1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
22 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
24 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
25 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
38 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
39 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
41 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent};
42 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
43 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
45 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
47 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
48 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemoryChannelKeys};
49 use util::config::UserConfig;
50 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
51 use util::{byte_utils, events};
52 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
53 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
54 use util::logger::Logger;
55 use util::errors::APIError;
58 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
59 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
60 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
61 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
62 use std::time::Duration;
63 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
65 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
67 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
69 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
70 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
71 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
73 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
74 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
75 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
76 // before we forward it.
78 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
79 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
80 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
81 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
82 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
84 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
85 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
87 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
88 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
91 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
92 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
96 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
97 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
98 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
99 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
100 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
101 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
102 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
105 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
106 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
107 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
108 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
111 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
112 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
113 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
114 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
115 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
118 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
120 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
122 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
126 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
130 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
131 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
132 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
133 short_channel_id: u64,
135 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
138 struct ClaimableHTLC {
139 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
141 /// Filled in when the HTLC was received with a payment_secret packet, which contains a
142 /// total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
143 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
144 /// are part of the same payment.
145 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
149 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
150 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
151 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
152 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
155 session_priv: SecretKey,
156 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
157 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
158 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
163 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
164 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
166 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
167 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
172 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
173 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
175 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
183 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
184 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
185 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
186 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
187 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
188 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
189 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
190 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
191 /// payment_secret type, use to authenticate sender to the receiver and tie MPP HTLCs together
192 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
193 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
194 pub struct PaymentSecret(pub [u8;32]);
196 type ShutdownResult = (Option<OutPoint>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
198 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
199 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
200 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
201 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
202 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
204 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
205 err: msgs::LightningError,
206 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
208 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
210 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
212 err: LightningError {
214 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
215 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
221 shutdown_finish: None,
225 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
227 err: LightningError {
229 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
231 shutdown_finish: None,
235 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
236 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
239 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
241 err: LightningError {
243 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
244 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
250 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
254 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
257 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
259 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
261 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
263 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
264 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
270 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
272 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
273 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
280 shutdown_finish: None,
285 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
286 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
287 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
288 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
289 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
291 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
292 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
293 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
294 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
295 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
296 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
297 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
299 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
303 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
304 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
305 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<ChanSigner>>,
306 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
307 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
308 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
309 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
310 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
311 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
312 /// (payment_hash, payment_secret) -> Vec<HTLCs> for tracking HTLCs that
313 /// were to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
314 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
315 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
317 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<(PaymentHash, Option<PaymentSecret>), Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
318 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
319 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
320 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
323 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
324 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
326 latest_features: InitFeatures,
329 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
330 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
332 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
333 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
334 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
335 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
336 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
337 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
338 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
339 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = Arc<ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>>;
341 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
342 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
343 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
344 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
345 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
346 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
347 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
348 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
349 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
351 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
352 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
354 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
355 /// to individual Channels.
357 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
358 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
359 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
360 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
362 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
363 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
364 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
365 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
366 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
367 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
368 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
370 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
371 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
372 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
373 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
376 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
377 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
378 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
379 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
380 /// timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
382 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
383 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
384 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
385 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
386 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
387 pub struct ChannelManager<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
388 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
389 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
390 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
391 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
394 default_configuration: UserConfig,
395 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
401 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
403 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
404 last_block_hash: Mutex<BlockHash>,
405 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
408 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
410 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
411 our_network_key: SecretKey,
413 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
414 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
415 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
417 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
418 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
419 /// are currently open with that peer.
420 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
421 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
423 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
425 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
426 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
427 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
428 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
429 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
436 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
437 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
438 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
439 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
440 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
442 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
443 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
444 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
445 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
446 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
447 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
448 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
450 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
451 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
452 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
453 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
454 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
455 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
458 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
460 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
461 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
464 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
466 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
467 pub struct ChannelDetails {
468 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
469 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
470 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
471 /// lifetime of the channel.
472 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
473 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
474 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
475 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
476 /// The node_id of our counterparty
477 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
478 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
479 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
480 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
481 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
482 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
483 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
484 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
486 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
487 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
488 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
489 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
490 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
491 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
492 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
493 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
494 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
495 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
496 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
497 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
498 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
502 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
503 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
506 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
507 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
508 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
509 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
510 ParameterError(APIError),
511 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
512 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
513 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
516 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
518 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
519 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
520 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
521 /// paths than the ones selected).
522 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
523 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
524 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
525 /// in over-/re-payment.
527 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
528 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
529 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
531 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
532 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
533 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
534 /// with the latest update_id.
535 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
538 macro_rules! handle_error {
539 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
542 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
543 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
545 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
546 // entering the macro.
547 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
550 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
552 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
553 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
554 if let Some(update) = update_option {
555 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
561 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
562 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
564 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
565 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
566 action: err.action.clone()
570 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
571 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
574 // Return error in case higher-API need one
581 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
582 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
585 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
586 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
588 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
589 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
590 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
591 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
592 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
594 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
596 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
601 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
602 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
605 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
606 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
608 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
609 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
610 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
611 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
612 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
614 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
616 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg)) => {
617 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
618 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
619 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
620 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
622 let shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown(false);
623 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
629 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
630 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
631 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
633 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
635 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
636 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
637 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
638 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
639 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
641 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
642 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
643 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
644 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
645 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
646 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
647 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
648 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
649 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
650 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
653 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
654 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
655 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
656 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
658 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
659 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
661 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
662 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
664 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
665 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
666 if !$resend_commitment {
667 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
670 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
672 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
673 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$entry.key()))
679 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
680 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
681 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
683 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
684 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
688 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
689 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
690 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
691 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
692 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
695 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
700 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
701 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
702 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
703 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
704 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
707 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
709 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
710 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
712 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
714 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
716 /// Users must provide the current blockchain height from which to track onchain channel
717 /// funding outpoints and send payments with reliable timelocks.
719 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
720 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods.
721 pub fn new(network: Network, fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Self {
722 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
725 default_configuration: config.clone(),
726 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.block_hash(),
727 fee_estimator: fee_est,
731 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height),
732 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
735 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
736 by_id: HashMap::new(),
737 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
738 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
739 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
740 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
742 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
744 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
746 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
748 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
749 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
757 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
759 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
760 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
761 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
762 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
764 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
765 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
767 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
768 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
769 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
770 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
771 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
774 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
775 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
776 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
778 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
779 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
780 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
781 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
782 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
783 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
785 panic!("RNG is bad???");
788 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
790 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
791 node_id: their_network_key,
797 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<ChanSigner>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
798 let mut res = Vec::new();
800 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
801 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
802 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
803 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
804 res.push(ChannelDetails {
805 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
806 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
807 remote_network_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
808 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
809 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
810 inbound_capacity_msat,
811 outbound_capacity_msat,
812 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
813 is_live: channel.is_live(),
817 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
818 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
819 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
820 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
826 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
827 /// more information.
828 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
829 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
832 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
833 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
835 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
836 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
837 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
838 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
839 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
840 // really wanted anyway.
841 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
844 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
845 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
846 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
848 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
849 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
850 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
852 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
853 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
854 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
855 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
856 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
857 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
858 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
859 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
862 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
863 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
864 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
866 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
867 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
869 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
872 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
873 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
875 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
876 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
881 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
882 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
883 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
892 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
893 let (funding_txo_option, monitor_update, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
894 log_trace!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
895 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
896 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
898 if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_option {
899 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
900 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
901 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
902 // ignore the result here.
903 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
907 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
908 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
909 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
910 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
913 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
914 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
915 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
916 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
917 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
924 log_trace!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
925 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
926 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
927 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
928 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
934 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
935 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
936 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
937 for chan in self.list_channels() {
938 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
942 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>) {
943 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
944 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
946 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
947 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
948 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
949 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
950 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
951 failure_code: $err_code,
952 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
957 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
958 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
961 let shared_secret = {
962 let mut arr = [0; 32];
963 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
966 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
968 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
969 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
970 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
971 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
972 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
973 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
974 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
975 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
978 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
979 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
980 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
981 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
982 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
985 let mut channel_state = None;
986 macro_rules! return_err {
987 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
989 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
990 if channel_state.is_none() {
991 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
993 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
994 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
995 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
996 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
997 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1002 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1003 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1004 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1005 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1007 let error_code = match err {
1008 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1009 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1010 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1011 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1012 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1014 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1017 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1018 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1019 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1026 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1029 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1030 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1031 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1032 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1033 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1034 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1035 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1036 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1037 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1038 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1039 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1040 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1044 // final_expiry_too_soon
1045 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least
1046 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1047 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward
1048 // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational).
1049 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1050 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1052 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1053 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1054 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1056 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1057 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1058 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1061 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1062 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1063 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1064 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1067 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1068 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1069 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1070 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1072 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1073 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1075 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1077 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1078 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1079 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1080 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1083 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1084 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1085 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1087 // Check two things:
1088 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1089 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1090 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1092 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1094 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1095 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1096 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1098 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1100 let blinding_factor = {
1101 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1102 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1103 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1104 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1107 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1109 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1111 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1114 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1115 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1118 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1119 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1120 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1121 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1122 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1126 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1127 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1128 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1129 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1131 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1132 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1133 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1134 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1138 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1139 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1140 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1141 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1142 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1143 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1144 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1145 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1146 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1147 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1149 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1151 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1152 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1154 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1155 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1156 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1157 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1158 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1159 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1160 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1162 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1163 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1165 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1166 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1167 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1169 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1170 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1172 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1173 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1174 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1175 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1176 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1178 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1179 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1181 // In theory, we would be safe against unitentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1182 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longuer delay.
1183 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1184 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1190 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1191 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1192 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1193 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1195 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1196 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1198 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1199 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1200 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1202 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1204 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1209 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1212 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1213 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1214 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1215 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1216 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1220 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1222 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1223 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1224 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1225 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1226 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1227 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1228 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1229 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1230 fee_base_msat: chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1231 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1232 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1235 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1236 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1238 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1244 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1245 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1246 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1247 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1248 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1250 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1251 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1252 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1253 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1254 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1256 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1258 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1260 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1261 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1262 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1263 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1264 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1267 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1268 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1270 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1271 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1273 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1274 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1276 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1278 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1279 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1280 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1282 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1283 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1284 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1285 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1286 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1287 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1288 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1289 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1290 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1293 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1294 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1295 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1296 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1297 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1298 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1299 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1307 } else { unreachable!(); }
1311 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1312 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1314 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1319 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1321 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1322 /// fields for more info.
1324 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1325 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1326 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1327 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1328 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1329 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1331 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1333 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1334 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1335 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1337 /// In general, a path may raise:
1338 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1339 /// node public key) is specified.
1340 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1341 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1343 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1344 /// relevant updates.
1346 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1347 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1348 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1350 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1351 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1352 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1353 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1355 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1356 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1357 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1358 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1359 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1360 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1362 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1363 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1364 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1365 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1366 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1368 let mut total_value = 0;
1369 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1370 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1371 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1372 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1373 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1374 continue 'path_check;
1376 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1377 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1378 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1379 continue 'path_check;
1382 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1383 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1385 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1386 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1389 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1390 let mut results = Vec::new();
1391 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1392 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height));
1394 let mut has_ok = false;
1395 let mut has_err = false;
1396 for res in results.iter() {
1397 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1398 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1399 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1400 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1407 if has_err && has_ok {
1408 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1410 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1416 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1418 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1419 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1421 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1423 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1424 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1425 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1426 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1429 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1431 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo, &self.logger)
1432 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1433 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1434 } else { unreachable!(); })
1439 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
1440 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1443 Err(_) => { return; }
1447 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1448 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1449 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1452 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1453 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1454 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1456 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1462 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1463 if !chan.should_announce() {
1464 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1468 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1470 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1472 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1473 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1475 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1476 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1477 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1478 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1479 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1484 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1485 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1486 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1488 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1491 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1492 // smaller than 500:
1493 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1495 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1496 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event. Note that such messages will be ignored unless peers have
1497 /// seen a channel_announcement from us (ie unless we have public channels open).
1499 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias is a printable human-readable string to describe this node
1500 /// to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1502 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1503 /// incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these
1504 /// addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain
1505 /// only Tor Onion addresses.
1507 /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
1508 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
1509 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1511 if addresses.len() > 500 {
1512 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
1515 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1516 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1517 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1518 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1519 rgb, alias, addresses,
1520 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1521 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1523 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1525 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1526 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1527 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1528 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1529 contents: announcement
1534 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1536 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1537 /// Will likely generate further events.
1538 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1539 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1541 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1542 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1543 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1545 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1546 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1548 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1549 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1550 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1551 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1553 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1554 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1555 match forward_info {
1556 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1557 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1558 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1559 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1560 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1562 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
1563 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
1566 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1567 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1568 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1569 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1570 // problem, not ours.
1577 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1578 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1579 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1580 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1581 match forward_info {
1582 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1583 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1585 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value }, } => {
1586 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1587 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1588 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1589 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1590 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1592 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
1594 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1595 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1597 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1599 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1600 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
1601 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
1607 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1609 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1610 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1611 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1612 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1613 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1614 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1615 // this channel currently :/.
1621 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1622 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
1624 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1625 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1626 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1628 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1629 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1631 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1633 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1634 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1635 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1638 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1640 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1641 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1642 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1643 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1644 // messages when we can.
1645 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1646 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1647 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1654 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1655 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
1658 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1659 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1660 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1661 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1662 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1663 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1665 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1666 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1667 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1668 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1669 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1671 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1673 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1675 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
1679 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1680 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1683 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1684 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1685 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1686 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1687 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1688 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1689 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1691 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1699 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1700 match forward_info {
1701 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1702 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry },
1703 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. }, } => {
1704 let prev_hop = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1705 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1706 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1707 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1710 let mut total_value = 0;
1711 let payment_secret_opt =
1712 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data { Some(data.payment_secret.clone()) } else { None };
1713 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry((payment_hash, payment_secret_opt))
1714 .or_insert(Vec::new());
1715 htlcs.push(ClaimableHTLC {
1717 value: amt_to_forward,
1718 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
1719 cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry,
1721 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1722 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1723 total_value += htlc.value;
1724 if htlc.payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat != data.total_msat {
1725 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
1727 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
1729 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > data.total_msat {
1730 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1731 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1732 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
1733 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(
1734 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire)
1738 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1739 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
1740 htlc_id: htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
1741 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
1743 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
1746 } else if total_value == data.total_msat {
1747 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1748 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1749 payment_secret: Some(data.payment_secret),
1754 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1755 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1756 payment_secret: None,
1757 amt: amt_to_forward,
1761 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1762 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
1764 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1765 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1773 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1774 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
1777 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1778 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
1781 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1782 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1783 events.append(&mut new_events);
1786 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1787 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1788 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1790 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1791 pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
1792 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1793 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1794 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1795 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
1796 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
1797 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1798 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1803 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
1805 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
1806 chan.to_disabled_staged();
1811 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1812 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1813 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1814 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1815 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1816 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> bool {
1817 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1819 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1820 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(*payment_hash, *payment_secret));
1821 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1822 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
1823 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1824 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1825 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
1826 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
1828 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1829 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
1830 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
1836 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
1837 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
1838 // be surfaced to the user.
1839 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
1840 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
1842 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
1843 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
1844 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
1845 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
1846 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(&chan_entry.get()) {
1847 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
1849 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
1852 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
1854 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1855 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
1856 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
1858 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1859 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1860 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1862 rejected_by_dest: false,
1874 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1875 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1876 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1877 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1878 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1879 /// still-available channels.
1880 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1881 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1882 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1883 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1886 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } => {
1887 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1888 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1889 match &onion_error {
1890 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
1892 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1894 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1895 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1896 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1897 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1898 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1899 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1900 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1905 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1906 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1907 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1908 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1910 error_code: onion_error_code,
1912 error_data: onion_error_data
1916 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1922 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1923 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1924 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
1925 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1927 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1928 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1929 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1930 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1931 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1932 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
1934 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1936 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
1942 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1943 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1944 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1945 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1946 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1947 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1949 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
1950 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1951 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1955 let mut forward_event = None;
1956 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1957 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
1959 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1960 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1961 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1963 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1964 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1967 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1968 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1969 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1970 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1971 time_forwardable: time
1978 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1979 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1980 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1982 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
1983 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
1984 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
1985 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
1986 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
1987 /// motivated attackers.
1989 /// Note that the privacy concerns in (b) are not relevant in payments with a payment_secret
1990 /// set. Thus, for such payments we will claim any payments which do not under-pay.
1992 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1993 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
1994 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1996 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1998 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1999 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(payment_hash, *payment_secret));
2000 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2001 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2003 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2004 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2005 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2006 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2008 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2009 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2010 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2011 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2012 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2015 let (is_mpp, mut valid_mpp) = if let &Some(ref data) = &sources[0].payment_data {
2016 assert!(payment_secret.is_some());
2017 (true, data.total_msat >= expected_amount)
2019 assert!(payment_secret.is_none());
2023 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2024 if !is_mpp || !valid_mpp { break; }
2025 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2030 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2031 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2032 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2033 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2034 if (is_mpp && !valid_mpp) || (!is_mpp && (htlc.value < expected_amount || htlc.value > expected_amount * 2)) {
2035 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2036 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2037 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
2039 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2040 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2041 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2043 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2045 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
2046 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2047 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2048 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
2049 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2050 } else { errs.push(e); }
2052 Err(None) if is_mpp => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2054 log_warn!(self.logger, "Channel we expected to claim an HTLC from was closed.");
2056 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2061 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2062 // which were generated.
2063 channel_state.take();
2065 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2066 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2067 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2074 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2075 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2076 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2077 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2078 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2084 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2085 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2086 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2087 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
2088 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
2089 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2090 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2091 assert!(msgs.is_none());
2093 return Err(Some((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err())));
2097 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2098 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2099 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2100 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2101 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2102 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2103 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2104 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2113 // TODO: Do something with e?
2114 // This should only occur if we are claiming an HTLC at the same time as the
2115 // HTLC is being failed (eg because a block is being connected and this caused
2116 // an HTLC to time out). This should, of course, only occur if the user is the
2117 // one doing the claiming (as it being a part of a peer claim would imply we're
2118 // about to lose funds) and only if the lock in claim_funds was dropped as a
2119 // previous HTLC was failed (thus not for an MPP payment).
2120 debug_assert!(false, "This shouldn't be reachable except in absurdly rare cases between monitor updates and HTLC timeouts: {:?}", e);
2124 } else { unreachable!(); }
2127 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2129 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2130 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2131 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2132 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2136 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2137 if let Err((counterparty_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2140 // TODO: There is probably a channel monitor somewhere that needs to
2141 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
2142 // why it's missing.
2145 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2147 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2148 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2149 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2155 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2156 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2157 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
2160 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2161 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2164 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2165 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2167 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2168 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2169 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2170 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2172 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2173 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
2174 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2175 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2176 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2177 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2178 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2179 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2180 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2181 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2183 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
2184 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
2185 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
2186 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
2189 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2190 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2191 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2192 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2193 let channel = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2197 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2201 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2202 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2203 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
2205 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
2207 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
2208 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
2209 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2210 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2215 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
2216 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
2217 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2218 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2219 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2224 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2228 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2233 if needs_broadcast_safe {
2234 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2235 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
2236 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2239 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2240 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2241 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2244 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2245 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2246 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2247 msg: announcement_sigs,
2250 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2254 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
2256 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
2257 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2259 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
2261 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
2262 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
2266 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2267 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2268 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2271 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
2272 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2273 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2274 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2275 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2276 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2277 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2278 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2279 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2280 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2282 entry.insert(channel);
2288 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2289 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2290 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2291 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2292 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2293 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2294 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2295 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2297 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2298 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2300 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2303 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2304 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2305 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2306 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2307 output_script: output_script,
2308 user_channel_id: user_id,
2313 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2314 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
2315 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2316 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2317 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2318 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2319 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2320 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2322 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2324 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2327 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2328 // lock before watch_channel
2329 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
2331 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2332 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2333 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2334 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2335 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2336 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), None));
2338 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2339 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2340 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2341 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2342 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2343 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2347 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2348 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2349 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2350 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2351 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
2353 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2354 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2355 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2364 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2365 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
2366 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2367 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2368 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2369 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2370 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2371 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2373 let monitor = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
2374 Ok(update) => update,
2375 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2377 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2378 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2380 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2382 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2385 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2386 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2387 funding_txo: funding_txo,
2388 user_channel_id: user_id,
2393 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2394 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2395 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2396 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2397 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2398 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2399 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2401 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2402 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2403 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2404 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2405 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2406 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2407 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2408 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2409 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2410 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2411 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2412 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2413 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2414 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2415 msg: announcement_sigs,
2420 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2424 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2425 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2426 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2427 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2429 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2430 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2431 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2432 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2434 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2435 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2436 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2437 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2441 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2442 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2443 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2447 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2448 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2449 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2451 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2452 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2454 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2457 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2458 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2460 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2461 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2462 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2463 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2471 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2472 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2473 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2474 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2475 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2476 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2477 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2478 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2480 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2481 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2482 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2483 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2488 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2489 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2490 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2491 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2492 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2493 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2494 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2496 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2497 } else { (tx, None) }
2499 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2502 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2503 log_trace!(self.logger, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2504 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2506 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2507 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2508 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2509 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2517 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2518 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2519 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2520 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2522 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2523 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2524 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2525 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2527 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2528 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2530 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2531 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2532 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2533 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2536 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
2537 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
2538 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
2539 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
2540 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2541 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2542 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2543 match pending_forward_info {
2544 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2545 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(chan) {
2546 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
2547 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2548 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2549 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2550 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
2554 // The only case where we'd be unable to
2555 // successfully get a channel update is if the
2556 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
2557 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
2558 // payments over the channel back to themselves
2559 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
2560 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
2561 // no problem just calling this
2562 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
2563 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2565 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2566 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2567 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2570 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
2572 _ => pending_forward_info
2575 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2577 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2582 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2583 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2585 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2586 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2587 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2588 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2589 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2591 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2593 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2596 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2600 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2601 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2602 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2603 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2604 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2605 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2606 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2608 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2610 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2615 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2616 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2617 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2618 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2619 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2620 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2621 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2623 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2624 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
2625 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2627 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2630 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2634 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2635 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2636 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2637 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2638 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2639 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2640 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2642 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2643 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
2644 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2645 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
2646 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2647 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
2648 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2653 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2654 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2655 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2657 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2658 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2659 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2661 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2662 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2663 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2664 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2665 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2666 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2667 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2668 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2670 commitment_signed: msg,
2674 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2675 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2676 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2682 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2687 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2688 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2689 let mut forward_event = None;
2690 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2691 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2692 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2693 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2695 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2696 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
2697 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
2698 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
2700 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2701 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2703 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2704 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2709 match forward_event {
2711 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2712 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2713 time_forwardable: time
2721 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2722 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2724 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2725 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2726 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2727 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2728 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2729 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2731 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2732 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
2733 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2734 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
2735 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2736 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2737 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2738 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
2740 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
2742 } else { unreachable!(); }
2745 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2746 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2747 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2751 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2752 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2753 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2757 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel")))
2759 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2762 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
2764 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id)) => {
2765 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2766 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2768 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2775 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2776 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2777 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2778 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2779 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2780 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2781 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2783 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2785 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2790 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2791 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2792 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2794 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2795 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2796 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2797 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2799 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2800 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2803 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2804 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2805 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2807 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2808 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2810 let their_node_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 };
2811 let their_bitcoin_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 };
2812 match (self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, their_node_key),
2813 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, their_bitcoin_key)) {
2815 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature: {:?}. Maybe using different node_secret for transport and routing msg? UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}", e, &announcement, their_node_key));
2816 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2819 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature: {:?}. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})", e, &announcement, their_bitcoin_key));
2820 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2826 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2828 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2829 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2830 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2831 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2832 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2833 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2834 contents: announcement,
2836 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2839 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2844 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2845 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2846 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2848 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2849 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2850 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2851 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2853 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
2854 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
2855 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
2856 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
2857 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) =
2858 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2859 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
2860 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2861 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2862 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2863 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2864 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2865 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2867 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2868 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2870 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2871 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2874 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2875 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2876 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2880 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2881 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2882 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2883 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2888 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2889 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2890 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2891 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2897 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2901 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2906 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2907 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2908 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2914 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2918 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2919 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2920 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2921 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2922 /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
2924 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2925 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2926 let counterparty_node_id;
2927 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2928 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2929 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2931 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2932 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
2933 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2934 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2935 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
2937 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2938 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2940 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2941 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2943 counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2944 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
2945 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
2947 if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2950 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2951 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2952 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2953 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2954 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2955 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2956 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2957 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2967 match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) {
2968 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2969 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
2973 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`.
2974 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) {
2975 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2977 for monitor_event in self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events() {
2978 match monitor_event {
2979 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
2980 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2981 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2982 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2984 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2985 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2988 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
2989 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2990 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2991 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
2992 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2993 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2994 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
2995 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2996 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2998 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
2999 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3000 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3010 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3011 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3016 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3017 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3018 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3019 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3020 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3023 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
3024 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3025 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3026 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3028 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3029 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3030 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
3035 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3036 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3037 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3038 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3039 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3042 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
3043 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3044 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3045 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3047 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3048 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3049 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
3054 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3055 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3056 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3057 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3058 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3061 /// Updates channel state based on transactions seen in a connected block.
3062 pub fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3063 let header_hash = header.block_hash();
3064 log_trace!(self.logger, "Block {} at height {} connected", header_hash, height);
3065 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3066 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3067 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3069 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3070 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3071 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3072 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3073 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
3074 let res = channel.block_connected(header, txdata, height);
3075 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
3076 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
3077 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3078 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3079 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
3083 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
3084 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3085 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3086 msg: funding_locked,
3088 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
3089 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3090 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3091 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3092 msg: announcement_sigs,
3095 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3097 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
3099 } else if let Err(e) = res {
3100 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3101 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3102 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
3106 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
3107 for &(_, tx) in txdata.iter() {
3108 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
3109 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
3110 log_trace!(self.logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3111 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3112 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3114 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
3115 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
3116 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
3117 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
3118 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
3119 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3131 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|&(ref payment_hash, _), htlcs| {
3132 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3133 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
3134 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
3135 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
3136 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
3137 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3138 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3139 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
3140 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3141 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
3142 data: htlc_msat_height_data
3147 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
3150 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3151 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3154 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
3155 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
3157 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
3158 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
3160 // Update last_node_announcement_serial to be the max of its current value and the
3161 // block timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
3162 // having an explicit local time source.
3163 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully update
3164 // last_node_announcement_serial or decide we don't need to.
3165 let old_serial = self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire);
3166 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
3167 if self.last_node_announcement_serial.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
3173 /// Updates channel state based on a disconnected block.
3175 /// If necessary, the channel may be force-closed without letting the counterparty participate
3176 /// in the shutdown.
3177 pub fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
3178 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3179 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3181 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3182 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3183 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3184 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3185 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
3186 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
3187 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
3188 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3190 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown(true));
3191 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
3192 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3202 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3203 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3205 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
3206 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.block_hash();
3210 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send>
3211 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3212 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3213 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3214 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3215 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3218 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
3219 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3220 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3223 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
3224 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3225 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3228 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
3229 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3230 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3233 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
3234 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3235 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3238 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
3239 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3240 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3243 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
3244 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3245 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3248 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
3249 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3250 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3253 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
3254 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3255 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3258 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
3259 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3260 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3263 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
3264 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3265 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3268 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
3269 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3270 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3273 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
3274 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3275 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3278 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
3279 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3280 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3283 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
3284 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3285 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3288 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
3289 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3290 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3293 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
3294 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3295 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3298 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
3299 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3300 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3301 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
3302 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
3304 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3305 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3306 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3307 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3308 if no_connection_possible {
3309 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3310 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3311 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3312 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3313 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3315 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
3316 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3317 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3327 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3328 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3329 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3330 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are no
3331 // holding cell add-HTLCs, so if in the future we stop removing uncommitted HTLCs
3332 // on peer disconnect here, there will need to be corresponding changes in
3333 // reestablish logic.
3334 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
3335 chan.to_disabled_marked();
3336 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
3337 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3338 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
3340 if chan.is_shutdown() {
3341 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3342 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3346 no_channels_remain = false;
3352 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
3354 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3355 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3356 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3357 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3358 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3359 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3360 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3361 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3362 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3363 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3364 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3365 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3366 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3367 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
3368 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3369 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
3373 if no_channels_remain {
3374 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
3377 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3378 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3380 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
3381 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
3382 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
3387 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
3388 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3390 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3393 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3394 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
3395 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3396 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
3397 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
3400 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
3401 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
3406 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3407 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3408 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3409 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3410 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3411 if !chan.have_received_message() {
3412 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
3413 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
3414 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
3418 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
3419 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3420 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
3426 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3429 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3430 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3432 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3433 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3434 if chan.remote_network_id == *counterparty_node_id {
3435 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
3439 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
3444 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3445 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3447 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3448 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3449 match &self.routing {
3450 &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
3452 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3453 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3455 &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { ref payment_data, ref incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3457 payment_data.write(writer)?;
3458 incoming_cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3461 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3462 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3463 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3464 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3469 impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3470 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3471 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3472 routing: match Readable::read(reader)? {
3473 0u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3474 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3475 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3477 1u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3478 payment_data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3479 incoming_cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3481 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3483 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3484 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3485 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3486 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3491 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3492 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3494 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3496 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3498 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3500 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3507 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3508 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3509 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3510 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3511 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3512 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3517 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3518 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3520 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3522 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3524 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3526 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3533 impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3534 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3535 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3536 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3537 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3538 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3543 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3546 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3549 impl_writeable!(ClaimableHTLC, 0, {
3556 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3557 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3559 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3561 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3563 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3565 path.write(writer)?;
3566 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3567 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3574 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
3575 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3576 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3577 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3578 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3579 path: Readable::read(reader)?,
3580 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3581 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3583 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3588 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3589 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3591 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3595 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3597 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3598 data.write(writer)?;
3605 impl Readable for HTLCFailReason {
3606 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3607 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3608 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3609 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3610 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3611 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3613 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3618 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3619 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3621 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3623 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3624 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3625 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3627 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3629 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3630 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3637 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3638 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3639 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3640 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3641 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3642 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3643 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3645 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3646 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3647 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3649 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3654 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3655 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3656 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3657 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3658 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3661 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3662 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3664 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3665 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3667 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3668 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3669 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3671 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3672 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3673 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3674 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3675 unfunded_channels += 1;
3678 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3679 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3680 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3681 channel.write(writer)?;
3685 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3686 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3687 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3688 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3689 for forward in pending_forwards {
3690 forward.write(writer)?;
3694 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3695 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3696 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3697 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3698 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
3699 htlc.write(writer)?;
3703 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3704 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3705 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3706 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3707 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3708 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
3711 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3712 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3713 for event in events.iter() {
3714 event.write(writer)?;
3717 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3723 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3725 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3727 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3728 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3729 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3730 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3731 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3732 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3733 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3734 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3735 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
3736 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3737 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
3738 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3739 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3740 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3741 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3744 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3745 /// deserialization.
3746 pub keys_manager: K,
3748 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3750 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3751 pub fee_estimator: F,
3752 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3754 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3755 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3756 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3757 pub chain_monitor: M,
3759 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3760 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3761 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3762 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
3763 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3764 /// deserialization.
3766 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3767 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3768 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3770 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3771 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3773 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3774 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3775 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3776 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3778 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3781 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
3782 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>,
3785 impl<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
3786 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3787 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3788 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3789 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3790 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3793 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
3794 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
3795 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
3796 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
3797 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>) -> Self {
3799 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
3800 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
3805 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
3806 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
3807 impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
3808 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>>)
3809 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3810 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3811 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3812 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3815 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3816 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
3817 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
3821 impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
3822 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>)
3823 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3824 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3825 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3826 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3829 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3830 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3831 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3832 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3833 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3836 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3837 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3838 let last_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3840 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3842 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3843 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3844 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3845 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3846 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3847 let mut channel: Channel<ChanSigner> = Readable::read(reader)?;
3848 if channel.last_block_connected != Default::default() && channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3849 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3852 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3853 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3854 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
3855 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
3856 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3857 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
3858 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
3859 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
3860 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3861 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
3862 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3863 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
3864 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
3865 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
3866 let (_, _, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
3867 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
3868 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
3870 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3871 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3873 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3876 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3880 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
3881 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3882 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
3886 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
3887 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3888 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3889 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3890 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3891 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3892 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
3893 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3894 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3896 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3899 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3900 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3901 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3902 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3903 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3904 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
3905 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3906 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3908 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3911 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3912 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
3913 for _ in 0..peer_count {
3914 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3915 let peer_state = PeerState {
3916 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
3918 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
3921 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3922 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
3923 for _ in 0..event_count {
3924 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3925 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
3930 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3932 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3934 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3935 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3936 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3938 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3939 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3940 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3942 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3947 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3949 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3951 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
3953 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
3955 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
3956 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3957 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3958 logger: args.logger,
3959 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3962 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3963 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3966 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3967 //connection or two.
3969 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))