1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
16 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
18 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
19 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
20 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
23 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
24 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
25 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelKeys};
26 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
27 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
29 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, HandleError, RAACommitmentOrder};
30 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
31 use util::sha2::Sha256;
32 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
33 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
34 use util::logger::Logger;
35 use util::errors::APIError;
38 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
39 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
40 use crypto::digest::Digest;
41 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
44 use std::collections::HashMap;
45 use std::collections::hash_map;
47 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
49 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
51 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
53 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
54 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
55 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
57 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
58 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
59 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
60 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
61 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
62 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
63 mod channel_held_info {
65 use ln::router::Route;
66 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
67 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
69 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
70 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
71 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
72 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
73 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
74 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
75 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
76 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
77 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
80 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
81 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
82 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
83 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
86 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
87 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
88 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
89 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
93 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
95 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
96 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
97 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
98 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
101 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
103 pub enum HTLCSource {
104 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
107 session_priv: SecretKey,
108 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
109 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
110 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
115 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
116 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
117 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
118 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
119 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
124 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
125 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
127 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
135 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
137 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
138 err: msgs::HandleError,
139 needs_channel_force_close: bool,
141 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
143 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
147 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
148 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
150 data: err.to_string()
154 needs_channel_force_close: false,
158 fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
162 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
163 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
165 data: err.to_string()
169 needs_channel_force_close: true,
173 fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
174 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
177 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
178 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
181 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
184 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
186 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
188 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
190 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
191 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
193 data: msg.to_string()
198 needs_channel_force_close: false,
202 fn from_chan_maybe_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
205 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
207 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
209 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
211 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
212 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
214 data: msg.to_string()
219 needs_channel_force_close: true,
224 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
225 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
226 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
227 /// probably increase this significantly.
228 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
230 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
231 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
233 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
236 struct ChannelHolder {
237 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
238 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
239 next_forward: Instant,
240 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
241 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
242 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
243 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
244 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
245 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
246 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
248 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
250 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
251 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
252 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
253 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
254 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
255 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
258 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
260 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
261 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
262 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
263 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
264 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
269 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
270 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
272 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
273 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
275 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
276 /// to individual Channels.
277 pub struct ChannelManager {
278 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
279 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
280 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
281 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
282 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
284 announce_channels_publicly: bool,
285 fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
286 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
287 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
289 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
290 our_network_key: SecretKey,
292 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
297 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
298 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
299 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
300 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
301 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
302 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
303 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
305 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ie that
306 // if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have
307 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it backwards ourselves before hitting the
308 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel on-chain to time out the HTLC.
311 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
313 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
314 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
317 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
319 macro_rules! secp_call {
320 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
323 Err(_) => return Err($err),
330 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
332 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
333 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
338 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
339 pub struct ChannelDetails {
340 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
341 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
342 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
343 /// lifetime of the channel.
344 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
345 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
346 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
347 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
348 /// The node_id of our counterparty
349 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
350 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
351 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
352 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
356 impl ChannelManager {
357 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
359 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
360 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
362 /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
363 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
365 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
366 pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
367 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
369 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
370 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
371 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
372 monitor: monitor.clone(),
376 announce_channels_publicly,
377 fee_proportional_millionths,
378 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
381 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
382 by_id: HashMap::new(),
383 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
384 next_forward: Instant::now(),
385 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
386 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
390 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
394 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
395 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
399 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
401 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
402 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
403 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
404 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
406 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
407 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
409 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
410 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
411 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
413 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
414 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
415 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
416 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
417 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
418 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
419 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
420 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
423 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
424 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
425 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
427 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
431 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
432 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
433 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
434 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
435 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
436 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
437 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
439 panic!("RNG is bad???");
442 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
445 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
446 events.push(events::Event::SendOpenChannel {
447 node_id: their_network_key,
453 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
454 /// more information.
455 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
456 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
457 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
458 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
459 res.push(ChannelDetails {
460 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
461 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
462 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
463 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
464 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
470 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
471 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
472 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
473 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
474 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
475 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
476 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
477 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
478 // really wanted anyway.
479 if channel.is_live() {
480 res.push(ChannelDetails {
481 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
482 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
483 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
484 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
485 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
492 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
493 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
494 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
496 /// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed.
497 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
498 let (mut res, node_id, chan_option) = {
499 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
500 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
501 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
502 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
503 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
504 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
505 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
506 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
508 (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
509 } else { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), None) }
511 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
514 for htlc_source in res.1.drain(..) {
515 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
516 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
518 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
519 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
524 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
525 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
526 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
530 events.push(events::Event::SendShutdown {
539 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
540 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
541 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
542 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
543 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
545 for tx in local_txn {
546 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
548 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
549 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
550 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
551 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
552 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
553 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
554 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
557 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
558 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
559 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
561 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
562 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
563 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
564 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
565 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
572 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
573 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
574 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
575 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
581 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
582 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
583 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
584 for chan in self.list_channels() {
585 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
589 fn handle_monitor_update_fail(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, channel_id: &[u8; 32], err: ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, reason: RAACommitmentOrder) {
591 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
593 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
594 let chan = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
595 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
596 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
600 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
601 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
602 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
603 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
604 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
609 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
610 let channel = channel_state_lock.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
611 channel.monitor_update_failed(reason);
617 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
619 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
620 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
621 let mut res = [0; 32];
622 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
626 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
627 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
628 let mut res = [0; 32];
629 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
635 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
636 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
637 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
638 let mut res = [0; 32];
639 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
644 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
645 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
646 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
647 let mut res = [0; 32];
648 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
652 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
654 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
655 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
656 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
658 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
659 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
661 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
662 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
663 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
664 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
665 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
667 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
669 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
670 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
672 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
678 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
679 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
680 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
682 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
683 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
689 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
699 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
700 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
701 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
702 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
703 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
704 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
705 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
706 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
708 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
709 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
710 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
711 // the intended recipient).
712 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
713 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
714 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
716 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
717 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
718 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
719 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
723 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
724 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
725 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
727 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
728 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
729 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
731 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
733 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
737 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
739 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
747 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
748 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
750 for i in 0..dst.len() {
755 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
756 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
757 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
758 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
761 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
762 let end_len = iters * 65;
763 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
764 res.resize(end_len, 0);
766 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
767 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
768 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
769 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
770 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
775 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
776 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
778 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
779 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
780 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
781 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
783 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
784 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
785 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
788 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
791 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
792 hmac.input(&packet_data);
793 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
794 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
799 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
800 hop_data: packet_data,
805 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
806 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
807 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
808 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
810 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
811 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
812 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
813 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
814 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
815 data: packet_crypted,
819 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
820 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
822 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
825 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
826 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
827 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
828 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
832 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
833 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
836 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
838 failuremsg: failuremsg,
842 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
843 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
844 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
850 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
851 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
852 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
855 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
856 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
859 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
860 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
861 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
862 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
868 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
869 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
870 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
871 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
872 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
873 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
874 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
875 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
878 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
879 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
881 let mut channel_state = None;
882 macro_rules! return_err {
883 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
885 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
886 if channel_state.is_none() {
887 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
889 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
890 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
891 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
892 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
893 })), channel_state.unwrap());
898 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
899 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
900 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
901 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
902 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
903 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
904 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
905 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
908 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
909 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
910 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
911 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
912 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
915 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
916 let next_hop_data = {
917 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
918 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
919 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
921 let error_code = match err {
922 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
923 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
925 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
931 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
933 // final_expiry_too_soon
934 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
935 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
937 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
938 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
939 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
941 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
942 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
943 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
946 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
947 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
948 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
949 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
951 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
953 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
955 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
956 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
957 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
960 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
961 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
962 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
964 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
966 let blinding_factor = {
967 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
968 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
969 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
970 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
971 sha.result(&mut res);
972 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
974 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
980 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
981 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
984 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
986 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
987 hop_data: new_packet_data,
988 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
991 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
992 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
993 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
994 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
995 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
996 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
997 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1001 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1002 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1003 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1004 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1005 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1006 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1007 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1009 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1011 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1012 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1014 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1015 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1016 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1017 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1018 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1019 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1020 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1022 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1023 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1025 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1026 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1027 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1029 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1030 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1032 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1033 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1034 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1035 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1037 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1038 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1043 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1044 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1045 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1047 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1048 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1050 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1051 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1053 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1058 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1061 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1062 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1063 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1064 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1065 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1069 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1071 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1072 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1073 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1074 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1075 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1076 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1077 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1078 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1079 fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
1080 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1083 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1084 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1086 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1092 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1094 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1095 /// fields for more info.
1097 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1098 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1099 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1100 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1101 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1102 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1104 /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
1106 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1107 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
1108 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1109 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1110 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1112 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1113 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1114 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1115 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1119 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
1120 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
1121 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
1123 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
1125 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1127 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1128 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1129 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1130 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1132 let (first_hop_node_id, update_add, commitment_signed) = {
1133 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1135 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1136 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1137 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1142 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
1143 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1144 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1146 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1147 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1149 if !chan.is_live() {
1150 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1152 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1153 route: route.clone(),
1154 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1155 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1156 }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: he.err})?
1159 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1160 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1161 self.handle_monitor_update_fail(channel_state, &id, e, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1162 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1164 Some((update_add, commitment_signed))
1170 let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
1173 Some((update_add, commitment_signed)) => {
1174 (first_hop_node_id, update_add, commitment_signed)
1176 None => return Ok(()),
1180 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1181 events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1182 node_id: first_hop_node_id,
1183 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1184 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1185 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1186 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1187 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1195 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1197 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1199 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1200 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1201 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1202 macro_rules! add_pending_event {
1205 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1206 pending_events.push($event);
1211 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1212 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1213 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1215 match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
1216 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1217 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1220 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1221 mem::drop(channel_state);
1222 add_pending_event!(events::Event::HandleError {
1223 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1233 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1234 // lock before add_update_monitor
1235 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1238 add_pending_event!(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
1239 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1243 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1244 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1245 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1246 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1248 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1254 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1255 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1257 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1259 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1261 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1262 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1264 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1265 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1266 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1267 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1268 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1272 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1274 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1275 /// Will likely generate further events.
1276 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1277 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1278 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1280 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1281 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1283 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1287 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1288 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1289 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1290 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1292 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1293 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1294 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1295 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1296 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1297 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1299 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1304 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1306 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1307 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1308 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1309 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1310 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1311 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1313 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1315 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1316 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1321 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1323 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1324 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1325 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1326 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1327 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1328 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1329 // this channel currently :/.
1336 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1337 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1340 if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
1341 } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
1343 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1345 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1349 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1350 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1352 new_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1353 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1354 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1355 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1356 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1357 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1358 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1360 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1365 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1366 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1367 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1368 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1369 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1371 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1372 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1373 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1375 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1376 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1377 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1384 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1386 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1387 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1391 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1392 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1393 events.append(&mut new_events);
1396 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
1397 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
1398 // TODO: Add ability to return 0x4000|16 (incorrect_payment_amount) if the amount we
1399 // received is < expected or > 2*expected
1400 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1401 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1402 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1403 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1404 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1405 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() });
1411 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1412 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1413 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1414 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1415 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1416 /// still-available channels.
1417 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1419 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1420 mem::drop(channel_state);
1421 if let &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } = &onion_error {
1422 let (channel_update, payment_retryable) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1423 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1424 if let Some(channel_update) = channel_update {
1425 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1426 update: channel_update,
1429 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1430 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1431 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1434 panic!("should have onion error packet here");
1437 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1438 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1439 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1440 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1441 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1443 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1444 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1448 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
1449 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1450 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1454 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1455 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1456 Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1457 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1460 (chan.get_their_node_id(), Some((msg, commitment_msg)))
1462 Ok(None) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), None),
1464 //TODO: Do something with e?
1471 Some((msg, commitment_msg)) => {
1472 mem::drop(channel_state);
1474 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1475 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1477 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1478 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1479 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1480 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1481 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1483 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1493 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1494 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1495 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1497 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1498 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1499 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1500 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1501 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1502 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1504 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1505 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1506 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1507 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1508 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1509 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1514 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1516 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1517 mem::drop(channel_state);
1518 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1519 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1523 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1524 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1525 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
1526 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1527 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1529 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1530 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1536 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1537 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1538 Ok((msgs, Some(chan_monitor))) => {
1539 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1540 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1542 (chan.get_their_node_id(), msgs)
1544 Ok((msgs, None)) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msgs),
1546 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1547 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1548 //TODO: Do something with e?
1554 mem::drop(channel_state);
1555 if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs {
1556 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1557 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1559 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1560 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1561 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1562 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1563 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1565 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1573 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1574 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1575 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1578 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1579 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1581 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1582 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1583 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1584 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1585 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1588 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1589 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1590 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1591 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1592 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1593 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1594 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1596 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1597 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1598 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1600 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1601 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1602 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1608 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1611 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1612 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1613 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1615 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1617 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1618 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1619 new_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1620 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1625 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1626 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1627 new_events.push(events::Event::SendRevokeAndACK {
1628 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1629 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1634 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1638 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1649 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1650 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1652 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1654 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1655 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1658 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut new_events);
1661 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1662 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1663 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1665 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1666 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1667 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1670 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1672 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]).unwrap(),
1673 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0]).unwrap(),
1674 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0]).unwrap(),
1675 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0]).unwrap(),
1676 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0]).unwrap(),
1677 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0]).unwrap(),
1678 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0]).unwrap(),
1679 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
1682 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
1683 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
1684 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
1686 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
1690 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger))
1691 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1692 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel();
1693 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1697 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1698 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1699 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1700 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1702 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1703 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1704 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1706 chan.accept_channel(&msg)
1707 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1708 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1710 //TODO: same as above
1711 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1714 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1715 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1716 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1717 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1718 output_script: output_script,
1719 user_channel_id: user_id,
1724 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1725 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1726 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1727 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1728 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1729 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1730 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1731 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1733 match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1734 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1735 (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1738 return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1742 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1745 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1746 // lock before add_update_monitor
1747 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1750 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1751 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1752 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1753 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1755 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1762 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1763 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1764 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1765 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1767 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1768 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1769 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1771 let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1772 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1775 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id())
1777 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1780 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1781 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1782 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1783 user_channel_id: user_id,
1788 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1789 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1790 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1792 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1793 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1794 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1796 chan.funding_locked(&msg)
1797 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1798 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan));
1800 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1804 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1805 let (mut res, chan_option) = {
1806 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1807 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1809 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1810 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1811 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1812 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1813 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1815 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1816 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1817 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1818 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1820 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1821 } else { (res, None) }
1823 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1826 for htlc_source in res.2.drain(..) {
1827 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1828 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1830 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1831 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1832 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1833 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1841 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1842 let (res, chan_option) = {
1843 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1844 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1845 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1846 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1847 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1848 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1849 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1851 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1852 if res.1.is_some() {
1853 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1854 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1855 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1856 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1857 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1858 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1859 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1861 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1862 } else { (res, None) }
1864 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1867 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1868 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1870 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1871 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1872 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1873 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1881 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1882 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1883 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1884 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1886 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1887 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1888 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1889 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1891 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1892 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1894 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1896 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1897 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1898 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1900 if !chan.is_usable() {
1901 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1903 chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1905 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1909 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1910 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1911 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1913 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1914 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1915 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1917 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
1918 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?.clone()
1920 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1922 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1926 // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
1927 // indicating that the payment itself failed
1928 fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool) {
1929 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
1930 macro_rules! onion_failure_log {
1931 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr, $reported_name: expr, $reported_value: expr ) => {
1932 log_trace!(self, "{}({:#x}) {}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code, $reported_name, $reported_value);
1934 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr ) => {
1935 log_trace!(self, "{}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code);
1939 const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
1940 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
1941 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
1944 let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
1946 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1947 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1948 if res.is_some() { return; }
1950 let incoming_htlc_msat = htlc_msat;
1951 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
1952 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
1954 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1956 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1957 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1958 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1959 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1960 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1962 let is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
1964 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
1965 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1966 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1967 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1968 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1969 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1971 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1972 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() < 2 {
1973 // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
1974 // definitely came from the peer in question
1975 res = Some((None, !is_from_final_node));
1977 let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]);
1979 match error_code & 0xff {
1981 // either from an intermediate or final node
1982 // invalid_realm(PERM|1),
1983 // temporary_node_failure(NODE|2)
1984 // permanent_node_failure(PERM|NODE|2)
1985 // required_node_feature_mssing(PERM|NODE|3)
1986 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
1987 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
1988 is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM,
1989 }), !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
1990 // node returning invalid_realm is removed from network_map,
1991 // although NODE flag is not set, TODO: or remove channel only?
1992 // retry payment when removed node is not a final node
1998 if is_from_final_node {
1999 let payment_retryable = match error_code {
2000 c if c == PERM|15 => false, // unknown_payment_hash
2001 c if c == PERM|16 => false, // incorrect_payment_amount
2002 17 => true, // final_expiry_too_soon
2003 18 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 6 => { // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2004 let _reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2007 19 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 10 => { // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
2008 let _reported_incoming_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2012 // A final node has sent us either an invalid code or an error_code that
2013 // MUST be sent from the processing node, or the formmat of failuremsg
2014 // does not coform to the spec.
2015 // Remove it from the network map and don't may retry payment
2016 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2017 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2023 res = Some((None, payment_retryable));
2027 // now, error_code should be only from the intermediate nodes
2029 _c if error_code & PERM == PERM => {
2030 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2031 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
2035 _c if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE => {
2036 let offset = match error_code {
2037 c if c == UPDATE|7 => 0, // temporary_channel_failure
2038 c if c == UPDATE|11 => 8, // amount_below_minimum
2039 c if c == UPDATE|12 => 8, // fee_insufficient
2040 c if c == UPDATE|13 => 4, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2041 c if c == UPDATE|14 => 0, // expiry_too_soon
2042 c if c == UPDATE|20 => 2, // channel_disabled
2044 // node sending unknown code
2045 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2046 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2053 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 2 {
2054 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset+2..offset+4]) as usize;
2055 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 4 + update_len {
2056 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset + 4..offset + 4 + update_len])) {
2057 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
2058 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
2059 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code {
2060 c if c == UPDATE|7 => { // temporary_channel_failure
2063 c if c == UPDATE|11 => { // amount_below_minimum
2064 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2065 onion_failure_log!("amount_below_minimum", UPDATE|11, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2066 incoming_htlc_msat > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat
2068 c if c == UPDATE|12 => { // fee_insufficient
2069 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2070 let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
2071 onion_failure_log!("fee_insufficient", UPDATE|12, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2072 new_fee.is_none() || incoming_htlc_msat >= new_fee.unwrap() && incoming_htlc_msat >= amt_to_forward + new_fee.unwrap()
2074 c if c == UPDATE|13 => { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2075 let reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2076 onion_failure_log!("incorrect_cltv_expiry", UPDATE|13, "cltv_expiry", reported_cltv_expiry);
2077 route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
2079 c if c == UPDATE|20 => { // channel_disabled
2080 let reported_flags = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+2]);
2081 onion_failure_log!("channel_disabled", UPDATE|20, "flags", reported_flags);
2082 chan_update.contents.flags & 0x01 == 0x01
2084 c if c == UPDATE|21 => true, // expiry_too_far
2085 _ => { unreachable!(); },
2088 let msg = if is_chan_update_invalid { None } else {
2089 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2093 res = Some((msg, true));
2099 _c if error_code & BADONION == BADONION => {
2102 14 => { // expiry_too_soon
2103 res = Some((None, true));
2107 // node sending unknown code
2108 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2109 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2118 }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
2119 res.unwrap_or((None, true))
2120 } else { ((None, true)) }
2123 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2124 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2125 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2127 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2128 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2129 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2131 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
2132 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2134 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2139 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2140 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2141 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2143 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2144 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2145 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2147 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) != 0 {
2148 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION set", msg.channel_id));
2150 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
2151 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2154 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2158 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2159 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = {
2160 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2161 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2163 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2164 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2165 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2167 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = chan.commitment_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
2168 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2171 (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed)
2173 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2176 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
2180 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2181 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2182 let mut forward_event = None;
2183 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2184 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2185 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2186 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2187 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2189 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2190 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2191 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2192 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2194 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2195 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2200 match forward_event {
2202 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2203 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2204 time_forwardable: time
2212 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2213 let ((res, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures), short_channel_id) = {
2214 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2215 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2217 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2218 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2219 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2221 let (res, pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan_monitor) = chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
2222 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2225 ((res, pending_forwards, pending_failures), chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2227 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2230 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2231 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2233 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2238 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2239 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2240 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2242 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2243 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2244 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2246 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2248 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2252 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2253 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
2254 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2255 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2257 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2258 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2260 if !chan.is_usable() {
2261 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2264 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2265 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
2266 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2268 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2269 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2270 let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
2271 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2272 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2274 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2276 (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2277 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2278 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2279 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2280 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2281 contents: announcement,
2282 }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2284 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2287 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2288 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
2292 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2294 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2295 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2297 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2298 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2300 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, order) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg)
2301 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2302 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2303 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2307 Ok((funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order))
2309 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2316 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2317 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2318 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2319 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2321 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2322 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2323 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2324 None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2326 if !chan.is_outbound() {
2327 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2329 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2330 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2332 if !chan.is_live() {
2333 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2335 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw).map_err(|e| APIError::APIMisuseError{err: e.err})? {
2336 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2339 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2340 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
2341 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2342 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2343 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2344 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2345 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2346 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2347 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2358 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2359 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2360 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2361 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2362 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2367 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2368 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2369 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2370 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2372 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2373 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2374 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2375 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2376 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2377 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2378 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel);
2379 new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
2380 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2381 msg: funding_locked,
2382 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
2384 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2385 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2386 new_events.push(events::Event::HandleError {
2387 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2390 if channel.is_shutdown() {
2394 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2395 for tx in txn_matched {
2396 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2397 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2398 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2399 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2401 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2402 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2403 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2404 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2405 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2406 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2415 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2416 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2417 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2419 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2420 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2421 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2422 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2423 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2424 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2425 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2434 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2435 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2437 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2438 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2439 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2441 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2444 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2445 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2446 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2447 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2449 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2450 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2451 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2452 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2453 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2454 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2455 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2457 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2458 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2459 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2469 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2470 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2472 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2473 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2474 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2475 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2478 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2482 macro_rules! handle_error {
2483 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
2486 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
2487 if needs_channel_force_close {
2489 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
2490 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2491 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2493 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2496 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
2497 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
2498 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
2499 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2500 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2502 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2514 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2515 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2516 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
2517 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2520 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2521 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2524 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
2525 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2528 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2529 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2532 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
2533 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2536 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
2537 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2540 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
2541 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2544 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2545 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2548 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2549 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2552 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2553 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2556 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2557 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2560 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
2561 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2564 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
2565 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2568 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2569 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2572 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2573 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2576 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder), HandleError> {
2577 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2580 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2581 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2582 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2583 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2585 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2586 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2587 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2588 if no_connection_possible {
2589 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2590 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2591 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2592 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2594 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2595 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2596 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2606 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2607 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2608 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2609 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2610 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2611 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2612 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2614 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2615 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2616 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2625 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2626 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2628 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2629 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2630 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
2631 pending_events.push(event);
2634 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2635 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2636 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2641 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<msgs::ChannelReestablish> {
2642 let mut res = Vec::new();
2643 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2644 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2645 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2646 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2647 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2648 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2649 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2653 res.push(chan.get_channel_reestablish());
2658 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2662 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2663 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2664 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2665 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2666 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2670 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2677 use chain::chaininterface;
2678 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2679 use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
2680 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
2681 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
2682 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
2684 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
2685 use util::test_utils;
2686 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
2687 use util::errors::APIError;
2688 use util::logger::Logger;
2689 use util::ser::Writeable;
2691 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
2692 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
2693 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
2694 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
2695 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2696 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
2697 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
2701 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2702 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2704 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
2705 use crypto::digest::Digest;
2707 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2709 use std::cell::RefCell;
2710 use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
2711 use std::default::Default;
2713 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2714 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
2715 use std::time::Instant;
2718 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
2719 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
2720 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2725 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2726 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2729 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2730 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2733 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2734 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2737 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2738 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2741 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2742 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2747 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2749 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
2750 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
2755 fn onion_vectors() {
2756 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
2757 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2759 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
2760 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
2761 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
2762 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
2763 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
2765 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
2766 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
2767 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
2768 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
2769 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
2771 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
2772 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
2773 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
2774 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
2775 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
2777 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
2778 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
2779 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
2780 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
2781 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
2783 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
2784 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
2785 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
2786 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
2787 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
2789 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
2790 let payloads = vec!(
2791 msgs::OnionHopData {
2793 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2794 short_channel_id: 0,
2796 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2800 msgs::OnionHopData {
2802 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2803 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
2804 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
2805 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2809 msgs::OnionHopData {
2811 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2812 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
2813 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
2814 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2818 msgs::OnionHopData {
2820 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2821 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2822 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2823 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2827 msgs::OnionHopData {
2829 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2830 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2831 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2832 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2838 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
2839 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2841 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2845 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2846 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2848 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2849 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2850 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("4c2fc8bc08510334b6833ad9c3e79cd1b52ae59dfe5c2a4b23ead50f09f7ee0b0002200200fe0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
2852 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2853 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2855 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2856 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2858 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2859 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2861 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2862 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2864 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2865 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2868 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2869 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2870 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2871 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2873 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2874 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2879 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2880 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2881 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2882 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2884 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
2885 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
2887 impl Drop for Node {
2888 fn drop(&mut self) {
2889 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
2890 // Check that we processed all pending events
2891 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2892 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2897 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2898 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
2901 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2902 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
2903 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
2904 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
2907 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
2908 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
2910 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2911 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2912 let accept_chan = match events_1[0] {
2913 Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2914 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2915 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2917 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2920 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
2922 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
2926 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2927 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2929 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2930 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
2931 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2933 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2934 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2936 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2938 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2939 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2940 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2941 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2942 added_monitors.clear();
2944 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2947 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2948 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2949 let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
2950 Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2951 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2952 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2953 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2954 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2955 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2956 added_monitors.clear();
2959 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2962 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2964 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2965 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2966 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2967 added_monitors.clear();
2970 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2971 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2973 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2974 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2975 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2977 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2983 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
2984 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
2985 let events_5 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2986 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2988 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2989 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2990 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2991 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2993 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2998 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
2999 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3000 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
3001 (match events_6[0] {
3002 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
3003 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
3004 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3005 (msg.clone(), announcement_sigs.clone().unwrap())
3007 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3011 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3012 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3013 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
3017 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3018 let bs_announcement_sigs = {
3019 let bs_announcement_sigs = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap().unwrap();
3020 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
3021 bs_announcement_sigs
3024 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3025 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3026 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
3027 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3030 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3033 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
3034 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3035 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3036 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
3037 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3038 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
3041 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3044 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3046 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
3049 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3050 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
3053 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3054 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
3056 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
3057 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
3058 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
3060 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
3063 macro_rules! check_spends {
3064 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
3066 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3067 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
3068 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
3069 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3074 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3075 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3076 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3079 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
3080 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3081 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3082 let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
3083 Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3084 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
3087 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3090 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
3091 if !close_inbound_first {
3092 assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
3094 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3095 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
3096 if close_inbound_first {
3097 assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
3098 closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3099 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3100 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3102 let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3103 assert!(empty_b.is_none());
3104 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3105 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3107 closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3108 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3109 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3111 let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3112 assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
3113 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3114 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3116 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
3117 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
3119 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3120 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3121 let as_update = match events_2[0] {
3122 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3125 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3128 let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3129 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3130 let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
3131 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3134 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3137 (as_update, bs_update)
3142 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
3143 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
3146 fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent {
3147 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3148 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3149 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3150 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3151 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
3154 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
3156 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates),
3157 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
3162 macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
3163 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
3165 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3166 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
3167 added_monitors.clear();
3172 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
3173 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
3175 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3176 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3177 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3178 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
3179 assert!($node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
3180 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3181 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
3182 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
3183 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3184 if $fail_backwards {
3185 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3187 assert!($node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
3189 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3190 if $fail_backwards {
3191 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
3192 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
3194 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3196 added_monitors.clear();
3202 macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
3205 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
3206 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3207 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
3208 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3209 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
3210 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
3211 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
3216 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3217 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3219 let mut payment_event = {
3220 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3221 check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
3223 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3224 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3225 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3227 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
3229 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
3230 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3232 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3233 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
3234 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3236 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3237 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3239 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3240 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3243 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3244 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3246 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3247 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3248 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3250 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
3251 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
3252 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
3254 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3257 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
3258 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3259 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3265 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
3268 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3269 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
3270 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3272 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3273 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
3274 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
3276 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3278 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
3280 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
3282 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
3287 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3288 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3289 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3290 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3291 if next_msgs.is_some() {
3292 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
3295 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3296 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
3297 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3299 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3300 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3301 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3302 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3303 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3304 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3305 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3306 next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
3308 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3311 assert!(events.is_empty());
3313 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3314 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3321 update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
3322 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3323 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3325 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
3326 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
3328 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3333 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3334 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
3337 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
3339 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3340 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3341 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3342 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3343 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3346 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
3349 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3350 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3351 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3352 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3353 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3356 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3358 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
3360 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
3361 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
3365 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3366 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
3367 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
3370 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3371 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
3372 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3374 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3375 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
3376 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
3378 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3379 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
3384 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3385 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3386 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3387 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3388 if next_msgs.is_some() {
3389 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
3390 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
3391 // second-to-last node!
3392 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
3395 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3396 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
3397 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3399 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3400 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3401 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3402 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3403 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3404 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3405 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3406 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
3408 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3411 assert!(events.is_empty());
3413 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3414 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3421 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
3423 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3424 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3426 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
3427 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
3428 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3430 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3435 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3436 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
3439 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
3440 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
3441 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3442 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3443 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3445 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3446 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3448 for _ in 0..node_count {
3449 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
3450 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
3451 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
3452 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
3454 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
3455 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
3456 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
3458 let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
3459 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
3460 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router,
3461 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
3462 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
3470 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
3471 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3472 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3473 let channel_id = chan.2;
3475 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3477 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3478 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3484 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3488 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
3489 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
3490 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
3491 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
3492 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
3493 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
3494 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
3495 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
3496 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
3497 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
3499 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
3501 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
3503 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3504 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3505 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3507 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3508 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3509 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3510 Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3511 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3513 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3516 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3518 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3519 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3520 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3521 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3523 let payment_event = {
3524 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3525 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3526 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3528 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3529 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3531 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3532 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3533 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3534 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3535 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3537 // deliver(1), generate (3):
3538 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3539 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack
3540 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3542 let bs_update = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
3543 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3544 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3545 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3546 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3547 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
3548 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3550 let as_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
3551 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3552 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3553 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3554 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3555 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
3556 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3558 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
3559 assert!(as_second_commitment_signed.is_none()); // only (6)
3560 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3562 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
3563 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.is_none());
3564 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3566 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3567 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3569 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3570 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3572 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
3573 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3576 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (6)
3577 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3581 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
3582 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
3583 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
3584 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3585 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3586 let channel_id = chan.2;
3588 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3590 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3591 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3597 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3599 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3600 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3601 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3603 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3604 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3605 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3606 Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
3609 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3612 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3614 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3615 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3616 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3617 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3619 let payment_event = {
3620 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3621 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3622 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3624 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3625 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3627 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3628 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3629 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3630 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3631 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3633 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (2)
3634 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3636 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
3640 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
3641 let nodes = create_network(2);
3642 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3643 let channel_id = chan.2;
3645 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3647 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3648 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3654 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
3655 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
3656 // update_fee (never committed) ->
3657 // (3) update_fee ->
3658 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
3659 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
3660 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
3661 // <- (1) RAA delivered
3662 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
3663 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
3664 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
3665 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
3666 // revoke_and_ack ->
3667 // B should send no response here
3668 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
3669 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
3670 // revoke_and_ack ->
3672 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3673 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3674 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
3675 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3677 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3678 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3679 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3680 Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3681 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
3683 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3686 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
3687 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
3688 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
3689 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3691 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
3693 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
3694 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3696 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
3697 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
3698 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
3699 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
3702 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3704 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
3706 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3708 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
3709 let as_second_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
3710 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3711 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3712 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3713 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3714 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3715 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
3716 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
3717 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
3719 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
3720 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), bs_commitment_signed.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
3721 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3722 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
3724 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none());
3725 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3728 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
3729 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3731 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3732 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3734 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment.unwrap()).unwrap();
3735 assert!(as_second_commitment.is_none());
3736 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3738 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3739 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3743 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
3744 let nodes = create_network(2);
3745 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3746 let channel_id = chan.2;
3748 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3750 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3751 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3756 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3757 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3759 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3760 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3761 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3762 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3763 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3765 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3767 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3769 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3770 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3771 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3772 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3774 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3775 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3776 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3778 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3779 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3780 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3782 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3783 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3784 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3788 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
3789 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3790 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3791 let channel_id = chan.2;
3793 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3795 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3796 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3802 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3804 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3805 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3807 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3808 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3809 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3810 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3811 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3813 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3815 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3816 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3817 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3818 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3819 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3821 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3823 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
3825 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
3826 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3828 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3829 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
3830 added_monitors.clear();
3832 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3833 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
3834 // node[1] has nothing to do
3836 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3837 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3838 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3840 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3841 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3842 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3843 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3844 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
3846 let commitment_update = resp_option.unwrap();
3847 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3848 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
3849 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
3850 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
3851 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
3853 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
3854 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
3855 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3856 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3857 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3858 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3859 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3860 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3862 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3863 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3864 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3865 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3866 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3867 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3869 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3870 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3872 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3873 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3875 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3876 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3878 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3879 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3881 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
3882 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3885 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
3887 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
3888 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
3889 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3893 fn test_update_fee() {
3894 let nodes = create_network(2);
3895 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3896 let channel_id = chan.2;
3898 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3900 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3901 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3907 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
3908 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
3909 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
3910 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
3911 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
3912 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
3913 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
3914 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
3915 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
3916 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
3917 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
3918 // revoke_and_ack ->
3920 // Create and deliver (1)...
3921 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3922 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3924 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3925 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3926 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3927 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3928 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3930 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3932 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3934 // Generate (2) and (3):
3935 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3936 let commitment_signed_0 = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3937 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3938 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3941 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3942 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3943 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3945 // Create and deliver (4)...
3946 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
3947 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3948 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3949 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3950 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3951 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3953 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3955 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3957 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3959 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3960 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3961 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3963 // Handle (3), creating (6):
3964 let (revoke_msg_0, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
3965 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3966 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3969 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3970 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3971 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3973 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
3974 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
3975 let commitment_signed = resp_option.unwrap().commitment_signed;
3976 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3979 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3980 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3981 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3982 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3983 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3984 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3986 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0]), feerate + 30);
3987 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1]), feerate + 30);
3988 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3992 fn fake_network_test() {
3993 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3994 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
3995 let nodes = create_network(4);
3997 // Create some initial channels
3998 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3999 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4000 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4002 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
4003 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4004 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4005 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4006 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4008 // Send some more payments
4009 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
4010 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
4011 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
4013 // Test failure packets
4014 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
4015 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
4017 // Add a new channel that skips 3
4018 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4020 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
4021 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
4022 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4023 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4024 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4025 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4026 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4028 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
4029 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
4030 hops.push(RouteHop {
4031 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
4032 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4034 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4036 hops.push(RouteHop {
4037 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
4038 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4040 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4042 hops.push(RouteHop {
4043 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
4044 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4046 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
4048 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4049 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4050 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
4052 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
4053 hops.push(RouteHop {
4054 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
4055 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4057 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4059 hops.push(RouteHop {
4060 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
4061 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4063 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4065 hops.push(RouteHop {
4066 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
4067 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4069 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
4071 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4072 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4073 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
4075 // Claim the rebalances...
4076 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
4077 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4079 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
4080 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4082 // Send some payments across both channels
4083 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4084 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4085 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4087 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
4089 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
4091 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
4092 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
4093 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
4095 // Close down the channels...
4096 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
4097 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
4098 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
4099 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
4100 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
4104 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
4105 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
4106 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
4107 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
4109 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
4110 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
4111 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4112 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4113 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4114 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
4116 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
4118 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
4119 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
4121 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
4122 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
4124 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
4125 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
4126 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
4129 #[derive(PartialEq)]
4130 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
4131 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
4133 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
4134 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
4135 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
4137 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
4138 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
4140 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
4142 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
4143 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4144 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
4146 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
4147 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4148 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
4149 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
4150 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
4151 res.push(tx.clone());
4156 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
4157 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
4160 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
4162 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
4163 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4164 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
4165 check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
4166 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
4167 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
4169 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
4171 res.push(tx.clone());
4175 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
4178 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
4182 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
4183 /// HTLC transaction.
4184 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
4185 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4186 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4187 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4188 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
4189 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
4193 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
4196 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
4197 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4199 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
4200 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4201 let mut found_prev = false;
4203 for tx in prev_txn {
4204 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
4205 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
4206 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
4207 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
4213 assert!(found_prev);
4215 let mut res = Vec::new();
4216 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
4220 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
4221 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4222 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4223 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
4224 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
4227 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4230 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4231 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4232 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
4233 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
4236 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4240 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4241 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4245 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
4247 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4248 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4250 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4251 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4253 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4254 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4259 fn channel_reserve_test() {
4261 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
4262 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
4264 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
4265 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
4266 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4267 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
4268 chan.get_value_stat()
4272 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4273 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
4274 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
4276 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4277 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4279 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
4280 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4282 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
4283 ($recv_value: expr) => {{
4284 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4285 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4286 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
4290 macro_rules! expect_forward {
4292 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4293 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4294 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4295 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
4300 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
4301 ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
4302 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4303 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4305 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4306 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4307 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
4309 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4314 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
4315 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
4317 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
4319 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4321 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
4322 assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
4323 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4325 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4326 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4330 let mut htlc_id = 0;
4331 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
4332 // nodes[0]'s wealth
4334 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
4335 if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
4338 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
4341 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
4342 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
4343 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
4344 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
4345 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
4348 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
4349 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
4350 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
4351 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
4352 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
4356 let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4357 // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
4358 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
4359 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4361 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4362 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4366 // adding pending output
4367 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
4368 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
4370 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
4371 let payment_event_1 = {
4372 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
4373 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4375 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4376 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4377 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4379 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4381 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
4382 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4384 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4385 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4386 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4387 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4392 // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
4393 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4395 // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
4396 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4397 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
4398 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
4399 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
4401 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
4403 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
4404 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
4405 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
4406 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
4407 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4408 channel_id: chan_1.2,
4410 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
4411 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
4412 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
4413 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
4416 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
4418 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
4422 // split the rest to test holding cell
4423 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
4424 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
4426 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4427 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
4430 // now see if they go through on both sides
4431 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
4432 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
4433 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
4434 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4435 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4436 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
4438 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
4440 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
4441 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4442 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4443 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4447 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
4448 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
4449 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
4450 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4451 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4452 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
4454 // flush the pending htlc
4455 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4458 let commitment_update_2 = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
4459 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4460 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4461 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
4462 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4463 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4464 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4466 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4468 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4469 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4470 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
4472 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4473 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
4475 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
4476 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
4477 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4478 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
4479 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
4480 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4482 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4483 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
4484 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4485 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
4487 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
4488 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4490 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4491 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4493 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4494 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
4495 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
4497 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4500 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4501 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
4502 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
4504 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4507 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
4508 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
4509 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
4511 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
4512 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4513 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
4514 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
4516 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4517 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
4521 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
4522 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
4523 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
4524 let nodes = create_network(5);
4526 // Create some initial channels
4527 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4528 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4529 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4530 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4532 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
4533 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4534 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4535 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4536 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4538 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
4539 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4541 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4542 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4543 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4544 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4546 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4547 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4548 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4550 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
4551 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4553 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
4554 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4556 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4557 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4558 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4559 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4561 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
4562 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4563 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4565 macro_rules! claim_funds {
4566 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
4568 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
4569 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4571 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4572 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4574 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
4575 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4576 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4577 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4579 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4585 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
4586 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
4587 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4589 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4591 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4592 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
4594 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4595 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4597 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
4599 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
4600 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4601 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4603 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
4604 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4605 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
4608 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
4609 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
4610 // One pending HTLC to time out:
4611 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
4612 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
4616 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4617 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4618 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
4619 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4620 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4623 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4625 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4626 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
4628 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4629 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4630 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
4631 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4632 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4635 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
4637 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4638 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
4640 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
4642 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
4643 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4644 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4646 // Create some new channels:
4647 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4649 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
4650 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4651 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
4652 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4653 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
4654 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4655 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
4656 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
4657 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4658 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4659 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4660 // Revoke the old state
4661 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
4664 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4665 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4667 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4668 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4669 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
4670 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
4672 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4673 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
4675 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4677 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4678 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4679 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4680 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
4681 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
4683 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4684 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4685 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4689 fn revoked_output_claim() {
4690 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
4691 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
4692 let nodes = create_network(2);
4693 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4694 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
4695 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4696 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
4697 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
4698 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4699 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
4700 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
4702 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
4703 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4704 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4705 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4706 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
4708 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
4710 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4711 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
4713 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
4714 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4715 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4719 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
4720 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
4721 let nodes = create_network(2);
4723 // Create some new channel:
4724 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4726 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4727 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4728 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
4729 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4730 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4732 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4733 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4734 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
4735 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4736 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4737 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4738 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4739 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4740 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4742 //Revoke the old state
4743 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4746 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4748 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4750 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4751 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4752 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
4754 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
4755 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4757 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
4759 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4760 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4761 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4762 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4763 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4764 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4765 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4766 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4768 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
4769 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4770 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
4772 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4773 let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
4774 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4775 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
4776 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4777 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
4779 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4780 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4781 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4785 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
4786 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
4787 let nodes = create_network(2);
4789 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4791 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4792 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4793 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
4794 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
4795 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4796 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4798 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4799 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4801 //Revoke the old state
4802 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4805 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4807 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4809 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4810 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4811 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
4813 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
4814 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
4815 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
4816 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
4817 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
4818 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
4819 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
4821 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4822 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4823 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4825 let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
4826 revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4827 node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4828 node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4829 node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4831 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4832 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4833 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4834 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4835 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4836 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4837 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4838 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4840 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
4841 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
4843 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
4844 let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
4845 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4846 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
4847 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4848 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4850 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4851 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4852 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4856 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
4857 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
4858 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
4859 let nodes = create_network(2);
4860 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4862 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
4863 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
4865 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4866 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4868 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4869 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4871 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4875 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4876 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4878 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4879 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4882 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4883 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4885 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4886 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4888 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4892 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
4893 // registering new transactions
4894 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4898 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
4899 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
4900 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4901 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4902 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4904 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
4906 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4908 let mut payment_event = {
4909 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4910 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4912 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4913 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4914 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4917 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4918 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4920 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4921 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4923 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4924 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4927 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4928 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4930 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4931 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4932 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
4933 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4935 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4936 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4937 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4938 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4940 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
4941 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
4942 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
4944 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
4945 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4946 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4948 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4949 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4951 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4955 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4956 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
4957 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
4958 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
4959 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4963 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4964 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4966 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4967 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
4968 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
4970 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4971 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4973 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4976 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
4978 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
4979 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
4980 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
4982 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4983 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4984 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4985 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4986 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
4987 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4988 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4990 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
4994 fn test_unconf_chan() {
4995 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
4996 let nodes = create_network(2);
4997 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4999 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5000 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
5001 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
5002 mem::drop(channel_state);
5004 let mut headers = Vec::new();
5005 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5006 headers.push(header.clone());
5008 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5009 headers.push(header.clone());
5011 while !headers.is_empty() {
5012 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
5015 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5016 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5018 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5019 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5021 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5024 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5025 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
5026 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
5029 /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
5030 /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
5031 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
5032 let reestablish_1 = node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
5033 let reestablish_2 = node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
5035 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
5036 for msg in reestablish_1 {
5037 resp_1.push(node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
5039 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
5040 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5042 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
5045 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
5046 for msg in reestablish_2 {
5047 resp_2.push(node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
5049 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
5050 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5052 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
5055 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
5056 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
5057 (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
5059 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
5061 let a = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap());
5062 let _announcement_sigs_opt = a.unwrap();
5063 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
5065 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
5068 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5069 assert!(node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap().is_none());
5070 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5072 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
5074 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
5075 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
5076 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5077 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
5079 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5081 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
5082 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
5083 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5084 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
5085 node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
5087 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
5088 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
5090 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
5091 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
5094 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5095 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
5097 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5098 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5099 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
5100 assert!(node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5101 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5104 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
5108 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
5110 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
5111 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
5113 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
5116 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5117 assert!(node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap().is_none());
5118 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5120 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
5122 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
5123 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
5124 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5125 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
5127 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
5128 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
5129 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5130 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
5131 node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
5133 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
5134 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
5136 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
5137 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
5140 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5141 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
5143 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5144 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5145 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
5146 assert!(node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5147 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5150 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
5156 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
5157 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
5158 let nodes = create_network(3);
5159 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5160 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5162 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5163 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5164 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5166 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5167 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5168 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
5169 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
5171 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5172 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5173 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5175 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5176 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5177 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5178 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5180 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5181 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5183 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
5184 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
5186 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
5188 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5189 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5191 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
5192 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
5194 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5197 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
5198 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
5199 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
5201 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5205 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
5206 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
5209 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
5210 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
5211 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5212 if messages_delivered == 0 {
5213 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
5214 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
5216 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5219 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5220 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5222 let payment_event = {
5223 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5224 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5226 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5227 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5228 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5230 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
5232 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5233 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
5235 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5236 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5237 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5239 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
5240 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5241 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5243 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
5244 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5245 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
5246 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5248 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
5249 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5250 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5256 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5257 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5258 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5259 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
5260 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
5261 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5262 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
5263 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
5264 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
5265 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
5266 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
5267 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5268 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
5269 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
5270 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
5271 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
5272 // Everything was delivered...
5273 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5276 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5277 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5279 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5280 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5283 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5284 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5285 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5287 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5288 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5290 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5291 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5293 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5294 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
5295 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
5297 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5300 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5303 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5304 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5305 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
5306 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5307 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5308 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5309 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5310 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5311 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5312 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5313 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5315 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5318 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
5319 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
5321 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5322 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5324 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5325 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
5327 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5330 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
5331 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
5332 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5334 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
5335 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5336 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5338 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
5339 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5340 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
5341 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5343 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
5344 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5345 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5352 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5353 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5354 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5355 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5356 //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
5357 //if messages_delivered < 1 {
5358 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5359 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5361 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5362 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
5364 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5367 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
5368 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
5369 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
5370 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
5371 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
5372 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5373 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
5374 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
5375 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
5376 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
5377 // Everything was delivered...
5378 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5381 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5382 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5383 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5385 // Channel should still work fine...
5386 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
5387 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
5391 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
5392 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
5393 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
5394 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
5398 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
5399 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
5400 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
5401 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
5405 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
5406 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
5407 let nodes = create_network(2);
5408 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
5410 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5411 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5413 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
5414 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5415 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5417 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _, ref announcement_sigs } => {
5418 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5419 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
5421 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5424 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
5425 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5426 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5428 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _, ref announcement_sigs } => {
5429 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5430 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
5432 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5435 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5436 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5437 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5438 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5440 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
5441 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
5443 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5444 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5445 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
5449 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
5450 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
5451 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
5452 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5453 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5455 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5457 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
5458 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5459 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5461 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
5462 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5464 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5465 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5467 Event::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5468 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5471 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
5472 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5474 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5475 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5477 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
5478 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5479 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5480 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5481 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5482 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5483 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
5485 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5486 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5487 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5489 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5490 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
5492 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5495 let (_, commitment_update) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
5496 assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
5497 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5499 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5502 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5503 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5505 let reestablish_1 = nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5506 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
5507 let reestablish_2 = nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5508 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
5510 let as_resp = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
5511 let bs_resp = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
5513 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
5514 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
5516 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5517 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
5519 assert!(as_resp.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
5521 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5522 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5523 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5524 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5525 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
5526 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5527 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
5528 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
5529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5531 let bs_second_commitment_signed = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap().unwrap();
5532 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5533 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5534 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5535 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5536 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
5537 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5539 let as_commitment_signed = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
5540 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5541 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5542 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5543 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5544 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
5545 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5547 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5548 assert!(as_second_commitment_signed.is_none());
5549 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5551 let (bs_second_revoke_and_ack, bs_third_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5552 assert!(bs_third_commitment_signed.is_none());
5553 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5555 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5556 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5558 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5559 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5561 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5562 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5565 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5566 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5568 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5569 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
5571 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
5572 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
5574 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5577 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5578 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5580 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
5584 fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
5585 // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
5586 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5587 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5589 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5590 let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5592 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
5593 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
5594 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5596 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5597 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5599 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5600 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5603 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
5604 // PaymentFailed event
5606 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5609 fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
5610 // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
5611 // a disconnect in between
5612 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5613 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5615 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5616 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5618 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
5619 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
5620 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5622 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5623 assert!(events_1.is_empty());
5624 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5627 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5628 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5629 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5632 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
5633 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
5634 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5636 let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5637 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5638 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
5639 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5640 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5641 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5643 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5645 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5646 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5648 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5649 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
5650 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
5652 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5655 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
5657 // Now set it to failed again...
5658 let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5659 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
5660 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
5661 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5663 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5664 assert!(events_4.is_empty());
5665 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5668 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5669 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5670 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5673 // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
5674 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
5675 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
5676 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5678 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5679 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
5681 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5682 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5685 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
5686 // PaymentFailed event
5688 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5692 fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
5693 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
5694 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
5697 fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
5698 let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
5700 // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
5701 // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
5702 // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
5703 // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
5704 // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
5705 // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
5706 // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
5707 // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
5708 // immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
5709 // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
5710 // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
5711 // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
5712 // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
5713 // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
5714 // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
5715 // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
5716 // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
5717 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5718 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5720 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5722 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
5723 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5724 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5726 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
5727 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
5728 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5730 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5731 assert!(events_1.is_empty());
5732 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5734 // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
5735 // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
5736 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
5737 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5738 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5739 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5740 let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
5741 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
5742 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5743 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5744 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5745 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5746 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5747 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
5749 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
5750 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5751 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5752 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5754 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5755 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
5757 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5760 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
5761 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
5762 } else { panic!(); }
5765 (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
5767 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5770 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
5771 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5772 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5775 // Now fix monitor updating...
5776 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
5777 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
5778 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5780 macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
5781 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5782 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5784 let reestablish_1 = nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5785 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
5786 let reestablish_2 = nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5787 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
5789 let as_resp = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
5790 let bs_resp = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
5792 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
5793 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
5795 (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
5798 let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
5799 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5800 assert!(events_4.is_empty());
5802 let reestablish_1 = nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5803 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
5804 let reestablish_2 = nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5805 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
5807 let mut as_resp = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
5808 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5809 let mut bs_resp = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
5810 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5812 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
5813 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
5815 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5816 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
5817 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
5819 assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
5820 assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
5821 assert!(as_resp.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
5823 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5824 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5825 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5826 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
5827 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
5828 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
5830 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
5832 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5833 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5834 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5836 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5837 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
5839 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5842 let (as_resp_raa, as_resp_cu) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
5843 assert!(as_resp_cu.is_none());
5844 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5846 as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
5850 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
5851 let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5853 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
5854 assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
5855 assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
5857 assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
5858 assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
5861 (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
5863 let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5864 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
5865 (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
5866 Event::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
5867 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5870 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5874 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5876 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5877 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5878 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still
5879 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5881 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
5882 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5884 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
5885 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
5887 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
5888 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
5891 let as_commitment_update;
5892 let bs_second_commitment_update;
5894 macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
5895 as_commitment_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
5896 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5897 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5898 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5899 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5900 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
5901 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5904 macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
5905 bs_second_commitment_update = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
5906 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5907 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5908 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5909 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5910 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
5911 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5914 if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
5917 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
5918 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5920 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
5921 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5923 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
5924 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
5926 assert!(as_resp.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5929 handle_initial_raa!();
5931 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
5932 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5934 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
5935 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5937 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
5938 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
5941 handle_initial_raa!();
5943 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
5944 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5946 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
5947 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
5949 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
5950 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
5952 assert!(bs_resp.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5957 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
5958 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5960 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
5961 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5963 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
5964 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
5968 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5969 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
5970 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5972 let (bs_second_revoke_and_ack, bs_third_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5973 assert!(bs_third_commitment_signed.is_none());
5974 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5976 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5977 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5979 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5980 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5982 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5984 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5985 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
5987 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5988 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
5989 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
5991 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5994 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
5998 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
5999 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
6000 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
6001 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
6002 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
6003 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
6004 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
6008 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
6009 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
6010 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
6011 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
6012 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
6016 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
6017 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
6018 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
6019 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
6020 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
6021 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
6025 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
6026 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
6027 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6028 let nodes = create_network(2);
6030 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
6032 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6033 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6034 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
6035 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
6037 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
6039 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6040 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6042 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6043 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6045 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
6047 let mut chan_announcement;
6049 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
6051 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
6052 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
6053 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
6054 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
6055 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
6056 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
6057 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
6058 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
6059 excess_data: Vec::new(),
6064 macro_rules! sign_msg {
6065 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
6066 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
6067 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6068 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6069 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
6070 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
6071 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
6072 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
6073 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
6074 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
6075 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
6076 contents: $unsigned_msg
6081 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6082 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6083 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
6084 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
6086 // Configured with Network::Testnet
6087 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6088 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
6089 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6090 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
6092 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6093 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
6094 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6095 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());