1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
18 use bitcoin::network::serialize;
19 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
20 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
22 use crypto::digest::Digest;
24 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
25 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
28 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, HandleError};
30 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
31 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
32 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
33 use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
34 use util::ser::{Readable, Writer};
35 use util::sha2::Sha256;
36 use util::{byte_utils, events};
38 use std::collections::HashMap;
39 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
40 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
42 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
44 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
45 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
46 /// to succeed at some point in the future).
48 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
49 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
50 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
51 /// the channel to an operational state.
53 /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
54 /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
55 /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
57 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
58 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
59 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
60 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
61 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
62 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
65 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
66 /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
67 /// channel operation.
69 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
70 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
71 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
75 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
76 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
77 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
80 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
81 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
82 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
83 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
84 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
85 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
87 /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
88 /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
90 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
93 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
94 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
96 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
98 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
99 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
100 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
102 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
103 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
104 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
105 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
106 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
108 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
109 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
110 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
111 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
114 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
115 fn block_connected(&self, _header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
116 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
118 let monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
119 for monitor in monitors.values() {
120 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &*self.broadcaster);
121 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
122 new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
123 outputs: spendable_outputs,
126 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
127 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
128 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
133 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
134 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
137 fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
140 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
141 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
142 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
143 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
144 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
145 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
148 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
150 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
151 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
155 /// Adds or udpates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
156 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
157 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
158 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
159 Some(orig_monitor) => return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor),
162 match &monitor.funding_txo {
163 &None => self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(),
164 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
165 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
166 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
169 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
174 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
175 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
176 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
178 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
183 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
184 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
185 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
186 let mut ret = Vec::new();
187 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
192 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
193 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
194 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
195 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
196 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
197 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
198 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
199 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
200 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
201 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
202 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers).
203 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
205 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
208 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
209 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
210 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
211 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
212 latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
215 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
216 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
217 sigs: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Signature>,
221 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
222 struct LocalSignedTx {
223 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
226 revocation_key: PublicKey,
227 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
228 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
229 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
231 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
234 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
235 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
237 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
238 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
240 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
241 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
242 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
243 funding_txo: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
244 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
246 key_storage: KeyStorage,
247 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
248 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
249 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
250 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
252 our_to_self_delay: u16,
253 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
255 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
256 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>,
257 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
258 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
259 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
260 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
261 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
262 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex<HashMap<Sha256dHash, u64>>,
263 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
264 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
265 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
266 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
267 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>,
269 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
270 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
271 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
272 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
273 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
274 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
276 payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
278 destination_script: Script,
279 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
281 impl Clone for ChannelMonitor {
282 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
284 funding_txo: self.funding_txo.clone(),
285 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor.clone(),
287 key_storage: self.key_storage.clone(),
288 their_htlc_base_key: self.their_htlc_base_key.clone(),
289 their_delayed_payment_base_key: self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
290 their_cur_revocation_points: self.their_cur_revocation_points.clone(),
292 our_to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
293 their_to_self_delay: self.their_to_self_delay,
295 old_secrets: self.old_secrets.clone(),
296 remote_claimable_outpoints: self.remote_claimable_outpoints.clone(),
297 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new((*self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap()).clone()),
298 remote_hash_commitment_number: self.remote_hash_commitment_number.clone(),
300 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
301 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
303 payment_preimages: self.payment_preimages.clone(),
305 destination_script: self.destination_script.clone(),
306 secp_ctx: self.secp_ctx.clone(),
311 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
312 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
313 /// underlying object
314 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
315 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
316 if self.funding_txo != other.funding_txo ||
317 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
318 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
319 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
320 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
321 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
322 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
323 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
324 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
325 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
326 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
327 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
328 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
329 self.destination_script != other.destination_script
333 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
334 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
338 let us = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
339 let them = other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
345 impl ChannelMonitor {
346 pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor {
349 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
351 key_storage: KeyStorage::PrivMode {
352 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
353 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
354 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
355 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
356 latest_per_commitment_point: None,
358 their_htlc_base_key: None,
359 their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
360 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
362 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
363 their_to_self_delay: None,
365 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
366 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
367 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
368 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
370 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
371 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
373 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
375 destination_script: destination_script,
376 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
381 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
383 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
391 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
392 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
394 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
395 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
396 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
397 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
399 sha.result(&mut res);
405 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Also optionally tracks the next
406 /// revocation point which may be required to claim HTLC outputs which we know the preimage of
407 /// in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state. Prunes old preimages if neither
408 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
409 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
410 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
411 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
413 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
414 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
415 return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous secret did not match new one", action: None})
418 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
420 if let Some(new_revocation_point) = their_next_revocation_point {
421 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
422 Some(old_points) => {
423 if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 1 {
424 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
425 } else if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 2 {
426 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
427 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
429 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
432 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
436 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
441 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
442 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
443 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
444 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
445 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
447 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
448 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
449 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
453 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
454 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
455 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
460 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
467 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
476 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
477 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
478 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
479 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
480 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, commitment_number: u64) {
481 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
482 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
483 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
485 for htlc in &htlc_outputs {
486 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
488 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs);
491 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
492 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
493 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
494 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
495 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
496 /// Also update KeyStorage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
497 /// case of onchain HTLC tx
498 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
499 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
500 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
501 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
502 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
503 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
504 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
505 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
506 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
507 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
511 self.key_storage = if let KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, prev_latest_per_commitment_point: _, ref latest_per_commitment_point } = self.key_storage {
512 KeyStorage::PrivMode {
513 revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key,
514 htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key,
515 delayed_payment_base_key: *delayed_payment_base_key,
516 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: *latest_per_commitment_point,
517 latest_per_commitment_point: Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point),
519 } else { unimplemented!(); };
522 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
523 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
524 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
525 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
528 /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
529 /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
530 /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
531 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
532 if self.funding_txo.is_some() {
533 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially
534 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
535 if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 != self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
536 return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", action: None});
539 self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo.take();
541 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
542 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
543 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
544 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap(), None)?;
546 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
547 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
548 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
549 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
551 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
552 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
554 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
555 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
557 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
562 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
563 pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
564 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
565 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
568 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
569 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
570 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
571 /// provides slightly better privacy.
572 /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
573 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
574 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
575 self.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
578 /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
579 pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
580 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
581 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
584 pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
585 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
588 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
589 self.funding_txo = None;
592 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
593 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
594 match self.funding_txo {
595 Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
600 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
601 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
602 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
603 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
604 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
605 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
607 match &self.funding_txo {
608 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
609 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
610 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
611 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(script.len() as u64))?;
612 writer.write_all(&script[..])?;
615 // We haven't even been initialized...not sure why anyone is serializing us, but
616 // not much to give them.
621 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
622 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor))?;
624 match self.key_storage {
625 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => {
626 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
627 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
628 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
629 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
630 if let Some(ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point) = *prev_latest_per_commitment_point {
631 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
632 writer.write_all(&prev_latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
634 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
636 if let Some(ref latest_per_commitment_point) = *latest_per_commitment_point {
637 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
638 writer.write_all(&latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
640 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
644 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => unimplemented!(),
647 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
648 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
650 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
651 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
652 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
653 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
654 match second_option {
655 Some(second_pubkey) => {
656 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
659 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
664 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
668 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
669 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
671 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
672 writer.write_all(secret)?;
673 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
676 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
677 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
678 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
679 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
680 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
681 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash)?;
682 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index))?;
686 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
687 for (txid, htlc_outputs) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
688 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
689 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
690 for htlc_output in htlc_outputs.iter() {
691 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
696 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
697 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
698 for (txid, commitment_number) in remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
699 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
700 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
704 if for_local_storage {
705 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
706 for (payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
707 writer.write_all(payment_hash)?;
708 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
711 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
714 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
715 ($local_tx: expr) => {
716 let tx_ser = serialize::serialize(&$local_tx.tx).unwrap();
717 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(tx_ser.len() as u64))?;
718 writer.write_all(&tx_ser)?;
720 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
721 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
722 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
723 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
725 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
726 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
727 for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
728 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
729 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
730 writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
735 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
736 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
737 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
739 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
742 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
743 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
744 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
746 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
749 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
750 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
751 writer.write_all(payment_preimage)?;
754 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.destination_script.len() as u64))?;
755 writer.write_all(&self.destination_script[..])?;
760 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
761 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
762 self.write(writer, true)
765 /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
766 pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
767 self.write(writer, false)
770 //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
771 //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
773 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
774 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
775 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
776 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
777 return Ok(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
780 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
781 Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", action: None})
784 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
785 //TODO This can be optimized?
786 let mut min = 1 << 48;
787 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
795 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
796 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
797 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
798 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
799 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
800 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
801 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
802 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
803 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
804 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
806 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
807 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
809 macro_rules! ignore_error {
810 ( $thing : expr ) => {
813 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
818 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
819 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
820 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
821 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
822 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
823 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
824 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
825 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
826 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
828 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
829 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
830 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
831 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)))
834 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
835 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
836 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
837 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
840 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
841 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
843 let mut total_value = 0;
844 let mut values = Vec::new();
845 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
846 let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
848 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
849 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
851 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
852 txid: commitment_txid,
855 script_sig: Script::new(),
856 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
859 htlc_idxs.push(None);
860 values.push(outp.value);
861 total_value += outp.value;
862 break; // There can only be one of these
866 macro_rules! sign_input {
867 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
869 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
870 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
871 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
872 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
873 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
875 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
876 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
877 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript)
879 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
883 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
884 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
885 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
886 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
888 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
890 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
895 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
896 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
898 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
899 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
900 if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
901 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
902 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
903 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
906 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
907 txid: commitment_txid,
908 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
910 script_sig: Script::new(),
911 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
914 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
916 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
917 values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
918 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
920 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
925 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
926 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
929 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
930 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
931 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
936 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
937 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
938 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
939 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
941 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
943 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
944 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
945 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
947 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
954 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
955 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
957 for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
958 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
959 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
962 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
963 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
964 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
966 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
967 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
968 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
969 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
970 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
971 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
972 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
973 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
975 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
976 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
978 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
979 let revocation_point_option =
980 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
981 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
982 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
984 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
985 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
986 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
987 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
988 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
990 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
991 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
992 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
995 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
996 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
997 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1000 let mut total_value = 0;
1001 let mut values = Vec::new();
1002 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1004 macro_rules! sign_input {
1005 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1007 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1008 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1009 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize];
1010 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1011 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1012 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1013 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript)
1015 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1019 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1020 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1021 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1022 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1027 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1028 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1030 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1031 txid: commitment_txid,
1032 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1034 script_sig: Script::new(),
1035 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1036 witness: Vec::new(),
1038 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1040 values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
1041 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1043 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1047 output: vec!(TxOut {
1048 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1049 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1052 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1053 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
1054 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1055 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1056 output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
1058 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1063 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1065 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1066 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1067 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1069 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1076 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1077 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1079 for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
1080 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1081 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
1084 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1085 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1086 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1088 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1093 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1096 /// Attempst to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout s outputs using the revocation key
1097 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1098 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
1102 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1103 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1106 Err(_) => return (None, None)
1111 let secret = ignore_error!(self.get_secret(commitment_number));
1112 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
1113 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1114 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
1115 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1116 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
1118 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1119 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
1122 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
1123 None => return (None, None),
1124 Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
1126 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &delayed_key);
1127 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1128 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1130 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1133 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
1135 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1139 script_sig: Script::new(),
1140 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1141 witness: Vec::new(),
1143 amount = tx.output[0].value;
1146 if !inputs.is_empty() {
1147 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1148 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1149 value: amount, //TODO: - fee
1152 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1159 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1161 let sig = match self.key_storage {
1162 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1163 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]));
1164 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1165 self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)
1167 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1171 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1172 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1173 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
1174 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1176 let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
1177 let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
1178 (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
1179 } else { (None, None) }
1182 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1183 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1184 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1186 for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1188 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1190 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1192 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1193 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1194 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1195 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1197 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1198 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1200 if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
1201 if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
1202 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
1203 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutput {
1204 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_timeout_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1206 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
1207 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay
1212 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
1214 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1215 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1217 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1219 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1220 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1221 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1222 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1224 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
1225 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1227 if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
1228 if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
1229 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
1230 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutput {
1231 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_success_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1233 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
1234 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay
1239 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
1244 (res, spendable_outputs)
1247 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1248 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1249 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1250 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1251 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1252 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1253 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1254 match self.key_storage {
1255 KeyStorage::PrivMode { revocation_base_key: _, htlc_base_key: _, ref delayed_payment_base_key, prev_latest_per_commitment_point: _, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => {
1256 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1258 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1259 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1264 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1265 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1266 match self.key_storage {
1267 KeyStorage::PrivMode { revocation_base_key: _, htlc_base_key: _, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1268 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1270 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1271 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1276 (Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1279 fn block_connected(&self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1280 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1281 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1282 for tx in txn_matched {
1283 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1284 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1285 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1286 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1288 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1289 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
1290 if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
1291 let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
1293 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1294 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1295 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1298 let (remote_txn, mut outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
1299 spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
1303 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
1304 if let Some(commitment_number) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1305 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, *commitment_number);
1306 if let Some(tx) = tx {
1309 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
1310 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1314 for tx in txn.iter() {
1315 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1319 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1320 if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1321 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
1322 match self.key_storage {
1323 KeyStorage::PrivMode { revocation_base_key: _, htlc_base_key: _, ref delayed_payment_base_key, prev_latest_per_commitment_point: _, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => {
1324 let (txs, mut outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1325 spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
1327 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1330 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1331 let (txs, mut outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None);
1332 spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
1334 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1340 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs)
1343 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
1344 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1345 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1346 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
1347 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
1348 // time out the HTLC first.
1349 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
1350 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
1351 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
1352 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
1353 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
1354 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
1355 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
1356 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
1357 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
1358 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
1359 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
1360 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
1361 // aka outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1362 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1363 // outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1364 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
1365 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
1366 if ( htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS <= height) ||
1367 (!htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
1376 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for ChannelMonitor {
1377 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1378 // TODO: read_to_end and then deserializing from that vector is really dumb, we should
1379 // actually use the fancy serialization framework we have instead of hacking around it.
1380 let mut datavec = Vec::new();
1381 reader.read_to_end(&mut datavec)?;
1382 let data = &datavec;
1384 let mut read_pos = 0;
1385 macro_rules! read_bytes {
1386 ($byte_count: expr) => {
1388 if ($byte_count as usize) > data.len() - read_pos {
1389 return Err(DecodeError::ShortRead);
1391 read_pos += $byte_count as usize;
1392 &data[read_pos - $byte_count as usize..read_pos]
1397 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1398 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
1402 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1407 let _ver = read_bytes!(1)[0];
1408 let min_ver = read_bytes!(1)[0];
1409 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
1410 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
1413 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
1414 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
1415 let outpoint = OutPoint {
1416 txid: Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32)),
1417 index: byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)),
1419 let script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
1420 let funding_txo = Some((outpoint, Script::from(read_bytes!(script_len).to_vec())));
1421 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
1423 let key_storage = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
1425 let revocation_base_key = unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32)));
1426 let htlc_base_key = unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32)));
1427 let delayed_payment_base_key = unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32)));
1428 let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
1431 Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))))
1433 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1435 let latest_per_commitment_point = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
1438 Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))))
1440 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1442 KeyStorage::PrivMode {
1443 revocation_base_key,
1445 delayed_payment_base_key,
1446 prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
1447 latest_per_commitment_point,
1450 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1453 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))));
1454 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))));
1456 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
1457 let first_idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
1461 let first_point = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
1462 let second_point_slice = read_bytes!(33);
1463 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
1464 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
1466 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, second_point_slice)))))
1471 let our_to_self_delay = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2));
1472 let their_to_self_delay = Some(byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)));
1474 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
1475 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
1476 secret.copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
1477 *idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
1480 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
1483 let offered = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
1484 0 => false, 1 => true,
1485 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1487 let amount_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
1488 let cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4));
1489 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1490 payment_hash[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
1491 let transaction_output_index = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4));
1493 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1494 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
1500 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
1501 if remote_claimable_outpoints_len > data.len() as u64 / 64 { return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor); }
1502 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize);
1503 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
1504 let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32));
1505 let outputs_count = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
1506 if outputs_count > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor); }
1507 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(outputs_count as usize);
1508 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
1509 outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!());
1511 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, outputs) {
1512 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1516 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
1517 if remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor); }
1518 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize);
1519 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
1520 let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32));
1521 let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
1522 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
1523 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1527 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
1528 if remote_hash_commitment_number_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor); }
1529 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize);
1530 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
1531 let mut txid = [0; 32];
1532 txid[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
1533 let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
1534 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
1535 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1539 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
1542 let tx_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
1543 let tx_ser = read_bytes!(tx_len);
1544 let tx: Transaction = unwrap_obj!(serialize::deserialize(tx_ser));
1545 if serialize::serialize(&tx).unwrap() != tx_ser {
1546 // We check that the tx re-serializes to the same form to ensure there is
1547 // no extra data, and as rust-bitcoin doesn't handle the 0-input ambiguity
1549 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1552 let revocation_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
1553 let a_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
1554 let b_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
1555 let delayed_payment_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
1556 let feerate_per_kw = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
1558 let htlc_outputs_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
1559 if htlc_outputs_len > data.len() as u64 / 128 { return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor); }
1560 let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs_len as usize);
1561 for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
1562 htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(),
1563 unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64))),
1564 unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64)))));
1569 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs
1575 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
1578 Some(read_local_tx!())
1580 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1583 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
1586 Some(read_local_tx!())
1588 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1591 let payment_preimages_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
1592 if payment_preimages_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
1593 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(payment_preimages_len as usize);
1594 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1595 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
1596 let mut preimage = [0; 32];
1597 preimage[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
1599 sha.input(&preimage);
1600 let mut hash = [0; 32];
1601 sha.result(&mut hash);
1602 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
1603 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1607 let destination_script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
1608 let destination_script = Script::from(read_bytes!(destination_script_len).to_vec());
1612 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1615 their_htlc_base_key,
1616 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
1617 their_cur_revocation_points,
1620 their_to_self_delay,
1623 remote_claimable_outpoints,
1624 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain),
1625 remote_hash_commitment_number,
1627 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
1628 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
1641 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
1642 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
1643 use crypto::digest::Digest;
1645 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1646 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
1647 use util::sha2::Sha256;
1648 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
1649 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
1650 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
1653 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
1654 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
1655 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
1656 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
1657 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1659 macro_rules! test_secrets {
1661 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
1662 for secret in secrets.iter() {
1663 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
1666 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
1667 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_err());
1672 // insert_secret correct sequence
1673 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1676 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1677 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1678 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1681 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1682 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1683 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1686 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1687 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1688 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1691 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1692 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1693 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1696 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1697 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1698 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1701 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1702 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1703 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1706 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1707 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1708 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1711 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1712 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1713 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1718 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
1719 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1722 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1723 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1724 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1727 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1728 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1729 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1730 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1734 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
1735 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1738 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1739 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1740 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1743 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1744 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1745 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1748 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1749 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1750 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1753 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1754 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1755 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1756 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1760 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
1761 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1764 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1765 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1766 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1769 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1770 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1771 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1774 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1775 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1776 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1779 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1780 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1781 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1782 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1786 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
1787 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1790 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1791 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1792 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1795 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1796 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1797 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1800 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1801 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1802 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1805 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1806 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
1807 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1810 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1811 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1812 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1815 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1816 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1817 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1820 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1821 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1822 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1825 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1826 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1827 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1828 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1832 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
1833 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1836 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1837 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1838 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1841 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1842 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1843 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1846 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1847 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1848 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1851 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1852 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1853 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1856 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1857 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1858 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1861 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1862 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1863 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1864 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1868 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
1869 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1872 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1873 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1874 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1877 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1878 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1879 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1882 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1883 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1884 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1887 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1888 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1889 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1892 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1893 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1894 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1897 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1898 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1899 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1902 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1903 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1904 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1907 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1908 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1909 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1910 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1914 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1915 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1918 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1919 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1920 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1923 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1924 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1925 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1928 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1929 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1930 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1933 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1934 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1935 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1938 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1939 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1940 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1943 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1944 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1945 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1948 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1949 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1950 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1953 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1954 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1955 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1956 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1960 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1961 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1964 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1965 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1966 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1969 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1970 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1971 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1974 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1975 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1976 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1979 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1980 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1981 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1984 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1985 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1986 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1989 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1990 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1991 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1994 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1995 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1996 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1999 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2000 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
2001 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
2002 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2007 fn test_prune_preimages() {
2008 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2009 let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2011 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
2014 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
2016 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
2017 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2018 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2019 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2020 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2021 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2026 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2028 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2030 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2032 let mut preimage = [0; 32];
2033 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
2034 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2035 sha.input(&preimage);
2036 let mut hash = [0; 32];
2037 sha.result(&mut hash);
2038 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2042 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2043 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2045 let mut res = Vec::new();
2046 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2047 res.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2051 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2052 transaction_output_index: idx as u32,
2059 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
2060 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2062 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2063 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e, dummy_sig.clone(), dummy_sig.clone()) }).collect();
2069 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2070 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2071 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2072 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2077 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
2079 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
2080 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
2082 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
2083 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655);
2084 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654);
2085 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653);
2086 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652);
2087 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
2088 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
2091 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
2092 let mut secret = [0; 32];
2093 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2094 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
2095 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
2096 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2097 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
2099 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
2100 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2101 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
2102 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
2103 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2104 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
2106 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
2107 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
2108 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
2109 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2110 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
2111 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
2112 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2113 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
2115 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
2116 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
2117 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2118 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
2119 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
2120 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
2123 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.