1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
82 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
84 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
85 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
86 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
88 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
89 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
90 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
91 // before we forward it.
93 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
94 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
95 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
96 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
97 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
99 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
100 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
102 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
103 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
104 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
105 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
108 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
109 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
110 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
111 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
114 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
115 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
116 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
122 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
123 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
124 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
126 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
127 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
128 /// may overshoot this in either case)
129 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
130 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
133 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
134 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
135 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
136 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
139 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
140 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
141 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
142 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
143 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
146 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
147 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
149 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
150 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
151 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
154 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
155 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
157 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
158 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
161 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
162 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
165 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
169 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
170 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
171 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
172 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
173 short_channel_id: u64,
175 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
176 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
178 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
179 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
184 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
186 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
187 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
188 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
190 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
191 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
194 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
195 struct ClaimableHTLC {
196 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
198 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
200 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
201 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
202 sender_intended_value: u64,
203 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
205 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
206 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
207 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
208 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
212 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
214 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
215 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
216 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
218 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
219 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
224 impl Readable for PaymentId {
225 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
226 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
231 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
233 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
234 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
235 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
237 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
238 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
243 impl Readable for InterceptId {
244 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
245 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
250 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
251 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
252 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
253 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
254 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
257 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
259 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
260 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
261 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
263 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
264 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
268 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
269 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
270 (0, short_channel_id, required),
271 (2, htlc_id, required),
273 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
274 (0, session_priv, required),
279 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
280 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
281 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
282 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
283 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
286 session_priv: SecretKey,
287 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
288 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
289 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
290 payment_id: PaymentId,
293 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
294 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
295 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
297 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
299 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
301 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
304 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
305 payment_id.hash(hasher);
306 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
312 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
314 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
315 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
316 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
317 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
318 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
319 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
323 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
324 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
325 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
326 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
327 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
328 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
330 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
336 struct ReceiveError {
342 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
343 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
345 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
346 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
347 pub enum FailureCode {
348 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
349 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
350 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
351 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
352 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
353 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
354 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
355 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
356 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
357 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
358 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
361 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
363 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
364 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
365 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
366 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
367 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
369 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
370 err: msgs::LightningError,
371 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
372 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
374 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
376 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
378 err: LightningError {
380 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
381 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
388 shutdown_finish: None,
392 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
393 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
396 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
398 err: LightningError {
400 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
401 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
407 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
408 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
412 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
415 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
417 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
418 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
422 log_level: Level::Warn,
425 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
427 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
429 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
431 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
432 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
440 shutdown_finish: None,
445 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
446 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
447 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
448 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
449 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
451 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
452 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
453 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
454 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
455 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
456 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
457 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
459 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
463 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
464 struct ClaimingPayment {
466 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
467 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
469 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
470 (0, amount_msat, required),
471 (2, payment_purpose, required),
472 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
475 struct ClaimablePayment {
476 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
477 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
478 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
481 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
482 struct ClaimablePayments {
483 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
484 /// failed/claimed by the user.
486 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
487 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
489 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
490 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
491 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
493 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
494 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
495 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
496 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
499 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
500 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
501 /// quite some time lag.
502 enum BackgroundEvent {
503 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
504 /// commitment transaction.
505 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
509 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
510 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
511 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
512 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
513 /// event can be generated.
514 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
515 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
516 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
519 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
520 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
521 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
524 /// State we hold per-peer.
525 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
526 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
528 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
529 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
531 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
532 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
533 latest_features: InitFeatures,
534 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
535 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
536 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
537 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
538 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
540 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
541 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
542 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
543 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
545 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
546 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
547 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
548 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
549 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
550 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
551 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
552 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
553 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
554 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
558 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
559 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
560 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
561 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
562 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
563 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
566 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
570 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
571 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
573 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
576 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
577 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
578 struct PendingInboundPayment {
579 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
580 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
581 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
582 /// this payment being removed.
584 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
585 user_payment_id: u64,
586 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
587 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
588 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
591 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
592 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
593 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
594 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
595 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
596 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
597 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
598 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
600 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
601 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
609 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
611 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
616 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
617 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
618 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
619 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
620 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
621 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
622 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
623 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
624 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
626 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
627 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
629 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
630 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
631 pub trait AChannelManager {
632 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer>;
633 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
634 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface;
635 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
636 type EntropySource: EntropySource;
637 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
638 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner;
639 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
640 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
641 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer>;
642 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
643 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator;
644 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
646 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
648 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
649 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
651 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
652 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
653 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
655 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> + Sized,
656 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface + Sized,
657 ES::Target: EntropySource + Sized,
658 NS::Target: NodeSigner + Sized,
659 SP::Target: SignerProvider + Sized,
660 F::Target: FeeEstimator + Sized,
661 R::Target: Router + Sized,
662 L::Target: Logger + Sized,
664 type Watch = M::Target;
666 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
668 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
670 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
672 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
673 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
675 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
677 type Router = R::Target;
679 type Logger = L::Target;
681 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
684 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
685 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
687 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
688 /// to individual Channels.
690 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
691 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
692 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
693 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
695 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
696 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
697 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
698 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
699 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
700 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
701 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
703 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
704 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
705 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
707 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
708 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
709 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
710 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
711 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
713 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
714 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
715 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
716 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
718 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
719 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
720 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
722 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
723 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
724 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
725 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
726 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
728 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
729 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
730 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
731 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
732 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
733 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
734 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
735 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
738 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
739 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
740 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
741 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
742 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
746 // `total_consistency_lock`
748 // |__`forward_htlcs`
750 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
752 // |__`per_peer_state`
754 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
756 // | |__`claimable_payments`
758 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
764 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
766 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
770 // | |__`pending_events`
772 // | |__`pending_background_events`
774 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
776 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
777 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
778 ES::Target: EntropySource,
779 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
780 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
781 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
785 default_configuration: UserConfig,
786 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
787 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
793 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
795 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
797 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
798 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
800 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
801 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
802 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
803 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
805 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
806 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
808 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
809 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
810 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
811 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
812 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
813 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
814 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
815 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
817 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
819 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
820 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
822 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
824 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
825 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
826 /// and via the classic SCID.
828 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
829 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
831 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
833 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
835 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
836 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
837 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
839 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
840 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
842 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
843 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
845 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
846 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
848 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
849 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
850 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
851 /// active channel list on load.
853 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
854 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
856 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
858 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
859 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
860 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
862 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
863 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
864 /// the handling of the events.
866 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
867 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
870 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
871 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
872 /// would break backwards compatability.
873 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
874 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
875 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
877 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
878 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
880 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
882 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
883 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
884 /// confirmation depth.
886 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
887 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
888 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
890 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
892 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
894 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
896 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
898 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
900 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
901 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
902 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
904 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
905 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
907 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
908 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
909 /// keeping additional state.
910 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
912 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
913 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
914 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
915 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
917 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
918 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
920 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
921 /// are currently open with that peer.
923 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
924 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
927 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
929 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
930 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
931 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
932 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
933 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
935 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
936 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
937 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
938 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
939 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
940 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
941 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
942 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
943 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
944 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
945 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
947 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
956 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
958 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
959 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
960 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
961 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
962 pub struct ChainParameters {
963 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
964 pub network: Network,
966 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
968 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
969 pub best_block: BestBlock,
972 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
978 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
979 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
980 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
981 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
982 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
983 /// updates are ready for persistence).
985 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
986 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
987 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
988 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
989 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
991 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
992 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
995 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
996 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
997 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1000 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1001 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1003 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1004 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1005 should_persist: persist_check,
1006 _read_guard: read_guard,
1011 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1012 fn drop(&mut self) {
1013 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1014 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1019 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1020 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1022 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1024 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1025 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1026 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1027 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1028 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1030 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1031 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1033 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1035 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1036 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1037 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1038 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1039 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1040 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1041 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1042 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1043 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1044 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1045 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1046 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1047 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1049 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1050 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1052 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1053 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1054 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1055 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1057 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1058 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1059 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1060 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1061 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1062 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1065 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1067 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1068 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1071 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1073 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1074 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1076 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1077 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1078 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1079 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1081 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1082 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1083 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1085 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1086 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1087 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1089 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1090 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1091 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1092 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1094 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1095 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1096 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1098 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1099 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1100 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1102 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1103 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1104 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1105 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1106 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1107 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1108 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1109 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1110 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1111 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1112 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1115 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1116 /// to better separate parameters.
1117 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1118 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1119 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1120 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1121 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1122 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1123 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1124 pub features: InitFeatures,
1125 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1126 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1127 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1129 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1131 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1132 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1133 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1134 /// payments to us through this channel.
1135 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1136 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1137 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1138 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1139 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1140 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1141 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1144 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1145 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1146 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1147 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1148 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1149 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1150 /// lifetime of the channel.
1151 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1152 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1153 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1154 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1155 /// our counterparty already.
1157 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1158 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1159 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1160 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1162 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1163 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1164 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1165 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1167 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1168 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1170 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1171 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1173 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1174 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1175 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1176 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1177 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1178 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1179 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1180 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1181 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1184 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1186 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1187 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1188 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1189 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1190 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1191 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1192 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1194 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1195 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1197 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1198 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1199 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1200 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1201 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1202 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1203 /// this value on chain.
1205 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1207 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1209 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1210 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1211 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1212 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1214 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1215 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1216 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1218 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1219 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1220 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1221 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1222 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1224 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1225 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1226 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1227 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1229 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1230 pub balance_msat: u64,
1231 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1232 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1233 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1234 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1236 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1238 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1239 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1240 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1241 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1242 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1243 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1244 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1245 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1247 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1248 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1249 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1250 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1251 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1252 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1253 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1255 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1256 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1257 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1258 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1259 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1260 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1261 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1262 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1263 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1265 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1267 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1268 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1269 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1270 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1271 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1273 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1274 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1275 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1276 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1277 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1278 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1279 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1281 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1282 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1283 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1284 pub is_outbound: bool,
1285 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1286 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1287 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1288 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1289 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1291 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1292 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1293 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1294 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1296 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1297 pub is_usable: bool,
1298 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1299 pub is_public: bool,
1300 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1301 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1302 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1303 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1304 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1305 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1307 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1308 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1311 impl ChannelDetails {
1312 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1313 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1314 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1316 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1317 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1318 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1319 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1322 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1323 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1324 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1326 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1327 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1328 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1329 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1332 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1333 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1335 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1336 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1337 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1339 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1340 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1341 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1342 features: latest_features,
1343 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1344 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1345 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1346 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1347 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1348 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1349 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1350 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1351 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1352 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1354 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1355 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1356 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1357 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1358 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1359 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1360 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1361 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1362 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1363 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1364 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1365 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1366 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1367 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1368 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1369 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1370 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1371 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1372 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1373 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1374 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1375 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1376 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1377 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1378 config: Some(channel.config()),
1383 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1384 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1385 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1386 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1387 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1389 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1391 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1392 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1393 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1396 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1397 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1398 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1400 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1401 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1402 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1404 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1405 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1406 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1408 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1409 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1413 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1415 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1417 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1418 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1419 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1420 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1422 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1423 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1424 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1427 macro_rules! handle_error {
1428 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1429 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1430 // entering the macro.
1431 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1432 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1436 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1437 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1439 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1440 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1441 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1442 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1446 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1447 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1448 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1449 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1454 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1455 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1457 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1458 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1459 action: err.action.clone()
1463 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1464 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1465 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1466 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1467 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1471 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1478 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1479 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1480 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1481 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1482 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1483 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1485 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1486 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1487 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1488 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1489 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1491 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1492 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1494 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1498 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1499 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1500 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1502 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1503 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1505 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1506 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1508 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1509 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1510 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1511 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1512 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1513 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1519 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1520 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1524 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1526 $entry.remove_entry();
1534 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1535 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1539 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1541 $entry.remove_entry();
1549 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1550 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1552 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1553 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1559 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1560 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1561 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1562 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1563 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1565 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1566 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1567 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1568 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1569 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1570 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1571 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1572 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1573 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1574 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1579 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1580 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1581 if $channel.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1582 $locked_events.push(events::Event::ChannelPending {
1583 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1584 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.temporary_channel_id(),
1585 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1586 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1587 funding_txo: $channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1589 $channel.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1594 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1595 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1596 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1597 debug_assert!($channel.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1598 $locked_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1599 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1600 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1601 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1602 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1604 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1609 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1610 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1611 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1612 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1613 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1614 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1615 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1616 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1617 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1618 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1619 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1621 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1622 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1623 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1629 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1630 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1632 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1633 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1634 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1635 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1636 updates.announcement_sigs);
1637 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1638 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1641 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1642 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1643 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1645 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1647 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1648 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1650 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1651 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1652 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1653 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1658 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1659 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1660 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1661 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1662 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1664 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1665 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1666 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1669 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1670 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1671 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1672 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1673 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1674 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1675 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1676 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1680 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1681 if ($update_id == 0 || $chan.get_next_monitor_update()
1682 .expect("We can't be processing a monitor update if it isn't queued")
1683 .update_id == $update_id) &&
1684 $chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id
1686 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1692 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1693 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1697 macro_rules! process_events_body {
1698 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1699 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
1700 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
1701 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1703 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
1705 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
1706 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
1707 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
1708 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1711 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *$self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
1712 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
1713 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1716 for event in pending_events {
1717 $event_to_handle = event;
1721 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1722 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1727 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1729 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1730 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1731 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1732 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1733 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1734 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1738 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1740 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1741 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1743 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1745 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1746 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1747 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1750 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1751 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1752 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1753 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1754 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1755 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1756 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1757 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1759 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1760 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1761 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1766 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1768 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1769 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1770 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1771 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1772 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1773 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1774 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1775 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1777 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1780 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1781 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1783 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1785 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1787 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1789 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1790 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1791 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1792 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1802 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1803 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1804 &self.default_configuration
1807 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1808 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1809 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1812 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1813 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1815 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1817 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1821 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1826 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1828 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1829 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1830 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1831 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1832 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1834 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1835 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1837 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1838 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1839 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1841 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1842 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1843 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1844 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1845 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1846 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1848 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1849 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1850 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1851 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1852 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1853 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1856 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1857 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1858 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1860 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1862 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1863 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1865 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1867 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1868 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1869 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1870 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1871 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1872 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1876 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1881 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1883 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1884 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1885 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1887 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1889 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1892 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1895 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1896 node_id: their_network_key,
1899 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1902 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1903 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1904 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1905 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1906 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1907 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1908 // the same channel.
1909 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1911 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1912 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1913 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1914 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1915 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1916 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1917 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
1918 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
1926 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
1927 /// more information.
1928 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1929 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1932 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1933 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1935 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1936 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1938 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1939 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1940 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1941 // really wanted anyway.
1942 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1945 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
1946 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1947 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1948 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1950 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
1951 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1952 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1953 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1954 return peer_state.channel_by_id
1957 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
1963 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1964 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1966 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1967 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1968 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1970 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1971 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1972 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1973 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1974 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1975 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1976 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1977 total_msat: *total_msat,
1980 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
1981 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1983 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
1984 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1986 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
1991 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1992 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1993 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1994 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1995 Some(transaction) => {
1996 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
2000 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2001 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
2002 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2003 reason: closure_reason
2007 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2008 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2010 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2011 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2012 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2014 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2015 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2017 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2018 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2019 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2020 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2021 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
2022 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2023 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2024 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
2025 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2027 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2028 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2029 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2030 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2031 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2035 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2036 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2037 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2038 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
2039 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
2042 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2043 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2044 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2045 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2049 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2053 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
2057 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2058 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2059 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2060 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2063 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2067 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2068 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2069 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2071 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2072 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2074 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2075 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2076 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2077 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2079 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2081 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2082 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2083 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2084 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2085 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2086 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
2089 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2090 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2091 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2093 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2094 /// the channel being closed or not:
2095 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2096 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2097 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2098 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2099 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2100 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2101 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2103 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2105 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2106 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2107 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2108 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2109 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2110 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
2114 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2115 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2116 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2117 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2118 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2119 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2120 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2121 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2123 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2124 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2125 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2126 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2127 // ignore the result here.
2128 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2132 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2133 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2134 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2135 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2136 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2137 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2138 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2140 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2141 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2142 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2143 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2144 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
2146 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2148 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2150 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2153 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2154 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2155 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2156 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2157 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2162 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2165 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2166 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2167 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2168 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2169 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2170 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2171 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2172 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2173 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2174 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2175 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2176 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2187 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2188 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2189 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2191 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2192 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2193 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2196 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2197 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2198 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2200 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2201 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2202 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2203 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2204 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2207 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2208 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2209 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2210 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2211 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2215 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2216 /// local transaction(s).
2217 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2218 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2219 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2223 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2224 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2226 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2227 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2228 return Err(ReceiveError {
2229 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2231 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2234 // final_expiry_too_soon
2235 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2236 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2238 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2239 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2240 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2241 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2242 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2243 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2244 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2245 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2246 return Err(ReceiveError {
2247 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2248 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2251 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2252 return Err(ReceiveError {
2254 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2255 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2259 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2260 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2261 return Err(ReceiveError {
2262 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2263 err_data: Vec::new(),
2264 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2267 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
2268 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2269 return Err(ReceiveError {
2270 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2271 err_data: Vec::new(),
2272 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2274 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2275 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2278 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2279 phantom_shared_secret,
2281 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2282 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2283 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2284 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2285 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2286 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2287 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2288 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2289 return Err(ReceiveError {
2290 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2291 err_data: Vec::new(),
2292 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2296 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2299 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2302 return Err(ReceiveError {
2303 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2304 err_data: Vec::new(),
2305 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2310 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2313 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2314 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2315 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2316 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2320 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2321 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2322 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2324 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2325 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2326 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2327 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2328 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2329 failure_code: $err_code,
2335 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2336 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2339 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2340 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2341 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2343 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2344 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2345 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2346 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2347 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2348 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2349 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2350 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2352 macro_rules! return_err {
2353 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2355 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2356 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2357 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2358 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2359 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2360 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2366 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2368 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2369 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2371 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2372 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2376 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2377 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2379 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2381 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2382 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2383 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2384 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2385 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2387 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2390 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2391 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2392 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2394 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2395 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2396 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2399 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2400 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2401 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2402 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2406 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2407 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2408 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2411 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2412 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2413 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2414 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2415 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2420 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2421 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2422 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2423 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2424 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2425 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2426 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2427 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2428 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2429 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2430 // phantom or an intercept.
2431 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2432 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2433 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2437 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2440 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2442 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2443 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2444 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2445 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2446 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2448 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2449 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2450 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2452 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2453 // have no consistency guarantees.
2454 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2458 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2459 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2460 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2461 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2462 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2464 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2465 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2466 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2467 // we don't have the channel here.
2468 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2470 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2472 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2473 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2474 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2475 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2476 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2477 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2478 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2479 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2480 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2481 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2482 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2484 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2487 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2488 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2490 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2491 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2495 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2496 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2497 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2498 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2500 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2507 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2508 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2509 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2510 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2511 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2512 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2514 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2515 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2517 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2518 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2519 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2520 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2521 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2522 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2523 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2524 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2525 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2526 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2532 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2533 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2534 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2535 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2537 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2538 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2540 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2541 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2542 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2544 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2545 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2546 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2547 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2548 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2549 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2550 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2554 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2559 pending_forward_info
2562 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2563 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2564 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2566 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2567 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2568 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2570 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2571 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2572 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2573 if !chan.should_announce() {
2574 return Err(LightningError {
2575 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2576 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2579 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2580 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2582 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2583 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2586 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2587 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2588 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2589 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2591 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2592 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2593 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2595 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2596 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2597 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2598 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2599 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2600 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2604 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2606 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2607 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2608 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2610 let enabled = chan.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
2611 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
2612 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
2613 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
2614 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
2617 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2618 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2620 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2621 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
2622 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2623 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2624 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2625 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2626 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2627 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2629 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2630 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2631 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2633 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2635 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2642 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2643 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2644 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2647 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2648 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2649 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2651 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2652 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2653 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2655 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2656 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2657 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2658 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2659 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
2661 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2663 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2664 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2665 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2666 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2669 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2670 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2671 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2672 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2673 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2674 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2675 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2676 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2678 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2679 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2680 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2682 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2683 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2685 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2686 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2687 Some(monitor_update) => {
2688 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2689 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2690 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2693 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2694 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2695 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2696 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2697 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2698 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2699 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2700 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2706 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2707 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2708 // `channel_by_id` map.
2709 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2710 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2715 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2716 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2718 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2723 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2725 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2726 /// fields for more info.
2728 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2729 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2731 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2733 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2734 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2735 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2736 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2737 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2739 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2740 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2741 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2742 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2743 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2745 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2746 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2747 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2748 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2750 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2752 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
2753 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2754 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2756 /// In general, a path may raise:
2757 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2758 /// node public key) is specified.
2759 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2760 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2762 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2763 /// relevant updates.
2765 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
2766 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2767 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2769 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2770 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2771 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
2772 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2773 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2774 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2775 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2776 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2777 self.pending_outbound_payments
2778 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2779 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2780 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2783 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2784 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2785 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2786 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2787 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2788 self.pending_outbound_payments
2789 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2790 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2791 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2792 &self.pending_events,
2793 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2794 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2798 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2799 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2800 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2801 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2802 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2803 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2807 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2808 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2809 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2813 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
2814 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
2818 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2819 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2820 /// retries are exhausted.
2822 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2823 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2825 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2826 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2827 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2829 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2830 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2832 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2833 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2834 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2835 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2836 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
2839 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2840 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2841 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2842 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2843 /// never reach the recipient.
2845 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2846 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2848 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2849 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2851 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2853 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2854 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2855 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2856 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2857 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2858 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
2859 &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2860 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2861 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2864 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2865 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2867 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2870 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2871 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2872 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2873 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2874 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
2875 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2876 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2877 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2878 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2879 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2882 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2883 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2884 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2885 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2886 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2887 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2888 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2889 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2890 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2893 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2896 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2897 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2900 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2901 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2902 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2903 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2904 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2905 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2906 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2907 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2909 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2910 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2911 let (msg, chan) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2913 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2915 let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2916 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2917 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2918 } else { unreachable!(); });
2920 Ok(funding_msg) => (funding_msg, chan),
2922 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2923 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2925 let _ = handle_error!(self, funding_res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
2926 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2927 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
2933 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2935 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2936 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2941 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2942 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2945 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2946 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2947 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2949 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2950 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2951 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2952 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2961 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2962 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2963 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2967 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2969 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2970 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2972 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2973 /// across the p2p network.
2975 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2976 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2978 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2979 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2980 /// keys per-channel).
2982 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2983 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2984 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2986 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2987 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2988 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2990 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2991 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2992 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2993 /// for more details.
2995 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2996 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2997 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2998 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3000 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3001 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3002 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3003 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3008 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3009 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
3010 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
3011 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
3012 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
3013 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3014 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3018 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3019 let mut output_index = None;
3020 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3021 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3022 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
3023 if output_index.is_some() {
3024 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3025 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3028 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
3029 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3030 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3033 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3036 if output_index.is_none() {
3037 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3038 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3041 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3045 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3047 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3048 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3049 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3050 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3052 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3053 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3055 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3056 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3058 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3060 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3061 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3062 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3063 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3064 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3065 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3066 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3067 pub fn update_channel_config(
3068 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3069 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3070 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3071 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3072 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3076 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
3077 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
3079 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3080 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3081 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3082 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3083 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3084 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3085 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
3086 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3087 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3091 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3092 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3093 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3096 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3097 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3098 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3099 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3100 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3108 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3109 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3111 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3112 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3114 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3115 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3116 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3117 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3118 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3120 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3121 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3123 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3126 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3127 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3128 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3129 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3130 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3131 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3133 let next_hop_scid = {
3134 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3135 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3136 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3137 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3138 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3139 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3141 if !chan.is_usable() {
3142 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3143 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3146 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3148 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3149 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3154 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3155 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3156 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3159 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3160 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3161 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3163 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3165 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3166 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3169 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3170 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3171 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3172 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3173 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3175 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3179 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3180 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3182 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3185 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3186 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3187 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3189 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3190 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3191 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3194 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3195 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3196 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3197 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3198 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3199 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3200 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3203 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3204 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3205 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3206 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3211 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3213 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3214 /// Will likely generate further events.
3215 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3216 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3218 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3219 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3220 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3222 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3223 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3225 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3226 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3227 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3229 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3230 match forward_info {
3231 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3232 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3233 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3234 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3235 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3238 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3239 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3240 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3242 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3243 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3244 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3245 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3246 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3247 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3250 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3251 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3253 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3256 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3257 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3263 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3264 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3266 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3270 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3271 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3273 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3277 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3278 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3279 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3280 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3281 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3283 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3284 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3285 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3286 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3287 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3289 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3291 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3292 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3296 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3297 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3298 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3299 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3305 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3308 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3311 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3312 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3313 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3314 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3315 // problem, not ours.
3321 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3322 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3324 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3328 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3329 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3330 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3331 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3334 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3335 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3336 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3337 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3338 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3341 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3342 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3343 match forward_info {
3344 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3345 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3346 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3347 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3348 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3351 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3352 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3353 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3354 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3355 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3356 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3357 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3358 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3360 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3361 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3362 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3364 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3365 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3367 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3369 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3370 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3371 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3372 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3377 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3378 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3380 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3381 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3382 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3383 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3385 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3386 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3388 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3390 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3391 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3392 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3401 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3402 match forward_info {
3403 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3404 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3405 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3406 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3409 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
3410 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3411 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3413 RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
3414 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
3415 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
3417 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3418 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: None, payment_metadata };
3419 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
3420 None, None, onion_fields)
3423 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3426 let mut claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3427 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3428 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3429 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3430 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3431 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3432 phantom_shared_secret,
3434 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3435 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3436 // if routing nodes overpay
3437 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3438 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3440 total_value_received: None,
3441 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3446 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
3448 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3449 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3450 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
3451 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3452 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3453 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3455 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3456 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3457 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3458 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3459 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3460 phantom_shared_secret,
3462 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3463 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3465 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
3468 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3469 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3470 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3471 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3472 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3475 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3476 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3477 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3479 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3480 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3481 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3484 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3485 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3486 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3488 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
3489 .entry(payment_hash)
3490 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
3491 .or_insert_with(|| {
3492 committed_to_claimable = true;
3494 purpose: purpose(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
3497 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
3498 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
3499 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3502 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
3504 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
3505 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3506 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3507 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3508 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3511 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3512 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
3513 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3514 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3515 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3516 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3517 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3518 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3519 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3520 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3521 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3523 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3525 _ => unreachable!(),
3528 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3529 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3530 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3531 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3532 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3533 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3534 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3535 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3536 } else if total_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3537 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3538 committed_to_claimable = true;
3540 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3541 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3542 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3543 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3544 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3545 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3549 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3550 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3551 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
3552 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
3554 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3556 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3557 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3559 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3560 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3561 committed_to_claimable = true;
3564 payment_claimable_generated
3568 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3569 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3570 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3571 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3572 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3573 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3574 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3575 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3576 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3577 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3578 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3579 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3580 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3581 Ok(result) => result,
3583 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3584 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3587 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3588 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3589 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3590 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3591 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3592 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3595 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3597 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3598 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3599 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3600 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3602 match claimable_payments.claimable_payments.entry(payment_hash) {
3603 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3604 let amount_msat = claimable_htlc.value;
3605 claimable_htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat);
3606 let claim_deadline = Some(claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER);
3607 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3608 e.insert(ClaimablePayment {
3609 purpose: purpose.clone(),
3610 onion_fields: Some(onion_fields.clone()),
3611 htlcs: vec![claimable_htlc],
3613 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3614 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3615 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3619 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3620 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3622 onion_fields: Some(onion_fields),
3625 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3626 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3627 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3633 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3634 if payment_data.is_none() {
3635 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3636 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3638 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3639 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3640 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3641 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3642 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3643 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3644 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3645 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3647 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3648 if payment_claimable_generated {
3649 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3655 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3656 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3664 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3665 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3666 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3667 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3668 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3669 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3671 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3672 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3674 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3676 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3677 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3678 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3680 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3682 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3683 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3684 events.append(&mut new_events);
3687 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3689 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3690 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3692 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3693 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3694 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3695 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3696 if background_events.is_empty() {
3700 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3702 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3703 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3704 // monitor updating completing.
3705 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3712 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3713 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3714 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3715 self.process_background_events();
3718 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3719 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3720 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3721 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3722 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3723 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3724 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3726 if !chan.is_live() {
3727 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3728 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3729 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3731 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3732 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3734 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3735 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3739 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3740 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3741 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3742 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3743 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3744 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3745 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3747 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3749 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3750 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3751 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3752 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3753 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3754 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3755 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3763 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3765 /// This currently includes:
3766 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3767 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3768 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3770 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3771 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
3772 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3774 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
3775 /// estimate fetches.
3777 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3778 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
3779 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3780 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3781 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3782 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3784 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3786 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3787 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3788 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3790 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3791 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3792 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3793 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3794 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3795 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3796 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3797 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3798 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3800 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3801 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3802 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3803 if needs_close { return false; }
3806 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3807 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
3808 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
3809 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.is_live()
3810 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3811 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.is_live()
3812 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3813 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.is_live() => {
3815 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
3816 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3817 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3818 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3822 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3824 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
3827 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.is_live() => {
3829 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
3830 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3831 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3832 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3836 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3838 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
3844 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3848 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3849 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3854 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3855 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3856 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3857 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3858 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3859 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3860 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3861 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3862 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3863 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3864 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3865 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3866 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3867 // have no channels to the peer.
3868 let remove_entry = {
3869 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3870 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3873 entry.remove_entry();
3876 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3881 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
3882 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
3883 // This should be unreachable
3884 debug_assert!(false);
3887 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3888 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3889 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3890 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
3891 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
3892 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
3893 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
3896 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
3897 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3898 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3900 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
3901 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3908 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3909 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3910 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3911 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3912 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3915 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3916 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3919 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3921 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3922 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3923 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3924 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3925 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3932 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3933 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3934 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3936 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3937 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3938 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3939 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3941 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3942 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3943 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3944 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3945 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3946 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3949 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3950 /// reason for the failure.
3952 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3953 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
3954 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3956 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
3957 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
3958 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
3959 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3960 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3961 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3962 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3967 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3968 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3969 match failure_code {
3970 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3971 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3972 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3973 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3974 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3975 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3980 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3981 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3983 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3985 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3986 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3987 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3988 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3989 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3990 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3991 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3993 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3995 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3996 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3998 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4003 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4004 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4005 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4006 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4007 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4008 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4009 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4010 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4011 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4012 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4014 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4015 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4016 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4017 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4019 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4020 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4021 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4022 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4023 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4027 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4028 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4029 // be surfaced to the user.
4030 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4031 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4032 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4034 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4035 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4036 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4037 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4038 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4039 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4040 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4041 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4043 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4045 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4048 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4049 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4050 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4051 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4055 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4056 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4057 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4058 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4059 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4060 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4061 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4062 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4063 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4066 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4067 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4068 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4071 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4072 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4073 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4075 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4076 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4077 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4078 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4079 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4081 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4082 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4083 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4085 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4086 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4087 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4088 push_forward_ev = true;
4090 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4091 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4092 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4094 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4095 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4098 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4099 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4100 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4101 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4102 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4103 failed_next_destination: destination,
4109 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4110 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4112 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4113 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4114 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4115 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4117 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4118 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4119 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4120 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4122 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4123 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4124 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4125 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4126 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4127 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4128 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4129 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4131 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4134 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4135 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4136 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4137 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4138 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4139 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4140 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4141 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4146 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4147 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4148 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4150 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4151 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4152 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4153 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4158 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4160 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4161 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4162 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4163 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4164 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4165 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4166 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4167 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4168 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4169 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4170 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4171 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4172 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4173 debug_assert!(false);
4177 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4179 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4180 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4181 debug_assert!(false);
4185 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4187 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4188 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4189 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4190 if sources.len() != 1 {
4191 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4192 debug_assert!(false);
4198 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4200 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4201 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4202 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4203 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4206 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4207 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4208 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4209 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4213 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4214 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4215 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4216 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4218 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4219 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4220 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4221 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4222 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4227 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4228 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4229 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4230 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4231 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4232 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4233 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4235 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4238 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4239 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4240 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4241 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4245 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4246 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4247 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4248 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4251 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4252 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4253 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4254 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4258 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4259 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4260 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4263 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4264 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4265 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4266 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4267 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4268 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4270 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4271 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4272 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4273 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4274 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4276 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4277 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4278 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4279 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4280 if let Err(e) = res {
4281 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4282 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4283 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4284 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4285 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4292 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4293 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4294 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4298 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4299 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4300 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4301 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4302 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4303 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4304 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4305 // again on restart.
4306 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4307 payment_preimage, update_res);
4309 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4310 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4311 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4312 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4313 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4314 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4318 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4319 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4322 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4324 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4325 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4327 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4328 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4329 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4330 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4331 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4332 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4333 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4336 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4337 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4339 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4341 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4344 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4348 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4349 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4350 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4356 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4357 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4358 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4361 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4362 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4364 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4365 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4366 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4367 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4368 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4372 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4373 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4379 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4380 /// update completion.
4381 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4382 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4383 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4384 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4385 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4386 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4387 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4388 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4389 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4390 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4391 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4392 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4393 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4395 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4397 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4398 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4399 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4400 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4403 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4404 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4406 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4407 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4408 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4413 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4414 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4415 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4416 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4421 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4422 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4423 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4424 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4425 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4430 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4434 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4440 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4441 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4442 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4446 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4447 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4448 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4454 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4455 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4457 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4458 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4460 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4461 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4462 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4463 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4464 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4469 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4470 let mut peer_state_lock;
4471 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4472 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4473 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4474 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4476 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4477 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4478 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4481 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4482 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4483 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4486 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4489 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4491 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4492 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4495 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4496 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4497 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4499 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4500 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4501 /// used to accept such channels.
4503 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4504 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4505 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4506 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4509 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4510 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4512 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4513 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4514 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4516 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4517 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4519 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4520 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4522 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4523 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4525 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4526 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4527 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4528 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4531 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4532 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4534 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4535 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4536 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4537 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4538 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4539 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4540 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4541 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4542 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4543 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4544 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4547 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4548 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4549 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4550 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4551 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4552 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4555 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4556 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4557 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4559 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4560 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4561 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4562 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4563 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4564 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4565 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4566 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4569 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4570 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4571 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4575 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4576 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4577 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4580 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4581 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4587 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4588 /// or 0-conf channels.
4590 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4591 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4592 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4593 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4594 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4595 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4597 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4598 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4599 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4600 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4601 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4602 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4603 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4607 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4610 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4611 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4613 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4614 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4615 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4616 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4618 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4621 num_unfunded_channels
4624 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4625 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4626 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4629 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4630 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4633 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4634 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4635 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4636 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4638 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4639 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4640 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4641 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4643 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4644 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4646 debug_assert!(false);
4647 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4649 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4650 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4652 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4653 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4654 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4655 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4656 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4657 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4659 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4660 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4661 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4664 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4665 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4666 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4667 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4668 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4671 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4672 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4673 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4676 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4677 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4681 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4682 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4683 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4684 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4686 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4687 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4688 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4689 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4691 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4692 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4693 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4696 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4697 pending_events.push(
4698 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4699 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4700 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4701 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4702 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4703 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4708 entry.insert(channel);
4714 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4715 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4716 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4717 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4719 debug_assert!(false);
4720 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4722 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4723 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4724 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4725 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4726 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4727 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4729 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4732 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4733 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4734 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4735 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4736 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4738 user_channel_id: user_id,
4743 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4744 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4746 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4747 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4749 debug_assert!(false);
4750 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4753 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4754 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4755 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4756 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4757 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4758 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4760 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4763 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4764 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4765 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4767 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4768 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4769 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4770 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4771 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4772 funding_msg.channel_id))
4774 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4775 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4779 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4780 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4781 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4782 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4783 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4784 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4785 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4789 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4791 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4792 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4793 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4795 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4796 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4797 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4798 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4799 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4800 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4801 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4802 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4810 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4811 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4812 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4813 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4815 debug_assert!(false);
4816 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4819 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4820 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4821 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4822 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4823 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4824 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4825 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4826 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4827 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4828 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4829 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4830 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4831 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4832 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4837 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4841 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4842 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4843 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4845 debug_assert!(false);
4846 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4848 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4849 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4850 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4851 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4852 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4853 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4854 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4855 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4856 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4857 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4858 msg: announcement_sigs,
4860 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4861 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4862 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4863 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4864 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4865 // announcement_signatures.
4866 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4867 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4868 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4869 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4876 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4877 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
4882 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4886 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4887 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4888 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4889 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4890 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4892 debug_assert!(false);
4893 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4895 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4896 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4897 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4898 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4900 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4901 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4902 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4903 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4906 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4907 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4908 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4909 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4911 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4912 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4913 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4914 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4915 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4916 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4921 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4922 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
4923 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4924 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4925 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
4929 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4932 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4933 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4934 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4935 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4941 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4942 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4943 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4945 debug_assert!(false);
4946 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4948 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4949 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4950 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4951 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4952 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4953 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4954 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4955 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4956 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4961 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4962 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4963 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4964 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4965 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4966 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4967 } else { (tx, None) }
4969 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4972 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4973 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4974 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4976 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4977 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4978 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4979 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4980 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4984 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4989 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4990 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4991 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4992 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4994 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4995 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4996 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4997 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4999 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5000 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5001 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5003 debug_assert!(false);
5004 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5006 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5007 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5008 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5009 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5011 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5012 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5013 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5014 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5015 match pending_forward_info {
5016 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5017 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5018 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5019 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5021 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5022 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5023 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5024 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5025 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5028 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5030 _ => pending_forward_info
5033 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
5035 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5040 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5041 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5042 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5043 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5045 debug_assert!(false);
5046 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5048 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5049 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5050 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5051 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5052 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5054 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5057 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5061 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5062 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5063 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5065 debug_assert!(false);
5066 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5068 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5069 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5070 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5071 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5072 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5074 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5079 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5080 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5081 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5083 debug_assert!(false);
5084 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5086 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5087 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5088 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5089 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5090 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5091 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5092 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5094 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5097 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5101 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5102 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5103 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5105 debug_assert!(false);
5106 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5108 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5109 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5110 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5111 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5112 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5113 let monitor_update = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5114 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5115 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5116 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
5117 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5119 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5124 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5125 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5126 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5127 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
5128 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5129 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5130 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5131 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5132 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5133 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5134 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5136 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5137 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5139 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5140 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5141 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5142 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5143 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5144 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5146 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5147 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5148 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5150 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5151 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5152 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5153 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5154 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5155 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5156 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5157 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5158 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5161 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5162 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5164 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5165 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5166 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5167 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5168 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5169 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5170 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5171 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5174 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5175 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5176 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5181 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5182 // payments are being processed.
5183 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5184 push_forward_event = true;
5186 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5187 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5194 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5195 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5198 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5199 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5200 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5202 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5206 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5207 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5208 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5209 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5210 .find(|ev| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5212 if !forward_ev_exists {
5213 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5215 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5220 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5221 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5222 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5223 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5225 debug_assert!(false);
5226 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5227 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5228 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5229 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5230 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5231 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5232 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5233 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5234 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5235 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5236 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5237 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5239 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5242 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5246 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5247 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5248 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5250 debug_assert!(false);
5251 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5253 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5254 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5255 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5256 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5257 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5259 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5264 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5265 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5266 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5268 debug_assert!(false);
5269 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5271 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5272 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5273 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5274 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5275 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5276 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5279 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5280 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5281 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5282 msg, &self.default_configuration
5284 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5285 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5286 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5289 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5294 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5295 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5296 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5297 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5299 // It's not a local channel
5300 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5303 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5304 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5305 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5306 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5308 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5309 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5310 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5311 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5312 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5313 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5314 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5315 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5316 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5317 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5319 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5321 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5322 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5323 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5324 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5326 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5327 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5330 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5332 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5335 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5337 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5338 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5340 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5342 debug_assert!(false);
5343 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5345 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5346 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5347 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5348 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5349 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5350 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5351 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5352 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5353 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5354 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5355 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5356 let mut channel_update = None;
5357 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5358 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5359 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5362 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5363 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5364 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5365 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5366 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5367 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5368 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5373 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5374 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5375 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5376 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5377 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5378 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5382 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5386 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5387 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5390 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5391 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5396 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5397 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5398 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5400 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5401 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5402 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5403 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5404 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5405 match monitor_event {
5406 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5407 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5408 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5409 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5411 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5412 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5413 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5414 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5417 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5418 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5419 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5420 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5422 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5423 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5424 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5425 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5428 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5429 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5430 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5431 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5432 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5433 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5434 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5435 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5436 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5437 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5438 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5442 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5443 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5445 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5447 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5448 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5449 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5450 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5451 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5458 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5459 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5465 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5466 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5469 has_pending_monitor_events
5472 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5473 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5474 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5476 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5477 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5478 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5479 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5481 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5486 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5487 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5488 /// update was applied.
5489 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5490 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5491 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5492 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5494 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5495 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5496 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5497 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5499 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5500 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5502 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5503 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5504 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5505 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5506 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5507 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5508 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5509 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5510 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5512 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5513 has_monitor_update = true;
5515 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5516 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5517 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5518 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5519 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5520 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5521 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5523 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5525 continue 'peer_loop;
5534 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5535 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5536 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5539 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5540 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5546 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5547 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5548 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5549 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5550 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5551 let mut has_update = false;
5553 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5555 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5556 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5557 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5558 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5559 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5560 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5561 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5562 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5564 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5565 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5568 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5569 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5570 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5571 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5572 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5577 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5579 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5580 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5581 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5587 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5588 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5596 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5597 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5603 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5604 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5606 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5607 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5608 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5609 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5610 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5611 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5612 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5613 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5614 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5615 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5616 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5617 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5618 assert!(should_broadcast);
5619 } else { unreachable!(); }
5620 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5622 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5626 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5627 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5629 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5630 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5633 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5635 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5636 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5637 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5638 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5639 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5640 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5641 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5642 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5643 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5644 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5645 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5646 // never fail a payment too early.
5647 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5649 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5652 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5657 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5660 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5661 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5663 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5664 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5665 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5666 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5668 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5670 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5671 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5675 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5676 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5678 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5680 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5681 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5683 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5684 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5685 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5686 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5687 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5688 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5689 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5690 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5691 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5692 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5693 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5696 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5697 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5699 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5702 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5704 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5706 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5707 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5708 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5709 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5710 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5713 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5714 /// stored external to LDK.
5716 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5717 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5718 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5720 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5721 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5724 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5725 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5726 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5727 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5729 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5730 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5731 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5732 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5733 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5735 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5736 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5737 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5738 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5739 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5741 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5742 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5744 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5745 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5749 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5750 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5752 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5754 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5755 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5757 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5758 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5759 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5760 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5761 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5762 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5763 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5766 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5767 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5769 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5772 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5774 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5776 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5777 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5780 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5781 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5783 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5784 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5785 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5788 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5789 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5791 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5792 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5793 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5794 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5796 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5797 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5798 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5799 Some(_) => continue,
5800 None => return scid_candidate
5805 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5807 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5808 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5810 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5811 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5812 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5816 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5817 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5818 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5820 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5821 /// times to get a unique scid.
5822 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5823 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5824 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5826 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5827 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5828 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5829 return scid_candidate
5833 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5834 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5835 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5836 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5838 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5839 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5840 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5841 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5842 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5843 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5844 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5845 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5854 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5855 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5856 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5857 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5858 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5862 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5863 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5864 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5869 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5870 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5871 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5875 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5876 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5880 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5881 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5884 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5885 /// using the given event handler.
5887 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5888 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5892 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
5896 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5898 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5899 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5900 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5901 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5902 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5903 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5907 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5908 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5909 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5910 /// is always placed next to each other.
5912 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5913 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5914 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5915 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5917 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5918 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5919 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5920 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5921 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5922 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5923 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5925 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5926 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5927 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5928 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5931 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5932 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5934 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5935 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5938 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5939 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5940 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5941 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5942 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5943 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5944 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5948 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5949 events.replace(pending_events);
5958 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5960 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5961 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5962 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5963 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5964 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5965 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5969 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5971 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5972 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5973 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5975 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
5979 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5981 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5982 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5983 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5984 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5985 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5986 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5990 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5992 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5993 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5994 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5995 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5996 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5999 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6000 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6003 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6004 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6005 let new_height = height - 1;
6007 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6008 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6009 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6010 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6011 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6012 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6015 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6019 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6021 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6022 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6023 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6024 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6025 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6026 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6030 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6031 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6032 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6033 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6035 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6036 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6038 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6039 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6040 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6042 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6043 if height < last_best_block_height {
6044 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6045 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6049 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6050 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6051 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6052 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6054 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6055 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6057 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6059 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6061 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6063 macro_rules! max_time {
6064 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6066 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6067 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6068 // having an explicit local time source.
6069 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6070 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6071 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6072 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6073 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6079 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6080 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6081 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6082 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6086 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6087 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6088 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6089 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6090 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6091 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6092 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6093 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6100 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6101 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6102 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6103 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
6104 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6105 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6106 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6107 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6112 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6114 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6115 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6116 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6117 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6118 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6119 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6123 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6124 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6126 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6127 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6128 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6129 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6130 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6132 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6133 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6135 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6136 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6137 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6138 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6139 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6140 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6141 let res = f(channel);
6142 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6143 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6144 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6145 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6146 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6148 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6149 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6150 if channel.is_usable() {
6151 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6152 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6153 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6154 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6159 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6164 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6165 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6168 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6169 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6170 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6171 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6172 msg: announcement_sigs,
6174 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6175 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6176 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6178 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6179 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6180 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6185 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6186 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6187 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6188 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6189 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6190 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6191 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6192 // is always consistent.
6193 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6194 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6195 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6196 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6197 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6200 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6201 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6202 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6203 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6204 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6205 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6206 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6210 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6211 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6212 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6213 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6214 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6215 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6216 data: reason_message,
6226 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6227 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
6228 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6229 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6230 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6231 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6232 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6233 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6234 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6235 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6237 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6238 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6239 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6243 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6246 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6247 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6248 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6249 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6250 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6251 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6252 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6253 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6254 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6257 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6258 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6259 _ => unreachable!(),
6261 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6262 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6263 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6264 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6270 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6272 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6273 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6277 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6279 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6280 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6282 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6283 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6286 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6287 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6288 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6291 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6292 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6293 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6294 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6297 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6298 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6299 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6300 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6303 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6304 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6306 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6307 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6308 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6309 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6310 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6313 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6314 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6315 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6316 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6319 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6320 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6321 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6322 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6325 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6326 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6327 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6328 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6332 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6333 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6335 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6336 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6337 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6338 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6339 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6340 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6344 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6345 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6346 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6349 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6350 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6351 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6354 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6355 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6356 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6359 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6360 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6361 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6364 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6365 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6366 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6369 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6370 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6371 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6374 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6375 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6376 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6379 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6380 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6381 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6384 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6385 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6386 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6389 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6390 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6391 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6394 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6395 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6396 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6399 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6400 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6401 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6404 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6405 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6406 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6409 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6410 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6411 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6414 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6415 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6416 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6419 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6420 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6421 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6424 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6429 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6430 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6431 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6434 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6435 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6436 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6437 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6439 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6440 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6441 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6442 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6443 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6444 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6445 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6446 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6447 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6448 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6449 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6454 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6456 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6457 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6458 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6459 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6460 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6461 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6462 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6463 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6464 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6465 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6466 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6467 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6468 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6469 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6470 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6471 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6472 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6473 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6474 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6475 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6476 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6479 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6480 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6481 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6482 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6485 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6487 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6489 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6490 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6494 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6495 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6496 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6500 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6502 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6503 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6504 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6505 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6506 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6507 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6510 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6511 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6512 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6513 if inbound_peer_limited {
6516 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6517 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6518 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6519 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6520 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6524 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6525 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6526 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6528 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6529 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6530 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6531 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6536 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6537 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6542 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6544 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6545 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6546 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6547 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6548 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6549 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6550 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6551 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6552 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6553 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6554 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6558 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6559 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6560 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6565 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6566 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6567 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6568 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6569 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6578 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6582 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6583 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6585 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6586 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6587 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6588 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6589 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6590 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6591 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6592 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6594 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6595 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6596 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6600 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6601 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6602 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6603 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6604 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6605 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6606 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6607 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6608 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6609 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6617 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6618 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6622 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6623 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6626 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6627 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6631 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6632 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6633 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6634 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6637 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6638 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6640 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6641 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6642 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6643 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6644 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6647 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6648 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6649 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6650 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6653 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6654 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6655 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6656 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6659 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6660 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6661 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6662 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6663 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
6664 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
6665 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6666 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6667 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6668 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6669 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6670 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6671 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6672 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6673 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6674 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6675 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6676 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6678 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6679 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6680 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6686 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6687 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6689 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6690 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6691 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6692 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6695 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6696 (2, node_id, required),
6697 (4, features, required),
6698 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6699 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6700 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6701 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6704 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6705 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6706 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6707 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6708 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6709 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6710 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6711 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6712 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6713 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6714 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6715 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6716 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6717 (7, self.config, option),
6718 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6719 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6720 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6721 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6722 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6723 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6724 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6725 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6726 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6727 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6728 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6729 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6730 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6731 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6732 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6733 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6734 (32, self.is_public, required),
6735 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6736 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6737 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6738 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6744 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6745 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6746 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6747 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6748 (2, channel_id, required),
6749 (3, channel_type, option),
6750 (4, counterparty, required),
6751 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6752 (6, funding_txo, option),
6753 (7, config, option),
6754 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6755 (9, confirmations, option),
6756 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6757 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6758 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6759 (16, balance_msat, required),
6760 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6761 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6762 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6763 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6764 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6765 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6766 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6767 (26, is_outbound, required),
6768 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6769 (30, is_usable, required),
6770 (32, is_public, required),
6771 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6772 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6773 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6774 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6777 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6778 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6779 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6780 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6781 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6785 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6787 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6788 outbound_scid_alias,
6792 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6793 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6795 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6796 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6797 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6798 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6799 confirmations_required,
6801 force_close_spend_delay,
6802 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6803 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6804 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6805 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6806 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6807 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6808 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
6813 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6814 (2, channels, vec_type),
6815 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6816 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6819 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6821 (0, onion_packet, required),
6822 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6825 (0, payment_data, required),
6826 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6827 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6828 (3, payment_metadata, option),
6830 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6831 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6832 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6833 (3, payment_metadata, option),
6837 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6838 (0, routing, required),
6839 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6840 (4, payment_hash, required),
6841 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6842 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6843 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6847 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6848 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6850 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6852 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6853 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6854 reason.write(writer)?;
6856 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6857 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6860 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6861 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6862 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6863 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6870 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6871 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6872 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6875 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6876 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6877 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6878 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6882 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6883 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6884 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6885 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6886 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6889 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6890 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6891 // messages contained in the variants.
6892 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6893 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6894 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6896 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6897 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6898 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6899 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6900 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6903 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6904 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6905 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6906 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6907 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6909 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6914 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6919 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6920 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6921 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6922 (2, outpoint, required),
6923 (4, htlc_id, required),
6924 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6927 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6928 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6929 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6930 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6931 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6933 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6934 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6935 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6936 (2, self.value, required),
6937 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
6938 (4, payment_data, option),
6939 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
6940 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6941 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6947 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6948 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6949 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6951 let mut sender_intended_value = None;
6952 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6953 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6954 let mut total_value_received = None;
6955 let mut total_msat = None;
6956 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6957 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6958 (0, prev_hop, required),
6959 (1, total_msat, option),
6960 (2, value, required),
6961 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
6962 (4, payment_data, option),
6963 (5, total_value_received, option),
6964 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6965 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6967 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6969 if payment_data.is_some() {
6970 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6972 if total_msat.is_none() {
6973 total_msat = Some(value);
6975 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6978 if total_msat.is_none() {
6979 if payment_data.is_none() {
6980 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6982 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6984 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6988 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6991 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
6992 total_value_received,
6993 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7000 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7001 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7002 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7005 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7006 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7007 let mut path_hops: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
7008 let mut payment_id = None;
7009 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
7010 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
7011 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7012 (0, session_priv, required),
7013 (1, payment_id, option),
7014 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7015 (4, path_hops, vec_type),
7016 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
7017 (6, blinded_tail, option),
7019 if payment_id.is_none() {
7020 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7022 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7024 let path = Path { hops: path_hops.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?, blinded_tail };
7025 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
7026 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7028 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
7029 if params.final_cltv_expiry_delta == 0 {
7030 params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7033 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7034 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7035 first_hop_htlc_msat,
7037 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7040 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7041 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7046 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7047 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7049 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
7051 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7052 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7053 (0, session_priv, required),
7054 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7055 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7056 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
7057 (4, path.hops, vec_type),
7058 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
7059 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
7062 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7064 field.write(writer)?;
7071 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7072 (0, forward_info, required),
7073 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7074 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7075 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7076 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7079 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7081 (0, htlc_id, required),
7082 (2, err_packet, required),
7087 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7088 (0, payment_secret, required),
7089 (2, expiry_time, required),
7090 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7091 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7092 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7095 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7097 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7098 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7099 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7100 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7101 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7102 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7106 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7107 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7109 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7111 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7113 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7114 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7115 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7118 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7120 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7121 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7122 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7123 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7124 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7125 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7126 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7127 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7129 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7130 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7131 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7132 unfunded_channels += 1;
7137 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7139 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7140 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7141 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7142 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7143 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7144 channel.write(writer)?;
7151 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7152 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7153 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7154 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7155 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7156 for forward in pending_forwards {
7157 forward.write(writer)?;
7162 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7164 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7165 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7166 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7168 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7169 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
7170 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7171 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
7172 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7173 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7174 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
7175 htlc.write(writer)?;
7177 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
7178 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
7181 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7182 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7183 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7184 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7185 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7186 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7187 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7190 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7191 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7192 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7193 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7194 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7196 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7197 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7198 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7199 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7200 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7201 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7202 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7207 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7208 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7209 for event in events.iter() {
7210 event.write(writer)?;
7213 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7214 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7215 for event in background_events.iter() {
7217 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7219 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7220 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7225 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7226 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7227 // likely to be identical.
7228 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7229 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7231 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7232 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7233 hash.write(writer)?;
7234 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7237 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7238 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7239 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7240 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7241 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7244 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7245 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7247 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7248 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7249 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7250 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7253 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7254 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7258 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7259 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7260 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7262 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7263 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7264 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7270 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7271 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7272 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7273 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7276 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7277 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7278 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7279 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7280 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7283 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7284 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7285 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7286 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7287 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7288 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7289 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7290 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7291 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7292 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7293 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7300 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7302 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7304 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7305 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7306 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7307 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7308 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7309 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7310 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7311 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7312 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7313 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7314 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7315 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7316 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7318 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7319 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7321 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7322 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7324 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7325 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7326 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7327 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7328 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7329 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7331 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7332 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7334 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7335 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7336 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7337 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7338 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7339 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7343 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7344 pub entropy_source: ES,
7346 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7347 pub node_signer: NS,
7349 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7350 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7352 pub signer_provider: SP,
7354 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7356 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7357 pub fee_estimator: F,
7358 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7360 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7361 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7362 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7363 pub chain_monitor: M,
7365 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7366 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7367 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7368 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7369 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7370 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7372 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7374 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7375 /// deserialization.
7377 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7378 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7379 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7381 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7382 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7384 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7385 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7386 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7387 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7389 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7392 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
7393 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7396 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7397 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7399 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7400 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7401 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7402 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7403 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7404 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7408 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7409 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7410 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7411 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7412 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7414 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7415 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7420 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7421 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7422 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7423 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7425 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7426 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7427 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7428 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7429 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7430 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7434 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7435 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7436 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7440 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7441 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7443 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7444 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7445 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7446 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7447 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7448 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7452 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7453 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7455 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7456 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7457 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7459 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7461 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7462 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7463 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7464 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7465 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7466 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7467 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
7468 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7469 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7470 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7472 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7473 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7474 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7475 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7476 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7477 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7478 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7479 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7480 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7481 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7482 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7483 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7484 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7485 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7486 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7487 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7488 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7489 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7490 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7491 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7492 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7493 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7494 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7495 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7496 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7497 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7498 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
7499 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate(monitor_update));
7501 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7502 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7503 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7504 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7505 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7507 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7508 let mut found_htlc = false;
7509 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7510 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7513 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7514 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7515 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7516 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7517 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7518 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7519 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7520 log_info!(args.logger,
7521 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7522 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7523 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7527 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7528 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7529 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7531 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7532 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7534 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7535 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7536 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7537 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7539 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7540 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7541 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7542 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7546 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7547 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7548 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7549 // safely discard the channel.
7550 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7551 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7552 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7553 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7554 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7557 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7558 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7559 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7560 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7561 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7562 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7566 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7567 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7568 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7569 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
7570 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
7572 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7576 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7577 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7578 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7579 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7580 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7581 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7582 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7583 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7584 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7586 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7589 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7590 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7591 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7592 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7593 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7594 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7595 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7596 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7598 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7601 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7602 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7603 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7604 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7605 let peer_state = PeerState {
7606 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7607 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7608 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7609 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7610 is_connected: false,
7612 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7615 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7616 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7617 for _ in 0..event_count {
7618 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7619 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7624 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7625 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7626 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7628 let (funding_txo, monitor_update): (OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate) = (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
7629 if pending_background_events.iter().find(|e| {
7630 let BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((pending_funding_txo, pending_monitor_update)) = e;
7631 *pending_funding_txo == funding_txo && *pending_monitor_update == monitor_update
7633 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7636 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7640 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7641 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7643 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7644 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7645 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7646 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7647 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7651 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7652 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7653 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7654 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7655 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7656 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7657 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7659 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7660 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7664 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7665 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7666 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7667 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7668 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7669 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7670 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7671 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7672 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
7673 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7674 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7675 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7676 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7677 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7678 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7679 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7680 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7681 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7682 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7683 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7684 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7685 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7687 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7688 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7691 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7692 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7695 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7696 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7699 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7700 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7701 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7702 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7703 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7704 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7706 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7708 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
7709 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7710 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
7714 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7715 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7716 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7717 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7718 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7719 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7720 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7722 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7723 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7724 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
7725 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
7726 if path.hops.is_empty() {
7727 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7728 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7731 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
7732 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7733 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7734 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7735 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7736 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7737 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7738 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7740 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7741 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
7742 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7743 retry_strategy: None,
7744 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7745 payment_params: None,
7746 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7747 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7748 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7749 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7750 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7751 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7752 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7753 total_msat: path_amt,
7754 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7756 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7757 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7762 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7764 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
7765 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7766 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7767 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7769 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7770 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7771 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7772 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7773 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7774 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7775 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7776 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7777 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7778 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7779 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7784 !forwards.is_empty()
7786 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7787 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7788 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7789 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7790 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7791 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7792 intercepted_id != ev_id
7799 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
7800 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
7801 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
7802 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
7803 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
7804 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
7805 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
7806 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
7807 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
7808 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
7809 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
7810 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
7811 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
7820 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
7821 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7822 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7823 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7824 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7825 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7826 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7827 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7831 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7832 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7834 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7835 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7836 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7837 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7839 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
7840 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7841 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7843 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
7844 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
7846 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
7847 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
7849 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7852 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
7853 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
7854 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
7856 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7860 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7861 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7862 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7863 if htlcs.is_empty() {
7864 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7866 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
7867 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7868 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7869 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7870 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7871 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7872 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7873 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7875 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7876 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7880 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7882 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7884 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7885 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7887 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
7888 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
7893 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7894 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7896 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7898 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7900 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7901 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7902 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7903 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7907 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7908 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7909 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7910 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7911 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7912 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7913 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7915 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7916 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7917 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7919 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7920 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7921 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7922 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7923 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7924 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7926 if chan.is_usable() {
7927 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7928 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7929 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7930 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7931 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7937 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7939 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7940 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7941 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
7942 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7943 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7944 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7945 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7946 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7947 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7948 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7949 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7951 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
7952 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7954 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7955 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7956 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7957 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7959 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7960 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7961 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7962 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7964 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7965 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7966 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7967 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7969 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7970 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7971 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7972 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7973 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7974 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7975 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7978 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7979 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7982 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7985 purpose: payment.purpose,
7986 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7992 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
7993 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
7994 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
7996 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
7997 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8001 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
8003 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
8004 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
8005 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
8006 router: args.router,
8008 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
8010 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
8011 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
8012 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
8013 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
8015 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
8016 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
8017 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
8018 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
8019 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
8020 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
8022 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
8027 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
8029 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
8031 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
8032 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
8033 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
8034 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
8036 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
8037 node_signer: args.node_signer,
8038 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
8040 logger: args.logger,
8041 default_configuration: args.default_config,
8044 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8045 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
8046 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
8047 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8048 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8051 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
8052 //connection or two.
8054 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
8060 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8061 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8062 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
8063 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
8064 use core::time::Duration;
8065 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
8066 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
8067 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
8068 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
8069 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8070 use crate::ln::msgs;
8071 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
8072 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
8073 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8074 use crate::util::test_utils;
8075 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
8076 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
8079 fn test_notify_limits() {
8080 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
8081 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
8082 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8083 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8084 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8085 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8087 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
8088 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
8089 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8090 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8091 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8093 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8095 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
8096 // to connect messages with new values
8097 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8098 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8099 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8100 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8101 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8102 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8104 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
8105 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8106 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8107 // ... but the last node should not.
8108 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8109 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
8110 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8111 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8113 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
8114 // about the channel.
8115 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8116 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8117 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8119 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
8121 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8122 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8123 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8124 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8125 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8126 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8128 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
8129 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8130 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8132 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
8133 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8134 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8135 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8136 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8137 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8139 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8140 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8141 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8142 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8143 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8144 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8145 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8146 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8148 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8149 // the channel info has updated.
8150 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8151 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8152 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8153 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8154 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8155 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8159 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8160 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8162 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8163 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8164 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8165 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8166 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8168 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8169 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8170 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8171 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8173 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8174 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8175 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8176 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8177 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8178 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8179 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
8180 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8181 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8182 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8183 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8184 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8186 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8187 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8188 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8189 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8190 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8191 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8192 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8193 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8194 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8195 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8196 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8197 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8198 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8200 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8201 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8202 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8203 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8204 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8205 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8206 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8207 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8208 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8210 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8211 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
8212 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8213 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8214 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8215 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8216 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8218 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8219 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8220 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8221 // lightning messages manually.
8222 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8223 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8224 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8226 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8227 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8228 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8229 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8230 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8231 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8232 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8233 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8234 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8235 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8236 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8237 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8238 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8239 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8240 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8241 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8242 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8243 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8244 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8245 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8246 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8247 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8248 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8249 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8250 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8252 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8253 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8254 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8255 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8257 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8258 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8259 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8260 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8262 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8265 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8266 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8267 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8268 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8270 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8273 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8274 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8275 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8276 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8278 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8283 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8284 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8285 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8286 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8287 // fails as expected.
8288 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8289 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8290 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8291 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8292 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8293 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8294 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8296 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8297 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8298 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8300 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8301 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8302 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8303 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8305 let route = find_route(
8306 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8307 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8309 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8310 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8312 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8313 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8314 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8315 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8316 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8317 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8318 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8319 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8320 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8321 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8322 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8323 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8324 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8325 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8326 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8327 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8328 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8329 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8330 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8331 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8332 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8334 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8335 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8337 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8338 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8339 let route = find_route(
8340 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8341 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8343 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8344 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8345 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8346 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8347 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8348 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8349 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8350 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8352 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8353 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8354 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8355 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8357 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8358 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8359 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8360 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8361 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8362 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8363 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8364 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8365 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8366 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8367 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8368 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8369 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8370 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8371 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8372 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8373 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8374 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8375 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8377 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8378 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8382 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8383 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8384 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8385 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8386 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8387 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8388 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8390 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8391 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8393 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8394 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8395 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8396 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8398 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8399 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8400 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8401 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8402 let route = find_route(
8403 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8404 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8407 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8408 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8409 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
8410 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8411 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
8412 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8413 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8415 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8416 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8417 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8418 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8419 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8420 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8421 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8423 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
8427 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8428 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8429 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8430 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8431 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8432 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8434 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8435 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8437 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8438 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8439 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8440 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8442 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8443 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8444 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8445 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8446 let route = find_route(
8447 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8448 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8451 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8452 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8453 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8454 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
8455 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8456 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
8457 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
8458 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8459 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8461 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8462 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8463 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8464 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8465 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8466 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8467 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8469 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
8473 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8474 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8475 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8476 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8477 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8479 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8480 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8481 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8482 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8484 // Marshall an MPP route.
8485 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8486 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8487 route.paths.push(path);
8488 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8489 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8490 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8491 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8492 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8493 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8495 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8496 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
8498 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8499 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
8501 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8506 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8507 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8508 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8509 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8510 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8512 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8514 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8515 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8517 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8518 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8519 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8520 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8523 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8524 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8525 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8526 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8527 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8528 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8531 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8534 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8535 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8540 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8541 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8542 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8543 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8544 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8545 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8547 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8548 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8550 total_msat: 100_000,
8553 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8554 // payment verification fails as expected.
8555 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8556 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8557 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8558 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8560 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
8564 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8565 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8569 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8570 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8571 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8572 // the channel is successfully closed.
8573 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8574 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8575 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8576 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8578 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8579 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8580 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8581 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8582 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8584 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8585 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8587 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8588 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8589 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8590 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8593 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8595 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8596 // as it has the funding transaction.
8597 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8598 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8599 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8602 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8604 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8606 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8608 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8609 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8610 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8612 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8615 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8616 // as it has the funding transaction.
8617 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8618 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8619 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8621 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8622 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8623 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8624 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8625 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8626 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8627 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8628 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8630 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8631 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8632 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8633 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8635 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8636 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8638 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8639 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8640 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8641 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8642 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8643 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8644 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8648 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8649 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8650 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8651 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8652 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8653 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8654 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8657 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8659 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8660 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8661 // closing transaction).
8662 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8663 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8664 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8666 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8667 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8668 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8669 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8670 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8673 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8675 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8677 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8678 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8679 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8681 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8683 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8684 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8687 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8688 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8689 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8692 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8693 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8694 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8697 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8699 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8700 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8702 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8703 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8705 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8706 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8711 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8712 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8713 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8714 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8715 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8716 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8717 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8718 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8721 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8722 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8723 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8725 // Test the API functions.
8726 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8728 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8730 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8732 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8734 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8736 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8738 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8742 fn test_connection_limiting() {
8743 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
8744 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8745 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8746 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8747 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8749 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8751 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8752 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8754 let mut funding_tx = None;
8755 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8756 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8757 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8760 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8761 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8762 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
8763 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
8764 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8766 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8767 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8768 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8770 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8772 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8773 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8774 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8776 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8779 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
8780 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8781 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8782 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8783 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8785 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
8786 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
8788 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
8789 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
8790 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8791 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8792 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
8793 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8794 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8796 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8797 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8798 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8799 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8801 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
8802 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
8803 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8804 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8805 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
8806 for ev in chan_closed_events {
8807 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
8809 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8810 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8811 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8812 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8814 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
8815 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8816 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8817 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8819 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
8820 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
8822 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
8823 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8824 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
8825 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
8826 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8828 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8829 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8830 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8832 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
8833 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8834 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
8836 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
8837 // "protected" and can connect again.
8838 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
8839 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8840 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8841 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8843 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
8845 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8846 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8850 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
8851 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
8852 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8853 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8854 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8855 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8857 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8859 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8860 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8862 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8863 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8864 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8865 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8868 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
8870 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8871 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8872 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8874 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
8875 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8876 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8878 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
8879 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8880 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8881 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8885 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
8886 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
8887 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
8888 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8889 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8890 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
8891 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8892 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
8893 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8895 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8897 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8898 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8900 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
8901 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8902 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8903 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8904 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8905 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8907 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8908 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8910 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8911 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8913 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8915 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
8916 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8919 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
8920 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8921 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8922 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8923 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8924 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8925 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8927 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8928 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
8929 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
8930 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
8934 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8936 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8937 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8939 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
8940 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8941 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8943 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8944 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8946 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8948 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8953 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8954 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8955 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8956 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8957 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8958 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8959 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8960 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8961 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8962 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8963 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8965 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8966 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8967 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8969 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8970 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8972 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8973 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8975 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8978 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8979 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8981 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8982 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8984 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8988 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8990 use crate::chain::Listen;
8991 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8992 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8993 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8994 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
8995 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8996 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8997 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8998 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
8999 use crate::util::test_utils;
9000 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9002 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9003 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9004 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
9006 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
9010 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
9011 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
9012 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
9013 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
9014 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
9015 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
9016 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
9018 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
9019 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
9021 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
9022 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
9024 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
9026 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
9031 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
9032 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
9035 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
9036 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
9037 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
9039 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
9041 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
9042 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
9043 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9044 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
9045 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
9047 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
9048 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
9050 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
9051 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
9052 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
9053 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9055 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9057 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
9059 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9060 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
9061 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
9062 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
9063 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9065 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9067 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
9069 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9070 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
9071 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9072 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9073 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9076 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
9077 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9078 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
9080 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9081 } else { panic!(); }
9083 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9084 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9085 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9087 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9088 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9090 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9093 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9094 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9095 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9097 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9098 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9100 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9103 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
9106 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
9109 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
9110 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
9112 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9113 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9114 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
9115 match msg_events[0] {
9116 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
9117 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
9118 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9122 match msg_events[1] {
9123 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9127 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9128 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9130 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9131 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9133 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9136 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9137 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9139 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9140 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9142 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9145 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
9146 macro_rules! send_payment {
9147 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
9148 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9149 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
9150 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
9151 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
9153 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
9154 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
9156 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
9157 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
9158 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
9159 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
9160 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
9161 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9162 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
9163 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
9164 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9165 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9166 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9168 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
9169 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
9170 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9171 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
9173 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
9174 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
9175 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
9176 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9177 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
9179 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
9182 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
9183 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9184 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9185 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9187 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
9192 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
9193 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);