1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 pub use crate::ln::channel::{InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
48 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
50 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
56 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
60 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
61 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, ExplicitSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
62 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
63 use crate::offers::invoice_request::{DerivedPayerId, InvoiceRequestBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
65 use crate::offers::offer::{Offer, OfferBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
67 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
68 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
69 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
70 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
71 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
72 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
73 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
74 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
75 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
76 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
77 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
78 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
79 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
81 crate::offers::offer::DerivedMetadata,
82 crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
83 crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
84 crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
85 crate::sign::KeysManager,
89 crate::offers::offer::OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
90 crate::offers::refund::RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
93 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
96 use crate::prelude::*;
98 use core::cell::RefCell;
100 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
101 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
102 use core::time::Duration;
103 use core::ops::Deref;
105 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
106 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
107 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
109 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
111 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
112 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
113 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
115 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
116 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
117 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
118 // before we forward it.
120 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
121 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
122 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
123 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
124 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
126 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
129 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
130 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
132 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
133 /// do with the HTLC.
134 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
135 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
137 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
138 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
139 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
140 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
141 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
142 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
144 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
146 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
147 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
149 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
150 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
151 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
152 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
153 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
155 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
156 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
157 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
158 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
159 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
161 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
162 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
163 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
164 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
166 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
167 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
169 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
170 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
171 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
172 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
173 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
174 requires_blinded_error: bool,
176 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
177 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
178 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
180 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
181 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
183 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
184 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
185 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
186 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
187 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
188 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
189 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
191 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
192 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
193 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
194 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
196 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
197 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
198 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
200 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
201 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
202 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
206 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
207 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
208 pub struct BlindedForward {
209 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
210 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
211 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
212 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
213 /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
214 /// the introduction node.
215 pub failure: BlindedFailure,
218 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
219 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
220 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
222 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
223 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
229 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
231 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
232 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
233 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
234 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
235 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
236 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
238 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
239 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
240 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
241 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
242 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
244 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
246 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
247 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
248 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
250 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
251 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
252 /// it along another path).
254 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
255 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
256 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
257 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
258 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
259 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
260 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
261 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
262 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
264 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
267 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
269 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
271 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
274 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
275 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
276 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
277 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
280 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
281 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
282 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
283 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
284 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
287 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
288 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
289 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
291 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
292 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
293 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
296 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
297 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
299 prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
300 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
301 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
304 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
305 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
306 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
309 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
314 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
318 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
319 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
320 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
321 pub enum BlindedFailure {
322 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
323 /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
324 FromIntroductionNode,
325 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
326 /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
330 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
331 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
332 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
333 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
334 short_channel_id: u64,
335 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
337 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
338 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
339 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
340 channel_id: ChannelId,
342 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
343 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
348 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
350 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
351 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
352 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
354 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
355 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
358 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
359 struct ClaimableHTLC {
360 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
362 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
364 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
365 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
366 sender_intended_value: u64,
367 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
369 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
370 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
371 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
372 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
374 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
375 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
378 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
379 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
380 events::ClaimedHTLC {
381 channel_id: val.prev_hop.channel_id,
382 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
383 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
384 value_msat: val.value,
385 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
390 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
391 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
393 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
394 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
395 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
398 /// Number of bytes in the id.
399 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
402 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
403 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
408 impl Readable for PaymentId {
409 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
410 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
415 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
416 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
417 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
421 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
423 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
424 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
425 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
427 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
428 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
433 impl Readable for InterceptId {
434 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
435 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
440 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
441 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
442 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
443 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
444 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
447 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
449 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
450 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
451 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
453 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
454 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
458 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
459 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
460 (0, short_channel_id, required),
461 (2, htlc_id, required),
463 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
464 (0, session_priv, required),
469 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
470 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
471 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
472 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
473 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
476 session_priv: SecretKey,
477 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
478 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
479 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
480 payment_id: PaymentId,
483 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
484 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
485 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
487 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
489 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
491 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
494 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
495 payment_id.hash(hasher);
496 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
502 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
504 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
505 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
506 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
507 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
508 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
509 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
513 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
514 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
515 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
516 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
517 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
518 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
520 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
526 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
527 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
529 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
530 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
531 pub enum FailureCode {
532 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
533 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
534 TemporaryNodeFailure,
535 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
536 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
537 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
538 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
539 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
540 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
541 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
542 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
543 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
544 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
546 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
547 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
548 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
551 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
552 fn into(self) -> u16 {
554 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
555 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
556 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
557 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
562 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
563 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
564 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
565 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
566 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
568 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
569 err: msgs::LightningError,
570 closes_channel: bool,
571 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
573 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
575 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
577 err: LightningError {
579 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
580 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
586 closes_channel: false,
587 shutdown_finish: None,
591 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
592 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
595 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
596 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
597 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
598 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
599 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
600 // commitment upon reconnecting.
601 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
603 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
606 err: LightningError { err, action },
607 closes_channel: true,
608 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
612 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
615 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
617 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
618 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
622 log_level: Level::Warn,
625 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
627 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
629 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
631 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
632 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
639 closes_channel: false,
640 shutdown_finish: None,
644 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
649 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
650 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
651 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
652 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
653 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
655 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
656 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
657 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
658 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
659 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
660 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
661 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
663 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
667 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
668 struct ClaimingPayment {
670 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
671 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
672 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
673 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
675 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
676 (0, amount_msat, required),
677 (2, payment_purpose, required),
678 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
679 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
680 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
683 struct ClaimablePayment {
684 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
685 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
686 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
689 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
690 struct ClaimablePayments {
691 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
692 /// failed/claimed by the user.
694 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
695 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
697 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
698 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
699 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
701 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
702 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
703 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
704 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
707 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
708 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
709 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
710 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
712 enum BackgroundEvent {
713 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
714 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
715 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
716 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
718 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
719 /// are regenerated on startup.
720 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
721 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
722 /// channel to continue normal operation.
724 /// In general this should be used rather than
725 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
726 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
727 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
729 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
730 /// are regenerated on startup.
731 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
732 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
733 funding_txo: OutPoint,
734 channel_id: ChannelId,
735 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
737 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
738 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
740 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
741 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
742 channel_id: ChannelId,
747 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
748 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
749 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
750 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
751 /// event can be generated.
752 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
753 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
754 /// operation of another channel.
756 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
757 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
758 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
759 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
761 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
762 event: events::Event,
763 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
765 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
766 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
767 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
769 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
770 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
771 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
772 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
773 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
775 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
776 /// stored for later processing.
777 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
778 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
779 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
780 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
781 downstream_channel_id: ChannelId,
785 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
786 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
787 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
788 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
789 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
790 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
791 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
792 (4, blocking_action, required),
793 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, downstream_funding_outpoint will be
794 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
795 (5, downstream_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(downstream_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
797 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
798 (0, event, upgradable_required),
799 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
800 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
801 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
802 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
803 // downgrades to prior versions.
804 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
808 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
809 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
810 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
811 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
812 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
813 channel_id: ChannelId,
816 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
817 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
818 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
819 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
820 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, channel_funding_outpoint will be
821 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
822 (3, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(channel_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
826 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
827 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
828 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
829 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
830 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
831 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
833 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
834 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
835 channel_id: ChannelId,
836 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
841 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
842 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
843 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
844 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
845 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
850 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
851 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
855 /// State we hold per-peer.
856 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
857 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
859 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
860 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
861 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
863 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
864 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
865 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
866 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
867 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
868 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
869 latest_features: InitFeatures,
870 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
871 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
872 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
873 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
874 /// user but which have not yet completed.
876 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
877 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
878 /// for a missing channel.
879 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
880 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
881 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
883 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
884 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
885 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
886 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
888 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
889 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
890 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
891 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
892 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
893 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
894 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
895 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
896 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
897 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
898 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
899 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
900 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
901 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
902 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
906 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
907 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
908 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
909 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
910 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
911 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
914 !self.channel_by_id.iter().any(|(_, phase)|
916 ChannelPhase::Funded(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => true,
917 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => false,
919 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => true,
921 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => false,
924 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
925 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
928 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
929 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
930 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
933 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
934 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
935 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
936 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
940 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
941 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
942 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
943 /// The original OpenChannel message.
944 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
945 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
946 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
949 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
950 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
951 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
953 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
954 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
956 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
959 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
960 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
961 struct PendingInboundPayment {
962 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
963 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
964 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
965 /// this payment being removed.
967 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
968 user_payment_id: u64,
969 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
970 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
971 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
974 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
975 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
976 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
977 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
978 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
979 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
980 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
981 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
983 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
984 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
985 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
993 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
996 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
997 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
998 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
1003 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
1004 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
1005 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
1006 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
1007 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
1008 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
1009 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
1010 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
1011 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
1013 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1014 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1015 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1024 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1027 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1028 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1029 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1034 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1036 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1038 pub trait AChannelManager {
1039 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1040 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1041 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1042 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1043 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1044 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1045 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1046 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1047 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1048 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1049 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1050 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1051 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1052 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1053 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1054 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1055 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1056 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1057 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1058 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1059 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1060 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1061 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1062 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1063 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1064 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1065 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1066 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1067 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1068 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1069 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1070 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1071 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1072 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1073 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1074 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1077 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1078 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1080 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1081 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1082 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1083 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1084 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1085 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1089 type Watch = M::Target;
1091 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1093 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1095 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1097 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1098 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1100 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1102 type Router = R::Target;
1104 type Logger = L::Target;
1106 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1109 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
1110 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
1112 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
1113 /// to individual Channels.
1115 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1116 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1117 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1118 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1120 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1121 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1122 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1123 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1124 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1125 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1126 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1127 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1128 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1130 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1131 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1132 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1134 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1135 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1136 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1137 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1138 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1140 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1141 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1142 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1143 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1145 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1146 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1147 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1149 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1150 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1151 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1152 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1153 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1155 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1156 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1157 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1158 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1159 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1160 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1161 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1162 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1165 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1166 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1167 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1168 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1169 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1173 // `pending_offers_messages`
1175 // `total_consistency_lock`
1177 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1179 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1181 // |__`per_peer_state`
1183 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1185 // |__`claimable_payments`
1187 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1191 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1193 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1195 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1199 // |__`pending_events`
1201 // |__`pending_background_events`
1203 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1205 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1206 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1207 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1208 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1209 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1210 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1214 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1215 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1216 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1222 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1224 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1226 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1227 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1229 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1230 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1231 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1232 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1234 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1235 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1237 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1238 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1239 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1240 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1241 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1242 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1243 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1244 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1246 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1248 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1249 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1251 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1253 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1254 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1255 /// and via the classic SCID.
1257 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1258 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1260 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1262 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1264 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1265 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1266 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1268 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1269 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1271 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1272 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1274 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1275 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1277 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1278 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1279 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1280 /// active channel list on load.
1282 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1283 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1285 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1287 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1288 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1289 /// the handling of the events.
1291 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1292 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1295 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1296 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1297 /// would break backwards compatability.
1298 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1299 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1300 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1302 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1304 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1306 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1308 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1310 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1311 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1312 /// confirmation depth.
1314 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1315 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1316 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1318 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1320 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1322 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1324 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1326 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1328 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1329 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1330 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1332 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1333 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1335 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1336 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1337 /// keeping additional state.
1338 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1340 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1341 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1342 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1343 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1345 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1346 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1348 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1349 /// are currently open with that peer.
1351 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1352 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1355 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1357 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1358 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1359 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1360 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1361 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1363 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1364 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1365 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1366 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1367 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1369 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1370 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1372 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1373 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1374 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1375 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1376 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1378 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1379 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1381 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1382 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1383 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1384 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1385 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1387 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1389 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1391 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1392 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1393 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1394 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1395 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1396 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1397 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1398 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1399 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1400 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1401 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1403 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1404 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1405 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1407 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1409 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1410 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1412 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1416 signer_provider: SP,
1421 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1423 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1424 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1425 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1426 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1427 pub struct ChainParameters {
1428 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1429 pub network: Network,
1431 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1433 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1434 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1437 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1441 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1442 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1445 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1446 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1447 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1448 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1449 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1450 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1452 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1453 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1454 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1455 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1456 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1457 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1459 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1460 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1463 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1464 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1465 /// events to handle.
1467 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1468 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1470 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1471 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1474 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1475 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1476 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1477 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1479 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1480 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1481 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1482 should_persist: move || {
1483 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1484 // processing and return that.
1485 let notify = persist_check();
1486 match (notify, force_notify) {
1487 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1488 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1489 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1490 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1491 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1494 _read_guard: read_guard,
1498 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1499 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1500 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1501 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1502 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1503 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1505 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1506 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1507 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1508 should_persist: persist_check,
1509 _read_guard: read_guard,
1514 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1515 fn drop(&mut self) {
1516 match (self.should_persist)() {
1517 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1518 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1519 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1521 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1522 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1523 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1528 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1529 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1531 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1533 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1534 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1535 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1536 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1537 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1539 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1540 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1542 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1544 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1545 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1546 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1547 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1548 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1549 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1550 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1551 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1552 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1553 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1554 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1555 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1556 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1558 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1559 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1561 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1562 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1563 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1564 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1566 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1567 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1568 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1569 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1570 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1571 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1573 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1575 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1576 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1578 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1580 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1581 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1583 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1584 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1585 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1587 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1588 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1589 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1591 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1592 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1593 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1594 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1596 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1597 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1598 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1600 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1601 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1602 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1604 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1605 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1606 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1607 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1608 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1609 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1610 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1611 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1612 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1613 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1614 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1617 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1618 /// to better separate parameters.
1619 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1620 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1621 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1622 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1623 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1624 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1625 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1626 pub features: InitFeatures,
1627 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1628 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1629 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1631 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1633 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1634 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1635 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1636 /// payments to us through this channel.
1637 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1638 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1639 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1640 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1641 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1642 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1643 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1646 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1647 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1648 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1649 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1650 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1651 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1652 /// lifetime of the channel.
1653 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1654 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1655 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1656 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1657 /// our counterparty already.
1658 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1659 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1661 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1662 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1663 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1664 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1666 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1667 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1669 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1670 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1672 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1673 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1674 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1675 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1676 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1677 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1678 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1679 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1680 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1683 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1685 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1686 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1687 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1688 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1689 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1690 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1691 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1693 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1694 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1696 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1697 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1698 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1699 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1700 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1701 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1702 /// this value on chain.
1704 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1706 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1708 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1709 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1710 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1711 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1712 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1713 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1714 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1716 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1717 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1718 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1719 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1720 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1721 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1723 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1724 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1725 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1726 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1727 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1729 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1730 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1731 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1732 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1734 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1735 pub balance_msat: u64,
1736 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1737 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1738 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1739 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1741 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1743 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1744 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1745 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1746 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1747 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1748 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1749 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1750 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1752 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1753 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1754 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1755 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1756 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1757 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1758 /// route which is valid.
1759 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1760 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1761 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1762 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1763 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1764 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1766 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1767 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1768 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1769 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1770 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1771 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1772 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1773 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1774 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1776 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1778 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1779 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1780 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1781 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1782 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1784 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1785 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1786 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1787 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1788 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1789 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1790 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1792 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1793 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1794 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1795 pub is_outbound: bool,
1796 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1797 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1798 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1799 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1800 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1802 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1803 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1804 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1805 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1806 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1807 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1808 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1810 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1811 pub is_usable: bool,
1812 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1813 pub is_public: bool,
1814 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1815 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1816 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1817 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1818 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1819 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1821 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1822 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1823 /// Pending inbound HTLCs.
1825 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
1826 pub pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCDetails>,
1827 /// Pending outbound HTLCs.
1829 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
1830 pub pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails>,
1833 impl ChannelDetails {
1834 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1835 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1836 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1838 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1839 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1840 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1841 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1844 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1845 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1846 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1848 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1849 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1850 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1851 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1854 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1855 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1856 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1859 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1860 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1862 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1863 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1864 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1866 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1867 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1868 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1869 features: latest_features,
1870 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1871 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1872 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1873 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1874 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1875 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1876 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1877 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1878 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1879 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1881 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1882 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1883 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1884 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1885 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1886 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1887 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1888 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1889 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1890 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1891 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1892 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1893 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1894 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1895 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1896 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1897 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1898 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1899 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1900 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1901 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1902 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1903 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1904 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1905 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1906 config: Some(context.config()),
1907 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1908 pending_inbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(),
1909 pending_outbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(),
1914 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1915 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1916 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1917 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1918 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1919 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1920 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1921 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1922 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1924 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1926 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1927 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1929 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1930 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1931 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1932 /// to drop the channel.
1936 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1937 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1938 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1939 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1940 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1942 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1943 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1944 payment_id: PaymentId,
1946 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1948 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1949 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1950 payment_id: PaymentId,
1951 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1953 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1954 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1955 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1958 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1959 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1960 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1962 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1963 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1964 payment_id: PaymentId,
1965 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1966 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1967 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1969 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1970 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1971 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1973 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1974 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1975 payment_id: PaymentId,
1976 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1977 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1981 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1983 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1985 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1986 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1987 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1988 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1990 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1991 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1992 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1995 macro_rules! handle_error {
1996 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1997 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1998 // entering the macro.
1999 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2000 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2004 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
2005 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2007 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
2008 let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
2009 let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
2010 let logger = WithContext::from(
2011 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
2013 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
2015 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
2016 if let Some(update) = update_option {
2017 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2022 log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
2025 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
2027 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2028 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
2029 action: err.action.clone()
2033 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
2034 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2035 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2036 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2037 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
2041 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2048 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2049 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2050 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2051 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2053 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2054 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2055 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2057 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2058 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2059 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2060 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2061 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2063 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2064 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2066 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2070 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2071 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2072 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2074 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2075 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2077 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2078 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2080 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2081 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2082 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2083 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2084 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2085 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2087 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2092 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2093 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2095 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2096 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2098 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2099 match $channel_phase {
2100 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2101 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2103 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2104 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2106 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2107 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2109 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2110 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(channel) => {
2111 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2113 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2114 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
2115 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2121 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2122 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2126 let key = *$entry.key();
2127 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2129 $entry.remove_entry();
2137 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2138 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2142 let key = *$entry.key();
2143 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2145 $entry.remove_entry();
2153 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2154 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2156 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2157 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2163 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2164 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2165 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2166 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2167 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2169 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2170 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2171 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2172 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2173 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2174 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2175 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2176 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2177 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2178 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2183 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2184 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2185 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2186 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2187 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2188 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2189 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2190 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2191 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2192 channel_type: Some($channel.context.get_channel_type().clone()),
2194 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2199 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2200 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2201 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2202 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2203 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2204 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2205 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2206 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2207 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2209 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2214 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2215 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2216 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2217 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2218 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2219 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height);
2220 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2221 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2222 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2223 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2224 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2225 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2227 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2228 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2229 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2235 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2236 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2238 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2239 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2240 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2241 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2242 updates.announcement_sigs);
2243 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2244 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2247 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2248 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2249 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2250 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2252 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2253 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2254 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2255 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2256 let mut batch_completed = false;
2257 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2258 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2259 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2260 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2262 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2263 channel_state.2 = true;
2265 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2267 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2269 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2272 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2273 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2274 if batch_completed {
2275 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2276 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2277 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2278 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2279 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2280 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2281 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2282 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2283 chan.set_batch_ready();
2284 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2285 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2289 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2290 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2291 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2296 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2298 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2299 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2301 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2302 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2303 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2304 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2309 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2310 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2311 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2312 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2314 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2315 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2316 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2317 panic!("{}", err_str);
2319 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2320 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2321 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2324 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2330 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2331 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2332 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2334 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2335 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2336 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2337 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2338 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2339 // filter for uniqueness here.
2340 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2341 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2342 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2343 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2345 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2346 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2348 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2349 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2350 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2356 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2357 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2358 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2359 while !processed_all_events {
2360 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2367 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2368 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2369 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2371 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2372 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2373 result = $self.process_background_events();
2375 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2376 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2377 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2378 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2382 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2383 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2384 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2385 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2388 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2390 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2391 $event_to_handle = event;
2393 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2394 post_event_actions.push(action);
2399 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2400 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2401 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2402 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2403 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2404 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2407 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2408 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2409 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2410 processed_all_events = false;
2414 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2415 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2416 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2418 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2419 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2420 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2426 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2428 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2429 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2430 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2431 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2432 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2433 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2437 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2439 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2441 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2442 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2444 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2446 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2447 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2448 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2451 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2452 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2453 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2455 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2456 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2457 current_timestamp: u32,
2459 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2460 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2461 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2462 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2464 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2465 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2466 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2471 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2473 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(new_hash_set()),
2474 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2475 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2476 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2477 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: new_hash_map(), pending_claiming_payments: new_hash_map() }),
2478 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2479 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2480 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2482 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2485 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2486 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2488 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2490 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2492 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2494 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2495 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2496 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2497 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2498 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2499 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2500 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2501 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2503 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2513 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2514 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2515 &self.default_configuration
2518 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2519 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2520 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2523 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2524 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2526 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2528 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2532 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2537 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2539 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2540 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2541 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2542 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2543 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2545 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2546 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2548 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2549 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2550 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2552 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2553 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2554 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2556 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2557 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2559 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2560 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2561 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2562 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2563 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2564 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2566 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2567 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2568 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2569 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2570 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2571 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2574 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2575 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2576 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2578 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2580 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2581 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2583 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2585 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2586 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2587 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2592 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2593 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2594 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2595 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2596 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2597 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height, outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2601 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2606 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2608 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2609 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2610 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2612 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2614 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2617 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2620 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2621 node_id: their_network_key,
2624 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2627 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2628 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2629 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2630 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2631 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2632 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2633 // the same channel.
2634 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2636 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2637 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2638 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2639 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2640 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2641 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2642 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2643 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2644 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2648 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2649 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2650 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2658 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2659 /// more information.
2660 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2661 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2662 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2663 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2664 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2665 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2666 // the same channel.
2667 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2669 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2670 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2671 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2672 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2673 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2674 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2675 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2676 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2684 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2685 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2687 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2688 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2690 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2691 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2692 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2693 // really wanted anyway.
2694 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2697 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2698 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2699 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2700 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2702 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2703 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2704 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2705 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2706 let context_to_details = |context| {
2707 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2709 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2711 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2712 .map(context_to_details)
2718 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2719 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2721 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2722 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2723 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2725 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2726 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2727 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2728 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2729 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2730 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2732 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2733 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2734 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2736 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2737 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2738 payment_id: *payment_id,
2739 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2740 total_msat: *total_msat,
2743 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2744 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2746 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2747 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2749 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2754 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2755 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2757 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
2758 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2761 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2763 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2764 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2766 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2767 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2769 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2770 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2771 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2772 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2773 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2774 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2775 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2776 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2778 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2779 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2780 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2781 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2782 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2786 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2787 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2789 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2790 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2791 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2792 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2795 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2796 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
2799 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2800 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2802 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2803 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
2810 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2811 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2812 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2813 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2816 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2817 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2823 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2824 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2825 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2827 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2828 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2830 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2831 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2832 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2833 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2835 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2837 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2838 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2839 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2842 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2843 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2844 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2845 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2846 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2847 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2850 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2851 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2852 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2854 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2855 /// the channel being closed or not:
2856 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2857 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2858 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2859 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2860 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2861 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2862 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2864 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2865 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2866 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2867 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2869 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2871 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2872 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2873 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2876 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2877 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2878 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2879 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2880 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2883 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2884 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2885 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2886 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2887 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2890 let logger = WithContext::from(
2891 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
2894 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
2895 shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2896 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2897 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2898 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2899 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2900 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2902 if let Some((_, funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2903 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2904 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2905 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2906 // ignore the result here.
2907 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2909 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2910 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2911 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2912 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2913 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2914 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2915 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2916 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2917 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2918 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2919 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2920 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
2923 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2926 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2927 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2932 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2933 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2934 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
2935 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
2936 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
2937 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
2938 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
2939 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
2942 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
2943 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2944 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
2948 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2949 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2953 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2954 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2955 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2956 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2957 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2958 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2959 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2960 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2961 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2962 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2963 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2965 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2967 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
2968 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2969 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2970 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2971 mem::drop(peer_state);
2972 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2974 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2975 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
2976 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2978 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2979 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
2980 // Unfunded channel has no update
2981 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2983 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
2984 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2985 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => {
2986 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
2987 // Unfunded channel has no update
2988 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2991 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2992 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2993 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2994 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2996 (None, *peer_node_id)
2998 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
3001 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
3002 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
3003 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
3004 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3005 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3006 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
3007 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
3008 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3009 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3015 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
3018 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3019 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3020 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
3021 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
3022 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3023 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3024 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3025 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
3026 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3027 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3028 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
3029 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
3040 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
3041 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
3042 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
3044 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3045 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3046 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
3049 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3050 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3051 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3053 /// You can always broadcast the latest local transaction(s) via
3054 /// [`ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3055 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3056 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3057 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3060 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3061 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3062 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3063 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3064 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3068 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3069 /// local transaction(s).
3070 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3071 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3072 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3076 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3077 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3079 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3081 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3082 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3085 let is_intro_node_forward = match next_hop {
3086 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3087 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward {
3088 intro_node_blinding_point: Some(_), ..
3094 macro_rules! return_err {
3095 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3098 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3099 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
3101 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3102 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3103 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3104 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3105 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3106 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3107 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3111 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_forward {
3112 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3113 } else { ($err_code, $data) };
3114 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3115 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3116 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3117 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3118 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3124 let NextPacketDetails {
3125 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
3126 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
3127 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3128 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3129 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3132 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3133 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3134 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3135 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3136 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3137 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3138 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3139 // phantom or an intercept.
3140 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3141 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3142 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3146 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3149 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3151 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3152 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3153 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3154 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3155 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3157 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3158 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3159 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3160 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3163 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3164 // have no consistency guarantees.
3165 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3169 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3170 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3171 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3172 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3173 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3175 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3176 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3177 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3178 // we don't have the channel here.
3179 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3181 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3183 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3184 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3185 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3186 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3187 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3188 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3189 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3190 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3191 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3192 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3193 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3195 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3198 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3199 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3201 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3202 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3209 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3211 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3212 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3214 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3215 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3216 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3217 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3218 break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3220 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3221 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3227 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3228 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3229 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3230 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3232 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3233 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3235 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3236 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3237 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3239 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3240 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3241 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3242 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3243 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3244 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3245 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3249 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3251 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3254 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3255 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3256 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3257 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3258 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3259 macro_rules! return_err {
3260 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3262 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3263 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3264 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3265 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3266 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3267 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3268 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3269 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3270 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3274 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3275 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3276 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3277 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3278 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3284 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3286 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3287 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3288 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3289 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3292 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3293 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3294 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3295 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3296 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3298 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3301 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3302 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3303 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3304 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3305 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3311 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3312 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3313 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3315 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3316 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3317 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3319 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3320 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3321 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3322 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3323 return Err(LightningError {
3324 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3325 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3328 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3329 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3331 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3332 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3333 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3336 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3337 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3338 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3339 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3341 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3342 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3343 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3345 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3346 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3347 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3348 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3349 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3350 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3351 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3355 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3358 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3359 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3360 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3361 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3363 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3364 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3365 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3366 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3367 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3370 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3371 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3373 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3374 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3375 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3376 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3377 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3378 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3379 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3380 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3382 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3383 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3384 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3386 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3388 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3395 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3396 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3397 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3398 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3403 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3404 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3405 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3408 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3409 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3410 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3411 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3413 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3414 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3415 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3417 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3418 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3422 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3423 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3425 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3426 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3427 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3429 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3432 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
3434 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3435 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3437 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3438 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3439 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3440 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3441 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3442 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3443 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3444 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3445 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3446 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3448 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3449 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3450 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3451 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3453 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3454 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3456 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3457 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3458 Some(monitor_update) => {
3459 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3461 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3462 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3463 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3464 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3465 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3466 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3467 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3475 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3478 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3479 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3480 // `channel_by_id` map.
3481 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3482 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3486 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3487 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3489 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3494 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3496 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3497 /// fields for more info.
3499 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3500 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3502 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3504 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3505 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3506 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3507 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3508 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3510 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3511 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3512 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3513 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3514 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3516 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3517 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3518 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3519 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3521 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3523 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3524 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3525 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3527 /// In general, a path may raise:
3528 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3529 /// node public key) is specified.
3530 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3531 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3532 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3533 /// relevant updates.
3535 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3536 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3537 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3539 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3540 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3541 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3542 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3543 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3544 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3545 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3546 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3547 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3548 self.pending_outbound_payments
3549 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3550 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3551 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3554 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3555 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3556 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3557 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3558 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3559 self.pending_outbound_payments
3560 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3561 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3562 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3563 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3567 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3568 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3569 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3570 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3571 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3572 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3576 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3577 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3578 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3582 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3583 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3586 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3587 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3588 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3589 self.pending_outbound_payments
3590 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3591 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3592 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3593 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3594 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3598 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3599 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3600 /// retries are exhausted.
3602 /// # Event Generation
3604 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3605 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3607 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3608 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3609 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3611 /// # Requested Invoices
3613 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3614 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3615 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3616 /// once the invoice has been received.
3618 /// # Restart Behavior
3620 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3621 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3622 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3624 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3625 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3626 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3627 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3630 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3631 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3632 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3633 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3634 /// never reach the recipient.
3636 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3637 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3639 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3640 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3642 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3643 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3644 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3645 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3646 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3647 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3648 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3651 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3652 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3654 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3657 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3658 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3659 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3660 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3661 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3662 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3663 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3664 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3667 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3668 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3669 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3670 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3671 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3672 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3673 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3674 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3675 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3678 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3681 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3682 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3685 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3686 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3688 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3689 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3690 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3691 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3692 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3693 let payment_params =
3694 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3696 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3698 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3701 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3702 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3704 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3705 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3706 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3707 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3709 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3710 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3711 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3712 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3713 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3714 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3715 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3716 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3717 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3718 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3720 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3721 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3722 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3723 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3727 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3729 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3730 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3733 let mut used_liquidity_map = hash_map_with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3735 let mut res = Vec::new();
3737 for mut path in route.paths {
3738 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3739 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3740 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3741 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3742 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3745 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3748 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3749 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3751 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3753 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3754 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3759 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3762 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3767 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3768 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3769 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3771 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3772 let used_liquidity =
3773 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3775 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3776 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3778 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3781 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3786 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3787 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3788 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3795 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3796 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3797 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3798 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3799 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3800 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3801 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3802 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3803 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3805 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3806 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3808 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3809 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
3810 funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3812 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3813 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
3814 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3815 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3816 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
3817 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
3818 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None))
3819 } else { unreachable!(); });
3821 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
3822 Err((chan, err)) => {
3823 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3824 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3825 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3826 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3827 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3833 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3834 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3836 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3837 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3840 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3841 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3842 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3846 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3847 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3848 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3852 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3853 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3854 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3856 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3857 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3858 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
3859 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
3860 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
3862 "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
3863 funding_txo, o.get()
3865 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
3866 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3867 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3868 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
3869 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
3870 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
3873 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
3880 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3881 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3882 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3886 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3888 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3889 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3891 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3892 /// across the p2p network.
3894 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3895 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3897 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3898 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3899 /// keys per-channel).
3901 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3902 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3903 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3905 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3906 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3907 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3909 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3910 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3911 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3912 /// for more details.
3914 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3915 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3916 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3917 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3920 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3922 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3923 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3925 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3926 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3927 /// signature for each channel.
3929 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3930 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3931 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3932 let mut result = Ok(());
3934 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3935 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3936 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3937 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3938 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3943 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3944 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3945 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3949 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3950 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3951 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3952 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3953 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3954 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3955 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3956 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3958 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3959 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3964 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3965 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3966 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3967 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3971 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3972 match states.entry(txid) {
3973 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3974 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3975 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3979 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3982 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3983 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3984 temporary_channel_id,
3985 counterparty_node_id,
3986 funding_transaction.clone(),
3989 let mut output_index = None;
3990 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3991 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3992 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3993 if output_index.is_some() {
3994 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3995 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3998 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
4001 if output_index.is_none() {
4002 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4003 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
4006 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
4007 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
4008 // TODO(dual_funding): We only do batch funding for V1 channels at the moment, but we'll probably
4009 // need to fix this somehow to not rely on using the outpoint for the channel ID if we
4010 // want to support V2 batching here as well.
4011 funding_batch_state.push((ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint), *counterparty_node_id, false));
4017 if let Err(ref e) = result {
4018 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
4019 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4020 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4021 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4022 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4023 .into_iter().flatten()
4024 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4026 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4027 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4029 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4031 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4032 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4033 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4034 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4035 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
4037 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4038 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
4039 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
4043 mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
4044 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4045 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4051 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4053 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4054 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4055 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4056 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4058 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4059 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4061 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4062 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4064 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4066 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4067 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4068 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4069 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4070 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4071 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4072 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4073 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4074 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4075 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4076 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4077 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4078 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4082 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4083 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4084 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4085 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4086 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4087 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4088 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4089 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4090 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4091 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4095 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4096 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4097 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4098 config.apply(config_update);
4099 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4102 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4103 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4104 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4105 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4106 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4107 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4114 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4115 debug_assert!(false);
4116 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4118 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4119 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4126 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4128 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4129 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4130 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4131 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4133 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4134 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4136 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4137 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4139 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4141 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4142 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4143 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4144 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4145 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4146 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4147 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4148 pub fn update_channel_config(
4149 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4150 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4151 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4154 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4155 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4157 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4158 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4160 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4161 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4162 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4163 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4164 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4166 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4167 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4168 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4171 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4174 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4175 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4176 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4177 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4178 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4179 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4180 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4182 let next_hop_scid = {
4183 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4184 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4185 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4186 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4187 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4188 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4189 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4190 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4191 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4192 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4195 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4197 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4198 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4199 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4202 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4203 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4204 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4205 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4206 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4213 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4214 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4215 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4218 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4219 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4220 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4221 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4224 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4226 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4227 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4228 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4229 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4230 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4233 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4234 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4235 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4236 payment.prev_channel_id,
4237 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4238 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4240 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4244 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4245 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4247 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4250 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4251 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4252 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4254 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4255 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4256 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4259 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4260 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4261 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4262 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4263 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4264 channel_id: payment.prev_channel_id,
4265 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4266 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4267 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4268 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4271 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4272 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4273 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4274 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4279 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4281 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4282 /// Will likely generate further events.
4283 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4284 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4286 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4287 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4288 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4290 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4291 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4293 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4294 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4295 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4296 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4298 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4299 match forward_info {
4300 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4301 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4302 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4303 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4304 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4307 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4308 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4309 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id));
4310 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4312 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4313 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4314 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4315 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4316 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4317 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4318 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4319 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4320 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4323 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4324 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4326 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4329 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4330 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4336 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4337 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4339 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4343 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4344 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4346 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4350 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4351 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4352 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4353 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4354 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4355 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4356 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4359 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4360 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4361 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4362 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4363 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4365 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4367 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4368 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4372 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4373 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4374 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4375 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4376 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4377 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4379 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4380 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4386 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4389 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4392 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4393 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4394 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4395 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4396 // problem, not ours.
4402 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4403 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4404 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4406 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4410 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4411 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4412 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4413 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4414 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4417 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4418 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4419 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4420 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4421 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4422 let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
4423 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4424 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4425 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4426 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4427 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4428 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4429 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4432 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4433 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4434 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4435 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4436 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4437 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4438 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4439 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4440 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4441 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4442 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
4444 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4445 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4446 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4447 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4448 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4449 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4452 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4453 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4454 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4457 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4458 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4460 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4462 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4463 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4464 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4465 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4471 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4472 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4474 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4475 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4476 Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
4478 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4479 log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4480 let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
4481 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
4483 Some((res, htlc_id))
4486 if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4487 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4488 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4489 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4491 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
4493 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4494 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4495 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4501 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4505 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4506 match forward_info {
4507 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4508 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4509 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4510 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4511 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4514 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4515 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4516 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4517 payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret,
4518 custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4520 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4521 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4522 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4523 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4524 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4526 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4527 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4528 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4532 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4533 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4536 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4539 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4540 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4541 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4542 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4543 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4544 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4545 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4546 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4547 phantom_shared_secret,
4550 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4551 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4552 // if routing nodes overpay
4553 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4554 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4556 total_value_received: None,
4557 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4560 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4563 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4565 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4566 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4567 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4568 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4569 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4570 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes(),
4572 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4573 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4574 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4575 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4576 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4577 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4578 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4579 phantom_shared_secret,
4582 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4583 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4585 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4588 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4589 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4590 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4591 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4592 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4595 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4596 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4597 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4598 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4599 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4600 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4602 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4603 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4604 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4606 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4607 .entry(payment_hash)
4608 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4609 .or_insert_with(|| {
4610 committed_to_claimable = true;
4612 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4615 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4616 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4617 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4618 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4620 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4621 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4622 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4624 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4625 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4626 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4629 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4631 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4632 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4633 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4634 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4635 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4636 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4637 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4638 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4639 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4640 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4642 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4644 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4645 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4646 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4647 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4648 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4649 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4651 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4652 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4653 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4654 committed_to_claimable = true;
4656 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4657 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4658 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4659 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4660 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4661 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4662 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4663 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4664 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4668 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4669 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4670 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4671 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4672 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4674 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4676 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4677 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4679 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4680 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4681 committed_to_claimable = true;
4684 payment_claimable_generated
4688 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4689 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4690 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4691 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4692 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4693 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4694 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4695 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4696 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4697 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4698 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4699 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4700 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4701 Ok(result) => result,
4703 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4704 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4707 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4708 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4709 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4710 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4711 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4712 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4715 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4716 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4717 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4719 check_total_value!(purpose);
4721 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4722 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4723 check_total_value!(purpose);
4727 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4728 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4729 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4730 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4732 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4733 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4734 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4735 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4736 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4737 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4738 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4739 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4741 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4742 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4743 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4745 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4746 if payment_claimable_generated {
4747 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4753 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4754 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4762 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4763 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4764 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4765 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4767 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4768 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4770 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4772 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4773 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4774 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4776 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4778 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4779 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4780 events.append(&mut new_events);
4783 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4785 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4786 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4787 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4789 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4791 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4792 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4793 if background_events.is_empty() {
4794 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4797 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4799 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, _channel_id, update)) => {
4800 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4801 // monitor updating completing.
4802 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4804 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update } => {
4805 let mut updated_chan = false;
4807 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4808 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4809 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4810 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4811 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4812 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4813 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4814 updated_chan = true;
4815 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4816 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4818 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4821 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4826 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4827 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4830 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4831 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4832 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4833 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4834 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4835 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4836 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4838 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4839 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4840 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4841 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4842 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4848 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4851 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4852 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4853 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4854 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4855 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4858 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4859 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4861 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4863 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4864 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4865 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4867 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4868 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4869 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4870 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4872 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4873 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4875 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4876 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4880 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4881 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4882 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4883 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4884 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4885 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4886 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4888 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4889 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4891 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4892 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4893 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4894 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4895 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4896 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4898 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4903 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4904 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4912 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4914 /// This currently includes:
4915 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4916 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4917 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4919 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4920 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4921 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4922 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4923 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4924 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4925 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4926 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4928 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4929 /// estimate fetches.
4931 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4932 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4933 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4934 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4935 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4937 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4938 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4940 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4941 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4942 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4943 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4945 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4946 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4947 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4948 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4949 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4950 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4952 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4953 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4954 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
4956 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4957 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4958 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
4959 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4960 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4961 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4962 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4963 channel_id: *chan_id,
4964 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4975 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4976 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4977 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4978 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4979 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4980 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4981 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4983 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4984 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4989 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4990 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4992 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4993 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4994 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4995 if needs_close { return false; }
4998 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4999 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
5000 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
5001 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
5002 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
5003 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
5004 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
5005 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
5007 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5008 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
5009 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5010 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5014 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5016 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
5019 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
5021 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5022 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
5023 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5024 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5028 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5030 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
5036 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5038 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
5039 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5040 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
5041 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
5042 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5043 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5044 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
5045 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
5046 channel_id: *chan_id,
5047 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5055 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5056 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5057 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5059 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5060 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5061 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5063 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5064 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
5065 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5066 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5068 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5069 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
5070 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5071 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5076 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5077 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5078 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
5079 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5080 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5081 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5082 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5083 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5084 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5090 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5092 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5093 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5098 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5099 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5100 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5101 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5102 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5103 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5104 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5105 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5106 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5107 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5108 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5109 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5110 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5111 // have no channels to the peer.
5112 let remove_entry = {
5113 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5114 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5117 entry.remove_entry();
5120 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5125 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5126 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5127 // This should be unreachable
5128 debug_assert!(false);
5131 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5132 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5133 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5134 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5135 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5136 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5137 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5140 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5141 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5142 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5144 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5145 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5152 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5153 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5154 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5155 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5156 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5159 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5160 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5163 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5164 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5167 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5168 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5169 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5170 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5171 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5172 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5173 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5176 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5177 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5180 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5181 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5182 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5183 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5184 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5191 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5192 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5193 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5195 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5196 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5197 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5198 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5200 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5201 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5202 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5203 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5204 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5205 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5208 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5209 /// reason for the failure.
5211 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5212 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5213 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5215 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5216 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5217 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5218 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5219 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5220 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5221 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5226 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5227 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5228 match failure_code {
5229 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5230 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5231 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5232 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5233 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
5234 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5236 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5237 let fail_data = match data {
5238 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5241 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5246 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5247 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5249 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5251 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5252 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5253 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5254 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5255 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5256 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5257 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5259 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5261 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5262 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5264 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5269 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5270 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5271 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5272 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5273 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5274 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5275 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5276 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5277 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5278 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5280 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5281 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5282 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5283 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5285 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5286 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5287 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5288 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5289 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5293 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5294 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5295 // be surfaced to the user.
5296 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5297 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5298 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5300 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5301 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5302 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5303 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5304 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5305 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5306 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5307 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5308 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5310 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5311 debug_assert!(false);
5312 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5315 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5317 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5320 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5321 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5322 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5323 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5327 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5328 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5329 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5330 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5331 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5332 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5333 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5334 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5335 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5336 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5339 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5340 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5341 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5344 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5345 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5346 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5348 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5349 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5350 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5351 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5352 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5354 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5355 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5356 ref phantom_shared_secret, outpoint: _, ref blinded_failure, ref channel_id, ..
5359 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id)),
5360 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5361 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5363 let failure = match blinded_failure {
5364 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5365 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5366 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5367 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5369 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5371 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
5372 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5374 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
5375 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
5379 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5380 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5382 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5386 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5387 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5388 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5389 push_forward_ev = true;
5391 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5392 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5393 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
5395 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5396 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
5399 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5400 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5401 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5402 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5403 prev_channel_id: *channel_id,
5404 failed_next_destination: destination,
5410 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5411 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5413 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5414 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5415 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5416 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5418 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5419 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5420 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5421 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5423 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5424 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5425 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5427 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5428 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5429 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5430 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5431 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5432 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5433 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5434 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5435 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5438 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5439 /// even type numbers.
5443 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5444 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5446 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5447 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5448 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5451 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5452 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5454 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5457 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5458 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5459 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5460 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5461 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5462 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5463 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5464 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5469 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5470 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5471 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5472 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5473 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5475 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5476 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5477 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5481 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5482 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5483 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5484 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5485 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5486 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5487 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5488 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5489 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5490 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5491 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5500 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5502 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5503 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5504 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5505 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5506 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5507 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5508 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5509 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5510 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5511 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5512 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5513 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5514 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5515 debug_assert!(false);
5519 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5521 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5522 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5523 debug_assert!(false);
5527 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5528 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5530 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5531 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5532 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5533 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5536 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5537 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5538 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5539 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5543 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5544 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
5545 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5546 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5547 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5548 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5549 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5552 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5553 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5554 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5555 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
5556 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5557 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5562 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5563 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5564 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
5565 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5566 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5567 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5568 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5570 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5573 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5574 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5575 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5576 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5580 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5581 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5582 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5583 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5585 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5586 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5587 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5588 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5590 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5591 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5592 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5593 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5596 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5597 let chan_id = prev_hop.channel_id;
5598 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5599 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5603 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5604 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5605 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5608 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5609 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5610 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5611 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5612 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5613 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5614 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5615 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
5618 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5619 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5620 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5622 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5625 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5626 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5628 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5629 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5630 // monitor update as a background event.
5631 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5632 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5633 counterparty_node_id,
5634 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5635 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
5636 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5640 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5641 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5646 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5648 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5650 let (node_id, _funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker) =
5651 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5652 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5653 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5654 blocking_action: blocker, downstream_channel_id: channel_id,
5656 (node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)
5658 debug_assert!(false,
5659 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5662 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5663 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5664 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5665 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5666 .get_mut(&channel_id)
5668 let mut found_blocker = false;
5669 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5670 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5671 // which case we need to only remove the one
5672 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5673 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5674 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5675 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5677 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5680 debug_assert!(false);
5689 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5690 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5691 counterparty_node_id: None,
5692 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5695 channel_id: Some(prev_hop.channel_id),
5699 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5700 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5701 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5702 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5703 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5704 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5705 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5706 // again on restart.
5707 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id)),
5708 "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5709 payment_preimage, update_res);
5712 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5713 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5715 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5716 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5717 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5718 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5719 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5720 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5721 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5722 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5723 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5724 prev_hop.outpoint, prev_hop.channel_id, preimage_update,
5727 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5728 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5729 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5730 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5731 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5732 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5736 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5737 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5740 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5741 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
5742 startup_replay: bool, next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
5743 next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint, next_channel_id: ChannelId,
5746 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5747 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5748 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5749 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5750 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5752 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5753 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint, channel_id: next_channel_id,
5754 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5756 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5757 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5760 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5761 let prev_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
5762 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5763 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5764 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5765 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5766 let claiming_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
5767 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5768 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5769 let chan_to_release =
5770 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5771 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, next_channel_id, completed_blocker))
5773 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5774 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5775 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5776 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5781 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5782 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5783 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5784 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5785 // in the background.
5786 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5787 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5788 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5789 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5791 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5792 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5793 funding_txo, update, ..
5795 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5796 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5797 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5798 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5800 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5806 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5807 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5808 (funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)
5810 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5811 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5813 monitor_update.updates[0],
5814 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5819 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5820 // immediately once we get going.
5821 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5824 *channel_id == claiming_channel_id,
5826 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5829 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5830 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5831 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5832 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5833 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5834 downstream_channel_id: other_chan.2,
5835 blocking_action: other_chan.3,
5839 let total_fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5840 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5841 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5844 debug_assert!(skimmed_fee_msat <= total_fee_earned_msat,
5845 "skimmed_fee_msat must always be included in total_fee_earned_msat");
5846 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5847 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5848 total_fee_earned_msat,
5849 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5850 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
5851 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
5852 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5855 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5859 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5860 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5861 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5867 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5868 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5869 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5872 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5873 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5874 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5875 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5877 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5879 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5880 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5881 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5883 payment_purpose: purpose,
5886 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5888 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5892 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5894 sender_intended_total_msat,
5898 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5899 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5901 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5902 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5903 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
5906 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5907 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, downstream_channel_id, blocking_action,
5909 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5910 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5911 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5912 downstream_channel_id,
5913 Some(blocking_action),
5920 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5921 /// update completion.
5922 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5923 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5924 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5925 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5926 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5927 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5928 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5929 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5930 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5931 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5932 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5933 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5934 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5935 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5937 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5939 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5940 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5941 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5942 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5945 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5946 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5948 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5949 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5950 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5955 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5956 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5957 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5958 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5963 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5964 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5965 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5966 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5967 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5972 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5976 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5982 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5983 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5984 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5988 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5989 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5990 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5996 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, channel_id: &ChannelId, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5997 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5999 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
6000 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6002 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6003 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
6004 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6005 match outpoint_to_peer.get(funding_txo) {
6006 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6011 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6012 let mut peer_state_lock;
6013 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
6014 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
6015 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6016 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6018 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
6021 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
6022 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
6023 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6024 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6025 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
6028 let remaining_in_flight =
6029 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
6030 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
6033 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6034 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
6035 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
6036 remaining_in_flight);
6037 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
6040 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
6043 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
6045 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
6046 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
6049 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6050 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6051 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6053 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
6054 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
6055 /// used to accept such channels.
6057 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6058 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6059 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6060 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
6063 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
6064 /// it as confirmed immediately.
6066 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6067 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6068 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6070 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
6071 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6073 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6074 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6076 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6077 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6079 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6080 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6081 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6082 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6085 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6087 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
6088 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6090 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6091 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6092 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6093 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6095 let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6096 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6098 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6100 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6101 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6102 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6104 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6105 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6106 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6108 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6109 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6110 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6111 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6112 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6113 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6114 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| {
6115 let err_str = e.to_string();
6116 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6118 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6122 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6123 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6125 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str })
6130 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6131 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6132 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6133 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6134 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6135 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6136 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6139 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6140 let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6141 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6143 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6145 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6146 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6147 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6148 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6149 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6150 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6151 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6152 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6155 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6156 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
6157 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6159 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6163 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6164 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6165 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6167 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6168 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6169 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6172 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6177 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6178 /// or 0-conf channels.
6180 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6181 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6182 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6183 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6184 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6185 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6187 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6188 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6189 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6190 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6191 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6192 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6193 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6197 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6200 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6201 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6203 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6204 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6206 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6207 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6208 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6209 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6210 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6212 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6215 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6216 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6217 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6220 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
6221 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6222 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
6223 // Only inbound V2 channels that are not 0conf and that we do not contribute to will be
6224 // included in the unfunded count.
6225 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6226 chan.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis == 0 {
6227 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6230 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6231 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6234 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
6235 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6236 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
6237 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6242 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6245 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6246 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6247 // likely to be lost on restart!
6248 if msg.common_fields.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6249 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(),
6250 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6253 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6254 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(),
6255 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6258 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6259 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6260 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6261 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6262 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6264 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6265 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6267 debug_assert!(false);
6268 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6269 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6270 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6272 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6273 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6275 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6276 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6277 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6278 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6279 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6280 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6282 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6283 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6284 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6287 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6288 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6289 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6290 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6291 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6294 let channel_id = msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
6295 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6297 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6298 "temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(),
6299 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6302 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6303 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6304 let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
6305 &msg.common_fields, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
6307 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6309 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6310 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6311 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6312 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6313 funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
6314 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6317 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6318 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6319 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6324 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6325 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6326 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6327 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6328 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6329 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6330 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6333 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6338 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6339 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6340 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6341 "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(),
6342 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6344 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6345 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6346 "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(),
6347 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6350 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6351 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6353 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6354 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6355 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6357 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6361 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6362 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6363 // likely to be lost on restart!
6364 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6365 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6366 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6368 debug_assert!(false);
6369 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6371 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6372 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6373 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id) {
6374 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6375 match phase.get_mut() {
6376 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6377 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6378 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6381 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6385 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id))
6388 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6389 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6390 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id,
6391 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6392 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6394 user_channel_id: user_id,
6399 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6400 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6402 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6403 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6405 debug_assert!(false);
6406 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6409 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6410 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6411 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6412 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6413 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6414 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6415 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6417 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
6418 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6419 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6420 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6421 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
6422 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
6423 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
6424 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
6425 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6429 Some(mut phase) => {
6430 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6431 let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
6432 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6434 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6437 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
6439 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
6440 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
6441 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
6442 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
6443 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
6444 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
6446 let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
6447 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
6448 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
6451 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
6452 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6453 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
6455 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6456 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6457 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
6458 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6459 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
6461 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6462 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6463 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6464 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6465 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
6467 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6468 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6469 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6470 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6471 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6472 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6473 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6478 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6479 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6480 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6482 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6486 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6487 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6488 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
6496 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6497 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6498 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6499 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6501 debug_assert!(false);
6502 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6505 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6506 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6507 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6508 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6509 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
6510 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
6511 let logger = WithContext::from(
6513 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
6514 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
6517 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
6519 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
6520 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6521 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
6522 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
6523 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
6524 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
6525 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
6526 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6527 } else { unreachable!(); }
6530 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
6531 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
6532 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
6533 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
6534 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
6535 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
6536 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6540 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
6541 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
6542 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
6543 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
6544 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6545 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6549 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6552 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6556 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6557 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6558 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6559 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6560 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6562 debug_assert!(false);
6563 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6565 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6566 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6567 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6568 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6569 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6570 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6571 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6572 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6573 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6574 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6575 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6576 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6577 msg: announcement_sigs,
6579 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6580 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6581 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6582 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6583 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6584 // announcement_signatures.
6585 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6586 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6587 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6588 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6595 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6596 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6601 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6602 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6605 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6606 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6611 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6612 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6613 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6615 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6616 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6618 debug_assert!(false);
6619 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6621 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6622 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6623 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6624 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6626 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6627 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6628 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6629 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6631 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6634 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6635 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6636 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6637 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6639 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6640 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6641 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6642 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6643 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6644 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6648 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6649 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6650 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6651 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6654 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6655 let context = phase.context_mut();
6656 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
6657 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6658 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6659 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6661 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
6662 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6663 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
6664 let context = phase.context_mut();
6665 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6666 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6667 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6671 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6674 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6675 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6676 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6677 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6679 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6680 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6686 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6687 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6688 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6690 debug_assert!(false);
6691 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6693 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6694 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6695 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6696 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6697 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6698 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6699 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6700 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6701 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6702 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6703 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6708 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6709 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6710 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6711 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6712 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6713 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6714 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6716 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6717 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6720 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6723 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6724 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
6725 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6726 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6728 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6729 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6730 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6731 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6732 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6737 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6738 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6739 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6744 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6745 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6746 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6747 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6749 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6750 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6751 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6752 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6754 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6755 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6757 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
6758 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6759 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6761 debug_assert!(false);
6762 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6764 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6765 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6766 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6767 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6768 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6769 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6770 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6771 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
6772 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
6773 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
6775 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6777 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6778 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
6779 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
6780 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6781 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6782 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6783 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
6784 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6788 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6789 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6790 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6791 match pending_forward_info {
6792 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
6793 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
6795 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
6796 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
6797 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6798 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6799 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6801 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6802 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6803 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6804 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6805 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6808 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6810 _ => pending_forward_info
6813 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6814 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6816 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6817 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6820 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6825 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6827 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value, skimmed_fee_msat) = {
6828 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6829 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6831 debug_assert!(false);
6832 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6834 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6835 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6836 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6837 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6838 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6839 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6840 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6841 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6843 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6845 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6846 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6847 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6849 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6850 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6851 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6852 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6853 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6854 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6855 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6858 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6859 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6862 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6865 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(),
6866 Some(forwarded_htlc_value), skimmed_fee_msat, false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id),
6867 funding_txo, msg.channel_id
6873 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6874 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6875 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6876 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6877 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6879 debug_assert!(false);
6880 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6882 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6883 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6884 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6885 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6886 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6887 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6889 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6890 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6893 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6898 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6899 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6900 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6901 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6902 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6904 debug_assert!(false);
6905 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6907 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6908 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6909 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6910 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6911 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6912 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6913 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6915 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6916 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6918 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6919 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6923 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6927 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6928 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6929 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6931 debug_assert!(false);
6932 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6934 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6935 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6936 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6937 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6938 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6939 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6940 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6941 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6942 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6943 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6944 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6948 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6949 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6952 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6957 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6958 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6959 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6960 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6961 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6962 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6963 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6964 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6965 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6966 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6967 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6969 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6970 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6972 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6973 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6974 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6975 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6976 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6977 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6979 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6980 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6981 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6983 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
6984 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6985 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6986 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6987 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6988 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6989 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6990 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6991 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6994 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6995 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6997 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6998 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id));
6999 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
7000 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7001 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
7002 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
7003 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
7004 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
7005 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
7006 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7007 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7008 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
7011 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
7012 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
7013 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
7018 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
7019 // payments are being processed.
7020 if forward_htlcs_empty {
7021 push_forward_event = true;
7023 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7024 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
7031 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
7032 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
7035 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
7036 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7037 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
7039 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
7043 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
7044 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7045 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7046 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
7047 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
7049 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
7050 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
7051 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
7052 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
7053 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
7054 // real by taking more time.
7055 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
7056 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7057 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
7062 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
7063 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
7064 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
7065 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
7066 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7067 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
7068 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
7070 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7071 .get(&channel_id).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
7072 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
7073 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7074 channel_funding_outpoint,
7076 counterparty_node_id,
7081 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7082 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7083 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
7085 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7086 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7087 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7088 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7090 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
7091 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7092 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7098 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7099 let htlcs_to_fail = {
7100 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7101 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7103 debug_assert!(false);
7104 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7105 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
7106 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7107 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7108 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7109 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7110 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7111 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7112 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
7113 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
7114 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo, msg.channel_id,
7115 *counterparty_node_id)
7117 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7118 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
7119 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7120 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
7121 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
7122 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
7123 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7127 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7128 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7131 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7134 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7138 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7139 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7140 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7142 debug_assert!(false);
7143 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7145 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7146 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7147 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7148 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7149 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7150 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7151 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7153 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7154 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7157 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7162 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7163 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7164 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7166 debug_assert!(false);
7167 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7169 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7170 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7171 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7172 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7173 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7174 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7175 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7178 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7179 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7180 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height,
7181 msg, &self.default_configuration
7182 ), chan_phase_entry),
7183 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7184 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7185 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7188 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7189 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7192 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7197 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7198 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7199 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7200 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7202 // It's not a local channel
7203 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7206 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7207 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7208 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7209 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7211 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7212 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7213 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7214 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7215 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7216 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7217 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7218 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7219 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7220 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7221 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7223 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7225 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7226 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7227 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7228 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7230 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7231 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7232 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7233 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7236 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7240 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7241 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7244 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7246 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7249 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7251 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7252 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7254 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7256 debug_assert!(false);
7257 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7258 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7262 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
7263 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7264 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7265 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7266 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7267 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7268 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7269 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7270 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7271 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7272 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7273 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7274 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7275 let mut channel_update = None;
7276 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7277 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7278 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7281 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7282 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7283 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7284 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7285 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7286 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7287 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7292 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7293 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7294 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7295 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7296 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7297 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7301 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7302 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7305 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7306 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7308 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7309 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7310 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7311 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7312 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7313 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7315 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7316 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7317 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7318 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7319 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7320 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7321 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7322 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7323 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7324 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7325 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7326 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7327 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7328 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7329 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7330 next_funding_txid: None,
7333 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7334 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7335 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7341 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7342 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7343 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7344 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7347 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7348 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7353 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7354 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7355 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7357 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7358 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7359 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7360 for (funding_outpoint, channel_id, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7361 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7362 match monitor_event {
7363 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7364 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id));
7365 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7366 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7367 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage,
7368 htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), None, true,
7369 false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id);
7371 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7372 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id };
7373 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7374 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7377 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_funding_outpoint) => {
7378 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7379 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7381 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7382 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
7383 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7384 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
7387 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7388 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7389 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7390 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7391 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7392 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7393 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
7394 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7395 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
7396 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7397 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7401 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7402 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7403 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7404 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7412 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update_id } => {
7413 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, &channel_id, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7419 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7420 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7423 has_pending_monitor_events
7426 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7427 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7428 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7430 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7431 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7432 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7435 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7436 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7437 /// update was applied.
7438 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7439 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7440 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7442 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7443 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7444 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7445 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7447 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7448 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7450 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7451 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7452 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7453 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7455 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7456 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7457 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7458 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
7459 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7460 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7462 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7463 has_monitor_update = true;
7465 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7466 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7467 continue 'peer_loop;
7476 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7477 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7478 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7484 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7485 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7487 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7488 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7490 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7491 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7492 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7493 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7495 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7496 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7498 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7499 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7500 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7501 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7506 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7507 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7512 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7513 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7516 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7517 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
7518 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7524 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
7528 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7529 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7530 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7531 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7532 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7533 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7534 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7538 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7539 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7540 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7541 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7542 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7548 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7549 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7550 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7551 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7552 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7553 let mut has_update = false;
7554 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7556 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7558 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7559 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7560 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7561 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7562 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7564 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7565 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7566 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
7567 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7568 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7570 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7571 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7574 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7575 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7576 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7578 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7579 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7580 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7581 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7582 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7587 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7588 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7589 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7595 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7596 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7601 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7607 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7608 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7611 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7612 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7618 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7619 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7621 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7622 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7623 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7624 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7625 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7626 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7627 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7628 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7629 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7630 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7631 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7632 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7633 assert!(should_broadcast);
7634 } else { unreachable!(); }
7635 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7636 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7637 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update, channel_id,
7640 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7645 macro_rules! create_offer_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
7646 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7647 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7648 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7652 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
7653 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7654 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7655 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7656 /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7658 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
7662 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7667 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
7669 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7671 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7672 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7673 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7674 &$self, description: String
7675 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7676 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
7677 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
7678 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
7679 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
7681 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7682 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
7683 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
7685 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
7692 macro_rules! create_refund_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
7693 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7694 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7698 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7699 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7701 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7702 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7703 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7706 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7707 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7708 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7710 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7711 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7715 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
7716 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7717 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7718 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7719 /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7721 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
7725 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7726 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7731 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7732 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
7733 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
7735 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7737 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7738 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7739 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7740 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7741 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7742 &$self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7743 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7744 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7745 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
7746 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
7747 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
7748 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
7750 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7751 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7752 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7754 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
7755 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7758 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop($self);
7760 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7761 $self.pending_outbound_payments
7762 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7763 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7765 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7771 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7773 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
7774 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7775 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7776 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7777 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7778 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7782 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
7783 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>);
7784 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
7785 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>);
7788 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
7790 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
7792 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7793 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7794 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7796 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7797 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7798 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7799 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7800 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7801 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7802 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7804 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7805 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7809 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7810 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7813 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7814 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7815 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7819 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7820 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7821 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7822 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7826 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7827 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7828 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7833 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7834 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
7835 /// - the offer is for an unsupported chain, or
7836 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
7839 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7840 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7841 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7842 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7843 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7844 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7845 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7846 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7847 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7848 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7849 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7850 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7851 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7852 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7853 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7855 let builder: InvoiceRequestBuilder<DerivedPayerId, secp256k1::All> = offer
7856 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7858 let builder = builder.chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7860 let builder = match quantity {
7862 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7864 let builder = match amount_msats {
7866 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7868 let builder = match payer_note {
7870 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7872 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7873 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7875 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7877 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7878 self.pending_outbound_payments
7879 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7880 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7882 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7884 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7885 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7886 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7887 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7888 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7891 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7893 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7894 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7895 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7896 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7897 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7898 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7899 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7900 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7901 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7903 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7910 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7913 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7914 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7915 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7919 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7920 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7921 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7922 /// received and no retries will be made.
7927 /// - the refund is for an unsupported chain, or
7928 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply path for
7931 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7932 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7933 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7934 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7935 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7937 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7938 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7940 if refund.chain() != self.chain_hash {
7941 return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::UnsupportedChain);
7944 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7946 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7947 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7948 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(amount_msats, payment_secret)
7949 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7951 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
7952 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7953 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7955 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
7956 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7957 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7959 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
7960 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7961 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7963 let builder: InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey> = builder.into();
7964 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7965 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
7966 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7968 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7969 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7970 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7971 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7972 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7975 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7977 for path in refund.paths() {
7978 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7979 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7980 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7981 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7983 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7989 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7993 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7996 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7997 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7999 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
8000 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
8001 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
8002 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
8004 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
8006 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8007 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8011 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8012 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8014 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8016 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8017 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8019 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
8020 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8021 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
8022 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
8023 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
8024 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
8025 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
8026 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
8027 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
8028 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8029 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
8032 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
8033 /// stored external to LDK.
8035 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
8036 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
8037 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
8039 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
8040 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
8043 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
8044 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
8045 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
8046 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
8048 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
8049 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
8050 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
8051 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
8052 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
8054 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
8055 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
8056 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
8057 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
8058 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
8060 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
8061 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
8063 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8064 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8068 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8069 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8071 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8073 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8074 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8076 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8077 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8078 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
8079 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
8080 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
8081 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8082 min_final_cltv_expiry)
8085 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
8086 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
8088 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8089 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
8090 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
8093 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
8095 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
8096 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8097 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
8098 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8100 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
8102 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
8103 .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
8104 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
8107 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
8108 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
8111 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
8112 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
8113 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
8114 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
8115 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
8116 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8118 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
8119 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
8120 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
8121 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8122 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
8124 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
8126 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
8129 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8130 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, secp_ctx
8134 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
8135 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
8137 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8138 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8139 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8140 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8142 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8143 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8144 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
8145 Some(_) => continue,
8146 None => return scid_candidate
8151 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
8153 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8154 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
8156 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
8157 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
8158 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
8162 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
8163 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
8164 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
8166 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
8167 /// times to get a unique scid.
8168 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8169 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8170 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8172 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8173 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8174 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
8175 return scid_candidate
8179 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
8180 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
8181 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
8182 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
8184 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8185 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8186 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8187 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8188 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
8189 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
8191 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8192 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
8193 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
8202 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8203 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
8204 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8205 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
8206 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
8210 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
8211 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
8212 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8213 events.push_back((event, None));
8217 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8218 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8219 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8223 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8224 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8228 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8229 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
8232 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
8233 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
8234 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
8235 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
8236 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
8237 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId,
8238 mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
8240 let logger = WithContext::from(
8241 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
8244 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8245 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8246 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8247 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
8248 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
8249 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
8250 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8251 .get_mut(&channel_id)
8253 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
8257 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8258 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) {
8259 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
8260 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
8261 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
8262 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
8267 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(
8269 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8270 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
8271 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
8272 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
8274 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8275 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8276 if further_update_exists {
8277 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8282 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
8289 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
8290 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8296 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
8297 for action in actions {
8299 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
8300 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id
8302 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
8308 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
8309 /// using the given event handler.
8311 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8312 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8316 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8320 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8322 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8323 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8324 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8325 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8326 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8327 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8331 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8332 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8333 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8334 /// is always placed next to each other.
8336 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8337 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8338 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8339 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8341 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8342 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8343 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8344 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8345 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8346 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8347 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8349 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8350 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8351 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8352 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8355 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8356 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8358 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8359 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8362 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8363 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8364 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8365 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8366 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8367 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8368 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8372 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8373 events.replace(pending_events);
8382 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8384 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8385 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8386 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8387 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8388 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8389 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8393 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8395 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8396 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8397 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8399 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8403 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8405 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8406 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8407 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8408 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8409 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8410 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8414 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8416 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8417 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.prev_blockhash,
8418 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8419 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height - 1,
8420 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8423 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8424 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8427 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8428 let _persistence_guard =
8429 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8430 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8431 let new_height = height - 1;
8433 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8434 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.block_hash(),
8435 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8436 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height,
8437 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8438 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8441 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8445 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8447 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8448 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8449 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8450 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8451 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8452 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8456 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8457 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8458 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8459 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8461 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8462 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8464 let _persistence_guard =
8465 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8466 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8467 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
8468 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8470 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8471 if height < last_best_block_height {
8472 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8473 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8477 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8478 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8479 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8480 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8482 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8483 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8485 let _persistence_guard =
8486 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8487 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8488 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8490 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8492 macro_rules! max_time {
8493 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8495 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8496 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8497 // having an explicit local time source.
8498 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8499 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8500 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8501 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8502 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8508 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8509 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8510 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8511 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8515 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8516 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8517 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8518 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8519 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8520 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8521 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8522 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8523 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8524 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8525 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8532 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8533 let _persistence_guard =
8534 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8535 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8536 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8537 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8538 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8539 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8540 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8541 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8546 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8548 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8549 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8550 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8551 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8552 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8553 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8557 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8558 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8560 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8561 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8562 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8563 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8564 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8566 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8567 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8569 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8570 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8571 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8572 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8573 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8574 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8576 // Retain unfunded channels.
8577 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8578 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
8579 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
8580 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => true,
8581 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8582 let res = f(channel);
8583 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8584 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8585 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8586 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8587 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8589 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
8590 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8591 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8592 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8593 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8594 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8595 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8596 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8601 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8606 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8607 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8610 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8611 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8612 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8613 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8614 msg: announcement_sigs,
8616 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8617 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8618 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8620 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8621 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8622 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8627 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8628 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8629 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8630 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8631 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8632 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8633 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8634 // is always consistent.
8635 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8636 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8637 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8638 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8639 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8642 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8643 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8644 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8645 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8646 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8647 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
8648 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8649 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8653 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8654 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8655 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8656 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8657 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8658 data: reason_message,
8671 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8672 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8673 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8674 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8675 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8676 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8677 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8678 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8679 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8680 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8682 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8683 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8684 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8688 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8691 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8692 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8693 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8694 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8695 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8696 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8697 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8698 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8699 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8700 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8701 channel_id: htlc.prev_channel_id,
8702 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
8705 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8706 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8707 _ => unreachable!(),
8709 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8710 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8711 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8712 let logger = WithContext::from(
8713 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id)
8715 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8721 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8723 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8724 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8728 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8729 /// may have events that need processing.
8731 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8732 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8734 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8735 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8736 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8737 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8740 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8741 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8742 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8745 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8746 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8747 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8750 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8751 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8752 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8753 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8756 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8757 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8758 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8759 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8762 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8763 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8765 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8766 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8767 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8768 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8769 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8772 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8773 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8774 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8775 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8778 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8779 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8780 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8781 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8784 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8785 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8786 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8787 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8790 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8791 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8792 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8793 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8797 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8798 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8800 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8801 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8802 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8803 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8804 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8805 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8809 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8810 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8811 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8812 // change to the contents.
8813 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8814 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8815 let persist = match &res {
8816 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8817 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8818 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8820 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8822 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8827 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8828 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8829 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8830 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8833 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8834 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8835 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8836 // change to the contents.
8837 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8838 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8839 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8843 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8844 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8845 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8846 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8849 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8850 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8851 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8854 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8855 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8856 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8859 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8860 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8861 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8862 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8863 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8864 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8865 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8866 let persist = match &res {
8867 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8868 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8870 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8875 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8876 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8877 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8878 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8881 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8882 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8883 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8884 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8887 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8888 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8889 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8890 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8893 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8894 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8895 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8896 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8899 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8900 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8901 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8904 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8905 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8906 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8909 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8910 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8911 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8912 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8913 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8914 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8915 let persist = match &res {
8916 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8917 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8918 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8920 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8925 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8926 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8927 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8930 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8931 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8932 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8933 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8934 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8935 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8936 let persist = match &res {
8937 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8938 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8939 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8941 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8946 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8947 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8948 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8949 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8950 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8951 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8952 let persist = match &res {
8953 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8954 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8955 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8957 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8962 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8963 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8964 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8967 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8968 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8969 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8972 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8973 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8974 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8975 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8976 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8977 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8978 let persist = match &res {
8979 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8980 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8981 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8983 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8988 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8989 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8990 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8993 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8994 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8995 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8998 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9003 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
9004 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9005 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9006 let persist = match &res {
9007 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9008 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9009 Ok(persist) => *persist,
9011 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9016 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
9017 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9018 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
9019 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9020 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9023 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
9024 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
9025 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
9027 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9028 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9029 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9030 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9031 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9032 let context = match phase {
9033 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9034 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9035 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
9036 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
9041 // We retain UnfundedOutboundV1 channel for some time in case
9042 // peer unexpectedly disconnects, and intends to reconnect again.
9043 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
9046 // Unfunded inbound channels will always be removed.
9047 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
9050 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9051 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9054 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9055 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
9059 // Clean up for removal.
9060 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
9061 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
9064 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9065 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9066 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9067 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
9069 // V1 Channel Establishment
9070 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
9071 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
9072 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
9073 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
9074 // V2 Channel Establishment
9075 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9076 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9077 // Common Channel Establishment
9078 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
9079 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
9081 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
9083 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
9084 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
9085 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
9086 // Interactive Transaction Construction
9087 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
9088 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
9089 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
9090 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
9091 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
9092 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
9093 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
9094 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
9095 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
9096 // Channel Operations
9097 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
9098 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
9099 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
9100 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
9101 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
9102 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
9104 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
9105 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9106 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
9107 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9108 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
9109 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
9110 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
9111 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
9112 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
9115 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
9116 peer_state.is_connected = false;
9117 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
9118 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
9121 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
9123 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
9125 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
9126 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
9130 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
9131 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
9132 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
9133 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9137 let mut res = Ok(());
9139 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9140 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
9141 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
9142 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
9143 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
9144 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
9145 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
9148 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9149 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
9150 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
9151 if inbound_peer_limited {
9153 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9155 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
9156 channel_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9157 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9158 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
9159 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9160 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9161 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9162 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9166 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
9167 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
9168 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
9170 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9171 if inbound_peer_limited &&
9172 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
9173 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
9176 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9179 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
9180 peer_state.is_connected = true;
9185 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9187 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9188 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9189 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9190 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9191 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9193 for (_, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9195 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9196 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9197 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
9198 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9199 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
9203 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
9204 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9205 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9206 msg: chan.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash),
9210 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
9211 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9212 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9213 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9214 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9215 msg: chan.get_open_channel_v2(self.chain_hash),
9219 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
9220 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9221 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9222 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9223 debug_assert!(false);
9226 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
9227 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9228 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
9229 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9230 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9231 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9232 debug_assert!(false);
9238 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9239 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
9244 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
9245 match &msg.data as &str {
9246 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
9247 "link failed to shutdown" =>
9249 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
9250 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
9251 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
9252 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
9253 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
9254 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
9255 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
9256 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9257 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9259 || -> NotifyOption {
9260 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9261 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9262 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
9263 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9264 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
9265 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
9266 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
9267 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9271 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9272 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9273 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
9274 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
9275 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
9276 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
9278 log_level: Level::Trace,
9281 // This can happen in a fairly tight loop, so we absolutely cannot trigger
9282 // a `ChannelManager` write here.
9283 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9285 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents
9294 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9296 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9297 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
9298 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9299 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9300 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9301 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9302 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9303 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9304 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9305 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9306 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
9308 for channel_id in channel_ids {
9309 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9310 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9314 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
9315 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9316 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9317 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9318 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9319 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9320 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
9321 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan)) => {
9322 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9323 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9324 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9330 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9331 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan)) => {
9332 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9333 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9334 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9340 None | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) => (),
9341 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9342 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_)) => (),
9346 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9347 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9351 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9352 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9355 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
9356 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9359 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
9360 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
9363 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
9364 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9365 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9366 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9369 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
9370 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9371 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9372 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9375 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9376 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9377 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9378 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9381 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9382 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9383 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9384 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9387 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9388 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9389 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9390 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9393 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9394 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9395 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9396 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9399 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9400 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9401 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9402 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9405 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9406 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9407 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9408 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9411 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9412 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9413 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9414 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9418 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9419 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9421 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9422 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9423 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9424 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9425 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9426 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9430 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9431 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9432 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9435 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9436 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9439 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
9440 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9442 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9443 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9445 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9446 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9450 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9451 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
9452 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
9454 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
9456 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
9457 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9461 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9462 amount_msats, payment_secret
9464 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
9466 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
9467 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9471 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9472 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9473 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9476 if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
9477 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9478 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9479 payment_paths, payment_hash
9481 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9482 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9483 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9485 let builder: Result<InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey>, _> =
9486 builder.map(|b| b.into());
9487 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9488 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9489 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9492 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9493 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9494 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9495 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9496 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9498 let builder: Result<InvoiceBuilder<ExplicitSigningPubkey>, _> =
9499 builder.map(|b| b.into());
9500 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9501 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9502 .and_then(|invoice| {
9504 let mut invoice = invoice;
9505 match invoice.sign(|invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice|
9506 self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)
9508 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9509 Err(SignError::Signing) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9510 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9512 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9513 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9518 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9519 Err(error) => Some(error),
9523 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9524 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9526 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9528 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9529 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9532 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9533 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9534 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9541 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9542 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9548 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9549 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9553 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9554 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9555 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9556 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9557 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9561 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9562 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9564 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9565 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9566 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9567 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9568 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9571 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9572 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9573 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9574 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9577 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9578 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9579 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9580 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9583 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9584 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9585 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9586 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9589 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9590 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9591 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9592 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9593 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9594 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9595 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9596 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9597 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9598 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9599 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9600 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9601 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9602 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9603 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9604 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9605 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9606 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9607 features.set_route_blinding_optional();
9608 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9609 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9614 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9615 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9617 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9618 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9619 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9620 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9623 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9624 (2, node_id, required),
9625 (4, features, required),
9626 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9627 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9628 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9629 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9632 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9633 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9634 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9635 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9636 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9637 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9638 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9639 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9640 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9641 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9642 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9643 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9644 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9645 (7, self.config, option),
9646 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9647 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9648 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9649 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9650 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9651 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9652 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9653 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9654 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9655 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9656 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9657 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9658 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9659 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9660 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9661 (32, self.is_public, required),
9662 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9663 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9664 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9665 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9666 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9667 (43, self.pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9668 (45, self.pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9674 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9675 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9676 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9677 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9678 (2, channel_id, required),
9679 (3, channel_type, option),
9680 (4, counterparty, required),
9681 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9682 (6, funding_txo, option),
9683 (7, config, option),
9684 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9685 (9, confirmations, option),
9686 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9687 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9688 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9689 (16, balance_msat, required),
9690 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9691 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9692 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9693 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9694 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9695 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9696 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9697 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9698 (26, is_outbound, required),
9699 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9700 (30, is_usable, required),
9701 (32, is_public, required),
9702 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9703 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9704 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9705 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9706 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9707 (43, pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9708 (45, pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9711 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9712 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9713 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9714 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9715 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9719 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9721 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9722 outbound_scid_alias,
9726 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9727 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9729 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9730 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9731 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9732 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9733 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9734 confirmations_required,
9736 force_close_spend_delay,
9737 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9738 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9739 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9740 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9741 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9742 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9743 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9744 channel_shutdown_state,
9745 pending_inbound_htlcs: pending_inbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9746 pending_outbound_htlcs: pending_outbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9751 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9752 (2, channels, required_vec),
9753 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9754 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9757 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9758 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9759 (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
9762 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9764 (0, onion_packet, required),
9765 (1, blinded, option),
9766 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9769 (0, payment_data, required),
9770 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9771 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9772 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9773 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9774 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9776 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9777 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9778 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9779 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9780 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9781 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9785 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9786 (0, routing, required),
9787 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9788 (4, payment_hash, required),
9789 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9790 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9791 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9792 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9796 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9797 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9799 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9801 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9802 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9803 reason.write(writer)?;
9805 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9806 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9809 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9810 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9811 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9812 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9819 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9820 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9821 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9824 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9825 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9826 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9827 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9831 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9832 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9833 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9834 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9835 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9838 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9839 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9840 // messages contained in the variants.
9841 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9842 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9843 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9845 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9846 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9847 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9848 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9849 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9852 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9853 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9854 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9855 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9856 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9858 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9863 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9868 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
9869 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
9870 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
9873 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9874 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9875 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9876 (2, outpoint, required),
9877 (3, blinded_failure, option),
9878 (4, htlc_id, required),
9879 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9880 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9881 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 2 above, outpoint will be
9882 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9883 (9, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
9886 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9887 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9888 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9889 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9890 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9892 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9893 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9894 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9895 (2, self.value, required),
9896 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9897 (4, payment_data, option),
9898 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9899 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9900 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9901 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9907 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9908 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9909 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9910 (0, prev_hop, required),
9911 (1, total_msat, option),
9912 (2, value_ser, required),
9913 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9914 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9915 (5, total_value_received, option),
9916 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9917 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9918 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9920 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9921 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9922 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9924 if payment_data.is_some() {
9925 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9927 if total_msat.is_none() {
9928 total_msat = Some(value);
9930 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9933 if total_msat.is_none() {
9934 if payment_data.is_none() {
9935 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9937 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9939 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9943 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9946 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9947 total_value_received,
9948 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9950 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9951 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9956 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9957 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9958 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9961 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9962 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9963 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9964 let mut payment_id = None;
9965 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9966 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9967 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9968 (0, session_priv, required),
9969 (1, payment_id, option),
9970 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9971 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9972 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9973 (6, blinded_tail, option),
9975 if payment_id.is_none() {
9976 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9978 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9980 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9981 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9982 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9984 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9985 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9986 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9987 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9991 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9992 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9993 first_hop_htlc_msat,
9995 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9998 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9999 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10004 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
10005 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
10007 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
10008 0u8.write(writer)?;
10009 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
10010 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10011 (0, session_priv, required),
10012 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
10013 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10014 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
10015 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
10016 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
10017 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
10020 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
10021 1u8.write(writer)?;
10022 field.write(writer)?;
10029 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
10030 (0, forward_info, required),
10031 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
10032 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
10033 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
10034 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
10035 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 6 above, prev_funding_outpoint will be
10036 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10037 (7, prev_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(prev_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10040 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10041 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10042 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
10044 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
10048 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
10049 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10050 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10051 (0, htlc_id, required),
10052 (2, err_packet, required),
10055 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
10056 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
10057 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
10058 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
10059 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10060 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
10061 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10062 (0, htlc_id, required),
10063 (1, failure_code, required),
10064 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
10065 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
10073 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10074 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10075 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
10077 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
10079 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
10080 (0, htlc_id, required),
10081 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
10082 (2, err_packet, required),
10083 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
10085 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
10086 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
10087 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10089 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
10093 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10094 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
10098 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10103 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
10104 (0, payment_secret, required),
10105 (2, expiry_time, required),
10106 (4, user_payment_id, required),
10107 (6, payment_preimage, required),
10108 (8, min_value_msat, required),
10111 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10113 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10114 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10115 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10116 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10117 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10118 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10122 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10123 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
10125 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10127 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
10129 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
10130 best_block.height.write(writer)?;
10131 best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
10134 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
10136 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10137 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
10138 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10139 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10140 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10141 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10142 serializable_peer_count += 1;
10145 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
10146 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
10150 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
10152 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10153 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10154 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10155 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
10156 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
10157 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
10160 channel.write(writer)?;
10166 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10167 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10168 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
10169 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
10170 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10171 for forward in pending_forwards {
10172 forward.write(writer)?;
10177 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
10179 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10180 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
10181 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10183 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
10184 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
10185 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10186 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
10187 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
10188 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10189 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
10190 htlc.write(writer)?;
10192 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
10193 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
10196 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
10197 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
10198 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10199 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
10200 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
10201 // per_peer_state lock at all.
10202 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
10205 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
10206 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10207 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
10208 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
10209 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
10211 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10212 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
10213 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
10214 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
10215 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
10216 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
10217 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
10222 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
10223 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
10224 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
10225 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
10226 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
10227 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
10228 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
10229 // well save the space and not write any events here.
10230 0u64.write(writer)?;
10232 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10233 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
10234 event.write(writer)?;
10238 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
10239 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
10240 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
10241 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
10242 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
10243 0u64.write(writer)?;
10245 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
10246 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
10247 // likely to be identical.
10248 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10249 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10251 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10252 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
10253 hash.write(writer)?;
10254 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
10257 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
10258 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
10259 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10260 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
10261 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
10264 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
10265 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10267 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10268 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10269 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
10270 session_priv.write(writer)?;
10273 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
10274 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
10275 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
10276 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
10280 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
10281 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = new_hash_map();
10282 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10284 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10285 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10286 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
10292 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
10293 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10294 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
10295 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
10298 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
10299 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
10300 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
10301 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
10302 pending_claiming_payments = None;
10305 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10306 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10307 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
10308 if !updates.is_empty() {
10309 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(new_hash_map()); }
10310 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
10315 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10316 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
10317 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10318 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
10319 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10320 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
10321 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10322 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
10323 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
10324 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
10325 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10326 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
10327 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10334 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10335 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10336 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
10337 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
10340 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
10341 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
10342 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
10343 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
10344 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
10345 // check that the event is sane here.
10346 let event_encoded = event.encode();
10347 let event_read: Option<Event> =
10348 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
10349 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
10355 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10356 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10357 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10358 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
10359 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
10360 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
10363 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
10364 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
10365 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
10366 events.push_back((ev, action));
10367 } else if action.is_some() {
10368 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10375 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
10376 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
10377 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
10378 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
10379 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
10380 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
10383 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
10385 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
10387 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10388 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
10389 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
10390 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
10391 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
10392 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
10393 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
10394 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
10395 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10396 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
10397 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
10398 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
10399 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
10401 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
10402 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
10404 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
10405 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
10407 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
10408 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
10409 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
10410 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
10411 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
10412 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
10414 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
10415 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10417 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10418 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10419 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10420 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10421 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10422 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10426 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
10427 pub entropy_source: ES,
10429 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
10430 pub node_signer: NS,
10432 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
10433 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
10435 pub signer_provider: SP,
10437 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10439 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
10440 pub fee_estimator: F,
10441 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10443 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
10444 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
10445 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
10446 pub chain_monitor: M,
10448 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
10449 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
10450 /// force-closed during deserialization.
10451 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
10452 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
10453 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
10455 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
10457 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
10458 /// deserialization.
10460 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
10461 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
10462 pub default_config: UserConfig,
10464 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
10465 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
10467 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
10468 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
10469 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
10470 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
10472 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
10475 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10476 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
10479 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10480 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10482 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10483 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10484 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10485 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10486 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10487 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10491 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10492 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10493 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10494 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10495 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
10497 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10498 channel_monitors: hash_map_from_iter(
10499 channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) })
10505 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10506 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10507 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10508 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10510 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10511 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10512 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10513 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10514 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10515 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10519 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10520 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10521 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10525 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10526 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10528 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10529 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10530 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10531 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10532 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10533 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10537 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10538 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10540 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10541 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10542 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10544 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10546 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10547 let mut funding_txo_set = hash_set_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10548 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10549 let mut outpoint_to_peer = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10550 let mut short_to_chan_info = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10551 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10552 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10553 let mut funding_txo_to_channel_id = hash_map_with_capacity(channel_count as usize);
10554 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10555 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10556 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10558 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10559 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10560 funding_txo_to_channel_id.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.channel_id());
10561 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10562 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10563 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10564 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10565 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10566 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10567 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10568 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10569 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10570 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10571 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10572 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10574 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10575 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10576 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10578 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10579 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10580 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10582 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10583 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10584 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10586 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
10587 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10588 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10590 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10591 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10592 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update
10595 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10596 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10597 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10598 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10599 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10600 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10601 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10602 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10604 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10605 let mut found_htlc = false;
10606 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10607 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10610 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10611 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10612 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10613 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10614 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10615 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10616 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10618 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10619 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10620 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10624 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10625 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10626 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10627 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10628 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10630 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
10631 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10633 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10634 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10635 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10636 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10638 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10639 let mut by_id_map = new_hash_map();
10640 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10641 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10645 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10646 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10647 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10648 // safely discard the channel.
10649 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
10650 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10651 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10652 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10653 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10654 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10655 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10656 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10659 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10660 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10661 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10662 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10663 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10664 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10668 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10669 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10670 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10671 let channel_id = monitor.channel_id();
10672 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10674 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10675 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10676 counterparty_node_id: None,
10677 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10678 channel_id: Some(monitor.channel_id()),
10680 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update)));
10684 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10685 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10686 let mut forward_htlcs = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10687 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10688 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10689 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10690 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10691 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10692 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10694 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10697 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10698 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10699 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10700 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10701 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10702 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10703 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10704 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10706 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10709 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10712 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
10713 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10714 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10715 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10716 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10717 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10718 is_connected: false,
10722 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10723 let mut per_peer_state = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10724 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10725 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10726 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(new_hash_map());
10727 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10728 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10729 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10732 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10733 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10734 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10735 for _ in 0..event_count {
10736 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10737 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10742 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10743 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10744 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10746 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10747 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10748 // on-startup monitor updates.
10749 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10750 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10752 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10756 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10757 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10759 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10760 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10761 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10762 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10763 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10767 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10768 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10769 hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10770 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10771 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10772 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10773 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv]),
10775 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10776 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10780 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10781 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10782 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10783 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(new_hash_map());
10784 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10785 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10786 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10787 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10788 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10789 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(new_hash_map());
10790 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10791 let mut events_override = None;
10792 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10793 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10794 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10795 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10796 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10797 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10798 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10799 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10800 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10801 (8, events_override, option),
10802 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10803 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10804 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10805 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10807 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10808 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10811 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10812 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10815 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10816 pending_events_read = events;
10819 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10820 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10823 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10824 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10825 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10826 let mut outbounds = new_hash_map();
10827 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10828 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10830 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10832 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10833 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10834 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10837 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10838 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10839 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10840 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10841 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10843 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10844 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10845 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10847 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10848 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10849 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10850 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10851 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10853 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10854 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10855 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10856 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10857 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$monitor.channel_id());
10858 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10859 pending_background_events.push(
10860 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10861 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10862 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10863 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
10864 update: update.clone(),
10867 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10868 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10869 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10870 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10871 pending_background_events.push(
10872 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10873 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10874 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
10877 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10878 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10879 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10881 max_in_flight_update_id
10885 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10886 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10887 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10888 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10889 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10890 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10892 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10894 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10895 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10896 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10897 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10898 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10899 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10900 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10901 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10902 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
10905 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10906 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10907 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10908 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10909 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10910 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10911 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10912 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10913 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10914 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10915 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10918 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10919 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10920 debug_assert!(false);
10921 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10926 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10927 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10928 let channel_id = funding_txo_to_channel_id.get(&funding_txo).copied();
10929 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id);
10930 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10931 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10932 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10933 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10934 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10935 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(new_hash_map()))
10937 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10938 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10939 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
10941 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10942 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", if let Some(channel_id) =
10943 channel_id { channel_id.to_string() } else { format!("with outpoint {}", funding_txo) } );
10944 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10945 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10946 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10947 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10948 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10953 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10954 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10956 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10957 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10958 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10959 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10962 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10963 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10964 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10965 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10966 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10967 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10968 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10970 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10971 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
10972 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10973 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10974 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10975 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10976 if path.hops.is_empty() {
10977 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10978 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10981 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10982 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10983 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10984 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10985 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10986 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10987 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10988 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
10990 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10991 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10992 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10993 retry_strategy: None,
10994 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10995 payment_params: None,
10996 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv_bytes]),
10997 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10998 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10999 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11000 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11001 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11002 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
11003 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
11004 total_msat: path_amt,
11005 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
11006 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11008 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
11009 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
11014 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11015 match htlc_source {
11016 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
11017 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
11018 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
11019 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
11021 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
11022 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
11023 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
11024 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
11025 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
11026 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
11027 forwards.retain(|forward| {
11028 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
11029 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11030 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11031 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11036 !forwards.is_empty()
11038 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
11039 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11040 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11041 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11042 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
11043 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
11044 intercepted_id != ev_id
11051 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
11052 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
11053 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
11054 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
11055 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
11056 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
11057 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
11058 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
11059 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
11060 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
11061 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
11063 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
11064 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
11065 channel_id: monitor.channel_id(),
11066 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
11068 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
11069 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
11070 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
11077 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
11078 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
11080 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
11082 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
11083 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
11084 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
11085 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
11086 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
11087 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
11088 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
11089 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
11090 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11091 monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor.channel_id()))
11094 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
11095 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
11096 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
11097 // channel still live case here.
11101 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
11102 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
11107 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
11108 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
11109 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
11110 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
11111 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
11112 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
11113 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
11114 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
11118 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
11119 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
11121 let mut claimable_payments = hash_map_with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
11122 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
11123 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11124 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11126 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
11127 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11128 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11130 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
11131 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
11133 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11134 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
11136 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11139 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
11140 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11141 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11143 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11147 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
11148 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
11149 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
11150 if htlcs.is_empty() {
11151 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11153 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
11154 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
11155 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
11156 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
11157 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
11158 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
11159 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
11160 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
11162 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
11163 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11167 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
11169 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11171 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
11172 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
11174 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11175 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11180 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11181 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11183 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
11185 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11187 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
11188 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
11189 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
11190 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11194 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = new_hash_set();
11195 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11196 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11197 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11198 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
11199 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11200 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
11201 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
11202 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
11204 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
11205 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
11206 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
11208 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
11209 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
11210 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11211 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11212 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11213 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11215 if chan.context.is_usable() {
11216 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
11217 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11218 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11219 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11220 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11224 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11225 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11226 debug_assert!(false);
11227 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11232 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
11234 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11235 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
11236 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
11237 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
11238 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
11239 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
11240 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
11241 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
11242 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
11243 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
11244 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
11246 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
11247 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
11249 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
11250 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
11251 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
11252 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
11254 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
11255 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
11256 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
11257 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
11259 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
11260 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
11261 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
11262 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
11264 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
11265 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11266 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
11267 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11268 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11269 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
11270 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
11271 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
11274 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11275 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
11278 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
11281 purpose: payment.purpose,
11282 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
11283 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
11284 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
11290 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
11291 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
11292 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
11293 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
11294 for action in actions.iter() {
11295 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
11296 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
11297 Some((blocked_node_id, _blocked_channel_outpoint, blocked_channel_id, blocking_action)), ..
11299 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(blocked_node_id) {
11301 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
11302 blocked_channel_id);
11303 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
11304 .entry(*blocked_channel_id)
11305 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
11307 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
11308 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
11309 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
11310 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
11314 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
11315 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
11319 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
11321 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
11322 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11326 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
11328 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
11329 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
11330 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
11331 router: args.router,
11333 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
11335 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
11336 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
11337 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
11338 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
11340 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
11341 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
11342 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
11343 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
11344 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
11345 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
11347 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
11349 our_network_pubkey,
11352 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
11354 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
11356 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
11357 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
11358 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
11359 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
11360 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
11362 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
11363 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
11365 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
11367 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
11369 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
11370 node_signer: args.node_signer,
11371 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
11373 logger: args.logger,
11374 default_configuration: args.default_config,
11377 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
11378 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
11379 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
11380 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
11381 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
11384 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
11385 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
11386 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
11387 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
11388 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), None,
11389 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id);
11392 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
11393 //connection or two.
11395 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
11401 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11402 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11403 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
11404 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
11405 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
11406 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
11407 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
11408 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
11409 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11410 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
11411 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
11412 use crate::prelude::*;
11413 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
11414 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
11415 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
11416 use crate::util::test_utils;
11417 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
11418 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
11421 fn test_notify_limits() {
11422 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
11423 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
11424 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11425 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11426 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
11427 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11429 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
11430 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
11431 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11432 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11433 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11435 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11437 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
11438 // to connect messages with new values
11439 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11440 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11441 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11442 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11443 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11444 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11446 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
11447 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11448 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11449 // ... but the last node should not.
11450 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11451 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
11452 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11453 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11455 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
11456 // about the channel.
11457 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11458 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11459 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11461 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
11463 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11464 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11465 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11466 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11467 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11468 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11470 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
11471 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11472 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11474 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
11475 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
11476 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
11477 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
11478 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
11479 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
11481 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
11482 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
11483 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11484 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11485 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11486 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11487 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11488 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11490 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11491 // the channel info has updated.
11492 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11493 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11494 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11495 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11496 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11497 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11501 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11502 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11504 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11505 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11506 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11507 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11508 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11510 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11511 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11512 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11513 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11515 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11516 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11517 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11518 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11519 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11520 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11521 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11522 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11523 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11524 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11525 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11526 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11528 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11529 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11530 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11531 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11532 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11533 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11534 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11535 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11536 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11537 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11538 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11539 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11540 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11541 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11542 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11543 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11544 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11545 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11546 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11547 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11548 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11549 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11550 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11552 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11553 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11554 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11555 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11556 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11557 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11558 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11560 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11561 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11562 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11563 // lightning messages manually.
11564 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11565 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11566 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11568 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11569 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11570 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11571 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11572 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11573 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11574 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11575 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11576 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11577 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11578 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11579 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11580 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11581 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11582 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11583 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11584 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11585 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11586 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11587 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11588 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11589 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11590 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11591 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11592 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11593 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11595 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11596 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11597 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11598 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11600 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11601 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11602 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11603 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11605 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11608 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11609 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11610 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11611 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11613 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11618 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11619 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11620 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11623 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11624 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11625 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11626 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11627 // fails as expected.
11628 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11629 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11630 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11631 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11632 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11633 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11634 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11635 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11636 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11637 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11638 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11639 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11640 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11641 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11642 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11644 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11645 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11646 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11648 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11649 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11650 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11651 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11652 let route = find_route(
11653 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11654 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11656 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11657 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11658 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11659 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11660 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11661 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11662 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11663 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11664 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11665 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11666 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11667 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11668 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11669 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11670 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11671 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11672 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11673 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11674 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11675 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11676 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11677 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11678 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11679 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11681 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11682 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11684 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11685 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11686 let route = find_route(
11687 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11688 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11690 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11691 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11692 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11693 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11694 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11695 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11696 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11697 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11699 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11700 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11701 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11702 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11703 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11704 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11705 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11706 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11707 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11708 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11709 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11710 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11711 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11712 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11713 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11714 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11715 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11716 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11717 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11718 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11719 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11720 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11721 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11722 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11724 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11725 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11727 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11728 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11729 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11730 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11731 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11732 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11733 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11734 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11735 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11736 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11738 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11739 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11740 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11743 let route = find_route(
11744 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11745 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11747 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11748 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11749 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11750 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11751 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11752 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11753 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11754 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11755 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11756 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11757 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11758 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11759 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11760 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11761 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11762 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11763 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11764 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11765 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11766 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11767 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11768 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11769 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11771 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11772 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11776 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11777 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11778 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11779 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11780 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11781 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11782 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11784 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11785 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11787 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11788 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11789 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11790 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11791 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11792 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11793 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11794 let route = find_route(
11795 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11796 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11799 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11800 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11801 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11802 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11803 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11804 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11805 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11807 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11808 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11809 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11810 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11811 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11812 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11813 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11815 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11819 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11820 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11821 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11822 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11823 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11824 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11825 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11826 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11827 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11829 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11830 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11832 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11833 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11834 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11835 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11836 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11837 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11838 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11839 let route = find_route(
11840 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11841 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11844 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11845 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11846 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11847 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11848 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11849 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11850 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11851 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11852 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11854 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11855 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11856 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11857 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11858 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11859 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11860 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11862 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11866 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11867 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11868 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11869 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11870 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11872 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11873 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11874 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11875 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11877 // Marshall an MPP route.
11878 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11879 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11880 route.paths.push(path);
11881 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11882 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11883 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11884 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11885 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11886 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11888 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11889 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11891 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11892 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11894 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11899 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11900 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11901 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11902 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11903 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11905 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11907 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11908 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11910 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11911 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11912 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11913 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11916 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11917 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11918 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11919 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11920 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11921 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11924 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11927 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11928 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11933 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11934 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11935 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11936 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11937 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11938 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11940 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11941 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11943 total_msat: 100_000,
11946 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11947 // payment verification fails as expected.
11948 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11949 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11950 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11951 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11953 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11957 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11958 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11962 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
11963 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11964 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11965 // the channel is successfully closed.
11966 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11967 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11968 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11969 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11971 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11972 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11973 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11974 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11975 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11977 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11978 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
11980 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11981 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11982 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11983 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11986 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11988 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11989 // as it has the funding transaction.
11990 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11991 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11992 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11995 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11997 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11999 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12001 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12002 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12003 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12005 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12008 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
12009 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
12010 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12011 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12012 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12014 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12015 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12016 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12017 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12018 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12019 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
12020 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
12021 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
12023 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12024 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
12025 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12026 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
12028 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12029 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
12031 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
12032 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
12033 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
12034 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
12035 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12036 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12037 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12041 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
12042 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
12043 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
12044 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
12045 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12046 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12047 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12050 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
12052 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
12053 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
12054 // closing transaction).
12055 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
12056 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
12057 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12059 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
12060 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
12061 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12062 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12063 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12066 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12068 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
12070 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
12071 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
12072 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12074 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12076 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12077 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12080 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12081 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
12082 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12085 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12086 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
12087 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12090 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
12091 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
12092 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12095 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12096 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
12097 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12100 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12102 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
12103 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12105 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
12106 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12108 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
12109 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
12114 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
12115 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
12116 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
12117 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
12118 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12119 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12120 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12121 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12124 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12125 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
12126 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
12128 // Test the API functions.
12129 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
12131 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
12133 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12135 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12137 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12139 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
12141 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
12145 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
12146 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
12147 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
12148 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
12149 // the given `channel_id`.
12150 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12151 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12152 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12153 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12155 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12158 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12160 // Test the API functions.
12161 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
12163 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12165 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12167 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12169 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12171 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12175 fn test_connection_limiting() {
12176 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
12177 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12178 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12179 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12180 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12182 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12184 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12185 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12187 let mut funding_tx = None;
12188 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12189 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12190 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12193 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12194 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
12195 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
12196 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
12197 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12199 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12200 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12201 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12203 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12205 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12206 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12207 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12209 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12212 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
12213 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(
12214 &nodes[0].keys_manager);
12215 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12216 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12217 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12219 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
12220 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
12222 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
12223 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
12224 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12225 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12226 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
12227 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12228 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12231 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12232 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12233 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12234 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12235 }, true).unwrap_err();
12237 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
12238 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
12239 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12240 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12241 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
12242 for ev in chan_closed_events {
12243 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
12245 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12246 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12248 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12249 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12250 }, true).unwrap_err();
12252 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
12253 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12254 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12255 }, false).unwrap();
12256 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12258 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
12259 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
12261 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
12262 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12263 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
12264 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
12265 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12267 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12268 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12269 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12271 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
12272 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12273 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
12275 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
12276 // "protected" and can connect again.
12277 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
12278 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12279 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12281 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12283 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
12285 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12286 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12290 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
12291 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
12292 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12293 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12294 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12295 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12297 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12299 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12300 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12302 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12303 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12304 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12305 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12308 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
12310 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12311 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12312 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12314 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
12315 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12316 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12318 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
12319 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12320 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12321 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12325 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
12326 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12327 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12328 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12329 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12330 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
12331 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12332 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
12333 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12335 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12337 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12338 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12340 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
12341 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12342 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12343 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12344 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12345 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12348 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12349 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12351 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12352 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12354 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12356 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
12357 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12360 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
12361 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12362 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12363 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12364 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12366 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12367 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12369 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12370 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
12371 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
12372 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
12376 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12378 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12379 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12381 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
12382 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12383 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12385 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12386 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12388 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12390 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12394 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
12395 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12396 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12397 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12398 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12399 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
12400 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
12401 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12402 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12403 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12404 payment_metadata: None,
12405 keysend_preimage: None,
12406 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12407 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12409 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12411 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
12412 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
12413 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12414 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
12415 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12416 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12417 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
12419 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
12420 } else { panic!(); }
12422 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
12423 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
12424 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12425 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12426 payment_metadata: None,
12427 keysend_preimage: None,
12428 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12429 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12431 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12433 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12434 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12435 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12436 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
12440 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
12441 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12442 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12443 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12444 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12446 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12447 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12448 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12449 cltv_expiry_height: 22,
12450 payment_metadata: None,
12451 keysend_preimage: None,
12452 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12453 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
12455 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12456 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
12457 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
12459 // Should not return an error as this condition:
12460 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
12461 // is not satisfied.
12462 assert!(result.is_ok());
12466 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
12467 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12468 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12469 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12470 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12472 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
12473 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12475 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12476 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12477 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
12478 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
12479 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12481 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12482 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12484 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12485 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12486 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12487 match &msg_events[0] {
12488 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
12489 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12491 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12492 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12493 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12496 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12499 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12500 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12502 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12503 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12504 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12506 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12510 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12511 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12512 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12513 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12514 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12515 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12516 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12517 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12518 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12519 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12520 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12522 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
12523 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12524 assert!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12526 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12527 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12529 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12530 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12532 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12535 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12536 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12538 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12539 assert!(!open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12541 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12542 // not have generated any events.
12543 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12547 fn test_update_channel_config() {
12548 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12549 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12550 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12551 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12552 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12553 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12554 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12556 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12557 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12558 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12560 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12561 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12562 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12563 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12564 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12566 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12567 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12570 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12571 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12572 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12574 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12575 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12576 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12577 ..Default::default()
12579 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12580 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12581 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12583 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12584 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12587 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12588 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12589 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12590 ..Default::default()
12592 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12593 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12594 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12595 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12597 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12598 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12601 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12602 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12603 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12604 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12605 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12608 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12609 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12610 ..Default::default()
12612 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12615 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12616 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12617 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12618 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12622 fn test_payment_display() {
12623 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12624 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12625 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12626 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12627 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12628 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12632 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12633 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12634 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12635 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12636 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12637 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12639 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12640 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12641 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12642 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12643 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12644 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12645 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12646 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12648 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12649 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12650 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12653 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12654 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12656 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12657 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12659 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12660 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12661 }, false).unwrap();
12662 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12663 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12664 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12666 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12668 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12669 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12670 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12671 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12672 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12673 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12674 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12675 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12676 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12677 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12678 } else { panic!() };
12679 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12680 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12681 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12682 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12684 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12686 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12687 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12688 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12693 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
12694 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
12695 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12696 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12699 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12700 let deserialized_chanmgr;
12701 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
12703 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12704 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
12706 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12707 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
12710 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12711 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
12712 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12714 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12718 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12719 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
12720 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12722 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12727 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
12728 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
12729 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
12730 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
12732 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12733 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
12734 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
12736 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
12738 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12739 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
12740 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
12741 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
12743 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
12744 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
12746 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
12752 use crate::chain::Listen;
12753 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12754 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12755 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12756 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12757 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12758 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12759 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12760 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12761 use crate::util::test_utils;
12762 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12764 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12765 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12766 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12767 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
12769 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12771 use criterion::Criterion;
12773 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12774 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12775 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12776 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12777 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12778 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12779 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12781 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12782 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12784 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12785 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12787 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12789 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12792 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12793 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12796 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12797 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12798 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12800 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12801 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12803 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12804 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12805 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12806 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12807 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
12809 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12810 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12811 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12813 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12814 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12815 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12816 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12818 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12819 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12820 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12822 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12823 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12824 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12825 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12826 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12828 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12829 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12830 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12832 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12833 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12835 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12836 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12837 }, false).unwrap();
12838 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12839 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12840 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12843 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12844 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12845 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12847 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12848 } else { panic!(); }
12850 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12851 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12852 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12853 match events_b[0] {
12854 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12855 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12857 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12860 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12861 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12862 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12863 match events_a[0] {
12864 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12865 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12867 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12870 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12872 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash, 42, vec![tx]);
12873 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12874 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12876 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12877 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12878 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12879 match msg_events[0] {
12880 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12881 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12882 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12886 match msg_events[1] {
12887 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12891 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12892 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12893 match events_a[0] {
12894 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12895 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12897 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12900 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12901 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12902 match events_b[0] {
12903 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12904 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12906 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12909 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12910 macro_rules! send_payment {
12911 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12912 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12913 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12914 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12915 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12916 payment_count += 1;
12917 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
12918 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12920 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12921 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12922 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12923 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12924 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12925 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12926 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12927 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12928 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12929 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12930 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12932 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12933 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12934 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12935 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12937 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12938 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12939 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12940 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12941 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12943 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12946 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12947 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12948 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12949 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12951 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12955 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12956 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12957 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);