1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
49 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
50 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
51 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
53 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
55 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
57 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
59 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
60 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
61 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
62 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
63 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
65 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
66 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
67 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
68 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
69 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
70 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
71 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
72 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
73 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
74 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
75 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
76 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
77 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
79 crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
80 crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
81 crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
82 crate::sign::KeysManager,
85 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
88 use crate::prelude::*;
90 use core::cell::RefCell;
92 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
93 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
94 use core::time::Duration;
97 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
98 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
99 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
101 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
103 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
104 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
105 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
107 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
108 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
109 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
110 // before we forward it.
112 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
113 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
114 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
115 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
116 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
118 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
119 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
120 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
121 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
122 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
124 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
125 /// do with the HTLC.
126 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
127 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
129 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
130 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
131 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
132 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
133 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
134 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
136 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
138 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
139 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
141 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
142 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
143 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
144 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
145 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
147 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
148 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
149 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
150 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
151 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
153 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
154 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
155 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
156 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
158 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
159 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
161 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
162 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
163 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
164 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
165 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
166 requires_blinded_error: bool,
168 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
169 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
170 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
172 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
173 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
175 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
176 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
177 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
178 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
179 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
180 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
181 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
183 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
184 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
185 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
186 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
188 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
189 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
190 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
192 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
193 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
194 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
198 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
199 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
200 pub struct BlindedForward {
201 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
202 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
203 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
204 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
205 // Another field will be added here when we support forwarding as a non-intro node.
208 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
209 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
210 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
211 // TODO: needs update when we support forwarding blinded HTLCs as non-intro node
213 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(_), .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode),
214 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
220 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
222 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
223 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
224 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
225 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
226 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
227 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
229 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
230 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
231 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
232 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
233 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
235 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
237 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
238 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
239 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
241 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
242 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
243 /// it along another path).
245 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
246 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
247 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
248 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
249 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
250 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
251 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
252 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
253 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
255 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
258 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
260 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
262 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
265 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
266 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
267 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
268 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
271 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
272 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
273 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
274 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
275 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
278 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
279 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
280 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
282 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
283 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
284 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
287 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
288 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
290 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
291 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
294 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
295 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
296 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
299 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
304 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
308 // Used for failing blinded HTLCs backwards correctly.
309 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
310 enum BlindedFailure {
311 FromIntroductionNode,
315 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
316 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
317 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
318 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
319 short_channel_id: u64,
320 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
322 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
323 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
324 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
326 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
327 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
332 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
334 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
335 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
336 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
338 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
339 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
342 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
343 struct ClaimableHTLC {
344 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
346 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
348 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
349 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
350 sender_intended_value: u64,
351 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
353 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
354 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
355 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
356 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
358 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
359 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
362 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
363 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
364 events::ClaimedHTLC {
365 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
366 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
367 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
368 value_msat: val.value,
369 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
374 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
375 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
377 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
378 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
379 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
382 /// Number of bytes in the id.
383 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
386 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
387 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
392 impl Readable for PaymentId {
393 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
394 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
399 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
400 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
401 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
405 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
407 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
408 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
409 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
411 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
412 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
417 impl Readable for InterceptId {
418 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
419 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
424 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
425 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
426 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
427 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
428 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
431 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
433 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
434 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
435 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
437 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
438 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
442 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
443 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
444 (0, short_channel_id, required),
445 (2, htlc_id, required),
447 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
448 (0, session_priv, required),
453 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
454 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
455 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
456 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
457 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
460 session_priv: SecretKey,
461 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
462 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
463 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
464 payment_id: PaymentId,
467 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
468 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
469 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
471 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
473 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
475 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
478 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
479 payment_id.hash(hasher);
480 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
486 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
488 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
489 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
490 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
491 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
492 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
493 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
497 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
498 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
499 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
500 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
501 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
502 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
504 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
510 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
511 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
513 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
514 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
515 pub enum FailureCode {
516 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
517 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
518 TemporaryNodeFailure,
519 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
520 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
521 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
522 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
523 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
524 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
525 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
526 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
527 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
528 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
530 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
531 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
532 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
535 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
536 fn into(self) -> u16 {
538 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
539 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
540 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
541 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
546 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
547 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
548 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
549 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
550 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
552 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
553 err: msgs::LightningError,
554 closes_channel: bool,
555 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
557 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
559 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
561 err: LightningError {
563 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
564 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
570 closes_channel: false,
571 shutdown_finish: None,
575 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
576 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
579 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
580 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
581 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
582 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
583 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
584 // commitment upon reconnecting.
585 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
587 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
590 err: LightningError { err, action },
591 closes_channel: true,
592 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
596 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
599 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
601 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
602 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
606 log_level: Level::Warn,
609 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
611 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
613 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
615 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
616 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
623 closes_channel: false,
624 shutdown_finish: None,
628 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
633 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
634 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
635 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
636 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
637 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
639 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
640 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
641 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
642 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
643 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
644 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
645 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
647 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
651 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
652 struct ClaimingPayment {
654 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
655 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
656 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
657 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
659 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
660 (0, amount_msat, required),
661 (2, payment_purpose, required),
662 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
663 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
664 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
667 struct ClaimablePayment {
668 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
669 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
670 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
673 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
674 struct ClaimablePayments {
675 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
676 /// failed/claimed by the user.
678 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
679 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
681 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
682 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
683 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
685 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
686 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
687 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
688 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
691 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
692 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
693 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
694 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
696 enum BackgroundEvent {
697 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
698 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
699 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
700 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
702 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
703 /// are regenerated on startup.
704 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
705 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
706 /// channel to continue normal operation.
708 /// In general this should be used rather than
709 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
710 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
711 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
713 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
714 /// are regenerated on startup.
715 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
716 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
717 funding_txo: OutPoint,
718 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
720 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
721 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
723 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
724 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
725 channel_id: ChannelId,
730 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
731 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
732 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
733 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
734 /// event can be generated.
735 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
736 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
737 /// operation of another channel.
739 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
740 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
741 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
742 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
744 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
745 event: events::Event,
746 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
748 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
749 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
750 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
752 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
753 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
754 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
755 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
756 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
758 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
759 /// stored for later processing.
760 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
761 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
762 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
763 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
767 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
768 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
769 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
770 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
771 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
772 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
773 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
774 (4, blocking_action, required),
776 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
777 (0, event, upgradable_required),
778 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
779 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
780 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
781 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
782 // downgrades to prior versions.
783 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
787 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
788 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
789 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
790 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
791 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
794 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
795 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
796 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
797 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
801 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
802 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
803 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
804 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
805 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
806 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
808 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
809 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
810 channel_id: ChannelId,
811 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
816 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
817 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
818 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
819 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
820 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
825 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
826 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
830 /// State we hold per-peer.
831 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
832 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
834 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
835 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
836 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
838 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
839 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
840 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
841 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
842 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
843 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
844 latest_features: InitFeatures,
845 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
846 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
847 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
848 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
849 /// user but which have not yet completed.
851 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
852 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
853 /// for a missing channel.
854 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
855 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
856 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
858 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
859 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
860 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
861 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
863 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
864 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
865 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
866 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
867 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
868 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
869 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
870 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
871 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
872 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
873 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
874 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
875 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
876 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
877 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
881 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
882 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
883 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
884 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
885 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
886 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
889 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
890 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
891 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
894 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
895 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
896 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
899 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
900 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
901 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
902 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
906 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
907 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
908 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
909 /// The original OpenChannel message.
910 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
911 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
912 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
915 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
916 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
917 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
919 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
920 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
922 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
925 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
926 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
927 struct PendingInboundPayment {
928 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
929 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
930 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
931 /// this payment being removed.
933 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
934 user_payment_id: u64,
935 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
936 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
937 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
940 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
941 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
942 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
943 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
944 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
945 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
946 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
947 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
949 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
950 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
951 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
959 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
961 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
962 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
963 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
968 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
969 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
970 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
971 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
972 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
973 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
974 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
975 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
976 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
978 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
979 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
980 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
989 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
991 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
992 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
993 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
998 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1000 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1002 pub trait AChannelManager {
1003 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1004 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1005 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1006 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1007 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1008 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1009 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1010 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1011 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1012 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1013 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1014 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1015 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1016 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1017 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1018 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1019 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1020 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1021 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1022 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1023 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1024 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1025 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1026 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1027 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1028 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1029 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1030 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1031 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1032 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1033 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1034 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1035 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1036 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1037 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1038 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1041 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1042 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1044 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1045 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1046 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1047 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1048 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1049 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1053 type Watch = M::Target;
1055 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1057 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1059 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1061 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1062 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1064 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1066 type Router = R::Target;
1068 type Logger = L::Target;
1070 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1073 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
1074 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
1076 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
1077 /// to individual Channels.
1079 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1080 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1081 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1082 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1084 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1085 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1086 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1087 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1088 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1089 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1090 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1091 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1092 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1094 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1095 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1096 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1098 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1099 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1100 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1101 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1102 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1104 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1105 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1106 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1107 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1109 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1110 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1111 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1113 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1114 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1115 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1116 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1117 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1119 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1120 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1121 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1122 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1123 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1124 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1125 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1126 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1129 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1130 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1131 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1132 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1133 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1137 // `pending_offers_messages`
1139 // `total_consistency_lock`
1141 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1143 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1145 // |__`per_peer_state`
1147 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1149 // |__`claimable_payments`
1151 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1155 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1157 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1159 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1163 // |__`pending_events`
1165 // |__`pending_background_events`
1167 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1169 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1170 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1171 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1172 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1173 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1174 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1178 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1179 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1180 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1186 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1188 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1190 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1191 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1193 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1194 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1195 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1196 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1198 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1199 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1201 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1202 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1203 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1204 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1205 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1206 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1207 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1208 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1210 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1212 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1213 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1215 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1217 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1218 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1219 /// and via the classic SCID.
1221 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1222 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1224 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1226 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1228 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1229 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1230 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1232 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1233 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1235 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1236 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1238 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1239 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1241 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1242 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1243 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1244 /// active channel list on load.
1246 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1247 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1249 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1251 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1252 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1253 /// the handling of the events.
1255 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1256 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1259 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1260 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1261 /// would break backwards compatability.
1262 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1263 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1264 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1266 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1268 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1270 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1272 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1274 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1275 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1276 /// confirmation depth.
1278 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1279 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1280 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1282 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1284 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1286 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1288 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1290 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1292 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1293 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1294 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1296 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1297 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1299 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1300 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1301 /// keeping additional state.
1302 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1304 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1305 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1306 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1307 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1309 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1310 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1312 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1313 /// are currently open with that peer.
1315 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1316 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1319 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1321 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1322 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1323 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1324 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1325 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1327 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1328 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1329 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1330 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1331 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1333 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1334 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1336 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1337 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1338 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1339 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1340 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1342 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1343 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1345 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1346 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1347 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1348 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1349 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1351 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1353 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1355 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1356 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1357 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1358 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1359 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1360 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1361 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1362 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1363 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1364 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1365 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1367 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1368 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1369 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1371 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1373 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1374 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1376 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1380 signer_provider: SP,
1385 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1387 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1388 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1389 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1390 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1391 pub struct ChainParameters {
1392 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1393 pub network: Network,
1395 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1397 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1398 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1401 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1405 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1406 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1409 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1410 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1411 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1412 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1413 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1414 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1416 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1417 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1418 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1419 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1420 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1421 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1423 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1424 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1427 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1428 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1429 /// events to handle.
1431 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1432 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1434 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1435 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1438 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1439 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1440 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1441 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1443 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1444 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1445 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1446 should_persist: move || {
1447 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1448 // processing and return that.
1449 let notify = persist_check();
1450 match (notify, force_notify) {
1451 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1452 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1453 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1454 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1455 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1458 _read_guard: read_guard,
1462 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1463 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1464 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1465 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1466 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1467 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1469 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1470 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1471 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1472 should_persist: persist_check,
1473 _read_guard: read_guard,
1478 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1479 fn drop(&mut self) {
1480 match (self.should_persist)() {
1481 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1482 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1483 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1485 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1486 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1487 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1492 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1493 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1495 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1497 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1498 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1499 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1500 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1501 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1503 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1504 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1506 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1508 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1509 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1510 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1511 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1512 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1513 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1514 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1515 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1516 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1517 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1518 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1519 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1520 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1522 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1523 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1525 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1526 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1527 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1528 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1530 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1531 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1532 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1533 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1534 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1535 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1537 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1539 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1540 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1542 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1544 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1545 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1547 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1548 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1549 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1551 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1552 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1553 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1555 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1556 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1557 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1558 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1560 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1561 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1562 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1564 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1565 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1566 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1568 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1569 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1570 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1571 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1572 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1573 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1574 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1575 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1576 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1577 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1578 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1581 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1582 /// to better separate parameters.
1583 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1584 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1585 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1586 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1587 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1588 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1589 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1590 pub features: InitFeatures,
1591 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1592 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1593 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1595 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1597 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1598 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1599 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1600 /// payments to us through this channel.
1601 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1602 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1603 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1604 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1605 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1606 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1607 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1610 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1611 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1612 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1613 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1614 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1615 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1616 /// lifetime of the channel.
1617 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1618 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1619 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1620 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1621 /// our counterparty already.
1623 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1624 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1625 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1626 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1628 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1629 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1630 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1631 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1633 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1634 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1636 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1637 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1639 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1640 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1641 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1642 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1643 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1644 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1645 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1646 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1647 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1650 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1652 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1653 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1654 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1655 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1656 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1657 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1658 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1660 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1661 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1663 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1664 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1665 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1666 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1667 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1668 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1669 /// this value on chain.
1671 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1673 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1675 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1676 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1677 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1678 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1679 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1680 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1681 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1683 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1684 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1685 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1686 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1687 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1688 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1690 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1691 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1692 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1693 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1694 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1696 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1697 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1698 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1699 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1701 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1702 pub balance_msat: u64,
1703 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1704 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1705 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1706 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1708 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1710 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1711 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1712 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1713 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1714 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1715 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1716 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1717 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1719 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1720 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1721 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1722 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1723 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1724 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1725 /// route which is valid.
1726 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1727 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1728 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1729 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1730 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1731 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1733 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1734 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1735 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1736 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1737 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1738 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1739 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1740 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1741 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1743 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1745 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1746 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1747 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1748 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1749 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1751 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1752 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1753 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1754 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1755 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1756 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1757 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1759 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1760 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1761 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1762 pub is_outbound: bool,
1763 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1764 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1765 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1766 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1767 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1769 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1770 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1771 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1772 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1773 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1774 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1775 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1777 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1778 pub is_usable: bool,
1779 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1780 pub is_public: bool,
1781 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1782 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1783 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1784 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1785 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1786 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1788 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1789 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1792 impl ChannelDetails {
1793 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1794 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1795 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1797 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1798 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1799 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1800 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1803 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1804 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1805 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1807 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1808 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1809 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1810 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1813 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1814 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1815 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1818 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1819 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1821 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1822 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1823 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1825 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1826 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1827 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1828 features: latest_features,
1829 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1830 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1831 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1832 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1833 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1834 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1835 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1836 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1837 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1838 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1840 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1841 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1842 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1843 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1844 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1845 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1846 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1847 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1848 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1849 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1850 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1851 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1852 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1853 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1854 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1855 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1856 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1857 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1858 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1859 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1860 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1861 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1862 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1863 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1864 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1865 config: Some(context.config()),
1866 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1871 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1872 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1873 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1874 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1875 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1876 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1877 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1878 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1879 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1881 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1883 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1884 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1886 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1887 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1888 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1889 /// to drop the channel.
1893 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1894 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1895 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1896 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1897 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1899 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1900 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1901 payment_id: PaymentId,
1903 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1905 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1906 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1907 payment_id: PaymentId,
1908 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1910 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1911 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1912 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1915 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1916 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1917 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1919 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1920 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1921 payment_id: PaymentId,
1922 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1923 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1924 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1926 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1927 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1928 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1930 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1931 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1932 payment_id: PaymentId,
1933 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1934 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1938 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1940 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1942 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1943 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1944 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1945 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1947 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1948 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1949 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1952 macro_rules! handle_error {
1953 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1954 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1955 // entering the macro.
1956 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1957 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1961 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
1962 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1964 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1965 let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
1966 let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
1967 let logger = WithContext::from(
1968 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
1970 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
1972 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1973 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1974 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1979 log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
1982 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1984 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1985 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1986 action: err.action.clone()
1990 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1991 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1992 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1993 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1994 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1998 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2005 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2006 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2007 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2008 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2010 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2011 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2012 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2014 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2015 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2016 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2017 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2018 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2020 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2021 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2023 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2027 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2028 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2029 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2031 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2032 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2034 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2035 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2037 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2038 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2039 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2040 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2041 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2042 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2044 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2049 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2050 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2052 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2053 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2055 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2056 match $channel_phase {
2057 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2058 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2060 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2061 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2063 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2064 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2070 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2071 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2075 let key = *$entry.key();
2076 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2078 $entry.remove_entry();
2086 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2087 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2091 let key = *$entry.key();
2092 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2094 $entry.remove_entry();
2102 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2103 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2105 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2106 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2112 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2113 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2114 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2115 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2116 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2118 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2119 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2120 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2121 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2122 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2123 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2124 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2125 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2126 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2127 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2132 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2133 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2134 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2135 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2136 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2137 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2138 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2139 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2140 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2142 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2147 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2148 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2149 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2150 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2151 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2152 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2153 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2154 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2155 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2157 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2162 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2163 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2164 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2165 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2166 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2167 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2168 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2169 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2170 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2171 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2172 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2173 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2175 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2176 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2177 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2183 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2184 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2186 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2187 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2188 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2189 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2190 updates.announcement_sigs);
2191 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2192 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2195 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2196 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2197 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2198 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2200 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2201 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2202 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2203 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2204 let mut batch_completed = false;
2205 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2206 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2207 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2208 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2210 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2211 channel_state.2 = true;
2213 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2215 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2217 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2220 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2221 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2222 if batch_completed {
2223 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2224 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2225 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2226 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2227 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2228 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2229 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2230 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2231 chan.set_batch_ready();
2232 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2233 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2237 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2238 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2239 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2244 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2246 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2247 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2249 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2250 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2251 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2252 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2257 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2258 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2259 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2260 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2262 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2263 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2264 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2265 panic!("{}", err_str);
2267 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2268 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2269 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2272 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2278 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2279 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2280 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2282 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2283 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2284 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2285 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2286 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2287 // filter for uniqueness here.
2288 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2289 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2290 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2291 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2293 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2294 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2296 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2297 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2298 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2304 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2305 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2306 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2307 while !processed_all_events {
2308 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2315 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2316 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2317 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2319 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2320 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2321 result = $self.process_background_events();
2323 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2324 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2325 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2326 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2330 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2331 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2332 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2333 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2336 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2338 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2339 $event_to_handle = event;
2341 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2342 post_event_actions.push(action);
2347 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2348 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2349 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2350 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2351 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2352 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2355 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2356 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2357 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2358 processed_all_events = false;
2362 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2363 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2364 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2366 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2367 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2368 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2374 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2376 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2377 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2378 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2379 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2380 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2381 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2385 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2387 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2389 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2390 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2392 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2394 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2395 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2396 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2399 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2400 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2401 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2403 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2404 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2405 current_timestamp: u32,
2407 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2408 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2409 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2410 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2412 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2413 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2414 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2419 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2421 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2422 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2423 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2424 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2425 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2426 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2427 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2428 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2430 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2433 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2434 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2436 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2438 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2440 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2442 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2443 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2444 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2445 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2446 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2447 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2448 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2449 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2451 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2461 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2462 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2463 &self.default_configuration
2466 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2467 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2468 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2471 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2472 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2474 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2476 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2480 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2485 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2487 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2488 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2489 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2490 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2491 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2493 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2494 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2496 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2497 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2498 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2500 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2501 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2502 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2504 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2505 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2507 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2508 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2509 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2510 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2511 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2512 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2514 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2515 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2516 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2517 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2518 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2519 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2522 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2523 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2524 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2526 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2528 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2529 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2531 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2533 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2534 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2535 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2540 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2541 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2542 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2543 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2544 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2545 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2549 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2554 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2556 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2557 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2558 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2560 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2562 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2565 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2568 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2569 node_id: their_network_key,
2572 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2575 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2576 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2577 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2578 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2579 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2580 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2581 // the same channel.
2582 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2584 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2585 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2586 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2587 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2588 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2589 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2590 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2591 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2592 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2596 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2597 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2598 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2606 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2607 /// more information.
2608 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2609 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2610 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2611 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2612 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2613 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2614 // the same channel.
2615 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2617 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2618 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2619 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2620 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2621 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2622 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2623 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2624 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2632 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2633 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2635 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2636 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2638 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2639 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2640 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2641 // really wanted anyway.
2642 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2645 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2646 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2647 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2648 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2650 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2651 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2652 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2653 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2654 let context_to_details = |context| {
2655 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2657 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2659 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2660 .map(context_to_details)
2666 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2667 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2669 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2670 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2671 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2673 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2674 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2675 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2676 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2677 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2678 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2680 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2681 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2682 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2684 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2685 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2686 payment_id: *payment_id,
2687 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2688 total_msat: *total_msat,
2691 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2692 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2694 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2695 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2697 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2702 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2703 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2705 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
2706 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2709 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2711 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2712 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2714 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2715 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2717 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2718 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2719 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2720 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2721 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2722 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2723 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2724 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2726 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2727 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2728 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2729 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2730 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2734 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2735 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2737 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2738 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2739 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2740 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2743 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2744 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
2747 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2748 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2750 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2751 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
2758 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2759 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2760 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2761 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2764 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2765 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2771 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2772 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2773 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2775 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2776 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2778 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2779 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2780 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2781 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2783 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2785 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2786 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2787 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2790 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2791 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2792 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2793 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2794 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2795 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2798 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2799 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2800 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2802 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2803 /// the channel being closed or not:
2804 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2805 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2806 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2807 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2808 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2809 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2810 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2812 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2813 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2814 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2815 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2817 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2819 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2820 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2821 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2824 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2825 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2826 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2827 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2828 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2831 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2832 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2833 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2834 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2835 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2838 let logger = WithContext::from(
2839 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
2842 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
2843 shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2844 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2845 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2846 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2847 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2848 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2850 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2851 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2852 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2853 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2854 // ignore the result here.
2855 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2857 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2858 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2859 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2860 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2861 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2862 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2863 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2864 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2865 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2866 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2867 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2868 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
2871 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2874 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2875 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2880 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2881 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2882 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
2883 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
2884 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
2885 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
2886 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
2887 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
2890 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
2891 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2892 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
2896 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2897 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2901 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2902 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2903 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2904 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2905 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2906 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2907 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2908 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2909 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2910 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2911 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2913 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2915 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
2916 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2917 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2918 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2919 mem::drop(peer_state);
2920 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2922 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2923 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
2924 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2926 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2927 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
2928 // Unfunded channel has no update
2929 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2932 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2933 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2934 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2935 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2937 (None, *peer_node_id)
2939 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2942 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2943 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2944 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2945 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2946 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2947 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2948 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2949 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2950 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2956 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2959 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2960 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2961 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2962 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2963 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2964 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2965 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2966 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2967 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2968 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2969 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2970 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2981 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2982 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2983 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2985 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2986 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2987 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2990 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2991 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2992 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2994 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2995 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2996 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2997 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2998 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3001 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3002 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3003 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3004 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3005 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3009 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3010 /// local transaction(s).
3011 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3012 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3013 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3017 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3018 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3020 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3022 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3023 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3026 let is_intro_node_forward = match next_hop {
3027 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3028 // TODO: update this when we support blinded forwarding as non-intro node
3029 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward { .. }, ..
3034 macro_rules! return_err {
3035 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3038 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3039 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
3041 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3042 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3043 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3044 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3045 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3046 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3047 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3051 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_forward {
3052 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3053 } else { ($err_code, $data) };
3054 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3055 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3056 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3057 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3058 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3064 let NextPacketDetails {
3065 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
3066 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
3067 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3068 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3069 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3072 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3073 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3074 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3075 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3076 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3077 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3078 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3079 // phantom or an intercept.
3080 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3081 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3082 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3086 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3089 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3091 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3092 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3093 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3094 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3095 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3097 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3098 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3099 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3100 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3103 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3104 // have no consistency guarantees.
3105 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3109 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3110 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3111 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3112 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3113 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3115 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3116 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3117 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3118 // we don't have the channel here.
3119 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3121 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3123 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3124 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3125 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3126 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3127 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3128 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3129 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3130 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3131 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3132 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3133 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3135 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3138 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3139 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3141 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3142 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3149 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3151 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3152 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3154 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3155 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3156 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3157 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3158 break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3160 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3161 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3167 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3168 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3169 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3170 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3172 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3173 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3175 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3176 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3177 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3179 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3180 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3181 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3182 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3183 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3184 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3185 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3189 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3191 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3194 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3195 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3196 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3197 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3198 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3199 macro_rules! return_err {
3200 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3202 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3203 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3204 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3205 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3206 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3207 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3208 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3209 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3210 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3214 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3215 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3216 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3217 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3218 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3224 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3226 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3227 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3228 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3229 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3232 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3233 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3234 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3235 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3236 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3238 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3241 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3242 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3243 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3244 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3245 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3251 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3252 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3253 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3255 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3256 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3257 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3259 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3260 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3261 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3262 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3263 return Err(LightningError {
3264 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3265 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3268 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3269 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3271 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3272 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3273 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3276 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3277 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3278 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3279 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3281 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3282 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3283 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3285 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3286 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3287 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3288 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3289 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3290 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3291 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3295 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3298 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3299 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3300 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3301 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3303 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3304 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3305 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3306 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3307 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3310 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3311 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3313 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3314 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3315 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3316 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3317 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3318 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3319 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3320 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3322 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3323 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3324 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3326 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3328 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3335 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3336 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3337 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3338 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3343 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3344 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3345 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3348 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3349 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3350 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3351 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3353 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3354 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3355 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3357 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3358 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3362 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3363 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3365 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3366 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3367 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3369 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3372 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
3374 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3375 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3377 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3378 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3379 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3380 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3381 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3382 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3383 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3384 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3385 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3386 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3388 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3389 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3390 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3391 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3393 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3394 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3396 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3397 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3398 Some(monitor_update) => {
3399 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3401 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3402 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3403 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3404 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3405 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3406 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3407 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3415 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3418 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3419 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3420 // `channel_by_id` map.
3421 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3422 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3426 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3427 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3429 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3434 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3436 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3437 /// fields for more info.
3439 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3440 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3442 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3444 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3445 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3446 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3447 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3448 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3450 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3451 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3452 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3453 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3454 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3456 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3457 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3458 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3459 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3461 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3463 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3464 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3465 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3467 /// In general, a path may raise:
3468 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3469 /// node public key) is specified.
3470 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3471 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3472 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3473 /// relevant updates.
3475 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3476 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3477 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3479 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3480 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3481 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3482 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3483 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3484 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3485 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3486 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3487 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3488 self.pending_outbound_payments
3489 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3490 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3491 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3494 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3495 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3496 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3497 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3498 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3499 self.pending_outbound_payments
3500 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3501 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3502 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3503 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3507 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3508 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3509 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3510 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3511 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3512 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3516 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3517 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3518 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3522 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3523 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3526 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3527 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3528 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3529 self.pending_outbound_payments
3530 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3531 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3532 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3533 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3534 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3538 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3539 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3540 /// retries are exhausted.
3542 /// # Event Generation
3544 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3545 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3547 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3548 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3549 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3551 /// # Requested Invoices
3553 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3554 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3555 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3556 /// once the invoice has been received.
3558 /// # Restart Behavior
3560 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3561 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3562 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3564 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3565 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3566 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3567 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3570 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3571 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3572 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3573 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3574 /// never reach the recipient.
3576 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3577 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3579 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3580 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3582 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3583 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3584 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3585 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3586 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3587 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3588 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3591 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3592 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3594 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3597 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3598 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3599 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3600 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3601 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3602 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3603 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3604 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3607 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3608 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3609 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3610 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3611 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3612 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3613 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3614 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3615 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3618 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3621 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3622 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3625 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3626 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3628 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3629 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3630 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3631 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3632 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3633 let payment_params =
3634 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3636 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3638 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3641 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3642 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3644 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3645 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3646 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3647 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3649 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3650 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3651 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3652 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3653 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3654 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3655 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3656 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3657 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3658 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3660 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3661 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3662 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3663 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3667 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3669 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3670 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3673 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3675 let mut res = Vec::new();
3677 for mut path in route.paths {
3678 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3679 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3680 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3681 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3682 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3685 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3688 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3689 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3691 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3693 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3694 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3699 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3702 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3707 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3708 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3709 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3711 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3712 let used_liquidity =
3713 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3715 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3716 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3718 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3721 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3726 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3727 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3728 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3735 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3736 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3737 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3738 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3739 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3740 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3741 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3742 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3743 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3745 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3746 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3748 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3749 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
3750 funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3752 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3753 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
3754 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3755 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3756 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
3757 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
3758 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None))
3759 } else { unreachable!(); });
3761 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
3762 Err((chan, err)) => {
3763 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3764 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3765 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3766 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3767 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3773 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3774 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3776 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3777 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3780 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3781 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3782 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3786 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3787 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3788 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3792 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3793 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3794 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3796 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3797 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3798 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
3799 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
3800 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
3802 "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
3803 funding_txo, o.get()
3805 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
3806 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3807 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3808 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
3809 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
3810 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
3813 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
3820 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3821 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3822 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3826 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3828 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3829 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3831 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3832 /// across the p2p network.
3834 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3835 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3837 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3838 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3839 /// keys per-channel).
3841 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3842 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3843 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3845 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3846 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3847 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3849 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3850 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3851 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3852 /// for more details.
3854 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3855 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3856 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3857 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3860 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3862 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3863 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3865 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3866 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3867 /// signature for each channel.
3869 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3870 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3871 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3872 let mut result = Ok(());
3874 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3875 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3876 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3877 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3878 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3883 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3884 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3885 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3889 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3890 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3891 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3892 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3893 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3894 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3895 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3896 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3898 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3899 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3904 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3905 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3906 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3907 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3911 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3912 match states.entry(txid) {
3913 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3914 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3915 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3919 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3922 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3923 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3924 temporary_channel_id,
3925 counterparty_node_id,
3926 funding_transaction.clone(),
3929 let mut output_index = None;
3930 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3931 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3932 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3933 if output_index.is_some() {
3934 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3935 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3938 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3941 if output_index.is_none() {
3942 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3943 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3946 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3947 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3948 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3954 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3955 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3956 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3957 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3958 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3959 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3960 .into_iter().flatten()
3961 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3963 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3964 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3966 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3968 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3969 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3970 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3971 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3972 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3974 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3975 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
3976 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3980 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3981 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3987 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3989 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3990 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3991 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3992 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3994 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3995 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3997 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3998 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4000 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4002 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4003 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4004 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4005 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4006 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4007 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4008 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4009 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4010 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4011 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4012 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4013 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4014 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4018 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4019 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4020 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4021 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4022 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4023 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4024 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4025 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4026 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4027 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4031 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4032 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4033 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4034 config.apply(config_update);
4035 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4038 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4039 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4040 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4041 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4042 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4043 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4050 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4051 debug_assert!(false);
4052 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4054 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4055 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4062 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4064 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4065 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4066 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4067 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4069 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4070 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4072 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4073 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4075 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4077 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4078 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4079 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4080 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4081 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4082 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4083 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4084 pub fn update_channel_config(
4085 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4086 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4087 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4090 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4091 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4093 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4094 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4096 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4097 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4098 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4099 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4100 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4102 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4103 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4104 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4107 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4110 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4111 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4112 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4113 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4114 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4115 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4116 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4118 let next_hop_scid = {
4119 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4120 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4121 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4122 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4123 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4124 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4125 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4126 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4127 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4128 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4131 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4133 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4134 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4135 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4138 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4139 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4140 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4141 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4142 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4149 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4150 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4151 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4154 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4155 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4156 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4157 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4160 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4162 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4163 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4164 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4165 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4166 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4169 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4170 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4171 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4172 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4173 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4175 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4179 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4180 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4182 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4185 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4186 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4187 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4189 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4190 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4191 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4194 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4195 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4196 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4197 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4198 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4199 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4200 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4201 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4202 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4205 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4206 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4207 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4208 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4213 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4215 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4216 /// Will likely generate further events.
4217 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4218 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4220 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4221 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4222 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4224 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4225 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4227 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4228 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4229 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4230 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4232 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4233 match forward_info {
4234 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4235 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4236 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4237 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4238 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4241 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4242 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4243 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
4244 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4246 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4247 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4248 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4249 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4250 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4251 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4252 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4253 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4256 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4257 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4259 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4262 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4263 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4269 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4270 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4272 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4276 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4277 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4279 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4283 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4284 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4285 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4286 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4287 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4288 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4289 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4292 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4293 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4294 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4295 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4296 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4298 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4300 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4301 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4305 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4306 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4307 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4308 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4309 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4310 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4312 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4313 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4319 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4322 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4325 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4326 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4327 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4328 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4329 // problem, not ours.
4335 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4336 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4337 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4339 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4343 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4344 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4345 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4346 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4347 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4350 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4351 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4352 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4353 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4354 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4355 let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
4356 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4357 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4358 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4359 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4360 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4361 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4362 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4365 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4366 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4367 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4368 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4369 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4370 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4371 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4372 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4373 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4374 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|_| BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode),
4376 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4377 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4378 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4379 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4380 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4381 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4384 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4385 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4386 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4389 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4390 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4392 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4394 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4395 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4396 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4397 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4403 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4404 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4406 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4407 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4408 Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
4410 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4411 log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4412 let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
4413 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
4415 Some((res, htlc_id))
4418 if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4419 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4420 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4421 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4423 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
4425 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4426 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4427 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4433 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4437 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4438 match forward_info {
4439 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4440 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4441 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4442 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4443 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4446 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4447 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4448 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4449 payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret,
4450 custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4452 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4453 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4454 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4455 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4456 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4458 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4459 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4460 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4464 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4465 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4468 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4471 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4472 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4473 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4474 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4475 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4476 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4477 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4478 phantom_shared_secret,
4481 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4482 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4483 // if routing nodes overpay
4484 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4485 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4487 total_value_received: None,
4488 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4491 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4494 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4496 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4497 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4498 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4499 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4500 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4501 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4503 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4504 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4505 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4506 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4507 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4508 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4509 phantom_shared_secret,
4512 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4513 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4515 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4518 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4519 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4520 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4521 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4522 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4525 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4526 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4527 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4528 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4529 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4530 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4532 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4533 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4534 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4536 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4537 .entry(payment_hash)
4538 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4539 .or_insert_with(|| {
4540 committed_to_claimable = true;
4542 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4545 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4546 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4547 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4548 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4550 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4551 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4552 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4554 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4555 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4556 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4559 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4561 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4562 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4563 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4564 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4565 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4566 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4567 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4568 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4569 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4570 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4572 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4574 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4575 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4576 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4577 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4578 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4579 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4581 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4582 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4583 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4584 committed_to_claimable = true;
4586 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4587 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4588 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4589 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4590 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4591 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4592 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4593 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4594 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4595 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4599 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4600 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4601 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4602 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4603 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4605 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4607 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4608 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4610 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4611 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4612 committed_to_claimable = true;
4615 payment_claimable_generated
4619 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4620 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4621 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4622 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4623 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4624 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4625 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4626 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4627 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4628 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4629 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4630 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4631 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4632 Ok(result) => result,
4634 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4635 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4638 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4639 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4640 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4641 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4642 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4643 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4646 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4647 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4648 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4650 check_total_value!(purpose);
4652 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4653 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4654 check_total_value!(purpose);
4658 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4659 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4660 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4661 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4663 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4664 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4665 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4666 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4667 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4668 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4669 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4670 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4672 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4673 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4674 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4676 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4677 if payment_claimable_generated {
4678 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4684 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4685 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4693 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4694 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4695 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4696 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4698 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4699 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4701 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4703 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4704 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4705 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4707 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4709 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4710 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4711 events.append(&mut new_events);
4714 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4716 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4717 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4718 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4720 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4722 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4723 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4724 if background_events.is_empty() {
4725 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4728 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4730 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4731 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4732 // monitor updating completing.
4733 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4735 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4736 let mut updated_chan = false;
4738 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4739 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4740 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4741 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4742 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4743 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4744 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4745 updated_chan = true;
4746 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4747 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4749 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4752 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4757 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4758 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4761 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4762 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4763 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4764 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4765 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4766 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4767 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4769 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4770 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4771 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4772 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4773 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4779 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4782 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4783 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4784 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4785 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4786 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4789 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4790 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4792 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4794 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4795 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4796 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4797 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4798 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4800 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4802 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4803 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4804 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4805 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4807 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4808 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4810 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4811 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4815 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4816 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4817 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4818 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4819 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4820 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4821 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4823 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4824 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4826 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4827 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4828 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4829 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4830 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4831 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4833 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4838 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4839 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4847 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4849 /// This currently includes:
4850 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4851 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4852 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4854 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4855 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4856 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4857 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4858 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4859 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4860 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4861 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4863 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4864 /// estimate fetches.
4866 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4867 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4868 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4869 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4870 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4872 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4873 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4875 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4876 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4877 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4878 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4880 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4881 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4882 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4883 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4884 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4885 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4887 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4888 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4889 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
4891 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4892 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4893 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
4894 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4895 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4896 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4897 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4898 channel_id: *chan_id,
4899 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4910 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4911 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4912 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4913 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4914 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4915 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4916 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4918 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4919 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4924 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4925 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4927 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4928 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4929 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4930 if needs_close { return false; }
4933 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4934 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4935 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4936 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4937 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4938 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4939 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4940 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4942 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4943 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4944 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4945 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4949 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4951 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4954 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4956 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4957 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4958 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4959 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4963 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4965 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4971 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4973 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4974 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4975 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4976 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4977 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4978 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4979 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4980 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4981 channel_id: *chan_id,
4982 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4990 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4991 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4992 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4994 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4995 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4996 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5001 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5002 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5003 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
5004 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5005 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5006 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5007 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5008 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5009 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5015 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5017 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5018 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5023 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5024 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5025 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5026 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5027 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5028 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5029 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5030 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5031 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5032 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5033 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5034 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5035 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5036 // have no channels to the peer.
5037 let remove_entry = {
5038 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5039 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5042 entry.remove_entry();
5045 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5050 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5051 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5052 // This should be unreachable
5053 debug_assert!(false);
5056 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5057 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5058 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5059 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5060 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5061 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5062 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5065 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5066 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5067 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5069 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5070 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5077 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5078 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5079 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5080 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5081 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5084 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5085 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5088 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5089 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5092 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5093 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5094 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5095 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5096 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5097 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5098 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5101 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5102 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5105 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5106 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5107 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5108 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5109 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5116 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5117 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5118 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5120 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5121 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5122 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5123 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5125 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5126 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5127 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5128 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5129 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5130 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5133 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5134 /// reason for the failure.
5136 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5137 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5138 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5140 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5141 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5142 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5143 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5144 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5145 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5146 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5151 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5152 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5153 match failure_code {
5154 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5155 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5156 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5157 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5158 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5159 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5161 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5162 let fail_data = match data {
5163 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5166 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5171 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5172 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5174 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5176 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5177 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5178 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5179 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5180 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5181 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5182 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5184 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5186 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5187 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5189 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5194 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5195 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5196 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5197 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5198 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5199 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5200 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5201 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5202 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5203 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5205 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5206 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5207 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5208 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5210 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5211 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5212 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5213 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5214 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5218 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5219 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5220 // be surfaced to the user.
5221 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5222 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5223 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5225 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5226 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5227 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5228 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5229 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5230 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5231 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5232 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5233 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5235 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5236 debug_assert!(false);
5237 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5240 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5242 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5245 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5246 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5247 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5248 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5252 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5253 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5254 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5255 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5256 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5257 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5258 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5259 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5260 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5261 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5264 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5265 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5266 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5269 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5270 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5271 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5273 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5274 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5275 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5276 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5277 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5279 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5280 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5281 ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, ref blinded_failure, ..
5284 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(outpoint.to_channel_id())),
5285 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5286 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5288 let failure = match blinded_failure {
5289 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5290 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5291 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5292 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5294 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5296 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
5297 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5299 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
5300 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
5304 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5305 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5307 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5311 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5312 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5313 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5314 push_forward_ev = true;
5316 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5317 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5318 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
5320 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5321 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
5324 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5325 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5326 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5327 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5328 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5329 failed_next_destination: destination,
5335 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5336 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5338 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5339 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5340 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5341 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5343 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5344 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5345 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5346 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5348 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5349 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5350 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5352 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5353 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5354 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5355 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5356 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5357 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5358 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5359 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5360 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5363 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5364 /// even type numbers.
5368 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5369 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5371 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5372 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5373 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5376 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5377 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5379 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5382 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5383 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5384 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5385 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5386 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5387 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5388 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5389 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5394 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5395 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5396 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5397 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5398 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5400 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5401 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5402 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5406 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5407 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5408 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5409 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5410 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5411 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5412 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5413 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5414 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5415 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5416 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5425 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5427 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5428 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5429 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5430 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5431 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5432 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5433 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5434 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5435 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5436 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5437 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5438 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5439 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5440 debug_assert!(false);
5444 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5446 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5447 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5448 debug_assert!(false);
5452 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5453 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5455 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5456 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5457 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5458 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5461 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5462 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5463 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5464 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5468 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5469 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5470 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5471 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5472 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5473 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5474 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5477 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5478 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5479 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5480 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
5481 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5482 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5487 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5488 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5489 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5490 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5491 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5492 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5493 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5495 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5498 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5499 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5500 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5501 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5505 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5506 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5507 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5508 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5510 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5511 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5512 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5513 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5515 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5516 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5517 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5518 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5521 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5522 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5523 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5524 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5528 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5529 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5530 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5533 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5534 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5535 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5536 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5537 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5538 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5539 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5540 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
5543 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5544 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5545 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5547 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5550 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5551 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5553 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5554 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5555 // monitor update as a background event.
5556 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5557 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5558 counterparty_node_id,
5559 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5560 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5564 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5565 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5570 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5572 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5574 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5575 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5576 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5577 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5578 blocking_action: blocker,
5580 (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5582 debug_assert!(false,
5583 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5586 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5587 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5588 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5589 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5590 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5592 let mut found_blocker = false;
5593 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5594 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5595 // which case we need to only remove the one
5596 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5597 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5598 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5599 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5601 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5604 debug_assert!(false);
5613 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5614 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5615 counterparty_node_id: None,
5616 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5622 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5623 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5624 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5625 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5626 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5627 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5628 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5629 // again on restart.
5630 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id())), "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5631 payment_preimage, update_res);
5634 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5635 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5637 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5638 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5639 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5640 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5641 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5642 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5643 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5644 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5645 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5646 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5649 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5650 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5651 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5652 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5653 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5654 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5658 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5659 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5662 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5663 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5664 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5667 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5668 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5669 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5670 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5671 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5673 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5674 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5675 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5677 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5678 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5681 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5682 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5683 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5684 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5685 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5686 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5687 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5688 let chan_to_release =
5689 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5690 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5692 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5693 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5694 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5695 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5700 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5701 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5702 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5703 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5704 // in the background.
5705 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5706 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5707 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5708 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5710 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5711 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5712 funding_txo, update, ..
5714 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5715 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5716 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5717 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5719 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5725 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5726 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5727 (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5729 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5730 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5732 monitor_update.updates[0],
5733 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5738 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5739 // immediately once we get going.
5740 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5743 *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5745 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5748 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5749 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5750 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5751 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5752 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5753 blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5757 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5758 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5759 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5762 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5763 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5765 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5766 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5767 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5768 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5770 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5774 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5775 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5776 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5782 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5783 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5784 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5787 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5788 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5789 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5790 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5792 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5794 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5795 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5796 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5798 payment_purpose: purpose,
5801 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5803 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5807 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5809 sender_intended_total_msat,
5813 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5814 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5816 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5817 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5818 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5821 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5822 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5824 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5825 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5826 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5827 Some(blocking_action),
5834 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5835 /// update completion.
5836 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5837 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5838 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5839 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5840 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5841 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5842 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5843 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5844 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5845 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5846 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5847 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5848 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5849 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5851 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5853 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5854 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5855 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5856 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5859 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5860 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5862 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5863 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5864 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5869 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5870 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5871 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5872 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5877 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5878 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5879 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5880 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5881 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5886 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5890 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5896 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5897 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5898 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5902 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5903 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5904 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5910 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5911 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5913 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5914 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5916 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5917 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
5918 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5919 match outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_txo) {
5920 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5925 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5926 let mut peer_state_lock;
5927 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5928 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5929 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5930 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5932 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5935 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5936 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5937 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5938 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5939 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5942 let remaining_in_flight =
5943 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5944 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5947 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5948 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5949 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5950 remaining_in_flight);
5951 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5954 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5957 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5959 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5960 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5963 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5964 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5965 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5967 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5968 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5969 /// used to accept such channels.
5971 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5972 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5973 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5974 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5977 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5978 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5980 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5981 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5982 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5984 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5985 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5987 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5988 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5990 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5991 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5993 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5994 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5995 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5996 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5999 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6001 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
6002 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6004 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6005 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6006 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6007 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6009 let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6010 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6012 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6014 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6015 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6016 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6018 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6019 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6020 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6022 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6023 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6024 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6025 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6026 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6027 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6028 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| {
6029 let err_str = e.to_string();
6030 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6032 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6036 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6037 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6039 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str })
6044 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6045 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6046 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6047 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6048 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6049 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6050 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6053 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6054 let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6055 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6057 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6059 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6060 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6061 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6062 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6063 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6064 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6065 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6066 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6069 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6070 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
6071 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6073 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6077 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6078 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6079 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6081 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6082 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6083 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6086 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6091 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6092 /// or 0-conf channels.
6094 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6095 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6096 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6097 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6098 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6099 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6101 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6102 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6103 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6104 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6105 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6106 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6107 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6111 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6114 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6115 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6117 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6118 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6120 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6121 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6122 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6123 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6124 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6126 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6129 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6130 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6131 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6134 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6135 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6140 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6143 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6144 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6145 // likely to be lost on restart!
6146 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6147 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6150 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6151 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6154 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6155 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6156 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6157 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6158 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6160 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6161 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6163 debug_assert!(false);
6164 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6166 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6167 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6169 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6170 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6171 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6172 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6173 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6174 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6176 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6177 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6178 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6181 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6182 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6183 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6184 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6185 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6188 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
6189 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6191 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6194 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6195 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6196 let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
6197 &msg, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
6199 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id)
6201 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6202 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6203 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6204 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6205 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6206 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6209 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6210 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6211 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6216 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6217 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6218 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6219 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6220 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6221 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6222 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6225 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6230 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6231 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6232 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6234 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6235 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6238 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6239 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6241 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6242 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6243 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6245 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6249 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6250 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6251 // likely to be lost on restart!
6252 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6253 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6254 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6256 debug_assert!(false);
6257 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6259 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6260 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6261 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6262 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6263 match phase.get_mut() {
6264 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6265 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6266 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6269 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6273 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6276 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6277 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6278 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6279 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6280 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6282 user_channel_id: user_id,
6287 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6288 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6290 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6291 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6293 debug_assert!(false);
6294 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6297 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6298 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6299 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6300 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6301 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6302 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6303 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6305 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
6306 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6307 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6308 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6309 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
6310 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
6311 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
6312 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
6313 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6317 Some(mut phase) => {
6318 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6319 let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
6320 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6322 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6325 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
6327 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
6328 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
6329 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
6330 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
6331 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
6332 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
6334 let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
6335 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
6336 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
6339 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
6340 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6341 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
6343 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6344 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6345 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
6346 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6347 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
6349 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6350 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6351 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6352 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6353 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
6355 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6356 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6357 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6358 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6359 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6360 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6361 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6366 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6367 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6368 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6370 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6374 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6375 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6376 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
6384 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6385 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6386 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6387 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6389 debug_assert!(false);
6390 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6393 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6394 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6395 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6396 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6397 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
6398 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
6399 let logger = WithContext::from(
6401 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
6402 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
6405 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
6407 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
6408 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6409 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
6410 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
6411 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
6412 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
6413 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
6414 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6415 } else { unreachable!(); }
6418 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
6419 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
6420 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
6421 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
6422 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
6423 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
6424 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6428 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
6429 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
6430 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
6431 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
6432 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6433 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6437 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6440 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6444 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6445 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6446 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6447 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6448 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6450 debug_assert!(false);
6451 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6453 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6454 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6455 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6456 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6457 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6458 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6459 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6460 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6461 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6462 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6463 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6464 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6465 msg: announcement_sigs,
6467 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6468 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6469 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6470 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6471 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6472 // announcement_signatures.
6473 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6474 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6475 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6476 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6483 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6484 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6489 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6490 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6493 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6494 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6499 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6500 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6501 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6503 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6504 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6506 debug_assert!(false);
6507 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6509 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6510 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6511 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6512 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6514 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6515 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6516 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6517 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6519 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6522 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6523 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6524 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6525 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6527 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6528 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6529 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6530 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6531 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6532 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6536 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6537 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6538 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6539 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6542 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6543 let context = phase.context_mut();
6544 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
6545 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6546 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6547 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6551 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6554 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6555 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6556 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6557 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6559 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6560 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6566 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6567 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6568 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6570 debug_assert!(false);
6571 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6573 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6574 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6575 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6576 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6577 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6578 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6579 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6580 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6581 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6582 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6583 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6588 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6589 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6590 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6591 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6592 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6593 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6594 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6596 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6597 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6600 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6603 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6604 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
6605 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6606 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6608 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6609 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6610 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6611 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6612 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6617 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6618 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6619 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6624 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6625 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6626 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6627 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6629 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6630 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6631 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6632 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6634 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6635 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6637 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
6638 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6639 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6641 debug_assert!(false);
6642 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6644 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6645 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6646 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6647 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6648 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6649 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6650 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6651 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
6652 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
6653 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
6655 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6657 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6658 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
6659 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
6660 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6661 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6662 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6663 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
6664 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6668 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6669 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6670 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6671 match pending_forward_info {
6672 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
6673 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
6675 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
6676 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
6677 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6678 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6679 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6681 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6682 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6683 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6684 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6685 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6688 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6690 _ => pending_forward_info
6693 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6694 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6696 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6697 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6700 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6705 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6707 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6708 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6709 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6711 debug_assert!(false);
6712 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6714 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6715 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6716 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6717 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6718 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6719 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6720 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6721 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6723 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6725 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6726 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6727 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6729 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6730 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6731 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6732 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6733 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6734 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6735 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6738 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6739 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6742 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6745 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6749 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6750 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6751 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6752 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6753 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6755 debug_assert!(false);
6756 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6758 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6759 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6760 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6761 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6762 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6763 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6765 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6766 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6769 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6774 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6775 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6776 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6777 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6778 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6780 debug_assert!(false);
6781 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6783 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6784 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6785 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6786 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6787 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6788 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6789 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6791 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6792 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6794 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6795 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6799 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6803 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6804 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6805 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6807 debug_assert!(false);
6808 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6810 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6811 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6812 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6813 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6814 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6815 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6816 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6817 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6818 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6819 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6820 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6824 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6825 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6828 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6833 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6834 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6835 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6836 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6837 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6838 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6839 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6840 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6841 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6842 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6843 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6845 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6846 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6848 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6849 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6850 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6851 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6852 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6853 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6855 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6856 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6857 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6859 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
6860 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6861 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6862 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6863 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6864 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6865 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6866 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6867 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6870 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6871 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6873 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6874 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
6875 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6876 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6877 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6878 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6879 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6880 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6881 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6882 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6883 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
6886 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6887 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6888 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6893 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6894 // payments are being processed.
6895 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6896 push_forward_event = true;
6898 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6899 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6906 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6907 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6910 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6911 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6912 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6914 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6918 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6919 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6920 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6921 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6922 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6924 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6925 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6926 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6927 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6928 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6929 // real by taking more time.
6930 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6931 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6932 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6937 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6938 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6939 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6940 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6941 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6942 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6943 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6945 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6946 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6947 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6948 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6949 channel_funding_outpoint,
6950 counterparty_node_id,
6955 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6956 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6957 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6959 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6960 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6961 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6962 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6964 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6965 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6966 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6972 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6973 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6974 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6975 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6977 debug_assert!(false);
6978 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6979 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6980 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6981 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6982 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6983 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6984 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6985 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6986 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6987 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6988 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6989 *counterparty_node_id)
6991 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6992 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6993 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6994 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6995 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6996 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6997 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7001 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7002 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7005 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7008 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7012 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7013 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7014 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7016 debug_assert!(false);
7017 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7019 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7020 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7021 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7022 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7023 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7024 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7025 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7027 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7028 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7031 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7036 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7037 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7038 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7040 debug_assert!(false);
7041 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7043 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7044 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7045 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7046 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7047 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7048 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7049 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7052 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7053 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7054 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
7055 msg, &self.default_configuration
7056 ), chan_phase_entry),
7057 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7058 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7059 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7062 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7063 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7066 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7071 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7072 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7073 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7074 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7076 // It's not a local channel
7077 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7080 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7081 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7082 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7083 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7085 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7086 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7087 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7088 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7089 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7090 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7091 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7092 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7093 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7094 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7095 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7097 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7099 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7100 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7101 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7102 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7104 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7105 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7106 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7107 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7110 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7114 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7115 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7118 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7120 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7123 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7125 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7126 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7128 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7130 debug_assert!(false);
7131 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7132 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7136 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
7137 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7138 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7139 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7140 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7141 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7142 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7143 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7144 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7145 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7146 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7147 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7148 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7149 let mut channel_update = None;
7150 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7151 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7152 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7155 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7156 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7157 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7158 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7159 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7160 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7161 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7166 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7167 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7168 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7169 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7170 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7171 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7175 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7176 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7179 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7180 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7182 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7183 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7184 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7185 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7186 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7187 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7189 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7190 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7191 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7192 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7193 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7194 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7195 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7196 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7197 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7198 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7199 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7200 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7201 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7202 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7203 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7204 next_funding_txid: None,
7207 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7208 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7209 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7215 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7216 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7217 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7218 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7221 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7222 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7227 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7228 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7229 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7231 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7232 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7233 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7234 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7235 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7236 match monitor_event {
7237 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7238 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
7239 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7240 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7241 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
7243 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7244 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
7245 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7246 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7249 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
7250 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7251 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7253 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7254 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
7255 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7256 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
7259 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7260 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7261 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7262 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7263 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7264 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7265 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7266 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7267 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
7268 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7269 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7273 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7274 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7275 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7276 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7284 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
7285 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7291 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7292 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7295 has_pending_monitor_events
7298 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7299 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7300 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7302 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7303 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7304 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7307 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7308 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7309 /// update was applied.
7310 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7311 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7312 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7314 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7315 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7316 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7317 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7319 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7320 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7322 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7323 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7324 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7325 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7327 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7328 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7329 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7330 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
7331 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7332 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7334 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7335 has_monitor_update = true;
7337 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7338 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7339 continue 'peer_loop;
7348 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7349 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7350 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7356 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7357 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7359 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7360 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7362 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7363 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7364 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7365 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7367 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7368 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7370 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7371 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7372 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7373 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7378 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7379 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7384 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7385 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7388 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7389 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
7390 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7396 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
7400 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7401 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7402 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7403 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7404 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7405 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7406 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7410 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7411 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7412 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7413 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7414 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7420 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7421 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7422 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7423 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7424 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7425 let mut has_update = false;
7426 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7428 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7430 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7431 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7432 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7433 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7434 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7436 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7437 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7438 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
7439 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7440 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7442 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7443 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7446 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7447 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7448 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7450 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7451 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7452 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7453 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7454 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7459 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7460 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7461 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7467 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7468 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7473 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7479 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7480 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7483 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7484 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7490 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7491 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7493 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7494 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7495 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7496 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7497 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7498 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7499 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7500 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7501 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7502 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7503 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7504 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7505 assert!(should_broadcast);
7506 } else { unreachable!(); }
7507 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7508 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7509 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7512 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7516 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7517 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7518 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7522 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
7523 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7524 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7525 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7526 /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7528 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
7532 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7537 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
7539 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7541 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7542 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7543 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7544 &self, description: String
7545 ) -> Result<OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7546 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7547 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7548 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7549 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7551 let path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7552 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
7553 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
7555 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7561 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7562 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7566 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7567 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7569 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7570 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7571 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7574 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7575 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7576 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7578 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7579 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7583 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
7584 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7585 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7586 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7587 /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7589 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
7593 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7594 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7599 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7600 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
7601 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
7603 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7605 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7606 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7607 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7608 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7609 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7610 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7611 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7612 ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7613 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7614 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7615 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7616 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7618 let path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7619 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7620 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7622 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7623 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7626 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7627 self.pending_outbound_payments
7628 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7629 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7631 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7636 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7637 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7638 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7640 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7641 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7642 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7643 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7644 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7645 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7646 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7648 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7649 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7653 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7654 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7657 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7658 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7659 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7663 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7664 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7665 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7666 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7670 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7671 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7672 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7677 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7678 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
7679 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
7682 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7683 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7684 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7685 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7686 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7687 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7688 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7689 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7690 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7691 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7692 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7693 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7694 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7695 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7696 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7699 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7700 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7701 let builder = match quantity {
7703 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7705 let builder = match amount_msats {
7707 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7709 let builder = match payer_note {
7711 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7713 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7714 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7716 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7717 self.pending_outbound_payments
7718 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7719 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7721 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7723 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7724 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7725 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7726 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7727 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7730 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7732 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7733 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7734 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7735 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7736 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7737 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7738 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7739 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7740 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7742 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7749 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7752 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7753 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7754 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7758 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7759 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7760 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7761 /// received and no retries will be made.
7765 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply
7766 /// path for the invoice.
7768 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7769 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7770 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7771 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7772 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7774 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7775 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7777 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7778 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7779 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(amount_msats, payment_secret)
7780 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7782 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
7783 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7784 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7786 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
7787 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7788 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7790 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
7791 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7792 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7794 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7795 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
7796 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7798 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7799 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7800 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7801 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7802 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7805 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7807 for path in refund.paths() {
7808 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7809 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7810 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7811 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7813 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7819 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7823 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7826 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7827 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7829 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7830 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7831 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7832 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7834 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7836 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7837 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7841 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7842 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7844 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7846 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7847 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7849 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7850 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7851 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7852 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7853 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7854 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7855 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7856 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7857 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7858 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7859 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7862 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7863 /// stored external to LDK.
7865 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7866 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7867 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7869 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7870 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7873 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7874 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7875 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7876 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7878 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7879 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7880 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7881 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7882 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7884 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7885 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7886 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7887 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7888 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7890 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7891 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7893 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7894 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7898 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7899 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7901 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7903 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7904 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7906 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7907 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7908 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7909 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7910 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7911 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7912 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7915 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7916 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7918 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7919 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7920 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7923 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
7925 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
7926 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
7927 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
7928 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7929 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7931 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
7933 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
7934 .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
7935 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
7938 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, entropy_source, secp_ctx)
7939 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
7942 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
7943 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
7944 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
7945 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7946 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
7947 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7948 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7950 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
7951 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7952 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
7953 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7954 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
7956 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
7958 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
7961 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
7962 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, entropy_source, secp_ctx
7966 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7967 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7969 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7970 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7971 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7972 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7974 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7975 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7976 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7977 Some(_) => continue,
7978 None => return scid_candidate
7983 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7985 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7986 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7988 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7989 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7990 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7994 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7995 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7996 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7998 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7999 /// times to get a unique scid.
8000 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8001 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8002 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8004 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8005 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8006 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
8007 return scid_candidate
8011 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
8012 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
8013 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
8014 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
8016 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8017 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8018 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8019 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8020 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
8021 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
8023 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8024 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
8025 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
8034 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8035 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
8036 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8037 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
8038 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
8042 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
8043 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
8044 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8045 events.push_back((event, None));
8049 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8050 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8051 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8055 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8056 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8060 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8061 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
8064 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
8065 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
8066 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
8067 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
8068 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
8069 let logger = WithContext::from(
8070 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8073 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8074 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8075 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8076 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
8077 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
8078 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
8079 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8080 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8082 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
8086 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8087 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
8088 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
8089 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
8090 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
8091 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
8092 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8096 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
8097 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8098 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
8099 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
8100 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
8101 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8102 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8103 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8104 if further_update_exists {
8105 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8110 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
8111 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8117 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
8118 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8124 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
8125 for action in actions {
8127 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
8128 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
8130 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
8136 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
8137 /// using the given event handler.
8139 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8140 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8144 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8148 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8150 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8151 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8152 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8153 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8154 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8155 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8159 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8160 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8161 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8162 /// is always placed next to each other.
8164 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8165 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8166 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8167 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8169 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8170 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8171 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8172 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8173 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8174 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8175 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8177 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8178 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8179 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8180 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8183 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8184 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8186 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8187 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8190 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8191 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8192 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8193 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8194 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8195 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8196 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8200 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8201 events.replace(pending_events);
8210 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8212 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8213 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8214 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8215 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8216 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8217 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8221 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8223 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8224 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8225 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8227 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8231 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8233 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8234 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8235 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8236 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8237 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8238 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8242 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8244 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8245 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
8246 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8247 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
8248 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8251 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8252 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8255 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8256 let _persistence_guard =
8257 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8258 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8259 let new_height = height - 1;
8261 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8262 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
8263 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8264 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
8265 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8266 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8269 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8273 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8275 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8276 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8277 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8278 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8279 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8280 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8284 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8285 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8286 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8287 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8289 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8290 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8292 let _persistence_guard =
8293 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8294 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8295 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
8296 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8298 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8299 if height < last_best_block_height {
8300 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8301 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8305 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8306 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8307 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8308 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8310 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8311 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8313 let _persistence_guard =
8314 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8315 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8316 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8318 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8320 macro_rules! max_time {
8321 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8323 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8324 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8325 // having an explicit local time source.
8326 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8327 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8328 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8329 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8330 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8336 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8337 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8338 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8339 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8343 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8344 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8345 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8346 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8347 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8348 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8349 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8350 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8351 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8352 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8353 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8360 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8361 let _persistence_guard =
8362 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8363 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8364 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8365 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8366 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8367 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8368 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8369 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8374 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8376 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8377 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8378 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8379 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8380 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8381 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8385 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8386 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8388 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8389 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8390 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8391 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8392 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8394 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8395 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8397 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8398 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8399 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8400 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8401 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8402 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8404 // Retain unfunded channels.
8405 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8406 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8407 let res = f(channel);
8408 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8409 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8410 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8411 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8412 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8414 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
8415 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8416 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8417 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8418 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8419 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8420 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8421 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8426 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8431 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8432 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8435 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8436 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8437 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8438 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8439 msg: announcement_sigs,
8441 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8442 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8443 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8445 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8446 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8447 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8452 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8453 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8454 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8455 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8456 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8457 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8458 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8459 // is always consistent.
8460 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8461 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8462 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8463 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8464 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8467 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8468 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8469 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8470 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8471 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8472 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
8473 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8474 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8478 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8479 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8480 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8481 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8482 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8483 data: reason_message,
8496 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8497 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8498 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8499 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8500 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8501 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8502 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8503 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8504 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8505 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8507 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8508 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8509 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8513 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8516 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8517 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8518 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8519 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8520 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8521 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8522 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8523 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8524 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8525 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8526 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
8529 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8530 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8531 _ => unreachable!(),
8533 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8534 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8535 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8536 let logger = WithContext::from(
8537 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8539 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8545 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8547 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8548 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8552 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8553 /// may have events that need processing.
8555 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8556 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8558 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8559 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8560 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8561 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8564 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8565 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8566 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8569 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8570 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8571 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8574 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8575 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8576 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8577 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8580 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8581 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8582 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8583 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8586 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8587 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8589 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8590 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8591 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8592 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8593 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8596 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8597 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8598 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8599 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8602 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8603 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8604 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8605 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8608 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8609 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8610 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8611 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8614 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8615 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8616 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8617 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8621 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8622 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8624 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8625 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8626 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8627 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8628 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8629 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8633 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8634 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8635 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8636 // change to the contents.
8637 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8638 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8639 let persist = match &res {
8640 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8641 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8642 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8644 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8646 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8651 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8652 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8653 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8654 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8657 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8658 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8659 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8660 // change to the contents.
8661 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8662 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8663 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8667 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8668 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8669 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8670 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8673 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8674 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8675 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8678 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8679 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8680 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8683 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8684 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8685 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8686 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8687 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8688 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8689 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8690 let persist = match &res {
8691 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8692 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8694 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8699 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8700 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8701 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8702 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8705 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8706 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8707 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8708 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8711 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8712 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8713 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8714 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8717 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8718 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8719 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8720 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8723 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8724 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8725 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8728 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8729 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8730 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8733 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8734 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8735 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8736 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8737 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8738 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8739 let persist = match &res {
8740 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8741 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8742 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8744 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8749 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8750 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8751 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8754 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8755 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8756 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8757 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8758 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8759 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8760 let persist = match &res {
8761 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8762 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8763 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8765 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8770 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8771 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8772 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8773 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8774 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8775 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8776 let persist = match &res {
8777 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8778 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8779 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8781 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8786 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8787 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8788 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8791 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8792 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8793 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8796 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8797 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8798 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8799 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8800 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8801 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8802 let persist = match &res {
8803 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8804 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8805 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8807 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8812 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8813 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8814 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8817 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8818 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8819 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8822 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8827 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8828 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8829 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8830 let persist = match &res {
8831 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8832 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8833 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8835 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8840 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8841 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8842 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8843 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8844 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8847 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
8848 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8849 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
8851 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8852 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8853 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8854 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8855 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8856 let context = match phase {
8857 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8858 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8859 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
8860 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8865 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8866 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8869 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8873 // Clean up for removal.
8874 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8875 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
8878 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8879 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8880 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8881 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8883 // V1 Channel Establishment
8884 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8885 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8886 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8887 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8888 // V2 Channel Establishment
8889 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8890 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8891 // Common Channel Establishment
8892 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8893 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8895 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
8897 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
8898 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
8899 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
8900 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8901 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8902 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8903 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8904 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8905 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8906 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8907 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8908 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8909 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8910 // Channel Operations
8911 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8912 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8913 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8914 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8915 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8916 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8918 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8919 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8920 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8921 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8922 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8923 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8924 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8925 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8926 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8929 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8930 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8931 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8932 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8935 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8937 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8939 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8940 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8944 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8945 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
8946 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8947 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8951 let mut res = Ok(());
8953 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8954 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8955 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8956 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8957 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8958 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8959 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8962 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8963 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8964 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8965 if inbound_peer_limited {
8967 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8969 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8970 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8971 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8972 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8973 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8974 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8975 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8976 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8980 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8981 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8982 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8984 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8985 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8986 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8987 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8990 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8993 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8994 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8999 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9001 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9002 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9003 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9004 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9005 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9007 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
9008 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
9010 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9011 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
9012 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9013 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
9018 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9019 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
9024 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
9025 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9027 match &msg.data as &str {
9028 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
9029 "link failed to shutdown" =>
9031 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
9032 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
9033 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
9034 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
9035 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
9036 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
9037 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
9038 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9039 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9040 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9041 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9042 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9043 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
9044 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
9045 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
9046 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9050 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9051 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9052 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
9053 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
9054 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
9055 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
9057 log_level: Level::Trace,
9067 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9068 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
9069 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9070 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9071 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9072 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9073 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9074 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9075 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9076 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9077 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
9079 for channel_id in channel_ids {
9080 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9081 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9085 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
9086 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9087 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9088 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9089 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9090 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9091 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
9092 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9093 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9094 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9102 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9103 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9107 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9108 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9111 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
9112 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9115 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
9116 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
9119 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
9120 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9121 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9122 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9125 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
9126 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9127 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9128 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9131 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9132 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9133 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9134 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9137 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9138 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9139 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9140 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9143 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9144 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9145 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9146 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9149 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9150 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9151 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9152 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9155 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9156 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9157 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9158 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9161 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9162 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9163 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9164 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9167 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9168 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9169 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9170 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9174 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9175 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9177 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9178 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9179 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9180 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9181 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9182 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9186 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9187 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9188 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9191 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9192 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9195 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
9196 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9198 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9199 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9201 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9202 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9206 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9207 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
9208 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
9210 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
9212 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
9213 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9217 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9218 amount_msats, payment_secret
9220 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
9222 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
9223 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9227 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9228 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9229 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9232 if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
9233 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9234 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9235 payment_paths, payment_hash
9237 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9238 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9239 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9241 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9242 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9243 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9246 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9247 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9248 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9249 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9250 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9252 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9253 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9255 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
9256 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9257 Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9258 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9260 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9261 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9265 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9266 Err(error) => Some(error),
9270 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9271 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9273 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9275 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9276 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9279 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9280 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9281 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9288 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9289 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9295 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9296 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9300 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9301 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9302 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9303 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9304 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9308 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9309 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9311 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9312 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9313 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9314 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9315 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9318 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9319 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9320 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9321 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9324 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9325 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9326 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9327 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9330 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9331 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9332 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9333 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9336 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9337 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9338 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9339 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9340 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9341 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9342 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9343 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9344 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9345 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9346 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9347 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9348 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9349 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9350 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9351 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9352 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9353 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9354 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9355 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9360 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9361 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9363 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9364 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9365 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9366 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9369 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9370 (2, node_id, required),
9371 (4, features, required),
9372 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9373 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9374 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9375 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9378 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9379 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9380 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9381 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9382 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9383 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9384 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9385 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9386 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9387 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9388 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9389 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9390 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9391 (7, self.config, option),
9392 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9393 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9394 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9395 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9396 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9397 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9398 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9399 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9400 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9401 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9402 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9403 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9404 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9405 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9406 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9407 (32, self.is_public, required),
9408 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9409 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9410 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9411 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9412 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9418 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9419 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9420 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9421 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9422 (2, channel_id, required),
9423 (3, channel_type, option),
9424 (4, counterparty, required),
9425 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9426 (6, funding_txo, option),
9427 (7, config, option),
9428 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9429 (9, confirmations, option),
9430 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9431 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9432 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9433 (16, balance_msat, required),
9434 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9435 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9436 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9437 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9438 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9439 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9440 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9441 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9442 (26, is_outbound, required),
9443 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9444 (30, is_usable, required),
9445 (32, is_public, required),
9446 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9447 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9448 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9449 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9450 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9453 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9454 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9455 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9456 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9457 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9461 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9463 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9464 outbound_scid_alias,
9468 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9469 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9471 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9472 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9473 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9474 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9475 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9476 confirmations_required,
9478 force_close_spend_delay,
9479 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9480 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9481 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9482 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9483 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9484 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9485 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9486 channel_shutdown_state,
9491 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9492 (2, channels, required_vec),
9493 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9494 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9497 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9498 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9501 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9503 (0, onion_packet, required),
9504 (1, blinded, option),
9505 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9508 (0, payment_data, required),
9509 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9510 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9511 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9512 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9513 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9515 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9516 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9517 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9518 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9519 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9520 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9524 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9525 (0, routing, required),
9526 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9527 (4, payment_hash, required),
9528 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9529 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9530 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9531 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9535 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9536 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9538 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9540 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9541 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9542 reason.write(writer)?;
9544 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9545 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9548 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9549 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9550 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9551 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9558 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9559 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9560 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9563 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9564 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9565 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9566 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9570 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9571 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9572 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9573 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9574 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9577 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9578 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9579 // messages contained in the variants.
9580 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9581 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9582 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9584 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9585 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9586 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9587 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9588 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9591 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9592 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9593 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9594 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9595 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9597 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9602 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9607 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
9608 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
9609 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
9612 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9613 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9614 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9615 (2, outpoint, required),
9616 (3, blinded_failure, option),
9617 (4, htlc_id, required),
9618 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9619 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9622 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9623 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9624 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9625 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9626 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9628 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9629 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9630 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9631 (2, self.value, required),
9632 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9633 (4, payment_data, option),
9634 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9635 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9636 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9637 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9643 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9644 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9645 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9646 (0, prev_hop, required),
9647 (1, total_msat, option),
9648 (2, value_ser, required),
9649 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9650 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9651 (5, total_value_received, option),
9652 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9653 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9654 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9656 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9657 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9658 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9660 if payment_data.is_some() {
9661 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9663 if total_msat.is_none() {
9664 total_msat = Some(value);
9666 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9669 if total_msat.is_none() {
9670 if payment_data.is_none() {
9671 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9673 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9675 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9679 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9682 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9683 total_value_received,
9684 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9686 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9687 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9692 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9693 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9694 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9697 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9698 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9699 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9700 let mut payment_id = None;
9701 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9702 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9703 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9704 (0, session_priv, required),
9705 (1, payment_id, option),
9706 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9707 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9708 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9709 (6, blinded_tail, option),
9711 if payment_id.is_none() {
9712 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9714 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9716 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9717 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9718 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9720 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9721 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9722 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9723 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9727 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9728 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9729 first_hop_htlc_msat,
9731 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9734 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9735 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9740 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9741 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9743 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9745 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9746 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9747 (0, session_priv, required),
9748 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9749 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9750 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9751 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9752 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9753 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9756 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9758 field.write(writer)?;
9765 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9766 (0, forward_info, required),
9767 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9768 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9769 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9770 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9773 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
9774 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9775 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
9777 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
9781 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
9782 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
9783 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
9784 (0, htlc_id, required),
9785 (2, err_packet, required),
9788 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
9789 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
9790 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
9791 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
9792 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
9793 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
9794 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
9795 (0, htlc_id, required),
9796 (1, failure_code, required),
9797 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
9798 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
9806 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
9807 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9808 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
9810 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
9812 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
9813 (0, htlc_id, required),
9814 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
9815 (2, err_packet, required),
9816 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
9818 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
9819 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
9820 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
9822 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
9826 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
9827 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
9831 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9836 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9837 (0, payment_secret, required),
9838 (2, expiry_time, required),
9839 (4, user_payment_id, required),
9840 (6, payment_preimage, required),
9841 (8, min_value_msat, required),
9844 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9846 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9847 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9848 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9849 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9850 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9851 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9855 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9856 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9858 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9860 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9862 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9863 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9864 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9867 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9869 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9870 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9871 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9872 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9873 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9874 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9875 serializable_peer_count += 1;
9878 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9879 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9883 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9885 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9886 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9887 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9888 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9889 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9890 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9893 channel.write(writer)?;
9899 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9900 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9901 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9902 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9903 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9904 for forward in pending_forwards {
9905 forward.write(writer)?;
9910 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9912 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9913 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9914 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9916 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9917 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9918 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9919 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9920 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9921 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9922 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9923 htlc.write(writer)?;
9925 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9926 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9929 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9930 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9931 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9932 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9933 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9934 // per_peer_state lock at all.
9935 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9938 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9939 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9940 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9941 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9942 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9944 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9945 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9946 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9947 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9948 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9949 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9950 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9955 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9956 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9957 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9958 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9959 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9960 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9961 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9962 // well save the space and not write any events here.
9963 0u64.write(writer)?;
9965 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9966 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9967 event.write(writer)?;
9971 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9972 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9973 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9974 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9975 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9976 0u64.write(writer)?;
9978 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9979 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9980 // likely to be identical.
9981 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9982 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9984 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9985 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9986 hash.write(writer)?;
9987 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9990 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
9991 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
9992 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9993 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
9994 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
9997 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
9998 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10000 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10001 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10002 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
10003 session_priv.write(writer)?;
10006 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
10007 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
10008 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
10009 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
10013 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
10014 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
10015 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10017 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10018 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10019 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
10025 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
10026 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10027 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
10028 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
10031 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
10032 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
10033 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
10034 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
10035 pending_claiming_payments = None;
10038 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10039 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10040 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
10041 if !updates.is_empty() {
10042 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
10043 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
10048 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10049 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
10050 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10051 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
10052 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10053 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
10054 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10055 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
10056 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
10057 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
10058 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10059 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
10060 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10067 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10068 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10069 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
10070 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
10073 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
10074 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
10075 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
10076 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
10077 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
10078 // check that the event is sane here.
10079 let event_encoded = event.encode();
10080 let event_read: Option<Event> =
10081 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
10082 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
10088 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10089 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10090 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10091 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
10092 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
10093 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
10096 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
10097 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
10098 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
10099 events.push_back((ev, action));
10100 } else if action.is_some() {
10101 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10108 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
10109 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
10110 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
10111 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
10112 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
10113 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
10116 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
10118 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
10120 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10121 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
10122 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
10123 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
10124 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
10125 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
10126 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
10127 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
10128 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10129 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
10130 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
10131 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
10132 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
10134 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
10135 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
10137 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
10138 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
10140 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
10141 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
10142 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
10143 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
10144 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
10145 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
10147 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
10148 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10150 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10151 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10152 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10153 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10154 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10155 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10159 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
10160 pub entropy_source: ES,
10162 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
10163 pub node_signer: NS,
10165 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
10166 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
10168 pub signer_provider: SP,
10170 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10172 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
10173 pub fee_estimator: F,
10174 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10176 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
10177 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
10178 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
10179 pub chain_monitor: M,
10181 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
10182 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
10183 /// force-closed during deserialization.
10184 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
10185 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
10186 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
10188 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
10190 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
10191 /// deserialization.
10193 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
10194 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
10195 pub default_config: UserConfig,
10197 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
10198 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
10200 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
10201 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
10202 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
10203 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
10205 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
10208 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10209 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
10212 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10213 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10215 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10216 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10217 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10218 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10219 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10220 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10224 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10225 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10226 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10227 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10228 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
10230 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10231 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
10236 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10237 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10238 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10239 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10241 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10242 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10243 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10244 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10245 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10246 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10250 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10251 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10252 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10256 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10257 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10259 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10260 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10261 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10262 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10263 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10264 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10268 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10269 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10271 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10272 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10273 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10275 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10277 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10278 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10279 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10280 let mut outpoint_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10281 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10282 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10283 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10284 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10285 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10286 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10288 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10289 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10290 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10291 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10292 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10293 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10294 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10295 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10296 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10297 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10298 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10299 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10300 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10301 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10303 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10304 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10305 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10307 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10308 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10309 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10311 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10312 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10313 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10315 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
10316 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10317 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10319 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10320 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10321 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
10324 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10325 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10326 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10327 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10328 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10329 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10330 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10331 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10333 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10334 let mut found_htlc = false;
10335 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10336 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10339 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10340 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10341 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10342 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10343 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10344 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10345 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10347 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10348 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10349 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10353 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10354 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10355 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10356 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10357 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10359 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
10360 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10362 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10363 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10364 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10365 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10367 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10368 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
10369 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10370 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10374 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10375 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10376 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10377 // safely discard the channel.
10378 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
10379 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10380 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10381 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10382 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10383 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10384 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10385 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10388 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10389 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10390 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10391 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10392 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10393 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10397 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10398 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10399 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10400 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10401 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10402 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10403 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10404 counterparty_node_id: None,
10405 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10407 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
10411 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10412 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10413 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10414 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10415 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10416 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10417 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10418 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10419 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10421 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10424 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10425 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10426 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10427 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10428 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10429 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10430 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10431 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10433 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10436 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10439 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
10440 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10441 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10442 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10443 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10444 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10445 is_connected: false,
10449 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10450 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10451 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10452 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10453 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
10454 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10455 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10456 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10459 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10460 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10461 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10462 for _ in 0..event_count {
10463 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10464 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10469 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10470 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10471 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10473 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10474 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10475 // on-startup monitor updates.
10476 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10477 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10479 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10483 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10484 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10486 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10487 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10488 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10489 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10490 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10494 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10495 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10496 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10497 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10498 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10499 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10500 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
10502 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10503 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10507 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10508 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10509 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10510 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
10511 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10512 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10513 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10514 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10515 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10516 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
10517 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10518 let mut events_override = None;
10519 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10520 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10521 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10522 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10523 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10524 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10525 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10526 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10527 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10528 (8, events_override, option),
10529 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10530 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10531 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10532 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10534 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10535 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10538 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10539 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10542 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10543 pending_events_read = events;
10546 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10547 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10550 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10551 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10552 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10553 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
10554 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10555 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10557 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10559 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10560 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10561 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10564 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10565 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10566 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10567 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10568 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10570 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10571 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10572 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10574 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10575 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10576 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10577 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10578 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10580 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10581 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10582 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10583 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10584 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10585 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10586 pending_background_events.push(
10587 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10588 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10589 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10590 update: update.clone(),
10593 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10594 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10595 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10596 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10597 pending_background_events.push(
10598 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10599 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10600 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
10603 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10604 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10605 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10607 max_in_flight_update_id
10611 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10612 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10613 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10614 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10615 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10616 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10618 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10620 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10621 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10622 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10623 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10624 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10625 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10626 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10627 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10628 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
10631 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10632 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10633 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10634 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10635 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10636 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10637 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10638 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10639 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10640 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10641 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10644 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10645 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10646 debug_assert!(false);
10647 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10652 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10653 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10654 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), Some(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
10655 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10656 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10657 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10658 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10659 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10660 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10662 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10663 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10664 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
10666 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10667 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
10668 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10669 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10670 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10671 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10672 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10673 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10678 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10679 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10681 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10682 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10683 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10684 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10687 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10688 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10689 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10690 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10691 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10692 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10693 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10695 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10696 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
10697 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10698 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10699 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10700 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10701 if path.hops.is_empty() {
10702 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10703 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10706 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10707 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10708 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10709 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10710 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10711 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10712 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10713 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
10715 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10716 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10717 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10718 retry_strategy: None,
10719 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10720 payment_params: None,
10721 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10722 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10723 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10724 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10725 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10726 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10727 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10728 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10729 total_msat: path_amt,
10730 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10731 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10733 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10734 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10739 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10740 match htlc_source {
10741 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10742 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10743 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10744 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10746 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10747 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10748 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10749 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10750 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10751 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10752 forwards.retain(|forward| {
10753 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10754 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10755 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10756 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10761 !forwards.is_empty()
10763 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10764 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10765 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10766 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10767 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10768 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10769 intercepted_id != ev_id
10776 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10777 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10778 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10779 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10780 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10781 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10782 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10783 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10784 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10785 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10786 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10788 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10789 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10790 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10792 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10793 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
10794 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10801 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10802 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10804 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10806 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10807 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10808 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10809 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10810 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10811 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10812 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10813 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10814 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10815 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10818 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10819 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10820 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10821 // channel still live case here.
10825 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10826 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10831 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10832 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10833 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10834 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10835 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10836 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10837 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10838 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10842 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10843 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10845 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10846 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10847 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10848 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10850 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10851 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10852 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10854 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10855 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10857 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10858 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10860 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10863 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10864 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10865 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10867 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10871 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10872 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10873 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10874 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10875 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10877 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10878 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10879 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10880 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10881 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10882 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10883 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10884 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10886 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10887 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10891 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10893 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10895 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10896 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10898 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10899 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10904 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10905 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10907 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10909 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10911 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10912 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10913 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10914 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10918 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10919 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10920 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10921 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10922 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10923 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10924 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10925 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10926 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10928 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10929 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10930 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10932 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10933 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10934 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10935 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10936 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10937 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10939 if chan.context.is_usable() {
10940 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10941 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10942 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10943 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10944 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10948 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10949 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10950 debug_assert!(false);
10951 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10956 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10958 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10959 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10960 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10961 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10962 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10963 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10964 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10965 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10966 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10967 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10968 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10970 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10971 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10973 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10974 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10975 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10976 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10978 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10979 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10980 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10981 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10983 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10984 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10985 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10986 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10988 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
10989 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10990 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
10991 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10992 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10993 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
10994 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10995 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
10998 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10999 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
11002 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
11005 purpose: payment.purpose,
11006 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
11007 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
11008 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
11014 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
11015 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
11016 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
11017 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
11018 for action in actions.iter() {
11019 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
11020 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
11021 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
11023 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
11025 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
11026 blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
11027 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
11028 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
11029 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
11031 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
11032 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
11033 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
11034 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
11038 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
11039 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
11043 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
11045 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
11046 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11050 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
11052 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
11053 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
11054 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
11055 router: args.router,
11057 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
11059 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
11060 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
11061 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
11062 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
11064 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
11065 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
11066 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
11067 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
11068 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
11069 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
11071 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
11073 our_network_pubkey,
11076 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
11078 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
11080 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
11081 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
11082 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
11083 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
11084 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
11086 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
11087 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
11089 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
11091 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
11093 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
11094 node_signer: args.node_signer,
11095 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
11097 logger: args.logger,
11098 default_configuration: args.default_config,
11101 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
11102 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
11103 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
11104 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
11105 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
11108 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
11109 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
11110 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
11111 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
11112 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
11113 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
11116 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
11117 //connection or two.
11119 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
11125 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11126 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11127 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
11128 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
11129 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
11130 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
11131 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
11132 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
11133 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11134 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
11135 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
11136 use crate::prelude::*;
11137 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
11138 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
11139 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
11140 use crate::util::test_utils;
11141 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
11142 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
11145 fn test_notify_limits() {
11146 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
11147 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
11148 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11149 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11150 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
11151 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11153 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
11154 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
11155 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11156 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11157 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11159 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11161 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
11162 // to connect messages with new values
11163 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11164 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11165 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11166 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11167 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11168 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11170 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
11171 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11172 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11173 // ... but the last node should not.
11174 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11175 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
11176 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11177 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11179 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
11180 // about the channel.
11181 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11182 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11183 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11185 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
11187 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11188 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11189 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11190 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11191 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11192 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11194 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
11195 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11196 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11198 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
11199 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
11200 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
11201 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
11202 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
11203 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
11205 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
11206 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
11207 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11208 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11209 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11210 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11211 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11212 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11214 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11215 // the channel info has updated.
11216 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11217 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11218 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11219 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11220 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11221 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11225 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11226 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11228 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11229 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11230 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11231 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11232 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11234 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11235 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11236 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11237 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11239 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11240 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11241 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11242 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11243 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11244 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11245 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11246 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11247 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11248 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11249 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11250 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11252 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11253 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11254 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11255 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11256 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11257 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11258 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11259 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11260 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11261 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11262 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11263 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11264 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11265 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11266 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11267 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11268 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11269 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11270 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11271 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11272 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11273 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11274 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11276 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11277 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11278 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11280 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11281 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11282 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11284 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11285 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11286 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11287 // lightning messages manually.
11288 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11289 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11290 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11292 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11293 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11294 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11295 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11296 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11297 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11298 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11299 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11300 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11301 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11302 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11303 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11304 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11305 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11307 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11308 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11309 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11310 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11311 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11312 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11313 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11314 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11315 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11316 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11317 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11319 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11320 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11321 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11322 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11324 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11325 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11326 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11327 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11329 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11332 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11333 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11334 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11335 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11337 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11342 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11343 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11344 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11347 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11348 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11349 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11350 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11351 // fails as expected.
11352 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11353 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11354 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11355 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11356 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11357 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11358 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11359 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11360 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11361 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11362 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11363 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11364 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11365 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11366 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11368 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11369 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11370 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11372 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11373 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11374 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11375 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11376 let route = find_route(
11377 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11378 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11380 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11381 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11382 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11383 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11384 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11385 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11386 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11387 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11388 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11389 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11390 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11391 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11392 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11393 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11394 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11395 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11396 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11397 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11398 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11399 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11400 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11401 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11402 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11403 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11405 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11406 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11408 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11409 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11410 let route = find_route(
11411 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11412 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11414 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11415 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11416 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11417 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11418 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11419 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11420 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11421 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11423 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11424 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11425 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11426 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11428 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11429 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11430 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11431 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11432 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11433 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11434 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11435 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11436 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11437 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11438 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11439 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11440 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11441 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11442 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11443 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11444 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11445 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11446 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11448 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11449 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11451 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11452 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11453 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11454 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11455 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11456 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11457 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11458 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11459 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11460 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11462 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11463 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11464 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11467 let route = find_route(
11468 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11469 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11471 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11472 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11473 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11474 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11475 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11476 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11477 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11478 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11479 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11480 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11481 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11482 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11483 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11484 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11485 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11486 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11487 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11488 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11489 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11490 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11491 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11492 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11493 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11495 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11496 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11500 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11501 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11502 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11503 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11504 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11505 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11506 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11508 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11509 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11511 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11512 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11513 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11514 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11515 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11516 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11517 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11518 let route = find_route(
11519 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11520 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11523 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11524 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11525 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11526 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11527 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11528 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11531 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11532 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11533 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11534 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11535 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11536 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11537 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11539 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11543 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11544 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11545 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11546 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11547 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11548 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11549 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11550 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11551 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11553 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11554 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11556 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11557 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11558 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11559 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11560 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11561 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11562 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11563 let route = find_route(
11564 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11565 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11568 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11569 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11570 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11571 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11572 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11573 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11574 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11575 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11576 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11578 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11579 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11580 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11581 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11582 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11583 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11584 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11586 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11590 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11591 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11592 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11593 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11594 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11596 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11597 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11598 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11599 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11601 // Marshall an MPP route.
11602 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11603 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11604 route.paths.push(path);
11605 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11606 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11607 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11608 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11609 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11610 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11612 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11613 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11615 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11616 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11618 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11623 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11624 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11625 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11626 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11627 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11629 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11631 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11632 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11634 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11635 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11636 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11637 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11640 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11641 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11642 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11643 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11644 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11645 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11648 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11651 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11652 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11657 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11658 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11659 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11660 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11661 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11662 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11664 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11665 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11667 total_msat: 100_000,
11670 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11671 // payment verification fails as expected.
11672 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11673 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11674 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11675 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11677 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11681 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11682 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11686 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
11687 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11688 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11689 // the channel is successfully closed.
11690 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11691 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11692 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11693 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11695 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11696 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11697 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11698 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11699 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11701 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11702 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
11704 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11705 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11706 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11707 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11710 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11712 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11713 // as it has the funding transaction.
11714 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11715 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11716 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11719 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11721 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11723 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11725 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11726 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11727 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11729 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11732 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
11733 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
11734 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11735 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11736 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11738 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11739 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11740 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11741 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11742 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11743 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11744 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11745 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11747 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11748 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11749 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11750 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11752 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11753 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11755 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11756 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11757 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11758 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11759 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11760 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11761 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11765 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11766 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11767 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11768 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
11769 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11770 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11771 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11774 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11776 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11777 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11778 // closing transaction).
11779 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
11780 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11781 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11783 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11784 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11785 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11786 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11787 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11790 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11792 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11794 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
11795 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11796 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11798 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11800 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11801 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11804 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11805 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11806 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11809 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11810 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11811 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11814 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11815 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11816 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11819 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11820 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11821 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11824 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11826 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11827 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11829 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11830 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11832 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11833 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11838 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11839 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11840 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11841 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11842 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11843 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11844 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11845 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11848 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11849 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11850 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11852 // Test the API functions.
11853 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
11855 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11857 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11859 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11861 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11863 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11865 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11869 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11870 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11871 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11872 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11873 // the given `channel_id`.
11874 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11875 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11876 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11877 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11879 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11882 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11884 // Test the API functions.
11885 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11887 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11889 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11891 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11893 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11895 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11899 fn test_connection_limiting() {
11900 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11901 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11902 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11903 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11904 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11906 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11908 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11909 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11911 let mut funding_tx = None;
11912 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11913 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11914 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11917 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11918 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11919 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11920 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11921 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11923 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11924 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11925 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11927 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11929 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11930 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11931 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11933 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11936 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11937 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11938 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11939 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11940 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11942 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11943 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11945 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11946 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11947 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11948 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11949 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11950 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11951 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11954 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11955 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11956 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11957 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11958 }, true).unwrap_err();
11960 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11961 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11962 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11963 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11964 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11965 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11966 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11968 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11969 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11971 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11972 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11973 }, true).unwrap_err();
11975 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11976 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11977 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11978 }, false).unwrap();
11979 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11981 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11982 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11984 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11985 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11986 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11987 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11988 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11990 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11991 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11992 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11994 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
11995 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11996 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
11998 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
11999 // "protected" and can connect again.
12000 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
12001 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12002 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12004 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12006 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
12008 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12009 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12013 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
12014 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
12015 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12016 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12017 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12018 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12020 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12022 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12023 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12025 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12026 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12027 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12028 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12031 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
12033 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12034 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12035 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12037 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
12038 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12039 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12041 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
12042 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12043 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12044 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12048 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
12049 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12050 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12051 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12052 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12053 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
12054 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12055 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
12056 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12058 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12060 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12061 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12063 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
12064 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12065 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12066 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12067 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12068 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12071 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12072 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12074 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12075 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12077 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12079 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
12080 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12083 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
12084 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12085 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12086 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12087 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12089 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12090 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12092 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12093 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
12094 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
12095 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
12099 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12101 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12102 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12104 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
12105 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12106 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12108 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12109 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12111 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12113 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12117 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
12118 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12119 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12120 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12121 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12122 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
12123 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
12124 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12125 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12126 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12127 payment_metadata: None,
12128 keysend_preimage: None,
12129 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12130 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12132 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12134 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
12135 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
12136 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12137 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
12138 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12139 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12140 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
12142 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
12143 } else { panic!(); }
12145 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
12146 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
12147 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12148 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12149 payment_metadata: None,
12150 keysend_preimage: None,
12151 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12152 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12154 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12156 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12157 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12158 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12159 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
12163 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
12164 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12165 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12166 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12167 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12169 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12170 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12171 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12172 cltv_expiry_height: 22,
12173 payment_metadata: None,
12174 keysend_preimage: None,
12175 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12176 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
12178 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12179 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
12180 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
12182 // Should not return an error as this condition:
12183 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
12184 // is not satisfied.
12185 assert!(result.is_ok());
12189 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
12190 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12191 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12192 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12193 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12195 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
12196 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12198 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12199 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12200 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
12201 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
12202 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12204 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12205 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12207 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12208 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12209 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12210 match &msg_events[0] {
12211 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
12212 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12214 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12215 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12216 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12219 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12222 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12223 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12225 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12226 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12227 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12229 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12233 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12234 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12235 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12236 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12237 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12238 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12239 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12240 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12241 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12242 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12243 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12245 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
12246 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12247 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12249 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12250 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12252 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12253 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12255 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12258 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12259 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12261 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12262 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12264 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12265 // not have generated any events.
12266 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12270 fn test_update_channel_config() {
12271 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12272 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12273 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12274 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12275 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12276 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12277 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12279 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12280 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12281 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12283 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12284 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12285 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12286 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12287 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12289 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12290 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12293 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12294 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12295 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12297 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12298 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12299 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12300 ..Default::default()
12302 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12303 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12304 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12306 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12307 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12310 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12311 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12312 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12313 ..Default::default()
12315 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12316 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12317 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12318 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12320 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12321 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12324 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12325 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12326 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12327 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12328 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12331 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12332 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12333 ..Default::default()
12335 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12338 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12339 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12340 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12341 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12345 fn test_payment_display() {
12346 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12347 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12348 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12349 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12350 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12351 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12355 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12356 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12357 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12358 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12359 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12360 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12362 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12363 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12364 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12365 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12366 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12367 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12368 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12369 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12371 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12372 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12373 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12376 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12377 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12379 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12380 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12382 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12383 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12384 }, false).unwrap();
12385 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12386 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12387 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12389 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12391 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12392 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12393 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12394 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12395 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12396 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12397 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12398 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12399 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12400 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12401 } else { panic!() };
12402 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12403 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12404 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12405 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12407 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12409 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12410 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12411 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12416 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
12417 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
12418 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12419 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12422 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12423 let deserialized_chanmgr;
12424 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
12426 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12427 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
12429 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12430 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
12433 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12434 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
12435 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12437 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12441 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12442 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
12443 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12445 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12450 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
12451 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
12452 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
12453 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
12455 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12456 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
12457 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
12459 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
12461 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12462 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
12463 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
12464 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
12466 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
12467 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
12469 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
12475 use crate::chain::Listen;
12476 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12477 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12478 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12479 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12480 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12481 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12482 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12483 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12484 use crate::util::test_utils;
12485 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12487 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12488 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12489 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12490 use bitcoin::{Block, Transaction, TxOut};
12492 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12494 use criterion::Criterion;
12496 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12497 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12498 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12499 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12500 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12501 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12502 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12504 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12505 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12507 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12508 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12510 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12512 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12515 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12516 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12519 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12520 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12521 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12523 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12524 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12526 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12527 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12528 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12529 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12530 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
12532 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12533 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12534 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12536 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12537 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12538 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12539 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12541 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12542 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12543 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12545 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12546 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12547 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12548 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12549 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12551 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12552 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12553 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12555 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12556 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12558 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12559 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12560 }, false).unwrap();
12561 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12562 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12563 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12566 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12567 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12568 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12570 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12571 } else { panic!(); }
12573 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12574 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12575 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12576 match events_b[0] {
12577 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12578 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12580 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12583 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12584 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12585 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12586 match events_a[0] {
12587 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12588 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12590 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12593 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12595 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12596 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12597 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12599 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12600 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12601 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12602 match msg_events[0] {
12603 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12604 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12605 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12609 match msg_events[1] {
12610 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12614 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12615 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12616 match events_a[0] {
12617 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12618 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12620 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12623 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12624 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12625 match events_b[0] {
12626 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12627 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12629 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12632 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12633 macro_rules! send_payment {
12634 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12635 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12636 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12637 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12638 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12639 payment_count += 1;
12640 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
12641 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12643 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12644 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12645 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12646 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12647 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12648 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12649 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12650 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12651 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12652 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12653 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12655 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12656 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12657 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12658 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12660 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12661 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12662 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12663 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12664 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12666 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12669 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12670 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12671 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12672 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12674 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12678 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12679 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12680 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);