1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
16 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
18 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
19 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
20 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
23 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
24 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
25 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelKeys};
26 use ln::channelmonitor::{ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
27 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
29 use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler};
30 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
31 use util::sha2::Sha256;
32 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
33 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
34 use util::logger::Logger;
35 use util::errors::APIError;
38 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
39 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
40 use crypto::digest::Digest;
41 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
44 use std::collections::HashMap;
45 use std::collections::hash_map;
47 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
49 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
51 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
53 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
54 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
55 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
57 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
58 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
59 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
60 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
61 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
62 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
63 mod channel_held_info {
65 use ln::router::Route;
66 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
67 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
69 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
70 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
71 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
72 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
73 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
74 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
75 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
76 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
77 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
80 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
81 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
82 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
83 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
86 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
87 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
88 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
89 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
93 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
95 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
96 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
97 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
98 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
101 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
103 pub enum HTLCSource {
104 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
107 session_priv: SecretKey,
112 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
113 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
114 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
115 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
123 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
131 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
133 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
134 err: msgs::HandleError,
135 needs_channel_force_close: bool,
137 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
139 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
143 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
144 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
146 data: err.to_string()
150 needs_channel_force_close: false,
154 fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
158 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
159 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
161 data: err.to_string()
165 needs_channel_force_close: true,
169 fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
170 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
173 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
174 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
177 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
180 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
182 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
184 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
186 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
187 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
189 data: msg.to_string()
194 needs_channel_force_close: false,
198 fn from_chan_maybe_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
201 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
203 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
205 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
207 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
208 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
210 data: msg.to_string()
215 needs_channel_force_close: true,
220 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
221 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
222 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
223 /// probably increase this significantly.
224 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
226 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
227 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
229 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
232 struct ChannelHolder {
233 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
234 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
235 next_forward: Instant,
236 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
237 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
238 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
239 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
240 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
241 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
242 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
244 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
246 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
247 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
248 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
249 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
250 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
251 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
254 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
256 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
257 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
258 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
259 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
260 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
265 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
266 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
268 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
269 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
271 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
272 /// to individual Channels.
273 pub struct ChannelManager {
274 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
275 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
276 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
277 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
278 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
280 announce_channels_publicly: bool,
281 fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
282 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
283 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
285 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
286 our_network_key: SecretKey,
288 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
293 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
294 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
295 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
296 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
297 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
298 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
299 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
301 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ie that
302 // if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have
303 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it backwards ourselves before hitting the
304 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel on-chain to time out the HTLC.
307 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
309 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
310 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
313 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
315 macro_rules! secp_call {
316 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
319 Err(_) => return Err($err),
326 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
328 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
329 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
334 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
335 pub struct ChannelDetails {
336 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
337 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
338 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
339 /// lifetime of the channel.
340 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
341 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
342 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
343 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
344 /// The node_id of our counterparty
345 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
346 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
347 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
348 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
352 impl ChannelManager {
353 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
355 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
356 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
358 /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
359 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
361 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
362 pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
363 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
365 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
366 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
367 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
368 monitor: monitor.clone(),
372 announce_channels_publicly,
373 fee_proportional_millionths,
374 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
377 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
378 by_id: HashMap::new(),
379 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
380 next_forward: Instant::now(),
381 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
382 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
386 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
390 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
391 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
395 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
397 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
398 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
399 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
400 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
402 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
403 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
405 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
406 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
407 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
409 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
410 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
411 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
412 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
413 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
414 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
415 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
416 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
419 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
420 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
421 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
423 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
427 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
428 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
429 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
430 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
431 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
432 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
433 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
435 panic!("RNG is bad???");
438 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
441 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
442 events.push(events::Event::SendOpenChannel {
443 node_id: their_network_key,
449 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
450 /// more information.
451 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
452 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
453 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
454 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
455 res.push(ChannelDetails {
456 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
457 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
458 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
459 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
460 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
466 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
467 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
468 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
469 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
470 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
471 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
472 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
473 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
474 // really wanted anyway.
475 if channel.is_live() {
476 res.push(ChannelDetails {
477 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
478 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
479 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
480 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
481 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
488 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
489 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
490 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
492 /// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed.
493 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
494 let (mut res, node_id, chan_option) = {
495 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
496 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
497 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
498 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
499 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
500 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
501 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
502 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
504 (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
505 } else { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), None) }
507 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
510 for htlc_source in res.1.drain(..) {
511 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
512 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
514 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
515 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
520 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
521 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
522 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
526 events.push(events::Event::SendShutdown {
535 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
536 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
537 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
538 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
539 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
541 for tx in local_txn {
542 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
544 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
545 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
546 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
547 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
548 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
549 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
550 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
553 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
554 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
555 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
557 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
558 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
559 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
560 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
561 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
568 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
569 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
570 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
571 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
577 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
578 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
579 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
580 for chan in self.list_channels() {
581 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
586 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
588 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
589 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
590 let mut res = [0; 32];
591 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
595 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
596 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
597 let mut res = [0; 32];
598 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
604 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
605 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
606 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
607 let mut res = [0; 32];
608 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
613 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
614 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
615 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
616 let mut res = [0; 32];
617 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
621 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
623 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
624 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
625 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
627 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
628 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
630 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
631 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
632 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
633 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
634 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
636 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
638 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
639 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
641 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
647 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
648 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
649 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
651 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
652 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
658 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
668 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
669 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
670 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
671 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
672 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
673 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
674 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
675 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
677 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
678 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
679 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
680 // the intended recipient).
681 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
682 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
683 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
685 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
686 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
687 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
688 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
692 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
693 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
694 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
696 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
697 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
698 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
700 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
702 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
706 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
708 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
716 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
717 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
719 for i in 0..dst.len() {
724 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
725 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
726 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
727 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
730 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
731 let end_len = iters * 65;
732 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
733 res.resize(end_len, 0);
735 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
736 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
737 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
738 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
739 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
744 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
745 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
747 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
748 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
749 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
750 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
752 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
753 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
754 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
757 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
760 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
761 hmac.input(&packet_data);
762 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
763 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
768 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
769 hop_data: packet_data,
774 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
775 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
776 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
777 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
779 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
780 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
781 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
782 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
783 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
784 data: packet_crypted,
788 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
789 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
791 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
794 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
795 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
796 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
797 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
801 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
802 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
805 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
807 failuremsg: failuremsg,
811 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
812 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
813 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
819 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
820 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
821 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
824 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
825 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
828 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
829 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
830 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
831 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
837 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
838 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
839 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
840 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
841 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
842 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
843 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
844 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
847 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
848 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
850 let mut channel_state = None;
851 macro_rules! return_err {
852 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
854 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
855 if channel_state.is_none() {
856 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
858 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
859 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
860 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
861 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
862 })), channel_state.unwrap());
867 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
868 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
869 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
870 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
871 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
872 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
873 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
874 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
877 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
878 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
879 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
880 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
881 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
884 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
885 let next_hop_data = {
886 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
887 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
888 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
890 let error_code = match err {
891 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
892 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
894 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
900 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
902 // final_expiry_too_soon
903 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
904 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
906 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
907 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
908 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
910 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
911 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
912 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
915 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
916 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
917 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
918 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
920 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
922 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
924 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
925 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
926 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
929 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
930 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
931 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
933 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
935 let blinding_factor = {
936 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
937 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
938 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
939 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
940 sha.result(&mut res);
941 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
943 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
949 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
950 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
953 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
955 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
956 hop_data: new_packet_data,
957 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
960 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
961 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
962 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
963 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
964 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
965 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
966 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
970 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
971 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
972 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
973 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
974 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
975 None => { // unknown_next_peer
976 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
978 Some(id) => id.clone(),
980 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
981 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
983 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
984 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
986 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
987 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
989 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
990 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
991 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
993 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
994 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
996 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
997 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
998 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
999 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1001 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1002 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1007 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1008 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1009 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1011 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1012 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1014 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1015 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1017 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1022 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1025 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1026 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1027 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1028 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1032 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1034 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1035 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1036 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1037 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1038 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1039 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1040 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1041 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1042 fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
1043 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1046 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1047 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1049 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1055 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1057 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1058 /// fields for more info.
1060 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1061 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1062 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1063 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1064 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1065 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1067 /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
1069 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1070 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
1071 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1072 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1073 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1075 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1076 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1077 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1078 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1082 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
1083 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
1084 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
1086 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
1088 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1090 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1091 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1092 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1093 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1095 let (first_hop_node_id, (update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = {
1096 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1097 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1099 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1100 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1101 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1105 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
1106 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1107 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1109 if !chan.is_live() {
1110 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1112 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1113 route: route.clone(),
1114 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1115 }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: he.err})?
1118 let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
1121 Some(msgs) => (first_hop_node_id, msgs),
1122 None => return Ok(()),
1126 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1130 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1131 events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1132 node_id: first_hop_node_id,
1133 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1134 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1135 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1136 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1137 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1145 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1147 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1149 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1150 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1151 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1152 macro_rules! add_pending_event {
1155 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1156 pending_events.push($event);
1161 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1162 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1163 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1165 match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
1166 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1167 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1170 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1171 mem::drop(channel_state);
1172 add_pending_event!(events::Event::HandleError {
1173 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1182 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1183 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1186 add_pending_event!(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
1187 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1191 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1192 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1193 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1194 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1196 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1202 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1203 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1205 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1207 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1209 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1210 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1212 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1213 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1214 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1215 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1216 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1220 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1222 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1223 /// Will likely generate further events.
1224 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1225 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1226 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1228 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1229 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1231 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1235 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1236 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1237 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1238 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1240 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1241 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1242 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1243 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1244 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1245 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1247 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1252 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1254 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1255 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1256 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1257 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1258 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1259 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1261 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1263 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1264 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1269 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1271 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1272 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1273 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1274 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1275 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1276 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1277 // this channel currently :/.
1284 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1285 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1288 if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
1289 } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
1291 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1293 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1297 new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1298 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1299 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1300 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1301 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1302 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1303 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1305 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1310 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1311 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1312 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1313 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1314 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1316 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1317 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1318 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1320 new_events.push((None, events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1321 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1322 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1329 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1331 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1332 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1336 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1338 new_events.retain(|event| {
1339 if let &Some(ref monitor) = &event.0 {
1340 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor.clone()) {
1341 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1347 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1348 events.reserve(new_events.len());
1349 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
1350 events.push(event.1);
1354 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
1355 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
1356 // TODO: Add ability to return 0x4000|16 (incorrect_payment_amount) if the amount we
1357 // received is < expected or > 2*expected
1358 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1359 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1360 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1361 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1362 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1363 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() });
1369 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1370 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1371 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1372 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1373 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1374 /// still-available channels.
1375 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1377 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1378 mem::drop(channel_state);
1380 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1381 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1382 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone()
1385 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1386 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1387 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1388 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1389 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1391 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1392 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1396 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
1397 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1398 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1402 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1403 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1404 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1406 //TODO: Do something with e?
1413 Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
1414 mem::drop(channel_state);
1416 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1417 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1420 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1421 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1423 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1424 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1425 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1426 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1427 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1429 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1439 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1440 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1441 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1443 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1444 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1445 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1446 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1447 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1448 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1450 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1451 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1452 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1453 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1454 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1455 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1460 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1462 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1463 mem::drop(channel_state);
1464 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1465 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1469 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1470 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1471 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
1472 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1473 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1475 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1476 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1482 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1483 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1484 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1486 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1487 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1488 //TODO: Do something with e?
1494 mem::drop(channel_state);
1495 if let Some(chan_monitor) = fulfill_msgs.1 {
1496 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1497 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1501 if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs.0 {
1502 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1503 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1505 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1506 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1507 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1508 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1509 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1511 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1519 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1520 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1521 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1524 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1525 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1527 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1531 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1532 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1533 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1535 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1536 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1537 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1540 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1542 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]).unwrap(),
1543 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0]).unwrap(),
1544 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0]).unwrap(),
1545 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0]).unwrap(),
1546 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0]).unwrap(),
1547 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0]).unwrap(),
1548 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0]).unwrap(),
1549 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
1552 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
1553 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
1554 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
1556 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
1560 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger))
1561 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1562 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel();
1563 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1567 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1568 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1569 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1570 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1572 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1573 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1574 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1576 chan.accept_channel(&msg)
1577 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1578 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1580 //TODO: same as above
1581 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1584 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1585 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1586 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1587 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1588 output_script: output_script,
1589 user_channel_id: user_id,
1594 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1595 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1596 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1597 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1598 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1599 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1600 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1601 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1603 match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1604 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1605 (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1608 return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1612 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1614 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1615 // note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same
1616 // channel back-to-back with funding_created, we'll end up thinking they sent a message
1617 // for a bogus channel.
1618 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1621 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1622 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1623 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1624 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1626 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1633 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1634 let (funding_txo, user_id, monitor) = {
1635 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1636 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1638 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1639 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1640 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1642 let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1643 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id(), chan_monitor)
1645 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1648 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1651 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1652 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1653 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1654 user_channel_id: user_id,
1659 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1660 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1661 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1663 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1664 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1665 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1667 chan.funding_locked(&msg)
1668 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1669 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan));
1671 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1675 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1676 let (mut res, chan_option) = {
1677 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1678 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1680 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1681 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1682 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1683 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1684 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1686 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1687 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1688 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1689 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1691 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1692 } else { (res, None) }
1694 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1697 for htlc_source in res.2.drain(..) {
1698 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1699 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1701 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1702 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1703 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1704 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1712 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1713 let (res, chan_option) = {
1714 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1715 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1716 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1717 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1718 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1719 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1720 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1722 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1723 if res.1.is_some() {
1724 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1725 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1726 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1727 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1728 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1729 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1730 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1732 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1733 } else { (res, None) }
1735 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1738 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1739 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1741 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1742 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1743 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1744 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1752 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1753 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1754 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1755 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1757 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1758 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1759 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1760 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1762 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1763 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1765 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1767 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1768 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1769 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1771 if !chan.is_usable() {
1772 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1774 chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1776 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1780 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1781 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1782 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1784 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1785 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1786 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1788 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
1789 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?.clone()
1791 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1793 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1797 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1798 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1799 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1801 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1802 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1803 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1805 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
1806 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
1808 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1812 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, .. } => {
1813 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1814 let mut packet_decrypted = msg.reason.data.clone();
1816 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1817 if res.is_some() { return; }
1819 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1821 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1822 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1823 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1824 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1825 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1827 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
1828 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 2 {
1829 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1831 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1832 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1833 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1834 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1835 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1836 const UNKNOWN_CHAN: u16 = 0x4000|10;
1837 const TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE: u16 = 0x4000|7;
1838 match byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]) {
1839 TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE => {
1840 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 {
1841 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..4]) as usize;
1842 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + update_len {
1843 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4 + update_len])) {
1844 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
1852 // No such next-hop. We know this came from the
1853 // current node as the HMAC validated.
1854 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1855 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
1859 _ => {}, //TODO: Enumerate all of these!
1871 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1872 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1873 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1875 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1876 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1877 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1879 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) != 0 {
1880 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION set", msg.channel_id));
1882 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
1883 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1886 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1890 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1891 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = {
1892 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1893 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1895 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1896 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1897 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1899 chan.commitment_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?
1901 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1904 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1908 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
1911 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1912 let ((res, mut pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, chan_monitor), short_channel_id) = {
1913 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1914 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1916 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1917 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1918 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1920 (chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?, chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
1922 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1925 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1928 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
1929 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1932 let mut forward_event = None;
1933 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1934 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1935 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1936 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1937 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1939 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1940 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1941 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1942 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id: short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
1944 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1945 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id: short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
1950 match forward_event {
1952 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1953 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1954 time_forwardable: time
1963 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1964 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1965 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1967 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1968 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1969 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1971 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
1973 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1977 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1978 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
1979 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1980 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1982 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1983 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1985 if !chan.is_usable() {
1986 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1989 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1990 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
1991 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1993 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
1994 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1995 let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
1996 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
1997 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
1999 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2001 (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2002 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2003 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2004 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2005 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2006 contents: announcement,
2007 }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2009 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2012 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2013 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
2017 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2018 let (res, chan_monitor) = {
2019 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2020 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2022 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2023 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2025 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg)
2026 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2027 (Ok((funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update)), channel_monitor)
2029 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2032 if let Some(monitor) = chan_monitor {
2033 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2040 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2041 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2042 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2043 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2045 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2046 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2047 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2048 None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2050 if !chan.is_outbound() {
2051 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2053 if !chan.is_live() {
2054 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2056 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw).map_err(|e| APIError::APIMisuseError{err: e.err})? {
2057 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2060 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2061 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
2062 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2063 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2064 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2065 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2066 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2067 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2068 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2079 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2080 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2081 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2082 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2083 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2088 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2089 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2090 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2091 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2093 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2094 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2095 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2096 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2097 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2098 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2099 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel);
2100 new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
2101 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2102 msg: funding_locked,
2103 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
2105 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2106 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2107 new_events.push(events::Event::HandleError {
2108 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2111 if channel.is_shutdown() {
2115 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2116 for tx in txn_matched {
2117 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2118 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2119 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2120 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2122 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2123 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2124 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2125 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2126 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2127 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2136 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2137 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2138 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2140 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2141 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2142 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2143 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2144 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2145 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2146 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2155 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2156 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2158 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2159 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2160 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2162 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2165 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2166 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2167 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2168 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2170 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2171 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2172 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2173 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2174 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2175 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2176 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2178 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2179 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2180 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2190 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2191 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2193 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2194 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2195 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2196 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2199 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2203 macro_rules! handle_error {
2204 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
2207 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
2208 if needs_channel_force_close {
2210 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
2211 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2212 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2214 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2217 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
2218 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
2219 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
2220 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2221 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2223 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2235 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2236 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2237 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
2238 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2241 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2242 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2245 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
2246 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2249 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2250 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2253 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
2254 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2257 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
2258 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2261 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
2262 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2265 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2266 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2269 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2270 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2273 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, HandleError> {
2274 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2277 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2278 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2281 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
2282 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2285 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
2286 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2289 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2290 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2293 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2294 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2297 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>), HandleError> {
2298 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2301 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2302 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2303 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2304 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2306 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2307 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2308 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2309 if no_connection_possible {
2310 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2311 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2312 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2313 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2315 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2316 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2317 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2327 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2328 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2329 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2330 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2331 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2332 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2333 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2335 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2336 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2337 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2346 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2347 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2349 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2350 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2351 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
2352 pending_events.push(event);
2355 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2356 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2357 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2362 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<msgs::ChannelReestablish> {
2363 let mut res = Vec::new();
2364 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2365 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2366 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2367 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2368 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2369 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2370 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2374 res.push(chan.get_channel_reestablish());
2379 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2383 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2384 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2385 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2386 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2387 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2391 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2398 use chain::chaininterface;
2399 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2400 use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
2401 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
2402 use ln::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
2403 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
2405 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
2406 use util::test_utils;
2407 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
2408 use util::errors::APIError;
2409 use util::logger::Logger;
2410 use util::ser::Writeable;
2412 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
2413 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
2414 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
2415 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
2416 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2417 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
2418 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
2422 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2423 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2425 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
2426 use crypto::digest::Digest;
2428 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2430 use std::cell::RefCell;
2431 use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
2432 use std::default::Default;
2434 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2435 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
2436 use std::time::Instant;
2439 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
2440 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
2441 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2446 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2447 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2450 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2451 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2454 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2455 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2458 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2459 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2462 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2463 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2468 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2470 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
2471 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
2476 fn onion_vectors() {
2477 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
2478 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2480 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
2481 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
2482 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
2483 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
2484 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
2486 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
2487 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
2488 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
2489 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
2490 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
2492 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
2493 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
2494 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
2495 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
2496 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
2498 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
2499 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
2500 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
2501 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
2502 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
2504 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
2505 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
2506 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
2507 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
2508 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
2510 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
2511 let payloads = vec!(
2512 msgs::OnionHopData {
2514 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2515 short_channel_id: 0,
2517 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2521 msgs::OnionHopData {
2523 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2524 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
2525 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
2526 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2530 msgs::OnionHopData {
2532 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2533 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
2534 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
2535 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2539 msgs::OnionHopData {
2541 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2542 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2543 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2544 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2548 msgs::OnionHopData {
2550 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2551 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2552 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2553 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2559 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
2560 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2562 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2566 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2567 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2569 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2570 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2571 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2573 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2574 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2576 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2577 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2579 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2580 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2582 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2583 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2585 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2586 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2589 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2590 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2591 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2592 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2594 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2595 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2600 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2601 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2602 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2603 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2605 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
2606 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
2608 impl Drop for Node {
2609 fn drop(&mut self) {
2610 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
2611 // Check that we processed all pending events
2612 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2613 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2618 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2619 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
2622 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2623 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
2624 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
2625 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
2628 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
2629 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
2631 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2632 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2633 let accept_chan = match events_1[0] {
2634 Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2635 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2636 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2638 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2641 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
2643 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
2647 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2648 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2650 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2651 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
2652 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2654 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2655 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2657 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2659 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2660 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2661 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2662 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2663 added_monitors.clear();
2665 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2668 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2669 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2670 let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
2671 Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2672 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2673 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2674 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2675 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2676 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2677 added_monitors.clear();
2680 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2683 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2685 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2686 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2687 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2688 added_monitors.clear();
2691 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2692 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2694 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2695 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2696 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2698 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2704 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
2705 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
2706 let events_5 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2707 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2709 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2710 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2711 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2712 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2714 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2719 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
2720 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2721 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
2722 (match events_6[0] {
2723 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2724 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
2725 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2726 (msg.clone(), announcement_sigs.clone().unwrap())
2728 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2732 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2733 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
2734 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
2738 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2739 let bs_announcement_sigs = {
2740 let bs_announcement_sigs = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap().unwrap();
2741 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
2742 bs_announcement_sigs
2745 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2746 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
2747 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
2748 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2751 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2754 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
2755 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2756 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
2757 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
2758 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2759 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
2762 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2765 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2767 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
2770 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2771 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
2774 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2775 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
2777 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
2778 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
2779 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
2781 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
2784 macro_rules! check_spends {
2785 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
2787 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2788 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
2789 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
2790 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2795 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2796 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2797 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2800 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
2801 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2802 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2803 let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
2804 Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2805 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
2808 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2811 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
2812 if !close_inbound_first {
2813 assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
2815 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2816 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
2817 if close_inbound_first {
2818 assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
2819 closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2820 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2821 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2823 let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2824 assert!(empty_b.is_none());
2825 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2826 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2828 closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2829 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2830 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2832 let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2833 assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
2834 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2835 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2837 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
2838 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
2840 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2841 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2842 let as_update = match events_2[0] {
2843 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2846 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2849 let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2850 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2851 let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
2852 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2855 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2858 (as_update, bs_update)
2863 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
2864 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
2867 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
2869 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee, commitment_signed } } => {
2870 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2871 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2872 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2873 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
2874 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: commitment_signed }
2876 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
2881 macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
2882 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
2884 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2885 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
2886 added_monitors.clear();
2891 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
2892 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
2894 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
2895 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
2896 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
2897 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
2898 assert!($node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
2899 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
2900 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
2901 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
2902 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
2903 if $fail_backwards {
2904 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2906 assert!($node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
2908 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2909 if $fail_backwards {
2910 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2911 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2913 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2915 added_monitors.clear();
2921 macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
2924 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
2925 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2926 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
2927 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2928 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
2929 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
2930 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
2935 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2936 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
2938 let mut payment_event = {
2939 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
2940 check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
2942 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2943 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2944 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2946 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
2948 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
2949 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
2951 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
2952 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
2953 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
2955 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2956 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2958 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2959 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2962 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
2963 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
2965 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2966 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2967 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2969 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
2970 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
2971 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
2973 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2976 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
2977 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
2978 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
2984 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
2987 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2988 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
2989 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
2991 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2992 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
2993 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2995 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2997 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
2999 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
3001 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
3006 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3007 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3008 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3009 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3010 if next_msgs.is_some() {
3011 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
3014 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3015 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
3016 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3018 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3019 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3020 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3021 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3022 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3023 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3024 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3025 next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
3027 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3030 assert!(events.is_empty());
3032 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3033 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3040 update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
3041 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3042 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3044 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
3045 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
3047 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3052 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3053 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
3056 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
3058 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3059 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3060 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3061 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3062 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3065 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
3068 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3069 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3070 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3071 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3072 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3075 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3077 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
3079 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
3080 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
3084 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3085 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
3086 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
3089 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3090 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
3091 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3093 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3094 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
3095 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
3097 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3098 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
3103 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3104 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3105 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3106 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3107 if next_msgs.is_some() {
3108 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
3109 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
3110 // second-to-last node!
3111 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
3114 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3115 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
3116 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3118 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3119 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3120 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3121 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3122 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3123 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3124 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3125 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
3127 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3130 assert!(events.is_empty());
3132 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3133 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3140 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
3142 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3143 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3145 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
3146 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
3148 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3153 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3154 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
3157 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
3158 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
3159 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3160 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3161 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3163 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3164 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3166 for _ in 0..node_count {
3167 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
3168 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
3169 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
3170 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
3172 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
3173 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
3174 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
3176 let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
3177 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
3178 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router,
3179 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
3180 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
3188 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
3189 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3190 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3191 let channel_id = chan.2;
3193 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3195 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3196 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3202 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3206 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
3207 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
3208 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
3209 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
3210 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
3211 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
3212 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
3213 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
3214 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
3215 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
3217 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
3219 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
3221 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3222 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3225 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3226 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3227 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3228 Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3229 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3231 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3234 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3236 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3237 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3238 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3239 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3241 let payment_event = {
3242 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3243 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3244 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3246 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3247 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3249 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3250 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3251 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3252 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3253 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3255 // deliver(1), generate (3):
3256 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3257 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack
3258 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3260 let bs_update = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
3261 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3262 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3263 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3264 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3265 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
3266 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3268 let as_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
3269 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3270 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3271 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3272 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3273 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
3274 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3276 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
3277 assert!(as_second_commitment_signed.is_none()); // only (6)
3278 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3280 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
3281 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.is_none());
3282 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3284 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3285 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3287 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3288 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3290 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
3291 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3294 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (6)
3295 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3299 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
3300 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
3301 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
3302 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3303 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3304 let channel_id = chan.2;
3306 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3308 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3309 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3315 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3317 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3318 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3319 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3321 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3322 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3323 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3324 Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
3327 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3330 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3332 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3333 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3334 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3335 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3337 let payment_event = {
3338 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3339 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3340 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3342 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3343 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3345 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3346 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3347 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3348 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3349 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3351 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (2)
3352 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3354 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
3358 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
3359 let nodes = create_network(2);
3360 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3361 let channel_id = chan.2;
3363 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3365 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3366 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3372 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
3373 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
3374 // update_fee (never committed) ->
3375 // (3) update_fee ->
3376 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
3377 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
3378 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
3379 // <- (1) RAA delivered
3380 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
3381 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
3382 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
3383 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
3384 // revoke_and_ack ->
3385 // B should send no response here
3386 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
3387 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
3388 // revoke_and_ack ->
3390 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3391 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3392 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
3393 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3395 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3396 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3397 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3398 Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3399 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
3401 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3404 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
3405 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
3406 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
3407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3409 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
3411 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
3412 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3414 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
3415 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
3416 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
3417 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
3420 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3422 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
3424 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3426 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
3427 let as_second_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
3428 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3429 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3430 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3431 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3432 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3433 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
3434 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
3435 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
3437 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
3438 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), bs_commitment_signed.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
3439 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3440 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
3442 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none());
3443 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3446 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
3447 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3449 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3450 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3452 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment.unwrap()).unwrap();
3453 assert!(as_second_commitment.is_none());
3454 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3456 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3457 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3461 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
3462 let nodes = create_network(2);
3463 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3464 let channel_id = chan.2;
3466 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3468 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3469 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3474 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3475 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3477 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3478 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3479 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3480 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3481 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3483 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3485 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3487 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3488 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3489 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3490 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3492 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3493 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3494 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3496 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3497 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3498 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3500 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3501 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3502 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3506 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
3507 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3508 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3509 let channel_id = chan.2;
3511 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3513 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3514 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3520 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3522 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3523 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3525 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3526 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3527 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3528 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3529 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3531 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3533 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3534 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3535 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3536 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3537 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3539 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3541 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
3543 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
3544 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3546 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3547 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
3548 added_monitors.clear();
3550 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3551 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
3552 // node[1] has nothing to do
3554 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3555 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3556 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3558 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3559 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3560 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3561 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3562 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
3564 let commitment_update = resp_option.unwrap();
3565 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3566 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
3567 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
3568 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
3569 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
3571 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
3572 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
3573 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3574 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3575 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3576 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3577 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3578 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3580 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3581 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3582 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3583 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3584 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3585 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3587 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3588 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3590 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3591 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3593 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3594 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3596 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3597 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3599 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
3600 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3603 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
3605 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
3606 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
3607 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3611 fn test_update_fee() {
3612 let nodes = create_network(2);
3613 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3614 let channel_id = chan.2;
3616 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3618 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3619 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3625 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
3626 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
3627 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
3628 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
3629 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
3630 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
3631 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
3632 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
3633 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
3634 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
3635 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
3636 // revoke_and_ack ->
3638 // Create and deliver (1)...
3639 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3640 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3642 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3643 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3644 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3645 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3646 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3648 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3650 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3652 // Generate (2) and (3):
3653 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3654 let commitment_signed_0 = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3655 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3659 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3660 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3661 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3663 // Create and deliver (4)...
3664 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
3665 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3666 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3667 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3668 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3669 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3671 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3673 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3675 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3677 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3678 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3679 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3681 // Handle (3), creating (6):
3682 let (revoke_msg_0, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
3683 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3684 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3687 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3688 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3689 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3691 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
3692 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
3693 let commitment_signed = resp_option.unwrap().commitment_signed;
3694 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3697 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3698 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3699 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3700 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3701 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3702 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3704 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0]), feerate + 30);
3705 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1]), feerate + 30);
3706 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3710 fn fake_network_test() {
3711 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3712 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
3713 let nodes = create_network(4);
3715 // Create some initial channels
3716 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3717 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3718 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3720 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
3721 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3722 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3723 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3724 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3726 // Send some more payments
3727 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3728 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
3729 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
3731 // Test failure packets
3732 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
3733 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
3735 // Add a new channel that skips 3
3736 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3738 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3739 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3740 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3741 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3742 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3743 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3744 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3746 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
3747 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3748 hops.push(RouteHop {
3749 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3750 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3752 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3754 hops.push(RouteHop {
3755 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3756 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3758 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3760 hops.push(RouteHop {
3761 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3762 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3764 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3766 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3767 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3768 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
3770 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3771 hops.push(RouteHop {
3772 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3773 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3775 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3777 hops.push(RouteHop {
3778 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3779 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3781 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3783 hops.push(RouteHop {
3784 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3785 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3787 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3789 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3790 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3791 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
3793 // Claim the rebalances...
3794 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
3795 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
3797 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
3798 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3800 // Send some payments across both channels
3801 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3802 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3803 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3805 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
3807 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
3809 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
3810 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
3811 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
3813 // Close down the channels...
3814 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
3815 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
3816 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
3817 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
3818 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
3822 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
3823 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
3824 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
3825 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
3827 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
3828 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
3829 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3830 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3831 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
3832 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
3834 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
3836 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
3837 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
3839 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
3840 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
3842 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
3843 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
3844 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
3847 #[derive(PartialEq)]
3848 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
3849 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
3851 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
3852 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
3853 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
3855 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
3856 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
3858 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
3860 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3861 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3862 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
3864 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
3865 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3866 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
3867 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
3868 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
3869 res.push(tx.clone());
3874 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
3875 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
3878 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
3880 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
3881 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3882 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
3883 check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
3884 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
3885 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
3887 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
3889 res.push(tx.clone());
3893 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
3896 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
3900 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
3901 /// HTLC transaction.
3902 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
3903 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3904 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3905 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3906 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
3907 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
3911 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
3914 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3915 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3917 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
3918 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3919 let mut found_prev = false;
3921 for tx in prev_txn {
3922 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
3923 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
3924 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
3925 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
3931 assert!(found_prev);
3933 let mut res = Vec::new();
3934 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
3938 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
3939 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3940 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3941 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
3942 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3945 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3948 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3949 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3950 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
3951 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3954 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3958 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3959 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3964 fn channel_reserve_test() {
3966 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
3967 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
3969 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
3970 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
3971 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3972 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
3973 chan.get_value_stat()
3977 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
3978 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
3979 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
3981 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
3982 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3984 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
3985 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3987 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
3988 ($recv_value: expr) => {{
3989 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3990 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3991 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
3995 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
3997 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3998 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4000 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4001 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4003 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4004 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4008 macro_rules! expect_forward {
4010 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4011 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4012 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4013 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
4018 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
4019 ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
4020 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4021 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4023 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4024 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4025 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
4027 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4032 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
4033 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
4035 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
4037 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4039 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
4040 assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
4041 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4043 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4044 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4048 let mut htlc_id = 0;
4049 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
4050 // nodes[0]'s wealth
4052 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
4053 if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
4056 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
4059 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
4060 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
4061 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
4062 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
4063 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
4066 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
4067 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
4068 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
4069 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
4070 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
4074 let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4075 // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
4076 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
4077 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4079 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4080 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4084 // adding pending output
4085 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
4086 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
4088 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
4089 let payment_event_1 = {
4090 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
4091 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4093 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4094 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4095 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4097 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4099 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
4100 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4102 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4103 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4104 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4105 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4110 // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
4111 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4113 // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
4114 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4115 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
4116 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
4117 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
4119 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
4121 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
4122 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
4123 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
4124 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
4125 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4126 channel_id: chan_1.2,
4128 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
4129 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
4130 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
4131 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
4134 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
4136 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
4140 // split the rest to test holding cell
4141 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
4142 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
4144 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4145 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
4148 // now see if they go through on both sides
4149 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
4150 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
4151 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
4152 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4153 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4154 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
4156 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
4158 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
4159 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4160 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4161 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4165 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
4166 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
4167 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
4168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4169 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4170 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
4172 // flush the pending htlc
4173 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4174 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4176 let commitment_update_2 = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
4177 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4178 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4179 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
4180 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4181 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4184 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4186 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4187 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4188 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
4190 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4191 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
4193 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
4194 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
4195 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4196 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
4197 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
4198 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4200 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4201 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
4202 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4203 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
4205 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
4206 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4208 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4209 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4211 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4212 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
4213 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
4215 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4218 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4219 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
4220 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
4222 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4225 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
4226 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
4227 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
4229 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
4230 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4231 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
4232 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
4234 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4235 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
4239 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
4240 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
4241 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
4242 let nodes = create_network(5);
4244 // Create some initial channels
4245 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4246 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4247 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4248 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4250 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
4251 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4252 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4253 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4254 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4256 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
4257 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4259 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4260 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4261 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4262 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4264 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4265 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4266 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4268 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
4269 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4271 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
4272 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4274 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4275 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4276 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4277 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4279 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
4280 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4281 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4283 macro_rules! claim_funds {
4284 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
4286 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
4287 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4289 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4290 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4292 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
4293 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4294 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4295 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4297 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4303 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
4304 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
4305 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4307 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4309 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4310 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
4312 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4313 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4315 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
4317 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
4318 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4319 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4321 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
4322 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4323 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
4326 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
4327 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
4328 // One pending HTLC to time out:
4329 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
4330 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
4334 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4335 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4336 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
4337 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4338 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4341 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4343 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4344 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
4346 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4347 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4348 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
4349 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4350 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4353 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
4355 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4356 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
4358 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
4360 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
4361 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4362 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4364 // Create some new channels:
4365 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4367 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
4368 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4369 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
4370 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4371 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
4372 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4373 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
4374 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
4375 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4376 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4377 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4378 // Revoke the old state
4379 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
4382 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4383 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4385 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4386 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4387 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
4388 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
4390 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4391 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
4393 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4395 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4396 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4397 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4398 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
4399 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
4401 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4402 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4403 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4407 fn revoked_output_claim() {
4408 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
4409 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
4410 let nodes = create_network(2);
4411 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4412 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
4413 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4414 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
4415 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
4416 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4417 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
4418 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
4420 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
4421 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4422 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4423 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4424 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
4426 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
4428 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4429 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
4431 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
4432 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4433 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4437 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
4438 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
4439 let nodes = create_network(2);
4441 // Create some new channel:
4442 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4444 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4445 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4446 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
4447 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4448 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4450 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4451 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4452 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
4453 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4454 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4455 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4456 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4457 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4458 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4460 //Revoke the old state
4461 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4464 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4466 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4468 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4469 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4470 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
4472 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
4473 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4475 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
4477 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4478 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4479 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4480 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4481 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4482 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4483 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4484 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4486 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
4487 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4488 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
4490 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4491 let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
4492 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4493 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
4494 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4495 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
4497 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4498 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4499 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4503 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
4504 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
4505 let nodes = create_network(2);
4507 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4509 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4510 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4511 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
4512 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
4513 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4514 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4516 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4517 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4519 //Revoke the old state
4520 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4523 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4525 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4527 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4528 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4529 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
4531 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
4532 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
4533 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
4534 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
4535 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
4536 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
4537 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
4539 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4540 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4541 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4543 let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
4544 revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4545 node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4546 node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4547 node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4549 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4550 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4551 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4552 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4553 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4554 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4555 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4556 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4558 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
4559 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
4561 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
4562 let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
4563 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4564 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
4565 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4566 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4568 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4569 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4570 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4574 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
4575 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
4576 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
4577 let nodes = create_network(2);
4578 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4580 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
4581 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
4583 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4584 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4586 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4587 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4589 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4593 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4594 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4596 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4597 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4600 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4601 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4603 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4604 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4606 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4610 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
4611 // registering new transactions
4612 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4616 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
4617 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
4618 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4619 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4620 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4622 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
4624 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4626 let mut payment_event = {
4627 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4628 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4630 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4631 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4632 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4635 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4636 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4638 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4639 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4641 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4642 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4645 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4646 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4648 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4649 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4650 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
4651 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4653 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4654 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4655 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4658 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
4659 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
4660 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
4662 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
4663 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4664 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4666 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4667 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4669 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4673 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4674 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
4675 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
4676 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
4677 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4681 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4682 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4684 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4685 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
4686 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
4688 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4689 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4691 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4694 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
4696 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
4697 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
4698 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
4700 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4701 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4702 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4703 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4704 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
4705 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4706 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4708 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
4712 fn test_unconf_chan() {
4713 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
4714 let nodes = create_network(2);
4715 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4717 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4718 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
4719 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
4720 mem::drop(channel_state);
4722 let mut headers = Vec::new();
4723 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4724 headers.push(header.clone());
4726 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4727 headers.push(header.clone());
4729 while !headers.is_empty() {
4730 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
4733 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4734 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4736 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4737 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4739 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4742 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4743 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
4744 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
4747 /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
4748 /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
4749 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
4750 let reestablish_1 = node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
4751 let reestablish_2 = node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4753 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
4754 for msg in reestablish_1 {
4755 resp_1.push(node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
4757 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
4758 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
4760 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
4763 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
4764 for msg in reestablish_2 {
4765 resp_2.push(node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
4767 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
4768 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
4770 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4773 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
4774 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
4775 (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
4777 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
4779 let a = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap());
4780 let _announcement_sigs_opt = a.unwrap();
4781 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
4783 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
4786 assert!(node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap().is_none());
4787 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
4789 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
4791 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
4792 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
4793 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
4794 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
4796 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4798 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
4799 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
4800 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4801 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
4802 node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
4804 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
4805 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
4807 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
4808 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
4811 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
4812 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
4814 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4815 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
4816 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
4817 assert!(node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4818 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
4821 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
4825 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
4827 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
4828 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
4830 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
4833 assert!(node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap().is_none());
4834 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
4836 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
4838 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
4839 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
4840 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
4841 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
4843 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
4844 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
4845 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4846 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
4847 node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
4849 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
4850 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
4852 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
4853 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
4856 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
4857 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
4859 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4860 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
4861 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
4862 assert!(node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4863 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
4866 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
4872 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
4873 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
4874 let nodes = create_network(3);
4875 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4876 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4878 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4879 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4880 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4882 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
4883 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
4884 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
4885 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
4887 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4888 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4889 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4891 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
4892 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
4893 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
4894 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
4896 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4897 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4899 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
4900 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
4902 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
4904 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4905 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4907 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
4908 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
4910 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4913 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
4914 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
4916 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4920 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
4921 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
4924 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
4925 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
4926 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4927 if messages_delivered == 0 {
4928 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
4929 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
4931 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4934 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4935 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4937 let payment_event = {
4938 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
4939 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4941 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4942 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4943 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4945 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
4947 if messages_delivered < 2 {
4948 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
4950 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4951 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4952 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4954 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
4955 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4956 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4958 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
4959 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4960 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
4961 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4963 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
4964 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4965 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4971 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4972 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4973 if messages_delivered < 2 {
4974 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
4975 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
4976 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4977 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
4978 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
4979 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
4980 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
4981 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
4982 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4983 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
4984 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
4985 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
4986 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
4987 // Everything was delivered...
4988 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4991 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4992 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4994 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4995 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4998 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4999 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5000 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5002 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5003 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5005 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5006 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5008 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5009 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
5010 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
5012 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5015 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5016 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5018 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5019 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5020 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
5021 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5022 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5023 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5024 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5025 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5026 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5027 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5028 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5030 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5033 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
5034 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
5036 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5037 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5039 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5040 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
5042 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5045 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
5046 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
5047 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5049 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
5050 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5051 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5053 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
5054 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5055 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
5056 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5058 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
5059 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5060 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5067 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5068 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5069 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5070 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5071 //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
5072 //if messages_delivered < 1 {
5073 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5074 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5076 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5077 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
5079 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5082 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
5083 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
5084 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
5085 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
5086 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
5087 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5088 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
5089 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
5090 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
5091 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
5092 // Everything was delivered...
5093 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5096 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5097 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5098 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5100 // Channel should still work fine...
5101 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
5102 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
5106 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
5107 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
5108 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
5109 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
5113 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
5114 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
5115 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
5116 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
5120 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
5121 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
5122 let nodes = create_network(2);
5123 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
5125 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5126 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5128 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
5129 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5130 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5132 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _, ref announcement_sigs } => {
5133 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5134 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
5136 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5139 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
5140 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5141 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5143 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _, ref announcement_sigs } => {
5144 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5145 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
5147 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5150 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5151 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5152 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5153 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5155 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
5156 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
5158 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5159 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5160 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
5164 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
5165 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
5166 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5167 let nodes = create_network(2);
5169 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
5171 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5172 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5173 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
5174 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
5176 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
5178 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
5179 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
5181 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5182 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5184 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
5186 let mut chan_announcement;
5188 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
5190 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5191 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
5192 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
5193 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5194 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
5195 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
5196 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
5197 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
5198 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5203 macro_rules! sign_msg {
5204 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
5205 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
5206 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
5207 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
5208 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
5209 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
5210 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5211 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
5212 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
5213 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
5214 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
5215 contents: $unsigned_msg
5220 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
5221 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
5222 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
5223 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
5225 // Configured with Network::Testnet
5226 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
5227 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
5228 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
5229 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
5231 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
5232 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
5233 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
5234 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());