1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::{BlindedPath, NodeIdLookUp};
35 use crate::blinded_path::message::ForwardNode;
36 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{Bolt12OfferContext, Bolt12RefundContext, PaymentConstraints, PaymentContext, ReceiveTlvs};
38 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
44 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
45 // construct one themselves.
46 use crate::ln::inbound_payment;
47 use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
48 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
49 use crate::ln::channel_state::ChannelDetails;
50 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
51 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
52 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
53 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
54 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
56 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
57 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
58 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
60 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
61 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
62 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
63 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, ExplicitSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
64 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
65 use crate::offers::invoice_request::{DerivedPayerId, InvoiceRequestBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::offer::{Offer, OfferBuilder};
67 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
68 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
69 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{new_pending_onion_message, Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, Responder, ResponseInstruction};
70 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
71 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
72 use crate::sign::ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner;
73 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
74 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
75 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
76 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
77 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
78 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
79 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
81 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
83 crate::offers::offer::DerivedMetadata,
84 crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
85 crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
86 crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
87 crate::sign::KeysManager,
91 crate::offers::offer::OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
92 crate::offers::refund::RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
95 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
98 use crate::prelude::*;
100 use core::cell::RefCell;
102 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
103 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
104 use core::time::Duration;
105 use core::ops::Deref;
107 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
108 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
109 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
111 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
113 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
114 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
115 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
117 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
118 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
119 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
120 // before we forward it.
122 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
123 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
124 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
125 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
126 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
128 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
129 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
130 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
131 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
132 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
134 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
135 /// do with the HTLC.
136 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
137 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
139 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
140 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
141 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
142 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
143 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
144 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
146 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
148 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
149 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
151 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
152 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
153 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
154 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
155 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
157 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
158 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
159 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
160 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
161 /// The context of the payment included by the recipient in a blinded path, or `None` if a
162 /// blinded path was not used.
164 /// Used in part to determine the [`events::PaymentPurpose`].
165 payment_context: Option<PaymentContext>,
166 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
168 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
169 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
170 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
171 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
173 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
174 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
176 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
177 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
178 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
179 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
180 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
181 requires_blinded_error: bool,
183 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
184 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
185 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
187 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
188 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
190 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
191 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
192 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
193 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
194 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
195 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
196 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
198 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
199 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
200 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
201 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
203 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
204 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
205 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
207 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
208 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
209 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
210 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
211 requires_blinded_error: bool,
215 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
216 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
217 pub struct BlindedForward {
218 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
219 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
220 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
221 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
222 /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
223 /// the introduction node.
224 pub failure: BlindedFailure,
227 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
228 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
229 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
231 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
232 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
233 Self::ReceiveKeysend { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
239 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
241 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
242 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
243 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
244 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
245 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
246 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
248 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
249 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
250 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
251 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
252 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
254 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
256 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
257 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
258 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
260 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
261 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
262 /// it along another path).
264 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
265 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
266 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
267 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
268 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
269 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
270 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
271 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
272 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
274 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
277 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
279 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
281 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
284 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
285 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
286 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
287 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
290 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
291 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
292 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
293 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
294 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
297 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
298 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
299 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
301 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
302 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
303 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
306 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
307 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
309 prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
310 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
311 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
314 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
315 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
316 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
319 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
324 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
328 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
329 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
330 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
331 pub enum BlindedFailure {
332 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
333 /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
334 FromIntroductionNode,
335 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
336 /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
340 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
341 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
342 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
343 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
344 short_channel_id: u64,
345 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
347 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
348 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
349 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
350 channel_id: ChannelId,
352 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
353 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
358 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
360 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
361 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
362 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
364 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
365 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
368 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
369 struct ClaimableHTLC {
370 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
372 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
374 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
375 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
376 sender_intended_value: u64,
377 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
379 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
380 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
381 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
382 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
384 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
385 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
388 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
389 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
390 events::ClaimedHTLC {
391 channel_id: val.prev_hop.channel_id,
392 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
393 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
394 value_msat: val.value,
395 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
400 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
401 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
403 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
404 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
405 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
408 /// Number of bytes in the id.
409 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
412 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
413 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
418 impl Readable for PaymentId {
419 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
420 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
425 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
426 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
427 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
431 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
433 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
434 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
435 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
437 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
438 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
443 impl Readable for InterceptId {
444 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
445 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
450 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
451 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
452 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
453 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
454 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
457 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
459 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
460 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
461 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
463 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
464 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
468 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
469 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
470 (0, short_channel_id, required),
471 (2, htlc_id, required),
473 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
474 (0, session_priv, required),
479 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
480 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
481 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
482 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
483 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
486 session_priv: SecretKey,
487 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
488 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
489 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
490 payment_id: PaymentId,
493 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
494 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
495 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
497 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
499 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
501 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
504 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
505 payment_id.hash(hasher);
506 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
512 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
514 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
515 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
516 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
517 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
518 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
519 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
523 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
524 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
525 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
526 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
527 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
528 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
530 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
536 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
537 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
539 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
540 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
541 pub enum FailureCode {
542 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
543 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
544 TemporaryNodeFailure,
545 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
546 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
547 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
548 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
549 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
550 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
551 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
552 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
553 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
554 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
556 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
557 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
558 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
561 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
562 fn into(self) -> u16 {
564 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
565 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
566 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
567 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
572 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
573 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
574 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
575 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
576 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
578 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
579 err: msgs::LightningError,
580 closes_channel: bool,
581 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
583 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
585 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
587 err: LightningError {
589 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
590 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
596 closes_channel: false,
597 shutdown_finish: None,
601 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
602 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
605 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
606 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
607 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
608 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
609 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
610 // commitment upon reconnecting.
611 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
613 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
616 err: LightningError { err, action },
617 closes_channel: true,
618 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
622 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
625 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
627 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
628 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
632 log_level: Level::Warn,
635 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
637 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
639 ChannelError::Close((msg, _reason)) => LightningError {
641 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
642 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
649 closes_channel: false,
650 shutdown_finish: None,
654 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
659 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
660 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
661 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
662 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
663 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
665 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
666 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
667 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
668 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
669 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
670 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
671 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
673 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
677 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
678 struct ClaimingPayment {
680 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
681 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
682 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
683 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
684 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
686 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
687 (0, amount_msat, required),
688 (2, payment_purpose, required),
689 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
690 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
691 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
692 (9, onion_fields, option),
695 struct ClaimablePayment {
696 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
697 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
698 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
701 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
702 struct ClaimablePayments {
703 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
704 /// failed/claimed by the user.
706 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
707 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
709 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
710 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
711 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
713 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
714 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
715 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
716 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
719 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
720 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
721 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
722 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
724 enum BackgroundEvent {
725 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
726 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
727 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
728 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
730 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
731 /// are regenerated on startup.
732 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
733 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
734 /// channel to continue normal operation.
736 /// In general this should be used rather than
737 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
738 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
739 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
741 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
742 /// are regenerated on startup.
743 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
744 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
745 funding_txo: OutPoint,
746 channel_id: ChannelId,
747 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
749 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
750 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
752 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
753 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
754 channel_id: ChannelId,
759 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
760 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
761 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
762 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
763 /// event can be generated.
764 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
765 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
766 /// operation of another channel.
768 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
769 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
770 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
771 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
773 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
774 event: events::Event,
775 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
777 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
778 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
779 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
781 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
782 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
783 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
784 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
785 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
787 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
788 /// stored for later processing.
789 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
790 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
791 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
792 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
793 downstream_channel_id: ChannelId,
797 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
798 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
799 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
800 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
801 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
802 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
803 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
804 (4, blocking_action, required),
805 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, downstream_funding_outpoint will be
806 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
807 (5, downstream_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(downstream_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
809 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
810 (0, event, upgradable_required),
811 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
812 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
813 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
814 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
815 // downgrades to prior versions.
816 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
820 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
821 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
822 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
823 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
824 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
825 channel_id: ChannelId,
828 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
829 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
830 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
831 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
832 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, channel_funding_outpoint will be
833 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
834 (3, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(channel_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
838 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
839 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
840 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
841 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
842 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
843 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
845 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
846 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
847 channel_id: ChannelId,
848 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
853 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
854 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
855 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
856 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
857 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
862 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
863 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
867 /// State we hold per-peer.
868 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
869 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
871 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
872 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
873 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
875 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
876 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
877 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
878 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
879 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
880 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
881 latest_features: InitFeatures,
882 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
883 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
884 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
885 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
886 /// user but which have not yet completed.
888 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
889 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
890 /// for a missing channel.
891 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
892 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
893 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
895 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
896 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
897 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
898 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
900 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
901 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
902 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
903 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
904 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
905 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
906 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
907 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
908 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
909 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
910 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
911 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
912 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
913 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
914 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
915 pub is_connected: bool,
918 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
919 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
920 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
921 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
922 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
923 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
926 !self.channel_by_id.iter().any(|(_, phase)|
928 ChannelPhase::Funded(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => true,
929 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => false,
930 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
931 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => true,
932 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
933 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => false,
936 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
937 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
940 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
941 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
942 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
945 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
946 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
947 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
948 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
952 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
953 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
954 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
955 /// The original OpenChannel message.
956 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
957 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
958 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
961 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
962 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
963 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
965 /// The number of blocks of historical feerate estimates we keep around and consider when deciding
966 /// to force-close a channel for having too-low fees. Also the number of blocks we have to see
967 /// after startup before we consider force-closing channels for having too-low fees.
968 pub(super) const FEERATE_TRACKING_BLOCKS: usize = 144;
970 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
971 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
973 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
976 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
977 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
978 struct PendingInboundPayment {
979 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
980 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
981 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
982 /// this payment being removed.
984 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
985 user_payment_id: u64,
986 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
987 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
988 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
991 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
992 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
993 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
994 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
995 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
996 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
997 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
998 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
1000 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1001 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1002 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
1010 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
1013 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
1014 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1015 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
1020 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
1021 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
1022 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
1023 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
1024 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
1025 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
1026 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
1027 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
1028 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
1030 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1031 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1032 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1041 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1044 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1045 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1046 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1051 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1053 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1055 pub trait AChannelManager {
1056 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1057 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1058 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1059 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1060 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1061 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1062 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1063 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1064 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1065 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1066 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1067 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1068 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1069 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1070 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1071 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1072 /// A type implementing [`EcdsaChannelSigner`].
1073 type Signer: EcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1074 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1075 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1076 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1077 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1078 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1079 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1080 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1081 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1082 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1083 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1084 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1085 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1086 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1087 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1088 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1089 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1090 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1091 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1094 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1095 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1097 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1098 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1099 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1100 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1101 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1102 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1106 type Watch = M::Target;
1108 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1110 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1112 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1114 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1115 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1117 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1119 type Router = R::Target;
1121 type Logger = L::Target;
1123 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1126 /// A lightning node's channel state machine and payment management logic, which facilitates
1127 /// sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through lightning channels.
1129 /// [`ChannelManager`] is parameterized by a number of components to achieve this.
1130 /// - [`chain::Watch`] (typically [`ChainMonitor`]) for on-chain monitoring and enforcement of each
1132 /// - [`BroadcasterInterface`] for broadcasting transactions related to opening, funding, and
1133 /// closing channels
1134 /// - [`EntropySource`] for providing random data needed for cryptographic operations
1135 /// - [`NodeSigner`] for cryptographic operations scoped to the node
1136 /// - [`SignerProvider`] for providing signers whose operations are scoped to individual channels
1137 /// - [`FeeEstimator`] to determine transaction fee rates needed to have a transaction mined in a
1139 /// - [`Router`] for finding payment paths when initiating and retrying payments
1140 /// - [`Logger`] for logging operational information of varying degrees
1142 /// Additionally, it implements the following traits:
1143 /// - [`ChannelMessageHandler`] to handle off-chain channel activity from peers
1144 /// - [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] to similarly send such messages to peers
1145 /// - [`OffersMessageHandler`] for BOLT 12 message handling and sending
1146 /// - [`EventsProvider`] to generate user-actionable [`Event`]s
1147 /// - [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for notification of on-chain activity
1149 /// Thus, [`ChannelManager`] is typically used to parameterize a [`MessageHandler`] and an
1150 /// [`OnionMessenger`]. The latter is required to support BOLT 12 functionality.
1152 /// # `ChannelManager` vs `ChannelMonitor`
1154 /// It's important to distinguish between the *off-chain* management and *on-chain* enforcement of
1155 /// lightning channels. [`ChannelManager`] exchanges messages with peers to manage the off-chain
1156 /// state of each channel. During this process, it generates a [`ChannelMonitor`] for each channel
1157 /// and a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] for each relevant change, notifying its parameterized
1158 /// [`chain::Watch`] of them.
1160 /// An implementation of [`chain::Watch`], such as [`ChainMonitor`], is responsible for aggregating
1161 /// these [`ChannelMonitor`]s and applying any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to them. It then monitors
1162 /// for any pertinent on-chain activity, enforcing claims as needed.
1164 /// This division of off-chain management and on-chain enforcement allows for interesting node
1165 /// setups. For instance, on-chain enforcement could be moved to a separate host or have added
1166 /// redundancy, possibly as a watchtower. See [`chain::Watch`] for the relevant interface.
1168 /// # Initialization
1170 /// Use [`ChannelManager::new`] with the most recent [`BlockHash`] when creating a fresh instance.
1171 /// Otherwise, if restarting, construct [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] with the necessary parameters and
1172 /// references to any deserialized [`ChannelMonitor`]s that were previously persisted. Use this to
1173 /// deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] and feed it any new chain data since it was last online, as
1174 /// detailed in the [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] documentation.
1177 /// use bitcoin::BlockHash;
1178 /// use bitcoin::network::Network;
1179 /// use lightning::chain::BestBlock;
1180 /// # use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1181 /// use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs};
1182 /// # use lightning::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
1183 /// use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
1184 /// use lightning::util::ser::ReadableArgs;
1186 /// # fn read_channel_monitors() -> Vec<ChannelMonitor<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>> { vec![] }
1189 /// # L: lightning::util::logger::Logger,
1190 /// # ES: lightning::sign::EntropySource,
1191 /// # S: for <'b> lightning::routing::scoring::LockableScore<'b, ScoreLookUp = SL>,
1192 /// # SL: lightning::routing::scoring::ScoreLookUp<ScoreParams = SP>,
1194 /// # R: lightning::io::Read,
1196 /// # fee_estimator: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::FeeEstimator,
1197 /// # chain_monitor: &dyn lightning::chain::Watch<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>,
1198 /// # tx_broadcaster: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface,
1199 /// # router: &lightning::routing::router::DefaultRouter<&NetworkGraph<&'a L>, &'a L, &ES, &S, SP, SL>,
1201 /// # entropy_source: &ES,
1202 /// # node_signer: &dyn lightning::sign::NodeSigner,
1203 /// # signer_provider: &lightning::sign::DynSignerProvider,
1204 /// # best_block: lightning::chain::BestBlock,
1205 /// # current_timestamp: u32,
1206 /// # mut reader: R,
1207 /// # ) -> Result<(), lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError> {
1208 /// // Fresh start with no channels
1209 /// let params = ChainParameters {
1210 /// network: Network::Bitcoin,
1213 /// let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1214 /// let channel_manager = ChannelManager::new(
1215 /// fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, entropy_source, node_signer,
1216 /// signer_provider, default_config, params, current_timestamp
1219 /// // Restart from deserialized data
1220 /// let mut channel_monitors = read_channel_monitors();
1221 /// let args = ChannelManagerReadArgs::new(
1222 /// entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster,
1223 /// router, logger, default_config, channel_monitors.iter_mut().collect()
1225 /// let (block_hash, channel_manager) =
1226 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<_, _, _, _, _, _, _, _>)>::read(&mut reader, args)?;
1228 /// // Update the ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors with the latest chain data
1231 /// // Move the monitors to the ChannelManager's chain::Watch parameter
1232 /// for monitor in channel_monitors {
1233 /// chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
1241 /// The following is required for [`ChannelManager`] to function properly:
1242 /// - Handle messages from peers using its [`ChannelMessageHandler`] implementation (typically
1243 /// called by [`PeerManager::read_event`] when processing network I/O)
1244 /// - Send messages to peers obtained via its [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] implementation
1245 /// (typically initiated when [`PeerManager::process_events`] is called)
1246 /// - Feed on-chain activity using either its [`chain::Listen`] or [`chain::Confirm`] implementation
1247 /// as documented by those traits
1248 /// - Perform any periodic channel and payment checks by calling [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly
1250 /// - Persist to disk whenever [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`] returns `true` using a
1251 /// [`Persister`] such as a [`KVStore`] implementation
1252 /// - Handle [`Event`]s obtained via its [`EventsProvider`] implementation
1254 /// The [`Future`] returned by [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] is useful in determining
1255 /// when the last two requirements need to be checked.
1257 /// The [`lightning-block-sync`] and [`lightning-transaction-sync`] crates provide utilities that
1258 /// simplify feeding in on-chain activity using the [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] traits,
1259 /// respectively. The remaining requirements can be met using the [`lightning-background-processor`]
1260 /// crate. For languages other than Rust, the availability of similar utilities may vary.
1264 /// [`ChannelManager`]'s primary function involves managing a channel state. Without channels,
1265 /// payments can't be sent. Use [`list_channels`] or [`list_usable_channels`] for a snapshot of the
1266 /// currently open channels.
1269 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1271 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1272 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1273 /// let channels = channel_manager.list_usable_channels();
1274 /// for details in channels {
1275 /// println!("{:?}", details);
1280 /// Each channel is identified using a [`ChannelId`], which will change throughout the channel's
1281 /// life cycle. Additionally, channels are assigned a `user_channel_id`, which is given in
1282 /// [`Event`]s associated with the channel and serves as a fixed identifier but is otherwise unused
1283 /// by [`ChannelManager`].
1285 /// ## Opening Channels
1287 /// To an open a channel with a peer, call [`create_channel`]. This will initiate the process of
1288 /// opening an outbound channel, which requires self-funding when handling
1289 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1292 /// # use bitcoin::{ScriptBuf, Transaction};
1293 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1294 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1295 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1297 /// # trait Wallet {
1298 /// # fn create_funding_transaction(
1299 /// # &self, _amount_sats: u64, _output_script: ScriptBuf
1300 /// # ) -> Transaction;
1303 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager, W: Wallet>(channel_manager: T, wallet: W, peer_id: PublicKey) {
1304 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1305 /// let value_sats = 1_000_000;
1306 /// let push_msats = 10_000_000;
1307 /// match channel_manager.create_channel(peer_id, value_sats, push_msats, 42, None, None) {
1308 /// Ok(channel_id) => println!("Opening channel {}", channel_id),
1309 /// Err(e) => println!("Error opening channel: {:?}", e),
1312 /// // On the event processing thread once the peer has responded
1313 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1314 /// Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1315 /// temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script,
1316 /// user_channel_id, ..
1318 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1319 /// let funding_transaction = wallet.create_funding_transaction(
1320 /// channel_value_satoshis, output_script
1322 /// match channel_manager.funding_transaction_generated(
1323 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction
1325 /// Ok(()) => println!("Funding channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1326 /// Err(e) => println!("Error funding channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1329 /// Event::ChannelPending { channel_id, user_channel_id, former_temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
1330 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1332 /// "Channel {} now {} pending (funding transaction has been broadcasted)", channel_id,
1333 /// former_temporary_channel_id.unwrap()
1336 /// Event::ChannelReady { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
1337 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1338 /// println!("Channel {} ready", channel_id);
1346 /// ## Accepting Channels
1348 /// Inbound channels are initiated by peers and are automatically accepted unless [`ChannelManager`]
1349 /// has [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] set. In that case, the channel may be
1350 /// either accepted or rejected when handling [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
1353 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1354 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1355 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1357 /// # fn is_trusted(counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> bool {
1359 /// # unimplemented!()
1362 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1363 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1364 /// # let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
1365 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1366 /// Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
1367 /// if !is_trusted(counterparty_node_id) {
1368 /// match channel_manager.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(
1369 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, error_message.to_string()
1371 /// Ok(()) => println!("Rejecting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1372 /// Err(e) => println!("Error rejecting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1377 /// let user_channel_id = 43;
1378 /// match channel_manager.accept_inbound_channel(
1379 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, user_channel_id
1381 /// Ok(()) => println!("Accepting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1382 /// Err(e) => println!("Error accepting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1391 /// ## Closing Channels
1393 /// There are two ways to close a channel: either cooperatively using [`close_channel`] or
1394 /// unilaterally using [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]. The former is ideal as it makes for
1395 /// lower fees and immediate access to funds. However, the latter may be necessary if the
1396 /// counterparty isn't behaving properly or has gone offline. [`Event::ChannelClosed`] is generated
1397 /// once the channel has been closed successfully.
1400 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1401 /// # use lightning::ln::types::ChannelId;
1402 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1403 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1405 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1406 /// # channel_manager: T, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
1408 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1409 /// match channel_manager.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id) {
1410 /// Ok(()) => println!("Closing channel {}", channel_id),
1411 /// Err(e) => println!("Error closing channel {}: {:?}", channel_id, e),
1414 /// // On the event processing thread
1415 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1416 /// Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
1417 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1418 /// println!("Channel {} closed", channel_id);
1428 /// [`ChannelManager`] is responsible for sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through its
1429 /// channels. A payment is typically initiated from a [BOLT 11] invoice or a [BOLT 12] offer, though
1430 /// spontaneous (i.e., keysend) payments are also possible. Incoming payments don't require
1431 /// maintaining any additional state as [`ChannelManager`] can reconstruct the [`PaymentPreimage`]
1432 /// from the [`PaymentSecret`]. Sending payments, however, require tracking in order to retry failed
1435 /// After a payment is initiated, it will appear in [`list_recent_payments`] until a short time
1436 /// after either an [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is handled. Failed HTLCs
1437 /// for a payment will be retried according to the payment's [`Retry`] strategy or until
1438 /// [`abandon_payment`] is called.
1440 /// ## BOLT 11 Invoices
1442 /// The [`lightning-invoice`] crate is useful for creating BOLT 11 invoices. Specifically, use the
1443 /// functions in its `utils` module for constructing invoices that are compatible with
1444 /// [`ChannelManager`]. These functions serve as a convenience for building invoices with the
1445 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentSecret`] returned from [`create_inbound_payment`]. To provide your
1446 /// own [`PaymentHash`], use [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] or the corresponding functions in
1447 /// the [`lightning-invoice`] `utils` module.
1449 /// [`ChannelManager`] generates an [`Event::PaymentClaimable`] once the full payment has been
1450 /// received. Call [`claim_funds`] to release the [`PaymentPreimage`], which in turn will result in
1451 /// an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`].
1454 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1455 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1457 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1458 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1459 /// // Or use utils::create_invoice_from_channelmanager
1460 /// let known_payment_hash = match channel_manager.create_inbound_payment(
1461 /// Some(10_000_000), 3600, None
1463 /// Ok((payment_hash, _payment_secret)) => {
1464 /// println!("Creating inbound payment {}", payment_hash);
1467 /// Err(()) => panic!("Error creating inbound payment"),
1470 /// // On the event processing thread
1471 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1472 /// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1473 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1474 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1475 /// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1476 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1478 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1479 /// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1481 /// PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(payment_preimage) => {
1482 /// assert_ne!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1483 /// println!("Claiming spontaneous payment {}", payment_hash);
1484 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1489 /// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1490 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1491 /// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1499 /// For paying an invoice, [`lightning-invoice`] provides a `payment` module with convenience
1500 /// functions for use with [`send_payment`].
1503 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1504 /// # use lightning::ln::types::PaymentHash;
1505 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
1506 /// # use lightning::routing::router::RouteParameters;
1508 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1509 /// # channel_manager: T, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields,
1510 /// # route_params: RouteParameters, retry: Retry
1512 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1513 /// // let (payment_hash, recipient_onion, route_params) =
1514 /// // payment::payment_parameters_from_invoice(&invoice);
1515 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1516 /// match channel_manager.send_payment(
1517 /// payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route_params, retry
1519 /// Ok(()) => println!("Sending payment with hash {}", payment_hash),
1520 /// Err(e) => println!("Failed sending payment with hash {}: {:?}", payment_hash, e),
1523 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1524 /// let expected_payment_hash = payment_hash;
1526 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1528 /// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1529 /// payment_id: expected_payment_id,
1530 /// payment_hash: expected_payment_hash,
1536 /// // On the event processing thread
1537 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1538 /// Event::PaymentSent { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_hash),
1539 /// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_hash),
1546 /// ## BOLT 12 Offers
1548 /// The [`offers`] module is useful for creating BOLT 12 offers. An [`Offer`] is a precursor to a
1549 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`], which must first be requested by the payer. The interchange of these messages
1550 /// as defined in the specification is handled by [`ChannelManager`] and its implementation of
1551 /// [`OffersMessageHandler`]. However, this only works with an [`Offer`] created using a builder
1552 /// returned by [`create_offer_builder`]. With this approach, BOLT 12 offers and invoices are
1553 /// stateless just as BOLT 11 invoices are.
1556 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1557 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1558 /// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
1560 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
1561 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1562 /// # let absolute_expiry = None;
1563 /// let offer = channel_manager
1564 /// .create_offer_builder(absolute_expiry)?
1566 /// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
1567 /// # let builder: lightning::offers::offer::OfferBuilder<_, _> = offer.into();
1568 /// # let offer = builder
1569 /// .description("coffee".to_string())
1570 /// .amount_msats(10_000_000)
1572 /// let bech32_offer = offer.to_string();
1574 /// // On the event processing thread
1575 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1576 /// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1577 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12OfferPayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1578 /// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1579 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1581 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12OfferPayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1582 /// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1587 /// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1588 /// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1597 /// Use [`pay_for_offer`] to initiated payment, which sends an [`InvoiceRequest`] for an [`Offer`]
1598 /// and pays the [`Bolt12Invoice`] response. In addition to success and failure events,
1599 /// [`ChannelManager`] may also generate an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
1602 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1603 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
1604 /// # use lightning::offers::offer::Offer;
1606 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1607 /// # channel_manager: T, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
1608 /// # payer_note: Option<String>, retry: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
1610 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1611 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1612 /// match channel_manager.pay_for_offer(
1613 /// offer, quantity, amount_msats, payer_note, payment_id, retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat
1615 /// Ok(()) => println!("Requesting invoice for offer"),
1616 /// Err(e) => println!("Unable to request invoice for offer: {:?}", e),
1619 /// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
1620 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1622 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1624 /// RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
1628 /// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
1630 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1632 /// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, .. }
1636 /// // On the event processing thread
1637 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1638 /// Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
1639 /// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1640 /// Event::InvoiceRequestFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1647 /// ## BOLT 12 Refunds
1649 /// A [`Refund`] is a request for an invoice to be paid. Like *paying* for an [`Offer`], *creating*
1650 /// a [`Refund`] involves maintaining state since it represents a future outbound payment.
1651 /// Therefore, use [`create_refund_builder`] when creating one, otherwise [`ChannelManager`] will
1652 /// refuse to pay any corresponding [`Bolt12Invoice`] that it receives.
1655 /// # use core::time::Duration;
1656 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1657 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
1658 /// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
1660 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1661 /// # channel_manager: T, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration, retry: Retry,
1662 /// # max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
1663 /// # ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
1664 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1665 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1666 /// let refund = channel_manager
1667 /// .create_refund_builder(
1668 /// amount_msats, absolute_expiry, payment_id, retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat
1671 /// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
1672 /// # let builder: lightning::offers::refund::RefundBuilder<_> = refund.into();
1673 /// # let refund = builder
1674 /// .description("coffee".to_string())
1675 /// .payer_note("refund for order 1234".to_string())
1677 /// let bech32_refund = refund.to_string();
1679 /// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
1680 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1682 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1684 /// RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
1688 /// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
1690 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1692 /// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, .. }
1696 /// // On the event processing thread
1697 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1698 /// Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
1699 /// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1707 /// Use [`request_refund_payment`] to send a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for receiving the refund. Similar to
1708 /// *creating* an [`Offer`], this is stateless as it represents an inbound payment.
1711 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1712 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1713 /// # use lightning::offers::refund::Refund;
1715 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T, refund: &Refund) {
1716 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1717 /// let known_payment_hash = match channel_manager.request_refund_payment(refund) {
1718 /// Ok(invoice) => {
1719 /// let payment_hash = invoice.payment_hash();
1720 /// println!("Requesting refund payment {}", payment_hash);
1723 /// Err(e) => panic!("Unable to request payment for refund: {:?}", e),
1726 /// // On the event processing thread
1727 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1728 /// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1729 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12RefundPayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1730 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1731 /// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1732 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1734 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12RefundPayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1735 /// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1740 /// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1741 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1742 /// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1752 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1753 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1754 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1755 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1757 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1758 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1759 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1760 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1761 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1762 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1763 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1764 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1765 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1767 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1768 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1769 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1771 /// # `ChannelUpdate` Messages
1773 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1774 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1775 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1776 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1777 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1779 /// # DoS Mitigation
1781 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1782 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1783 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1784 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1786 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1787 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1788 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1792 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1793 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1794 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1795 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1796 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1798 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1799 /// [`MessageHandler`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::MessageHandler
1800 /// [`OnionMessenger`]: crate::onion_message::messenger::OnionMessenger
1801 /// [`PeerManager::read_event`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::read_event
1802 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
1803 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1804 /// [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`]: Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence
1805 /// [`Persister`]: crate::util::persist::Persister
1806 /// [`KVStore`]: crate::util::persist::KVStore
1807 /// [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`]: Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future
1808 /// [`lightning-block-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_block_sync/latest/lightning_block_sync
1809 /// [`lightning-transaction-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_transaction_sync/latest/lightning_transaction_sync
1810 /// [`lightning-background-processor`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_background_processor/lightning_background_processor
1811 /// [`list_channels`]: Self::list_channels
1812 /// [`list_usable_channels`]: Self::list_usable_channels
1813 /// [`create_channel`]: Self::create_channel
1814 /// [`close_channel`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1815 /// [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1816 /// [BOLT 11]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/11-payment-encoding.md
1817 /// [BOLT 12]: https://github.com/rustyrussell/lightning-rfc/blob/guilt/offers/12-offer-encoding.md
1818 /// [`list_recent_payments`]: Self::list_recent_payments
1819 /// [`abandon_payment`]: Self::abandon_payment
1820 /// [`lightning-invoice`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_invoice/latest/lightning_invoice
1821 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
1822 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
1823 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
1824 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
1825 /// [`offers`]: crate::offers
1826 /// [`create_offer_builder`]: Self::create_offer_builder
1827 /// [`pay_for_offer`]: Self::pay_for_offer
1828 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
1829 /// [`create_refund_builder`]: Self::create_refund_builder
1830 /// [`request_refund_payment`]: Self::request_refund_payment
1831 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1832 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1833 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1834 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1835 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1836 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1837 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1840 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1841 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1842 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1843 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1844 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1848 // `pending_offers_messages`
1850 // `total_consistency_lock`
1852 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1854 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1856 // |__`decode_update_add_htlcs`
1858 // |__`per_peer_state`
1860 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1862 // |__`claimable_payments`
1864 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1868 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1870 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1872 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1876 // |__`pending_events`
1878 // |__`pending_background_events`
1880 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1882 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1883 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1884 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1885 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1886 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1887 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1891 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1892 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1893 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1899 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1901 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1903 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1904 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1906 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1907 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1908 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1909 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1911 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1912 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1914 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1915 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1916 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1917 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1918 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1919 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1920 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1921 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1923 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1925 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1926 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1928 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1930 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1931 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1932 /// and via the classic SCID.
1934 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1935 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1937 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1939 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1941 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1942 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1943 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1945 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1946 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1948 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> pending `update_add_htlc`s to decode.
1950 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1951 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1952 /// and via the classic SCID.
1954 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1955 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `channel_id` in `UpdateAddHTLC`!
1957 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1958 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>>,
1960 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1961 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1963 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1964 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1966 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1967 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1968 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1969 /// active channel list on load.
1971 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1972 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1974 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1976 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1977 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1978 /// the handling of the events.
1980 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1981 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1984 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1985 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1986 /// would break backwards compatability.
1987 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1988 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1989 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1991 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1993 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1995 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1997 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1999 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
2000 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
2001 /// confirmation depth.
2003 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
2004 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
2005 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
2007 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2009 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
2011 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
2013 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
2015 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
2017 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
2018 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
2019 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
2021 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
2022 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
2024 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
2025 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
2026 /// keeping additional state.
2027 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
2029 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
2030 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
2031 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
2032 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
2034 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
2035 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
2037 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
2038 /// are currently open with that peer.
2040 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
2041 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
2044 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
2046 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2047 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
2048 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
2049 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2050 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
2052 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
2053 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
2054 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
2055 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
2056 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
2058 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
2059 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
2061 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2062 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
2063 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
2064 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2065 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
2067 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
2068 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
2070 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
2071 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
2072 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
2073 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
2074 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
2076 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
2078 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2080 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
2081 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
2082 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
2083 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
2084 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
2085 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
2086 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
2087 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
2088 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
2089 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
2090 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
2092 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
2093 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
2094 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
2096 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
2098 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
2099 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
2101 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
2103 /// Tracks the message events that are to be broadcasted when we are connected to some peer.
2104 pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
2106 /// We only want to force-close our channels on peers based on stale feerates when we're
2107 /// confident the feerate on the channel is *really* stale, not just became stale recently.
2108 /// Thus, we store the fee estimates we had as of the last [`FEERATE_TRACKING_BLOCKS`] blocks
2109 /// (after startup completed) here, and only force-close when channels have a lower feerate
2110 /// than we predicted any time in the last [`FEERATE_TRACKING_BLOCKS`] blocks.
2112 /// We only keep this in memory as we assume any feerates we receive immediately after startup
2113 /// may be bunk (as they often are if Bitcoin Core crashes) and want to delay taking any
2114 /// actions for a day anyway.
2116 /// The first element in the pair is the
2117 /// [`ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee`] estimate, the second the
2118 /// [`ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee`] estimate.
2119 last_days_feerates: Mutex<VecDeque<(u32, u32)>>,
2123 signer_provider: SP,
2128 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
2130 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
2131 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
2132 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
2133 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
2134 pub struct ChainParameters {
2135 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
2136 pub network: Network,
2138 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
2140 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
2141 pub best_block: BestBlock,
2144 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
2148 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2149 SkipPersistNoEvents,
2152 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
2153 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
2154 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
2155 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
2156 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
2157 /// updates are ready for persistence).
2159 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
2160 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
2161 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
2162 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2163 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
2164 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
2166 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
2167 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
2170 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
2171 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
2172 /// events to handle.
2174 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
2175 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
2177 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2178 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
2181 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
2182 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2183 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2184 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
2186 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
2187 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
2188 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
2189 should_persist: move || {
2190 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
2191 // processing and return that.
2192 let notify = persist_check();
2193 match (notify, force_notify) {
2194 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
2195 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
2196 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2197 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2198 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
2201 _read_guard: read_guard,
2205 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
2206 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
2207 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
2208 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
2209 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
2210 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2212 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
2213 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
2214 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
2215 should_persist: persist_check,
2216 _read_guard: read_guard,
2221 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
2222 fn drop(&mut self) {
2223 match (self.should_persist)() {
2224 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2225 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2226 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
2228 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2229 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2230 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2235 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
2236 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
2238 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
2240 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
2241 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
2242 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
2243 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
2244 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
2246 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
2247 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
2249 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
2251 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2252 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
2253 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
2254 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
2255 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
2256 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
2257 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
2258 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
2259 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
2260 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
2261 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
2262 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
2263 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
2265 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
2266 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
2268 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
2269 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
2270 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
2271 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
2273 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
2274 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
2275 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
2276 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
2277 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
2278 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
2280 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
2282 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
2283 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
2285 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
2287 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
2288 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
2290 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
2291 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
2292 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
2294 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
2295 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
2296 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
2298 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
2299 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
2300 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
2301 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
2303 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
2304 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
2305 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
2307 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
2308 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
2309 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
2311 /// The maximum expiration from the current time where an [`Offer`] or [`Refund`] is considered
2312 /// short-lived, while anything with a greater expiration is considered long-lived.
2314 /// Using [`ChannelManager::create_offer_builder`] or [`ChannelManager::create_refund_builder`],
2315 /// will included a [`BlindedPath`] created using:
2316 /// - [`MessageRouter::create_compact_blinded_paths`] when short-lived, and
2317 /// - [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] when long-lived.
2319 /// Using compact [`BlindedPath`]s may provide better privacy as the [`MessageRouter`] could select
2320 /// more hops. However, since they use short channel ids instead of pubkeys, they are more likely to
2321 /// become invalid over time as channels are closed. Thus, they are only suitable for short-term use.
2322 pub const MAX_SHORT_LIVED_RELATIVE_EXPIRY: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60 * 60 * 24);
2324 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
2325 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2326 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
2327 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
2328 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
2330 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2331 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2332 payment_id: PaymentId,
2334 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
2336 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2337 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2338 payment_id: PaymentId,
2339 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
2341 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2342 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
2343 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
2346 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
2347 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
2348 /// payment is removed from tracking.
2350 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2351 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2352 payment_id: PaymentId,
2353 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
2354 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
2355 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
2357 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
2358 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
2359 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
2361 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2362 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2363 payment_id: PaymentId,
2364 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
2365 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2369 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
2371 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
2373 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
2374 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
2375 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
2376 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
2378 pub phantom_scid: u64,
2379 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
2380 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
2383 macro_rules! handle_error {
2384 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
2385 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
2386 // entering the macro.
2387 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2388 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2392 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
2393 let mut msg_event = None;
2395 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
2396 let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
2397 let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
2398 let logger = WithContext::from(
2399 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id), None
2401 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
2403 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
2404 if let Some(update) = update_option {
2405 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = $self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
2406 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2411 log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
2414 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
2416 msg_event = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2417 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
2418 action: err.action.clone()
2422 if let Some(msg_event) = msg_event {
2423 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2424 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2425 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2426 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(msg_event);
2430 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2437 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2438 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2439 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2440 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2442 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2443 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2444 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2446 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2447 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2448 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2449 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2450 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2452 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2453 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2455 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2459 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2460 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2461 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2463 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2464 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2466 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2467 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2469 ChannelError::Close((msg, reason)) => {
2470 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context, None);
2471 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2472 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2473 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2475 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2480 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2481 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2483 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2484 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2486 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2487 match $channel_phase {
2488 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2489 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2491 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2492 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2494 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2495 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2497 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
2498 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(channel) => {
2499 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2501 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
2502 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
2503 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2509 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2510 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2514 let key = *$entry.key();
2515 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2517 $entry.remove_entry();
2525 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2526 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2530 let key = *$entry.key();
2531 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2533 $entry.remove_entry();
2541 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2542 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2544 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2545 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2551 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2552 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2553 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2554 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2555 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2557 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2558 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2559 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2560 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2561 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2562 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2563 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2564 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2565 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2566 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2571 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2572 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2573 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2574 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2575 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2576 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2577 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2578 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2579 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2580 channel_type: Some($channel.context.get_channel_type().clone()),
2582 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2587 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2588 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2589 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2590 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2591 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2592 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2593 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2594 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2595 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2597 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2602 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2603 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2604 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context, None);
2605 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2606 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2607 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height);
2608 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2609 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2610 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2611 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2612 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2613 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2615 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2616 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2617 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2623 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2624 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2626 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2627 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2628 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.pending_update_adds,
2629 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2630 updates.announcement_sigs);
2631 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2632 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2635 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2636 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2637 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2638 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2640 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2641 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2642 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2643 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2644 let mut batch_completed = false;
2645 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2646 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2647 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2648 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2650 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2651 channel_state.2 = true;
2653 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2655 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2657 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2660 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2661 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2662 if batch_completed {
2663 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2664 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2665 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2666 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2667 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2668 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2669 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2670 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2671 chan.set_batch_ready();
2672 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2673 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2677 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2678 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2679 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2684 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2686 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2687 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2689 if let Some(decode) = decode_update_add_htlcs {
2690 $self.push_decode_update_add_htlcs(decode);
2692 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2693 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2694 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2695 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2700 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2701 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2702 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2703 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context, None);
2705 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2706 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2707 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2708 panic!("{}", err_str);
2710 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2711 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2712 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2715 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2721 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2722 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2723 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2725 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2726 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2727 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2728 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2729 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2730 // filter for uniqueness here.
2731 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2732 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2733 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2734 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2736 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2737 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2739 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2740 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2741 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2747 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2748 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2749 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2750 while !processed_all_events {
2751 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2758 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2759 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2760 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2762 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2763 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2764 result = $self.process_background_events();
2766 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2767 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2768 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2769 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2773 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2774 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2775 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2776 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2779 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2781 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2782 $event_to_handle = event;
2784 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2785 post_event_actions.push(action);
2790 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2791 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2792 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2793 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2794 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2795 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2798 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2799 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2800 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2801 processed_all_events = false;
2805 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2806 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2807 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2809 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2810 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2811 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2817 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2819 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2820 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2821 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2822 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2823 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2824 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2828 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2830 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2832 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2833 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2835 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2837 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2838 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2839 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2842 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2843 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2844 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2846 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2847 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2848 current_timestamp: u32,
2850 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2851 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2852 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2853 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2855 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2856 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2857 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2862 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2864 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(new_hash_set()),
2865 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2866 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2867 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2868 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2869 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: new_hash_map(), pending_claiming_payments: new_hash_map() }),
2870 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2871 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2872 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2874 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2877 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2878 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2880 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2882 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2884 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2886 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2887 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2888 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2889 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2890 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2891 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2892 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2893 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2895 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2896 pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2898 last_days_feerates: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2908 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2909 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2910 &self.default_configuration
2913 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2914 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2915 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2918 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2919 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2921 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2923 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2927 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2932 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2934 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2935 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2936 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2937 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2938 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2940 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2941 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2943 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2944 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2945 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2947 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2948 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2949 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2951 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2952 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2954 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2955 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2956 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2957 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2958 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2959 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2961 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2962 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2963 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2964 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2965 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2966 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2969 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2970 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2971 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2973 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2975 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2976 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2978 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2980 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2981 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2982 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2987 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2988 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2989 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2990 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2991 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2992 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height, outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2996 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
3001 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
3003 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
3004 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
3005 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3007 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
3009 panic!("RNG is bad???");
3012 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
3015 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
3016 node_id: their_network_key,
3019 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
3022 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3023 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
3024 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
3025 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
3026 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
3027 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
3028 // the same channel.
3029 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
3031 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3032 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3033 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3034 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3035 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3036 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
3037 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
3038 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
3039 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
3043 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
3044 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
3045 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3053 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
3054 /// more information.
3055 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3056 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
3057 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
3058 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
3059 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
3060 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
3061 // the same channel.
3062 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
3064 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3065 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3066 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3067 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3068 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3069 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
3070 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
3071 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
3079 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
3080 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
3082 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
3083 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
3085 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3086 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
3087 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
3088 // really wanted anyway.
3089 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
3092 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
3093 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3094 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3095 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3097 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3098 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3099 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3100 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3101 let context_to_details = |context| {
3102 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3104 return peer_state.channel_by_id
3106 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
3107 .map(context_to_details)
3113 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
3114 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
3116 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
3117 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
3118 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
3120 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3121 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
3122 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
3123 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
3124 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
3125 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3127 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
3128 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
3129 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3131 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
3132 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
3133 payment_id: *payment_id,
3134 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
3135 total_msat: *total_msat,
3138 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
3139 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3141 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
3142 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3144 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
3149 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3150 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3152 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
3153 let mut shutdown_result = None;
3156 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3158 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3159 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3161 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3162 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3164 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3165 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
3166 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3167 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
3168 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3169 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
3170 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
3171 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
3173 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
3174 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
3175 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
3176 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3177 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3181 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
3182 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
3184 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3185 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
3186 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
3187 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
3190 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3191 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(false) }));
3194 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3195 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3197 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3198 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
3205 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3206 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3207 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
3208 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3211 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
3212 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3218 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3219 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3220 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3222 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
3223 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3225 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
3226 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
3227 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
3228 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
3230 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3232 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3233 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3234 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3237 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3238 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
3239 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3240 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3241 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3242 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
3245 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3246 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3247 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3249 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
3250 /// the channel being closed or not:
3251 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
3252 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
3253 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3254 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
3255 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
3256 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
3257 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
3259 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
3260 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
3261 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
3262 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
3264 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3266 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3267 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3268 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3271 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3272 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3273 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3274 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3275 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
3278 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
3279 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3280 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3281 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3282 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3285 let logger = WithContext::from(
3286 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id), None
3289 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
3290 shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
3291 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
3292 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
3293 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3294 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
3295 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3297 if let Some((_, funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
3298 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
3299 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
3300 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
3301 // ignore the result here.
3302 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
3304 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3305 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
3306 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
3307 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
3308 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3309 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
3310 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
3311 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3312 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3313 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
3314 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3315 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
3318 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
3321 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
3322 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
3327 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3328 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
3329 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
3330 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
3331 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
3332 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
3333 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
3334 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
3337 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
3338 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
3339 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
3343 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3344 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3348 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
3349 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
3350 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
3351 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
3352 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3353 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3354 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
3355 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
3356 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3357 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
3358 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
3360 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(broadcast) }
3362 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id), None);
3363 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3364 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
3365 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3366 mem::drop(peer_state);
3367 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3369 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
3370 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
3371 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
3373 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
3374 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3375 // Unfunded channel has no update
3376 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3378 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
3379 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3380 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => {
3381 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3382 // Unfunded channel has no update
3383 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3386 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
3387 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
3388 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
3389 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
3391 (None, *peer_node_id)
3393 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
3396 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
3397 // If we have some Channel Update to broadcast, we cache it and broadcast it later.
3398 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
3399 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3404 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
3407 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool, error_message: String)
3408 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3409 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3410 log_debug!(self.logger,
3411 "Force-closing channel, The error message sent to the peer : {}", error_message);
3412 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
3413 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
3414 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3415 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3416 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3417 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
3418 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3419 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3420 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3421 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: error_message }
3432 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s),
3433 /// rejecting new HTLCs.
3435 /// The provided `error_message` is sent to connected peers for closing
3436 /// channels and should be a human-readable description of what went wrong.
3438 /// Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id`
3439 /// isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3440 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, error_message: String)
3441 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3442 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, error_message)
3445 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3446 /// the latest local transaction(s).
3448 /// The provided `error_message` is sent to connected peers for closing channels and should
3449 /// be a human-readable description of what went wrong.
3451 /// Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3452 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3453 /// You can always broadcast the latest local transaction(s) via
3454 /// [`ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3455 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, error_message: String)
3456 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3457 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, error_message)
3460 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3461 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3463 /// The provided `error_message` is sent to connected peers for closing channels and should
3464 /// be a human-readable description of what went wrong.
3465 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, error_message: String) {
3466 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3467 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id, error_message.clone());
3471 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3472 /// local transaction(s).
3474 /// The provided `error_message` is sent to connected peers for closing channels and
3475 /// should be a human-readable description of what went wrong.
3476 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, error_message: String) {
3477 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3478 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id, error_message.clone());
3482 fn can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(
3483 &self, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet: &NextPacketDetails
3484 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3485 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3486 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3487 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3488 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3489 return Err(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3491 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && next_packet.outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3492 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3493 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3494 // we don't have the channel here.
3495 return Err(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3498 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3499 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3500 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3501 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3502 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3503 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3504 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3505 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3506 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3507 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3508 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3509 return Err(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3511 return Err(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3514 if next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3515 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3516 return Err(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3518 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(msg, next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat, next_packet.outgoing_cltv_value) {
3519 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3520 return Err((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3526 /// Executes a callback `C` that returns some value `X` on the channel found with the given
3527 /// `scid`. `None` is returned when the channel is not found.
3528 fn do_funded_channel_callback<X, C: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> X>(
3529 &self, scid: u64, callback: C,
3531 let (counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&scid).cloned() {
3532 None => return None,
3533 Some((cp_id, id)) => (cp_id, id),
3535 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3536 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3537 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3540 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3541 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3542 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).and_then(
3543 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3546 Some(chan) => Some(callback(chan)),
3550 fn can_forward_htlc(
3551 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet_details: &NextPacketDetails
3552 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3553 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3554 self.can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(chan, msg, next_packet_details)
3557 Some(Err(e)) => return Err(e),
3559 // If we couldn't find the channel info for the scid, it may be a phantom or
3560 // intercept forward.
3561 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3562 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3563 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3565 return Err(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3570 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3571 if let Err((err_msg, err_code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3572 cur_height, next_packet_details.outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3574 let chan_update_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3575 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
3577 return Err((err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt));
3583 fn htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3584 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, err_msg: &'static str,
3585 mut err_code: u16, chan_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, is_intro_node_blinded_forward: bool,
3586 shared_secret: &[u8; 32]
3587 ) -> HTLCFailureMsg {
3588 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3589 if chan_update.is_some() && err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3590 let chan_update = chan_update.unwrap();
3591 if err_code == 0x1000 | 11 || err_code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3592 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3594 else if err_code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3595 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3597 else if err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3598 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3599 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3601 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3602 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3603 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3604 } else if err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3605 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3606 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3607 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3609 err_code = 0x2000 | 2;
3613 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id), Some(msg.payment_hash)),
3614 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", err_msg
3616 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3617 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3618 return HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3619 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3620 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3621 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3622 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3626 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_blinded_forward {
3627 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3629 (err_code, &res.0[..])
3631 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3632 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3633 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3634 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3635 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(shared_secret, &None),
3639 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3640 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3642 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3644 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3645 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3648 let next_packet_details = match next_packet_details_opt {
3649 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3650 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3651 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3654 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3655 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3656 self.can_forward_htlc(&msg, &next_packet_details).map_err(|e| {
3657 let (err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt) = e;
3658 self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3659 msg, counterparty_node_id, err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt,
3660 next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward(), &shared_secret
3664 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_details.next_packet_pubkey)))
3667 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3668 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3669 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3670 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3671 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3672 macro_rules! return_err {
3673 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3675 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id), Some(msg.payment_hash));
3676 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3677 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3678 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3679 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3680 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3681 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3682 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3683 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3687 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3688 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3689 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3690 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3691 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3697 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3699 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3700 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3701 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3702 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3705 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3706 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3707 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3708 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3709 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3711 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3714 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3715 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3716 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3717 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3718 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3724 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3725 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3726 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3728 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3729 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3730 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3732 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3733 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3734 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3735 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3736 return Err(LightningError {
3737 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3738 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3741 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3742 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3744 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
3745 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3746 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3749 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3750 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3751 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3752 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3754 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3755 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3756 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3758 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3759 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3760 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3761 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
3762 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3763 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3764 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3768 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3771 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3772 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
3773 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3774 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3776 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3777 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3778 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3779 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3780 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3783 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3784 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3786 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3787 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3788 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3789 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3790 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3791 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3792 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3793 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3795 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3796 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3797 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3799 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3801 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3808 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3809 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3810 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3811 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion: &recipient_onion, total_value,
3812 cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes
3816 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3817 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3818 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3821 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3822 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3823 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3824 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3826 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3827 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3828 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3830 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None, Some(*payment_hash));
3831 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3835 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3836 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3838 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None, Some(*payment_hash));
3839 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3840 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3842 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3845 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id), Some(*payment_hash));
3847 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3848 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3850 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3851 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3852 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3853 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3854 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3855 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3856 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3857 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3858 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3859 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3861 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3862 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(*payment_hash));
3863 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3864 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3866 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3867 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3869 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3870 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3871 Some(monitor_update) => {
3872 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3874 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3875 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3876 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3877 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3878 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3879 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3880 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3888 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3891 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3892 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3893 // `channel_by_id` map.
3894 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3895 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3899 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3900 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3902 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3907 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3909 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3910 /// fields for more info.
3912 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3913 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3915 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3917 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3918 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3919 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3920 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3921 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3923 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3924 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3925 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3926 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3927 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3929 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3930 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3931 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3932 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3934 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3936 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3937 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3938 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3940 /// In general, a path may raise:
3941 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3942 /// node public key) is specified.
3943 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3944 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3945 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3946 /// relevant updates.
3948 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3949 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3950 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3952 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3953 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3954 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3955 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3956 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3957 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3958 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3959 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3960 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3961 self.pending_outbound_payments
3962 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3963 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3964 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3967 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3968 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3969 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3970 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3971 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3972 self.pending_outbound_payments
3973 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3974 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3975 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3976 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3980 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3981 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3982 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3983 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3984 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3985 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3989 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3990 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3991 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3995 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3996 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3999 /// Pays the [`Bolt12Invoice`] associated with the `payment_id` encoded in its `payer_metadata`.
4001 /// The invoice's `payer_metadata` is used to authenticate that the invoice was indeed requested
4002 /// before attempting a payment. [`Bolt12PaymentError::UnexpectedInvoice`] is returned if this
4003 /// fails or if the encoded `payment_id` is not recognized. The latter may happen once the
4004 /// payment is no longer tracked because the payment was attempted after:
4005 /// - an invoice for the `payment_id` was already paid,
4006 /// - one full [timer tick] has elapsed since initially requesting the invoice when paying an
4008 /// - the refund corresponding to the invoice has already expired.
4010 /// To retry the payment, request another invoice using a new `payment_id`.
4012 /// Attempting to pay the same invoice twice while the first payment is still pending will
4013 /// result in a [`Bolt12PaymentError::DuplicateInvoice`].
4015 /// Otherwise, either [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`] are used to indicate
4016 /// whether or not the payment was successful.
4018 /// [timer tick]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
4019 pub fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
4020 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
4021 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
4022 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
4023 Ok(payment_id) => self.send_payment_for_verified_bolt12_invoice(invoice, payment_id),
4024 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12PaymentError::UnexpectedInvoice),
4028 fn send_payment_for_verified_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
4029 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4030 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4031 self.pending_outbound_payments
4032 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
4033 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
4034 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
4035 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
4036 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
4040 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
4041 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
4042 /// retries are exhausted.
4044 /// # Event Generation
4046 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
4047 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
4049 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
4050 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
4051 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
4053 /// # Requested Invoices
4055 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
4056 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
4057 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
4058 /// once the invoice has been received.
4060 /// # Restart Behavior
4062 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
4063 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
4064 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
4066 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
4067 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
4068 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4069 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
4072 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
4073 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
4074 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
4075 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
4076 /// never reach the recipient.
4078 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
4079 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
4081 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
4082 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
4084 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
4085 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
4086 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4087 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4088 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
4089 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
4090 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4093 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
4094 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
4096 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
4099 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
4100 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
4101 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4102 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4103 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
4104 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
4105 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4106 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4109 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
4110 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
4111 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
4112 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
4113 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4114 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4115 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
4116 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4117 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4120 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
4123 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
4124 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
4127 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
4128 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
4130 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
4131 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
4132 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
4133 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4134 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4135 let payment_params =
4136 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
4138 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
4140 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
4143 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
4144 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
4146 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
4147 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
4148 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
4149 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
4151 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
4152 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
4153 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
4154 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
4155 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
4156 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
4157 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
4158 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4159 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4160 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
4162 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
4163 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
4164 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
4165 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
4169 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
4171 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
4172 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
4175 let mut used_liquidity_map = hash_map_with_capacity(first_hops.len());
4177 let mut res = Vec::new();
4179 for mut path in route.paths {
4180 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
4181 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
4182 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
4183 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
4184 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
4187 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
4190 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
4191 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
4193 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
4195 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
4196 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
4201 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
4204 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
4209 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
4210 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
4211 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
4213 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
4214 let used_liquidity =
4215 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
4217 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
4218 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
4220 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
4223 *used_liquidity += path_value;
4228 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
4229 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
4230 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
4237 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
4238 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
4239 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, &'static str>>(
4240 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
4241 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
4242 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4243 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4244 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4245 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4247 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4248 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4250 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
4251 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
4252 macro_rules! close_chan { ($err: expr, $api_err: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
4254 let err = if let ChannelError::Close((msg, reason)) = $err {
4255 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
4256 counterparty = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4257 let shutdown_res = $chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
4258 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None)
4259 } else { unreachable!(); };
4261 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4262 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4263 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), counterparty);
4266 match find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction) {
4267 Ok(found_funding_txo) => funding_txo = found_funding_txo,
4269 let chan_err = ChannelError::close(err.to_owned());
4270 let api_err = APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err.to_owned() };
4271 return close_chan!(chan_err, api_err, chan);
4275 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
4276 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger);
4278 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
4279 Err((mut chan, chan_err)) => {
4280 let api_err = APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned() };
4281 return close_chan!(chan_err, api_err, chan);
4286 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
4287 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4289 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
4290 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4293 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
4294 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4295 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4299 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4300 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
4301 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4305 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
4306 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4307 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
4309 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4310 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4311 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
4312 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
4313 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
4315 "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
4316 funding_txo, o.get()
4318 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
4319 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4320 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4321 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
4322 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
4323 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
4326 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
4333 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4334 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
4335 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
4339 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
4341 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
4342 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
4344 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
4345 /// across the p2p network.
4347 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
4348 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
4350 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
4351 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
4352 /// keys per-channel).
4354 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
4355 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
4356 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
4358 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
4359 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
4360 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
4362 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
4363 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
4364 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
4365 /// for more details.
4367 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
4368 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
4369 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4370 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
4373 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
4375 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
4376 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
4378 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
4379 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
4380 /// signature for each channel.
4382 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
4383 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4384 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4385 let mut result = Ok(());
4387 if !funding_transaction.is_coinbase() {
4388 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
4389 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
4390 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4391 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
4396 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
4397 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4398 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
4402 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4403 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
4404 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
4405 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
4406 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
4407 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
4408 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
4409 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
4411 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4412 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
4417 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
4418 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
4419 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
4420 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
4424 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
4425 match states.entry(txid) {
4426 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4427 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4428 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
4432 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
4435 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
4436 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
4437 temporary_channel_id,
4438 counterparty_node_id,
4439 funding_transaction.clone(),
4442 let mut output_index = None;
4443 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_p2wsh();
4444 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4445 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value.to_sat() == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
4446 if output_index.is_some() {
4447 return Err("Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value");
4449 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
4452 if output_index.is_none() {
4453 return Err("No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event");
4455 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
4456 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
4457 // TODO(dual_funding): We only do batch funding for V1 channels at the moment, but we'll probably
4458 // need to fix this somehow to not rely on using the outpoint for the channel ID if we
4459 // want to support V2 batching here as well.
4460 funding_batch_state.push((ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint), *counterparty_node_id, false));
4466 if let Err(ref e) = result {
4467 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
4468 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4469 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4470 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4471 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4472 .into_iter().flatten()
4473 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4475 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4476 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4478 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4480 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4481 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4482 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4483 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4484 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id).map(|chan| (chan, peer_state)))
4485 .map(|(mut chan, mut peer_state)| {
4486 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4487 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
4488 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
4489 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4490 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4491 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4492 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4494 data: "Failed to fund channel".to_owned(),
4501 mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
4502 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4503 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4509 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4511 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4512 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4513 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4514 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4516 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4517 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4519 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4520 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4522 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4524 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4525 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4526 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4527 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4528 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4529 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4530 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4531 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4532 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4533 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4534 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4535 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4536 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4540 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4541 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4542 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4543 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4544 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4545 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4547 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4548 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4549 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4550 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4554 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4555 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4556 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4557 config.apply(config_update);
4558 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4561 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4562 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4563 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
4564 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4565 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4566 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4567 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4574 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4575 debug_assert!(false);
4576 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4578 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4579 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4586 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4588 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4589 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4590 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4591 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4593 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4594 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4596 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4597 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4599 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4601 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4602 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4603 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4604 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4605 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4606 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4607 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4608 pub fn update_channel_config(
4609 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4610 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4611 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4614 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4615 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4617 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4618 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4620 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4621 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4622 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4623 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4624 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4626 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4627 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4628 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4631 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4634 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4635 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4636 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4637 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4638 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4639 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4640 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4642 let next_hop_scid = {
4643 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4644 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4645 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4646 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4647 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4648 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4649 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4650 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4651 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4652 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4655 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4657 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4658 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4659 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4662 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4663 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4664 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id), None);
4665 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4666 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4673 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4674 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4675 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4678 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4679 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4680 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4681 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4684 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4686 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4687 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4688 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4689 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4690 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4693 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4694 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4695 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4696 payment.prev_channel_id,
4697 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4698 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4700 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4704 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4705 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4707 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4710 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4711 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4712 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4714 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4715 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4716 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4719 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4720 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4721 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4722 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4723 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4724 channel_id: payment.prev_channel_id,
4725 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4726 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4727 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4728 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4731 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4732 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4733 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4734 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4739 fn process_pending_update_add_htlcs(&self) {
4740 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4741 mem::swap(&mut decode_update_add_htlcs, &mut self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4743 let get_failed_htlc_destination = |outgoing_scid_opt: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash| {
4744 if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt {
4745 match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid) {
4746 Some((outgoing_counterparty_node_id, outgoing_channel_id)) =>
4747 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
4748 node_id: Some(*outgoing_counterparty_node_id),
4749 channel_id: *outgoing_channel_id,
4751 None => HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop {
4752 requested_forward_scid: outgoing_scid,
4756 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }
4760 'outer_loop: for (incoming_scid, update_add_htlcs) in decode_update_add_htlcs {
4761 let incoming_channel_details_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
4762 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4763 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
4764 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
4765 let user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
4766 let accept_underpaying_htlcs = chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs;
4767 (counterparty_node_id, channel_id, funding_txo, user_channel_id, accept_underpaying_htlcs)
4770 incoming_counterparty_node_id, incoming_channel_id, incoming_funding_txo,
4771 incoming_user_channel_id, incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs
4772 ) = if let Some(incoming_channel_details) = incoming_channel_details_opt {
4773 incoming_channel_details
4775 // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
4779 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
4780 let mut htlc_fails = Vec::new();
4781 for update_add_htlc in &update_add_htlcs {
4782 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = match decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
4783 &update_add_htlc, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
4785 Ok(decoded_onion) => decoded_onion,
4787 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, HTLCDestination::InvalidOnion));
4792 let is_intro_node_blinded_forward = next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward();
4793 let outgoing_scid_opt = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref().map(|d| d.outgoing_scid);
4795 // Process the HTLC on the incoming channel.
4796 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
4797 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(update_add_htlc.payment_hash));
4798 chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(
4799 update_add_htlc, &self.fee_estimator, &logger,
4803 Some(Err((err, code))) => {
4804 let outgoing_chan_update_opt = if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt.as_ref() {
4805 self.do_funded_channel_callback(*outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
4806 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
4811 let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
4812 &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
4813 outgoing_chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
4815 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
4816 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
4819 // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
4820 None => continue 'outer_loop,
4823 // Now process the HTLC on the outgoing channel if it's a forward.
4824 if let Some(next_packet_details) = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref() {
4825 if let Err((err, code, chan_update_opt)) = self.can_forward_htlc(
4826 &update_add_htlc, next_packet_details
4828 let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
4829 &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
4830 chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
4832 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
4833 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
4838 match self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
4839 &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
4840 incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_details_opt.map(|d| d.next_packet_pubkey),
4842 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(htlc_forward) => {
4843 htlc_forwards.push((htlc_forward, update_add_htlc.htlc_id));
4845 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(htlc_fail) => {
4846 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
4847 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
4852 // Process all of the forwards and failures for the channel in which the HTLCs were
4853 // proposed to as a batch.
4854 let pending_forwards = (incoming_scid, incoming_funding_txo, incoming_channel_id,
4855 incoming_user_channel_id, htlc_forwards.drain(..).collect());
4856 self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&mut [pending_forwards]);
4857 for (htlc_fail, htlc_destination) in htlc_fails.drain(..) {
4858 let failure = match htlc_fail {
4859 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(fail_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
4860 htlc_id: fail_htlc.htlc_id,
4861 err_packet: fail_htlc.reason,
4863 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(fail_malformed_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
4864 htlc_id: fail_malformed_htlc.htlc_id,
4865 sha256_of_onion: fail_malformed_htlc.sha256_of_onion,
4866 failure_code: fail_malformed_htlc.failure_code,
4869 self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().entry(incoming_scid).or_insert(vec![]).push(failure);
4870 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4871 prev_channel_id: incoming_channel_id,
4872 failed_next_destination: htlc_destination,
4878 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4880 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4881 /// Will likely generate further events.
4882 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4883 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4885 self.process_pending_update_add_htlcs();
4887 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4888 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4889 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4891 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4892 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4894 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4895 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4896 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4897 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4899 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4900 match forward_info {
4901 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4902 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4903 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4904 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4905 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4908 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4909 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4910 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id), Some(payment_hash));
4911 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4913 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4914 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4915 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4916 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4917 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4918 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4919 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4920 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4921 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4924 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4925 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4927 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4930 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4931 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4937 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4938 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4940 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4944 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4945 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4947 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4951 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4952 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4953 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4954 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4955 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4956 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4957 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4960 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4961 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4962 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4963 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4964 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4966 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4968 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4969 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4973 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4974 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4975 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4976 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4977 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4978 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4980 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4981 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4987 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4990 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4993 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4994 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4995 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4996 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4997 // problem, not ours.
5003 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
5004 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
5005 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
5007 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5011 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
5012 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5013 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5014 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5015 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5018 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5019 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5020 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
5021 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
5022 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5023 let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
5024 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5025 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5026 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5027 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
5028 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
5029 onion_packet, blinded, ..
5030 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
5033 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(payment_hash));
5034 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
5035 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5036 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5037 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5038 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5039 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5040 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5041 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5042 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
5043 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5044 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
5046 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
5047 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
5048 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
5049 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
5050 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
5051 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
5054 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
5055 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
5056 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
5059 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
5060 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
5062 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
5064 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
5065 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
5066 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5067 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
5073 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
5074 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
5076 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
5077 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
5078 Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
5080 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
5081 log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
5082 let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
5083 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
5085 Some((res, htlc_id))
5088 if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
5089 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
5090 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
5091 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
5093 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
5095 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
5096 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
5097 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
5103 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5107 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5108 match forward_info {
5109 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5110 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5111 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5112 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
5113 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
5116 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
5117 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, payment_context, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
5118 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
5119 payment_data, payment_metadata, payment_context,
5120 incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs,
5121 requires_blinded_error: _
5123 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
5124 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
5125 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
5126 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
5127 Some(payment_data), payment_context, phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
5129 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
5130 payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata,
5131 incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
5133 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
5134 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
5138 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
5139 payment_data, None, None, onion_fields)
5142 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
5145 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
5146 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
5147 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5148 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5149 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5150 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5151 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5152 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5153 phantom_shared_secret,
5156 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
5157 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
5158 // if routing nodes overpay
5159 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
5160 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
5162 total_value_received: None,
5163 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
5166 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
5169 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
5171 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
5172 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
5173 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
5174 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5175 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
5176 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes(),
5178 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5179 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
5180 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
5181 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5182 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5183 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
5184 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5185 phantom_shared_secret,
5188 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
5189 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
5191 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
5194 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
5195 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5196 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5197 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5198 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5201 macro_rules! check_total_value {
5202 ($purpose: expr) => {{
5203 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
5204 let is_keysend = $purpose.is_keysend();
5205 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5206 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
5207 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5209 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
5210 .entry(payment_hash)
5211 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
5212 .or_insert_with(|| {
5213 committed_to_claimable = true;
5215 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
5218 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
5219 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
5220 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
5221 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5223 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5224 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
5225 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5227 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
5228 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
5229 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5232 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
5234 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
5235 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
5236 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
5237 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
5238 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
5239 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
5240 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5241 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
5242 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
5243 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
5245 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
5247 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
5248 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
5249 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5250 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5251 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5252 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
5254 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5255 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5256 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5257 committed_to_claimable = true;
5259 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5260 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
5261 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
5262 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
5263 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
5264 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
5265 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
5266 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
5267 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5271 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
5272 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
5273 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5274 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
5275 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
5277 payment_claimable_generated = true;
5279 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
5280 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
5282 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5283 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5284 committed_to_claimable = true;
5287 payment_claimable_generated
5291 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
5292 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
5293 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
5294 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
5295 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
5296 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
5297 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5298 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5299 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5300 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5301 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
5302 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5303 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
5304 Ok(result) => result,
5306 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
5307 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5310 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
5311 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
5312 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
5313 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
5314 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
5315 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5318 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::from_parts(
5320 payment_data.payment_secret,
5323 check_total_value!(purpose);
5325 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
5326 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
5327 check_total_value!(purpose);
5331 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
5332 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5333 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
5334 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5336 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5337 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
5338 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
5339 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5340 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
5341 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
5342 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
5343 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5345 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::from_parts(
5346 inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
5347 payment_data.payment_secret,
5350 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
5351 if payment_claimable_generated {
5352 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
5358 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
5359 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
5367 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
5368 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
5369 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
5370 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
5372 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
5373 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5375 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
5377 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
5378 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
5379 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
5381 self.check_free_holding_cells();
5383 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
5384 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5385 events.append(&mut new_events);
5388 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
5390 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
5391 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
5392 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
5394 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
5396 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
5397 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
5398 if background_events.is_empty() {
5399 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5402 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
5404 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, _channel_id, update)) => {
5405 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
5406 // monitor updating completing.
5407 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5409 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update } => {
5410 let mut updated_chan = false;
5412 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5413 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5414 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5415 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5416 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5417 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
5418 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
5419 updated_chan = true;
5420 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
5421 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5423 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
5426 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
5431 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
5432 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5435 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
5436 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5437 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5438 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5439 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5440 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
5441 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5443 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5444 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5445 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5446 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5447 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5453 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5456 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5457 /// Process background events, for functional testing
5458 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
5459 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5460 let _ = self.process_background_events();
5463 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
5464 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
5466 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
5468 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
5469 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
5470 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5472 if !chan.context.is_live() {
5473 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
5474 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5475 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5477 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
5478 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5480 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
5481 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5485 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
5486 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
5487 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
5488 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
5489 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
5490 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5491 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5493 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5494 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5496 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5497 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5498 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5499 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5500 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
5501 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
5503 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5508 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5509 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5517 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
5519 /// This currently includes:
5520 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
5521 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
5522 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
5524 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
5525 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
5526 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
5527 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
5528 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
5529 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
5530 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
5531 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
5533 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
5534 /// estimate fetches.
5536 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
5537 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
5538 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
5539 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5540 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5542 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5543 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5545 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
5546 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
5547 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
5548 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
5550 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
5551 chan_id: &ChannelId,
5552 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
5553 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
5554 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5555 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
5557 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5558 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
5559 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context, None);
5561 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
5562 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
5563 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(false) }));
5564 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5565 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5566 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5567 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5568 channel_id: *chan_id,
5569 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
5580 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5581 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5582 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5583 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5584 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5585 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
5586 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
5588 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5589 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5594 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5595 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5597 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
5598 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
5599 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
5600 if needs_close { return false; }
5603 match chan.channel_update_status() {
5604 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
5605 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
5606 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
5607 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
5608 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
5609 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
5610 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
5612 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5613 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
5614 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5615 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
5616 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5620 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5622 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
5625 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
5627 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5628 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
5629 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5630 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
5631 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5635 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5637 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
5643 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5645 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
5646 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
5647 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
5648 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
5649 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5650 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5651 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
5652 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
5653 channel_id: *chan_id,
5654 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5662 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5663 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5664 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5666 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5667 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5668 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5670 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
5671 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
5672 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5673 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5675 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
5676 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
5677 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5678 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5683 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5684 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5685 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id), None);
5686 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5687 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5688 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5689 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5690 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5691 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5697 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5699 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5700 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5705 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5706 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5707 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5708 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5709 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5710 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5711 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5712 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5713 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5714 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5715 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5716 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5717 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5718 // have no channels to the peer.
5719 let remove_entry = {
5720 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5721 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5724 entry.remove_entry();
5727 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5732 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5733 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5734 // This should be unreachable
5735 debug_assert!(false);
5738 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5739 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5740 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5741 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5742 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5743 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5744 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5747 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5748 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5749 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5751 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5752 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5759 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5760 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5761 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5762 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5763 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5766 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5767 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5770 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5771 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5774 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5775 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5776 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5777 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5778 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5779 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5780 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5783 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5784 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5787 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5788 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5789 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5790 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5791 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5798 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5799 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5800 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5802 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5803 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5804 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5805 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5807 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5808 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5809 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5810 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5811 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5812 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5815 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5816 /// reason for the failure.
5818 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5819 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5820 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5822 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5823 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5824 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5825 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5826 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5827 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5828 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5833 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5834 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5835 match failure_code {
5836 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5837 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5838 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5839 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5840 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
5841 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5843 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5844 let fail_data = match data {
5845 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5848 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5853 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5854 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5856 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5858 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5859 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5860 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5861 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5862 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5863 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5864 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5866 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5868 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5869 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5871 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5876 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5877 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5878 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5879 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5880 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5881 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5882 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5883 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5884 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5885 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5887 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5888 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5889 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5890 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5892 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5893 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5894 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5895 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5896 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5900 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5901 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5902 // be surfaced to the user.
5903 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5904 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5905 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5907 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5908 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5909 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5910 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5911 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5912 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5913 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5914 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5915 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5917 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5918 debug_assert!(false);
5919 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5922 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5924 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5927 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5928 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5929 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5930 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5934 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5935 let push_forward_event = self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(source, payment_hash, onion_error, destination);
5936 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5939 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5940 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5941 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) -> bool {
5942 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5943 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5944 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5945 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5946 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5947 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5948 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5951 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5952 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5953 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5956 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5957 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5958 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5959 let mut push_forward_event;
5961 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5962 push_forward_event = self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5963 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5964 &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
5966 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5967 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5968 ref phantom_shared_secret, outpoint: _, ref blinded_failure, ref channel_id, ..
5971 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id), Some(*payment_hash)),
5972 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5973 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5975 let failure = match blinded_failure {
5976 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5977 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5978 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5979 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5981 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5983 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
5984 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5986 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
5987 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
5991 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5992 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5994 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5998 push_forward_event = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
5999 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6000 push_forward_event &= forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6001 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
6002 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6003 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
6005 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6006 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
6009 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
6010 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6011 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
6012 prev_channel_id: *channel_id,
6013 failed_next_destination: destination,
6020 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
6021 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
6023 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
6024 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
6025 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
6026 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
6028 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
6029 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
6030 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
6031 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
6033 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
6034 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
6035 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
6037 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6038 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
6039 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
6040 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
6041 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6042 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6043 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
6044 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
6045 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
6048 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
6049 /// even type numbers.
6053 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
6054 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
6056 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6057 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
6058 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
6061 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
6062 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
6064 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6067 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6068 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
6069 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
6070 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
6071 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
6072 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
6073 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
6074 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
6079 let claiming_payment = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments
6080 .entry(payment_hash)
6082 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
6083 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
6086 .or_insert_with(|| {
6087 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
6088 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
6090 amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
6091 payment_purpose: payment.purpose,
6094 sender_intended_value,
6095 onion_fields: payment.onion_fields,
6099 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = claiming_payment.onion_fields {
6100 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
6101 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
6102 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
6103 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6104 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
6105 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
6106 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
6107 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6108 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6109 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6118 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
6120 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
6121 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
6122 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
6123 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
6124 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
6125 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
6126 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
6127 let mut valid_mpp = true;
6128 let mut errs = Vec::new();
6129 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6130 for htlc in sources.iter() {
6131 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
6132 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
6133 debug_assert!(false);
6137 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
6139 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
6140 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
6141 debug_assert!(false);
6145 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
6146 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
6148 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6149 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
6150 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6151 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
6154 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
6155 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6156 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
6157 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
6161 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6162 self.claim_funds_from_hop(
6163 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
6164 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
6165 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
6166 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
6172 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6173 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6174 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
6175 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6176 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
6177 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6178 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6180 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6183 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
6184 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
6185 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6186 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6190 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(
6191 &self, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
6192 completion_action: ComplFunc,
6194 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
6196 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
6197 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
6198 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
6199 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6201 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
6202 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
6203 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6204 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6207 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6208 let chan_id = prev_hop.channel_id;
6209 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
6210 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
6214 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
6215 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6216 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
6219 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
6220 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
6221 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6222 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6223 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6224 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6225 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
6226 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
6229 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
6230 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
6231 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
6233 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
6236 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6237 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6239 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
6240 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
6241 // monitor update as a background event.
6242 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6243 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6244 counterparty_node_id,
6245 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
6246 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
6247 update: monitor_update.clone(),
6251 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
6252 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
6257 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6259 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
6261 let (node_id, _funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker) =
6262 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6263 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
6264 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
6265 blocking_action: blocker, downstream_channel_id: channel_id,
6267 (node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)
6269 debug_assert!(false,
6270 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
6273 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
6274 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6275 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
6276 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6277 .get_mut(&channel_id)
6279 let mut found_blocker = false;
6280 blockers.retain(|iter| {
6281 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
6282 // which case we need to only remove the one
6283 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
6284 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
6285 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
6286 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
6288 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
6291 debug_assert!(false);
6300 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6301 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
6302 counterparty_node_id: None,
6303 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6306 channel_id: Some(prev_hop.channel_id),
6310 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
6311 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
6312 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
6313 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
6314 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
6315 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
6316 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
6317 // again on restart.
6318 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id), None),
6319 "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
6320 payment_preimage, update_res);
6323 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
6324 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
6326 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
6327 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
6328 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
6329 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
6330 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
6331 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
6332 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
6333 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6334 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
6335 prev_hop.outpoint, prev_hop.channel_id, preimage_update,
6338 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
6339 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
6340 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
6341 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
6342 // `PaymentForwarded`).
6343 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
6346 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
6347 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
6350 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
6351 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
6352 startup_replay: bool, next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
6353 next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint, next_channel_id: ChannelId, next_user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
6356 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
6357 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
6358 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
6359 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6360 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
6362 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6363 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint, channel_id: next_channel_id,
6364 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
6366 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
6367 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
6370 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
6371 let prev_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
6372 let prev_user_channel_id = hop_data.user_channel_id;
6373 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
6374 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6375 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
6376 self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
6377 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
6378 let chan_to_release =
6379 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6380 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, next_channel_id, completed_blocker))
6382 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
6383 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
6384 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
6385 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
6390 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
6391 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
6392 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
6393 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
6394 // in the background.
6395 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
6396 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6397 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
6398 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
6400 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
6401 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6402 funding_txo, update, ..
6404 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
6405 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
6406 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6407 payment_preimage: update_preimage
6409 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
6415 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
6416 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
6417 (funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)
6419 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
6420 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
6422 monitor_update.updates[0],
6423 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
6428 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
6429 // immediately once we get going.
6430 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
6433 *channel_id == prev_channel_id,
6435 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
6438 } else if definitely_duplicate {
6439 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
6440 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6441 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
6442 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
6443 downstream_channel_id: other_chan.2,
6444 blocking_action: other_chan.3,
6448 let total_fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
6449 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
6450 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
6453 debug_assert!(skimmed_fee_msat <= total_fee_earned_msat,
6454 "skimmed_fee_msat must always be included in total_fee_earned_msat");
6455 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6456 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
6457 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
6458 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
6459 prev_user_channel_id,
6460 next_user_channel_id,
6461 total_fee_earned_msat,
6463 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
6464 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
6466 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
6474 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
6475 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
6476 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
6479 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
6480 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6481 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6482 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6484 for action in actions.into_iter() {
6486 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
6487 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6488 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
6490 payment_purpose: purpose,
6493 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
6496 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
6500 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
6502 sender_intended_total_msat,
6507 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6508 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
6510 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
6511 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
6512 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
6515 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6516 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, downstream_channel_id, blocking_action,
6518 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
6519 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
6520 downstream_funding_outpoint,
6521 downstream_channel_id,
6522 Some(blocking_action),
6529 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
6530 /// update completion.
6531 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
6532 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
6533 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
6534 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
6535 funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
6536 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
6537 -> (Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)>, Option<(u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)>) {
6538 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None);
6539 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {} pending update_add_htlcs, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
6540 &channel.context.channel_id(),
6541 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
6542 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
6543 pending_forwards.len(), pending_update_adds.len(),
6544 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
6545 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
6546 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
6548 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6549 let short_channel_id = channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias());
6551 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
6552 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6553 htlc_forwards = Some((short_channel_id, channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
6554 channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
6556 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = None;
6557 if !pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
6558 decode_update_add_htlcs = Some((short_channel_id, pending_update_adds));
6561 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
6562 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
6564 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
6565 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6566 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6571 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
6572 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
6573 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
6574 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6579 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
6580 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
6581 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
6582 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6583 msg: revoke_and_ack,
6588 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
6592 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
6598 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
6599 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
6600 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6604 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6605 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
6606 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6609 (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs)
6612 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, channel_id: &ChannelId, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
6613 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6615 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
6616 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6618 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6619 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
6620 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6621 match outpoint_to_peer.get(funding_txo) {
6622 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6627 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6628 let mut peer_state_lock;
6629 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
6630 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
6631 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6632 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6634 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
6637 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
6638 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
6639 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6640 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6641 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
6644 let remaining_in_flight =
6645 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
6646 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
6649 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None);
6650 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
6651 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
6652 remaining_in_flight);
6653 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || remaining_in_flight != 0 {
6656 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
6659 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
6661 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
6662 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
6665 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6666 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6667 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6669 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
6670 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
6671 /// used to accept such channels.
6673 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6674 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6675 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6676 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
6679 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
6680 /// it as confirmed immediately.
6682 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6683 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6684 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6686 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
6687 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6689 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6690 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6692 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6693 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6695 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6696 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6697 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6698 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6701 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6703 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id), None);
6704 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6706 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6707 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6708 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6709 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6711 let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6712 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6714 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6716 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6717 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6718 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6720 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6721 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6722 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6724 let res = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6725 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6726 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6727 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6728 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6729 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6730 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|err| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(err, *temporary_channel_id))
6733 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6734 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6736 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6742 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6743 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6744 match handle_error!(self, Result::<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>::Err(err), *counterparty_node_id) {
6745 Ok(_) => unreachable!("`handle_error` only returns Err as we've passed in an Err"),
6747 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err });
6751 Ok(mut channel) => {
6753 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6754 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6755 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6756 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6757 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6758 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6759 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6762 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6763 let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6764 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6766 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6768 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6769 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6770 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6771 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6772 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6773 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6774 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6775 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6778 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6779 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
6780 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6782 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6786 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6787 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6788 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6790 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6791 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6792 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6795 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6802 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6803 /// or 0-conf channels.
6805 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6806 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6807 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6808 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6809 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6810 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6812 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6813 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6814 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6815 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6816 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6817 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6818 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6822 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6825 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6826 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6828 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6829 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6831 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6832 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6833 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6834 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6835 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6837 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6840 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6841 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6842 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6845 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
6846 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
6847 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
6848 // Only inbound V2 channels that are not 0conf and that we do not contribute to will be
6849 // included in the unfunded count.
6850 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6851 chan.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis == 0 {
6852 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6855 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6856 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6859 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
6860 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
6861 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
6862 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6867 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6870 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6871 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6872 // likely to be lost on restart!
6873 if msg.common_fields.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6874 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(),
6875 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6878 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6879 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(),
6880 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6883 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6884 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6885 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6886 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6887 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6889 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6890 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6892 debug_assert!(false);
6893 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6894 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6895 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6897 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6898 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6900 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6901 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6902 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6903 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6904 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6905 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6907 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6908 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6909 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6912 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6913 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6914 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6915 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6916 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6919 let channel_id = msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
6920 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6922 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6923 "temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(),
6924 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6927 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6928 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6929 let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
6930 &msg.common_fields, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
6932 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6934 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6935 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6936 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6937 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6938 funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
6939 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6942 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6943 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6944 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6949 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6950 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6951 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6952 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6953 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6954 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6955 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6958 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6963 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6964 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6965 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6966 "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(),
6967 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6969 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6970 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6971 "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(),
6972 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6975 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6976 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6978 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6979 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6980 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6982 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6986 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6987 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6988 // likely to be lost on restart!
6989 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6990 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6991 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6993 debug_assert!(false);
6994 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6996 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6997 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6998 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id) {
6999 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
7000 match phase.get_mut() {
7001 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7002 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
7003 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
7006 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
7010 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id))
7013 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7014 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
7015 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id,
7016 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7017 channel_value_satoshis: value,
7019 user_channel_id: user_id,
7024 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7025 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7027 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7028 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7030 debug_assert!(false);
7031 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
7034 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7035 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7036 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
7037 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
7038 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
7039 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context, None);
7040 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
7042 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
7043 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
7044 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
7045 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
7046 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
7047 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
7048 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
7049 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
7050 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
7054 Some(mut phase) => {
7055 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
7056 let err = ChannelError::close(err_msg);
7057 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
7059 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
7062 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
7064 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
7065 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
7066 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
7067 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
7068 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
7069 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
7071 let err = ChannelError::close($err.to_owned());
7072 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
7073 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
7076 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
7077 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7078 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
7080 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7081 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7082 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
7083 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7084 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
7086 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
7087 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
7088 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
7089 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
7090 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
7092 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
7093 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
7094 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
7095 // until we have persisted our monitor.
7096 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
7097 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7098 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7103 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
7104 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
7105 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
7107 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
7111 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7112 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
7113 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
7121 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7122 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7123 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7124 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7126 debug_assert!(false);
7127 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7130 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7131 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7132 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7133 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
7134 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
7135 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
7136 let logger = WithContext::from(
7138 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
7139 Some(chan.context.channel_id()),
7143 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
7145 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
7146 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
7147 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
7148 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
7149 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
7150 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
7151 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
7152 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
7153 } else { unreachable!(); }
7156 let e = ChannelError::close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
7157 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
7158 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
7159 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
7160 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
7161 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
7162 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7166 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
7167 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
7168 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
7169 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
7170 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
7171 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7175 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
7178 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
7182 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7183 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7184 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7185 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7186 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7188 debug_assert!(false);
7189 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7191 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7192 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7193 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7194 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7195 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7196 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7197 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
7198 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7199 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
7200 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7201 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7202 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7203 msg: announcement_sigs,
7205 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7206 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
7207 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
7208 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
7209 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
7210 // announcement_signatures.
7211 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7212 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7213 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7214 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7221 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7222 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
7227 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7228 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
7231 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7232 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7237 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7238 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
7239 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
7241 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7242 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7244 debug_assert!(false);
7245 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7247 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7248 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7249 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7250 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
7252 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7253 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
7254 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7255 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
7257 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
7260 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7261 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7262 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7263 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
7265 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
7266 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
7267 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
7268 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
7269 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7270 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7274 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
7275 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7276 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7277 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7280 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
7281 let context = phase.context_mut();
7282 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context, None);
7283 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7284 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7285 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7287 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
7288 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7289 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
7290 let context = phase.context_mut();
7291 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7292 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7293 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7297 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7300 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
7301 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
7302 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7303 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
7305 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
7306 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
7312 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7313 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7314 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7316 debug_assert!(false);
7317 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7319 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
7320 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7321 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7322 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7323 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7324 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7325 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7326 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7327 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
7328 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7329 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7334 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
7335 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
7336 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
7337 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
7338 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
7339 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
7340 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
7342 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7343 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7346 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7349 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
7350 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
7351 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id, None), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
7352 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
7354 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
7355 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7356 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
7357 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7362 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7363 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
7364 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7369 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7370 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
7371 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
7372 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
7374 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
7375 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
7376 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
7377 //but we should prevent it anyway.
7379 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7380 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7382 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
7383 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7384 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7386 debug_assert!(false);
7387 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7389 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7390 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7391 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7392 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7393 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7394 let mut pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
7395 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
7396 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
7397 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
7398 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
7400 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
7402 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(msg.payment_hash));
7403 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
7404 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
7405 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
7406 if let Err((_, error_code)) = chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &logger) {
7407 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
7408 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
7409 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7410 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7411 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7412 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
7413 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
7417 match pending_forward_info {
7418 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
7419 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
7421 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
7422 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
7423 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
7424 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
7425 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
7427 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
7428 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
7429 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7430 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7431 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7434 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg));
7440 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, &self.fee_estimator), chan_phase_entry);
7442 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7443 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7446 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7451 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7453 let next_user_channel_id;
7454 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value, skimmed_fee_msat) = {
7455 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7456 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7458 debug_assert!(false);
7459 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7461 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7462 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7463 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7464 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7465 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7466 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7467 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
7468 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7470 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
7472 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
7473 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7474 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
7476 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
7477 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
7478 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
7479 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
7480 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
7481 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
7482 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
7483 next_user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
7486 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7487 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7490 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7493 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(),
7494 Some(forwarded_htlc_value), skimmed_fee_msat, false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id),
7495 funding_txo, msg.channel_id, Some(next_user_channel_id),
7501 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7502 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7503 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7504 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7505 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7507 debug_assert!(false);
7508 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7510 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7511 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7512 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7513 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7514 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7515 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
7517 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7518 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7521 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7526 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7527 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7528 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7529 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7530 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7532 debug_assert!(false);
7533 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7535 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7536 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7537 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7538 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7539 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
7540 let chan_err = ChannelError::close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
7541 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
7543 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7544 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
7546 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7547 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7551 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7555 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7556 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7557 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7559 debug_assert!(false);
7560 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7562 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7563 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7564 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7565 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7566 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7567 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7568 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7569 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7570 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7571 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
7572 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7576 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7577 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7580 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7584 fn push_decode_update_add_htlcs(&self, mut update_add_htlcs: (u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)) {
7585 let mut push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7586 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7587 push_forward_event &= decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty();
7588 let scid = update_add_htlcs.0;
7589 match decode_update_add_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7590 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => { e.get_mut().append(&mut update_add_htlcs.1); },
7591 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(update_add_htlcs.1); },
7593 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
7597 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
7598 let push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(per_source_pending_forwards);
7599 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
7603 fn forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) -> bool {
7604 let mut push_forward_event = false;
7605 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
7606 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
7607 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
7608 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
7609 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
7610 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
7611 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7612 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
7613 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
7615 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
7616 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
7618 let decode_update_add_htlcs_empty = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7619 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7620 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
7621 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7622 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7623 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7624 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
7626 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7627 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
7628 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
7630 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
7631 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7632 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
7633 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7634 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
7635 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
7636 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
7637 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
7638 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
7641 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7642 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
7644 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7645 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id), Some(forward_info.payment_hash));
7646 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
7647 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7648 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
7649 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
7650 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
7651 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
7652 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
7653 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7654 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7655 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
7658 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
7659 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
7660 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
7665 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
7666 // payments are being processed.
7667 push_forward_event |= forward_htlcs_empty && decode_update_add_htlcs_empty;
7668 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7669 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
7676 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
7677 push_forward_event |= self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
7680 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
7681 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7682 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
7688 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
7689 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7690 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7691 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
7692 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
7694 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
7695 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
7696 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
7697 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
7698 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
7699 // real by taking more time.
7700 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
7701 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7702 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
7707 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
7708 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
7709 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
7710 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
7711 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7712 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
7713 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
7715 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7716 .get(&channel_id).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
7717 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
7718 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7719 channel_funding_outpoint,
7721 counterparty_node_id,
7726 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7727 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7728 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
7730 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7731 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7732 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7733 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7735 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
7736 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7737 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7743 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7744 let htlcs_to_fail = {
7745 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7746 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7748 debug_assert!(false);
7749 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7750 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
7751 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7752 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7753 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7754 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7755 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7756 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7757 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
7758 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
7759 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo, msg.channel_id,
7760 *counterparty_node_id)
7762 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7763 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
7764 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7765 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
7766 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
7767 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
7768 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7772 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7773 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7776 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7779 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7783 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7784 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7785 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7787 debug_assert!(false);
7788 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7790 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7791 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7792 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7793 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7794 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7795 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7796 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7798 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7799 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7802 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7807 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7808 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7809 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7811 debug_assert!(false);
7812 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7814 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7815 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7816 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7817 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7818 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7819 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7820 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7823 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7824 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7825 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height,
7826 msg, &self.default_configuration
7827 ), chan_phase_entry),
7828 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7829 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7830 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7833 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7834 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7837 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7842 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7843 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7844 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7845 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7847 // It's not a local channel
7848 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7851 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7852 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7853 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7854 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7856 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7857 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7858 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7859 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7860 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7861 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7862 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7863 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7864 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7865 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7866 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7868 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7870 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7871 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7872 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7873 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7875 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7876 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7877 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7878 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7881 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7885 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7886 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7889 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7891 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7894 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7895 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7896 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7898 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7900 debug_assert!(false);
7901 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7902 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7906 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id), None);
7907 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7908 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7909 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7910 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7911 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7912 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7913 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7914 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7915 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7916 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7917 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7918 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7919 let mut channel_update = None;
7920 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7921 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7922 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7925 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7926 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7927 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7928 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7929 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7930 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7931 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7936 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7937 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7938 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7939 Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7940 debug_assert!(htlc_forwards.is_none());
7941 debug_assert!(decode_update_add_htlcs.is_none());
7942 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7943 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7947 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7948 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7951 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7952 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7954 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7955 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7956 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7957 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7958 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7959 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7961 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7962 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7963 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7964 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7965 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7966 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7967 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7968 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7969 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7970 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7971 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7972 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7973 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7974 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7975 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7976 next_funding_txid: None,
7979 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7980 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7981 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7987 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7988 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7990 Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents)
7993 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7994 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7995 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7997 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7998 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7999 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
8000 for (funding_outpoint, channel_id, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
8001 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
8002 match monitor_event {
8003 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
8004 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id), Some(htlc_update.payment_hash));
8005 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
8006 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
8007 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage,
8008 htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), None, true,
8009 false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
8011 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
8012 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id };
8013 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8014 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8017 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) | MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => {
8018 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
8019 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
8021 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
8022 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
8023 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8024 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
8027 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
8028 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8029 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8030 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8031 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8032 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8033 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
8034 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
8035 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { reason, .. } = monitor_event {
8038 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }
8040 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason.clone()));
8041 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
8042 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
8043 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8047 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8048 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8049 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8050 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: reason.to_string() })
8058 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update_id } => {
8059 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, &channel_id, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
8065 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8066 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8069 has_pending_monitor_events
8072 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
8073 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
8074 /// update events as a separate process method here.
8076 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
8077 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8078 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
8081 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
8082 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
8083 /// update was applied.
8084 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
8085 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
8086 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8088 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
8089 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
8090 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
8091 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
8093 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8094 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8096 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8097 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8098 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
8099 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
8101 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
8102 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8103 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
8104 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None));
8105 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
8106 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
8108 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
8109 has_monitor_update = true;
8111 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
8112 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8113 continue 'peer_loop;
8122 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
8123 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8124 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
8130 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
8131 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
8133 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
8134 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
8136 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
8137 #[cfg(async_signing)]
8138 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
8139 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8141 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
8142 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
8144 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8145 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
8146 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
8147 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
8152 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
8153 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
8158 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
8159 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
8162 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8163 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
8164 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
8170 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
8174 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8175 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
8176 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8177 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8178 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8179 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
8180 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8184 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8185 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8186 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8187 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8188 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8194 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
8195 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
8196 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
8197 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
8198 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
8199 let mut has_update = false;
8200 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
8202 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8204 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8205 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8206 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8207 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8208 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
8210 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8211 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
8212 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
8213 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
8214 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
8216 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
8217 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
8220 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
8221 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
8222 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
8224 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
8225 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
8226 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
8227 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
8228 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
8229 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8234 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
8235 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
8236 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
8242 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
8243 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
8248 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
8254 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
8255 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
8258 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
8259 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
8265 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
8266 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
8268 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
8269 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8270 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
8271 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
8272 // reorganized out of the main chain.
8273 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
8274 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
8275 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
8276 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
8277 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
8278 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
8279 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
8280 assert!(should_broadcast);
8281 } else { unreachable!(); }
8282 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
8283 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8284 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update, channel_id,
8287 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8292 macro_rules! create_offer_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8293 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
8294 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer's
8295 /// expiration will be `absolute_expiry` if `Some`, otherwise it will not expire.
8299 /// Uses [`MessageRouter`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer based on the given
8300 /// `absolute_expiry` according to [`MAX_SHORT_LIVED_RELATIVE_EXPIRY`]. See those docs for
8301 /// privacy implications as well as those of the parameterized [`Router`], which implements
8302 /// [`MessageRouter`].
8304 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
8308 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
8313 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
8315 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
8316 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8317 pub fn create_offer_builder(
8318 &$self, absolute_expiry: Option<Duration>
8319 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8320 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8321 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8322 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8323 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8325 let path = $self.create_blinded_path_using_absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
8326 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8327 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
8328 node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
8330 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8333 let builder = match absolute_expiry {
8335 Some(absolute_expiry) => builder.absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry),
8342 macro_rules! create_refund_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8343 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
8344 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
8348 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
8349 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
8351 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
8352 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
8353 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
8356 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8357 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
8358 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8360 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8361 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8365 /// Uses [`MessageRouter`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund based on the given
8366 /// `absolute_expiry` according to [`MAX_SHORT_LIVED_RELATIVE_EXPIRY`]. See those docs for
8367 /// privacy implications as well as those of the parameterized [`Router`], which implements
8368 /// [`MessageRouter`].
8370 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
8374 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
8375 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8380 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8381 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
8382 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
8384 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
8385 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8386 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8387 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8388 pub fn create_refund_builder(
8389 &$self, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration, payment_id: PaymentId,
8390 retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8391 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8392 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8393 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8394 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8395 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8397 let path = $self.create_blinded_path_using_absolute_expiry(Some(absolute_expiry))
8398 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8399 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
8400 node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
8402 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8403 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
8406 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop($self);
8408 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
8409 $self.pending_outbound_payments
8410 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8411 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
8413 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8419 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8421 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8422 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8423 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8424 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8425 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8426 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8430 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8431 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>);
8432 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8433 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>);
8436 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8438 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8440 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
8441 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
8442 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
8444 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
8445 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
8446 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
8447 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
8448 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
8449 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
8450 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
8452 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8453 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8457 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
8458 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
8461 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8462 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
8463 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8467 /// For payer privacy, uses a derived payer id and uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`]
8468 /// to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path. For further privacy implications, see the
8469 /// docs of the parameterized [`Router`], which implements [`MessageRouter`].
8473 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
8474 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
8475 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8480 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8481 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
8482 /// - the offer is for an unsupported chain, or
8483 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
8486 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8487 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
8488 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
8489 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
8490 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8491 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8492 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8493 pub fn pay_for_offer(
8494 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
8495 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
8496 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8497 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
8498 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8499 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8500 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8502 let builder: InvoiceRequestBuilder<DerivedPayerId, secp256k1::All> = offer
8503 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
8505 let builder = builder.chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
8507 let builder = match quantity {
8509 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
8511 let builder = match amount_msats {
8513 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
8515 let builder = match payer_note {
8517 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
8519 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
8520 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8522 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8524 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
8525 self.pending_outbound_payments
8526 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8527 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
8529 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8531 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8532 if !offer.paths().is_empty() {
8533 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
8534 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
8535 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
8536 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
8537 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
8538 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8539 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
8540 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8541 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8543 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8545 } else if let Some(signing_pubkey) = offer.signing_pubkey() {
8546 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8547 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
8548 Destination::Node(signing_pubkey),
8551 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8553 debug_assert!(false);
8554 return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::MissingSigningPubkey);
8560 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
8563 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
8564 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
8565 /// [`PaymentPreimage`]. It is returned purely for informational purposes.
8569 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
8570 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
8571 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
8572 /// received and no retries will be made.
8577 /// - the refund is for an unsupported chain, or
8578 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply path for
8581 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8582 pub fn request_refund_payment(
8583 &self, refund: &Refund
8584 ) -> Result<Bolt12Invoice, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8585 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8586 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8587 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8589 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
8590 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
8592 if refund.chain() != self.chain_hash {
8593 return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::UnsupportedChain);
8596 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8598 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
8599 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
8600 let payment_context = PaymentContext::Bolt12Refund(Bolt12RefundContext {});
8601 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8602 amount_msats, payment_secret, payment_context
8604 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8606 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
8607 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
8608 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
8610 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8611 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8612 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8614 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8615 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8616 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
8618 let builder: InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey> = builder.into();
8619 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
8620 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
8621 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8623 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8624 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
8625 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8626 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8627 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
8630 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8632 for path in refund.paths() {
8633 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8634 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8635 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8636 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8638 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8644 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
8648 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
8651 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
8652 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
8654 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`] event, which
8655 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] return `Some` for [`PaymentPurpose::preimage`]. That
8656 /// should then be passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
8658 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
8660 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8661 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8665 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8666 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8668 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8670 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8671 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8673 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
8674 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8675 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
8676 /// [`PaymentPurpose::preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::preimage
8677 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
8678 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
8679 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
8680 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
8681 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8682 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
8685 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
8686 /// stored external to LDK.
8688 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
8689 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
8690 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
8692 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
8693 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
8696 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
8697 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
8698 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
8699 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
8701 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
8702 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
8703 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
8704 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
8705 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
8707 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
8708 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
8709 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
8710 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
8711 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
8713 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
8714 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
8716 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8717 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8721 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8722 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8724 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8726 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8727 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8729 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8730 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8731 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
8732 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
8733 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
8734 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8735 min_final_cltv_expiry)
8738 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
8739 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
8741 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8742 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
8743 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
8746 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter`] based on the path's intended
8749 /// Whether or not the path is compact depends on whether the path is short-lived or long-lived,
8750 /// respectively, based on the given `absolute_expiry` as seconds since the Unix epoch. See
8751 /// [`MAX_SHORT_LIVED_RELATIVE_EXPIRY`].
8752 fn create_blinded_path_using_absolute_expiry(
8753 &self, absolute_expiry: Option<Duration>
8754 ) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8755 let now = self.duration_since_epoch();
8756 let max_short_lived_absolute_expiry = now.saturating_add(MAX_SHORT_LIVED_RELATIVE_EXPIRY);
8758 if absolute_expiry.unwrap_or(Duration::MAX) <= max_short_lived_absolute_expiry {
8759 self.create_compact_blinded_path()
8761 self.create_blinded_path()
8765 pub(super) fn duration_since_epoch(&self) -> Duration {
8766 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8767 let now = Duration::from_secs(
8768 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8770 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
8771 let now = std::time::SystemTime::now()
8772 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
8773 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
8778 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
8780 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
8781 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8782 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
8783 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8785 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
8787 .map(|(node_id, peer_state)| (node_id, peer_state.lock().unwrap()))
8788 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.is_connected)
8789 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
8790 .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
8791 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
8794 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
8795 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
8798 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_compact_blinded_paths`].
8800 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
8801 fn create_compact_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8802 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
8803 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8805 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
8807 .map(|(node_id, peer_state)| (node_id, peer_state.lock().unwrap()))
8808 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.is_connected)
8809 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
8810 .map(|(node_id, peer)| ForwardNode {
8812 short_channel_id: peer.channel_by_id
8814 .filter(|(_, channel)| channel.context().is_usable())
8815 .min_by_key(|(_, channel)| channel.context().channel_creation_height)
8816 .and_then(|(_, channel)| channel.context().get_short_channel_id()),
8818 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
8821 .create_compact_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
8822 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
8825 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
8826 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
8827 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
8828 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret, payment_context: PaymentContext
8829 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
8830 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8832 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
8833 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
8834 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
8835 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8836 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
8838 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
8840 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
8844 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8845 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, secp_ctx
8849 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
8850 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
8852 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8853 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8854 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8855 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8857 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8858 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8859 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
8860 Some(_) => continue,
8861 None => return scid_candidate
8866 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
8868 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8869 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
8871 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
8872 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
8873 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
8877 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
8878 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
8879 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
8881 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
8882 /// times to get a unique scid.
8883 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8884 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8885 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8887 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8888 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8889 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
8890 return scid_candidate
8894 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
8895 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
8896 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
8897 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
8899 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8900 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8901 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8902 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8903 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
8904 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
8906 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8907 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
8908 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
8917 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8918 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
8919 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8920 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
8921 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
8925 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
8926 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
8927 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8928 events.push_back((event, None));
8932 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8933 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8934 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8938 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8939 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8943 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8944 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
8947 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
8948 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
8949 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
8950 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
8951 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
8952 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId,
8953 mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
8955 let logger = WithContext::from(
8956 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id), None
8959 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8960 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8961 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8962 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
8963 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
8964 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
8965 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8966 .get_mut(&channel_id)
8968 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
8972 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8973 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) {
8974 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
8975 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
8976 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
8977 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
8982 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(
8984 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8985 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
8986 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
8987 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
8989 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8990 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8991 if further_update_exists {
8992 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8997 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
9004 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
9005 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9011 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
9012 for action in actions {
9014 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
9015 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id
9017 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
9023 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
9024 /// using the given event handler.
9026 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
9027 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
9031 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
9035 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9037 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9038 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9039 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9040 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9041 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9042 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9046 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
9047 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
9048 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
9049 /// is always placed next to each other.
9051 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
9052 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
9053 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
9054 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
9056 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
9057 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be placed among
9058 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
9059 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
9060 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
9061 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9062 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9064 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
9065 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
9066 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
9067 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9070 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
9071 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9073 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
9074 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9077 let mut is_any_peer_connected = false;
9078 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
9079 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9080 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9081 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9082 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9083 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
9084 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
9086 if peer_state.is_connected {
9087 is_any_peer_connected = true
9091 // Ensure that we are connected to some peers before getting broadcast messages.
9092 if is_any_peer_connected {
9093 let mut broadcast_msgs = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
9094 pending_events.append(&mut broadcast_msgs);
9097 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
9098 events.replace(pending_events);
9107 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9109 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9110 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9111 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9112 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9113 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9114 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9118 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
9120 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
9121 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
9122 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
9124 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
9128 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9130 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9131 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9132 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9133 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9134 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9135 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9139 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
9141 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9142 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.prev_blockhash,
9143 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
9144 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height - 1,
9145 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
9148 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
9149 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
9152 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
9153 let _persistence_guard =
9154 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9155 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9156 let new_height = height - 1;
9158 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
9159 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.block_hash(),
9160 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
9161 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height,
9162 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
9163 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
9166 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None)));
9170 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9172 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9173 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9174 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9175 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9176 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9177 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9181 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
9182 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9183 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9184 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9186 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
9187 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
9189 let _persistence_guard =
9190 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9191 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9192 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None))
9193 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
9195 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9196 if height < last_best_block_height {
9197 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
9198 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None)));
9202 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
9203 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9204 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9205 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9207 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
9208 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
9210 let _persistence_guard =
9211 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9212 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9213 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
9215 let mut min_anchor_feerate = None;
9216 let mut min_non_anchor_feerate = None;
9217 if self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Relaxed) {
9218 // If we're past the startup phase, update our feerate cache
9219 let mut last_days_feerates = self.last_days_feerates.lock().unwrap();
9220 if last_days_feerates.len() >= FEERATE_TRACKING_BLOCKS {
9221 last_days_feerates.pop_front();
9223 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator
9224 .bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee);
9225 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator
9226 .bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee);
9227 last_days_feerates.push_back((anchor_feerate, non_anchor_feerate));
9228 if last_days_feerates.len() >= FEERATE_TRACKING_BLOCKS {
9229 min_anchor_feerate = last_days_feerates.iter().map(|(f, _)| f).min().copied();
9230 min_non_anchor_feerate = last_days_feerates.iter().map(|(_, f)| f).min().copied();
9234 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| {
9235 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None);
9236 if channel.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
9237 if let Some(feerate) = min_anchor_feerate {
9238 channel.check_for_stale_feerate(&logger, feerate)?;
9241 if let Some(feerate) = min_non_anchor_feerate {
9242 channel.check_for_stale_feerate(&logger, feerate)?;
9245 channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None))
9248 macro_rules! max_time {
9249 ($timestamp: expr) => {
9251 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
9252 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
9253 // having an explicit local time source.
9254 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
9255 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
9256 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
9257 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
9258 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
9264 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
9265 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9266 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
9267 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
9271 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
9272 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
9273 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
9274 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9275 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9276 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
9277 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
9278 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
9279 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
9280 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
9281 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
9288 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
9289 let _persistence_guard =
9290 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9291 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9292 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
9293 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
9294 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
9295 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
9296 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9297 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9302 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9304 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9305 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9306 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9307 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9308 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9309 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9313 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
9314 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
9316 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
9317 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
9318 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9319 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9320 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9322 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9323 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
9325 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9326 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9327 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9328 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9329 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9331 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9333 // Retain unfunded channels.
9334 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
9335 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
9336 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9337 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => true,
9338 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
9339 let res = f(channel);
9340 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
9341 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
9342 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
9343 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
9344 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
9346 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None);
9347 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
9348 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
9349 if channel.context.is_usable() {
9350 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9351 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
9352 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
9353 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9358 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9363 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9364 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
9367 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
9368 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9369 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
9370 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9371 msg: announcement_sigs,
9373 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9374 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
9375 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
9377 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
9378 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
9379 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
9384 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
9385 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9386 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
9387 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
9388 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
9389 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
9390 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
9391 // is always consistent.
9392 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
9393 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9394 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
9395 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
9396 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
9399 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
9400 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
9401 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
9402 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
9403 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
9404 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
9405 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
9406 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
9407 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
9411 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9412 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9413 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
9414 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
9415 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9416 data: reason_message,
9429 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9430 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
9431 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
9432 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
9433 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
9434 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
9435 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
9436 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9437 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
9438 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
9440 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
9441 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
9442 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
9446 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
9449 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9450 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
9451 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9452 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
9453 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
9454 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
9455 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
9456 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
9457 phantom_shared_secret: None,
9458 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
9459 channel_id: htlc.prev_channel_id,
9460 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
9463 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
9464 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
9465 _ => unreachable!(),
9467 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
9468 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
9469 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
9470 let logger = WithContext::from(
9471 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id), Some(htlc.forward_info.payment_hash)
9473 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
9479 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
9481 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
9482 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
9486 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
9487 /// may have events that need processing.
9489 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
9490 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
9492 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
9493 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
9494 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
9495 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
9498 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
9500 /// See [`Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] for retrieving a [`Future`] that
9501 /// indicates this should be checked.
9502 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
9503 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
9506 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
9507 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
9508 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
9511 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
9512 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
9513 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
9514 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
9517 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9518 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9519 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9520 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9523 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9524 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9526 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9527 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9528 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9529 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9530 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9533 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9534 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9535 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9536 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9539 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9540 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9541 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
9542 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
9545 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9546 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9547 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9548 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
9551 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9552 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9553 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
9554 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9558 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9559 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9561 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9562 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9563 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9564 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9565 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9566 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9570 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
9571 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9572 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9573 // change to the contents.
9574 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9575 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9576 let persist = match &res {
9577 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
9578 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
9579 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9581 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9583 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9588 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
9589 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9590 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9591 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9594 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
9595 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9596 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9597 // change to the contents.
9598 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9599 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9600 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
9604 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
9605 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9606 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9607 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9610 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
9611 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9612 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9615 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
9616 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9617 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9620 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
9621 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9622 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
9623 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
9624 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
9625 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9626 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9627 let persist = match &res {
9628 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9629 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9631 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9636 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
9637 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9638 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
9639 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9643 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
9644 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9645 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
9646 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9650 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
9651 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9652 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
9653 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9657 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
9658 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9659 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
9660 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9663 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
9664 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9665 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9668 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
9669 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9670 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9673 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
9674 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9675 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9676 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9677 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9678 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9679 let persist = match &res {
9680 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9681 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9682 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9684 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9689 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
9690 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9691 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9694 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
9695 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9696 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9697 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9698 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9699 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9700 let persist = match &res {
9701 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9702 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9703 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9705 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9710 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
9711 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9712 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
9713 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9714 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9715 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9716 let persist = match &res {
9717 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9718 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9719 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9721 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9726 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
9727 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9728 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9731 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
9732 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9733 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9736 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
9737 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9738 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9739 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9740 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9741 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9742 let persist = match &res {
9743 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9744 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9745 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9747 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9752 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
9753 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9754 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9757 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
9758 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9759 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
9762 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9767 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
9768 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9769 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9770 let persist = match &res {
9771 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9772 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9773 Ok(persist) => *persist,
9775 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9780 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
9781 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9782 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
9783 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9784 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9787 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None, None),
9788 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
9789 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
9791 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9792 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9793 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9794 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9795 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9796 let context = match phase {
9797 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9798 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
9799 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
9800 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
9805 // If we get disconnected and haven't yet committed to a funding
9806 // transaction, we can replay the `open_channel` on reconnection, so don't
9807 // bother dropping the channel here. However, if we already committed to
9808 // the funding transaction we don't yet support replaying the funding
9809 // handshake (and bailing if the peer rejects it), so we force-close in
9811 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) if chan.is_resumable() => return true,
9812 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &mut chan.context,
9813 // Unfunded inbound channels will always be removed.
9814 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
9817 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9818 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9821 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9822 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
9826 // Clean up for removal.
9827 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
9828 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
9831 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9832 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9833 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9834 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
9836 // V1 Channel Establishment
9837 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
9838 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
9839 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
9840 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
9841 // V2 Channel Establishment
9842 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9843 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9844 // Common Channel Establishment
9845 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
9846 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
9848 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
9850 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
9851 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
9852 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
9853 // Interactive Transaction Construction
9854 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
9855 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
9856 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
9857 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
9858 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
9859 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
9860 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
9861 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
9862 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
9863 // Channel Operations
9864 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
9865 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
9866 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
9867 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
9868 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
9869 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
9871 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
9872 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9873 // [`ChannelManager::pending_broadcast_events`] holds the [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]
9874 // This check here is to ensure exhaustivity.
9875 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {
9876 debug_assert!(false, "This event shouldn't have been here");
9879 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9880 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
9881 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
9882 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
9883 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
9884 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
9887 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
9888 peer_state.is_connected = false;
9889 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
9890 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
9893 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
9895 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
9897 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
9898 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
9902 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
9903 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None, None);
9904 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
9905 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9909 let mut res = Ok(());
9911 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9912 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
9913 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
9914 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
9915 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
9916 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
9917 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
9920 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9921 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
9922 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
9923 if inbound_peer_limited {
9925 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9927 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
9928 channel_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9929 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9930 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
9931 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9932 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9933 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9934 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9938 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
9939 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
9940 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
9942 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9943 if inbound_peer_limited &&
9944 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
9945 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
9948 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9951 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
9952 peer_state.is_connected = true;
9957 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9959 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9960 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9961 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9962 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9963 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9965 for (_, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9967 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9968 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
9969 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
9970 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9971 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
9975 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
9976 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9977 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9978 msg: chan.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash),
9982 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
9983 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9984 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9985 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9986 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9987 msg: chan.get_open_channel_v2(self.chain_hash),
9991 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
9992 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9993 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9994 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9995 debug_assert!(false);
9998 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
9999 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10000 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
10001 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
10002 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
10003 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
10004 debug_assert!(false);
10010 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
10011 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
10016 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
10017 match &msg.data as &str {
10018 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
10019 "link failed to shutdown" =>
10021 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
10022 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
10023 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
10024 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
10025 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
10026 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
10027 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
10028 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
10029 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
10031 || -> NotifyOption {
10032 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10033 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10034 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
10035 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10036 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
10037 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
10038 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
10039 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10043 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
10044 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10045 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
10046 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
10047 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
10048 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
10050 log_level: Level::Trace,
10053 // This can happen in a fairly tight loop, so we absolutely cannot trigger
10054 // a `ChannelManager` write here.
10055 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
10057 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents
10066 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
10068 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
10069 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
10070 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10071 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10072 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
10073 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10074 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10075 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
10076 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
10077 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
10078 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
10080 for channel_id in channel_ids {
10081 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
10082 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
10086 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
10087 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10088 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10089 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
10090 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10091 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10092 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
10093 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan)) => {
10094 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
10095 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
10096 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10102 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10103 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan)) => {
10104 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
10105 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
10106 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10112 None | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) => (),
10113 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10114 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_)) => (),
10118 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
10119 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
10123 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
10124 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
10127 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
10128 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
10131 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
10132 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
10135 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
10136 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10137 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10138 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10141 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
10142 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10143 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10144 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10147 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
10148 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10149 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10150 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10153 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
10154 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10155 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10156 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10159 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
10160 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10161 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10162 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10165 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
10166 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10167 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10168 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10171 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
10172 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10173 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10174 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10177 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
10178 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10179 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10180 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10183 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
10184 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10185 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10186 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10190 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10191 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10193 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10194 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10195 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10196 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10197 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10198 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10202 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage, responder: Option<Responder>) -> ResponseInstruction<OffersMessage> {
10203 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
10204 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
10207 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
10208 let responder = match responder {
10209 Some(responder) => responder,
10210 None => return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse,
10212 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
10215 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
10216 Err(error) => return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
10218 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
10219 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
10221 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
10222 return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10226 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
10227 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
10228 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
10230 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
10232 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
10233 return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10237 let payment_context = PaymentContext::Bolt12Offer(Bolt12OfferContext {
10238 offer_id: invoice_request.offer_id,
10239 invoice_request: invoice_request.fields(),
10241 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
10242 amount_msats, payment_secret, payment_context
10244 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
10246 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
10247 return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10251 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10252 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
10253 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
10256 let response = if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
10257 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
10258 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
10259 payment_paths, payment_hash
10261 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10262 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
10263 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
10266 .map(InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::from)
10267 .and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx))
10268 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10270 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
10271 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
10272 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10273 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
10274 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
10277 .map(InvoiceBuilder::<ExplicitSigningPubkey>::from)
10278 .and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
10279 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10280 .and_then(|invoice| {
10282 let mut invoice = invoice;
10284 .sign(|invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice|
10285 self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)
10287 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10292 Ok(invoice) => responder.respond(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
10293 Err(error) => responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
10296 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
10297 let result = match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
10298 Ok(payment_id) => {
10299 let features = self.bolt12_invoice_features();
10300 if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&features) {
10301 Err(InvoiceError::from(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures))
10302 } else if self.default_configuration.manually_handle_bolt12_invoices {
10303 let event = Event::InvoiceReceived { payment_id, invoice, responder };
10304 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
10305 return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse;
10307 self.send_payment_for_verified_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id)
10309 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
10310 InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))
10314 Err(()) => Err(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())),
10318 Ok(()) => ResponseInstruction::NoResponse,
10319 Err(e) => match responder {
10320 Some(responder) => responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e)),
10322 log_trace!(self.logger, "No reply path for sending invoice error: {:?}", e);
10323 ResponseInstruction::NoResponse
10328 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
10329 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
10330 ResponseInstruction::NoResponse
10335 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
10336 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
10340 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10341 NodeIdLookUp for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10343 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10344 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10345 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10346 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10347 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10348 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10352 fn next_node_id(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<PublicKey> {
10353 self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).map(|(pubkey, _)| *pubkey)
10357 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10358 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10359 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
10360 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
10361 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
10365 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10366 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10368 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
10369 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
10370 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
10371 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
10372 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10375 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10376 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10377 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
10378 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10381 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10382 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10383 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
10384 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10387 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10388 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10389 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
10390 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
10393 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10394 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10395 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
10396 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
10397 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
10398 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
10399 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
10400 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
10401 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
10402 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
10403 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
10404 features.set_payment_secret_required();
10405 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
10406 features.set_wumbo_optional();
10407 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
10408 features.set_channel_type_optional();
10409 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
10410 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
10411 features.set_route_blinding_optional();
10412 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
10413 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
10418 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10419 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10421 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
10422 (2, channels, required_vec),
10423 (4, phantom_scid, required),
10424 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
10427 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
10428 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
10429 (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
10432 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
10434 (0, onion_packet, required),
10435 (1, blinded, option),
10436 (2, short_channel_id, required),
10439 (0, payment_data, required),
10440 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10441 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10442 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10443 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10444 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10445 (9, payment_context, option),
10447 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
10448 (0, payment_preimage, required),
10449 (1, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10450 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10451 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10452 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
10453 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10457 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
10458 (0, routing, required),
10459 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
10460 (4, payment_hash, required),
10461 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
10462 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
10463 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
10464 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10468 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10469 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10471 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
10472 0u8.write(writer)?;
10473 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10474 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10475 reason.write(writer)?;
10477 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10478 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
10480 1u8.write(writer)?;
10481 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10482 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10483 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
10484 failure_code.write(writer)?;
10491 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10492 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10493 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10496 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
10497 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10498 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10499 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
10503 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10504 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10505 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10506 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
10507 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
10510 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
10511 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
10512 // messages contained in the variants.
10513 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
10514 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
10515 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
10517 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10518 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10519 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10520 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10521 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
10524 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10525 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10526 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10527 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10528 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
10530 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10535 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
10540 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
10541 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
10542 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
10545 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
10546 (0, short_channel_id, required),
10547 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10548 (2, outpoint, required),
10549 (3, blinded_failure, option),
10550 (4, htlc_id, required),
10551 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
10552 (7, user_channel_id, option),
10553 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 2 above, outpoint will be
10554 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10555 (9, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10558 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
10559 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10560 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
10561 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10562 (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None)
10564 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
10566 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10567 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
10568 (1, self.total_msat, required),
10569 (2, self.value, required),
10570 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
10571 (4, payment_data, option),
10572 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
10573 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
10574 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10575 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10581 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
10582 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10583 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10584 (0, prev_hop, required),
10585 (1, total_msat, option),
10586 (2, value_ser, required),
10587 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
10588 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
10589 (5, total_value_received, option),
10590 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
10591 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10592 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10594 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
10595 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
10596 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
10598 if payment_data.is_some() {
10599 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10601 if total_msat.is_none() {
10602 total_msat = Some(value);
10604 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
10607 if total_msat.is_none() {
10608 if payment_data.is_none() {
10609 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10611 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
10613 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
10617 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
10620 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
10621 total_value_received,
10622 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
10624 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
10625 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
10630 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
10631 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10632 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10635 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
10636 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
10637 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
10638 let mut payment_id = None;
10639 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
10640 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
10641 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10642 (0, session_priv, required),
10643 (1, payment_id, option),
10644 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10645 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
10646 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
10647 (6, blinded_tail, option),
10649 if payment_id.is_none() {
10650 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
10652 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
10654 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
10655 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
10656 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10658 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
10659 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
10660 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
10661 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10665 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
10666 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
10667 first_hop_htlc_msat,
10669 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
10672 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
10673 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10678 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
10679 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
10681 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
10682 0u8.write(writer)?;
10683 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
10684 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10685 (0, session_priv, required),
10686 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
10687 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10688 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
10689 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
10690 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
10691 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
10694 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
10695 1u8.write(writer)?;
10696 field.write(writer)?;
10703 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
10704 (0, forward_info, required),
10705 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
10706 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
10707 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
10708 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
10709 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 6 above, prev_funding_outpoint will be
10710 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10711 (7, prev_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(prev_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10714 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10715 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10716 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
10718 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
10722 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
10723 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10724 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10725 (0, htlc_id, required),
10726 (2, err_packet, required),
10729 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
10730 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
10731 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
10732 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
10733 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10734 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
10735 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10736 (0, htlc_id, required),
10737 (1, failure_code, required),
10738 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
10739 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
10747 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10748 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10749 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
10751 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
10753 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
10754 (0, htlc_id, required),
10755 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
10756 (2, err_packet, required),
10757 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
10759 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
10760 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
10761 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10763 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
10767 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10768 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
10772 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10777 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
10778 (0, payment_secret, required),
10779 (2, expiry_time, required),
10780 (4, user_payment_id, required),
10781 (6, payment_preimage, required),
10782 (8, min_value_msat, required),
10785 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10787 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10788 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10789 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10790 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10791 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10792 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10796 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10797 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
10799 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10801 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
10803 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
10804 best_block.height.write(writer)?;
10805 best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
10808 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
10810 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
10812 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
10813 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10814 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10815 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10816 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10817 serializable_peer_count += 1;
10820 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
10821 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
10825 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
10827 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10828 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10829 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10830 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
10831 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
10832 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
10835 channel.write(writer)?;
10841 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10842 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10843 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
10844 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
10845 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10846 for forward in pending_forwards {
10847 forward.write(writer)?;
10852 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = None;
10853 let decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10854 if !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() {
10855 decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = Some(decode_update_add_htlcs);
10858 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10859 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
10860 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10862 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
10863 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
10864 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10865 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
10866 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
10867 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10868 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
10869 htlc.write(writer)?;
10871 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
10872 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
10875 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
10876 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
10877 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10878 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
10879 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
10880 // per_peer_state lock at all.
10881 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
10884 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
10885 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10886 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
10887 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
10888 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
10890 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10891 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
10892 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
10893 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
10894 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
10895 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
10896 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
10901 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
10902 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
10903 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
10904 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
10905 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
10906 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
10907 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
10908 // well save the space and not write any events here.
10909 0u64.write(writer)?;
10911 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10912 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
10913 event.write(writer)?;
10917 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
10918 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
10919 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
10920 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
10921 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
10922 0u64.write(writer)?;
10924 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
10925 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
10926 // likely to be identical.
10927 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10928 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10930 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10931 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
10932 hash.write(writer)?;
10933 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
10936 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
10937 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
10938 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10939 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
10940 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
10943 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
10944 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10946 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10947 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10948 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
10949 session_priv.write(writer)?;
10952 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
10953 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
10954 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
10955 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
10959 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
10960 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = new_hash_map();
10961 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10963 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10964 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10965 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
10971 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
10972 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10973 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
10974 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
10977 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
10978 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
10979 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
10980 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
10981 pending_claiming_payments = None;
10984 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10985 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10986 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
10987 if !updates.is_empty() {
10988 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(new_hash_map()); }
10989 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
10994 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10995 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
10996 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10997 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
10998 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10999 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
11000 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
11001 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
11002 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
11003 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
11004 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
11005 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
11006 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
11007 (14, decode_update_add_htlcs_opt, option),
11014 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
11015 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
11016 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
11017 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
11020 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
11021 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
11022 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
11023 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
11024 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
11025 // check that the event is sane here.
11026 let event_encoded = event.encode();
11027 let event_read: Option<Event> =
11028 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
11029 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
11035 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
11036 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11037 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11038 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
11039 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
11040 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
11043 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
11044 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
11045 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
11046 events.push_back((ev, action));
11047 } else if action.is_some() {
11048 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11055 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
11057 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
11059 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
11060 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
11061 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
11062 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
11063 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
11064 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
11065 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
11066 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
11067 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
11068 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
11069 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
11070 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
11071 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
11073 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
11074 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
11076 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
11077 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
11079 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
11080 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
11081 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
11082 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
11083 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
11084 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
11086 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
11087 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11089 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11090 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11091 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11092 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11093 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11094 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11098 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
11099 pub entropy_source: ES,
11101 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
11102 pub node_signer: NS,
11104 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
11105 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
11107 pub signer_provider: SP,
11109 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
11111 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
11112 pub fee_estimator: F,
11113 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
11115 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
11116 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
11117 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
11118 pub chain_monitor: M,
11120 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
11121 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
11122 /// force-closed during deserialization.
11123 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
11124 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
11125 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
11127 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
11129 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
11130 /// deserialization.
11132 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
11133 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
11134 pub default_config: UserConfig,
11136 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
11137 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
11139 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
11140 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
11141 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
11142 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
11144 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
11147 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
11148 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
11151 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11152 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
11154 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11155 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11156 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11157 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11158 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11159 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11163 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
11164 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
11165 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
11166 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
11167 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
11169 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
11170 channel_monitors: hash_map_from_iter(
11171 channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) })
11177 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
11178 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
11179 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11180 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
11182 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11183 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11184 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11185 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11186 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11187 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11191 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11192 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
11193 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
11197 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11198 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
11200 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11201 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11202 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11203 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11204 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11205 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11209 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11210 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
11212 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11213 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11214 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11216 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
11218 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11219 let mut funding_txo_set = hash_set_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11220 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11221 let mut outpoint_to_peer = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11222 let mut short_to_chan_info = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11223 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
11224 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
11225 let mut funding_txo_to_channel_id = hash_map_with_capacity(channel_count as usize);
11226 for _ in 0..channel_count {
11227 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
11228 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
11230 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context, None);
11231 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11232 funding_txo_to_channel_id.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.channel_id());
11233 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
11234 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
11235 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
11236 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
11237 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
11238 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11239 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
11240 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
11241 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
11242 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11243 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
11244 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
11246 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
11247 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
11248 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
11250 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
11251 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
11252 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11254 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
11255 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
11256 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11258 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
11259 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
11260 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11262 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
11263 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11264 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update
11267 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
11268 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11269 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11270 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11271 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
11272 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11273 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11274 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11276 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
11277 let mut found_htlc = false;
11278 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11279 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
11282 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
11283 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
11284 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
11285 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
11286 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
11287 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
11288 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
11289 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context, Some(*payment_hash));
11291 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
11292 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
11293 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11297 channel.on_startup_drop_completed_blocked_mon_updates_through(&logger, monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11298 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {} with {} blocked updates",
11299 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
11300 monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.blocked_monitor_updates_pending());
11301 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
11302 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11304 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
11305 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
11307 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
11308 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11309 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
11310 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11312 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11313 let mut by_id_map = new_hash_map();
11314 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11315 entry.insert(by_id_map);
11319 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
11320 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
11321 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
11322 // safely discard the channel.
11323 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
11324 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11325 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11326 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11327 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
11328 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11329 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11330 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11333 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
11334 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11335 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11336 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11337 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11338 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11342 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11343 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
11344 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor, None);
11345 let channel_id = monitor.channel_id();
11346 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
11348 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
11349 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
11350 counterparty_node_id: None,
11351 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
11352 channel_id: Some(monitor.channel_id()),
11354 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update)));
11358 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
11359 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11360 let mut forward_htlcs = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11361 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
11362 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
11363 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11364 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
11365 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
11366 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
11368 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
11371 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11372 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11373 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
11374 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11375 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11376 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
11377 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
11378 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
11380 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
11383 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
11386 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
11387 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
11388 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
11389 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11390 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
11391 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11392 is_connected: false,
11396 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11397 let mut per_peer_state = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
11398 for _ in 0..peer_count {
11399 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
11400 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(new_hash_map());
11401 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
11402 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
11403 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
11406 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11407 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
11408 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
11409 for _ in 0..event_count {
11410 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
11411 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
11416 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11417 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
11418 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
11420 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
11421 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
11422 // on-startup monitor updates.
11423 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
11424 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
11426 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
11430 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
11431 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11433 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11434 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
11435 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
11436 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
11437 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11441 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11442 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
11443 hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
11444 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
11445 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
11446 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
11447 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv]),
11449 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
11450 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11454 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
11455 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
11456 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
11457 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(new_hash_map());
11458 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
11459 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11460 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11461 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
11462 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
11463 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(new_hash_map());
11464 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
11465 let mut events_override = None;
11466 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
11467 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs: Option<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>> = None;
11468 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
11469 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
11470 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
11471 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
11472 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
11473 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
11474 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
11475 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
11476 (8, events_override, option),
11477 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
11478 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
11479 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
11480 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
11481 (14, decode_update_add_htlcs, option),
11483 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = decode_update_add_htlcs.unwrap_or_else(|| new_hash_map());
11484 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
11485 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11488 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
11489 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11492 if let Some(events) = events_override {
11493 pending_events_read = events;
11496 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
11497 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
11500 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
11501 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
11502 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
11503 let mut outbounds = new_hash_map();
11504 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
11505 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
11507 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
11509 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
11510 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
11511 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
11514 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
11515 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
11516 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
11517 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
11518 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
11520 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
11521 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
11522 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
11524 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
11525 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
11526 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
11527 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
11528 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
11530 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
11531 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11532 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
11533 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
11534 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$monitor.channel_id());
11535 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
11536 pending_background_events.push(
11537 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11538 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11539 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
11540 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11541 update: update.clone(),
11544 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
11545 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
11546 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
11547 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
11548 pending_background_events.push(
11549 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
11550 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11551 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11554 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
11555 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
11556 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11558 max_in_flight_update_id
11562 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11563 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
11564 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11565 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
11566 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11567 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context, None);
11569 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
11571 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11572 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
11573 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
11574 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
11575 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
11576 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
11577 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
11578 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
11579 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
11582 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
11583 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return DangerousValue:
11584 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11585 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
11586 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
11587 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
11588 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11589 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11590 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11591 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11592 return Err(DecodeError::DangerousValue);
11595 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11596 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11597 debug_assert!(false);
11598 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11603 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
11604 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
11605 let channel_id = funding_txo_to_channel_id.get(&funding_txo).copied();
11606 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id, None);
11607 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
11608 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
11609 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
11610 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
11611 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
11612 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(new_hash_map()))
11614 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11615 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
11616 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
11618 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11619 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", if let Some(channel_id) =
11620 channel_id { channel_id.to_string() } else { format!("with outpoint {}", funding_txo) } );
11621 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11622 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11623 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11624 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11625 log_error!(logger, " Pending in-flight updates are: {:?}", chan_in_flight_updates);
11626 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11631 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
11632 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
11634 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
11635 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
11636 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
11637 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
11640 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
11641 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
11642 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
11643 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
11644 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
11645 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
11646 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
11648 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11649 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
11650 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
11651 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
11652 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor, Some(htlc.payment_hash));
11653 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
11654 if path.hops.is_empty() {
11655 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
11656 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11659 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
11660 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
11661 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
11662 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
11663 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11664 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
11665 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
11666 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
11668 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11669 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
11670 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
11671 retry_strategy: None,
11672 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
11673 payment_params: None,
11674 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv_bytes]),
11675 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
11676 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11677 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11678 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11679 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11680 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
11681 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
11682 total_msat: path_amt,
11683 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
11684 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11686 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
11687 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
11692 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11693 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor, Some(htlc.payment_hash));
11694 match htlc_source {
11695 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
11696 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
11697 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
11698 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
11700 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
11701 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
11702 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
11703 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
11704 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
11705 decode_update_add_htlcs.retain(|scid, update_add_htlcs| {
11706 update_add_htlcs.retain(|update_add_htlc| {
11707 let matches = *scid == prev_hop_data.short_channel_id &&
11708 update_add_htlc.htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id;
11710 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-decode HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11711 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11715 !update_add_htlcs.is_empty()
11717 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
11718 forwards.retain(|forward| {
11719 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
11720 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11721 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11722 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11727 !forwards.is_empty()
11729 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
11730 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11731 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11732 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11733 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
11734 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
11735 intercepted_id != ev_id
11742 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
11743 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
11744 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
11745 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
11746 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
11747 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
11748 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
11749 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
11750 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
11751 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
11752 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
11754 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
11755 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
11756 channel_id: monitor.channel_id(),
11757 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
11759 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
11760 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
11761 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
11768 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
11769 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
11771 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
11773 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
11774 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
11775 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
11776 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
11777 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
11778 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
11779 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
11780 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
11781 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11782 monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor.channel_id()))
11785 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
11786 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
11787 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
11788 // channel still live case here.
11792 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
11793 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
11798 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
11799 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
11800 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
11801 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
11802 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
11803 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
11804 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
11805 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
11809 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
11810 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
11812 let mut claimable_payments = hash_map_with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
11813 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
11814 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11815 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11817 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
11818 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11819 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11821 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
11822 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
11824 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11825 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
11827 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11830 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
11831 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11832 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11834 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11838 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
11839 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
11840 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
11841 if htlcs.is_empty() {
11842 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11844 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
11845 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
11846 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
11847 events::PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment {
11848 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
11849 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
11850 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
11851 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
11853 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
11854 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11858 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
11860 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11862 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
11863 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
11865 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11866 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11871 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11872 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11874 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
11876 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11878 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
11879 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
11880 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
11881 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11885 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = new_hash_set();
11886 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11887 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11888 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11889 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
11890 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11891 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context, None);
11892 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
11893 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
11895 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
11896 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
11897 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
11899 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
11900 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
11901 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11902 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11903 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11904 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11906 if chan.context.is_usable() {
11907 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
11908 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11909 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11910 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11911 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11915 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11916 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11917 debug_assert!(false);
11918 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11923 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
11925 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11926 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
11927 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
11928 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
11929 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
11930 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
11931 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
11932 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
11933 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
11934 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
11935 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
11937 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
11938 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
11940 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
11941 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
11942 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
11943 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
11945 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
11946 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
11947 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
11948 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
11950 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
11951 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
11952 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
11953 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
11955 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
11956 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11957 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
11958 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11959 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11960 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
11961 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context, Some(payment_hash));
11962 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
11965 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11966 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
11969 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
11972 purpose: payment.purpose,
11973 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
11974 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
11975 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
11976 onion_fields: payment.onion_fields,
11982 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
11983 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
11984 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
11985 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id), None);
11986 for action in actions.iter() {
11987 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
11988 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
11989 Some((blocked_node_id, _blocked_channel_outpoint, blocked_channel_id, blocking_action)), ..
11991 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(blocked_node_id) {
11993 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
11994 blocked_channel_id);
11995 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
11996 .entry(*blocked_channel_id)
11997 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
11999 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
12000 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
12001 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
12002 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
12006 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
12007 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
12011 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
12013 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None, None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
12014 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12018 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
12020 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
12021 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
12022 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
12023 router: args.router,
12025 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
12027 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
12028 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
12029 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
12030 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
12032 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
12033 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(decode_update_add_htlcs),
12034 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
12035 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
12036 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
12037 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
12038 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
12040 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
12042 our_network_pubkey,
12045 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
12047 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
12049 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
12050 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
12051 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
12052 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
12053 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
12055 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
12056 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
12058 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
12060 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
12062 pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
12064 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
12065 node_signer: args.node_signer,
12066 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
12068 last_days_feerates: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
12070 logger: args.logger,
12071 default_configuration: args.default_config,
12074 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
12075 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
12076 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
12077 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
12078 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
12081 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
12082 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
12083 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
12084 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
12085 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), None,
12086 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding,
12087 downstream_channel_id, None
12091 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
12092 //connection or two.
12094 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
12100 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12101 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12102 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
12103 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
12104 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
12105 use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
12106 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
12107 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12108 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
12109 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
12110 use crate::prelude::*;
12111 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
12112 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
12113 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
12114 use crate::util::test_utils;
12115 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
12116 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
12119 fn test_notify_limits() {
12120 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
12121 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
12122 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12123 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12124 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
12125 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12127 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
12128 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
12129 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12130 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12131 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12133 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12135 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
12136 // to connect messages with new values
12137 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
12138 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
12139 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
12140 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
12141 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
12142 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
12144 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
12145 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12146 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12147 // ... but the last node should not.
12148 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12149 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
12150 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12151 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12153 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
12154 // about the channel.
12155 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12156 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12157 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12159 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
12161 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12162 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12163 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12164 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12165 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12166 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12168 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
12169 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12170 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12172 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
12173 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
12174 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
12175 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
12176 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
12177 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
12179 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
12180 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
12181 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
12182 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
12183 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12184 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12185 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12186 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12188 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
12189 // the channel info has updated.
12190 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
12191 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
12192 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12193 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12194 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12195 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12199 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
12200 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
12202 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12203 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12204 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12205 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12206 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12208 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
12209 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
12210 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
12211 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
12213 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12214 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
12215 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
12216 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
12217 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
12218 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
12219 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
12220 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
12221 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12222 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12223 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12224 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
12226 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
12227 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12228 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12229 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12230 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12231 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12232 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12233 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12234 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12235 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12236 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12237 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12238 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
12239 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12240 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12241 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12242 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12243 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12244 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12245 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12246 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12247 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12248 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
12250 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
12251 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
12252 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
12253 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12254 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12255 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12256 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
12258 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
12259 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
12260 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
12261 // lightning messages manually.
12262 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12263 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
12264 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
12266 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12267 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12268 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
12269 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
12270 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12271 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12272 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
12273 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12274 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12275 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
12276 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12277 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12278 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12279 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12280 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12281 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12282 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
12283 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12284 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12285 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
12286 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12287 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12288 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12289 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12290 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
12291 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12293 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
12294 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
12295 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12296 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
12298 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12299 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12300 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12301 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12303 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12306 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12307 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12308 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12309 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12311 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12316 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
12317 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
12318 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
12321 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
12322 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
12323 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
12324 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
12325 // fails as expected.
12326 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
12327 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
12328 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
12329 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
12330 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
12331 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
12332 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12333 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12334 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12335 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
12336 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12337 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12338 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12339 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12340 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12342 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
12343 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
12344 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
12346 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12347 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12348 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
12349 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
12350 let route = find_route(
12351 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12352 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12354 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12355 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12357 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12358 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12359 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12360 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12361 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12362 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12363 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12364 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
12365 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
12366 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12367 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12368 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12369 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12370 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12371 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12372 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12373 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12374 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12375 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12376 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12377 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12379 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12380 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12382 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12383 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12384 let route = find_route(
12385 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12386 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12388 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12389 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12390 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12391 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12392 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12393 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12394 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12395 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12397 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
12398 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12399 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12400 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
12401 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12402 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12403 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12404 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12405 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12406 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12408 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12409 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12410 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12411 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12412 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12413 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12414 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12415 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12416 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12417 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12418 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12419 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12420 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12422 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
12423 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12425 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12426 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
12427 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12428 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
12429 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12430 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12431 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12432 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12433 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12434 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12436 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12437 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12438 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
12441 let route = find_route(
12442 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12443 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12445 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
12446 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12447 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
12448 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12449 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12450 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12451 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12452 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12453 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12454 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12455 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12456 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12457 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12458 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12459 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12460 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12461 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12462 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12463 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12464 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12465 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12466 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12467 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12469 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12470 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12474 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
12475 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
12476 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
12477 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12478 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12479 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12480 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12482 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12483 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12485 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12486 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12487 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12488 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12489 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12490 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12491 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12492 let route = find_route(
12493 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12494 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12497 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12498 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
12499 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
12500 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12501 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
12502 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12503 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12505 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12506 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12507 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12508 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12509 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12510 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12511 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12513 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
12517 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
12518 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
12519 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
12520 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12521 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
12522 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12523 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12524 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12525 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12527 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12528 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12530 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12531 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12532 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12533 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12534 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12535 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12536 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12537 let route = find_route(
12538 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12539 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12542 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12543 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12544 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
12545 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
12546 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12547 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
12548 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
12549 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12550 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12552 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12553 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12554 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12555 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12556 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12557 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12558 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12560 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
12564 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
12565 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
12566 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
12567 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
12568 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12570 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12571 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12572 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12573 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12575 // Marshall an MPP route.
12576 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
12577 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
12578 route.paths.push(path);
12579 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12580 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
12581 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
12582 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
12583 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
12584 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
12586 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12587 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
12589 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
12590 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
12592 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
12597 fn test_channel_update_cached() {
12598 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12599 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12600 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
12601 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12603 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12605 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, true).unwrap();
12606 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12607 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12609 // Confirm that the channel_update was not sent immediately to node[1] but was cached.
12610 let node_1_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12611 assert_eq!(node_1_events.len(), 0);
12614 // Assert that ChannelUpdate message has been added to node[0] pending broadcast messages
12615 let pending_broadcast_messages= nodes[0].node.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
12616 assert_eq!(pending_broadcast_messages.len(), 1);
12619 // Test that we do not retrieve the pending broadcast messages when we are not connected to any peer
12620 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12621 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12623 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
12624 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12626 let node_0_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12627 assert_eq!(node_0_events.len(), 0);
12629 // Now we reconnect to a peer
12630 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12631 features: nodes[2].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12633 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12634 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12635 }, false).unwrap();
12637 // Confirm that get_and_clear_pending_msg_events correctly captures pending broadcast messages
12638 let node_0_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12639 assert_eq!(node_0_events.len(), 1);
12640 match &node_0_events[0] {
12641 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => (),
12642 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12645 // Assert that ChannelUpdate message has been cleared from nodes[0] pending broadcast messages
12646 let pending_broadcast_messages= nodes[0].node.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
12647 assert_eq!(pending_broadcast_messages.len(), 0);
12652 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
12653 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12654 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12655 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12656 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12658 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12660 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12661 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12662 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
12663 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
12664 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
12665 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12666 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12669 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
12670 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
12671 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
12672 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
12673 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
12674 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
12677 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
12680 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
12681 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
12686 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
12687 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
12688 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12689 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12690 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12691 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12693 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
12694 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12696 total_msat: 100_000,
12699 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
12700 // payment verification fails as expected.
12701 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
12702 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
12703 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
12704 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
12706 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
12710 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
12711 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
12715 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
12716 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
12717 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
12718 // the channel is successfully closed.
12719 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12720 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12721 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12722 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12724 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12725 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12726 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
12727 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12728 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12730 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
12731 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
12733 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
12734 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
12735 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12736 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12739 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12741 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
12742 // as it has the funding transaction.
12743 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12744 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12745 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12748 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12750 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12752 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12754 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12755 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12756 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12758 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12761 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
12762 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
12763 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12764 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12765 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12767 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12768 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12769 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12770 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12771 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12772 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
12773 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
12774 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
12776 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12777 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
12778 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12779 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
12781 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12782 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
12784 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
12785 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
12786 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
12787 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
12788 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12789 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12790 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12794 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
12795 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
12796 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
12797 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
12798 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12799 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12800 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12803 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
12805 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
12806 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
12807 // closing transaction).
12808 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
12809 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
12810 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12812 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
12813 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
12814 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12815 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12816 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12819 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12821 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
12823 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
12824 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
12825 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12827 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12829 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12830 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12833 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12834 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
12835 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12838 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12839 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
12840 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12843 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
12844 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
12845 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12848 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12849 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
12850 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12853 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12855 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
12856 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12858 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
12859 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12861 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
12862 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
12867 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
12868 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
12869 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
12870 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
12871 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12872 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12873 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12874 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12877 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12878 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
12879 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
12880 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
12882 // Test the API functions.
12883 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
12885 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
12887 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12889 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, error_message.to_string()), unkown_public_key);
12891 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, error_message.to_string()), unkown_public_key);
12893 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
12895 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
12899 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
12900 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
12901 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
12902 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
12903 // the given `channel_id`.
12904 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12905 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12906 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12907 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12909 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12912 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12913 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
12915 // Test the API functions.
12916 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
12918 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12920 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, error_message.to_string()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12922 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, error_message.to_string()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12924 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12926 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12930 fn test_connection_limiting() {
12931 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
12932 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12933 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12934 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12935 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12937 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12939 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12940 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12942 let mut funding_tx = None;
12943 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12944 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12945 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12948 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12949 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
12950 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
12951 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
12952 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12954 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12955 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12956 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12958 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12960 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12961 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12962 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12964 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12967 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
12968 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(
12969 &nodes[0].keys_manager);
12970 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12971 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12972 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12974 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
12975 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
12977 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
12978 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
12979 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12980 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12981 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
12982 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12983 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12986 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12987 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12988 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12989 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12990 }, true).unwrap_err();
12992 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
12993 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
12994 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12995 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12996 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
12997 for ev in chan_closed_events {
12998 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
13000 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13001 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13003 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13004 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13005 }, true).unwrap_err();
13007 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
13008 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13009 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13010 }, false).unwrap();
13011 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13013 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
13014 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
13016 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
13017 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
13018 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
13019 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
13020 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13022 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13023 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
13024 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13026 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
13027 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13028 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
13030 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
13031 // "protected" and can connect again.
13032 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
13033 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13034 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13036 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13038 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
13040 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13041 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
13045 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
13046 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
13047 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13048 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13049 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
13050 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13052 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13054 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13055 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13057 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
13058 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13059 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13060 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13063 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
13065 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13066 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13067 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13069 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
13070 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13071 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13073 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
13074 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13075 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13076 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13080 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
13081 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
13082 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
13083 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13084 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13085 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
13086 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13087 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
13088 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13090 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13092 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13093 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13095 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
13096 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
13097 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13098 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13099 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13100 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13103 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13104 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13106 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13107 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
13109 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13111 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
13112 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13115 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
13116 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13117 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13118 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13119 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13121 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13122 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13124 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13125 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
13126 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
13127 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
13131 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13133 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
13134 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13136 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
13137 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13138 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13140 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13141 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
13143 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13145 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
13149 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
13150 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13151 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13152 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13153 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13154 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
13155 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
13156 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
13157 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13158 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
13159 payment_metadata: None,
13160 keysend_preimage: None,
13161 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13162 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
13164 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13166 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
13167 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
13168 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13169 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
13170 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
13171 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
13172 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
13174 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
13175 } else { panic!(); }
13177 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
13178 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
13179 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13180 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
13181 payment_metadata: None,
13182 keysend_preimage: None,
13183 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13184 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
13186 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13188 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13189 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
13190 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
13191 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
13195 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
13196 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13197 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13198 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13199 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13201 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13202 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
13203 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13204 cltv_expiry_height: 22,
13205 payment_metadata: None,
13206 keysend_preimage: None,
13207 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13208 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
13210 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13211 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
13212 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
13214 // Should not return an error as this condition:
13215 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
13216 // is not satisfied.
13217 assert!(result.is_ok());
13221 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
13222 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
13223 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
13224 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
13225 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
13227 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
13228 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13230 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
13231 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
13232 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
13233 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
13234 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13236 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13237 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13239 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13240 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13241 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13242 match &msg_events[0] {
13243 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
13244 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13246 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
13247 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
13248 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
13251 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13254 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13255 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13257 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
13258 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
13259 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13261 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13265 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
13266 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
13267 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
13268 // the channel without the anchors feature.
13269 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13270 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13271 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
13272 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
13273 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13274 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
13275 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13276 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
13278 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
13279 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13280 assert!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13282 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13283 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13285 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13286 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
13288 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13291 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13292 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
13294 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13295 assert!(!open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13297 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
13298 // not have generated any events.
13299 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13303 fn test_update_channel_config() {
13304 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13305 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13306 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13307 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13308 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13309 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13310 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
13312 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13313 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13314 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13316 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
13317 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13318 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
13319 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13320 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13322 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13323 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13326 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
13327 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13328 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13330 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
13331 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13332 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
13333 ..Default::default()
13335 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13336 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13337 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13339 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13340 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13343 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
13344 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13345 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13346 ..Default::default()
13348 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13349 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
13350 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13351 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13353 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13354 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13357 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
13358 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
13359 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
13360 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
13361 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
13364 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13365 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13366 ..Default::default()
13368 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
13371 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
13372 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
13373 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13374 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13378 fn test_payment_display() {
13379 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
13380 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13381 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
13382 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13383 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
13384 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13388 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
13389 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13390 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13391 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13392 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13393 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13394 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
13396 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
13397 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13398 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13399 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13400 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
13401 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
13402 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
13403 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13405 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13406 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13407 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13410 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
13411 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
13413 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13414 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13416 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13417 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13418 }, false).unwrap();
13419 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
13420 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
13421 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
13423 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
13425 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
13426 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
13427 // close even if it was an lnd node.
13428 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13429 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13430 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
13431 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13432 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
13433 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
13434 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
13435 } else { panic!() };
13436 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
13437 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
13438 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
13439 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
13441 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13443 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13444 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13445 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13450 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
13451 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
13452 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13453 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13456 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13457 let deserialized_chanmgr;
13458 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
13460 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13461 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
13463 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13464 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
13467 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13468 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
13469 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13471 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13475 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13476 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
13477 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13479 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13484 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
13485 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
13486 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
13487 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
13489 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13490 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
13491 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
13493 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
13495 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13496 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
13497 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
13498 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
13500 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
13501 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
13503 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
13509 use crate::chain::Listen;
13510 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
13511 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
13512 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
13513 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
13514 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
13515 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
13516 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
13517 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
13518 use crate::util::test_utils;
13519 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
13521 use bitcoin::amount::Amount;
13522 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
13523 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
13524 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
13525 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
13526 use bitcoin::transaction::Version;
13528 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
13530 use criterion::Criterion;
13532 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
13533 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
13534 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
13535 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
13536 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
13537 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
13538 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
13540 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
13541 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
13543 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
13544 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
13546 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
13548 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
13551 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
13552 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
13555 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
13556 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
13557 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
13559 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
13560 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
13562 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
13563 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
13564 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13565 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
13566 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
13568 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
13569 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
13570 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
13572 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
13573 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
13574 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
13575 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13577 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13578 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13579 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
13581 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13582 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
13583 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
13584 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
13585 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13587 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13588 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13589 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
13591 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13592 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13594 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13595 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13596 }, false).unwrap();
13597 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13598 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13599 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13602 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
13603 tx = Transaction { version: Version::TWO, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
13604 value: Amount::from_sat(8_000_000), script_pubkey: output_script,
13606 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
13607 } else { panic!(); }
13609 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13610 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13611 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13612 match events_b[0] {
13613 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13614 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13616 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13619 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13620 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13621 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13622 match events_a[0] {
13623 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13624 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13626 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13629 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
13631 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash, 42, vec![tx]);
13632 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
13633 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
13635 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13636 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13637 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13638 match msg_events[0] {
13639 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
13640 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
13641 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13645 match msg_events[1] {
13646 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13650 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13651 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13652 match events_a[0] {
13653 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13654 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13656 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13659 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13660 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13661 match events_b[0] {
13662 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13663 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13665 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13668 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
13669 macro_rules! send_payment {
13670 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
13671 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
13672 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
13673 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
13674 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
13675 payment_count += 1;
13676 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
13677 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
13679 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
13680 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
13681 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
13682 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
13683 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
13684 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
13685 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
13686 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
13687 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13688 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13689 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13691 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
13692 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
13693 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
13694 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
13696 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
13697 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
13698 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
13699 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
13700 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
13702 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
13705 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
13706 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13707 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13708 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13710 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
13714 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
13715 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
13716 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);