1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
5 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
6 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
8 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
9 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
10 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
13 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
14 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
15 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelKeys};
16 use ln::channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor;
17 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
19 use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler};
20 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
21 use util::sha2::Sha256;
22 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
23 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
24 use util::logger::Logger;
25 use util::errors::APIError;
28 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
29 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
30 use crypto::digest::Digest;
31 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
34 use std::collections::HashMap;
35 use std::collections::hash_map;
37 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
38 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
39 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
41 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
43 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
44 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
45 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
47 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
48 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
49 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
50 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
51 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
52 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
53 mod channel_held_info {
55 use ln::router::Route;
56 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
57 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
59 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
60 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
61 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
62 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
63 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
64 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
65 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
66 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
67 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
70 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
71 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
72 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
73 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
76 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
77 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
78 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
79 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
83 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
85 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
86 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
87 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
88 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
91 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
94 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
97 session_priv: SecretKey,
102 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
103 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
104 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
105 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
110 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
111 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
113 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
121 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
123 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
124 err: msgs::HandleError,
125 needs_channel_force_close: bool,
127 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
129 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
133 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
134 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
136 data: err.to_string()
140 needs_channel_force_close: false,
144 fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
148 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
149 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
151 data: err.to_string()
155 needs_channel_force_close: true,
159 fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
160 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
163 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
164 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
168 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
169 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
170 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
171 /// probably increase this significantly.
172 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
174 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
175 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
177 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
180 struct ChannelHolder {
181 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
182 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
183 next_forward: Instant,
184 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
185 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
186 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
187 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
188 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
189 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
190 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
192 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
194 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
195 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
196 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
197 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
198 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
199 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
202 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
204 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
205 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
206 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
207 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
208 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
213 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
214 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
216 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
217 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
218 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
219 /// to individual Channels.
220 pub struct ChannelManager {
221 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
222 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
223 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
224 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
225 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
227 announce_channels_publicly: bool,
228 fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
229 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
230 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
232 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
233 our_network_key: SecretKey,
235 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
240 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
242 macro_rules! secp_call {
243 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
246 Err(_) => return Err($err),
253 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
255 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
256 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
261 pub struct ChannelDetails {
262 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
263 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
264 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
265 /// lifetime of the channel.
266 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
267 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
268 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
269 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
270 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
271 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
272 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
276 impl ChannelManager {
277 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them. This is
278 /// the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements ChannelMessageHandler.
279 /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
280 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
281 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
282 pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
283 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
285 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
286 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
287 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
288 monitor: monitor.clone(),
292 announce_channels_publicly,
293 fee_proportional_millionths,
294 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
297 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
298 by_id: HashMap::new(),
299 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
300 next_forward: Instant::now(),
301 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
302 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
306 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
310 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
311 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
315 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
316 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
317 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
318 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
319 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
320 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
321 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
322 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
323 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
324 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
326 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
327 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
328 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
329 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
330 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
331 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
332 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
333 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
336 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
337 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
338 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
340 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
344 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
345 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
346 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
347 match channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel) {
348 Some(_) => panic!("RNG is bad???"),
352 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
353 events.push(events::Event::SendOpenChannel {
354 node_id: their_network_key,
360 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
361 /// more information.
362 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
363 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
364 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
365 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
366 res.push(ChannelDetails {
367 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
368 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
369 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
370 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
371 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
377 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
378 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
379 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
380 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
381 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
382 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
383 if channel.is_usable() {
384 res.push(ChannelDetails {
385 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
386 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
387 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
388 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
389 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
396 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
397 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
398 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
399 /// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed.
400 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
401 let (mut res, node_id, chan_option) = {
402 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
403 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
404 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
405 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
406 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
407 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
408 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
409 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
411 (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
412 } else { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), None) }
414 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "No such channel", action: None})
417 for htlc_source in res.1.drain(..) {
418 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
419 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
421 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
422 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
427 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
428 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
429 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
433 events.push(events::Event::SendShutdown {
442 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
443 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
444 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
445 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
446 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
448 for tx in local_txn {
449 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
451 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
452 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
453 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
454 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
455 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
456 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
457 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
460 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
461 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
462 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
464 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
465 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
466 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
467 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
468 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
475 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
476 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
477 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
478 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
484 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
485 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
486 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
487 for chan in self.list_channels() {
488 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
493 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
495 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
496 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
497 let mut res = [0; 32];
498 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
502 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
503 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
504 let mut res = [0; 32];
505 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
511 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
512 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
513 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
514 let mut res = [0; 32];
515 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
520 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
521 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
522 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
523 let mut res = [0; 32];
524 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
528 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
530 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
531 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
532 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
534 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
535 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
537 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
538 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
539 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
540 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
541 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
543 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
545 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
546 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
548 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
554 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
555 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
556 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
558 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
559 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
565 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
575 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
576 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
577 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
578 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
579 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
580 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
581 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
582 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
584 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
585 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
586 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
587 // the intended recipient).
588 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
589 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
590 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
592 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
593 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
594 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
595 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
599 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
600 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
601 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
603 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
604 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
605 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
607 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
609 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
613 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
615 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
623 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
624 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
626 for i in 0..dst.len() {
631 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
632 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
633 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
634 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
637 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
638 let end_len = iters * 65;
639 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
640 res.resize(end_len, 0);
642 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
643 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
644 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
645 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
646 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
651 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
652 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
654 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
655 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
656 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
657 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
659 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
660 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
661 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
664 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
667 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
668 hmac.input(&packet_data);
669 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
670 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
675 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
676 hop_data: packet_data,
681 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
682 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
683 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
684 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
686 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
687 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
688 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
689 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
690 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
691 data: packet_crypted,
695 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
696 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
698 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
701 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
702 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
703 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
704 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
708 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
709 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
712 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
714 failuremsg: failuremsg,
718 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
719 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
720 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
726 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
727 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
728 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
731 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
732 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
735 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
736 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
737 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
738 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
744 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
745 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
746 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
747 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
748 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
749 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
750 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
751 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
754 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
755 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
757 let mut channel_state = None;
758 macro_rules! return_err {
759 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
761 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
762 if channel_state.is_none() {
763 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
765 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
766 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
767 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
768 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
769 })), channel_state.unwrap());
774 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
775 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
776 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
777 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
778 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
779 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
780 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
781 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
784 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
785 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
786 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
787 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
788 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
791 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
792 let next_hop_data = {
793 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
794 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
795 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
797 let error_code = match err {
798 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRealmByte => 0x4000 | 1,
799 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
801 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
807 //TODO: Check that msg.cltv_expiry is within acceptable bounds!
809 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
811 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
812 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
814 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
815 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
818 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
819 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
820 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
821 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
823 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
825 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
827 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
828 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
829 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
832 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
833 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
834 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
836 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
838 let blinding_factor = {
839 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
840 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
841 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
842 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
843 sha.result(&mut res);
844 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
846 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
852 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
853 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
856 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
858 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
859 hop_data: new_packet_data,
860 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
863 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
864 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
865 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
866 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
867 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
868 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
869 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
873 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
874 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
875 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
876 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
877 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
879 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
881 Some(id) => id.clone(),
883 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = {
884 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
886 Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
888 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
889 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward {
890 Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
892 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
893 Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
900 return_err!(err, code, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
905 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
908 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
909 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
910 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
911 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
915 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
917 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
918 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
919 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
920 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
921 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
922 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
923 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
924 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
925 fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
926 excess_data: Vec::new(),
929 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
930 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key); //TODO Can we unwrap here?
932 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
938 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
939 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
940 /// fields for more info.
941 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
942 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
943 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
944 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
945 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
946 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
947 /// See-also docs on Channel::send_htlc_and_commit.
948 /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
949 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
950 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
951 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
952 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
953 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
955 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
956 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
957 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
958 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
962 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
963 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
964 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
966 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
968 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
970 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
971 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
972 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
973 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
975 let (first_hop_node_id, (update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = {
976 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
977 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
979 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
980 None => return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
981 Some(id) => id.clone(),
985 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
986 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
987 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
990 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
992 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
993 route: route.clone(),
994 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
995 }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::RouteError{err: he.err})?
998 let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
1001 Some(msgs) => (first_hop_node_id, msgs),
1002 None => return Ok(()),
1006 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1010 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1011 events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1012 node_id: first_hop_node_id,
1013 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1014 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1015 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1016 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1017 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1024 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1025 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1026 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1027 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1028 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1030 macro_rules! add_pending_event {
1033 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1034 pending_events.push($event);
1039 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1040 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1041 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1043 match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
1044 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1045 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1048 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1049 mem::drop(channel_state);
1050 add_pending_event!(events::Event::HandleError {
1051 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1060 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1061 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1064 add_pending_event!(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
1065 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1069 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1070 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1071 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1072 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1074 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1080 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1081 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1083 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1085 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1087 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1088 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1090 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1091 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1092 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1093 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1094 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1098 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1099 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1100 /// Will likely generate further events.
1101 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1102 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1103 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1105 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1106 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1108 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1112 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1113 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1114 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1115 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1117 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1118 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1119 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1120 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1121 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1122 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1124 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1129 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1131 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1132 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1133 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1134 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1135 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1136 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1138 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1140 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1141 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1146 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1148 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1149 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1150 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1151 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1152 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1153 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1154 // this channel currently :/.
1161 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1162 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1165 if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
1166 } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
1168 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1170 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1174 new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1175 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1176 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1177 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1178 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1179 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1180 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1181 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1186 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1187 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1188 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1189 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1190 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1192 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1193 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1194 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1196 new_events.push((None, events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1197 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1198 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1205 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1207 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1208 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1212 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1214 new_events.retain(|event| {
1215 if let &Some(ref monitor) = &event.0 {
1216 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor.clone()) {
1217 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1223 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1224 events.reserve(new_events.len());
1225 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
1226 events.push(event.1);
1230 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
1231 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
1232 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1233 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1234 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1235 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1236 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1237 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() });
1243 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1244 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1245 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1246 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1247 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1248 /// still-available channels.
1249 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1251 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1252 mem::drop(channel_state);
1254 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1255 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1256 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone()
1259 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1260 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1261 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1262 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1263 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1265 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1266 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1270 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
1271 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1272 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1276 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1277 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1278 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1280 //TODO: Do something with e?
1287 Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
1288 mem::drop(channel_state);
1290 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1291 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1294 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1295 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1297 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1298 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1299 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1300 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1301 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1302 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1312 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1313 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1314 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1315 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1316 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1317 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1318 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1319 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1320 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1322 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1323 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1324 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1325 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1326 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1327 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1332 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1334 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1335 mem::drop(channel_state);
1336 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1337 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1341 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1342 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1343 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
1344 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1345 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1347 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1348 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1354 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1355 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1356 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1358 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1359 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1360 //TODO: Do something with e?
1366 mem::drop(channel_state);
1367 if let Some(chan_monitor) = fulfill_msgs.1 {
1368 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1369 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1373 if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs.0 {
1374 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1375 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1377 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1378 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1379 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1380 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1381 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1382 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1390 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1391 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1392 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1395 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1396 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1398 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1402 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1403 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1404 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1406 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1407 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1408 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1411 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1413 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]).unwrap(),
1414 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0]).unwrap(),
1415 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0]).unwrap(),
1416 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0]).unwrap(),
1417 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0]).unwrap(),
1418 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0]).unwrap(),
1419 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0]).unwrap(),
1420 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
1423 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
1424 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
1425 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
1427 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
1431 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger)).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(e))?;
1432 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel();
1433 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1437 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1438 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1439 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1440 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1442 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1443 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1444 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1446 chan.accept_channel(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1447 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1449 //TODO: same as above
1450 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1453 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1454 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1455 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1456 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1457 output_script: output_script,
1458 user_channel_id: user_id,
1463 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1464 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1465 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1466 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1467 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1468 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1469 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1470 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1472 match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1473 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1474 (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1477 return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1481 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1483 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1484 // note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same
1485 // channel back-to-back with funding_created, we'll end up thinking they sent a message
1486 // for a bogus channel.
1487 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1490 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1491 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1492 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1493 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1495 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1502 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1503 let (funding_txo, user_id, monitor) = {
1504 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1505 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1507 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1508 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1509 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1511 let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1512 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id(), chan_monitor)
1514 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1517 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1520 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1521 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1522 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1523 user_channel_id: user_id,
1528 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1529 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1530 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1532 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1533 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1534 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1536 chan.funding_locked(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1537 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan));
1539 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1543 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1544 let (mut res, chan_option) = {
1545 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1546 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1548 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1549 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1550 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1551 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1552 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1554 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1555 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1556 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1557 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1559 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1560 } else { (res, None) }
1562 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1565 for htlc_source in res.2.drain(..) {
1566 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1567 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1569 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1570 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1571 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1572 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1580 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1581 let (res, chan_option) = {
1582 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1583 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1584 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1585 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1586 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1587 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1588 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1590 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1591 if res.1.is_some() {
1592 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1593 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1594 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1595 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1596 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1597 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1598 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1600 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1601 } else { (res, None) }
1603 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1606 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1607 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1609 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1610 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1611 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1612 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1620 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1621 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1622 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1623 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1625 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1626 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1627 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1628 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1630 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1631 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1633 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1635 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1636 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1637 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1639 if !chan.is_usable() {
1640 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1642 chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1644 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1648 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1649 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1650 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1652 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1653 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1654 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1656 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?.clone()
1658 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1660 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1664 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1665 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1666 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1668 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1669 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1670 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1672 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1674 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1678 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, .. } => {
1679 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1680 let mut packet_decrypted = msg.reason.data.clone();
1682 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1683 if res.is_some() { return; }
1685 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1687 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1688 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1689 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1690 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1691 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1693 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
1694 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 2 {
1695 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1697 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1698 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1699 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1700 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1701 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1702 const UNKNOWN_CHAN: u16 = 0x4000|10;
1703 const TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE: u16 = 0x4000|7;
1704 match byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]) {
1705 TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE => {
1706 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 {
1707 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..4]) as usize;
1708 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + update_len {
1709 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4 + update_len])) {
1710 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
1718 // No such next-hop. We know this came from the
1719 // current node as the HMAC validated.
1720 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1721 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id
1724 _ => {}, //TODO: Enumerate all of these!
1736 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1737 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1738 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1740 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1741 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1742 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1744 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1747 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1751 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1752 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = {
1753 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1754 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1756 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1757 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1758 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1760 chan.commitment_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?
1762 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1765 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1769 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
1772 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1773 let ((res, mut pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, chan_monitor), short_channel_id) = {
1774 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1775 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1777 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1778 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1779 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1781 (chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?, chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
1783 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1786 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1789 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
1790 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1793 let mut forward_event = None;
1794 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1795 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1796 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1797 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1798 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1800 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1801 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1802 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1803 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id: short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
1805 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1806 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id: short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
1811 match forward_event {
1813 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1814 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1815 time_forwardable: time
1824 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1825 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1826 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1828 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1829 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1830 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1832 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1834 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1838 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1839 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
1840 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1841 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1843 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1844 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1846 if !chan.is_usable() {
1847 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1850 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1851 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
1852 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1854 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
1855 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1856 let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
1857 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
1858 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
1860 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1862 (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
1863 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
1864 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
1865 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
1866 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
1867 contents: announcement,
1868 }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
1870 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1873 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1874 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
1878 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1879 let (res, chan_monitor) = {
1880 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1881 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1883 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1884 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1886 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1887 (Ok((funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update)), channel_monitor)
1889 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1892 if let Some(monitor) = chan_monitor {
1893 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1901 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
1902 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
1903 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1904 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1905 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
1910 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
1911 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
1912 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1913 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
1915 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1916 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1917 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1918 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1919 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
1920 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
1921 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel);
1922 new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
1923 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1924 msg: funding_locked,
1925 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
1927 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
1928 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
1929 new_events.push(events::Event::HandleError {
1930 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1933 if channel.is_shutdown() {
1937 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
1938 for tx in txn_matched {
1939 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
1940 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
1941 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1942 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1944 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
1945 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
1946 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
1947 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1948 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1949 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1958 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1959 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1960 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1962 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1963 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
1964 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
1965 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
1966 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
1967 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1968 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1977 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
1978 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
1980 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1981 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
1982 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
1984 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
1987 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
1988 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
1989 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1990 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
1992 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1993 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1994 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1995 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
1996 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
1997 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
1998 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2000 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2001 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2002 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2012 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2013 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2015 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2016 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2017 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2018 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2021 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2025 macro_rules! handle_error {
2026 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
2029 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
2030 if needs_channel_force_close {
2032 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
2033 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2034 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2036 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2039 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
2040 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
2041 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
2042 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2043 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2045 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2057 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2058 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2059 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
2060 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2063 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2064 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2067 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
2068 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2071 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2072 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2075 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
2076 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2079 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
2080 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2083 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
2084 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2087 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2088 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2091 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2092 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2095 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, HandleError> {
2096 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2099 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2100 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2103 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
2104 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2107 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
2108 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2111 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2112 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2115 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2116 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2119 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>), HandleError> {
2120 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2123 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2124 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2125 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2126 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2128 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2129 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2130 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2131 if no_connection_possible {
2132 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2133 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2134 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2135 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2137 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2138 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2139 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2149 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2150 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2151 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2152 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2153 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2154 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2155 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2157 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2158 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2159 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2168 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2169 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2171 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2172 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2173 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
2174 pending_events.push(event);
2177 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2178 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2179 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2184 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<msgs::ChannelReestablish> {
2185 let mut res = Vec::new();
2186 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2187 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2188 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2189 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2190 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2191 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2192 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2196 res.push(chan.get_channel_reestablish());
2201 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2205 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2206 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2207 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2208 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2209 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2213 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2220 use chain::chaininterface;
2221 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2222 use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
2223 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
2224 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
2226 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
2227 use util::test_utils;
2228 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
2229 use util::errors::APIError;
2230 use util::logger::Logger;
2231 use util::ser::Writeable;
2233 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
2234 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
2235 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
2236 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
2237 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2238 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
2239 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
2243 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2244 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2246 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
2247 use crypto::digest::Digest;
2249 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2251 use std::cell::RefCell;
2252 use std::collections::HashMap;
2253 use std::default::Default;
2255 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2256 use std::time::Instant;
2259 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
2260 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
2261 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2266 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2267 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2270 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2271 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2274 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2275 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2278 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2279 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2282 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2283 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2288 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2290 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
2291 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
2296 fn onion_vectors() {
2297 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
2298 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2300 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
2301 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
2302 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
2303 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
2304 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
2306 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
2307 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
2308 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
2309 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
2310 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
2312 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
2313 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
2314 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
2315 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
2316 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
2318 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
2319 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
2320 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
2321 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
2322 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
2324 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
2325 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
2326 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
2327 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
2328 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
2330 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
2331 let payloads = vec!(
2332 msgs::OnionHopData {
2334 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2335 short_channel_id: 0,
2337 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2341 msgs::OnionHopData {
2343 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2344 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
2345 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
2346 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2350 msgs::OnionHopData {
2352 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2353 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
2354 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
2355 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2359 msgs::OnionHopData {
2361 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2362 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2363 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2364 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2368 msgs::OnionHopData {
2370 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2371 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2372 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2373 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2379 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
2380 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2382 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("0002eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619e5f14350c2a76fc232b5e46d421e9615471ab9e0bc887beff8c95fdb878f7b3a716a996c7845c93d90e4ecbb9bde4ece2f69425c99e4bc820e44485455f135edc0d10f7d61ab590531cf08000179a333a347f8b4072f216400406bdf3bf038659793d4a1fd7b246979e3150a0a4cb052c9ec69acf0f48c3d39cd55675fe717cb7d80ce721caad69320c3a469a202f1e468c67eaf7a7cd8226d0fd32f7b48084dca885d56047694762b67021713ca673929c163ec36e04e40ca8e1c6d17569419d3039d9a1ec866abe044a9ad635778b961fc0776dc832b3a451bd5d35072d2269cf9b040f6b7a7dad84fb114ed413b1426cb96ceaf83825665ed5a1d002c1687f92465b49ed4c7f0218ff8c6c7dd7221d589c65b3b9aaa71a41484b122846c7c7b57e02e679ea8469b70e14fe4f70fee4d87b910cf144be6fe48eef24da475c0b0bcc6565ae82cd3f4e3b24c76eaa5616c6111343306ab35c1fe5ca4a77c0e314ed7dba39d6f1e0de791719c241a939cc493bea2bae1c1e932679ea94d29084278513c77b899cc98059d06a27d171b0dbdf6bee13ddc4fc17a0c4d2827d488436b57baa167544138ca2e64a11b43ac8a06cd0c2fba2d4d900ed2d9205305e2d7383cc98dacb078133de5f6fb6bed2ef26ba92cea28aafc3b9948dd9ae5559e8bd6920b8cea462aa445ca6a95e0e7ba52961b181c79e73bd581821df2b10173727a810c92b83b5ba4a0403eb710d2ca10689a35bec6c3a708e9e92f7d78ff3c5d9989574b00c6736f84c199256e76e19e78f0c98a9d580b4a658c84fc8f2096c2fbea8f5f8c59d0fdacb3be2802ef802abbecb3aba4acaac69a0e965abd8981e9896b1f6ef9d60f7a164b371af869fd0e48073742825e9434fc54da837e120266d53302954843538ea7c6c3dbfb4ff3b2fdbe244437f2a153ccf7bdb4c92aa08102d4f3cff2ae5ef86fab4653595e6a5837fa2f3e29f27a9cde5966843fb847a4a61f1e76c281fe8bb2b0a181d096100db5a1a5ce7a910238251a43ca556712eaadea167fb4d7d75825e440f3ecd782036d7574df8bceacb397abefc5f5254d2722215c53ff54af8299aaaad642c6d72a14d27882d9bbd539e1cc7a527526ba89b8c037ad09120e98ab042d3e8652b31ae0e478516bfaf88efca9f3676ffe99d2819dcaeb7610a626695f53117665d267d3f7abebd6bbd6733f645c72c389f03855bdf1e4b8075b516569b118233a0f0971d24b83113c0b096f5216a207ca99a7cddc81c130923fe3d91e7508c9ac5f2e914ff5dccab9e558566fa14efb34ac98d878580814b94b73acbfde9072f30b881f7f0fff42d4045d1ace6322d86a97d164aa84d93a60498065cc7c20e636f5862dc81531a88c60305a2e59a985be327a6902e4bed986dbf4a0b50c217af0ea7fdf9ab37f9ea1a1aaa72f54cf40154ea9b269f1a7c09f9f43245109431a175d50e2db0132337baa0ef97eed0fcf20489da36b79a1172faccc2f7ded7c60e00694282d93359c4682135642bc81f433574aa8ef0c97b4ade7ca372c5ffc23c7eddd839bab4e0f14d6df15c9dbeab176bec8b5701cf054eb3072f6dadc98f88819042bf10c407516ee58bce33fbe3b3d86a54255e577db4598e30a135361528c101683a5fcde7e8ba53f3456254be8f45fe3a56120ae96ea3773631fcb3873aa3abd91bcff00bd38bd43697a2e789e00da6077482e7b1b1a677b5afae4c54e6cbdf7377b694eb7d7a5b913476a5be923322d3de06060fd5e819635232a2cf4f0731da13b8546d1d6d4f8d75b9fce6c2341a71b0ea6f780df54bfdb0dd5cd9855179f602f9172307c7268724c3618e6817abd793adc214a0dc0bc616816632f27ea336fb56dfd").unwrap());
2386 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2387 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2389 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2390 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2391 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2393 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2394 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2396 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2397 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2399 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2400 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2402 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2403 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2405 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2406 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2409 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2410 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2411 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2412 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2414 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2415 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2420 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2421 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2422 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2423 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2425 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
2426 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
2428 impl Drop for Node {
2429 fn drop(&mut self) {
2430 // Check that we processed all pending events
2431 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2432 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2436 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2437 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42).unwrap();
2439 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2440 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2441 let accept_chan = match events_1[0] {
2442 Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2443 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2444 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2446 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2449 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
2451 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
2455 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2456 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2458 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2459 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, 100000);
2460 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2462 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2463 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2465 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2467 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2468 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2469 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2470 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2471 added_monitors.clear();
2473 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2476 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2477 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2478 let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
2479 Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2480 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2481 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2482 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2483 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2484 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2485 added_monitors.clear();
2488 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2491 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2493 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2494 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2495 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2496 added_monitors.clear();
2499 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2500 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2502 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2503 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2504 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2506 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2509 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2510 let events_5 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2511 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2513 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2514 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2515 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2516 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2518 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2523 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2524 let events_6 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2525 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
2526 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
2527 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2528 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2529 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
2530 let as_announcement_sigs = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap().unwrap();
2531 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &(*announcement_sigs).clone().unwrap()).unwrap();
2532 as_announcement_sigs
2534 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2537 let events_7 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2538 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
2539 let (announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
2540 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2543 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2546 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
2547 let events_8 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2548 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
2549 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
2550 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2551 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
2554 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2557 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2559 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone(), channel_id, tx)
2562 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2563 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[a], &nodes[b]);
2565 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
2566 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
2567 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
2569 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
2572 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2573 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2574 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2577 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
2578 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2579 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2580 let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
2581 Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2582 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
2585 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2588 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
2589 if !close_inbound_first {
2590 assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
2592 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2593 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
2594 if close_inbound_first {
2595 assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
2596 closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2597 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2598 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2600 let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2601 assert!(empty_b.is_none());
2602 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2603 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2605 closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2606 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2607 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2609 let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2610 assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
2611 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2612 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2614 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
2615 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2616 funding_tx_map.insert(funding_tx.txid(), funding_tx);
2617 tx_a.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2619 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2620 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2621 let as_update = match events_2[0] {
2622 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2625 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2628 let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2629 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2630 let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
2631 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2634 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2637 (as_update, bs_update)
2642 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
2643 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
2646 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
2648 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, commitment_signed } } => {
2649 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2650 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2651 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2652 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: commitment_signed }
2654 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
2659 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
2660 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
2663 let added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2664 assert!(added_monitors.is_empty());
2666 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
2668 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2669 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2670 added_monitors.clear();
2673 let added_monitors = $node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2674 assert!(added_monitors.is_empty());
2676 assert!($node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
2678 let mut added_monitors = $node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2679 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2680 added_monitors.clear();
2682 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
2683 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
2685 let mut added_monitors = $node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2686 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2687 added_monitors.clear();
2689 if $fail_backwards {
2690 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2692 assert!($node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
2694 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2695 if $fail_backwards {
2696 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2697 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2699 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2701 added_monitors.clear();
2707 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2708 let our_payment_preimage = [*origin_node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
2709 *origin_node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2710 let our_payment_hash = {
2711 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2712 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2713 let mut ret = [0; 32];
2714 sha.result(&mut ret);
2718 let mut payment_event = {
2719 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
2721 let mut added_monitors = origin_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2722 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2723 added_monitors.clear();
2726 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2727 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2728 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2730 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
2732 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
2733 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
2735 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
2737 let added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2738 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
2741 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
2743 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2744 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2746 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2747 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2750 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
2751 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
2753 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2754 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2755 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2757 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
2758 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
2759 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
2761 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2765 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2766 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2767 added_monitors.clear();
2769 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
2770 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
2776 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
2779 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2780 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
2782 let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2783 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2784 added_monitors.clear();
2787 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2788 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
2789 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2791 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2793 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2795 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
2797 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2799 added_monitors.clear();
2801 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
2806 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2807 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2808 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
2809 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2810 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2811 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2814 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2815 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
2816 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2818 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed } } => {
2819 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2820 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2821 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2822 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2823 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2824 next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
2826 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2829 assert!(events.is_empty());
2831 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2832 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2839 update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2840 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2841 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2843 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
2844 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
2846 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2851 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2852 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
2855 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
2857 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2858 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2859 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2860 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2861 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2864 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
2867 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2868 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2869 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2870 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2871 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2874 let our_payment_preimage = [*origin_node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
2875 *origin_node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2876 let our_payment_hash = {
2877 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2878 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2879 let mut ret = [0; 32];
2880 sha.result(&mut ret);
2884 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
2886 APIError::RouteError{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
2887 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
2891 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2892 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
2893 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
2896 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
2897 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
2899 let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2900 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2901 added_monitors.clear();
2904 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2905 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
2906 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2908 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2909 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
2914 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2915 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2916 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
2917 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2918 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2919 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
2920 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
2921 // second-to-last node!
2922 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
2925 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2926 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
2927 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2929 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed } } => {
2930 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2931 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2932 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2933 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2934 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2935 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
2937 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2940 assert!(events.is_empty());
2942 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2943 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2950 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2952 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2953 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2955 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
2956 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
2958 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2963 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
2964 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
2967 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
2968 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
2969 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2970 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2971 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2973 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
2974 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
2976 for _ in 0..node_count {
2977 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
2978 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
2979 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
2980 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
2982 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
2983 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
2984 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
2986 let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
2987 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
2988 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router,
2989 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
2990 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
2998 fn fake_network_test() {
2999 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3000 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
3001 let nodes = create_network(4);
3003 // Create some initial channels
3004 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3005 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3006 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3008 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
3009 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3010 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3011 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3012 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3014 // Send some more payments
3015 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3016 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
3017 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
3019 // Test failure packets
3020 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
3021 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
3023 // Add a new channel that skips 3
3024 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3026 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3027 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3028 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3029 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3030 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3031 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3032 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3034 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
3035 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3036 hops.push(RouteHop {
3037 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3038 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3040 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3042 hops.push(RouteHop {
3043 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3044 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3046 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3048 hops.push(RouteHop {
3049 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3050 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3052 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3054 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3055 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3056 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
3058 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3059 hops.push(RouteHop {
3060 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3061 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3063 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3065 hops.push(RouteHop {
3066 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3067 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3069 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3071 hops.push(RouteHop {
3072 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3073 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3075 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3077 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3078 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3079 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
3081 // Claim the rebalances...
3082 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
3083 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
3085 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
3086 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3088 // Send some payments across both channels
3089 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3090 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3091 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3093 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
3095 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
3097 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
3098 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
3099 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
3101 // Close down the channels...
3102 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
3103 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
3104 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
3105 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
3106 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
3110 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
3111 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
3112 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
3113 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
3115 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
3116 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
3117 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3118 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3119 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
3120 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
3122 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
3124 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
3125 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
3127 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
3128 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
3130 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
3131 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
3132 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
3135 #[derive(PartialEq)]
3136 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
3137 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
3139 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
3140 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
3141 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
3143 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
3144 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
3146 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
3148 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3149 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3150 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
3152 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
3153 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3154 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
3155 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3156 funding_tx_map.insert(chan.3.txid(), chan.3.clone());
3157 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3158 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
3159 res.push(tx.clone());
3164 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
3165 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
3168 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
3170 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
3171 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3172 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
3173 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3174 funding_tx_map.insert(res[0].txid(), res[0].clone());
3175 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3176 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
3177 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
3179 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
3181 res.push(tx.clone());
3185 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
3188 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
3192 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
3193 /// HTLC transaction.
3194 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
3195 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3196 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3197 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3198 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
3199 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3200 funding_tx_map.insert(revoked_tx.txid(), revoked_tx.clone());
3201 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3205 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
3208 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3209 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3211 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
3212 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3213 let mut found_prev = false;
3215 for tx in prev_txn {
3216 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
3217 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3218 funding_tx_map.insert(tx.txid(), tx.clone());
3219 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3221 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
3222 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
3228 assert!(found_prev);
3230 let mut res = Vec::new();
3231 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
3235 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
3236 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3237 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3238 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
3239 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3242 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3245 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3246 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3247 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
3248 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3251 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3255 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3256 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3261 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
3262 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3263 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
3264 let nodes = create_network(5);
3266 // Create some initial channels
3267 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3268 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3269 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3270 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
3272 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
3273 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3274 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3275 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3276 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3278 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
3279 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3281 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3282 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3283 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
3284 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3286 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
3287 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3288 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3290 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
3291 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3293 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
3294 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3296 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3297 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3298 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
3299 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3301 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
3302 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3303 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3305 macro_rules! claim_funds {
3306 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
3308 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
3310 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3311 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3312 added_monitors.clear();
3315 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3316 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3318 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
3319 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3320 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3321 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3323 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3329 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
3330 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
3331 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3333 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3335 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
3336 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
3338 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3339 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3341 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
3343 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
3344 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3345 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3347 // One pending HTLC to time out:
3348 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
3351 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3352 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3353 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
3354 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3355 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3358 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3360 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
3361 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
3363 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3364 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3365 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
3366 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3367 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3370 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
3372 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3373 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
3375 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
3377 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
3378 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3379 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3381 // Create some new channels:
3382 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3384 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
3385 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
3386 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
3387 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
3388 // Revoke the old state
3389 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
3392 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3393 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3395 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3396 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3397 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
3398 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3400 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3401 funding_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
3402 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3403 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
3405 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3407 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3408 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3409 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3410 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
3411 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
3413 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
3414 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3415 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3419 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3420 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3421 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3422 let nodes = create_network(2);
3423 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3425 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3426 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
3428 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3429 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3431 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
3432 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
3434 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3438 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3439 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3441 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3442 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
3445 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3446 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3448 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
3449 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
3451 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3455 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
3456 // registering new transactions
3457 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
3461 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3462 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3463 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
3464 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3465 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3467 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
3469 let our_payment_preimage = [*nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
3470 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3471 let our_payment_hash = {
3472 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3473 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
3474 let mut ret = [0; 32];
3475 sha.result(&mut ret);
3479 let mut payment_event = {
3480 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3482 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3483 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3484 added_monitors.clear();
3487 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3488 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3489 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3492 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3493 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3495 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3496 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3498 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3499 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3502 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3503 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3505 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3506 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3507 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3508 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3511 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3512 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3513 added_monitors.clear();
3516 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3517 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
3520 let mut added_monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3521 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3522 added_monitors.clear();
3525 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3526 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3527 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3529 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
3530 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3531 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3533 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
3534 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
3536 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3540 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3541 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3542 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3543 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3544 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3548 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3549 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
3551 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3552 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3553 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3555 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
3556 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
3558 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3561 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3563 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
3564 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
3565 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
3567 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
3568 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3569 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3570 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3571 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3572 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3573 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3574 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3575 funding_tx_map.insert(tx.txid(), tx);
3576 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3580 fn test_unconf_chan() {
3581 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
3582 let nodes = create_network(2);
3583 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3585 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3586 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
3587 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
3588 mem::drop(channel_state);
3590 let mut headers = Vec::new();
3591 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3592 headers.push(header.clone());
3594 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3595 headers.push(header.clone());
3597 while !headers.is_empty() {
3598 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
3601 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3602 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3604 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
3605 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
3607 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3610 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3611 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
3612 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
3615 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_htlc_fails: (usize, usize)) {
3616 let reestablish_1 = node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3617 let reestablish_2 = node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3619 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
3620 for msg in reestablish_1 {
3621 resp_1.push(node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
3624 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3625 if pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
3626 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3628 assert!(added_monitors.is_empty());
3630 added_monitors.clear();
3633 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
3634 for msg in reestablish_2 {
3635 resp_2.push(node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
3638 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3639 if pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
3640 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3642 assert!(added_monitors.is_empty());
3644 added_monitors.clear();
3647 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
3648 assert!((pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_fails.0 == 0) || (pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
3650 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
3652 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
3653 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
3655 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
3657 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
3658 if pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
3659 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
3660 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // We can't relay while disconnected
3661 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0);
3662 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_fails.0);
3663 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3664 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
3665 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
3667 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
3668 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
3671 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
3673 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
3677 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
3679 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
3680 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
3682 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
3684 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
3685 if pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
3686 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
3687 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // We can't relay while disconnected
3688 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0);
3689 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_fails.0);
3690 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3691 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
3692 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
3694 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
3695 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
3698 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
3700 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
3706 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3707 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3708 let nodes = create_network(3);
3709 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3710 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3712 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3713 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3714 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0));
3716 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3717 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3718 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3719 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3721 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3722 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3723 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0));
3725 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3726 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3727 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3728 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3730 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3731 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3733 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
3734 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
3736 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (1, 0), (1, 0));
3738 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3739 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3741 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
3742 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3744 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3747 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
3748 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3750 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3754 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3755 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3759 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
3760 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
3761 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3762 let nodes = create_network(2);
3764 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3766 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3767 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3768 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
3769 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
3771 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() } );
3773 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3774 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3776 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
3777 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
3779 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
3781 let mut chan_announcement;
3783 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
3785 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3786 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
3787 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
3788 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3789 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
3790 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
3791 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
3792 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
3793 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3798 macro_rules! sign_msg {
3799 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
3800 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
3801 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3802 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3803 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
3804 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
3805 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
3806 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
3807 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
3808 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
3809 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
3810 contents: $unsigned_msg
3815 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
3816 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
3817 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
3818 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() } );
3820 // Configured with Network::Testnet
3821 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
3822 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
3823 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
3824 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
3826 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
3827 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
3828 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
3829 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());