1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
37 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
39 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
42 // construct one themselves.
43 use ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
44 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
45 use ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
46 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
48 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
50 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
52 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
53 use util::config::UserConfig;
54 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
55 use util::{byte_utils, events};
56 use util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
57 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
58 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
59 use util::errors::APIError;
64 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
67 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
68 use core::time::Duration;
71 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
72 use std::time::Instant;
73 use util::crypto::sign;
75 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
77 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
78 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
79 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
81 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
82 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
83 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
84 // before we forward it.
86 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
87 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
88 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
89 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
90 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
92 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
93 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
95 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
96 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a "real" SCID, an
97 /// outbound SCID alias, or a phantom node SCID.
98 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
101 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
102 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
103 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
106 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
107 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
111 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
112 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
113 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
114 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
115 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
116 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
117 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
122 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
123 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
126 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
129 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
130 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
133 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
135 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
137 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
138 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
139 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
142 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
143 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
145 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
149 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
153 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
154 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
155 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
156 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
157 short_channel_id: u64,
159 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
160 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
162 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
163 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
168 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
170 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
171 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
172 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
174 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
175 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
178 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
179 struct ClaimableHTLC {
180 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
182 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
184 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
186 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
190 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
191 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
192 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
193 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
195 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
196 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
201 impl Readable for PaymentId {
202 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
203 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
207 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
208 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
209 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
210 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
211 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
214 session_priv: SecretKey,
215 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
216 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
217 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
218 payment_id: PaymentId,
219 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
220 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
223 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
224 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
225 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
227 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
229 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
231 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
234 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
235 payment_id.hash(hasher);
236 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
237 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
238 payment_params.hash(hasher);
243 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
246 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
247 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
249 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
250 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
251 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
252 payment_secret: None,
253 payment_params: None,
258 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
259 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
261 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
269 struct ReceiveError {
275 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
276 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
278 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
283 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
285 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
286 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
287 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
288 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
289 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
291 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
292 err: msgs::LightningError,
293 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
294 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
296 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
298 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
300 err: LightningError {
302 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
303 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
310 shutdown_finish: None,
314 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
316 err: LightningError {
318 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
321 shutdown_finish: None,
325 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
326 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
329 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
331 err: LightningError {
333 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
334 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
340 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
341 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
345 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
348 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
350 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
351 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
355 log_level: Level::Warn,
358 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
360 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
362 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
364 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
365 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
371 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
373 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
374 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
382 shutdown_finish: None,
387 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
388 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
389 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
390 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
391 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
393 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
394 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
395 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
396 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
397 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
398 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
399 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
401 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
405 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
406 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
407 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
408 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) to the real channel id. Outbound SCID aliases are added
409 /// here once the channel is available for normal use, with SCIDs being added once the funding
410 /// transaction is confirmed at the channel's required confirmation depth.
411 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
412 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
414 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
415 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
416 /// and via the classic SCID.
418 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
419 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
420 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
421 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
422 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
423 /// failed/claimed by the user.
425 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
426 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
428 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
429 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
430 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
431 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
434 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
435 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
436 /// quite some time lag.
437 enum BackgroundEvent {
438 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
439 /// commitment transaction.
440 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
443 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
444 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
446 latest_features: InitFeatures,
449 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
450 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
452 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
455 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
456 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
457 struct PendingInboundPayment {
458 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
459 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
460 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
461 /// this payment being removed.
463 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
464 user_payment_id: u64,
465 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
466 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
467 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
470 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
471 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
472 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
474 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
477 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
478 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
479 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
480 pending_amt_msat: u64,
481 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
482 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
483 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
485 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
486 starting_block_height: u32,
488 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
489 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
490 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
492 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
493 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
495 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
496 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
497 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
498 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
499 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
501 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
503 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
504 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
508 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
509 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
511 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
515 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
517 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
521 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
523 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
527 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
529 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
534 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
536 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
537 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
538 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
539 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
543 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
544 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
545 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
546 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
547 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
548 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
549 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
552 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
553 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
556 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
557 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
558 let our_payment_hash;
559 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
560 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
561 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
563 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
564 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
565 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
569 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
573 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
574 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
575 let remove_res = match self {
576 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
577 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
578 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
579 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
580 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
584 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
585 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
586 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
587 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
588 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
589 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
596 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
597 let insert_res = match self {
598 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
599 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
600 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
602 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
603 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
606 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
607 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
608 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
609 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
610 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
617 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
619 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
620 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
621 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
622 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
629 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
630 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
631 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
632 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
633 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
634 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
635 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
637 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
638 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
640 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
641 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
642 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
643 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
644 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
645 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
646 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
647 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
649 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
650 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
652 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
653 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
655 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
656 /// to individual Channels.
658 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
659 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
660 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
661 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
663 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
664 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
665 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
666 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
667 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
668 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
669 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
671 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
672 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
673 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
674 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
677 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
678 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
679 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
680 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
681 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
683 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
684 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
685 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
686 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
687 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
688 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
689 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
690 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
691 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
692 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
695 default_configuration: UserConfig,
696 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
702 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
704 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
705 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
707 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
708 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
709 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
710 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
712 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
713 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
714 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
715 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
716 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
717 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
719 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
720 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
721 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
722 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
723 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
724 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
725 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
726 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
728 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
730 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
731 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
733 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
734 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
735 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
736 /// active channel list on load.
737 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
739 our_network_key: SecretKey,
740 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
742 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
744 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
745 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
746 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
748 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
749 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
751 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
752 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
753 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
755 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
756 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
757 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
758 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
760 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
761 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
762 /// are currently open with that peer.
763 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
764 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
767 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
768 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
770 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
771 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
772 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
773 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
774 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
775 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
776 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
777 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
778 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
780 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
787 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
789 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
790 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
791 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
792 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
793 pub struct ChainParameters {
794 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
795 pub network: Network,
797 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
799 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
800 pub best_block: BestBlock,
803 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
809 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
810 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
811 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
812 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
813 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
814 /// updates are ready for persistence).
816 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
817 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
818 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
819 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
820 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
822 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
823 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
826 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
827 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
828 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
831 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
832 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
834 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
835 persistence_notifier: notifier,
836 should_persist: persist_check,
837 _read_guard: read_guard,
842 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
844 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
845 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
850 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
851 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
853 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
855 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
856 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
857 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
858 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
859 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
861 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
862 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
864 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
866 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
867 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
868 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
869 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
870 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
871 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
872 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
874 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
875 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
877 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
878 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
879 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
880 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
882 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
883 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
884 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
885 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
886 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
887 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
890 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
892 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
893 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
896 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
898 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
899 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
900 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
902 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
903 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
905 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
906 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
907 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
908 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
909 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
910 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
911 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
912 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
913 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
914 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
915 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
918 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
919 /// to better separate parameters.
920 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
921 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
922 /// The node_id of our counterparty
923 pub node_id: PublicKey,
924 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
925 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
926 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
927 pub features: InitFeatures,
928 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
929 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
930 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
932 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
934 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
935 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
936 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
937 /// payments to us through this channel.
938 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
939 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
940 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
941 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
942 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
943 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
944 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
947 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
948 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
949 pub struct ChannelDetails {
950 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
951 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
952 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
953 /// lifetime of the channel.
954 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
955 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
956 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
957 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
958 /// our counterparty already.
960 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
961 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
962 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
963 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
965 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
966 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
967 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
968 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
970 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
971 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
973 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
974 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
976 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
977 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
978 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
979 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
980 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
981 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
982 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
983 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
984 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
987 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
989 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
990 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
991 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
992 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
993 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
994 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
995 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
997 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
998 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1000 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1001 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1002 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1003 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1004 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1005 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1006 /// this value on chain.
1008 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1010 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1012 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1013 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1014 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1015 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1016 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1017 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1018 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1020 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1021 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1022 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1023 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1025 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1026 pub balance_msat: u64,
1027 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1028 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1029 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1030 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1032 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1034 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1035 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1036 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1037 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1038 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1039 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1040 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1041 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1043 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1044 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1045 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1046 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1047 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1048 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1049 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1051 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1052 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1053 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1054 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1055 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1056 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1057 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1058 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1059 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1061 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1063 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1064 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1065 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1066 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1067 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1068 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1069 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1070 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1071 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1073 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1074 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1075 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1076 pub is_outbound: bool,
1077 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1078 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1079 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1080 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1081 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1083 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1084 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1085 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1086 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1088 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1089 pub is_usable: bool,
1090 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1091 pub is_public: bool,
1092 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1093 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1094 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1095 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1096 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1099 impl ChannelDetails {
1100 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1101 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1102 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1104 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1105 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1106 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1107 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1110 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1111 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1112 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1114 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1115 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1116 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1117 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1121 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1122 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1123 /// states for more.
1124 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1125 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1126 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1127 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1128 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1129 ParameterError(APIError),
1130 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1131 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1132 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1133 /// payment in full.
1135 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1137 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1138 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1139 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1140 /// paths than the ones selected).
1141 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1142 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1143 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1144 /// in over-/re-payment.
1146 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1147 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1148 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1150 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1151 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1152 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1153 /// with the latest update_id.
1155 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1156 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1157 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1158 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1159 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1160 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1161 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1162 payment_id: PaymentId,
1166 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1168 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1170 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1171 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1172 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1173 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1175 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1176 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1177 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1180 macro_rules! handle_error {
1181 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1184 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1185 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1187 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1188 // entering the macro.
1189 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1190 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1193 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1195 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1196 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1197 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1198 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1202 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1203 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1204 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1205 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1210 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1211 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1213 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1214 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1215 action: err.action.clone()
1219 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1220 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1223 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1230 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1231 ($self: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1232 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1233 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1235 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1236 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1237 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1238 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1239 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1241 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1242 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1244 $short_to_id.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1248 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1249 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1250 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1252 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1253 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1255 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1256 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1258 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1259 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1260 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
1261 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1262 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1263 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1265 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1266 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1267 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
1268 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1269 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1270 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1276 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1277 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1281 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1283 $entry.remove_entry();
1291 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1292 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1296 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1298 $entry.remove_entry();
1306 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1307 ($self: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1309 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1310 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel_state.short_to_id, channel);
1316 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1317 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1319 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1320 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1321 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $chan);
1322 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1323 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1324 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1325 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1326 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1327 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1328 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1329 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1330 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1331 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1332 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1335 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1336 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1337 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1338 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1339 match $action_type {
1340 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1341 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1343 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1344 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1346 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1347 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1348 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1349 if !$resend_commitment {
1350 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1353 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1355 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1356 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1360 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1361 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1363 $entry.remove_entry();
1367 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1368 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1369 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1371 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1372 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1374 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1375 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1377 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1378 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1380 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1381 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1385 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1386 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1387 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1389 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1390 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1394 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1395 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1396 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1397 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1398 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1401 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1406 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1407 ($short_to_id: expr, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {
1408 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1409 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1410 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1412 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1413 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1414 let outbound_alias_insert = $short_to_id.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), $channel.channel_id());
1415 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
1416 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1417 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1418 let scid_insert = $short_to_id.insert(real_scid, $channel.channel_id());
1419 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
1420 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1425 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1426 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1427 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1428 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $channel_ready: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1429 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1431 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1432 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1433 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1435 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1436 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1437 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or($channel_entry.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
1438 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1441 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1442 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a channel_ready if there have been
1443 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1444 // associated with a channel_ready would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1445 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1446 // channel_ready until it's been updated, so we can't have a channel_ready and a
1447 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1448 assert!($channel_ready.is_none());
1449 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a channel_ready or a
1450 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a channel_ready, we
1451 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1452 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1455 if let Some(msg) = $channel_ready {
1456 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the channel_ready fly
1457 // before it should be allowed to.
1458 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1459 send_channel_ready!($channel_state.short_to_id, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
1461 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1462 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1463 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1468 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1469 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1470 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1471 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1472 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1473 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1474 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1475 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1476 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1477 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1478 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1479 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1480 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1481 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1482 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1483 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1484 let mut order = $order;
1486 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1488 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1492 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1493 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1494 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1495 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1500 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1501 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1502 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1503 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1504 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1509 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1513 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1518 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1519 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1520 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1525 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1526 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1527 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1528 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1529 assert!(res.is_ok());
1532 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1536 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1537 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1538 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1540 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1542 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1543 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1548 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1549 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1550 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1551 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1552 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1555 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1557 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1558 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1560 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1562 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1563 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1564 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1565 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1566 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1567 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1568 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1569 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1571 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1572 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1573 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1577 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1579 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1580 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1581 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1582 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1583 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1584 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1586 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1587 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1588 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1590 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1591 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1594 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1595 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1597 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1598 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1600 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1602 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1603 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1604 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1605 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1613 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1614 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1615 &self.default_configuration
1618 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1619 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1620 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1623 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1624 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1626 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1628 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1632 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1637 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1639 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1640 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1641 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1642 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1643 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1646 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1647 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1649 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1650 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1651 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1653 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1654 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1655 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1656 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1657 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1658 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1660 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1661 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1662 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1663 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1664 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1665 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1669 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1670 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1671 Some(peer_state) => {
1672 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1673 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1674 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1675 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1676 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1677 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1678 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1682 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1687 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1690 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1692 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1693 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1694 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1696 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1697 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1698 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1699 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1701 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1703 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1706 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1708 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1709 node_id: their_network_key,
1712 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1715 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1716 let mut res = Vec::new();
1718 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1719 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1720 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1721 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1722 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1723 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1724 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1725 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1726 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1727 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1728 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1729 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1730 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1731 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1732 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1733 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1734 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1735 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1736 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1737 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1738 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1740 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1741 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1742 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1743 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1744 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1745 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1746 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1747 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1748 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1749 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1750 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1751 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1752 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1753 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1754 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1755 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1756 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1757 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1758 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1759 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1760 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1761 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat()
1765 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1766 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1767 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1768 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1774 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1775 /// more information.
1776 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1777 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1780 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1781 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1783 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1784 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1786 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1787 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1788 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1789 // really wanted anyway.
1790 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1793 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1794 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1795 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1796 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1797 Some(transaction) => {
1798 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1802 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1803 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1804 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1805 reason: closure_reason
1809 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1810 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1812 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1813 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1814 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1815 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1816 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1817 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1818 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1819 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1821 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1822 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1823 Some(peer_state) => {
1824 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1825 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1826 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1828 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1830 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1832 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1833 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1834 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1835 let (result, is_permanent) =
1836 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1838 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1844 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1845 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1849 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1850 let channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1851 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1852 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1856 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1860 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1864 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1865 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1868 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1872 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1873 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1874 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1876 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1877 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1879 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1880 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1881 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1882 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1884 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1886 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1887 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1888 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1889 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1890 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1893 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1894 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1895 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1897 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1898 /// the channel being closed or not:
1899 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1900 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1901 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1902 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1903 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1904 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1905 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1907 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1909 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1910 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1911 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1912 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1913 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1917 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1918 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1919 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1920 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1921 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1923 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1924 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1925 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1926 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1927 // ignore the result here.
1928 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1932 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1933 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1934 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1936 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1937 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1938 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1939 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
1940 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1942 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1943 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1945 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1947 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan)
1949 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1952 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1953 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1954 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1955 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1956 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1961 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1964 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1965 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
1966 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
1968 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1969 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1970 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None) {
1971 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1972 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1973 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1974 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1975 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1976 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1986 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1987 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1988 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1989 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1990 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1994 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
1995 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
1997 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1998 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
1999 return Err(ReceiveError {
2000 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2002 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2005 // final_expiry_too_soon
2006 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2007 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2008 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2009 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2010 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2011 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2012 return Err(ReceiveError {
2014 err_data: Vec::new(),
2015 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2018 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2019 return Err(ReceiveError {
2021 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2022 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2026 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2027 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => {
2028 return Err(ReceiveError {
2029 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2030 err_data: Vec::new(),
2031 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2034 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2035 return Err(ReceiveError {
2036 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2037 err_data: Vec::new(),
2038 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2041 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2042 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2043 return Err(ReceiveError {
2044 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2045 err_data: Vec::new(),
2046 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2048 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2049 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2051 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2052 phantom_shared_secret,
2054 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2055 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2056 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2057 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2058 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2059 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2060 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2061 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2062 return Err(ReceiveError {
2063 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2064 err_data: Vec::new(),
2065 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2069 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2071 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2074 return Err(ReceiveError {
2075 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2076 err_data: Vec::new(),
2077 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2082 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2085 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2086 amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
2087 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2091 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
2092 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2093 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2095 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2096 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2097 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2098 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2099 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2100 failure_code: $err_code,
2101 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2106 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2107 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2110 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2112 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2113 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2114 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2115 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2116 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2117 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2118 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2119 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2122 let mut channel_state = None;
2123 macro_rules! return_err {
2124 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2126 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2127 if channel_state.is_none() {
2128 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2130 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2131 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2132 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2133 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2134 })), channel_state.unwrap());
2139 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2141 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2142 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2144 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2145 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2149 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2150 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2152 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2154 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2155 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2156 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2157 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2158 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2160 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2163 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2164 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2166 let blinding_factor = {
2167 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
2168 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
2169 sha.input(&shared_secret);
2170 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
2173 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
2175 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
2177 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2180 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2181 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2184 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2185 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2186 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2187 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2188 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2192 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2193 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2194 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2197 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2198 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2199 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2200 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2205 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2206 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2207 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2208 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2209 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2210 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2211 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2212 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2213 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2214 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2215 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2217 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
2220 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2223 Some(id) => Some(id.clone()),
2225 let (chan_update_opt, forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta) = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2226 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2227 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2228 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2229 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2230 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2231 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2233 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2234 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2235 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2236 // we don't have the channel here.
2237 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2239 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2241 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2242 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2243 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2244 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2245 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2246 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2247 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2249 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2250 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2252 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
2253 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
2254 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
2255 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
2256 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, chan_update_opt));
2258 (chan_update_opt, chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta())
2259 } else { (None, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA) };
2261 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2262 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, chan_update_opt));
2264 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2265 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2266 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2267 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2268 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2269 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2271 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2272 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2274 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2275 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2276 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2277 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2278 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2279 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2280 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2281 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2282 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2283 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2289 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2290 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2291 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2292 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2294 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2295 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2297 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2298 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2299 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2301 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2302 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2303 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2305 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2310 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2313 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2314 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2315 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2317 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2318 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2319 if !chan.should_announce() {
2320 return Err(LightningError {
2321 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2322 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2325 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2326 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2328 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2329 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2332 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2333 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2334 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2335 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2336 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2337 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2338 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2339 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2340 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2344 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2346 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2347 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2348 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2350 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2351 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2353 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2354 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2355 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2356 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2357 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2358 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2359 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2360 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2363 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2364 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2366 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2372 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2373 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2374 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2375 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2376 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2377 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2379 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2380 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2381 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2382 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2383 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2385 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2387 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2389 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2390 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2392 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2393 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2394 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2395 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2396 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2397 err: "Payment already completed"
2402 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2403 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2404 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2407 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2409 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2410 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2411 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2412 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2413 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2414 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2415 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2416 total_msat: total_value,
2418 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2422 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2423 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2425 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2426 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2428 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2429 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2431 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2432 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2434 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2435 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2437 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2438 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2439 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2440 channel_state, chan)
2442 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2443 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2444 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2445 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2446 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2447 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2448 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2449 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2450 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2451 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2453 insert_outbound_payment!();
2455 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2456 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2457 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2458 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2459 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2460 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2461 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2462 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2468 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2470 } else { unreachable!(); }
2474 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2475 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2477 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2482 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2484 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2485 /// fields for more info.
2487 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2488 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2489 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2490 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2491 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2492 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2494 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2496 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2497 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2498 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2500 /// In general, a path may raise:
2501 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2502 /// node public key) is specified.
2503 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2504 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2506 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2507 /// relevant updates.
2509 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2510 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2511 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2513 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2514 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2515 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2516 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2518 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2519 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2520 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2521 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2522 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2525 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2526 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2527 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2529 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2530 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2531 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2532 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2533 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2535 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2536 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2538 let mut total_value = 0;
2539 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2540 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2541 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2542 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2543 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2544 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2545 continue 'path_check;
2547 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2548 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2549 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2550 continue 'path_check;
2553 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2554 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2556 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2557 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2559 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2560 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2561 total_value = amt_msat;
2564 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2565 let mut results = Vec::new();
2566 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2567 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2569 let mut has_ok = false;
2570 let mut has_err = false;
2571 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2572 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2573 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2574 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2575 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2576 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2577 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2581 } else if res.is_err() {
2582 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2583 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2586 if has_err && has_ok {
2587 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2590 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2591 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2592 Some(RouteParameters {
2593 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2594 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2595 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2601 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2602 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2603 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2604 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2610 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2612 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2613 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2614 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2615 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2616 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2618 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2619 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2620 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2621 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2622 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2623 if path.len() == 0 {
2624 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2625 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2630 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2631 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2632 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2634 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2635 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2637 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2638 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2639 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2640 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2643 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2645 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2646 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2647 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2650 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2651 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2652 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2655 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2656 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2657 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2662 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2663 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2667 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2670 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2672 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2673 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2674 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2675 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2677 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2678 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2679 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2681 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2682 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2683 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2684 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2685 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2687 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2688 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2689 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2690 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2691 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2693 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2701 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2702 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2703 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2704 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2705 /// never reach the recipient.
2707 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2709 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2710 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2712 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2714 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2715 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2716 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2718 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2720 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2721 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2722 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2727 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2728 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2729 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2730 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2731 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2733 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2735 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2737 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2738 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2739 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2740 } else { unreachable!(); })
2743 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2745 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2746 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2749 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2750 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2755 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2756 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2757 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2760 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2761 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2762 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2764 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2772 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2773 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2774 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2778 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2780 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2781 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2783 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2784 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2786 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2787 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2788 /// keys per-channel).
2790 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2791 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2792 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2794 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2795 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2796 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2798 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2799 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2800 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2801 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2803 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2804 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2805 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2806 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2810 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2811 let mut output_index = None;
2812 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2813 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2814 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2815 if output_index.is_some() {
2816 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2817 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2820 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2821 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2822 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2825 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2828 if output_index.is_none() {
2829 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2830 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2833 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2838 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2839 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2840 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2842 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2845 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2846 // smaller than 500:
2847 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2849 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2850 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2851 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2852 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2853 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2854 /// our network addresses.
2856 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2857 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2859 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2860 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2861 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2862 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2864 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2866 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2867 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2868 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2870 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2871 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2874 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2875 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2876 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2878 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2879 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2880 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2881 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2882 rgb, alias, addresses,
2883 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2884 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2886 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2887 let node_announce_sig = sign(&self.secp_ctx, &msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2889 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2890 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2892 let mut announced_chans = false;
2893 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2894 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
2895 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2897 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2902 announced_chans = true;
2904 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached channel_ready, check the
2905 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2906 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2910 if announced_chans {
2911 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2912 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2913 signature: node_announce_sig,
2914 contents: announcement
2920 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2922 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2923 /// Will likely generate further events.
2924 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2925 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2927 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2928 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2929 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
2930 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2932 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2933 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2935 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2936 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2937 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2938 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2940 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2941 match forward_info {
2942 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2943 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2944 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2945 macro_rules! fail_forward {
2946 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
2948 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2949 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2950 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2951 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2952 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2953 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2954 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
2956 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2957 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data }
2963 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
2964 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
2965 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
2966 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
2967 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
2969 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2970 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
2971 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
2972 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
2973 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
2975 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
2977 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2978 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
2982 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
2983 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
2984 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
2985 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => fail_forward!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
2991 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
2994 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
2997 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2998 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2999 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3000 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3001 // problem, not ours.
3008 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3009 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3010 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3011 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3012 match forward_info {
3013 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3014 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3016 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3017 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3018 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3019 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3020 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3021 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3022 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3023 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3024 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3025 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3027 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3029 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3030 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3032 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3034 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3035 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3036 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data }
3042 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3044 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3045 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3046 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3047 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3048 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3049 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3050 // this channel currently :/.
3056 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3057 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3059 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3060 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3061 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3063 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3064 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3066 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3068 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3069 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3070 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3073 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3075 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3076 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3077 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3078 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3079 // messages when we can.
3080 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3081 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3082 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3089 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3090 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3093 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3094 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3095 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3096 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3097 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3098 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3100 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3101 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3102 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan);
3103 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3104 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3106 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
3108 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3112 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3113 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3116 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3117 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3118 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3119 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3120 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3121 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3122 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3123 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3124 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3126 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3134 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3135 match forward_info {
3136 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3137 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3138 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3139 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3140 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3141 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3142 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3144 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3145 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3147 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3150 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3151 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3152 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3153 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3154 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3155 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3156 phantom_shared_secret,
3158 value: amt_to_forward,
3160 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { amt_to_forward },
3165 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3167 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3168 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3169 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3171 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3172 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3173 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3174 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3175 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3176 phantom_shared_secret,
3178 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
3183 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3184 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3185 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3187 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3188 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3189 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3192 let (_, htlcs) = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3193 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3194 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3195 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3196 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3197 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3201 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3202 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3203 total_value += htlc.value;
3204 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3205 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3206 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3207 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3208 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3209 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3211 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3213 _ => unreachable!(),
3216 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3217 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3218 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3219 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3220 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3221 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3222 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3225 amount_msat: total_value,
3227 payment_received_generated = true;
3229 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3230 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3232 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3234 payment_received_generated
3238 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3239 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3240 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3241 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3242 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3243 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3244 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3245 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3246 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3247 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3248 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3249 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3250 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3251 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3253 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3257 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3259 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3260 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3261 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3262 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3263 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3264 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3266 amount_msat: amt_to_forward,
3270 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3271 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3272 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3278 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3279 if payment_data.is_none() {
3280 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3281 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3284 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3285 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3286 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3287 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3288 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3289 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3290 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3291 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3293 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3294 if payment_received_generated {
3295 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3301 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3302 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3310 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3311 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
3313 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3315 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3316 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3319 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3320 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3321 events.append(&mut new_events);
3324 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3326 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3327 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3329 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3330 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3331 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3332 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3333 if background_events.is_empty() {
3337 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3339 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3340 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3341 // monitor updating completing.
3342 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3349 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3350 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3351 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3352 self.process_background_events();
3355 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3356 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3357 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3358 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3359 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3360 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3361 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3363 if !chan.is_live() {
3364 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3365 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3366 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3368 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3369 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3371 let mut retain_channel = true;
3372 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3375 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3376 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3380 let ret_err = match res {
3381 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3382 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3383 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3384 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3387 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3388 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3389 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3390 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3391 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3392 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3393 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3394 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3404 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3408 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3409 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3410 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3411 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3412 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3413 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3414 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3416 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3418 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3420 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3421 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3422 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3423 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3424 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3425 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3426 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3428 handle_errors.push(err);
3438 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3440 /// This currently includes:
3441 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3442 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3443 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3446 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3447 /// estimate fetches.
3448 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3449 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3450 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3451 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3453 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3455 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3456 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3458 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3459 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3460 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3461 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3462 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3463 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3464 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3465 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3467 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3469 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3471 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3472 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3473 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3474 if needs_close { return false; }
3477 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3478 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3479 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3480 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3481 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3482 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3483 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3484 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3488 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3489 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3491 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3492 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3493 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3497 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3498 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3506 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3507 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3508 // This should be unreachable
3509 debug_assert!(false);
3512 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3513 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3514 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3515 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3517 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3518 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3519 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3521 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.into_iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.prev_hop.clone(), payment_hash.clone())));
3529 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3530 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() });
3533 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3534 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3540 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3541 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3542 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3544 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3545 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3546 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentReceived`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3547 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3549 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3550 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3551 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3552 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3553 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3554 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3556 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3557 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3558 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3559 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3560 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3561 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3562 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3563 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3564 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3565 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3566 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3571 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3572 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3574 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3576 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3577 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3578 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3579 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3580 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3581 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3582 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3584 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3586 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3587 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3589 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3594 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3595 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3596 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3597 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3598 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3599 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3600 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3601 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3602 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3604 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3605 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3606 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3607 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3609 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3610 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3611 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3612 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3613 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3617 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3618 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3619 // be surfaced to the user.
3620 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3621 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3623 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3624 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3625 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3626 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3627 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3629 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3631 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3632 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3633 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3635 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payment_params, .. } => {
3636 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3637 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3638 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3639 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3640 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3641 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3642 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3643 Some(RouteParameters {
3644 payment_params: payment_params_data,
3645 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3646 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3649 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3650 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3651 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3653 rejected_by_dest: false,
3654 network_update: None,
3655 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3657 short_channel_id: None,
3664 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3665 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3667 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3673 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3680 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3681 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3682 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3683 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3684 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3685 /// still-available channels.
3686 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3687 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3688 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3689 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3692 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3693 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3694 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3696 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3697 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3698 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3699 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3700 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3701 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3702 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3703 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3704 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3707 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3708 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3711 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3712 all_paths_failed = true;
3713 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3714 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3716 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3722 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3725 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3726 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3727 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3728 Some(RouteParameters {
3729 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3730 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3731 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3734 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3736 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3737 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3739 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3741 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3742 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3743 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3744 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3745 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3746 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3747 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3748 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3755 error_code: onion_error_code,
3757 error_data: onion_error_data
3760 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3766 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3767 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3768 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3769 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3771 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3772 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3773 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3774 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3775 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3776 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3777 network_update: None,
3780 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3783 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3785 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3789 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3790 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3791 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3793 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3794 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3795 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3796 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3797 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
3798 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3799 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
3800 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
3802 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3803 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3806 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3807 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3808 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3812 let mut forward_event = None;
3813 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3814 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3816 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3817 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3818 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3820 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3821 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3824 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3825 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3826 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3827 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3828 time_forwardable: time
3835 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3836 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3838 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3839 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3840 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3842 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3843 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3844 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3845 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3847 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3848 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3849 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3850 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3851 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3852 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3853 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3854 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3856 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3858 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3859 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3860 if let Some((payment_purpose, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3861 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3863 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3864 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3865 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3866 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3868 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3869 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3870 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3871 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3872 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3874 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3875 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3876 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3877 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3878 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3882 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3883 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3884 debug_assert!(false);
3888 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3889 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3890 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3891 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3892 if sources.len() != 1 {
3893 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3894 debug_assert!(false);
3900 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
3902 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
3903 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
3906 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
3907 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
3908 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
3912 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3913 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3914 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3916 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3917 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3918 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3919 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3920 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3921 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3922 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3924 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3925 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3926 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3927 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3928 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3929 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3930 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3931 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3933 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3934 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3935 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3936 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3937 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3938 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3940 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3945 if claimed_any_htlcs {
3946 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
3948 purpose: payment_purpose,
3949 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
3953 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3954 // which were generated.
3955 channel_state.take();
3957 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3958 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3959 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3964 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3965 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3966 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3967 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3968 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3970 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3974 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3975 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3976 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3977 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3978 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3979 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3980 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3981 payment_preimage, e);
3982 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3983 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3984 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3985 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3988 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3989 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3990 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3991 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3992 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3993 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3994 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3995 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3996 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3997 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4003 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
4005 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
4008 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4009 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4010 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4011 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4012 payment_preimage, e);
4014 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4015 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4017 chan.remove_entry();
4019 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
4022 } else { unreachable!(); }
4025 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4026 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4027 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4028 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4029 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4030 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4031 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4032 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4033 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4034 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4035 pending_events.push(
4036 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4038 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4043 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4051 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4053 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4054 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4055 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4056 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4057 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4058 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4059 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4060 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4061 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4062 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4063 pending_events.push(
4064 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4065 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4071 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4075 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4076 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4077 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4079 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4080 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4081 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4082 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4083 pending_events.push(
4084 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4092 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4097 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4100 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4101 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4102 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4103 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4104 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4105 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4106 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4109 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4110 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4111 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4112 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4113 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4116 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4117 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4118 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4119 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
4120 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4121 payment_preimage, e);
4123 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4124 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4125 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4126 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4129 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4130 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4131 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4132 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4136 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4137 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4138 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4141 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4142 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4143 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4145 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4147 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4157 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4158 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4159 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4162 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4163 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4165 let chan_restoration_res;
4166 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
4167 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4168 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4169 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4170 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4171 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4173 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4177 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4178 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4179 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4180 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4181 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4182 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4184 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4185 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4186 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4191 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4192 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4193 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4195 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
4197 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4198 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4199 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4200 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4204 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4206 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4207 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4210 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4211 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4212 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4214 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4215 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4216 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4217 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4220 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4221 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4223 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4224 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4225 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4227 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4228 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4230 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4231 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4233 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4234 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4236 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4237 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4238 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4239 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4242 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4243 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4245 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4246 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4247 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4248 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4249 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4250 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4252 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4253 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4255 if accept_0conf { channel.get_mut().set_0conf(); }
4256 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4257 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4258 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4261 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4262 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4268 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4269 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4270 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4273 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4274 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4277 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4278 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4279 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration,
4280 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4283 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4284 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4288 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4289 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4290 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4291 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4292 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4293 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4295 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4296 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4297 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4298 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4299 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(0),
4302 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4303 pending_events.push(
4304 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4305 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4306 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4307 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4308 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4309 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4314 entry.insert(channel);
4320 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4321 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4322 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4323 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4324 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4325 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4326 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4327 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4329 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.peer_channel_config_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4330 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4332 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4335 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4336 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4337 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4338 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4339 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4341 user_channel_id: user_id,
4346 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4347 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4348 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4349 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4350 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4351 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4352 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4353 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4354 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4356 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4358 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4361 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4362 // lock before watch_channel
4363 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4365 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4366 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4367 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4368 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4369 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4370 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4371 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4372 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4373 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4374 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4375 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4377 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4378 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4379 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4380 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4381 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4382 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4383 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4387 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4388 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4389 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4390 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4391 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4393 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4394 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4395 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4398 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4399 send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_id, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4407 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4409 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4410 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4411 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4412 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4413 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4414 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4415 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4417 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4418 Ok(update) => update,
4419 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4421 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4422 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4423 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4424 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4425 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4426 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4427 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4428 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4433 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4434 send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_id, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4438 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4441 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4442 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4446 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4447 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4448 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4449 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4450 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4451 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4452 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4454 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4455 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4456 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4457 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4458 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4459 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4460 msg: announcement_sigs,
4462 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4463 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4464 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4465 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4466 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4467 // announcement_signatures.
4468 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4469 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4470 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4471 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4478 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4482 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4483 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4484 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4485 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4486 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4488 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4489 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4490 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4491 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4494 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4495 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4496 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4497 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4500 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4501 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4503 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4504 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4505 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4506 let (result, is_permanent) =
4507 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4509 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
4515 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4516 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4517 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4524 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4527 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4528 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4531 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4535 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4536 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4537 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4538 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4539 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4540 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4541 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4542 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4544 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4545 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4546 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4547 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4552 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4553 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4554 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4555 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4556 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4557 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry)))
4558 } else { (tx, None) }
4560 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4563 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4564 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4565 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4567 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4568 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4569 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4570 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4574 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4579 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4580 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4581 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4582 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4584 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4585 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4586 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4587 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4589 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4590 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4592 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4593 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4594 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4595 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4598 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4599 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4600 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4601 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4602 match pending_forward_info {
4603 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4604 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4605 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4606 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
4608 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4610 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4611 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4612 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4615 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4617 _ => pending_forward_info
4620 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4622 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4627 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4628 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4629 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4630 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4631 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4632 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4633 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4634 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4636 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4638 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4641 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4645 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4646 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4647 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4648 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4649 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4650 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4651 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4653 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4655 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4660 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4661 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4662 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4663 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4664 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4665 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4666 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4668 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4669 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4670 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4672 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4675 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4679 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4680 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4681 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4682 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4683 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4684 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4685 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4687 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4688 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4689 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4690 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4691 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4692 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4693 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4698 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4699 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4701 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4702 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4703 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4705 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4706 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4707 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4708 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4709 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4710 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4711 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4712 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4714 commitment_signed: msg,
4720 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4725 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4726 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4727 let mut forward_event = None;
4728 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4729 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4730 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4731 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4733 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4734 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4735 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4736 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4737 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4739 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4740 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4741 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4743 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4744 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4745 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4750 match forward_event {
4752 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4753 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4754 time_forwardable: time
4762 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4763 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4765 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4766 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4767 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4768 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4769 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4770 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4772 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4773 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4774 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4775 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4776 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4777 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4778 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4779 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4780 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4781 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4782 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4784 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4785 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4786 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
4787 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4788 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4790 } else { unreachable!(); }
4793 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4794 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4795 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4799 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4800 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4801 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4802 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
4803 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4805 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4808 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4810 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4811 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4813 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4814 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4816 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4817 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4824 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4825 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4826 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4827 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4828 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4829 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4830 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4832 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4834 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4839 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4840 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4841 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4843 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4844 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4845 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4846 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4848 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4849 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4852 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4853 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4854 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4855 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4856 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4857 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4860 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4865 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4866 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4867 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4868 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4869 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4870 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4872 // It's not a local channel
4873 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4876 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4877 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4878 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4879 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4880 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4881 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4882 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4883 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4885 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4887 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4888 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4889 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4890 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4892 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4895 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4897 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4900 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4901 let chan_restoration_res;
4902 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4903 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4904 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4906 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4907 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4908 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4909 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4911 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4912 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4913 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4914 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4915 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
4916 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
4917 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
4918 let mut channel_update = None;
4919 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
4920 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4921 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4924 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4925 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4926 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4927 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4928 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4929 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4930 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4935 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4936 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
4937 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
4938 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
4939 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4940 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4942 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
4944 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4947 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4948 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4950 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4951 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
4956 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4957 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4958 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4959 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4960 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4961 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4962 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
4963 match monitor_event {
4964 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4965 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4966 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4967 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4969 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4970 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4973 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4974 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4975 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4976 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4977 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4978 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4979 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4980 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
4981 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4982 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4983 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4987 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4988 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4990 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4992 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4993 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4994 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4995 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4996 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5001 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5002 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5008 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5009 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5012 has_pending_monitor_events
5015 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5016 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5017 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5019 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5020 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5023 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5024 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5025 /// update was applied.
5027 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5028 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5029 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5030 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5031 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5032 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5033 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5034 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5036 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5037 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5038 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5039 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5040 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5042 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5043 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5044 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5045 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5046 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
5048 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5049 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5050 has_monitor_update = true;
5051 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5052 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5053 if close_channel { return false; }
5055 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5056 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5057 updates: commitment_update,
5064 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
5065 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5066 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5073 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5074 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5075 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
5078 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5079 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5085 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5086 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5087 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5088 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5089 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5090 let mut has_update = false;
5092 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5093 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5094 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5095 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5096 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5098 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5099 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5100 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5101 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5103 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5104 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5107 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5108 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5109 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5110 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5111 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5116 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5118 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5119 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5120 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5126 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
5127 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5134 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5135 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5141 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5142 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5144 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5145 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5146 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5147 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5148 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5149 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5150 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5151 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5152 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5153 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5154 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5155 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5156 assert!(should_broadcast);
5157 } else { unreachable!(); }
5158 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5160 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5164 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5165 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5167 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5168 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5171 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5173 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5174 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5175 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5176 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5177 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5178 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5179 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5180 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5181 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5182 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5183 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5184 // never fail a payment too early.
5185 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5187 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5190 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5195 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5198 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5199 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5201 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5202 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5203 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5205 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5207 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5208 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5212 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5213 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5215 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5217 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5218 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5219 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5220 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5221 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5222 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5225 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5226 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5228 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5231 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5233 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5235 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5236 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5237 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5238 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5239 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5242 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5243 /// stored external to LDK.
5245 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5246 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5247 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5249 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5250 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5253 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5254 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5255 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5256 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5258 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5259 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5260 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5261 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5262 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5264 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5265 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5266 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5267 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5268 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5270 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5271 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5273 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5274 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5278 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5279 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5281 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5283 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5284 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5285 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5286 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5289 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5290 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5292 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5295 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5297 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5299 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5300 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5303 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5304 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5306 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5307 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5308 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5311 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5312 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5314 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5315 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5316 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5317 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5319 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5320 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5321 match channel_state.short_to_id.entry(scid_candidate) {
5322 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue,
5323 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate
5328 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5330 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5331 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5333 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5334 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5335 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5339 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5340 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5341 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5342 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5343 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5348 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5349 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5353 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5354 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5358 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5359 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5360 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5361 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5362 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5365 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5366 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5367 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5368 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5370 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5371 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5372 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5373 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5376 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5377 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5379 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5380 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5383 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5384 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5385 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5387 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5388 events.replace(pending_events);
5397 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5399 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5400 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5401 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5402 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5405 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5407 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5408 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5410 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
5411 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
5412 /// restarting from an old state.
5413 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5414 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5415 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5417 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5418 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5419 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5420 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5423 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5424 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5425 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5428 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5429 handler.handle_event(&event);
5437 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5439 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5440 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5441 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5442 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5445 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5447 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5448 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5449 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5450 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5451 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5454 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5455 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5458 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5459 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5460 let new_height = height - 1;
5462 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5463 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5464 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5465 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5466 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5467 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5470 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5474 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5476 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5477 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5478 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5479 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5482 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5483 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5484 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5485 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5487 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5488 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5490 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5491 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5492 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5494 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5495 if height < last_best_block_height {
5496 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5497 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5501 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5502 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5503 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5504 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5506 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5507 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5509 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5511 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5513 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5515 macro_rules! max_time {
5516 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5518 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5519 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5520 // having an explicit local time source.
5521 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5522 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5523 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5524 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5525 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5531 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
5532 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5533 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5534 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5535 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5538 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5539 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5540 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5541 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5542 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5543 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5544 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5545 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5546 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5554 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5555 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5556 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
5557 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5558 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5559 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5565 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5566 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5567 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5568 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5569 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5570 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5571 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5572 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5577 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5579 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5580 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5581 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5582 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5585 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5586 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5588 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5589 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5590 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5591 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5592 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5594 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5595 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5597 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5598 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5599 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5600 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5601 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5602 let res = f(channel);
5603 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5604 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5605 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5606 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5610 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5611 send_channel_ready!(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5612 if channel.is_usable() {
5613 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5614 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5615 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5616 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5621 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5624 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5625 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5626 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5627 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5628 msg: announcement_sigs,
5630 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5631 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5632 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5634 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5635 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5636 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5641 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5642 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5643 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5644 // to the short_to_id map here. Note that we check whether we can relay
5645 // using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e. enforce option_scid_alias
5646 // then), and if the funding tx is ever un-confirmed we force-close the
5647 // channel, ensuring short_to_id is always consistent.
5648 let scid_insert = short_to_id.insert(real_scid, channel.channel_id());
5649 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == channel.channel_id(),
5650 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5651 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5654 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5655 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, channel);
5656 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5657 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5658 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5659 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5660 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5664 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5665 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5666 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5667 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5668 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5669 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5670 data: reason_message,
5678 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5679 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
5680 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5681 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5682 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5683 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5684 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5685 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5686 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5687 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5688 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5689 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5690 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5695 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5700 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5702 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5703 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5707 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5708 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5709 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5712 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5713 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5714 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5715 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5718 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5719 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5721 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5722 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5725 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5726 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5727 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5728 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5729 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5733 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5734 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5735 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5736 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5740 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5741 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5742 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5743 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5744 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5745 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5748 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5749 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5750 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5753 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5754 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5755 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5758 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5759 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5760 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5763 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5764 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5765 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5768 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
5769 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5770 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5773 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5774 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5775 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5778 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5779 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5780 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5783 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5784 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5785 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5788 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5789 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5790 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5793 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5794 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5795 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5798 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5799 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5800 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5803 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5804 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5805 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5808 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5809 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5810 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5813 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5814 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5815 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5818 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5819 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5820 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5823 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5824 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5825 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5828 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5833 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5834 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5835 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5838 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5839 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5840 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5841 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5843 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5844 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5845 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5846 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5847 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
5848 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
5849 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5850 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5851 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5852 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5853 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5854 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5857 no_channels_remain = false;
5862 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5864 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5865 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5866 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5867 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5868 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5869 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5870 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5871 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5872 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5873 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5874 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5875 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5876 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5877 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5878 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5879 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5880 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5881 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5882 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5883 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
5887 if no_channels_remain {
5888 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5891 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5892 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5896 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5897 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5899 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5902 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5903 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5904 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5905 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5906 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5909 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5910 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5915 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5916 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5917 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5918 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5919 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5920 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5921 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5922 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5923 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5927 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5928 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5929 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5935 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5938 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5939 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5941 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5942 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5943 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5944 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5945 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data));
5950 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
5951 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5952 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
5953 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5956 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
5957 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
5958 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5966 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5967 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data));
5972 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5973 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5974 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5975 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5976 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5977 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5980 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5983 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5989 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5990 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5995 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5996 let result = *guard;
6004 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6005 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6006 let current_time = Instant::now();
6008 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
6009 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
6014 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
6015 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
6016 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
6017 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
6018 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
6020 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
6021 let result = *guard;
6022 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
6026 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
6027 None => return result,
6033 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
6035 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
6036 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6037 *persistence_lock = true;
6038 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
6043 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6044 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6046 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6047 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6048 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6049 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6052 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6053 (2, node_id, required),
6054 (4, features, required),
6055 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6056 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6057 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6058 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6061 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
6062 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6063 (2, channel_id, required),
6064 (3, channel_type, option),
6065 (4, counterparty, required),
6066 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6067 (6, funding_txo, option),
6068 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6069 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6070 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6071 (14, user_channel_id, required),
6072 (16, balance_msat, required),
6073 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6074 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6075 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6076 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap())),
6077 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6078 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6079 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6080 (26, is_outbound, required),
6081 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6082 (30, is_usable, required),
6083 (32, is_public, required),
6084 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6085 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6088 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6089 (2, channels, vec_type),
6090 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6091 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6094 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6096 (0, onion_packet, required),
6097 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6100 (0, payment_data, required),
6101 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6102 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6104 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6105 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6106 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6110 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6111 (0, routing, required),
6112 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6113 (4, payment_hash, required),
6114 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
6115 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
6119 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6120 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6122 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6124 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6125 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6126 reason.write(writer)?;
6128 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6129 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6132 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6133 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6134 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6135 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6142 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6143 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6144 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6147 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6148 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6149 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6150 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6154 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6155 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6156 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6157 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6158 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6161 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6162 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6163 // messages contained in the variants.
6164 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6165 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6166 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6168 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6169 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6170 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6171 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6172 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6175 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6176 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6177 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6178 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6179 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6181 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6186 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6191 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6192 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6193 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6194 (2, outpoint, required),
6195 (4, htlc_id, required),
6196 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6199 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6200 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6201 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6202 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6203 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6205 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6206 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6207 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6208 (2, self.value, required),
6209 (4, payment_data, option),
6210 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6211 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6217 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6218 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6219 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6221 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6222 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6223 let mut total_msat = None;
6224 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6225 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6226 (0, prev_hop, required),
6227 (1, total_msat, option),
6228 (2, value, required),
6229 (4, payment_data, option),
6230 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6231 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6233 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6235 if payment_data.is_some() {
6236 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6238 if total_msat.is_none() {
6239 total_msat = Some(value);
6241 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6244 if total_msat.is_none() {
6245 if payment_data.is_none() {
6246 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6248 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6250 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6254 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6257 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6264 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6265 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6266 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6269 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6270 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6271 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6272 let mut payment_id = None;
6273 let mut payment_secret = None;
6274 let mut payment_params = None;
6275 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6276 (0, session_priv, required),
6277 (1, payment_id, option),
6278 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6279 (3, payment_secret, option),
6280 (4, path, vec_type),
6281 (5, payment_params, option),
6283 if payment_id.is_none() {
6284 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6286 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6288 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6289 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6290 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6291 path: path.unwrap(),
6292 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6297 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6298 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6303 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6304 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6306 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6308 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6309 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6310 (0, session_priv, required),
6311 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6312 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6313 (3, payment_secret, option),
6314 (4, path, vec_type),
6315 (5, payment_params, option),
6318 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6320 field.write(writer)?;
6327 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6328 (0, LightningError) => {
6332 (0, failure_code, required),
6333 (2, data, vec_type),
6337 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6339 (0, forward_info, required),
6340 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6341 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6342 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6345 (0, htlc_id, required),
6346 (2, err_packet, required),
6350 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6351 (0, payment_secret, required),
6352 (2, expiry_time, required),
6353 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6354 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6355 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6358 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6360 (0, session_privs, required),
6363 (0, session_privs, required),
6364 (1, payment_hash, option),
6367 (0, session_privs, required),
6368 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6369 (2, payment_hash, required),
6370 (4, payment_secret, option),
6371 (6, total_msat, required),
6372 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6373 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6376 (0, session_privs, required),
6377 (2, payment_hash, required),
6381 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6382 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6383 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6384 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6385 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6388 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6389 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6391 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6393 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6395 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6396 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6397 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6400 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6401 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6402 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6403 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6404 unfunded_channels += 1;
6407 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6408 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6409 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6410 channel.write(writer)?;
6414 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6415 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6416 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6417 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6418 for forward in pending_forwards {
6419 forward.write(writer)?;
6423 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6424 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6425 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6426 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6427 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6428 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6429 htlc.write(writer)?;
6431 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6434 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6435 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6436 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6437 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6438 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6439 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6442 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6443 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6444 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6445 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6446 for event in events.iter() {
6447 event.write(writer)?;
6450 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6451 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6452 for event in background_events.iter() {
6454 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6456 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6457 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6462 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6463 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6465 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6466 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6467 hash.write(writer)?;
6468 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6471 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6472 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6473 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6474 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6475 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6478 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6479 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6481 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6482 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6483 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6484 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6487 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6488 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6492 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6493 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6494 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6496 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6497 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6498 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6503 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6504 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6505 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6506 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6507 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6508 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6515 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6517 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6519 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6520 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6521 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6522 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6523 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6524 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6525 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6526 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6527 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6528 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6529 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6530 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6531 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6533 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6534 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6536 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6537 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6539 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6540 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6541 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6542 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6543 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6544 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6546 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6547 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6548 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6549 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6550 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6551 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6554 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6555 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6557 pub keys_manager: K,
6559 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6561 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6562 pub fee_estimator: F,
6563 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6565 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6566 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6567 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6568 pub chain_monitor: M,
6570 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6571 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6572 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6573 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6574 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6575 /// deserialization.
6577 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6578 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6579 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6581 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6582 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6584 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6585 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6586 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6587 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6589 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6592 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6593 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6596 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6597 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6598 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6599 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6600 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6601 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6604 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6605 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6606 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6607 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6608 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6610 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6611 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6616 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6617 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6618 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6619 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6620 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6621 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6622 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6623 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6626 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6627 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6628 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6632 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6633 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6634 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6635 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6636 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6637 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6640 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6641 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6643 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6644 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6645 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6647 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6649 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6650 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6651 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6652 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6653 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6654 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6655 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6656 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6657 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6658 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6659 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6660 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6661 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6662 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6663 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6664 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6665 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6666 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6667 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6668 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6669 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6670 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6671 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6672 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6673 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6674 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6675 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6676 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6677 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6678 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6679 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6680 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6681 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6682 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6683 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6684 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6685 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6686 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6687 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6690 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6691 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6692 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
6694 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6697 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6698 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6699 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6700 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6701 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6702 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6706 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6707 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6708 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6709 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6713 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6714 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6715 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6716 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6717 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6718 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6719 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6720 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6721 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6723 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6726 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6727 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6728 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6729 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6730 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6731 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6732 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6733 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
6735 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
6738 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6739 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6740 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6741 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6742 let peer_state = PeerState {
6743 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6745 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6748 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6749 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6750 for _ in 0..event_count {
6751 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6752 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6756 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6757 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6758 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6759 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6760 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6761 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6762 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6763 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6767 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6768 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6769 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6770 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6771 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6772 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6776 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6777 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6779 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6780 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6781 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6782 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6783 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6787 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6788 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6789 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6790 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6791 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6792 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6793 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6795 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6796 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6800 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6801 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6802 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6803 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
6804 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6805 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
6806 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6807 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6808 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6809 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
6810 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
6811 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6813 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
6814 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6817 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6818 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6819 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6820 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6821 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6822 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6824 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6826 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6827 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6828 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6829 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6830 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6831 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6832 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6834 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
6835 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6836 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6837 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6838 if path.is_empty() {
6839 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6840 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6842 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6843 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6844 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6845 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6846 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6847 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6848 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6849 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6851 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6852 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6853 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6854 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6855 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6857 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6858 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6859 total_msat: path_amt,
6860 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6862 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6863 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6872 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
6873 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
6875 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
6876 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
6877 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
6878 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6880 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
6881 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
6884 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
6885 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
6886 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
6887 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
6888 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6890 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
6891 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
6892 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
6893 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
6894 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
6895 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
6896 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
6897 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
6899 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
6900 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6904 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
6906 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
6908 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
6909 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
6911 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
6915 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6916 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6918 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6919 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6922 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
6924 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6926 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
6927 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
6928 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
6929 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
6930 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6934 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
6935 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
6936 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
6937 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
6939 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
6940 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
6941 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
6943 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6944 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
6945 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
6946 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
6947 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
6948 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6950 if chan.is_usable() {
6951 if short_to_id.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), *chan_id).is_some() {
6952 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
6953 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
6954 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
6955 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6960 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
6961 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
6962 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
6963 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
6964 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
6965 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
6966 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
6968 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
6969 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
6970 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
6971 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
6973 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
6974 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
6975 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
6976 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
6978 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
6979 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
6980 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
6981 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
6983 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
6984 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
6985 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
6987 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
6988 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &args.fee_estimator, &args.logger);
6991 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
6993 purpose: payment_purpose,
6994 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7000 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7002 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
7003 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7004 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7006 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7008 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7013 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7015 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7016 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7017 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7019 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7020 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7026 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
7027 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7029 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7031 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7032 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7033 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7034 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
7036 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7037 logger: args.logger,
7038 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7041 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7042 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
7045 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7046 //connection or two.
7048 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7054 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7055 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7056 use core::time::Duration;
7057 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7058 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7059 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7060 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
7061 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
7062 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7064 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7065 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7066 use util::errors::APIError;
7067 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7068 use util::test_utils;
7069 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7071 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
7073 fn test_wait_timeout() {
7074 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
7076 use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
7079 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
7080 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
7082 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
7083 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
7084 thread::spawn(move || {
7086 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
7087 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7088 *persistence_lock = true;
7091 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
7097 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
7098 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
7100 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
7103 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
7108 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
7110 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
7113 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
7120 fn test_notify_limits() {
7121 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7122 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7123 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7124 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7125 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7126 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7128 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7129 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7130 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7131 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7132 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7134 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7136 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7137 // to connect messages with new values
7138 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7139 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7140 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7141 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7143 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7144 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7145 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7146 // ... but the last node should not.
7147 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7148 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7149 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7150 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7152 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7153 // about the channel.
7154 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7155 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7156 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7158 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7160 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7161 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7162 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7163 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7164 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7165 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7167 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7168 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7169 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7171 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7172 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7173 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7174 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7175 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7176 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7178 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7179 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7180 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7181 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7182 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7183 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7184 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7185 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7187 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7188 // the channel info has updated.
7189 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7190 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7191 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7192 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7193 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7194 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7198 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7199 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7201 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7202 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7203 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7204 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7205 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7207 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7208 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7209 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7210 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7211 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7212 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7213 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7214 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7215 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7216 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7217 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7219 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7220 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7221 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7222 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7223 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7224 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7225 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7226 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7227 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7228 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7229 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7230 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7231 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7232 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7233 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7234 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7235 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7236 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7237 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7238 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7239 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7240 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7242 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7243 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7244 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7245 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7246 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7247 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7249 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7250 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7251 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7252 // lightning messages manually.
7253 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7254 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7255 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7257 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7258 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7259 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7260 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7261 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7262 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7263 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7264 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7265 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7266 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7267 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7268 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7269 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7270 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7271 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7272 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7273 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7274 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7275 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7276 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7277 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7278 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7279 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7280 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7281 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7283 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7284 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7285 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7286 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7288 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7289 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7290 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7291 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7293 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7296 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7297 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7298 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7299 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7301 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7304 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7305 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7306 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7307 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7309 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7314 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7315 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7316 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7317 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7318 // fails as expected.
7319 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7320 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7321 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7322 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7323 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7324 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7325 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7327 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7328 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7329 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7331 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7332 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7333 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7334 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7335 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7337 let route = find_route(
7338 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7339 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7341 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7342 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7343 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7344 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7345 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7346 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7347 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7348 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7349 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7350 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7351 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7352 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7353 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7354 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7355 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7356 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7357 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7358 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7359 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7360 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7361 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7363 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7364 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7366 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7367 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7368 let route = find_route(
7369 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7370 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7372 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7373 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7374 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7375 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7376 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7377 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7378 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7380 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7381 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7382 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7383 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7384 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7385 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7386 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7387 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7388 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7389 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7390 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7391 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7392 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7393 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7394 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7395 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7396 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7397 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7398 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7399 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7400 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7401 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7402 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7404 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7405 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7409 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7410 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7411 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7412 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7413 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7414 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7415 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7417 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7418 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7419 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7420 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7422 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7423 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7424 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7425 final_value_msat: 10000,
7426 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7428 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7429 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7430 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7431 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7432 let route = find_route(
7433 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7434 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7437 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7438 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7439 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7440 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7442 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7443 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7444 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7445 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7446 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7447 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7448 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7450 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7454 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7455 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7456 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7457 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7458 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7459 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7461 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7462 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7463 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7464 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7466 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7467 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7468 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7469 final_value_msat: 10000,
7470 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7472 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7473 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7474 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7475 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7476 let route = find_route(
7477 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7478 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7481 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7482 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7483 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7484 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7485 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7487 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7488 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7489 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7490 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7491 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7492 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7493 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7495 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7499 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7500 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7501 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7502 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7503 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7505 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7506 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7507 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7508 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7510 // Marshall an MPP route.
7511 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7512 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7513 route.paths.push(path);
7514 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7515 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7516 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7517 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7518 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7519 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7521 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7522 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7523 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7524 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7529 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7530 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7531 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7532 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7533 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7534 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7536 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7537 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7539 total_msat: 100_000,
7542 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7543 // payment verification fails as expected.
7544 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7545 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7546 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7547 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7549 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7553 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7554 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7558 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
7561 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7562 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
7563 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7564 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7565 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7566 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7567 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
7568 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7569 use util::test_utils;
7570 use util::config::UserConfig;
7571 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7573 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7574 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7575 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
7577 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7581 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7582 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7583 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7584 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7585 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7586 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7587 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7592 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7593 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7596 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7597 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7598 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7600 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7601 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7603 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7604 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7606 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7607 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7609 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7610 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7611 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7612 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7613 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7615 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7617 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7619 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7620 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7621 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7622 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7623 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7625 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7627 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7629 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7630 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7631 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7632 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7633 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7636 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7637 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7638 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7640 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7641 } else { panic!(); }
7643 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7644 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7646 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7649 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7652 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7653 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7655 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7656 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7657 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7658 match msg_events[0] {
7659 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
7660 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7661 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7665 match msg_events[1] {
7666 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7670 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
7672 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7673 macro_rules! send_payment {
7674 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7675 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7676 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7677 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7678 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7679 let seed = [3u8; 32];
7680 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
7681 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7682 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
7683 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7685 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7686 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7688 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7689 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7691 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7692 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7693 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7694 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7695 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7696 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7697 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7698 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7700 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7701 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7702 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7703 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
7705 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7706 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7707 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7708 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7709 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7711 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7714 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7715 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7716 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7717 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7719 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7724 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7725 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);