1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
38 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
49 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
54 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
55 use util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
56 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
57 use util::{byte_utils, events};
58 use util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
59 use util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
60 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
61 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
62 use util::errors::APIError;
67 use core::cell::RefCell;
69 use sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
70 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
71 use core::time::Duration;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a "real" SCID, an
96 /// outbound SCID alias, or a phantom node SCID.
97 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
100 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
101 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
105 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
106 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
110 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
111 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
112 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
113 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
114 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
115 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
116 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
119 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
120 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
121 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
122 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
125 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
126 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
127 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
128 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
129 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
132 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
134 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
136 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
137 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
138 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
141 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
142 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
144 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
148 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
152 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
153 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
154 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
155 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
156 short_channel_id: u64,
158 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
159 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
161 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
162 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
167 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
169 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
170 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
171 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
173 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
174 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
177 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
178 struct ClaimableHTLC {
179 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
181 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
183 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
185 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
189 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
190 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
191 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
192 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
194 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
195 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
200 impl Readable for PaymentId {
201 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
202 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
206 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
207 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
208 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
209 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
210 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
213 session_priv: SecretKey,
214 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
215 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
216 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
217 payment_id: PaymentId,
218 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
219 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
222 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
223 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
224 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
226 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
228 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
230 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
233 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
234 payment_id.hash(hasher);
235 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
236 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
237 payment_params.hash(hasher);
242 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
245 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
246 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
248 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
249 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
250 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
251 payment_secret: None,
252 payment_params: None,
257 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
258 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
260 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
268 struct ReceiveError {
274 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
275 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
277 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
282 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
284 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
285 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
286 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
287 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
288 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
290 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
291 err: msgs::LightningError,
292 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
293 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
295 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
297 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
299 err: LightningError {
301 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
302 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
309 shutdown_finish: None,
313 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
315 err: LightningError {
317 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
320 shutdown_finish: None,
324 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
325 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
328 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
330 err: LightningError {
332 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
333 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
339 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
340 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
344 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
347 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
349 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
350 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
354 log_level: Level::Warn,
357 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
359 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
361 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
363 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
364 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
372 shutdown_finish: None,
377 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
378 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
379 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
380 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
381 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
383 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
384 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
385 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
386 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
387 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
388 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
389 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
391 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
395 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
396 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
397 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
398 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
400 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
401 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
402 /// confirmation depth.
403 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>,
404 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
405 /// failed/claimed by the user.
407 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
408 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
410 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
411 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
412 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
413 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
416 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
417 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
418 /// quite some time lag.
419 enum BackgroundEvent {
420 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
421 /// commitment transaction.
422 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
425 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
426 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
428 latest_features: InitFeatures,
431 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
432 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
434 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
437 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
438 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
439 struct PendingInboundPayment {
440 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
441 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
442 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
443 /// this payment being removed.
445 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
446 user_payment_id: u64,
447 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
448 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
449 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
452 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
453 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
454 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
456 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
459 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
460 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
461 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
462 pending_amt_msat: u64,
463 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
464 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
465 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
467 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
468 starting_block_height: u32,
470 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
471 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
472 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
474 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
475 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
477 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
478 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
479 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
480 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
481 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
483 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
485 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
486 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
490 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
491 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
493 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
497 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
499 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
503 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
505 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
509 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
511 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
516 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
518 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
519 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
520 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
521 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
525 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
526 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
527 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
528 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
529 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
530 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
531 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
534 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
535 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
538 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
539 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
540 let our_payment_hash;
541 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
542 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
543 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
545 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
546 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
547 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
551 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
555 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
556 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
557 let remove_res = match self {
558 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
559 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
560 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
561 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
562 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
566 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
567 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
568 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
569 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
570 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
571 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
578 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
579 let insert_res = match self {
580 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
581 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
582 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
584 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
585 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
588 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
589 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
590 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
591 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
592 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
599 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
601 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
602 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
603 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
604 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
611 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
612 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
613 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
614 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
615 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
616 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
617 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
619 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
620 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
622 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
623 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
624 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
625 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
626 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
627 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
628 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
629 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
631 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
632 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
634 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
635 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
637 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
638 /// to individual Channels.
640 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
641 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
642 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
643 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
645 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
646 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
647 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
648 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
649 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
650 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
651 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
653 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
654 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
655 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
656 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
659 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
660 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
661 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
662 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
663 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
665 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
666 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
667 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
668 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
669 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
672 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
673 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
674 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
675 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
676 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
680 // `total_consistency_lock`
682 // |__`forward_htlcs`
684 // |__`channel_state`
688 // | |__`per_peer_state`
690 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
692 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
694 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments`
698 // | |__`pending_events`
700 // | |__`pending_background_events`
702 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
703 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
704 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
705 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
706 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
709 default_configuration: UserConfig,
710 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
711 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
715 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
717 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
719 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
720 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
722 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
723 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
724 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
725 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
726 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
728 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
729 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
730 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
731 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
733 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
734 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
736 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
737 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
738 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
739 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
740 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
741 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
742 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
743 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
745 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
747 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
748 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
750 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
752 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
753 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
754 /// and via the classic SCID.
756 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
757 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
759 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
761 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
763 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
765 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
766 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
767 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
768 /// active channel list on load.
770 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
771 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
773 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
775 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
776 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
777 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
779 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
780 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
781 /// the handling of the events.
784 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
785 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
786 /// would break backwards compatability.
787 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
788 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
789 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
791 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
792 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
794 our_network_key: SecretKey,
795 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
797 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
799 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
800 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
801 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
803 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
804 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
806 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
807 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
808 /// keeping additional state.
809 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
811 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
812 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
813 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
814 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
816 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
817 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
818 /// are currently open with that peer.
819 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
820 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
823 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
824 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
826 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
827 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
828 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
829 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
830 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
831 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
832 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
833 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
834 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
835 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
836 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
838 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
845 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
847 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
848 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
849 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
850 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
851 pub struct ChainParameters {
852 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
853 pub network: Network,
855 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
857 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
858 pub best_block: BestBlock,
861 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
867 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
868 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
869 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
870 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
871 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
872 /// updates are ready for persistence).
874 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
875 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
876 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
877 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
878 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
880 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
881 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
884 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
885 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
886 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
889 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
890 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
892 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
893 persistence_notifier: notifier,
894 should_persist: persist_check,
895 _read_guard: read_guard,
900 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
902 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
903 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
908 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
909 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
911 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
913 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
914 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
915 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
916 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
917 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
919 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
920 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
922 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
924 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
925 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
926 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
927 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
928 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
929 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
930 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
931 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
932 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
933 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
934 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
935 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
936 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
938 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
939 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
941 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
942 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
943 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
944 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
946 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
947 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
948 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
949 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
950 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
951 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
954 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
956 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
957 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
960 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
962 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
963 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
964 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
966 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
967 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
969 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
970 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
971 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
972 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
973 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
974 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
975 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
976 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
977 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
978 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
979 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
982 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
983 /// to better separate parameters.
984 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
985 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
986 /// The node_id of our counterparty
987 pub node_id: PublicKey,
988 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
989 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
990 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
991 pub features: InitFeatures,
992 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
993 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
994 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
996 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
998 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
999 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1000 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1001 /// payments to us through this channel.
1002 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1003 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1004 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1005 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1006 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1007 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1008 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1011 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1012 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1013 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1014 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1015 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1016 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1017 /// lifetime of the channel.
1018 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1019 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1020 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1021 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1022 /// our counterparty already.
1024 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1025 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1026 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1027 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1029 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1030 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1031 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1032 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1034 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1035 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1037 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1038 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1040 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1041 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1042 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1043 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1044 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1045 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1046 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1047 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1048 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1051 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1053 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1054 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1055 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1056 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1057 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1058 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1059 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1061 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1062 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1064 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1065 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1066 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1067 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1068 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1069 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1070 /// this value on chain.
1072 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1074 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1076 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1077 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1078 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1079 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1080 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1081 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1082 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1084 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1085 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1086 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1087 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1089 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1090 pub balance_msat: u64,
1091 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1092 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1093 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1094 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1096 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1098 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1099 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1100 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1101 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1102 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1103 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1104 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1105 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1107 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1108 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1109 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1110 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1111 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1112 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1113 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1115 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1116 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1117 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1118 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1119 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1120 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1121 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1122 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1123 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1125 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1127 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1128 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1129 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1130 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1131 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1132 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1133 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1134 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1135 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1137 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1138 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1139 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1140 pub is_outbound: bool,
1141 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1142 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1143 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1144 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1145 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1147 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1148 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1149 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1150 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1152 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1153 pub is_usable: bool,
1154 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1155 pub is_public: bool,
1156 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1157 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1158 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1159 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1160 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1161 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1163 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1164 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1167 impl ChannelDetails {
1168 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1169 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1170 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1172 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1173 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1174 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1175 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1178 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1179 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1180 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1182 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1183 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1184 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1185 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1189 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1190 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1191 /// states for more.
1192 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1193 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1194 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1195 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1196 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1197 ParameterError(APIError),
1198 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1199 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1200 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1201 /// payment in full.
1203 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1205 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1206 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1207 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1208 /// paths than the ones selected).
1209 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1210 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1211 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1212 /// in over-/re-payment.
1214 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1215 /// send_payment, and any `Err`s which are not [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] can be
1216 /// safely retried via [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`].
1218 /// Any entries which contain `Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInprogress)` or `Ok(())` MUST NOT be
1219 /// retried as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent
1220 /// (in the case of `Ok(())`) or will send once a [`MonitorEvent::Completed`] is provided for
1221 /// the next-hop channel with the latest update_id.
1223 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1224 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1225 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1226 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1227 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1228 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1229 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1230 payment_id: PaymentId,
1234 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1236 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1238 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1239 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1240 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1241 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1243 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1244 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1245 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1248 macro_rules! handle_error {
1249 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1252 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1253 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1255 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1256 // entering the macro.
1257 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1258 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1261 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1263 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1264 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1265 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1266 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1270 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1271 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1272 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1273 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1278 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1279 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1281 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1282 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1283 action: err.action.clone()
1287 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1288 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1291 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1298 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1299 ($self: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1300 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1301 $short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1303 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1304 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1305 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1306 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1307 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1309 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1310 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1312 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1313 $short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1317 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1318 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1319 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1321 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1322 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1324 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1325 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1327 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1328 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1329 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_chan_info, $channel);
1330 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1331 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1332 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1338 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1339 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1343 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1345 $entry.remove_entry();
1353 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1354 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1358 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1360 $entry.remove_entry();
1368 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1369 ($self: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1371 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1372 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel);
1378 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1379 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1381 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1382 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1383 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_chan_info, $chan);
1384 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1385 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1386 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1387 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1388 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1389 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1390 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1391 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1392 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1393 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1394 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1397 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1398 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1399 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1400 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1401 match $action_type {
1402 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1403 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1405 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1406 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1408 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1409 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1410 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1411 if !$resend_commitment {
1412 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1415 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1417 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1418 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1420 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1425 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1426 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1428 $entry.remove_entry();
1432 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1433 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1434 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1436 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1437 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1439 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1440 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1442 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1443 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1445 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1446 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1450 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1451 ($short_to_chan_info: expr, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {
1452 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1453 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1454 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1456 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1457 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1458 let outbound_alias_insert = $short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1459 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1460 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1461 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1462 let scid_insert = $short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1463 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1464 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1469 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1470 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1471 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1472 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $channel_ready: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1473 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1475 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1476 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1477 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1479 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1480 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1481 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or($channel_entry.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
1482 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1485 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1486 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a channel_ready if there have been
1487 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1488 // associated with a channel_ready would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1489 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1490 // channel_ready until it's been updated, so we can't have a channel_ready and a
1491 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1492 assert!($channel_ready.is_none());
1493 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a channel_ready or a
1494 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a channel_ready, we
1495 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1496 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1499 if let Some(msg) = $channel_ready {
1500 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the channel_ready fly
1501 // before it should be allowed to.
1502 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1503 send_channel_ready!($channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
1505 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1506 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1507 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1512 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1513 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1514 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1515 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1516 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1517 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1518 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1519 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1520 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1521 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1522 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1523 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1524 match $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1525 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
1527 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1528 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1529 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1530 let mut order = $order;
1532 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1534 break handle_monitor_update_res!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1539 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1540 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1541 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1542 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1547 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1548 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1549 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1550 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1551 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1556 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1560 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1565 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1566 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1567 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1572 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1573 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1574 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1575 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1576 assert!(res.is_ok());
1579 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1583 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1584 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1585 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1587 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1589 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1590 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1595 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1596 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1597 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1598 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1599 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1602 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1604 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1605 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1607 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1609 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1610 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1611 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1612 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1613 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1614 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1615 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1616 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1618 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1619 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1620 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1624 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1626 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1627 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1628 short_to_chan_info: HashMap::new(),
1629 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1630 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1632 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1633 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1634 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1635 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1636 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1638 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1639 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1642 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1643 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1645 probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1647 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1649 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1651 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1652 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1653 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1654 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1662 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1663 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1664 &self.default_configuration
1667 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1668 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1669 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1672 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1673 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1675 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1677 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1681 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1686 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1688 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1689 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1690 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1691 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1692 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1695 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1696 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1698 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1699 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1700 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1702 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1703 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1704 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1705 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1706 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1707 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1709 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1710 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1711 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1712 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1713 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1714 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1718 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1719 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1720 Some(peer_state) => {
1721 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1722 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1723 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1724 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1725 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1726 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1727 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1731 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1736 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1739 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1741 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1742 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1743 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1745 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1746 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1747 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1748 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1750 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1752 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1755 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1757 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1758 node_id: their_network_key,
1761 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1764 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1765 let mut res = Vec::new();
1767 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1768 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1769 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1770 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1771 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1772 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1773 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1774 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1775 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1776 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1777 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1778 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1779 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1780 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1781 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1782 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1783 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1784 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1785 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1786 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1787 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1789 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1790 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1791 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1792 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1793 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1794 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1795 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1796 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1797 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1798 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1799 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1800 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1801 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1802 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1803 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1804 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1805 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1806 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1807 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1808 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1809 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1810 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1811 config: Some(channel.config()),
1815 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1816 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1817 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1818 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1824 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1825 /// more information.
1826 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1827 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1830 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1831 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1833 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1834 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1837 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1838 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1839 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1840 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1841 // really wanted anyway.
1842 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1845 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1846 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1847 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1848 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1849 Some(transaction) => {
1850 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1854 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1855 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1856 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1857 reason: closure_reason
1861 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1862 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1864 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1865 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1866 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1867 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1868 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1869 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1870 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1871 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1873 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1874 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1875 Some(peer_state) => {
1876 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1877 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1878 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1880 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1882 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1884 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1885 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1886 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
1887 let (result, is_permanent) =
1888 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1890 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1895 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1896 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1900 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1901 let channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1902 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1903 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1907 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1911 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1915 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1916 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1917 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
1920 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1924 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1925 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1926 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1928 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1929 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1931 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1932 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1933 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1934 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1936 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1938 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1939 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1940 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1941 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1942 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1945 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1946 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1947 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1949 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1950 /// the channel being closed or not:
1951 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1952 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1953 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1954 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1955 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1956 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1957 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1959 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1961 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1962 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1963 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1964 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1965 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1969 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1970 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1971 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1972 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1973 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1974 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1975 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
1977 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1978 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1979 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1980 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1981 // ignore the result here.
1982 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1986 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1987 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1988 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1989 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1991 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1992 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1993 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1994 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
1995 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1997 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1998 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
2000 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2002 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan)
2004 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2007 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2008 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2009 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2010 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2011 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2016 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2019 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2020 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2021 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2022 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2023 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2024 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2025 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2026 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2027 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2037 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2038 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2039 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2041 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2042 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2043 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2046 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2047 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2048 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2050 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2051 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2052 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2053 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2054 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2057 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2058 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2059 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2060 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2061 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2065 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2066 /// local transaction(s).
2067 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2068 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2069 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2073 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2074 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2076 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2077 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2078 return Err(ReceiveError {
2079 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2081 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2084 // final_expiry_too_soon
2085 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2086 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2087 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2088 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2089 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2090 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2091 return Err(ReceiveError {
2093 err_data: Vec::new(),
2094 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2097 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2098 return Err(ReceiveError {
2100 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2101 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2105 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2106 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => {
2107 return Err(ReceiveError {
2108 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2109 err_data: Vec::new(),
2110 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2113 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2114 return Err(ReceiveError {
2115 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2116 err_data: Vec::new(),
2117 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2120 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2121 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2122 return Err(ReceiveError {
2123 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2124 err_data: Vec::new(),
2125 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2127 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2128 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2130 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2131 phantom_shared_secret,
2133 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2134 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2135 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2136 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2137 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2138 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2139 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2140 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2141 return Err(ReceiveError {
2142 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2143 err_data: Vec::new(),
2144 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2148 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2150 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2153 return Err(ReceiveError {
2154 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2155 err_data: Vec::new(),
2156 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2161 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2164 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2165 amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
2166 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2170 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2171 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2172 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2174 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2175 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2176 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2177 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2178 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2179 failure_code: $err_code,
2185 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2186 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2189 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2191 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2192 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2193 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2194 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2195 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2196 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2197 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2198 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2200 macro_rules! return_err {
2201 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2203 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2204 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2205 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2206 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2207 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2213 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2215 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2216 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2218 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2219 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2223 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2224 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2226 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2228 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2229 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2230 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2231 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2232 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2234 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2237 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2238 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2239 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2241 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2242 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2243 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2246 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2247 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2248 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2249 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2250 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2254 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2255 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2256 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2259 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2260 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2261 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2262 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2267 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2268 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2269 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2270 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2271 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2272 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2273 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2274 let id_option = channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2275 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2276 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2277 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2279 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
2282 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2285 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()),
2287 let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2288 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2289 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2290 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2291 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2292 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2293 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2295 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2296 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2297 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2298 // we don't have the channel here.
2299 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2301 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2303 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2304 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2305 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2306 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2307 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2308 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2309 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2311 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2312 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2314 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *amt_to_forward, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2315 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2319 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2321 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2328 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2329 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2330 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2331 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2332 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2333 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2335 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2336 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2338 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2339 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2340 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2341 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2342 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2343 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2344 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2345 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2346 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2347 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2353 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2354 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2355 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2356 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2358 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2359 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2361 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2362 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2363 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2365 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2366 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2367 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2369 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2374 pending_forward_info
2377 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2378 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2379 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2381 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2382 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2383 if !chan.should_announce() {
2384 return Err(LightningError {
2385 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2386 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2389 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2390 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2392 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2393 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2396 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2397 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2398 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2399 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2400 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2401 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2402 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2403 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2404 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2408 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2410 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2411 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2412 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2414 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2415 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2417 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2418 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2419 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2420 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2421 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2422 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2423 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2424 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2427 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2428 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2430 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2436 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2437 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2438 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2439 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2440 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2441 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2443 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2444 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2445 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2446 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2447 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2449 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2451 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2453 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2454 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2456 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2457 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2458 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2459 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2460 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2461 err: "Payment already completed"
2466 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_chan_info.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2467 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2468 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
2471 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2473 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2474 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2475 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2476 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2477 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2478 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2479 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2480 total_msat: total_value,
2482 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2486 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2487 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2489 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2490 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2492 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2493 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2495 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2496 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2498 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2499 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2501 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2502 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2503 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2504 channel_state, chan)
2506 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2507 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
2508 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2510 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, channel_state, chan,
2511 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2513 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2514 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {
2515 insert_outbound_payment!();
2517 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2518 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2519 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2520 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2521 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2522 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2523 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2524 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2525 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2527 _ => unreachable!(),
2530 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2531 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2532 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2533 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2534 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2535 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2536 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2537 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2543 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2545 } else { unreachable!(); }
2549 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2550 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2552 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2557 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2559 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2560 /// fields for more info.
2562 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2563 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2564 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2565 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2566 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2567 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2569 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2571 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2572 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2573 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2575 /// In general, a path may raise:
2576 /// * [`APIError::RouteError`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2577 /// node public key) is specified.
2578 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2579 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2581 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2582 /// relevant updates.
2584 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2585 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2586 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2588 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2589 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2590 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2591 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2593 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2594 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2595 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2596 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2597 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2600 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2601 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2602 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2604 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2605 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2607 let mut total_value = 0;
2608 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2609 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2610 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2611 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2612 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2613 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2614 continue 'path_check;
2616 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2617 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2618 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2619 continue 'path_check;
2622 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2623 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2625 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2626 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2628 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2629 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2630 total_value = amt_msat;
2633 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2634 let mut results = Vec::new();
2635 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2636 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2638 let mut has_ok = false;
2639 let mut has_err = false;
2640 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2641 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2642 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2643 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2644 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2645 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) = res {
2646 // MonitorUpdateInProgress is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2650 } else if res.is_err() {
2651 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2652 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2655 if has_err && has_ok {
2656 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2659 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2660 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2661 Some(RouteParameters {
2662 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2663 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2664 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2670 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2671 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2672 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2673 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2679 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2681 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2682 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2683 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2684 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2685 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2687 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2688 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2689 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2690 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2691 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2692 if path.len() == 0 {
2693 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2694 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2699 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2700 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2701 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2703 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2704 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2706 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2707 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2708 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2709 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2712 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2714 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2715 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2716 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2719 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2720 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2721 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2724 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2725 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2726 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2731 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2732 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2736 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2739 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2741 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2742 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2743 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2744 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2746 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2747 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2748 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2750 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2751 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2752 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2753 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2754 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2756 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2757 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2758 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2759 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2760 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2762 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2770 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2771 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2772 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2773 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2774 /// never reach the recipient.
2776 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2778 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2779 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2781 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2783 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2784 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2785 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2787 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2789 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2790 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2791 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2796 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2797 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2798 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2799 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2800 let payment_id = PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2802 let payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(&payment_id);
2805 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2806 err: "No need probing a path with less than two hops".to_string()
2810 let route = Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None };
2812 match self.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &None, None, Some(payment_id), None) {
2813 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2818 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2820 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2821 let target_payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(payment_id);
2822 target_payment_hash == *payment_hash
2825 /// Returns the 'probing cookie' for the given [`PaymentId`].
2826 fn probing_cookie_from_id(&self, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> PaymentHash {
2827 let mut preimage = [0u8; 64];
2828 preimage[..32].copy_from_slice(&self.probing_cookie_secret);
2829 preimage[32..].copy_from_slice(&payment_id.0);
2830 PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage).into_inner())
2833 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2834 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2835 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2836 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2837 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2839 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2841 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2843 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2844 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2845 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2846 } else { unreachable!(); })
2849 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2851 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2852 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2855 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2856 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2861 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2862 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2863 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2866 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2867 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2868 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2870 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2871 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2872 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2873 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2882 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2883 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2884 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2888 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2890 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2891 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2893 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2894 /// across the p2p network.
2896 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2897 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2899 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2900 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2901 /// keys per-channel).
2903 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2904 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2905 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2907 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2908 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2909 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2911 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2912 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2913 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2914 /// for more details.
2916 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2917 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2918 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2919 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2921 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2922 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2923 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2924 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2929 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2930 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2931 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2932 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2933 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2934 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2935 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2939 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2940 let mut output_index = None;
2941 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2942 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2943 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2944 if output_index.is_some() {
2945 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2946 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2949 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2950 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2951 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2954 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2957 if output_index.is_none() {
2958 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2959 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2962 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2966 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2968 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2969 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2970 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2971 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2973 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2974 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2976 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2977 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2979 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2981 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2982 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2983 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2984 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2985 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2986 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2987 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2988 pub fn update_channel_config(
2989 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2990 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2991 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2992 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2993 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2997 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2998 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
3001 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3002 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3003 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3004 let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id)
3005 .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3006 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
3008 .get_counterparty_node_id();
3009 if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id {
3010 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3011 err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(),
3015 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3016 let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3017 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3020 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3021 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3022 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3023 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3024 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3033 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3035 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3036 /// Will likely generate further events.
3037 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3038 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3040 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3041 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3042 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3043 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3045 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3046 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3048 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3049 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3050 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3051 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3052 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&short_chan_id) {
3053 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
3055 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3056 match forward_info {
3057 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3058 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3059 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3060 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3061 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3062 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3064 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3065 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3066 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3067 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3068 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3069 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3072 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3073 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3075 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3078 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3079 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data },
3085 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3086 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3088 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3092 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3093 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3095 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3099 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3100 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3101 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
3102 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
3103 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3105 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3106 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3107 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3108 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3109 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3111 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3113 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3114 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3118 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3119 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3120 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3121 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3127 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3130 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3133 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3134 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3135 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3136 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3137 // problem, not ours.
3144 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3145 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3146 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3147 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3148 match forward_info {
3149 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3150 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3152 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3153 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3154 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3155 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3156 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3157 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3158 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3159 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3160 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3161 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3163 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3165 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3166 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3168 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3170 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3171 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3172 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data },
3173 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3179 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3181 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3182 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3183 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3184 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3185 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3186 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3187 // this channel currently :/.
3193 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3194 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3196 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3197 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3198 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3200 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3201 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3203 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3205 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3206 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3207 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3210 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3212 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3213 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3214 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3215 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3216 // messages when we can.
3217 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3218 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3219 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3226 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3227 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3230 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3231 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3232 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3233 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3234 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3235 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3237 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3238 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3239 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan);
3240 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3241 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3244 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3248 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3249 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3251 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3255 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3256 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3257 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3258 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3259 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3260 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3261 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3262 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3263 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3265 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3273 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3274 match forward_info {
3275 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3276 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3277 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3278 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3279 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3280 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3281 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3283 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3284 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3286 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3289 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3290 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3291 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3292 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3293 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3294 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3295 phantom_shared_secret,
3297 value: amt_to_forward,
3299 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { amt_to_forward },
3304 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3305 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3306 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3307 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3308 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3310 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3311 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3312 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3313 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3314 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3315 phantom_shared_secret,
3317 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
3318 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3323 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3324 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3325 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3327 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3328 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3329 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3332 let (_, htlcs) = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3333 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3334 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3335 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3336 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3337 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3341 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3342 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3343 total_value += htlc.value;
3344 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3345 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3346 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3347 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3348 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3349 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3351 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3353 _ => unreachable!(),
3356 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3357 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3358 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3359 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3360 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3361 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3362 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3365 amount_msat: total_value,
3367 payment_received_generated = true;
3369 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3370 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3372 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3374 payment_received_generated
3378 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3379 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3380 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3381 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3382 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3383 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3384 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3385 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3386 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3387 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3388 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3389 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3390 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3391 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3393 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3397 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3399 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3400 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3401 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3402 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3403 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3404 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3406 amount_msat: amt_to_forward,
3410 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3411 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3412 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3418 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3419 if payment_data.is_none() {
3420 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3421 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3424 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3425 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3426 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3427 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3428 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3429 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3430 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3431 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3433 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3434 if payment_received_generated {
3435 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3441 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3442 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3450 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3451 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason, destination);
3453 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3455 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3456 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3459 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3460 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3461 events.append(&mut new_events);
3464 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3466 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3467 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3469 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3470 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3471 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3472 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3473 if background_events.is_empty() {
3477 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3479 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3480 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3481 // monitor updating completing.
3482 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3489 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3490 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3491 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3492 self.process_background_events();
3495 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_chan_info: &mut HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3496 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3497 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3498 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3499 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3500 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3501 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3503 if !chan.is_live() {
3504 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3505 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3506 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3508 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3509 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3511 let mut retain_channel = true;
3512 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3515 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, chan_id);
3516 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3520 let ret_err = match res {
3521 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3522 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3523 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
3524 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3525 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3526 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3527 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3528 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3529 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3530 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3531 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3538 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3539 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3547 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3551 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3552 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3553 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3554 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3555 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3556 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3557 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3559 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3561 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3563 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3564 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3565 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3566 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
3567 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3568 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3569 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3571 handle_errors.push(err);
3581 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3583 /// This currently includes:
3584 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3585 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3586 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3588 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3589 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3591 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3592 /// estimate fetches.
3593 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3594 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3595 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3596 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3598 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3600 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3601 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3603 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3604 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3605 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3606 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
3607 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3608 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3609 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3610 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3612 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3614 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3616 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3617 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, chan_id);
3618 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3619 if needs_close { return false; }
3622 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3623 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3624 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3625 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3626 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3627 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3628 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3629 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3633 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3634 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3636 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3637 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3638 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3642 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3643 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3648 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3653 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3654 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3655 // This should be unreachable
3656 debug_assert!(false);
3659 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3660 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3661 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3662 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3664 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3665 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3666 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3668 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.into_iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.prev_hop.clone(), payment_hash.clone())));
3676 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3677 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3678 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone()), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() }, receiver );
3681 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3682 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3688 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3689 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3690 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3692 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3693 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3694 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentReceived`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3695 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3697 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3698 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3699 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3700 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3701 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3702 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3704 let removed_source = {
3705 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3706 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash)
3708 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3709 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3710 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3711 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3712 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3713 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(
3714 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3715 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
3716 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash });
3721 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3722 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3724 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3726 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3727 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3728 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3729 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3730 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3731 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3732 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3734 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3736 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3737 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3739 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3744 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3745 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3746 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3747 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3748 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3749 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3750 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3751 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3752 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3753 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3755 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3756 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3757 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3758 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3760 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3761 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3762 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3763 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3764 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3768 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3769 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3770 // be surfaced to the user.
3771 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3772 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3773 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3775 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3776 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3777 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3778 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3779 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3781 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3784 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3785 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data }, receiver);
3789 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3790 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3791 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason,destination: HTLCDestination) {
3792 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3794 // Ensure that the `channel_state` lock is not held when calling this function.
3795 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for
3796 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `channel_state` lock, which calling this
3797 // function with the `channel_state` locked would.
3798 assert!(self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
3801 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3802 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3803 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3806 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3807 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3808 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3810 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3811 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3812 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3813 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3814 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3815 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3816 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3817 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3818 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3821 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3822 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3825 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3826 all_paths_failed = true;
3827 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3828 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3830 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3836 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3839 let mut retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3840 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3841 Some(RouteParameters {
3842 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3843 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3844 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3847 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3849 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3850 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3852 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3854 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3856 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
3857 if !payment_retryable {
3858 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful {
3860 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3864 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
3866 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3872 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3873 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3874 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3875 if let Some(scid) = short_channel_id {
3876 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
3878 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3879 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3880 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3881 payment_failed_permanently: !payment_retryable,
3888 error_code: onion_error_code,
3890 error_data: onion_error_data
3894 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3900 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3901 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3902 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as find_route
3903 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3905 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3906 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3907 let scid = path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id;
3908 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
3910 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
3911 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
3913 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3915 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
3918 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3919 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3920 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3921 payment_failed_permanently: false,
3922 network_update: None,
3925 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
3928 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3930 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3935 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3936 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3937 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3939 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, outpoint }) => {
3940 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3941 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3942 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3943 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
3944 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3945 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
3946 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
3948 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3949 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3952 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3953 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3954 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3958 let mut forward_event = None;
3959 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3960 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3961 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3963 match forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3964 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3965 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3967 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3968 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3971 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3972 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3973 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3974 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3975 time_forwardable: time
3978 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3979 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3980 failed_next_destination: destination
3986 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3987 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3989 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3990 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3991 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3993 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3994 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3995 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3996 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3998 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3999 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4000 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4001 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4002 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4003 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
4004 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4005 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4007 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4009 let removed_source = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
4010 if let Some((payment_purpose, mut sources)) = removed_source {
4011 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4013 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
4014 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
4015 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
4016 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
4018 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
4019 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
4020 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
4021 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
4022 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
4024 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4025 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4026 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4027 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4028 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
4029 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4030 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4031 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4032 if let None = channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4036 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4037 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4038 debug_assert!(false);
4042 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4043 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4044 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4045 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4046 if sources.len() != 1 {
4047 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4048 debug_assert!(false);
4054 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4056 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4057 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4060 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4061 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4062 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4066 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4067 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
4068 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
4069 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4070 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4071 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4072 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4073 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
4074 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4076 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
4077 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
4078 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
4079 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
4080 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
4081 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
4083 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
4087 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4089 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4090 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4091 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
4092 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
4093 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(
4094 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
4095 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
4096 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash } );
4100 if claimed_any_htlcs {
4101 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4103 purpose: payment_purpose,
4104 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
4108 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4109 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4110 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4111 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4116 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
4117 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4118 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
4119 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4120 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
4122 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
4126 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4127 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4128 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4129 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4130 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4131 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4133 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4134 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4135 payment_preimage, e);
4136 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
4137 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4138 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
4139 Some(htlc_value_msat)
4143 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4144 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4145 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4146 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4147 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4148 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4149 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4150 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4151 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4152 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4158 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
4160 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
4163 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4164 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4165 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4167 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4168 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4169 payment_preimage, e);
4172 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4173 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4175 chan.remove_entry();
4177 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
4180 } else { unreachable!(); }
4183 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4184 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4185 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4186 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4187 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4188 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4189 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4190 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4191 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4192 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4193 pending_events.push(
4194 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4196 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4201 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4209 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4211 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4212 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4213 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4214 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4215 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4216 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4217 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4218 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4219 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4220 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4221 pending_events.push(
4222 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4223 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4229 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4233 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4234 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4235 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4237 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4238 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4239 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4240 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4241 pending_events.push(
4242 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4250 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4255 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4258 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4259 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4260 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4261 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4262 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4263 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4264 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4267 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4268 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4269 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4270 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4271 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4274 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4275 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4276 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4277 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update);
4278 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4279 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4280 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4281 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4282 // again on restart.
4283 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4284 payment_preimage, update_res);
4286 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4287 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4288 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4289 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4292 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4293 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4294 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4295 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4299 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4300 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4301 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4304 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4305 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4306 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4308 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4310 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4320 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4321 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4322 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4325 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4326 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4328 let chan_restoration_res;
4329 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4330 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4331 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4332 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4333 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4334 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4336 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4340 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4341 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4342 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4343 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4344 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4345 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4346 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4348 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4349 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4350 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4355 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4356 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4357 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4360 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4362 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4363 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4364 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4365 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4366 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
4370 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4372 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4373 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4376 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4377 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4378 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4380 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4381 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4382 /// used to accept such channels.
4384 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4385 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4386 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4387 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4390 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4391 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4393 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4394 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4395 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4397 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4398 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4400 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4401 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4403 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4404 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4406 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4407 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4408 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4409 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4412 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4413 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4415 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4416 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4417 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4418 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4419 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4420 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4422 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4423 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4426 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4427 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4428 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4429 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4430 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4431 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4434 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4435 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, channel);
4436 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4439 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4440 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4441 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4444 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4445 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4451 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4452 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4453 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4456 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4457 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4460 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4461 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4462 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration,
4463 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4466 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4467 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4471 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4472 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4473 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4474 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4475 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4476 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4478 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4479 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4480 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4481 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4483 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4484 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4485 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(0),
4488 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4489 pending_events.push(
4490 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4491 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4492 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4493 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4494 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4495 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4500 entry.insert(channel);
4506 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4507 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4508 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4509 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4510 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4511 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4512 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4513 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4515 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4516 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4518 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4521 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4522 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4523 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4524 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4525 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4527 user_channel_id: user_id,
4532 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4533 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4534 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4535 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4536 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4537 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4538 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4539 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4540 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4542 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4544 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4547 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4548 // lock before watch_channel
4549 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4550 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4551 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4552 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4553 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4554 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4555 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4556 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4557 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4558 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4559 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4560 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4561 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4563 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4564 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4565 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4566 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4567 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4568 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4569 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4572 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4573 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4574 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4575 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4576 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4578 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4579 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4580 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4581 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4582 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4583 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4584 funding_msg.channel_id))
4586 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4587 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4590 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4591 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4594 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4595 send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4603 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4605 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4606 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4607 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4608 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4609 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4610 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4611 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4613 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4614 Ok(update) => update,
4615 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4617 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4618 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4620 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4621 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4622 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4623 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4624 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4625 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4626 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4632 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4633 send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4637 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4640 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4641 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4645 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4646 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4647 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4648 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4649 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4650 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4651 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4653 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4654 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4655 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4656 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4657 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4658 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4659 msg: announcement_sigs,
4661 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4662 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4663 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4664 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4665 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4666 // announcement_signatures.
4667 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4668 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4669 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4670 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4677 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4681 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4682 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4683 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4684 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4685 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4687 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4688 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4689 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4690 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4693 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4694 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4695 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4696 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4699 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4700 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4702 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4703 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4704 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
4705 let (result, is_permanent) =
4706 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4708 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
4713 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4714 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4715 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4722 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4725 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4726 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4727 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
4730 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4734 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4735 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4736 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4737 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4738 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4739 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4740 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4741 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4743 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4744 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4745 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4746 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4751 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4752 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4753 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4754 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4755 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4756 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry)))
4757 } else { (tx, None) }
4759 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4762 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4763 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4764 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4766 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4767 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4768 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4769 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4773 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4778 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4779 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4780 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4781 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4783 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4784 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4785 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4786 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4788 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4789 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4790 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4792 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4793 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4794 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4795 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4798 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4799 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4800 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4801 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4802 match pending_forward_info {
4803 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4804 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4805 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4806 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
4808 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4810 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4811 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4812 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4815 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4817 _ => pending_forward_info
4820 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4822 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4827 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4828 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4829 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4830 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4831 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4832 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4833 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4834 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4836 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4838 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4841 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4845 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4846 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4847 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4848 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4849 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4850 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4851 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4853 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4855 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4860 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4861 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4862 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4863 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4864 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4865 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4866 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4868 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4869 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4870 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4872 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4875 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4879 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4880 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4881 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4882 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4883 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4884 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4885 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4887 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4888 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4889 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4890 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4891 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4892 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4893 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4898 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
4899 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
4903 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4904 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4905 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4907 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4908 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4909 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4910 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4911 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4912 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4913 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4914 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4916 commitment_signed: msg,
4922 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4927 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4928 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4929 let mut forward_event = None;
4930 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4931 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4932 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4933 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4935 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4936 match forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4937 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4938 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4939 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4941 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4942 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4943 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4945 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4946 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4947 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4952 match forward_event {
4954 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4955 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4956 time_forwardable: time
4964 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4965 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4967 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4968 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4969 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4970 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4971 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4972 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4974 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4975 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4976 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4977 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4978 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update);
4979 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
4980 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4981 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4982 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4983 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4984 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4985 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4987 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4988 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, channel_state, chan,
4989 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4990 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
4991 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4992 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4994 } else { unreachable!(); }
4996 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4997 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4998 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5002 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5003 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5004 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
5005 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
5006 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
5008 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5011 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5013 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
5014 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
5016 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
5017 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5018 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
5020 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
5021 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
5028 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5029 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5030 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5031 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5032 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5033 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5034 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5036 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
5038 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5043 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5044 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5045 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5047 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5048 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5049 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5050 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5052 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5053 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5056 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5057 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5058 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
5059 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5060 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5061 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
5064 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5069 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5070 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5071 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5072 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5073 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5074 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
5076 // It's not a local channel
5077 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5080 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5081 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5082 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5083 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5084 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5085 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5086 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5087 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5089 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5091 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5092 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5093 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5094 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5096 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5097 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
5100 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
5102 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5105 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5106 let chan_restoration_res;
5107 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
5108 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5109 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5111 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5112 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5113 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5114 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5116 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5117 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5118 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5119 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5120 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5121 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
5122 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
5123 let mut channel_update = None;
5124 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5125 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5126 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5129 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5130 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5131 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5132 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5133 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5134 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5135 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5140 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5141 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
5142 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5143 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5144 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5145 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5147 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
5149 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5152 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
5153 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5155 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5156 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5161 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5162 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5163 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5164 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5165 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5166 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5167 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5168 match monitor_event {
5169 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5170 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5171 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5172 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5174 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5175 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5176 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
5179 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5180 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5181 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5182 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5183 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5184 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5185 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5186 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
5187 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5188 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5189 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5193 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5194 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5196 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5198 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5199 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5200 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5201 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5202 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5207 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5208 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5214 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5215 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5218 has_pending_monitor_events
5221 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5222 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5223 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5225 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5226 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5229 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5230 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5231 /// update was applied.
5233 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5234 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5235 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5236 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5237 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5238 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5239 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5240 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5242 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5243 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5244 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5245 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
5246 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5248 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5249 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5250 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5251 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5253 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5255 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5258 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5259 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5260 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
5261 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5262 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5263 updates: commitment_update,
5267 has_monitor_update = true;
5268 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5269 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5270 if close_channel { return false; }
5277 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, channel_id);
5278 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5279 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5286 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5287 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5288 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5291 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5292 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5298 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5299 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5300 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5301 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5302 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5303 let mut has_update = false;
5305 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5306 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5307 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5308 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
5309 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5311 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5312 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5313 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5314 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5316 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5317 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5320 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5321 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5322 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5323 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5324 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5329 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5331 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5332 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5333 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, chan);
5339 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, channel_id);
5340 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5347 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5348 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5354 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5355 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5357 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5358 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5359 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5360 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5361 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5362 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5363 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5364 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5365 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5366 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5367 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5368 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5369 assert!(should_broadcast);
5370 } else { unreachable!(); }
5371 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5373 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5377 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5378 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5380 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5381 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5384 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5386 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5387 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5388 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5389 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5390 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5391 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5392 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5393 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5394 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5395 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5396 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5397 // never fail a payment too early.
5398 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5400 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5403 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5408 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5411 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5412 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5414 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5415 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5416 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5418 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5420 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5421 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5425 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5426 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5428 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5430 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5431 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5432 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5433 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5434 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5435 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5438 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5439 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5441 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5444 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5446 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5448 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5449 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5450 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5451 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5452 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5455 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5456 /// stored external to LDK.
5458 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5459 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5460 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5462 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5463 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5466 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5467 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5468 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5469 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5471 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5472 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5473 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5474 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5475 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5477 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5478 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5479 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5480 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5481 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5483 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5484 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5486 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5487 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5491 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5492 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5494 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5496 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5497 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5498 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5499 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5502 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5503 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5505 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5508 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5510 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5512 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5513 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5516 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5517 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5519 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5520 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5521 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5524 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5525 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5527 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5528 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5529 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5530 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5532 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5533 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5534 match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.entry(scid_candidate) {
5535 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue,
5536 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate
5541 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5543 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5544 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5546 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5547 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5548 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5552 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5553 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5554 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5555 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5556 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5561 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5562 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5566 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5567 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5571 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5572 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5573 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5574 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5575 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5578 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5579 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5580 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5581 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5583 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5584 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5585 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5586 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5589 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5590 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5592 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5593 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5596 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5597 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5598 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5600 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5601 events.replace(pending_events);
5610 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5612 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5613 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5614 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5615 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5618 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5620 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5621 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5622 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5623 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5624 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5626 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5627 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5628 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5629 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5632 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5633 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5634 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5637 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5638 handler.handle_event(&event);
5646 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5648 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5649 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5650 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5651 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5654 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5656 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5657 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5658 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5659 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5660 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5663 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5664 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5667 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5668 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5669 let new_height = height - 1;
5671 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5672 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5673 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5674 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5675 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5676 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5679 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5683 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5685 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5686 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5687 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5688 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5691 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5692 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5693 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5694 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5696 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5697 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5699 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5700 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5701 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5703 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5704 if height < last_best_block_height {
5705 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5706 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5710 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5711 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5712 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5713 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5715 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5716 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5718 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5720 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5722 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5724 macro_rules! max_time {
5725 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5727 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5728 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5729 // having an explicit local time source.
5730 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5731 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5732 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5733 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5734 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5740 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5741 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5742 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5743 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5746 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5747 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5748 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5749 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5750 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5751 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5752 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5753 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5754 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5762 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5763 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5764 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_chan_info.len());
5765 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5766 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5767 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5773 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5774 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5775 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5776 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5777 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5778 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5779 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5780 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5785 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5787 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5788 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5789 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5790 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5793 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5794 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5796 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5797 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5798 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5799 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5800 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5802 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5803 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5805 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5806 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5807 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
5808 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5809 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5810 let res = f(channel);
5811 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5812 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5813 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5814 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5816 }, HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5818 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5819 send_channel_ready!(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5820 if channel.is_usable() {
5821 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5822 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5823 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5824 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5829 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5832 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5833 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5834 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5835 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5836 msg: announcement_sigs,
5838 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5839 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5840 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5842 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5843 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5844 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5849 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5850 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5851 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5852 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
5853 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
5854 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
5855 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
5856 // is always consistent.
5857 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
5858 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
5859 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5860 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5863 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5864 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, channel);
5865 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5866 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5867 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5868 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5869 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5873 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5874 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5875 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5876 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5877 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5878 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5879 data: reason_message,
5887 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5888 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
5889 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5890 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5891 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5892 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5893 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5894 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5895 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5896 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5898 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5899 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5900 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5901 }, HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
5905 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5910 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5912 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5913 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, reason, destination);
5917 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5918 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5919 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5922 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5923 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5924 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5925 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5928 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5929 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5931 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5932 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5935 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
5936 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
5937 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
5938 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
5939 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
5942 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5943 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5944 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
5947 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5948 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5949 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5950 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5954 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5955 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5956 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5957 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5958 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5959 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5962 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5963 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5964 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5967 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5968 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5969 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5972 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5973 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5974 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5977 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5978 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5979 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5982 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
5983 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5984 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5987 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5988 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5989 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5992 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5993 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5994 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5997 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5998 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5999 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6002 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6003 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6004 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6007 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6008 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6009 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6012 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6013 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6014 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6017 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6018 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6019 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6022 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6023 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6024 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6027 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6028 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6029 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6032 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6033 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6034 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6037 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6038 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6039 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6042 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6047 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6048 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6049 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6052 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6053 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6054 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6055 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
6057 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6058 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6059 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6060 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
6061 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6062 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6063 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6064 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6065 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6066 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6067 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, chan);
6068 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6071 no_channels_remain = false;
6076 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6078 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6079 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6080 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6081 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6082 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6083 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6084 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6085 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6086 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6087 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6088 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6089 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6090 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6091 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6092 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6093 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6094 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6095 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6096 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6097 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6101 if no_channels_remain {
6102 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
6105 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6106 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6110 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6111 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6112 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6116 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6118 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6121 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6122 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6123 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6124 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6125 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6128 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6129 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6134 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6135 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6136 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6137 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6138 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6139 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6140 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6141 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6142 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6146 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6147 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6148 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6153 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6154 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
6155 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6156 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6157 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6165 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6169 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6170 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6172 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6173 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6174 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6175 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6176 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6181 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6182 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6183 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6184 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6187 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6188 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6189 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6197 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6198 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6202 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6203 provided_node_features()
6206 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6207 provided_init_features()
6211 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6212 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6213 pub fn provided_node_features() -> NodeFeatures {
6214 provided_init_features().to_context()
6217 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6218 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6220 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6221 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6222 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6223 pub fn provided_invoice_features() -> InvoiceFeatures {
6224 provided_init_features().to_context()
6227 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6228 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6229 pub fn provided_channel_features() -> ChannelFeatures {
6230 provided_init_features().to_context()
6233 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6234 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6235 pub fn provided_init_features() -> InitFeatures {
6236 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6237 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6238 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6239 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6240 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6241 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6242 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6243 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6244 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6245 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6246 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6247 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6248 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6249 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6250 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6254 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6255 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6257 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6258 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6259 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6260 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6263 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6264 (2, node_id, required),
6265 (4, features, required),
6266 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6267 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6268 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6269 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6272 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
6273 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6274 (2, channel_id, required),
6275 (3, channel_type, option),
6276 (4, counterparty, required),
6277 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6278 (6, funding_txo, option),
6279 (7, config, option),
6280 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6281 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6282 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6283 (14, user_channel_id, required),
6284 (16, balance_msat, required),
6285 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6286 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6287 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6288 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6289 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6290 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6291 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6292 (26, is_outbound, required),
6293 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6294 (30, is_usable, required),
6295 (32, is_public, required),
6296 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6297 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6300 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6301 (2, channels, vec_type),
6302 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6303 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6306 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6308 (0, onion_packet, required),
6309 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6312 (0, payment_data, required),
6313 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6314 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6316 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6317 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6318 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6322 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6323 (0, routing, required),
6324 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6325 (4, payment_hash, required),
6326 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
6327 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
6331 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6332 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6334 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6336 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6337 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6338 reason.write(writer)?;
6340 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6341 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6344 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6345 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6346 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6347 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6354 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6355 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6356 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6359 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6360 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6361 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6362 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6366 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6367 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6368 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6369 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6370 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6373 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6374 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6375 // messages contained in the variants.
6376 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6377 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6378 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6380 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6381 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6382 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6383 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6384 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6387 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6388 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6389 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6390 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6391 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6393 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6398 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6403 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6404 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6405 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6406 (2, outpoint, required),
6407 (4, htlc_id, required),
6408 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6411 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6412 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6413 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6414 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6415 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6417 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6418 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6419 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6420 (2, self.value, required),
6421 (4, payment_data, option),
6422 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6423 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6429 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6430 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6431 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6433 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6434 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6435 let mut total_msat = None;
6436 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6437 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6438 (0, prev_hop, required),
6439 (1, total_msat, option),
6440 (2, value, required),
6441 (4, payment_data, option),
6442 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6443 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6445 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6447 if payment_data.is_some() {
6448 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6450 if total_msat.is_none() {
6451 total_msat = Some(value);
6453 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6456 if total_msat.is_none() {
6457 if payment_data.is_none() {
6458 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6460 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6462 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6466 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6469 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6476 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6477 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6478 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6481 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6482 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6483 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6484 let mut payment_id = None;
6485 let mut payment_secret = None;
6486 let mut payment_params = None;
6487 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6488 (0, session_priv, required),
6489 (1, payment_id, option),
6490 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6491 (3, payment_secret, option),
6492 (4, path, vec_type),
6493 (5, payment_params, option),
6495 if payment_id.is_none() {
6496 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6498 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6500 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6501 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6502 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6503 path: path.unwrap(),
6504 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6509 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6510 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6515 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6516 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6518 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6520 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6521 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6522 (0, session_priv, required),
6523 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6524 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6525 (3, payment_secret, option),
6526 (4, path, vec_type),
6527 (5, payment_params, option),
6530 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6532 field.write(writer)?;
6539 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6540 (0, LightningError) => {
6544 (0, failure_code, required),
6545 (2, data, vec_type),
6549 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6551 (0, forward_info, required),
6552 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6553 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6554 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6557 (0, htlc_id, required),
6558 (2, err_packet, required),
6562 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6563 (0, payment_secret, required),
6564 (2, expiry_time, required),
6565 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6566 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6567 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6570 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6572 (0, session_privs, required),
6575 (0, session_privs, required),
6576 (1, payment_hash, option),
6579 (0, session_privs, required),
6580 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6581 (2, payment_hash, required),
6582 (4, payment_secret, option),
6583 (6, total_msat, required),
6584 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6585 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6588 (0, session_privs, required),
6589 (2, payment_hash, required),
6593 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6594 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6595 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6596 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6597 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6600 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6601 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6603 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6605 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6607 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6608 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6609 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6613 // Take `channel_state` lock temporarily to avoid creating a lock order that requires
6614 // that the `forward_htlcs` lock is taken after `channel_state`
6615 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6616 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6617 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6618 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6619 unfunded_channels += 1;
6622 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6623 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6624 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6625 channel.write(writer)?;
6631 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6632 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6633 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
6634 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6635 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6636 for forward in pending_forwards {
6637 forward.write(writer)?;
6642 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6643 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6644 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6645 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6646 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6647 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6648 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6649 htlc.write(writer)?;
6651 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6654 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6655 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6656 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6657 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6658 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6659 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6662 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6663 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6664 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6665 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6666 for event in events.iter() {
6667 event.write(writer)?;
6670 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6671 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6672 for event in background_events.iter() {
6674 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6676 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6677 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6682 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
6683 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
6684 // likely to be identical.
6685 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6686 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6688 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6689 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6690 hash.write(writer)?;
6691 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6694 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6695 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6696 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6697 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6698 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6701 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6702 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6704 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6705 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6706 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6707 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6710 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6711 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6715 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6716 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6717 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6719 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6720 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6721 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6726 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6727 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6728 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6729 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6730 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6731 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6732 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
6739 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6741 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6743 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6744 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6745 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6746 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6747 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6748 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6749 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6750 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6751 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6752 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6753 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6754 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6755 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6757 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6758 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6760 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6761 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6763 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6764 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6765 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6766 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6767 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6768 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6770 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6771 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6772 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6773 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6774 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6775 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6778 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6779 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6781 pub keys_manager: K,
6783 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6785 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6786 pub fee_estimator: F,
6787 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6789 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6790 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6791 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6792 pub chain_monitor: M,
6794 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6795 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6796 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6797 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6798 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6799 /// deserialization.
6801 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6802 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6803 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6805 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6806 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6808 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6809 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6810 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6811 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6813 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6816 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6817 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6820 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6821 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6822 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6823 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6824 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6825 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6828 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6829 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6830 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6831 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6832 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6834 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6835 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6840 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6841 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6842 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6843 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6844 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6845 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6846 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6847 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6850 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6851 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6852 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6856 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6857 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6858 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6859 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6860 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6861 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6864 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6865 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6867 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6868 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6869 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6871 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6873 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6874 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6875 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6876 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6877 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6878 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6879 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6880 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6881 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6882 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6883 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6884 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6885 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6886 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6887 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6888 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6889 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6890 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6891 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6892 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6893 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6894 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6895 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6896 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6897 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6898 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6899 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6900 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6901 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6902 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6903 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6904 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6905 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6906 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6907 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6908 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6909 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6910 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6911 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6912 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6915 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6916 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6917 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6919 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6920 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
6922 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6925 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6926 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6927 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6928 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6929 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6930 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6934 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6935 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6936 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6937 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6941 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6942 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6943 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6944 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6945 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6946 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6947 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6948 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6949 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6951 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6954 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6955 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6956 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6957 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6958 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6959 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6960 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6961 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
6963 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
6966 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6967 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6968 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6969 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6970 let peer_state = PeerState {
6971 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6973 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6976 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6977 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6978 for _ in 0..event_count {
6979 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6980 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6984 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6985 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6986 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6987 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6988 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6989 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6990 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6991 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6995 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6996 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6997 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6998 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6999 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7000 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7004 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7005 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7007 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7008 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7009 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7010 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7011 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7015 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7016 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7017 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7018 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7019 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7020 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7021 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7023 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7024 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7028 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7029 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7030 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7031 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7032 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7033 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7034 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7035 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7036 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7037 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7038 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7039 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7040 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7041 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7043 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7044 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7047 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7048 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7051 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7052 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7053 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7054 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7055 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7056 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7058 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7060 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7061 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7062 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7063 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7064 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7065 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7066 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7068 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7069 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7070 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7071 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7072 if path.is_empty() {
7073 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7074 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7076 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7077 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7078 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7079 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7080 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7081 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7082 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7083 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7085 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7086 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7087 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7088 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7089 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7091 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7092 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7093 total_msat: path_amt,
7094 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7096 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7097 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7106 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7107 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7109 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7110 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7111 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7112 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7114 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7115 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7118 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7119 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7120 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7121 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7122 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7124 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7125 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7126 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7127 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7128 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7129 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7130 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7131 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7133 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7134 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7138 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7140 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7142 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7143 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7145 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7149 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7150 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7152 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7153 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7156 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7158 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7160 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7161 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7162 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7163 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7164 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7168 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7169 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
7170 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7171 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7173 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7174 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7175 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7177 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7178 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7179 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7180 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7181 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7182 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7184 if chan.is_usable() {
7185 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7186 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7187 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7188 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7189 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7194 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7196 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7197 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7198 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7199 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7200 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7201 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7202 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7204 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7205 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7206 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7207 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7209 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7210 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7211 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7212 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7214 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7215 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7216 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7217 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7219 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7220 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7221 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7223 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7224 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7227 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7229 purpose: payment_purpose,
7230 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7236 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7238 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7239 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7240 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7242 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7244 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7248 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7250 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7251 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7252 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7254 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7255 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7256 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7257 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7259 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7265 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7267 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7269 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7270 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7271 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7272 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7274 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7275 logger: args.logger,
7276 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7279 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7280 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7281 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7282 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
7285 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7286 //connection or two.
7288 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7294 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7295 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7296 use core::time::Duration;
7297 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7298 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7299 use ln::channelmanager::{self, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7300 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7302 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7303 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7304 use util::errors::APIError;
7305 use util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7306 use util::test_utils;
7307 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7310 fn test_notify_limits() {
7311 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7312 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7313 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7314 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7315 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7316 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7318 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7319 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7320 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7321 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7322 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7324 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7326 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7327 // to connect messages with new values
7328 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7329 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7330 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7331 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7333 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7334 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7335 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7336 // ... but the last node should not.
7337 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7338 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7339 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7340 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7342 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7343 // about the channel.
7344 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7345 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7346 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7348 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7350 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7351 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7352 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7353 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7354 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7355 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7357 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7358 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7359 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7361 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7362 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7363 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7364 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7365 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7366 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7368 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7369 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7370 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7371 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7372 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7373 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7374 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7375 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7377 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7378 // the channel info has updated.
7379 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7380 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7381 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7382 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7383 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7384 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7388 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7389 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7391 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7392 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7393 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7394 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7395 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7397 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7398 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7399 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7400 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7401 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7402 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7403 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7404 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7405 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7406 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7407 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7409 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7410 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7411 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7412 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7413 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7414 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7415 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7416 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7417 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7418 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7419 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7420 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7421 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7422 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7423 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7424 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7425 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7426 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7427 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7428 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7429 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7430 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7432 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7433 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7434 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7435 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7436 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7437 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7439 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7440 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7441 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7442 // lightning messages manually.
7443 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7444 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7445 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7447 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7448 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7449 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7450 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7451 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7452 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7453 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7454 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7455 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7457 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7458 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7459 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7460 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7461 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7462 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7463 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7464 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7465 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7466 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7467 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7469 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7470 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7473 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7474 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7475 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7476 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7478 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7479 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7480 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7481 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7483 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7486 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7487 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7488 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7489 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7491 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7494 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7495 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7496 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7497 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7499 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7504 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7505 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7506 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7507 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7508 // fails as expected.
7509 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7510 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7511 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7512 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7513 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7514 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7515 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7517 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7518 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7519 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7521 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7522 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7523 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7524 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7525 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7527 let route = find_route(
7528 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7529 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7531 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7532 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7533 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7534 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7535 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7536 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7537 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7538 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7539 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7540 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
7541 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
7542 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7543 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7544 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7545 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7546 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7547 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7548 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7549 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7550 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7551 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7552 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7553 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7555 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7556 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7558 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7559 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7560 let route = find_route(
7561 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7562 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7564 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7565 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7566 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7567 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7568 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7569 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7570 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7572 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7573 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7574 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7575 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7576 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7577 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7578 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7579 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7580 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7581 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7582 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7583 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7584 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7585 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7586 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7587 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7588 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7589 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7590 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7591 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7592 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7593 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7594 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7596 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7597 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7601 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7602 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7603 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7604 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7605 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7606 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7607 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7609 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7610 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7611 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7612 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7614 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7615 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7616 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7617 final_value_msat: 10000,
7618 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7620 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7621 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7622 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7623 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7624 let route = find_route(
7625 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7626 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7629 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7630 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7631 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7632 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7634 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7635 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7636 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7637 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7638 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7639 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7640 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7642 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7646 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7647 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7648 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7649 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7650 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7651 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7653 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7654 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7655 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7656 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7658 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7659 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7660 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7661 final_value_msat: 10000,
7662 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7664 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7665 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7666 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7667 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7668 let route = find_route(
7669 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7670 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7673 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7674 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7675 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7676 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7677 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7679 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7680 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7681 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7682 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7683 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7684 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7685 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7687 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7691 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7692 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7693 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7694 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7695 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7697 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7698 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7699 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7700 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7702 // Marshall an MPP route.
7703 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7704 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7705 route.paths.push(path);
7706 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7707 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7708 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7709 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7710 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7711 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7713 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7714 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7715 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7716 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7721 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7722 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7723 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7724 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7725 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7726 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7728 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7729 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7731 total_msat: 100_000,
7734 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7735 // payment verification fails as expected.
7736 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7737 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7738 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7739 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7741 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7745 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7746 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7750 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
7751 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
7752 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
7753 // the channel is successfully closed.
7754 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7755 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7756 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7757 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7759 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7760 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7761 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
7762 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7763 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
7765 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
7766 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
7768 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
7769 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
7770 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7771 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7774 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7776 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
7777 // as it has the funding transaction.
7778 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7779 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7780 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7782 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7785 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7787 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7789 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7790 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7791 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7793 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
7794 // as it has the funding transaction.
7795 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7796 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7797 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7799 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7800 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7801 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
7802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7803 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
7804 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
7805 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
7807 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7808 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7809 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7810 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
7812 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7813 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
7815 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
7816 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
7817 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
7818 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
7819 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7820 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7821 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7823 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
7824 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
7825 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
7826 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
7827 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7828 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7829 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7832 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
7834 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
7835 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
7836 // closing transaction).
7837 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
7838 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
7839 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7841 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
7842 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
7843 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7844 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7845 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7848 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7850 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
7852 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
7853 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
7854 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7856 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7858 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7859 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7863 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
7866 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7867 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
7868 use ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7869 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7870 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7871 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7872 use routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
7873 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7874 use util::test_utils;
7875 use util::config::UserConfig;
7876 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7878 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7879 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7880 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
7882 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7886 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7887 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7888 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7889 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7890 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7891 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7892 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7897 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7898 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7901 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7902 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7903 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7905 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7906 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7908 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7909 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7911 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7912 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7914 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7915 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7916 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7917 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7918 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7920 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7922 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7924 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7925 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7926 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7927 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7928 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7930 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7932 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7934 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7935 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7936 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7937 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7938 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7941 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7942 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7943 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7945 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7946 } else { panic!(); }
7948 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7949 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7951 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7954 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7957 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7958 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7960 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7961 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7962 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7963 match msg_events[0] {
7964 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
7965 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7966 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7970 match msg_events[1] {
7971 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7975 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
7977 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7978 macro_rules! send_payment {
7979 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7980 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7981 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7982 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7983 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7984 let seed = [3u8; 32];
7985 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
7986 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7987 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
7988 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7990 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7991 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7993 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7994 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7996 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7997 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7998 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7999 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8000 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8001 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8002 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8003 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8005 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8006 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8007 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8008 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8010 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8011 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8012 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8013 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8014 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8016 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8019 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8020 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8021 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8022 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8024 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8029 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8030 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);