1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
38 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
49 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
51 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
54 use util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
58 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
59 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
72 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
73 use std::time::Instant;
74 use util::crypto::sign;
76 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
78 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
79 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
80 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
82 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
83 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
84 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
85 // before we forward it.
87 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
88 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
89 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
90 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
91 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
93 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
94 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
96 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
97 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a "real" SCID, an
98 /// outbound SCID alias, or a phantom node SCID.
99 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
102 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
103 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
104 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
107 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
108 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
113 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
114 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
115 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
116 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
117 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
118 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
121 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
122 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
123 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
124 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
127 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
128 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
129 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
130 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
131 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
134 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
136 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
138 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
139 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
140 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
143 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
144 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
146 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
150 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
154 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
155 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
156 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
157 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
158 short_channel_id: u64,
160 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
161 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
163 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
164 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
169 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
171 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
172 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
173 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
175 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
176 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
179 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
180 struct ClaimableHTLC {
181 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
183 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
185 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
187 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
191 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
192 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
193 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
194 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
196 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
197 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
202 impl Readable for PaymentId {
203 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
204 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
208 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
209 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
210 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
211 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
212 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
215 session_priv: SecretKey,
216 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
217 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
218 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
219 payment_id: PaymentId,
220 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
221 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
224 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
225 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
226 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
228 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
230 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
232 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
235 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
236 payment_id.hash(hasher);
237 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
238 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
239 payment_params.hash(hasher);
244 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
247 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
248 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
250 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
251 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
252 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
253 payment_secret: None,
254 payment_params: None,
259 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
260 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
262 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
270 struct ReceiveError {
276 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
277 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
279 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
284 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
286 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
287 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
288 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
289 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
290 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
292 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
293 err: msgs::LightningError,
294 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
295 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
297 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
299 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
301 err: LightningError {
303 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
304 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
311 shutdown_finish: None,
315 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
317 err: LightningError {
319 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
322 shutdown_finish: None,
326 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
327 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
330 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
332 err: LightningError {
334 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
335 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
341 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
342 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
346 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
349 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
351 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
352 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
356 log_level: Level::Warn,
359 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
361 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
363 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
365 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
366 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
374 shutdown_finish: None,
379 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
380 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
381 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
382 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
383 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
385 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
386 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
387 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
388 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
389 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
390 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
391 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
393 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
397 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
398 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
399 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
400 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
402 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
403 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
404 /// confirmation depth.
405 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>,
406 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
408 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
409 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
410 /// and via the classic SCID.
412 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
413 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
414 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
415 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
416 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
417 /// failed/claimed by the user.
419 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
420 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
422 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
423 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
424 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
425 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
428 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
429 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
430 /// quite some time lag.
431 enum BackgroundEvent {
432 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
433 /// commitment transaction.
434 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
437 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
438 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
440 latest_features: InitFeatures,
443 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
444 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
446 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
449 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
450 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
451 struct PendingInboundPayment {
452 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
453 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
454 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
455 /// this payment being removed.
457 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
458 user_payment_id: u64,
459 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
460 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
461 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
464 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
465 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
466 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
468 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
471 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
472 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
473 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
474 pending_amt_msat: u64,
475 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
476 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
477 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
479 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
480 starting_block_height: u32,
482 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
483 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
484 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
486 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
487 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
489 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
490 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
491 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
492 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
493 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
495 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
497 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
498 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
502 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
503 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
505 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
509 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
511 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
515 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
517 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
521 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
523 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
528 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
530 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
531 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
532 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
533 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
537 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
538 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
539 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
540 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
541 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
542 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
543 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
546 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
547 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
550 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
551 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
552 let our_payment_hash;
553 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
554 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
555 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
557 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
558 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
559 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
563 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
567 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
568 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
569 let remove_res = match self {
570 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
571 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
572 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
573 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
574 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
578 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
579 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
580 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
581 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
582 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
583 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
590 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
591 let insert_res = match self {
592 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
593 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
594 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
596 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
597 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
600 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
601 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
602 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
603 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
604 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
611 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
613 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
614 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
615 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
616 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
623 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
624 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
625 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
626 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
627 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
628 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
629 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
631 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
632 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
634 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
635 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
636 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
637 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
638 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
639 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
640 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
641 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
643 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
644 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
646 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
647 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
649 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
650 /// to individual Channels.
652 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
653 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
654 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
655 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
657 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
658 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
659 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
660 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
661 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
662 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
663 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
665 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
666 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
667 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
668 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
671 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
672 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
673 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
674 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
675 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
677 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
678 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
679 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
680 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
681 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
682 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
683 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
684 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
685 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
686 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
689 default_configuration: UserConfig,
690 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
691 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
696 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
698 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
699 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
701 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
702 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
703 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
704 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
706 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
707 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
708 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
709 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
710 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
711 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
713 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
714 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
715 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
716 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
717 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
718 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
719 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
720 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
722 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
724 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
725 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
727 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
728 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
729 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
730 /// active channel list on load.
731 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
733 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
735 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
736 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
737 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
739 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
740 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
741 /// the handling of the events.
744 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
745 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
746 /// would break backwards compatability.
747 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
748 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
749 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
750 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
752 our_network_key: SecretKey,
753 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
755 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
757 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
758 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
759 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
761 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
762 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
764 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
765 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
766 /// keeping additional state.
767 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
769 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
770 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
771 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
773 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
774 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
775 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
776 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
778 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
779 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
780 /// are currently open with that peer.
781 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
782 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
785 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
786 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
788 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
789 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
790 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
791 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
792 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
793 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
794 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
795 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
796 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
798 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
805 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
807 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
808 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
809 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
810 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
811 pub struct ChainParameters {
812 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
813 pub network: Network,
815 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
817 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
818 pub best_block: BestBlock,
821 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
827 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
828 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
829 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
830 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
831 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
832 /// updates are ready for persistence).
834 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
835 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
836 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
837 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
838 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
840 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
841 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
844 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
845 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
846 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
849 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
850 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
852 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
853 persistence_notifier: notifier,
854 should_persist: persist_check,
855 _read_guard: read_guard,
860 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
862 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
863 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
868 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
869 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
871 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
873 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
874 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
875 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
876 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
877 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
879 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
880 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
882 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
884 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
885 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
886 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
887 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
888 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
889 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
890 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
891 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
892 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
893 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
894 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
895 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
896 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
898 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
899 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
901 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
902 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
903 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
904 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
906 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
907 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
908 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
909 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
910 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
911 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
914 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
916 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
917 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
920 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
922 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
923 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
924 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
926 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
927 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
929 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
930 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
931 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
932 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
933 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
934 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
935 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
936 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
937 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
938 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
939 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
942 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
943 /// to better separate parameters.
944 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
945 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
946 /// The node_id of our counterparty
947 pub node_id: PublicKey,
948 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
949 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
950 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
951 pub features: InitFeatures,
952 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
953 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
954 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
956 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
958 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
959 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
960 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
961 /// payments to us through this channel.
962 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
963 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
964 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
965 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
966 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
967 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
968 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
971 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
972 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
973 pub struct ChannelDetails {
974 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
975 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
976 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
977 /// lifetime of the channel.
978 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
979 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
980 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
981 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
982 /// our counterparty already.
984 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
985 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
986 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
987 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
989 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
990 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
991 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
992 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
994 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
995 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
997 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
998 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1000 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1001 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1002 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1003 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1004 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1005 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1006 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1007 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1008 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1011 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1013 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1014 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1015 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1016 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1017 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1018 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1019 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1021 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1022 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1024 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1025 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1026 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1027 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1028 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1029 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1030 /// this value on chain.
1032 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1034 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1036 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1037 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1038 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1039 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1040 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1041 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1042 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1044 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1045 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1046 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1047 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1049 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1050 pub balance_msat: u64,
1051 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1052 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1053 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1054 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1056 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1058 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1059 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1060 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1061 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1062 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1063 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1064 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1065 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1067 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1068 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1069 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1070 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1071 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1072 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1073 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1075 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1076 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1077 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1078 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1079 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1080 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1081 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1082 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1083 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1085 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1087 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1088 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1089 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1090 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1091 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1092 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1093 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1094 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1095 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1097 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1098 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1099 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1100 pub is_outbound: bool,
1101 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1102 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1103 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1104 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1105 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1107 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1108 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1109 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1110 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1112 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1113 pub is_usable: bool,
1114 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1115 pub is_public: bool,
1116 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1117 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1118 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1119 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1120 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1121 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1123 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1124 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1127 impl ChannelDetails {
1128 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1129 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1130 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1132 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1133 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1134 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1135 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1138 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1139 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1140 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1142 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1143 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1144 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1145 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1149 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1150 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1151 /// states for more.
1152 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1153 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1154 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1155 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1156 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1157 ParameterError(APIError),
1158 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1159 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1160 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1161 /// payment in full.
1163 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1165 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1166 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1167 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1168 /// paths than the ones selected).
1169 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1170 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1171 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1172 /// in over-/re-payment.
1174 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1175 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1176 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1178 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1179 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1180 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1181 /// with the latest update_id.
1183 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1184 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1185 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1186 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1187 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1188 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1189 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1190 payment_id: PaymentId,
1194 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1196 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1198 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1199 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1200 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1201 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1203 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1204 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1205 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1208 macro_rules! handle_error {
1209 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1212 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1213 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1215 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1216 // entering the macro.
1217 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1218 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1221 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1223 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1224 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1225 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1226 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1230 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1231 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1232 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1233 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1238 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1239 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1241 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1242 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1243 action: err.action.clone()
1247 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1248 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1251 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1258 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1259 ($self: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1260 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1261 $short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1263 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1264 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1265 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1266 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1267 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1269 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1270 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1272 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1273 $short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1277 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1278 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1279 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1281 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1282 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1284 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1285 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1287 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1288 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1289 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_chan_info, $channel);
1290 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1291 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1292 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1298 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1299 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1303 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1305 $entry.remove_entry();
1313 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1314 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1318 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1320 $entry.remove_entry();
1328 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1329 ($self: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1331 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1332 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel);
1338 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1339 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1341 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1342 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1343 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_chan_info, $chan);
1344 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1345 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1346 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1347 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1348 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1349 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1350 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1351 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1352 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1353 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1354 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1357 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1358 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1359 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1360 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1361 match $action_type {
1362 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1363 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1365 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1366 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1368 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1369 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1370 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1371 if !$resend_commitment {
1372 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1375 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1377 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1378 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1382 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1383 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1385 $entry.remove_entry();
1389 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1390 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1391 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1393 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1394 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1396 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1397 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1399 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1400 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1402 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1403 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1407 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1408 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1409 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1411 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1412 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1416 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1417 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1418 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1419 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1420 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1423 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1428 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1429 ($short_to_chan_info: expr, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {
1430 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1431 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1432 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1434 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1435 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1436 let outbound_alias_insert = $short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1437 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1438 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1439 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1440 let scid_insert = $short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1441 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1442 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1447 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1448 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1449 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1450 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $channel_ready: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1451 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1453 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1454 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1455 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1457 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1458 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1459 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or($channel_entry.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
1460 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1463 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1464 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a channel_ready if there have been
1465 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1466 // associated with a channel_ready would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1467 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1468 // channel_ready until it's been updated, so we can't have a channel_ready and a
1469 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1470 assert!($channel_ready.is_none());
1471 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a channel_ready or a
1472 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a channel_ready, we
1473 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1474 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1477 if let Some(msg) = $channel_ready {
1478 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the channel_ready fly
1479 // before it should be allowed to.
1480 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1481 send_channel_ready!($channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
1483 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1484 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1485 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1490 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1491 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1492 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1493 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1494 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1495 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1496 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1497 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1498 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1499 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1500 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1501 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1502 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1503 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1504 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1505 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1506 let mut order = $order;
1508 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1510 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1514 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1515 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1516 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1517 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1522 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1523 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1524 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1525 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1526 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1531 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1535 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1540 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1541 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1542 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1547 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1548 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1549 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1550 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1551 assert!(res.is_ok());
1554 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1558 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1559 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1560 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1562 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1564 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1565 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1570 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1571 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1572 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1573 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1574 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1577 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1579 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1580 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1582 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1584 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1585 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1586 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1587 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1588 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1589 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1590 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1591 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1593 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1594 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1595 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1599 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1601 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1602 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1603 short_to_chan_info: HashMap::new(),
1604 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1605 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1606 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1608 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1609 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1610 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1611 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1613 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1614 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1617 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1618 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1620 probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1622 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1623 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1625 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1627 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1628 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1629 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1630 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1638 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1639 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1640 &self.default_configuration
1643 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1644 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1645 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1648 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1649 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1651 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1653 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1657 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1662 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1664 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1665 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1666 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1667 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1668 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1671 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1672 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1674 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1675 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1676 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1678 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1679 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1680 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1681 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1682 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1683 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1685 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1686 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1687 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1688 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1689 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1690 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1694 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1695 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1696 Some(peer_state) => {
1697 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1698 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1699 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1700 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1701 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1702 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1703 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1707 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1712 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1715 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1717 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1718 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1719 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1721 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1722 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1723 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1724 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1726 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1728 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1731 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1733 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1734 node_id: their_network_key,
1737 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1740 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1741 let mut res = Vec::new();
1743 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1744 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1745 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1746 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1747 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1748 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1749 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1750 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1751 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1752 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1753 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1754 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1755 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1756 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1757 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1758 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1759 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1760 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1761 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1762 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1763 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1765 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1766 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1767 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1768 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1769 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1770 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1771 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1772 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1773 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1774 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1775 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1776 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1777 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1778 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1779 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1780 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1781 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1782 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1783 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1784 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1785 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1786 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1787 config: Some(channel.config()),
1791 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1792 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1793 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1794 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1800 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1801 /// more information.
1802 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1803 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1806 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1807 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1809 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1810 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1813 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1814 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1815 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1816 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1817 // really wanted anyway.
1818 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1821 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1822 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1823 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1824 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1825 Some(transaction) => {
1826 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1830 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1831 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1832 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1833 reason: closure_reason
1837 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1838 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1840 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1841 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1842 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1843 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1844 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1845 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1846 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1847 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1849 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1850 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1851 Some(peer_state) => {
1852 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1853 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1854 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1856 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1858 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1860 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1861 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1862 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1863 let (result, is_permanent) =
1864 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1866 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1872 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1873 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1877 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1878 let channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1879 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1880 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1884 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1888 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1892 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1893 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1894 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
1897 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1901 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1902 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1903 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1905 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1906 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1908 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1909 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1910 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1911 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1913 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1915 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1916 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1917 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1918 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1919 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1922 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1923 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1924 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1926 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1927 /// the channel being closed or not:
1928 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1929 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1930 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1931 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1932 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1933 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1934 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1936 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1938 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1939 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1940 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1941 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1942 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1946 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1947 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1948 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1949 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1950 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1951 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_id };
1952 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
1954 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1955 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1956 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1957 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1958 // ignore the result here.
1959 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1963 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1964 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1965 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1966 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1968 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1969 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1970 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1971 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
1972 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1974 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1975 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1977 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1979 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan)
1981 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1984 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1985 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1986 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1987 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1988 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1993 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1996 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1997 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1998 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
1999 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2000 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2001 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2002 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2003 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2004 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2014 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2015 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2016 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2018 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2019 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2020 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2023 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2024 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2025 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2027 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2028 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2029 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2030 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2031 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2034 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2035 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2036 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2037 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2038 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2042 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2043 /// local transaction(s).
2044 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2045 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2046 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2050 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2051 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2053 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2054 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2055 return Err(ReceiveError {
2056 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2058 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2061 // final_expiry_too_soon
2062 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2063 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2064 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2065 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2066 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2067 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2068 return Err(ReceiveError {
2070 err_data: Vec::new(),
2071 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2074 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2075 return Err(ReceiveError {
2077 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2078 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2082 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2083 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => {
2084 return Err(ReceiveError {
2085 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2086 err_data: Vec::new(),
2087 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2090 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2091 return Err(ReceiveError {
2092 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2093 err_data: Vec::new(),
2094 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2097 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2098 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2099 return Err(ReceiveError {
2100 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2101 err_data: Vec::new(),
2102 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2104 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2105 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2107 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2108 phantom_shared_secret,
2110 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2111 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2112 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2113 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2114 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2115 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2116 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2117 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2118 return Err(ReceiveError {
2119 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2120 err_data: Vec::new(),
2121 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2125 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2127 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2130 return Err(ReceiveError {
2131 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2132 err_data: Vec::new(),
2133 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2138 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2141 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2142 amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
2143 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2147 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2148 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2149 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2151 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2152 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2153 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2154 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2155 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2156 failure_code: $err_code,
2162 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2163 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2166 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2168 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2169 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2170 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2171 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2172 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2173 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2174 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2175 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2177 macro_rules! return_err {
2178 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2180 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2181 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2182 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2183 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2184 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2190 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2192 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2193 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2195 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2196 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2200 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2201 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2203 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2205 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2206 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2207 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2208 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2209 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2211 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2214 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2215 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2216 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2218 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2219 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2220 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2223 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2224 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2225 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2226 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2227 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2231 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2232 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2233 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2236 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2237 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2238 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2239 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2244 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2245 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2246 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2247 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2248 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2249 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2250 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2251 let id_option = channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2252 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2253 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2254 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2256 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
2259 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2262 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()),
2264 let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2265 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2266 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2267 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2268 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2269 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2270 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2272 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2273 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2274 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2275 // we don't have the channel here.
2276 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2278 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2280 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2281 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2282 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2283 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2284 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2285 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2286 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2288 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2289 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2291 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *amt_to_forward, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2292 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2296 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2298 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2305 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2306 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2307 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2308 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2309 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2310 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2312 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2313 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2315 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2316 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2317 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2318 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2319 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2320 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2321 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2322 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2323 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2324 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2330 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2331 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2332 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2333 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2335 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2336 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2338 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2339 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2340 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2342 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2343 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2344 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2346 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2351 pending_forward_info
2354 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2355 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2356 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2358 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2359 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2360 if !chan.should_announce() {
2361 return Err(LightningError {
2362 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2363 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2366 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2367 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2369 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2370 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2373 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2374 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2375 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2376 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2377 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2378 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2379 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2380 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2381 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2385 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2387 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2388 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2389 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2391 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2392 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2394 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2395 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2396 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2397 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2398 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2399 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2400 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2401 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2404 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2405 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2407 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2413 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2414 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2415 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2416 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2417 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2418 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2420 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2421 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2422 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2423 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2424 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2426 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2428 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2430 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2431 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2433 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2434 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2435 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2436 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2437 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2438 err: "Payment already completed"
2443 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_chan_info.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2444 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2445 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
2448 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2450 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2451 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2452 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2453 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2454 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2455 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2456 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2457 total_msat: total_value,
2459 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2463 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2464 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2466 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2467 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2469 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2470 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2472 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2473 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2475 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2476 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2478 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2479 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2480 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2481 channel_state, chan)
2483 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2484 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2485 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2486 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2487 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2488 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2489 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2490 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2491 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2492 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2494 insert_outbound_payment!();
2496 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2497 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2498 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2499 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2500 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2501 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2502 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2503 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2509 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2511 } else { unreachable!(); }
2515 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2516 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2518 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2523 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2525 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2526 /// fields for more info.
2528 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2529 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2530 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2531 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2532 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2533 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2535 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2537 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2538 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2539 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2541 /// In general, a path may raise:
2542 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2543 /// node public key) is specified.
2544 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2545 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2547 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2548 /// relevant updates.
2550 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2551 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2552 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2554 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2555 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2556 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2557 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2559 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2560 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2561 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2562 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2563 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2566 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2567 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2568 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2570 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2571 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2573 let mut total_value = 0;
2574 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2575 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2576 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2577 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2578 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2579 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2580 continue 'path_check;
2582 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2583 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2584 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2585 continue 'path_check;
2588 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2589 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2591 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2592 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2594 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2595 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2596 total_value = amt_msat;
2599 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2600 let mut results = Vec::new();
2601 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2602 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2604 let mut has_ok = false;
2605 let mut has_err = false;
2606 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2607 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2608 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2609 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2610 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2611 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2612 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2616 } else if res.is_err() {
2617 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2618 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2621 if has_err && has_ok {
2622 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2625 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2626 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2627 Some(RouteParameters {
2628 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2629 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2630 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2636 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2637 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2638 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2639 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2645 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2647 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2648 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2649 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2650 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2651 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2653 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2654 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2655 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2656 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2657 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2658 if path.len() == 0 {
2659 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2660 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2665 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2666 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2667 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2669 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2670 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2672 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2673 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2674 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2675 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2678 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2680 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2681 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2682 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2685 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2686 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2687 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2690 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2691 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2692 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2697 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2698 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2702 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2705 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2707 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2708 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2709 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2710 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2712 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2713 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2714 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2716 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2717 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2718 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2719 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2720 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2722 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2723 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2724 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2725 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2726 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2728 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2736 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2737 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2738 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2739 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2740 /// never reach the recipient.
2742 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2744 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2745 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2747 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2749 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2750 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2751 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2753 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2755 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2756 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2757 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2762 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2763 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2764 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2765 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2766 let payment_id = PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2768 let payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(&payment_id);
2771 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2772 err: "No need probing a path with less than two hops".to_string()
2776 let route = Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None };
2778 match self.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &None, None, Some(payment_id), None) {
2779 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2784 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2786 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2787 let target_payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(payment_id);
2788 target_payment_hash == *payment_hash
2791 /// Returns the 'probing cookie' for the given [`PaymentId`].
2792 fn probing_cookie_from_id(&self, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> PaymentHash {
2793 let mut preimage = [0u8; 64];
2794 preimage[..32].copy_from_slice(&self.probing_cookie_secret);
2795 preimage[32..].copy_from_slice(&payment_id.0);
2796 PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage).into_inner())
2799 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2800 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2801 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2802 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2803 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2805 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2807 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2809 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2810 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2811 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2812 } else { unreachable!(); })
2815 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2817 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2818 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2821 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2822 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2827 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2828 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2829 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2832 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2833 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2834 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2836 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2837 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2838 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2839 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2848 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2849 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2850 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2854 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2856 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2857 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2859 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2860 /// across the p2p network.
2862 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2863 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2865 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2866 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2867 /// keys per-channel).
2869 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2870 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2871 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2873 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2874 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2875 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2877 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2878 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2879 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2880 /// for more details.
2882 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2883 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2884 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2885 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2887 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2888 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2889 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2890 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2895 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2896 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2897 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2898 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2899 // TODO: updated if/when https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-bitcoin/pull/994 landed and rust-bitcoin bumped.
2900 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2901 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2902 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2906 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2907 let mut output_index = None;
2908 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2909 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2910 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2911 if output_index.is_some() {
2912 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2913 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2916 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2917 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2918 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2921 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2924 if output_index.is_none() {
2925 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2926 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2929 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2934 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2935 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 100 (our stated public contract on when
2936 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2938 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2941 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2942 // smaller than 100:
2943 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 100;
2945 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2946 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2947 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2948 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2949 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2950 /// our network addresses.
2952 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2953 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2955 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2956 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2957 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2958 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2960 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 100).
2962 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2963 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2964 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2966 if addresses.len() > 100 {
2967 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2970 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2971 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2972 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2974 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2975 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2976 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2977 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2978 rgb, alias, addresses,
2979 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2980 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2982 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2983 let node_announce_sig = sign(&self.secp_ctx, &msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2985 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2986 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2988 let mut announced_chans = false;
2989 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2990 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
2991 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2993 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2998 announced_chans = true;
3000 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached channel_ready, check the
3001 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
3002 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
3006 if announced_chans {
3007 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
3008 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
3009 signature: node_announce_sig,
3010 contents: announcement
3016 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3018 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3019 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3020 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3021 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3023 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3024 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3026 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3027 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3029 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3031 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3032 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3033 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3034 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3035 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3036 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3037 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3038 pub fn update_channel_config(
3039 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3040 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3041 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3042 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3043 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3047 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
3048 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
3051 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3052 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3053 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3054 let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id)
3055 .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3056 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
3058 .get_counterparty_node_id();
3059 if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id {
3060 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3061 err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(),
3065 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3066 let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3067 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3070 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3071 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3072 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3073 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3074 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3083 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3085 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3086 /// Will likely generate further events.
3087 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3088 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3090 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3091 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3092 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3093 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3095 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3096 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3098 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
3099 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3100 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&short_chan_id) {
3101 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
3103 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3104 match forward_info {
3105 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3106 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3107 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3108 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3109 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3110 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3112 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3113 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3114 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3115 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3116 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3117 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3120 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3121 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3123 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3126 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3127 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data },
3133 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3134 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3136 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3140 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3141 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3143 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3147 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3148 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3149 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
3150 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
3151 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3153 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3154 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3155 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3156 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3157 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3159 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3161 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3162 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3166 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3167 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3168 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3169 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3175 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3178 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3181 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3182 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3183 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3184 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3185 // problem, not ours.
3192 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3193 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3194 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3195 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3196 match forward_info {
3197 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3198 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3200 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3201 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3202 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3203 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3204 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3205 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3206 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3207 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3208 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3209 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3211 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3213 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3214 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3216 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3218 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3219 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3220 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data },
3221 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3227 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3229 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3230 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3231 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3232 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3233 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3234 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3235 // this channel currently :/.
3241 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3242 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3244 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3245 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3246 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3248 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3249 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3251 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3253 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3254 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3255 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3258 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3260 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3261 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3262 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3263 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3264 // messages when we can.
3265 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3266 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3267 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3274 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3275 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3278 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3279 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3280 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3281 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3282 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3283 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3285 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3286 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3287 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan);
3288 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3289 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3292 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3296 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3297 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3300 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3301 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3302 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3303 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3304 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3305 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3306 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3307 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3308 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3310 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3318 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3319 match forward_info {
3320 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3321 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3322 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3323 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3324 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3325 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3326 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3328 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3329 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3331 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3334 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3335 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3336 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3337 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3338 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3339 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3340 phantom_shared_secret,
3342 value: amt_to_forward,
3344 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { amt_to_forward },
3349 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3350 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3351 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3352 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3353 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3355 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3356 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3357 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3358 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3359 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3360 phantom_shared_secret,
3362 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
3363 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3368 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3369 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3370 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3372 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3373 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3374 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3377 let (_, htlcs) = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3378 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3379 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3380 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3381 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3382 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3386 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3387 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3388 total_value += htlc.value;
3389 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3390 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3391 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3392 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3393 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3394 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3396 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3398 _ => unreachable!(),
3401 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3402 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3403 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3404 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3405 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3406 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3407 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3410 amount_msat: total_value,
3412 payment_received_generated = true;
3414 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3415 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3417 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3419 payment_received_generated
3423 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3424 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3425 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3426 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3427 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3428 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3429 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3430 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3431 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3432 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3433 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3434 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3435 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3436 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3438 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3442 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3444 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3445 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3446 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3447 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3448 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3449 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3451 amount_msat: amt_to_forward,
3455 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3456 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3457 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3463 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3464 if payment_data.is_none() {
3465 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3466 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3469 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3470 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3471 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3472 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3473 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3474 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3475 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3476 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3478 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3479 if payment_received_generated {
3480 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3486 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3487 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3495 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3496 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason, destination);
3498 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3500 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3501 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3504 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3505 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3506 events.append(&mut new_events);
3509 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3511 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3512 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3514 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3515 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3516 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3517 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3518 if background_events.is_empty() {
3522 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3524 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3525 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3526 // monitor updating completing.
3527 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3534 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3535 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3536 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3537 self.process_background_events();
3540 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_chan_info: &mut HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3541 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3542 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3543 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3544 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3545 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3546 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3548 if !chan.is_live() {
3549 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3550 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3551 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3553 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3554 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3556 let mut retain_channel = true;
3557 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3560 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, chan_id);
3561 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3565 let ret_err = match res {
3566 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3567 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3568 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3569 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3572 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3573 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3574 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3575 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3576 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3577 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3578 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3579 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3589 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3593 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3594 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3595 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3596 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3597 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3598 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3599 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3601 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3603 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3605 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3606 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3607 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3608 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
3609 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3610 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3611 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3613 handle_errors.push(err);
3623 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3625 /// This currently includes:
3626 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3627 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3628 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3630 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3631 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3633 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3634 /// estimate fetches.
3635 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3636 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3637 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3638 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3640 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3642 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3643 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3645 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3646 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3647 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3648 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
3649 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3650 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3651 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3652 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3654 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3656 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3658 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3659 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, chan_id);
3660 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3661 if needs_close { return false; }
3664 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3665 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3666 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3667 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3668 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3669 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3670 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3671 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3675 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3676 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3678 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3679 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3680 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3684 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3685 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3690 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3695 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3696 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3697 // This should be unreachable
3698 debug_assert!(false);
3701 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3702 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3703 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3704 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3706 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3707 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3708 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3710 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.into_iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.prev_hop.clone(), payment_hash.clone())));
3718 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3719 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3720 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone()), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() }, receiver );
3723 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3724 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3730 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3731 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3732 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3734 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3735 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3736 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentReceived`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3737 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3739 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3740 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3741 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3742 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3743 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3744 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3746 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3747 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3748 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3749 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3750 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3751 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3752 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3753 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3754 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3755 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3756 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
3757 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash });
3762 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3763 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3765 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3767 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3768 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3769 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3770 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3771 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3772 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3773 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3775 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3777 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3778 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3780 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3785 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3786 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3787 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3788 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3789 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3790 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3791 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3792 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3793 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3794 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3796 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3797 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3798 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3799 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3801 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3802 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3803 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3804 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3805 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3809 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3810 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3811 // be surfaced to the user.
3812 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3813 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3814 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3816 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3818 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3819 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3820 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3821 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3822 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3824 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3826 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3828 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3829 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state, htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data }, receiver)
3831 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payment_params, .. } => {
3832 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3833 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3834 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3835 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3836 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3837 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3838 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3839 Some(RouteParameters {
3840 payment_params: payment_params_data,
3841 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3842 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3845 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3846 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3847 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3849 rejected_by_dest: false,
3850 network_update: None,
3851 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3853 short_channel_id: None,
3860 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3861 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3863 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3869 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3876 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3877 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3878 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3879 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3880 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3881 /// still-available channels.
3882 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3883 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3884 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3885 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3888 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3889 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3890 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3892 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3893 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3894 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3895 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3896 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3897 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3898 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3899 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3900 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3903 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3904 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3907 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3908 all_paths_failed = true;
3909 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3910 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3912 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3918 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3921 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3922 let mut retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3923 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3924 Some(RouteParameters {
3925 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3926 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3927 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3930 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3932 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3933 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3935 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3937 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3939 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
3940 if !payment_retryable {
3941 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful {
3943 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3947 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
3948 payment_id: payment_id,
3949 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3955 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3956 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3957 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3958 if let Some(scid) = short_channel_id {
3959 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
3961 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3962 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3963 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3964 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3971 error_code: onion_error_code,
3973 error_data: onion_error_data
3977 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3983 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3984 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3985 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as find_route
3986 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3988 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3989 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3990 let scid = path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id;
3991 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
3992 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3993 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3994 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3995 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3996 network_update: None,
3999 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
4002 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
4004 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
4008 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4009 pending_events.push(path_failure);
4010 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
4012 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, outpoint }) => {
4013 let err_packet = match onion_error {
4014 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
4015 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
4016 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
4017 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
4018 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
4019 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
4021 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
4022 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
4025 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
4026 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4027 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
4031 let mut forward_event = None;
4032 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4033 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4035 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
4036 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4037 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
4039 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4040 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
4043 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4044 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4045 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
4046 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4047 time_forwardable: time
4050 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4051 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4052 failed_next_destination: destination
4058 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
4059 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4061 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
4062 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
4063 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
4065 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4066 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
4067 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4068 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4070 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
4071 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4072 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4073 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4074 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4075 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
4076 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4077 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4079 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4081 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
4082 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
4083 if let Some((payment_purpose, mut sources)) = removed_source {
4084 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4086 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
4087 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
4088 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
4089 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
4091 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
4092 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
4093 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
4094 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
4095 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
4097 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4098 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4099 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4100 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4101 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_chan_info.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4105 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4106 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4107 debug_assert!(false);
4111 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4112 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4113 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4114 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4115 if sources.len() != 1 {
4116 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4117 debug_assert!(false);
4123 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4125 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4126 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4129 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4130 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4131 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4135 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4136 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
4137 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4139 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
4140 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4141 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
4142 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
4143 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
4144 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
4145 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
4146 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash } );
4148 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
4149 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
4150 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4151 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4152 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4153 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4154 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
4155 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4157 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
4158 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
4159 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
4160 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
4161 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
4162 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
4164 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
4169 if claimed_any_htlcs {
4170 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4172 purpose: payment_purpose,
4173 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
4177 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
4178 // which were generated.
4179 channel_state.take();
4181 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4182 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4183 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4188 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
4189 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4190 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
4191 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4192 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
4194 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
4198 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4199 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4200 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4201 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4202 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4203 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4204 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4205 payment_preimage, e);
4206 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
4207 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4208 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
4209 Some(htlc_value_msat)
4212 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4213 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4214 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4215 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4216 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4217 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4218 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4219 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4220 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4221 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4227 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
4229 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
4232 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4233 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4234 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4235 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4236 payment_preimage, e);
4238 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4239 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4241 chan.remove_entry();
4243 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
4246 } else { unreachable!(); }
4249 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4250 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4251 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4252 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4253 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4254 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4255 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4256 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4257 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4258 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4259 pending_events.push(
4260 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4262 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4267 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4275 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4277 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4278 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4279 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4280 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4281 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4282 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4283 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4284 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4285 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4286 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4287 pending_events.push(
4288 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4289 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4295 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4299 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4300 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4301 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4303 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4304 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4305 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4306 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4307 pending_events.push(
4308 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4316 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4321 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4324 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4325 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4326 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4327 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4328 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4329 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4330 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4333 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4334 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4335 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4336 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4337 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4340 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4341 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4342 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4343 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
4344 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4345 payment_preimage, e);
4347 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4348 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4349 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4350 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4353 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4354 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4355 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4356 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4360 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4361 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4362 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4365 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4366 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4367 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4369 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4371 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4381 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4382 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4383 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4386 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4387 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4389 let chan_restoration_res;
4390 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4391 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4392 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4393 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4394 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4395 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4397 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4401 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4402 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4403 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4404 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4405 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4406 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4407 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4409 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4410 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4411 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4416 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4417 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4418 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4421 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4423 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4424 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4425 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4426 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4427 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
4431 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4433 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4434 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4437 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4438 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4439 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4441 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4442 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4443 /// used to accept such channels.
4445 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4446 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4447 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4448 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4451 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4452 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4454 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4455 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4456 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4458 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4459 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4461 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4462 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4464 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4465 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4467 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4468 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4469 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4470 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4473 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4474 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4476 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4477 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4478 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4479 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4480 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4481 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4483 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4484 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4487 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4488 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4489 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4490 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4491 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4492 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4495 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4496 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, channel);
4497 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4500 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4501 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4502 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4505 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4506 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4512 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4513 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4514 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4517 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4518 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4521 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4522 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4523 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration,
4524 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4527 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4528 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4532 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4533 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4534 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4535 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4536 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4537 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4539 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4540 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4541 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4542 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4544 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4545 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4546 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(0),
4549 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4550 pending_events.push(
4551 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4552 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4553 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4554 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4555 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4556 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4561 entry.insert(channel);
4567 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4568 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4569 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4570 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4571 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4572 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4573 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4574 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4576 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4577 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4579 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4582 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4583 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4584 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4585 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4586 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4588 user_channel_id: user_id,
4593 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4594 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4595 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4596 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4597 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4598 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4599 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4600 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4601 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4603 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4605 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4608 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4609 // lock before watch_channel
4610 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4612 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4613 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4614 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4615 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4616 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4617 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4618 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4619 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4620 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4621 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4622 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4624 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4625 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4626 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4627 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4628 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4629 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4630 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4634 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4635 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4636 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4637 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4638 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4640 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4641 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4642 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4643 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4644 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4645 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4646 funding_msg.channel_id))
4648 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4649 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4652 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4653 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4656 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4657 send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4665 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4667 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4668 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4669 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4670 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4671 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4672 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4673 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4675 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4676 Ok(update) => update,
4677 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4679 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4680 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4681 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4682 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4683 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4684 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4685 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4686 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4691 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4692 send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4696 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4699 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4700 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4704 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4705 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4706 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4707 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4708 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4709 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4710 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4712 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4713 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4714 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4715 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4716 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4717 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4718 msg: announcement_sigs,
4720 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4721 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4722 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4723 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4724 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4725 // announcement_signatures.
4726 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4727 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4728 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4729 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4736 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4740 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4741 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4742 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4743 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4744 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4746 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4747 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4748 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4749 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4752 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4753 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4754 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4755 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4758 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4759 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4761 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4762 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4763 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4764 let (result, is_permanent) =
4765 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4767 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
4773 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4774 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4775 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4782 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4785 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4786 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4787 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
4790 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4794 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4795 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4796 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4797 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4798 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4799 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4800 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4801 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4803 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4804 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4805 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4806 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4811 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4812 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4813 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4814 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4815 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4816 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry)))
4817 } else { (tx, None) }
4819 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4822 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4823 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4824 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4826 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4827 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4828 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4829 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4833 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4838 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4839 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4840 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4841 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4843 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4844 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4845 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4846 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4848 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4849 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4850 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4852 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4853 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4854 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4855 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4858 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4859 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4860 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4861 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4862 match pending_forward_info {
4863 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4864 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4865 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4866 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
4868 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4870 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4871 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4872 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4875 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4877 _ => pending_forward_info
4880 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4882 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4887 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4888 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4889 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4890 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4891 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4892 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4893 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4894 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4896 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4898 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4901 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4905 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4906 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4907 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4908 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4909 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4910 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4911 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4913 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4915 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4920 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4921 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4922 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4923 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4924 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4925 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4926 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4928 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4929 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4930 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4932 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4935 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4939 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4940 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4941 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4942 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4943 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4944 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4945 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4947 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4948 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4949 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4950 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4951 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4952 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4953 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4958 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4959 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4961 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4962 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4963 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4965 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4966 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4967 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4968 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4969 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4970 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4971 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4972 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4974 commitment_signed: msg,
4980 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4985 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4986 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4987 let mut forward_event = None;
4988 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4989 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4990 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4991 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4993 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4994 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4995 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4996 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4997 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4999 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5000 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5001 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
5003 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5004 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5005 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
5010 match forward_event {
5012 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5013 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5014 time_forwardable: time
5022 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5023 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
5025 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5026 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5027 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5028 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5029 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5030 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5032 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
5033 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
5034 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
5035 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
5036 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
5037 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
5038 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
5039 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
5040 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
5041 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
5042 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
5044 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
5045 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
5046 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
5047 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5048 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
5050 } else { unreachable!(); }
5053 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
5054 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5055 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5059 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5060 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5061 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
5062 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
5063 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
5065 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5068 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5070 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
5071 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
5073 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
5074 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5075 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
5077 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
5078 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
5085 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5086 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5087 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5088 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5089 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5090 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5091 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5093 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
5095 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5100 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5101 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5102 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5104 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5105 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5106 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5107 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5109 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5110 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5113 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5114 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5115 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
5116 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5117 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5118 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
5121 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5126 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5127 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5128 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5129 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5130 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5131 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
5133 // It's not a local channel
5134 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5137 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5138 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5139 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5140 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5141 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5142 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5143 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5144 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5146 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5148 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5149 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5150 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5151 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5153 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
5156 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
5158 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5161 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5162 let chan_restoration_res;
5163 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
5164 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5165 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5167 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5168 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5169 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5170 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5172 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5173 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5174 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5175 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5176 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5177 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
5178 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
5179 let mut channel_update = None;
5180 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5181 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5182 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5185 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5186 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5187 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5188 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5189 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5190 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5191 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5196 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5197 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
5198 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5199 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5200 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5201 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5203 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
5205 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5208 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
5209 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5211 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5212 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5217 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5218 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5219 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5220 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5221 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5222 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5223 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5224 match monitor_event {
5225 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5226 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5227 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5228 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5230 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5231 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5232 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
5235 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5236 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5237 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5238 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5239 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5240 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5241 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5242 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
5243 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5244 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5245 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5249 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5250 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5252 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5254 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5255 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5256 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5257 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5258 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5263 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5264 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5270 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5271 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5274 has_pending_monitor_events
5277 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5278 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5279 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5281 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5282 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5285 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5286 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5287 /// update was applied.
5289 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5290 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5291 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5292 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5293 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5294 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5295 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5296 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5298 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5299 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5300 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5301 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
5302 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5304 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5305 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5306 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5307 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5309 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5311 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5314 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5315 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5316 has_monitor_update = true;
5317 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5318 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5319 if close_channel { return false; }
5321 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5322 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5323 updates: commitment_update,
5330 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, channel_id);
5331 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5332 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5339 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5340 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5341 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5344 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5345 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5351 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5352 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5353 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5354 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5355 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5356 let mut has_update = false;
5358 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5359 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5360 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5361 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
5362 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5364 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5365 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5366 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5367 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5369 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5370 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5373 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5374 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5375 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5376 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5377 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5382 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5384 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5385 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5386 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, chan);
5392 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, channel_id);
5393 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5400 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5401 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5407 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5408 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5410 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5411 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5412 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5413 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5414 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5415 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5416 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5417 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5418 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5419 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5420 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5421 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5422 assert!(should_broadcast);
5423 } else { unreachable!(); }
5424 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5426 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5430 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5431 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5433 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5434 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5437 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5439 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5440 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5441 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5442 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5443 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5444 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5445 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5446 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5447 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5448 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5449 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5450 // never fail a payment too early.
5451 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5453 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5456 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5461 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5464 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5465 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5467 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5468 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5469 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5471 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5473 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5474 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5478 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5479 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5481 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5483 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5484 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5485 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5486 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5487 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5488 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5491 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5492 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5494 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5497 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5499 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5501 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5502 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5503 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5504 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5505 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5508 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5509 /// stored external to LDK.
5511 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5512 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5513 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5515 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5516 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5519 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5520 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5521 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5522 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5524 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5525 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5526 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5527 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5528 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5530 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5531 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5532 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5533 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5534 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5536 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5537 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5539 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5540 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5544 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5545 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5547 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5549 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5550 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5551 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5552 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5555 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5556 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5558 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5561 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5563 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5565 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5566 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5569 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5570 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5572 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5573 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5574 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5577 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5578 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5580 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5581 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5582 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5583 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5585 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5586 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5587 match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.entry(scid_candidate) {
5588 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue,
5589 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate
5594 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5596 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5597 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5599 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5600 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5601 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5605 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5606 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5607 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5608 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5609 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5614 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5615 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5619 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5620 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5624 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5625 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5626 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5627 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5628 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5631 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5632 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5633 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5634 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5636 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5637 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5638 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5639 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5642 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5643 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5645 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5646 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5649 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5650 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5651 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5653 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5654 events.replace(pending_events);
5663 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5665 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5666 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5667 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5668 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5671 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5673 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5674 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5676 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
5677 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
5678 /// restarting from an old state.
5679 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5680 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5681 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5683 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5684 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5685 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5686 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5689 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5690 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5691 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5694 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5695 handler.handle_event(&event);
5703 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5705 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5706 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5707 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5708 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5711 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5713 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5714 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5715 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5716 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5717 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5720 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5721 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5724 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5725 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5726 let new_height = height - 1;
5728 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5729 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5730 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5731 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5732 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5733 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5736 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5740 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5742 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5743 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5744 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5745 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5748 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5749 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5750 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5751 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5753 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5754 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5756 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5757 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5758 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5760 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5761 if height < last_best_block_height {
5762 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5763 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5767 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5768 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5769 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5770 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5772 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5773 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5775 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5777 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5779 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5781 macro_rules! max_time {
5782 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5784 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5785 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5786 // having an explicit local time source.
5787 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5788 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5789 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5790 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5791 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5797 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
5798 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5799 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5800 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5801 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5804 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5805 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5806 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5807 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5808 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5809 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5810 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5811 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5812 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5820 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5821 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5822 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_chan_info.len());
5823 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5824 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5825 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5831 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5832 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5833 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5834 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5835 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5836 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5837 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5838 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5843 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5845 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5846 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5847 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5848 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5851 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5852 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5854 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5855 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5856 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5857 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5858 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5860 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5861 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5863 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5864 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5865 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
5866 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5867 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5868 let res = f(channel);
5869 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5870 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5871 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5872 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5874 }, HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5876 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5877 send_channel_ready!(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5878 if channel.is_usable() {
5879 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5880 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5881 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5882 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5887 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5890 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5891 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5892 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5893 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5894 msg: announcement_sigs,
5896 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5897 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5898 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5900 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5901 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5902 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5907 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5908 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5909 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5910 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
5911 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
5912 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
5913 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
5914 // is always consistent.
5915 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
5916 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
5917 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5918 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5921 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5922 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, channel);
5923 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5924 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5925 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5926 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5927 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5931 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5932 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5933 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5934 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5935 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5936 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5937 data: reason_message,
5945 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5946 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
5947 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5948 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5949 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5950 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5951 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5952 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5953 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5954 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5956 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5957 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5958 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5959 }, HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
5963 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5968 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5970 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5971 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason, destination);
5975 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5976 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5977 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5980 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5981 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5982 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5983 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5986 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5987 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5989 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5990 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5993 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5994 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5995 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5996 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5997 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
6001 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6002 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6003 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6004 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6008 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
6009 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6010 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6011 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6012 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6013 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6016 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6017 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6018 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6021 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6022 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6023 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6026 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6027 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6028 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6031 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6032 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6033 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6036 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6037 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6038 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6041 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6042 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6043 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6046 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6047 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6048 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6051 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6052 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6053 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6056 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6057 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6058 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6061 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6062 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6063 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6066 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6067 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6068 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6071 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6072 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6073 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6076 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6077 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6078 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6081 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6082 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6083 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6086 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6087 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6088 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6091 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6092 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6093 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6096 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6101 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6102 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6103 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6106 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6107 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6108 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6109 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
6111 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6112 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6113 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6114 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
6115 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6116 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6117 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6118 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6119 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6120 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6121 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, chan);
6122 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6125 no_channels_remain = false;
6130 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6132 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6133 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6134 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6135 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6136 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6137 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6138 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6139 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6140 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6141 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6142 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6143 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6144 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6145 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6146 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6147 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6148 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6149 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6150 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6151 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6155 if no_channels_remain {
6156 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
6159 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6160 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6164 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
6165 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6167 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6170 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6171 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6172 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6173 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6174 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6177 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6178 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6183 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6184 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6185 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6186 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6187 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6188 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6189 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6190 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6191 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6195 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6196 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6197 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6203 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6206 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6207 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6209 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6210 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6211 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6212 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6213 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6218 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6219 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6220 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6221 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6224 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6225 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6226 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6234 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6235 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6240 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
6241 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
6242 struct PersistenceNotifier {
6243 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
6244 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
6245 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
6248 impl PersistenceNotifier {
6251 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
6257 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
6258 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
6263 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
6264 let result = *guard;
6272 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6273 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6274 let current_time = Instant::now();
6276 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
6277 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
6282 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
6283 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
6284 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
6285 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
6286 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
6288 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
6289 let result = *guard;
6290 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
6294 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
6295 None => return result,
6301 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
6303 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
6304 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6305 *persistence_lock = true;
6306 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
6311 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6312 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6314 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6315 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6316 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6317 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6320 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6321 (2, node_id, required),
6322 (4, features, required),
6323 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6324 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6325 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6326 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6329 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
6330 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6331 (2, channel_id, required),
6332 (3, channel_type, option),
6333 (4, counterparty, required),
6334 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6335 (6, funding_txo, option),
6336 (7, config, option),
6337 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6338 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6339 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6340 (14, user_channel_id, required),
6341 (16, balance_msat, required),
6342 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6343 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6344 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6345 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6346 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6347 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6348 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6349 (26, is_outbound, required),
6350 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6351 (30, is_usable, required),
6352 (32, is_public, required),
6353 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6354 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6357 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6358 (2, channels, vec_type),
6359 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6360 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6363 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6365 (0, onion_packet, required),
6366 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6369 (0, payment_data, required),
6370 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6371 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6373 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6374 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6375 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6379 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6380 (0, routing, required),
6381 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6382 (4, payment_hash, required),
6383 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
6384 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
6388 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6389 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6391 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6393 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6394 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6395 reason.write(writer)?;
6397 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6398 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6401 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6402 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6403 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6404 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6411 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6412 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6413 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6416 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6417 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6418 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6419 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6423 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6424 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6425 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6426 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6427 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6430 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6431 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6432 // messages contained in the variants.
6433 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6434 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6435 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6437 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6438 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6439 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6440 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6441 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6444 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6445 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6446 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6447 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6448 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6450 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6455 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6460 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6461 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6462 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6463 (2, outpoint, required),
6464 (4, htlc_id, required),
6465 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6468 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6469 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6470 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6471 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6472 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6474 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6475 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6476 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6477 (2, self.value, required),
6478 (4, payment_data, option),
6479 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6480 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6486 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6487 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6488 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6490 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6491 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6492 let mut total_msat = None;
6493 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6494 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6495 (0, prev_hop, required),
6496 (1, total_msat, option),
6497 (2, value, required),
6498 (4, payment_data, option),
6499 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6500 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6502 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6504 if payment_data.is_some() {
6505 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6507 if total_msat.is_none() {
6508 total_msat = Some(value);
6510 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6513 if total_msat.is_none() {
6514 if payment_data.is_none() {
6515 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6517 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6519 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6523 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6526 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6533 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6534 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6535 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6538 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6539 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6540 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6541 let mut payment_id = None;
6542 let mut payment_secret = None;
6543 let mut payment_params = None;
6544 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6545 (0, session_priv, required),
6546 (1, payment_id, option),
6547 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6548 (3, payment_secret, option),
6549 (4, path, vec_type),
6550 (5, payment_params, option),
6552 if payment_id.is_none() {
6553 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6555 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6557 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6558 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6559 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6560 path: path.unwrap(),
6561 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6566 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6567 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6572 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6573 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6575 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6577 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6578 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6579 (0, session_priv, required),
6580 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6581 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6582 (3, payment_secret, option),
6583 (4, path, vec_type),
6584 (5, payment_params, option),
6587 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6589 field.write(writer)?;
6596 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6597 (0, LightningError) => {
6601 (0, failure_code, required),
6602 (2, data, vec_type),
6606 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6608 (0, forward_info, required),
6609 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6610 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6611 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6614 (0, htlc_id, required),
6615 (2, err_packet, required),
6619 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6620 (0, payment_secret, required),
6621 (2, expiry_time, required),
6622 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6623 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6624 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6627 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6629 (0, session_privs, required),
6632 (0, session_privs, required),
6633 (1, payment_hash, option),
6636 (0, session_privs, required),
6637 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6638 (2, payment_hash, required),
6639 (4, payment_secret, option),
6640 (6, total_msat, required),
6641 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6642 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6645 (0, session_privs, required),
6646 (2, payment_hash, required),
6650 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6651 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6652 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6653 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6654 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6657 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6658 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6660 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6662 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6664 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6665 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6666 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6669 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6670 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6671 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6672 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6673 unfunded_channels += 1;
6676 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6677 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6678 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6679 channel.write(writer)?;
6683 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6684 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6685 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6686 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6687 for forward in pending_forwards {
6688 forward.write(writer)?;
6692 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6693 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6694 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6695 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6696 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6697 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6698 htlc.write(writer)?;
6700 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6703 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6704 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6705 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6706 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6707 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6708 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6711 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6712 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6713 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6714 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6715 for event in events.iter() {
6716 event.write(writer)?;
6719 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6720 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6721 for event in background_events.iter() {
6723 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6725 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6726 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6731 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6732 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6734 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6735 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6736 hash.write(writer)?;
6737 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6740 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6741 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6742 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6743 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6744 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6747 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6748 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6750 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6751 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6752 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6753 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6756 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6757 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6761 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6762 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6763 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6765 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6766 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6767 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6772 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6773 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6774 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6775 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6776 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6777 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6778 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
6785 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6787 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6789 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6790 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6791 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6792 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6793 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6794 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6795 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6796 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6797 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6798 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6799 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6800 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6801 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6803 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6804 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6806 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6807 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6809 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6810 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6811 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6812 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6813 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6814 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6816 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6817 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6818 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6819 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6820 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6821 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6824 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6825 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6827 pub keys_manager: K,
6829 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6831 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6832 pub fee_estimator: F,
6833 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6835 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6836 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6837 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6838 pub chain_monitor: M,
6840 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6841 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6842 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6843 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6844 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6845 /// deserialization.
6847 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6848 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6849 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6851 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6852 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6854 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6855 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6856 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6857 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6859 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6862 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6863 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6866 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6867 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6868 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6869 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6870 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6871 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6874 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6875 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6876 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6877 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6878 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6880 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6881 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6886 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6887 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6888 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6889 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6890 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6891 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6892 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6893 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6896 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6897 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6898 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6902 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6903 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6904 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6905 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6906 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6907 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6910 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6911 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6913 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6914 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6915 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6917 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6919 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6920 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6921 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6922 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6923 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6924 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6925 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6926 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6927 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6928 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6929 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6930 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6931 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6932 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6933 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6934 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6935 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6936 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6937 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6938 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6939 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6940 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6941 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6942 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6943 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6944 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6945 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6946 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6947 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6948 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6949 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6950 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6951 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6952 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6953 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6954 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6955 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6956 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6957 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6958 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6961 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6962 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6963 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6965 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6966 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
6968 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6971 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6972 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6973 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6974 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6975 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6976 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6980 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6981 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6982 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6983 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6987 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6988 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6989 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6990 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6991 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6992 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6993 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6994 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6995 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6997 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7000 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7001 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7002 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7003 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7004 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7005 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7006 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7007 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7009 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7012 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7013 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
7014 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7015 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7016 let peer_state = PeerState {
7017 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7019 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7022 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7023 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7024 for _ in 0..event_count {
7025 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7026 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7030 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
7031 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7032 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7033 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7034 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7035 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7036 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7037 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7041 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7042 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7043 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7044 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7045 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7046 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7050 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7051 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7053 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7054 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7055 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7056 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7057 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7061 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7062 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7063 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7064 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7065 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7066 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7067 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7069 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7070 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7074 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7075 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7076 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7077 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7078 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7079 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7080 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7081 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7082 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7083 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7084 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7085 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7086 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7087 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7089 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7090 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7093 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7094 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7097 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7098 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7099 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7100 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7101 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7102 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7104 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7106 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7107 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7108 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7109 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7110 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7111 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7112 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7114 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7115 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7116 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7117 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7118 if path.is_empty() {
7119 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7120 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7122 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7123 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7124 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7125 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7126 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7127 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7128 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7129 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7131 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7132 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7133 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7134 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7135 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7137 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7138 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7139 total_msat: path_amt,
7140 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7142 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7143 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7152 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7153 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7155 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7156 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7157 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7158 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7160 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7161 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7164 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7165 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7166 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7167 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7168 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7170 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7171 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7172 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7173 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7174 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7175 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7176 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7177 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7179 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7180 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7184 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7186 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7188 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7189 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7191 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7195 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7196 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7198 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7199 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7202 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7204 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7206 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7207 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7208 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7209 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7210 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7214 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7215 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
7216 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7217 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7219 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7220 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7221 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7223 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7224 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7225 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7226 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7227 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7228 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7230 if chan.is_usable() {
7231 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7232 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7233 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7234 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7235 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7240 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7242 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7243 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7244 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7245 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7246 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7247 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7248 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7250 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7251 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7252 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7253 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7255 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7256 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7257 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7258 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7260 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7261 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7262 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7263 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7265 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7266 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7267 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7269 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7270 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7273 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7275 purpose: payment_purpose,
7276 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7282 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7284 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7285 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7286 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7288 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7290 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7295 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7297 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7298 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7299 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7301 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7302 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7303 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7305 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7311 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
7312 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7314 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7316 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7317 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7318 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7319 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
7321 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7322 logger: args.logger,
7323 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7326 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7327 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7328 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7329 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
7332 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7333 //connection or two.
7335 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7341 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7342 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7343 use core::time::Duration;
7344 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7345 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7346 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7347 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
7348 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
7349 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7351 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7352 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7353 use util::errors::APIError;
7354 use util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7355 use util::test_utils;
7356 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7358 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
7360 fn test_wait_timeout() {
7361 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
7363 use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
7366 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
7367 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
7369 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
7370 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
7371 thread::spawn(move || {
7373 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
7374 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7375 *persistence_lock = true;
7378 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
7384 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
7385 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
7387 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
7390 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
7395 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
7397 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
7400 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
7407 fn test_notify_limits() {
7408 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7409 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7410 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7411 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7412 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7413 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7415 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7416 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7417 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7418 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7419 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7421 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7423 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7424 // to connect messages with new values
7425 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7426 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7427 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7428 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7430 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7431 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7432 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7433 // ... but the last node should not.
7434 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7435 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7436 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7437 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7439 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7440 // about the channel.
7441 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7442 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7443 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7445 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7447 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7448 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7449 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7450 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7451 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7452 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7454 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7455 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7456 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7458 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7459 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7460 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7461 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7462 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7463 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7465 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7466 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7467 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7468 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7469 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7470 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7471 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7472 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7474 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7475 // the channel info has updated.
7476 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7477 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7478 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7479 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7480 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7481 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7485 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7486 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7488 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7489 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7490 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7491 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7492 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7494 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7495 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7496 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7497 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7498 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7499 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7500 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7501 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7502 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7503 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7504 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7506 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7507 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7508 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7509 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7510 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7511 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7512 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7513 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7514 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7515 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7516 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7517 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7518 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7519 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7520 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7521 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7522 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7523 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7524 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7525 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7526 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7527 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7529 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7530 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7531 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7532 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7533 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7534 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7536 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7537 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7538 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7539 // lightning messages manually.
7540 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7541 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7542 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7544 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7545 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7546 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7547 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7548 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7549 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7550 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7551 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7552 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7553 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7554 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7555 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7556 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7557 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7558 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7559 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7560 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7561 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7562 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7563 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7564 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7565 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7566 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7567 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7568 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7570 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7571 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7572 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7573 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7575 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7576 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7577 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7578 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7580 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7583 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7584 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7585 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7586 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7588 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7591 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7592 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7593 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7594 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7596 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7601 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7602 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7603 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7604 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7605 // fails as expected.
7606 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7607 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7608 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7609 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7610 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7611 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7612 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7614 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7615 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7616 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7618 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7619 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7620 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7621 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7622 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7624 let route = find_route(
7625 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7626 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7628 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7629 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7630 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7631 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7632 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7633 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7634 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7635 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7636 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7637 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
7638 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
7639 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7640 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7641 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7642 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7643 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7644 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7645 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7646 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7647 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7648 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7649 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7650 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7652 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7653 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7655 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7656 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7657 let route = find_route(
7658 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7659 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7661 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7662 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7663 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7664 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7665 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7666 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7667 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7669 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7670 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7671 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7672 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7673 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7674 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7675 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7676 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7677 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7678 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7679 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7680 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7681 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7682 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7683 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7684 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7685 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7686 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7687 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7688 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7689 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7690 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7691 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7693 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7694 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7698 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7699 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7700 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7701 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7702 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7703 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7704 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7706 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7707 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7708 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7709 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7711 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7712 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7713 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7714 final_value_msat: 10000,
7715 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7717 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7718 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7719 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7720 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7721 let route = find_route(
7722 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7723 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7726 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7727 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7728 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7729 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7731 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7732 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7733 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7734 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7735 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7736 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7737 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7739 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7743 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7744 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7745 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7746 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7747 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7748 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7750 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7751 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7752 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7753 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7755 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7756 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7757 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7758 final_value_msat: 10000,
7759 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7761 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7762 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7763 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7764 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7765 let route = find_route(
7766 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7767 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7770 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7771 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7772 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7773 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7774 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7776 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7777 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7778 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7779 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7780 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7781 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7782 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7784 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7788 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7789 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7790 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7791 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7792 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7794 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7795 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7796 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7797 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7799 // Marshall an MPP route.
7800 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7801 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7802 route.paths.push(path);
7803 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7804 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7805 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7806 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7807 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7808 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7810 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7811 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7812 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7813 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7818 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7819 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7820 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7821 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7822 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7823 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7825 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7826 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7828 total_msat: 100_000,
7831 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7832 // payment verification fails as expected.
7833 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7834 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7835 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7836 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7838 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7842 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7843 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7847 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
7848 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
7849 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
7850 // the channel is successfully closed.
7851 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7852 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7853 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7854 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7856 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7857 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7858 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
7859 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7860 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7862 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
7863 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
7865 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
7866 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
7867 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7868 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7871 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7873 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
7874 // as it has the funding transaction.
7875 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7876 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7877 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7879 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7882 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7884 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7886 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7887 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7888 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7890 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
7891 // as it has the funding transaction.
7892 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7893 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7894 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7896 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7897 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7898 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
7899 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7900 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
7901 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
7902 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
7904 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7905 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7906 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7907 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
7909 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7910 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
7912 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
7913 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
7914 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
7915 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
7916 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7917 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7918 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7920 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
7921 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
7922 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
7923 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
7924 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7925 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7926 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7929 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
7931 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
7932 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
7933 // closing transaction).
7934 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
7935 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
7936 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7938 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
7939 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
7940 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7941 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7942 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7945 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7947 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
7949 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
7950 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
7951 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7953 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7955 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7956 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7960 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
7963 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7964 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
7965 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7966 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7967 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7968 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7969 use routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
7970 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7971 use util::test_utils;
7972 use util::config::UserConfig;
7973 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7975 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7976 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7977 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
7979 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7983 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7984 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7985 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7986 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7987 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7988 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7989 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7994 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7995 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7998 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7999 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8000 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8002 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8003 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8005 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8006 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8008 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8009 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8011 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8012 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8013 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8014 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8015 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8017 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8019 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8021 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8022 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8023 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8024 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8025 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8027 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8029 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8031 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
8032 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
8033 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8034 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8035 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8038 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8039 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8040 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8042 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8043 } else { panic!(); }
8045 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8046 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8048 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8051 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8054 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8055 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8057 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8058 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8059 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8060 match msg_events[0] {
8061 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8062 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8063 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8067 match msg_events[1] {
8068 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8072 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8074 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8075 macro_rules! send_payment {
8076 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8077 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8078 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
8079 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
8080 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8081 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8082 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8083 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8084 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8085 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8087 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8088 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8090 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8091 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
8093 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8094 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8095 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8096 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8097 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8098 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8099 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8100 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8102 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8103 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8104 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8105 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8107 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8108 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8109 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8110 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8111 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8113 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8116 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8117 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8118 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8119 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8121 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8126 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8127 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);