 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6615 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6620 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6621 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6622 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6623 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6624 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6625 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6626 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6628 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6629 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6630 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6631 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6632 channel_funding_outpoint,
6633 counterparty_node_id,
6638 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6639 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6640 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6642 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6643 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6644 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6645 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6647 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6648 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6649 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6655 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6656 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6657 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6658 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6660 debug_assert!(false);
6661 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6662 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6663 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6664 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6665 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6666 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6667 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6668 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6669 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6670 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6671 *counterparty_node_id)
6673 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6674 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6675 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6676 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6677 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6678 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6679 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6683 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6684 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6687 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6690 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6694 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6695 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6696 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6698 debug_assert!(false);
6699 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6701 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6702 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6703 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6704 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6705 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6706 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6708 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6709 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6712 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6717 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6718 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6719 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6721 debug_assert!(false);
6722 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6724 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6725 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6726 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6727 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6728 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6729 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6730 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6733 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6734 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6735 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6736 msg, &self.default_configuration
6737 ), chan_phase_entry),
6738 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6739 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6740 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6743 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6744 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6747 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6752 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6753 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6754 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6755 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6757 // It's not a local channel
6758 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6761 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6762 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6763 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6764 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6766 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6767 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6768 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6769 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6770 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6771 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6772 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6773 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6774 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6775 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6776 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6778 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6780 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6781 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6782 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6783 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6785 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
6786 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6787 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
6790 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6794 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6795 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6798 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6800 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6803 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6805 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6806 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6808 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6810 debug_assert!(false);
6811 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6812 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6816 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6817 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6818 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6819 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6820 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6821 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6822 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6823 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6824 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6825 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
6826 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
6827 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
6828 let mut channel_update = None;
6829 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6830 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6831 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6834 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6835 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6836 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6837 // they have the latest channel parameters.
6838 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6839 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6840 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6845 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6846 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6847 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6848 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6849 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6850 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6854 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6855 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6858 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6859 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
6860 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id.0));
6861 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
6862 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
6863 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
6864 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
6865 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
6866 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
6868 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
6869 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
6870 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
6871 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
6872 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
6873 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
6874 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
6875 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6876 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6877 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
6878 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6879 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
6880 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
6881 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
6882 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
6883 next_funding_txid: None,
6886 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6887 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
6888 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6894 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
6895 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6896 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6897 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6900 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6901 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6906 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6907 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6908 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6910 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6911 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6912 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6913 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6914 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6915 match monitor_event {
6916 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6917 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6918 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
6919 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
6921 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
6922 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6923 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6924 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6927 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
6928 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6929 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6931 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6932 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6933 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6934 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6937 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6938 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6939 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6940 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6941 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6942 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6943 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6944 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
6945 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6946 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6947 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6951 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
6952 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6953 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6954 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
6955 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
6963 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6964 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
6970 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6971 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
6974 has_pending_monitor_events
6977 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6978 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6979 /// update events as a separate process method here.
6981 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
6982 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6983 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
6986 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
6987 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
6988 /// update was applied.
6989 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
6990 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
6991 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6993 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
6994 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
6995 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
6996 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
6998 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6999 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7001 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7002 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7003 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7004 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7006 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7007 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7008 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7009 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
7010 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7011 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7013 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7014 has_monitor_update = true;
7016 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7017 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7018 continue 'peer_loop;
7027 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7028 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7029 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7035 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7036 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7037 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7038 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7039 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7040 let mut has_update = false;
7041 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7043 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7045 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7046 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7047 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7048 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7049 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7051 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7052 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
7053 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
7054 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
7055 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7057 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7058 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7061 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7062 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7063 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7064 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7065 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7070 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7072 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7073 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7074 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7075 shutdown_results.push((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
7081 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7082 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7087 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7093 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7094 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7097 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7098 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7104 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7105 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7107 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7108 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7109 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7110 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7111 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7112 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7113 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7114 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7115 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7116 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
7117 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7118 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7119 assert!(should_broadcast);
7120 } else { unreachable!(); }
7121 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7122 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7123 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7126 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7130 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7131 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7132 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7134 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the offer with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the
7135 /// introduction node and a derived signing pubkey for recipient privacy. As such, currently,
7136 /// the node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction
7137 /// node in order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7139 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7140 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7141 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7142 &self, description: String
7143 ) -> OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All> {
7144 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7145 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7146 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7147 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7148 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7150 OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx)
7151 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7155 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7156 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund. The builder will
7157 /// have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the returned builder will
7158 /// not be honored by [`ChannelManager`].
7160 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7162 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the refund with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as
7163 /// the introduction node and a derived payer id for sender privacy. As such, currently, the
7164 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7165 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7167 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7168 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7169 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7170 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7171 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7172 ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7173 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7174 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7175 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7176 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7177 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7179 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7180 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7182 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7183 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7186 self.pending_outbound_payments
7187 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7188 payment_id, absolute_expiry, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7190 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7195 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7198 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7199 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7201 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7202 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7203 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7204 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7206 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7208 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7209 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7213 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7214 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7216 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7218 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7219 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7221 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7222 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7223 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7224 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7225 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7226 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7227 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7228 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7229 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7230 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7231 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7234 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7235 /// stored external to LDK.
7237 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7238 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7239 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7241 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7242 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7245 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7246 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7247 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7248 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7250 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7251 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7252 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7253 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7254 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7256 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7257 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7258 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7259 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7260 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7262 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7263 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7265 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7266 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7270 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7271 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7273 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7275 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7276 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7278 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7279 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7280 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7281 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7282 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7283 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7284 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7287 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7288 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7290 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7291 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7292 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7295 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7297 fn create_one_hop_blinded_path(&self) -> BlindedPath {
7298 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7299 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7300 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(self.get_our_node_id(), entropy_source, secp_ctx).unwrap()
7303 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7304 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7306 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7307 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7308 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7309 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7311 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7312 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7313 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7314 Some(_) => continue,
7315 None => return scid_candidate
7320 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7322 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7323 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7325 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7326 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7327 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7331 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7332 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7333 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7335 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7336 /// times to get a unique scid.
7337 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7338 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7339 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7341 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7342 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7343 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7344 return scid_candidate
7348 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7349 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7350 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7351 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7353 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7354 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7355 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7356 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7357 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7358 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7360 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7361 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7362 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7371 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7372 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7373 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7374 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7375 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7379 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7380 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7381 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7382 events.push_back((event, None));
7386 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7387 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7388 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7392 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7393 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7397 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7398 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7401 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7402 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7403 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7404 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7405 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7407 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7408 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7409 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7410 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7412 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7413 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7414 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7415 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7417 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7421 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7422 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7423 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7424 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7425 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7426 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7427 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7431 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7432 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7433 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7434 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7435 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7436 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7437 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7438 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7439 if further_update_exists {
7440 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7445 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7446 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7451 log_debug!(self.logger,
7452 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7453 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7459 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7460 for action in actions {
7462 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7463 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7465 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7471 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7472 /// using the given event handler.
7474 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7475 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7479 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7483 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7485 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7486 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7487 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7488 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7489 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7490 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7494 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
7495 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
7496 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
7497 /// is always placed next to each other.
7499 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
7500 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
7501 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
7502 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
7504 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
7505 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
7506 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
7507 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
7508 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7509 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7510 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
7512 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
7513 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
7514 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
7515 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7518 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
7519 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7521 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
7522 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7525 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
7526 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7527 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7528 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7529 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7530 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
7531 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7535 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
7536 events.replace(pending_events);
7545 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7547 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7548 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7549 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7550 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7551 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7552 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7556 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
7558 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
7559 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
7560 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
7562 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
7566 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7568 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7569 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7570 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7571 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7572 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7573 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7577 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7579 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7580 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
7581 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
7582 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
7583 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
7586 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
7587 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
7590 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7591 let _persistence_guard =
7592 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7593 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7594 let new_height = height - 1;
7596 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
7597 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
7598 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
7599 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
7600 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
7601 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
7604 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7608 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7610 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7611 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7612 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7613 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7614 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7615 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7619 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7620 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7621 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7622 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7624 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7625 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
7627 let _persistence_guard =
7628 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7629 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7630 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
7631 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
7633 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7634 if height < last_best_block_height {
7635 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7636 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7640 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7641 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7642 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7643 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7645 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7646 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
7648 let _persistence_guard =
7649 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7650 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7651 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
7653 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7655 macro_rules! max_time {
7656 ($timestamp: expr) => {
7658 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
7659 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
7660 // having an explicit local time source.
7661 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
7662 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
7663 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7664 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
7665 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
7671 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
7672 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7673 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
7674 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
7678 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
7679 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
7680 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
7681 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7682 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7683 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
7684 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
7685 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
7692 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
7693 let _persistence_guard =
7694 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7695 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7696 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
7697 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
7698 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
7699 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
7700 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7701 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7706 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7708 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7709 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7710 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7711 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7712 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7713 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7717 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
7718 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
7720 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
7721 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
7722 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7723 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7724 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7726 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7727 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
7729 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7730 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7731 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7732 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7733 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7734 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
7736 // Retain unfunded channels.
7737 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
7738 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
7739 let res = f(channel);
7740 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
7741 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
7742 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
7743 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
7744 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
7746 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
7747 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
7748 if channel.context.is_usable() {
7749 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7750 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
7751 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7752 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7757 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7762 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7763 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
7766 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
7767 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7768 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7769 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7770 msg: announcement_sigs,
7772 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7773 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
7774 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7776 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7777 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7778 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
7783 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
7784 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
7785 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
7786 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
7787 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
7788 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
7789 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
7790 // is always consistent.
7791 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
7792 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
7793 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
7794 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
7795 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
7798 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
7799 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
7800 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
7801 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
7802 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
7803 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
7804 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7808 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
7809 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
7810 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7811 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7812 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7813 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
7814 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
7815 data: reason_message,
7828 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7829 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
7830 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
7831 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
7832 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
7833 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
7834 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
7835 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7836 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7837 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
7839 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
7840 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
7841 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
7845 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
7848 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7849 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
7850 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7851 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7852 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
7853 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
7854 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
7855 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7856 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7857 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
7860 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
7861 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7862 _ => unreachable!(),
7864 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
7865 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
7866 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
7867 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
7873 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
7875 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
7876 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
7880 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
7881 /// may have events that need processing.
7883 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
7884 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
7886 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
7887 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
7888 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
7889 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
7892 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
7893 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
7894 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
7897 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7898 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
7899 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
7902 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
7903 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
7904 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
7905 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
7908 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7909 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7910 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7911 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7914 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7915 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7917 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7918 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7919 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7920 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7921 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
7924 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7925 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7926 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
7927 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
7930 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7931 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7932 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7933 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
7936 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7937 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7938 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
7939 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7943 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7944 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7946 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7947 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7948 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7949 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7950 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7951 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7955 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
7956 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7957 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
7958 // change to the contents.
7959 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7960 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7961 let persist = match &res {
7962 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
7963 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
7964 NotifyOption::DoPersist
7966 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7968 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7973 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
7974 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7975 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7976 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7979 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
7980 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7981 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
7982 // change to the contents.
7983 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7984 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7985 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
7989 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
7990 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7991 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7992 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7995 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
7996 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7997 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8000 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8001 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8002 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8005 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8006 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8007 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8008 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8009 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8010 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8011 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8012 let persist = match &res {
8013 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8014 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8016 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8021 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8022 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8023 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8026 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8027 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8028 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8031 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8032 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8033 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8034 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8035 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8036 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8037 let persist = match &res {
8038 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8039 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8040 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8042 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8047 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8048 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8049 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8052 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8053 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8054 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8055 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8056 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8057 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8058 let persist = match &res {
8059 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8060 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8061 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8063 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8068 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8069 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8070 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8071 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8072 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8073 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8074 let persist = match &res {
8075 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8076 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8077 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8079 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8084 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8085 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8086 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8089 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8090 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8091 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8094 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8095 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8096 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8097 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8098 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8099 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8100 let persist = match &res {
8101 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8102 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8103 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8105 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8110 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8111 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8112 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8115 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8116 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8117 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8120 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8125 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8126 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8127 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8128 let persist = match &res {
8129 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8130 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8131 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8133 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8138 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8139 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8140 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8141 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8142 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8144 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8145 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8146 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8147 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8148 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8149 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8150 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8151 let context = match phase {
8152 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8153 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger).is_ok() {
8154 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8159 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8160 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8163 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8167 // Clean up for removal.
8168 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8169 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
8170 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
8173 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8174 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8175 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8176 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8178 // V1 Channel Establishment
8179 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8180 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8181 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8182 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8183 // V2 Channel Establishment
8184 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8185 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8186 // Common Channel Establishment
8187 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8188 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8189 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8190 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8191 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8192 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8193 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8194 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8195 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8196 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8197 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8198 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8199 // Channel Operations
8200 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8201 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8202 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8203 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8204 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8205 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8207 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8208 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8209 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8210 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8211 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8212 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8213 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8214 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8215 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8218 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8219 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8220 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8221 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8224 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8226 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8228 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8229 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8233 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8234 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8235 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8239 let mut res = Ok(());
8241 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8242 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8243 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8244 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8245 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8246 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8247 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8250 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8251 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8252 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8253 if inbound_peer_limited {
8255 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8257 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8258 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8259 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8260 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8261 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8262 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8263 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8264 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8268 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8269 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8270 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8272 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8273 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8274 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8275 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8278 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8281 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8282 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8287 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8289 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8290 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8291 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8292 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8293 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8295 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8296 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8297 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8298 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
8299 // worry about closing and removing them.
8300 debug_assert!(false);
8304 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8305 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8306 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
8311 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8312 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
8317 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8318 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8320 match &msg.data as &str {
8321 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
8322 "link failed to shutdown" =>
8324 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
8325 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
8326 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
8327 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
8328 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
8329 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
8330 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
8331 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8332 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8333 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8334 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8335 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8336 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
8337 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
8338 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8339 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8343 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8344 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8345 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
8346 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
8347 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8348 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
8350 log_level: Level::Trace,
8360 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8361 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
8362 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8363 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8364 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8365 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8366 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8367 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8368 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8369 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8370 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
8372 for channel_id in channel_ids {
8373 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8374 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8378 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
8379 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8380 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8381 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8382 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8383 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8384 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
8385 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
8386 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
8387 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8395 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8396 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8400 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8401 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8404 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
8405 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8408 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
8409 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
8412 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
8413 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8414 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8415 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8418 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
8419 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8420 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8421 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8424 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
8425 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8426 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8427 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8430 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
8431 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8432 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8433 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8436 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
8437 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8438 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8439 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8442 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
8443 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8444 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8445 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8448 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
8449 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8450 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8451 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8454 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
8455 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8456 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8457 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8460 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
8461 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8462 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8463 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8467 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8468 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8469 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
8470 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
8471 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
8475 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8476 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8478 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8479 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8480 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8481 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8482 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8485 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8486 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8487 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
8488 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8491 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8492 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8493 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8494 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
8497 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8498 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8499 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
8500 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
8501 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
8502 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
8503 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
8504 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
8505 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
8506 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
8507 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
8508 features.set_payment_secret_required();
8509 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
8510 features.set_wumbo_optional();
8511 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
8512 features.set_channel_type_optional();
8513 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
8514 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
8515 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
8516 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
8521 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
8522 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
8524 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
8525 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
8526 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
8527 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
8530 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
8531 (2, node_id, required),
8532 (4, features, required),
8533 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
8534 (8, forwarding_info, option),
8535 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8536 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8539 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
8540 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8541 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8542 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8543 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
8544 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
8545 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8546 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
8547 (2, self.channel_id, required),
8548 (3, self.channel_type, option),
8549 (4, self.counterparty, required),
8550 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
8551 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
8552 (7, self.config, option),
8553 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
8554 (9, self.confirmations, option),
8555 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
8556 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
8557 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
8558 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
8559 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8560 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
8561 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8562 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
8563 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
8564 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
8565 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
8566 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
8567 (30, self.is_usable, required),
8568 (32, self.is_public, required),
8569 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8570 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8571 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8572 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8573 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
8579 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
8580 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8581 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8582 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
8583 (2, channel_id, required),
8584 (3, channel_type, option),
8585 (4, counterparty, required),
8586 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8587 (6, funding_txo, option),
8588 (7, config, option),
8589 (8, short_channel_id, option),
8590 (9, confirmations, option),
8591 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
8592 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
8593 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
8594 (16, balance_msat, required),
8595 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8596 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
8597 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
8598 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
8599 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8600 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
8601 (22, confirmations_required, option),
8602 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
8603 (26, is_outbound, required),
8604 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
8605 (30, is_usable, required),
8606 (32, is_public, required),
8607 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8608 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8609 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8610 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8611 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
8614 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8615 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8616 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
8617 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
8618 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
8622 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
8624 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
8625 outbound_scid_alias,
8629 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
8630 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
8632 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
8633 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8634 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
8635 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
8636 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8637 confirmations_required,
8639 force_close_spend_delay,
8640 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
8641 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
8642 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
8643 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
8644 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
8645 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
8646 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8647 channel_shutdown_state,
8652 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
8653 (2, channels, required_vec),
8654 (4, phantom_scid, required),
8655 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
8658 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
8660 (0, onion_packet, required),
8661 (2, short_channel_id, required),
8664 (0, payment_data, required),
8665 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8666 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8667 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8668 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8670 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
8671 (0, payment_preimage, required),
8672 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8673 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8674 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
8675 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8679 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
8680 (0, routing, required),
8681 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
8682 (4, payment_hash, required),
8683 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
8684 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
8685 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
8686 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8690 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8691 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8693 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
8695 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8696 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8697 reason.write(writer)?;
8699 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8700 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
8703 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8704 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8705 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
8706 failure_code.write(writer)?;
8713 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8714 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8715 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8718 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
8719 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8720 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8721 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
8725 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8726 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8727 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8728 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
8729 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
8732 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
8733 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
8734 // messages contained in the variants.
8735 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
8736 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
8737 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
8739 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8740 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8741 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8742 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8743 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
8746 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8747 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8748 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8749 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8750 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
8752 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8757 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
8762 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
8763 (0, short_channel_id, required),
8764 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8765 (2, outpoint, required),
8766 (4, htlc_id, required),
8767 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
8768 (7, user_channel_id, option),
8771 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
8772 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8773 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
8774 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
8775 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
8777 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8778 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
8779 (1, self.total_msat, required),
8780 (2, self.value, required),
8781 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
8782 (4, payment_data, option),
8783 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
8784 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
8785 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8786 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8792 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
8793 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8794 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8795 (0, prev_hop, required),
8796 (1, total_msat, option),
8797 (2, value_ser, required),
8798 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
8799 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
8800 (5, total_value_received, option),
8801 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
8802 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8803 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8805 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
8806 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
8807 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
8809 if payment_data.is_some() {
8810 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8812 if total_msat.is_none() {
8813 total_msat = Some(value);
8815 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
8818 if total_msat.is_none() {
8819 if payment_data.is_none() {
8820 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8822 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
8824 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
8828 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
8831 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
8832 total_value_received,
8833 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
8835 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
8836 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
8841 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
8842 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8843 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8846 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
8847 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
8848 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
8849 let mut payment_id = None;
8850 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
8851 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
8852 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8853 (0, session_priv, required),
8854 (1, payment_id, option),
8855 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8856 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
8857 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
8858 (6, blinded_tail, option),
8860 if payment_id.is_none() {
8861 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
8863 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
8865 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
8866 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
8867 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8869 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
8870 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
8871 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
8872 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8876 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8877 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
8878 first_hop_htlc_msat,
8880 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
8883 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8884 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8889 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
8890 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
8892 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
8894 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
8895 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8896 (0, session_priv, required),
8897 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
8898 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8899 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
8900 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
8901 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
8902 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
8905 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
8907 field.write(writer)?;
8914 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
8915 (0, forward_info, required),
8916 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
8917 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
8918 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
8919 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
8922 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
8924 (0, htlc_id, required),
8925 (2, err_packet, required),
8930 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
8931 (0, payment_secret, required),
8932 (2, expiry_time, required),
8933 (4, user_payment_id, required),
8934 (6, payment_preimage, required),
8935 (8, min_value_msat, required),
8938 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8940 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8941 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8942 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8943 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8944 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8945 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8949 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8950 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
8952 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8954 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
8956 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8957 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
8958 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
8961 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
8963 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8964 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
8965 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8966 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8967 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8968 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8969 serializable_peer_count += 1;
8972 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
8973 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
8977 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
8979 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8980 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8981 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8982 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
8983 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
8984 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
8987 channel.write(writer)?;
8993 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8994 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8995 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
8996 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8997 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8998 for forward in pending_forwards {
8999 forward.write(writer)?;
9004 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9006 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9007 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9008 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9010 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9011 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9012 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9013 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9014 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9015 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9016 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9017 htlc.write(writer)?;
9019 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9020 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9023 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9024 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9025 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9026 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9027 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9028 // per_peer_state lock at all.
9029 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9032 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9033 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9034 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9035 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9036 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9038 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9039 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9040 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9041 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9042 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9043 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9044 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9049 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9050 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9051 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9052 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9053 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9054 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9055 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9056 // well save the space and not write any events here.
9057 0u64.write(writer)?;
9059 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9060 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9061 event.write(writer)?;
9065 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9066 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9067 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9068 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9069 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9070 0u64.write(writer)?;
9072 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9073 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9074 // likely to be identical.
9075 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9076 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9078 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9079 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9080 hash.write(writer)?;
9081 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9084 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
9085 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
9086 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9087 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
9088 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
9091 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
9092 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9094 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9095 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9096 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
9097 session_priv.write(writer)?;
9100 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
9101 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
9102 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
9103 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
9107 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
9108 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
9109 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9111 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9112 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9113 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
9119 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
9120 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9121 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
9122 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
9125 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
9126 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
9127 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
9128 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
9129 pending_claiming_payments = None;
9132 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9133 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9134 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
9135 if !updates.is_empty() {
9136 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
9137 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
9142 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9143 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
9144 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9145 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
9146 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9147 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
9148 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9149 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
9150 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
9151 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
9152 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9153 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
9154 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9161 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9162 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9163 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
9164 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
9167 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
9168 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
9169 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
9170 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
9171 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
9172 // check that the event is sane here.
9173 let event_encoded = event.encode();
9174 let event_read: Option<Event> =
9175 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
9176 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
9182 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9183 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9184 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9185 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
9186 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
9187 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
9190 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
9191 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
9192 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
9193 events.push_back((ev, action));
9194 } else if action.is_some() {
9195 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9202 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
9203 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
9204 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
9205 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
9206 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
9207 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
9210 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
9212 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
9214 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9215 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
9216 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
9217 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
9218 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
9219 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
9220 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
9221 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
9222 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9223 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
9224 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
9225 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
9226 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
9228 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
9229 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
9231 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
9232 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
9234 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
9235 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
9236 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
9237 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
9238 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
9239 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
9241 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
9242 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9244 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9245 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9246 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9247 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9248 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9249 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9253 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
9254 pub entropy_source: ES,
9256 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
9257 pub node_signer: NS,
9259 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
9260 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
9262 pub signer_provider: SP,
9264 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9266 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
9267 pub fee_estimator: F,
9268 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9270 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
9271 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
9272 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
9273 pub chain_monitor: M,
9275 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
9276 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
9277 /// force-closed during deserialization.
9278 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
9279 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
9280 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
9282 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
9284 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
9285 /// deserialization.
9287 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
9288 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
9289 pub default_config: UserConfig,
9291 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
9292 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
9294 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
9295 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
9296 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
9297 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
9299 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
9302 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
9303 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
9306 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9307 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9309 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9310 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9311 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9312 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9313 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9314 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9318 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
9319 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
9320 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
9321 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
9322 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
9324 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
9325 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
9330 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
9331 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
9332 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9333 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
9335 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9336 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9337 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9338 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9339 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9340 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9344 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9345 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
9346 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
9350 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9351 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
9353 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9354 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9355 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9356 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9357 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9358 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9362 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9363 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9365 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9366 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9367 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9369 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
9371 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9372 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9373 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9374 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9375 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9376 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
9377 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
9378 for _ in 0..channel_count {
9379 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
9380 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
9382 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9383 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
9384 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
9385 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
9386 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
9387 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
9388 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9389 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
9390 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
9391 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
9392 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9393 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
9394 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
9396 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
9397 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
9398 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
9400 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
9401 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
9402 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9404 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
9405 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
9406 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9408 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs, batch_funding_txid) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
9409 if batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
9410 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9412 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
9413 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9414 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
9417 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
9418 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9419 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9420 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9421 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
9422 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9423 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9425 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
9426 let mut found_htlc = false;
9427 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9428 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
9431 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
9432 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
9433 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
9434 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
9435 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
9436 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
9437 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
9438 log_info!(args.logger,
9439 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
9440 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
9441 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9445 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
9446 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
9447 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9448 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9449 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9451 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() {
9452 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
9454 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
9455 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9456 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
9457 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9459 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9460 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
9461 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9462 entry.insert(by_id_map);
9466 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
9467 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
9468 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
9469 // safely discard the channel.
9470 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
9471 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9472 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9473 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9474 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
9475 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9476 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9479 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
9480 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9481 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9482 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9483 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9484 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9488 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9489 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
9490 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
9491 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9492 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
9493 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
9494 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
9496 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
9500 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
9501 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9502 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
9503 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
9504 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9505 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9506 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
9507 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
9508 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
9510 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
9513 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9514 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
9515 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
9516 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9517 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9518 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
9519 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
9520 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
9522 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
9525 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
9528 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
9529 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
9530 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9531 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9532 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9533 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9534 is_connected: false,
9538 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9539 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
9540 for _ in 0..peer_count {
9541 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
9542 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
9543 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
9544 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
9545 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
9548 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9549 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
9550 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
9551 for _ in 0..event_count {
9552 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
9553 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
9558 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9559 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
9560 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
9562 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
9563 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
9564 // on-startup monitor updates.
9565 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
9566 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
9568 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9572 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
9573 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9575 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9576 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
9577 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
9578 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
9579 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9583 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9584 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
9585 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
9586 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
9587 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
9588 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
9589 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
9591 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
9592 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9596 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
9597 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
9598 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
9599 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
9600 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
9601 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9602 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9603 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
9604 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
9605 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
9606 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
9607 let mut events_override = None;
9608 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9609 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9610 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
9611 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9612 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
9613 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9614 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
9615 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9616 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
9617 (8, events_override, option),
9618 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
9619 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9620 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
9621 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9623 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
9624 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9627 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
9628 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9631 if let Some(events) = events_override {
9632 pending_events_read = events;
9635 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
9636 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
9639 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
9640 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
9641 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
9642 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
9643 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
9644 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
9646 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
9648 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
9649 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
9650 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
9653 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
9654 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
9655 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
9656 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
9657 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
9659 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
9660 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
9661 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
9663 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
9664 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
9665 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
9666 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
9667 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
9669 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
9670 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9671 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
9672 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
9673 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9674 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
9675 pending_background_events.push(
9676 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9677 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9678 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
9679 update: update.clone(),
9682 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
9683 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
9684 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
9685 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
9686 pending_background_events.push(
9687 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
9688 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9689 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
9692 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
9693 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
9694 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9696 max_in_flight_update_id
9700 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9701 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
9702 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9703 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
9704 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
9705 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
9707 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9708 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
9709 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
9710 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
9711 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
9712 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
9713 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
9714 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
9715 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
9718 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
9719 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
9720 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9721 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
9722 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
9723 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
9724 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9725 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9726 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9727 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9728 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9731 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
9732 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
9733 debug_assert!(false);
9734 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9739 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
9740 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
9741 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
9742 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
9743 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
9744 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
9745 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
9746 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
9748 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9749 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
9750 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
9752 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9753 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
9754 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9755 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9756 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9757 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9758 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9759 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9764 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
9765 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
9767 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
9768 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
9769 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
9770 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
9773 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
9774 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
9775 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
9776 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
9777 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
9778 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
9779 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
9781 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9782 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9783 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
9784 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
9785 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
9786 if path.hops.is_empty() {
9787 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
9788 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9791 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
9792 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
9793 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
9794 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
9795 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9796 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
9797 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
9798 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
9800 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9801 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
9802 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
9803 retry_strategy: None,
9804 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
9805 payment_params: None,
9806 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
9807 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
9808 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9809 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9810 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9811 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9812 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
9813 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
9814 total_msat: path_amt,
9815 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
9816 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9818 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
9819 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
9824 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9826 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
9827 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
9828 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
9829 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
9831 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
9832 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
9833 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
9834 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
9835 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
9836 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
9837 forwards.retain(|forward| {
9838 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
9839 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9840 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9841 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9846 !forwards.is_empty()
9848 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
9849 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9850 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9851 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9852 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
9853 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
9854 intercepted_id != ev_id
9861 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
9862 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
9863 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
9864 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
9865 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
9866 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
9867 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
9868 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
9869 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
9870 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
9871 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
9873 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
9874 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
9875 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
9877 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
9878 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
9879 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
9886 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
9887 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
9889 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
9891 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
9892 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
9893 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
9894 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
9895 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
9896 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
9897 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
9898 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
9899 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9900 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
9903 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
9904 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
9905 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
9906 // channel still live case here.
9910 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
9911 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
9916 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
9917 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
9918 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
9919 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
9920 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
9921 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
9922 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
9923 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
9927 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
9928 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
9930 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
9931 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
9932 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9933 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9935 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
9936 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9937 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9939 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
9940 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
9942 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9943 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
9945 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9948 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
9949 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9950 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9952 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9956 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
9957 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
9958 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
9959 if htlcs.is_empty() {
9960 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9962 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
9963 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
9964 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
9965 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
9966 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
9967 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
9968 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
9969 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
9971 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
9972 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9976 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
9978 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9980 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
9981 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
9983 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9984 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9989 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9990 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9992 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
9994 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9996 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
9997 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
9998 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
9999 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10003 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10004 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10005 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10006 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10007 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10008 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10009 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10010 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10012 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10013 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10014 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10016 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10017 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10018 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10019 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10020 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10021 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10023 if chan.context.is_usable() {
10024 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10025 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10026 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10027 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10028 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10032 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10033 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10034 debug_assert!(false);
10035 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10040 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10042 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10043 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10044 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10045 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10046 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10047 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10048 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10049 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10050 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10051 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10052 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10054 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10055 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10057 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10058 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10059 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10060 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10062 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10063 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10064 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10065 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10067 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10068 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10069 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10070 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10072 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
10073 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
10074 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
10075 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10076 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10077 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
10078 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
10081 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10082 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
10085 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
10088 purpose: payment.purpose,
10089 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
10090 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
10091 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
10097 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
10098 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
10099 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
10100 for action in actions.iter() {
10101 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
10102 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
10103 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
10105 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
10106 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
10107 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
10108 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
10110 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
10111 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
10112 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
10113 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
10119 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
10121 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
10122 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10126 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
10128 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
10129 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
10130 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
10131 router: args.router,
10133 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
10135 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
10136 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
10137 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
10138 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
10140 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
10141 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
10142 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
10143 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
10144 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
10145 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
10147 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
10149 our_network_pubkey,
10152 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
10154 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
10156 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
10157 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
10158 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
10159 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
10160 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
10162 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
10163 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
10165 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
10167 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
10168 node_signer: args.node_signer,
10169 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
10171 logger: args.logger,
10172 default_configuration: args.default_config,
10175 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
10176 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
10177 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
10178 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
10179 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
10182 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
10183 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
10184 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
10185 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
10186 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
10187 downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
10190 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
10191 //connection or two.
10193 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
10199 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10200 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10201 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
10202 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
10203 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
10204 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
10205 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
10206 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
10207 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10208 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
10209 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
10210 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
10211 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
10212 use crate::util::test_utils;
10213 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
10214 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
10217 fn test_notify_limits() {
10218 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
10219 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
10220 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10221 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10222 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10223 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10225 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
10226 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
10227 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10228 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10229 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10231 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10233 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
10234 // to connect messages with new values
10235 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10236 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10237 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10238 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10239 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10240 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10242 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
10243 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10244 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10245 // ... but the last node should not.
10246 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10247 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
10248 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10249 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10251 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
10252 // about the channel.
10253 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10254 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10255 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10257 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
10259 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10260 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10261 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10262 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10263 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10264 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10266 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
10267 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10268 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10270 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
10271 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
10272 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
10273 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
10274 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
10275 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
10277 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
10278 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
10279 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10280 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10281 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10282 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10283 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10284 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10286 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
10287 // the channel info has updated.
10288 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10289 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10290 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10291 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10292 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10293 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10297 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
10298 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
10300 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10301 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10302 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10303 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10304 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10306 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
10307 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
10308 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
10309 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
10311 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
10312 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
10313 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
10314 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
10315 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
10316 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
10317 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
10318 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
10319 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10320 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10321 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10322 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10324 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
10325 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10326 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10327 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10328 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10329 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10330 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10331 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10332 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10334 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10335 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10336 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
10337 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10338 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10339 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10340 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10341 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10342 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10343 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10344 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10345 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10346 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
10348 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
10349 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
10350 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
10351 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10352 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10353 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10354 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
10356 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
10357 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
10358 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
10359 // lightning messages manually.
10360 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10361 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
10362 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
10364 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10365 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10366 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
10367 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
10368 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10369 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10370 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
10371 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10372 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10373 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
10374 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10375 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10376 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10377 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10378 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10379 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10380 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
10381 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10382 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10383 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
10384 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10385 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10386 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10387 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10388 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
10389 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10391 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
10392 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
10393 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10394 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10396 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10397 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10398 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10399 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10401 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10404 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10405 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10406 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10407 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10409 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10414 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
10415 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
10416 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
10419 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
10420 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
10421 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
10422 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
10423 // fails as expected.
10424 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
10425 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
10426 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
10427 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
10428 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
10429 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
10430 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10431 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10432 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10433 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
10434 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10435 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10436 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10437 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10438 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10440 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
10441 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
10442 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
10444 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10445 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10446 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
10447 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
10448 let route = find_route(
10449 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10450 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10452 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10453 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10454 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10455 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10456 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10457 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10458 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10459 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10460 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10461 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10462 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
10463 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
10464 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10465 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10466 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10467 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10468 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10469 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10470 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10471 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10472 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10473 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10474 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10475 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10477 // Finally, claim the original payment.
10478 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10480 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
10481 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10482 let route = find_route(
10483 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10484 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10486 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10487 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10488 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10489 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10490 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10491 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10492 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10493 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
10495 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
10496 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10497 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10498 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10499 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10500 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10501 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10502 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10503 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10504 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10505 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10506 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10507 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10508 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10509 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10510 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10511 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10512 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10513 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10514 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10515 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10516 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10517 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10518 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10520 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
10521 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10523 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
10524 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
10525 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10526 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
10527 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10528 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10529 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10530 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10531 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10532 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
10534 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10535 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10536 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
10539 let route = find_route(
10540 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10541 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10543 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
10544 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10545 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
10546 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10547 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10548 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10549 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10550 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10551 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10552 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10553 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10554 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10555 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10556 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10557 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10558 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10559 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10560 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10561 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10562 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10563 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10564 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10565 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10567 // Finally, claim the original payment.
10568 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10572 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
10573 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
10574 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
10575 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10576 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10577 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10578 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10580 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10581 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10583 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10584 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10585 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10586 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10587 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10588 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10589 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10590 let route = find_route(
10591 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10592 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10595 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10596 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
10597 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
10598 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10599 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
10600 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10601 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10603 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10604 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10605 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10606 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10607 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10608 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10609 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10611 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
10615 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
10616 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
10617 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
10618 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10619 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
10620 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10621 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10622 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10623 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10625 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10626 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10628 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10629 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10630 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10631 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10632 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10633 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10634 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10635 let route = find_route(
10636 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10637 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10640 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10641 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10642 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
10643 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
10644 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10645 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
10646 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
10647 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10648 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10650 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10651 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10652 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10653 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10654 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10655 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10656 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10658 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
10662 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
10663 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10664 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10665 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10666 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10668 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10669 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10670 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10671 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10673 // Marshall an MPP route.
10674 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
10675 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
10676 route.paths.push(path);
10677 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10678 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
10679 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
10680 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
10681 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
10682 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
10684 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10685 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
10687 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
10688 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
10690 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
10695 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
10696 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10697 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10698 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10699 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10701 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10703 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10704 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10706 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10707 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
10708 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10709 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10712 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
10713 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
10714 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10715 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
10716 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
10717 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
10720 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10723 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
10724 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
10729 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
10730 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
10731 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10732 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10733 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10734 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10736 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
10737 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10739 total_msat: 100_000,
10742 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
10743 // payment verification fails as expected.
10744 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
10745 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
10746 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
10747 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
10749 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
10753 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
10754 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
10758 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
10759 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
10760 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
10761 // the channel is successfully closed.
10762 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10763 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10764 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10765 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10767 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10768 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10769 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
10770 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10771 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10773 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
10774 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
10776 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
10777 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
10778 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10779 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10782 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10784 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10785 // as it has the funding transaction.
10786 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10787 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10788 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10791 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10793 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10795 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10797 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10798 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10799 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10801 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10804 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10805 // as it has the funding transaction.
10806 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10807 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10808 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10810 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10811 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10812 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10813 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10814 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10815 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10816 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10817 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
10819 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10820 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10821 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10822 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
10824 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10825 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
10827 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
10828 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
10829 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
10830 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
10831 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10832 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10833 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10837 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
10838 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
10839 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
10840 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
10841 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10842 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10843 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10846 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10848 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
10849 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
10850 // closing transaction).
10851 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
10852 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
10853 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10855 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
10856 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
10857 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10858 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10859 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10862 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10864 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
10866 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
10867 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
10868 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10870 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10872 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10873 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10876 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10877 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
10878 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10881 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10882 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
10883 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10886 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
10887 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
10888 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10891 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
10892 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
10893 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10896 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
10898 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10899 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10901 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
10902 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10904 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
10905 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
10910 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
10911 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
10912 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
10913 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
10914 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10915 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10916 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
10917 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10920 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
10921 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10922 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
10924 // Test the API functions.
10925 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
10927 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
10929 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10931 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10933 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10935 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
10937 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
10941 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
10942 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
10943 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
10944 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
10945 // the given `channel_id`.
10946 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10947 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10948 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
10949 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10951 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10954 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
10956 // Test the API functions.
10957 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
10959 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
10961 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
10963 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
10965 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
10967 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
10971 fn test_connection_limiting() {
10972 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
10973 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10974 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10975 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10976 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10978 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10980 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10981 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10983 let mut funding_tx = None;
10984 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10985 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10986 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10989 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10990 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
10991 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
10992 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
10993 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10995 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10996 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10997 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10999 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11001 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11002 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11003 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11005 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11008 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11009 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11010 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11011 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11012 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11014 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11015 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11017 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11018 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11019 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11020 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11021 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11022 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11023 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11026 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11027 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11028 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11029 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11030 }, true).unwrap_err();
11032 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11033 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11034 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11035 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11036 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11037 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11038 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11040 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11041 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11043 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11044 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11045 }, true).unwrap_err();
11047 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11048 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11049 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11050 }, false).unwrap();
11051 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11053 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11054 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11056 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11057 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11058 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11059 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11060 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11062 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11063 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11064 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11066 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
11067 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11068 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
11070 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
11071 // "protected" and can connect again.
11072 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
11073 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11074 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11076 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11078 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
11080 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11081 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11085 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
11086 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
11087 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11088 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11089 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11090 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11092 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11094 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11095 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11097 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11098 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11099 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11100 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11103 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
11105 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11106 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11107 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11109 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
11110 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11111 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11113 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
11114 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11115 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11116 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11120 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
11121 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11122 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11123 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11124 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11125 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
11126 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11127 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
11128 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11130 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11132 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11133 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11135 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
11136 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11137 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11138 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11139 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11140 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11143 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11144 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11146 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11147 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11149 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11151 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
11152 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11155 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
11156 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11157 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11158 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11159 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11161 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11162 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11164 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11165 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
11166 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
11167 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
11171 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11173 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11174 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11176 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
11177 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11178 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11180 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11181 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11183 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11185 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11189 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
11190 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11191 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11192 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11193 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11194 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
11195 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
11196 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11198 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11199 payment_metadata: None,
11200 keysend_preimage: None,
11201 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11202 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11204 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11206 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
11207 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
11208 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
11209 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11210 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
11212 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
11213 } else { panic!(); }
11215 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
11216 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
11218 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11219 payment_metadata: None,
11220 keysend_preimage: None,
11221 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11222 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11224 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11226 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11227 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
11231 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
11232 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11233 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11234 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11235 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11237 let result = node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11239 outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
11240 payment_metadata: None,
11241 keysend_preimage: None,
11242 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11243 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
11245 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11246 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None);
11248 // Should not return an error as this condition:
11249 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
11250 // is not satisfied.
11251 assert!(result.is_ok());
11255 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
11256 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11257 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11258 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11259 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11261 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
11262 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11264 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11265 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11266 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
11267 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
11268 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11270 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11271 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11273 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11274 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11275 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11276 match &msg_events[0] {
11277 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
11278 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11280 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
11281 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
11282 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
11285 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11288 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11289 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11291 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
11292 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
11293 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11295 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11299 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
11300 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
11301 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
11302 // the channel without the anchors feature.
11303 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11304 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11305 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
11306 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11307 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11308 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
11309 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11311 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
11312 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11313 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11315 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11316 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11318 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11319 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11321 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11324 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11325 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
11327 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11328 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11330 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
11331 // not have generated any events.
11332 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11336 fn test_update_channel_config() {
11337 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11338 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11339 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
11340 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
11341 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11342 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11343 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
11345 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11346 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11347 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11349 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
11350 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11351 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
11352 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11353 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11355 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11356 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11359 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
11360 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11361 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11363 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
11364 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11365 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
11366 ..Default::default()
11368 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11369 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11370 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11372 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11373 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11376 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
11377 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11378 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11379 ..Default::default()
11381 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11382 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
11383 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11384 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11386 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11387 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11390 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
11391 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
11392 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
11393 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
11394 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
11397 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11398 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11399 ..Default::default()
11401 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
11404 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
11405 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
11406 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11407 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11411 fn test_payment_display() {
11412 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11413 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11414 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
11415 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11416 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11417 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11421 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
11422 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11423 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11424 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
11425 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
11426 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11428 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
11429 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11430 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11431 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11432 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11433 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
11434 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
11435 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11437 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
11438 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
11439 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
11442 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
11443 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
11445 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11446 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11448 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11449 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11450 }, false).unwrap();
11451 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
11452 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
11453 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
11455 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
11457 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
11458 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
11459 // close even if it was an lnd node.
11460 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11461 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
11462 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
11463 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11464 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
11465 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
11466 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
11467 } else { panic!() };
11468 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
11469 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
11470 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
11471 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
11473 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11475 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
11476 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
11477 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
11484 use crate::chain::Listen;
11485 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
11486 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
11487 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
11488 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
11489 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11490 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
11491 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
11492 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
11493 use crate::util::test_utils;
11494 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
11496 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11497 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11498 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
11500 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
11502 use criterion::Criterion;
11504 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
11505 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
11506 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
11507 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
11508 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
11509 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
11510 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
11512 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
11513 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
11515 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
11516 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
11518 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
11520 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
11523 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
11524 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
11527 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
11528 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
11529 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
11531 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
11532 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
11534 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
11535 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
11536 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
11537 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
11538 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
11540 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
11541 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
11542 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
11544 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
11545 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
11546 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
11547 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
11549 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
11550 }, genesis_block.header.time);
11551 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
11553 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
11554 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
11555 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
11556 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
11557 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
11559 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
11560 }, genesis_block.header.time);
11561 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
11563 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
11564 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11566 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
11567 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11568 }, false).unwrap();
11569 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
11570 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11571 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11574 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
11575 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
11576 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
11578 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11579 } else { panic!(); }
11581 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11582 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11583 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
11584 match events_b[0] {
11585 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11586 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11588 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11591 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11592 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11593 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
11594 match events_a[0] {
11595 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11596 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
11598 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11601 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
11603 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
11604 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
11605 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
11607 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11608 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11609 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
11610 match msg_events[0] {
11611 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
11612 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
11613 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11617 match msg_events[1] {
11618 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11622 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11623 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
11624 match events_a[0] {
11625 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11626 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
11628 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11631 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11632 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
11633 match events_b[0] {
11634 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11635 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11637 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11640 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
11641 macro_rules! send_payment {
11642 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
11643 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
11644 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
11645 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
11646 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
11647 payment_count += 1;
11648 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
11649 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
11651 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
11652 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
11653 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
11654 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
11655 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
11656 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11657 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
11658 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
11659 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
11660 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
11661 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11663 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
11664 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
11665 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11666 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
11668 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
11669 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
11670 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
11671 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11672 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
11674 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
11677 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
11678 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
11679 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
11680 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11682 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
11686 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
11687 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
11688 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);