1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
13 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
14 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
15 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
17 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
18 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
19 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
20 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
21 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
26 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
36 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
37 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
39 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCType, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
40 use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
42 use chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
43 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
44 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
45 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, Sign, KeysInterface};
46 use chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
47 use chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput};
49 use util::logger::Logger;
50 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48, OptionDeserWrapper};
52 use util::events::Event;
56 use io::{self, Error};
60 /// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
61 /// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
62 #[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
65 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
66 pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
67 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
68 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
69 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with one exception specified below.
71 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
72 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
73 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
75 /// The only instance where update_id values are not strictly increasing is the case where we
76 /// allow post-force-close updates with a special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. See
77 /// its docs for more details.
82 /// (1) a channel has been force closed and
83 /// (2) we receive a preimage from a forward link that allows us to spend an HTLC output on
84 /// this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted commitment transaction
85 /// then we allow the `ChannelManager` to send a `ChannelMonitorUpdate` with this update ID,
86 /// with the update providing said payment preimage. No other update types are allowed after
88 pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = core::u64::MAX;
90 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
91 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
92 write_ver_prefix!(w, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
93 self.update_id.write(w)?;
94 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
95 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
96 update_step.write(w)?;
98 write_tlv_fields!(w, {});
102 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
103 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
104 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(r, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
105 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
106 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
107 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::core::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
109 if let Some(upd) = MaybeReadable::read(r)? {
113 read_tlv_fields!(r, {});
114 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
118 /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
119 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
120 pub enum MonitorEvent {
121 /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
122 HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
124 /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was confirmed.
125 CommitmentTxConfirmed(OutPoint),
127 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has completed. See
128 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure`] for more information on how this is used.
130 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure
132 /// The funding outpoint of the [`ChannelMonitor`] that was updated
133 funding_txo: OutPoint,
134 /// The Update ID from [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::update_id`] which was applied or
135 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_update_id`].
137 /// Note that this should only be set to a given update's ID if all previous updates for the
138 /// same [`ChannelMonitor`] have been applied and persisted.
139 monitor_update_id: u64,
142 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has failed. See
143 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure`] for more information on how this is used.
145 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure
146 UpdateFailed(OutPoint),
148 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorEvent,
149 // Note that UpdateCompleted and UpdateFailed are currently never serialized to disk as they are
150 // generated only in ChainMonitor
151 (0, UpdateCompleted) => {
152 (0, funding_txo, required),
153 (2, monitor_update_id, required),
157 (4, CommitmentTxConfirmed),
161 /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
162 /// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
163 /// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
164 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
165 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
166 pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
167 pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
168 pub(crate) source: HTLCSource,
169 pub(crate) htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
171 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCUpdate, {
172 (0, payment_hash, required),
173 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
174 (2, source, required),
175 (4, payment_preimage, option),
178 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
179 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
180 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
181 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
182 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
183 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
184 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
185 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 18;
186 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
187 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
188 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
189 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
190 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
191 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
192 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
193 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
194 /// accurate block height.
195 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
196 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
197 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
198 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
199 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding
200 /// inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us
203 /// Note that this is a library-wide security assumption. If a reorg deeper than this number of
204 /// blocks occurs, counterparties may be able to steal funds or claims made by and balances exposed
205 /// by a [`ChannelMonitor`] may be incorrect.
206 // We also use this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
207 // It may cause spurious generation of bumped claim txn but that's alright given the outpoint is already
208 // solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
209 // keep bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
210 pub const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
211 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
212 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
214 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
215 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
216 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
218 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
219 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
221 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
222 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
224 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
225 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
226 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
227 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
229 // TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction
230 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
231 struct HolderSignedTx {
232 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
234 revocation_key: PublicKey,
235 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
236 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
237 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
238 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
239 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
240 to_self_value_sat: u64,
243 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderSignedTx, {
245 // Note that this is filled in with data from OnchainTxHandler if it's missing.
246 // For HolderSignedTx objects serialized with 0.0.100+, this should be filled in.
247 (1, to_self_value_sat, (default_value, u64::max_value())),
248 (2, revocation_key, required),
249 (4, a_htlc_key, required),
250 (6, b_htlc_key, required),
251 (8, delayed_payment_key, required),
252 (10, per_commitment_point, required),
253 (12, feerate_per_kw, required),
254 (14, htlc_outputs, vec_type)
257 /// We use this to track static counterparty commitment transaction data and to generate any
258 /// justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
260 struct CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
261 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
262 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
263 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
266 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
267 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
268 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
269 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
270 (0, self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
271 (2, self.counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
272 (4, self.on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
277 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
278 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
279 let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
280 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 had some per-HTLC state stored here, which is no longer
281 // used. Read it for compatibility.
282 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
283 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
284 let _txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
285 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
286 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
287 let _htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(r)?;
291 let mut counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
292 let mut counterparty_htlc_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
293 let mut on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = 0;
294 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
295 (0, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
296 (2, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
297 (4, on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
299 CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
300 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.0.unwrap(),
301 counterparty_htlc_base_key: counterparty_htlc_base_key.0.unwrap(),
302 on_counterparty_tx_csv,
305 Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
309 /// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height when the event was observed and the
310 /// transaction causing it.
312 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
314 struct OnchainEventEntry {
318 transaction: Option<Transaction>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in LDK 0.0.110
321 impl OnchainEventEntry {
322 fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
323 let mut conf_threshold = self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
325 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
326 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor)
328 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
329 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
330 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + descriptor.to_self_delay as u32 - 1);
332 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { on_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } |
333 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { on_to_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } => {
334 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
335 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
336 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + csv as u32 - 1);
343 fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, best_block: &BestBlock) -> bool {
344 best_block.height() >= self.confirmation_threshold()
348 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
349 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
352 /// An outbound HTLC failing after a transaction is confirmed. Used
353 /// * when an outbound HTLC output is spent by us after the HTLC timed out
354 /// * an outbound HTLC which was not present in the commitment transaction which appeared
355 /// on-chain (either because it was not fully committed to or it was dust).
356 /// Note that this is *not* used for preimage claims, as those are passed upstream immediately,
357 /// appearing only as an `HTLCSpendConfirmation`, below.
360 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
361 htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
362 /// None in the second case, above, ie when there is no relevant output in the commitment
363 /// transaction which appeared on chain.
364 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
367 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
369 /// A spend of the funding output, either a commitment transaction or a cooperative closing
371 FundingSpendConfirmation {
372 /// The CSV delay for the output of the funding spend transaction (implying it is a local
373 /// commitment transaction, and this is the delay on the to_self output).
374 on_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
376 /// A spend of a commitment transaction HTLC output, set in the cases where *no* `HTLCUpdate`
377 /// is constructed. This is used when
378 /// * an outbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty with a preimage, causing us to
379 /// immediately claim the HTLC on the inbound edge and track the resolution here,
380 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty (with a timeout),
381 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by us (with a preimage).
382 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by the revocation
384 HTLCSpendConfirmation {
385 commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
386 /// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
387 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
388 /// If the claim was made by us on an inbound HTLC against a local commitment transaction,
389 /// we set this to the output CSV value which we will have to wait until to spend the
390 /// output (and generate a SpendableOutput event).
391 on_to_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
395 impl Writeable for OnchainEventEntry {
396 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
397 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
398 (0, self.txid, required),
399 (1, self.transaction, option),
400 (2, self.height, required),
401 (4, self.event, required),
407 impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry {
408 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
409 let mut txid = Txid::all_zeros();
410 let mut transaction = None;
412 let mut event = None;
413 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
415 (1, transaction, option),
416 (2, height, required),
417 (4, event, ignorable),
419 if let Some(ev) = event {
420 Ok(Some(Self { txid, transaction, height, event: ev }))
427 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
429 (0, source, required),
430 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
431 (2, payment_hash, required),
432 (3, commitment_tx_output_idx, option),
434 (1, MaturingOutput) => {
435 (0, descriptor, required),
437 (3, FundingSpendConfirmation) => {
438 (0, on_local_output_csv, option),
440 (5, HTLCSpendConfirmation) => {
441 (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
442 (2, preimage, option),
443 (4, on_to_local_output_csv, option),
448 #[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
450 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
451 LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
452 commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
453 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
455 LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
456 commitment_txid: Txid,
457 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
458 commitment_number: u64,
459 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
462 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
468 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
469 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
471 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
472 /// think we've fallen behind!
473 should_broadcast: bool,
476 scriptpubkey: Script,
480 impl ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
481 fn variant_name(&self) -> &'static str {
483 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo",
484 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo",
485 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => "PaymentPreimage",
486 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { .. } => "CommitmentSecret",
487 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => "ChannelForceClosed",
488 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { .. } => "ShutdownScript",
493 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
494 (0, LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo) => {
495 (0, commitment_tx, required),
496 (2, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
498 (1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
499 (0, commitment_txid, required),
500 (2, commitment_number, required),
501 (4, their_per_commitment_point, required),
502 (6, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
504 (2, PaymentPreimage) => {
505 (0, payment_preimage, required),
507 (3, CommitmentSecret) => {
509 (2, secret, required),
511 (4, ChannelForceClosed) => {
512 (0, should_broadcast, required),
514 (5, ShutdownScript) => {
515 (0, scriptpubkey, required),
519 /// Details about the balance(s) available for spending once the channel appears on chain.
521 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] for more details on when these will or will not
523 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
524 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialOrd, Ord))]
526 /// The channel is not yet closed (or the commitment or closing transaction has not yet
527 /// appeared in a block). The given balance is claimable (less on-chain fees) if the channel is
528 /// force-closed now.
529 ClaimableOnChannelClose {
530 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
531 /// required to do so.
532 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
534 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance is ours but awaiting confirmations until
535 /// we consider it spendable.
536 ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
537 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, possibly excluding the on-chain fees which
538 /// were spent in broadcasting the transaction.
539 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
540 /// The height at which an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event will be generated for this
542 confirmation_height: u32,
544 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance should be ours but awaiting spending
545 /// transaction confirmation. If the spending transaction does not confirm in time, it is
546 /// possible our counterparty can take the funds by broadcasting an HTLC timeout on-chain.
548 /// Once the spending transaction confirms, before it has reached enough confirmations to be
549 /// considered safe from chain reorganizations, the balance will instead be provided via
550 /// [`Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`].
551 ContentiousClaimable {
552 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
553 /// required to do so.
554 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
555 /// The height at which the counterparty may be able to claim the balance if we have not
559 /// HTLCs which we sent to our counterparty which are claimable after a timeout (less on-chain
560 /// fees) if the counterparty does not know the preimage for the HTLCs. These are somewhat
561 /// likely to be claimed by our counterparty before we do.
562 MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
563 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
564 /// required to do so.
565 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
566 /// The height at which we will be able to claim the balance if our counterparty has not
568 claimable_height: u32,
572 /// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
574 struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
575 commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
576 /// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
577 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
580 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC, {
581 (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
582 (2, payment_preimage, option),
585 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
586 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
588 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
589 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
591 /// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
592 /// get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
593 /// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
594 /// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
596 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor), which
597 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
598 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
599 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
600 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
601 pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: Sign> {
603 pub(crate) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
605 inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
608 pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: Sign> {
609 latest_update_id: u64,
610 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
612 destination_script: Script,
613 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
614 counterparty_payment_script: Script,
615 shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
617 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
618 holder_revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
619 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
620 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
621 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
623 counterparty_commitment_params: CounterpartyCommitmentParameters,
624 funding_redeemscript: Script,
625 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
626 // first is the idx of the first of the two per-commitment points
627 their_cur_per_commitment_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
629 on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
631 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
632 /// The set of outpoints in each counterparty commitment transaction. We always need at least
633 /// the payment hash from `HTLCOutputInCommitment` to claim even a revoked commitment
634 /// transaction broadcast as we need to be able to construct the witness script in all cases.
635 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
636 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
637 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
638 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
639 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
640 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
641 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, u64>,
642 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
643 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
644 /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
645 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
646 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
648 // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
649 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
650 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
651 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
652 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
653 current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
655 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
657 current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
658 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
660 current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
662 /// The set of payment hashes from inbound payments for which we know the preimage. Payment
663 /// preimages that are not included in any unrevoked local commitment transaction or unrevoked
664 /// remote commitment transactions are automatically removed when commitment transactions are
666 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
668 // Note that `MonitorEvent`s MUST NOT be generated during update processing, only generated
669 // during chain data processing. This prevents a race in `ChainMonitor::update_channel` (and
670 // presumably user implementations thereof as well) where we update the in-memory channel
671 // object, then before the persistence finishes (as it's all under a read-lock), we return
672 // pending events to the user or to the relevant `ChannelManager`. Then, on reload, we'll have
673 // the pre-event state here, but have processed the event in the `ChannelManager`.
674 // Note that because the `event_lock` in `ChainMonitor` is only taken in
675 // block/transaction-connected events and *not* during block/transaction-disconnected events,
676 // we further MUST NOT generate events during block/transaction-disconnection.
677 pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
679 pending_events: Vec<Event>,
681 // Used to track on-chain events (i.e., transactions part of channels confirmed on chain) on
682 // which to take actions once they reach enough confirmations. Each entry includes the
683 // transaction's id and the height when the transaction was confirmed on chain.
684 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,
686 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
687 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
688 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
689 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
690 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>>,
693 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
695 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
697 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
698 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
699 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
700 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
702 // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
703 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
704 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
706 // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
707 // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
708 // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
709 holder_tx_signed: bool,
711 // If a spend of the funding output is seen, we set this to true and reject any further
712 // updates. This prevents any further changes in the offchain state no matter the order
713 // of block connection between ChannelMonitors and the ChannelManager.
714 funding_spend_seen: bool,
716 funding_spend_confirmed: Option<Txid>,
717 /// The set of HTLCs which have been either claimed or failed on chain and have reached
718 /// the requisite confirmations on the claim/fail transaction (either ANTI_REORG_DELAY or the
719 /// spending CSV for revocable outputs).
720 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec<IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC>,
722 // We simply modify best_block in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
723 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
724 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
725 // their best_block from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
726 // the full block_connected).
727 best_block: BestBlock,
729 /// The node_id of our counterparty
730 counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
732 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
735 /// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends.
736 pub type TransactionOutputs = (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>);
738 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
739 /// Used only in testing and fuzzing to check serialization roundtrips don't change the underlying
741 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
742 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
743 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
744 let other = other.inner.lock().unwrap();
749 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
750 /// Used only in testing and fuzzing to check serialization roundtrips don't change the underlying
752 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
753 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
754 if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
755 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
756 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
757 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script ||
758 self.counterparty_payment_script != other.counterparty_payment_script ||
759 self.channel_keys_id != other.channel_keys_id ||
760 self.holder_revocation_basepoint != other.holder_revocation_basepoint ||
761 self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
762 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.current_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
763 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
764 self.counterparty_commitment_params != other.counterparty_commitment_params ||
765 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
766 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
767 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points != other.their_cur_per_commitment_points ||
768 self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
769 self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
770 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
771 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
772 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number != other.counterparty_hash_commitment_number ||
773 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx ||
774 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number != other.current_counterparty_commitment_number ||
775 self.current_holder_commitment_number != other.current_holder_commitment_number ||
776 self.current_holder_commitment_tx != other.current_holder_commitment_tx ||
777 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
778 self.pending_monitor_events != other.pending_monitor_events ||
779 self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
780 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf ||
781 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
782 self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
783 self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed ||
784 self.funding_spend_seen != other.funding_spend_seen ||
785 self.funding_spend_confirmed != other.funding_spend_confirmed ||
786 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain != other.htlcs_resolved_on_chain
795 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
796 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
797 self.inner.lock().unwrap().write(writer)
801 // These are also used for ChannelMonitorUpdate, above.
802 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
803 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
805 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
806 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
807 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
809 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
811 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
812 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
814 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
815 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
816 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
817 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
818 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
819 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
821 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
824 self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
825 match &self.shutdown_script {
826 Some(script) => script.write(writer)?,
827 None => Script::new().write(writer)?,
830 self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
831 self.holder_revocation_basepoint.write(writer)?;
832 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
833 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
834 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
835 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
836 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
838 self.counterparty_commitment_params.write(writer)?;
839 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
840 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
842 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
843 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
844 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
845 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
846 match second_option {
847 Some(second_pubkey) => {
848 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
851 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
856 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
860 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_holder_tx_csv))?;
862 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
864 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
865 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
866 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
867 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
868 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
869 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
870 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
874 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
875 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
876 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
877 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
878 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
879 debug_assert!(htlc_source.is_none() || Some(**txid) == self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid
880 || Some(**txid) == self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
881 "HTLC Sources for all revoked commitment transactions should be none!");
882 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
883 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
887 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
888 for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
889 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
890 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
893 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
894 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
895 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
896 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
899 if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
900 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
901 prev_holder_tx.write(writer)?;
903 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
906 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.write(writer)?;
908 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
909 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
911 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
912 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
913 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
916 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_monitor_events.iter().filter(|ev| match ev {
917 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(_) => true,
918 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => true,
920 }).count() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
921 for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
923 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
927 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
928 _ => {}, // Covered in the TLV writes below
932 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
933 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
934 event.write(writer)?;
937 self.best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
938 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.height()))?;
940 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
941 for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
942 entry.write(writer)?;
945 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
946 for (txid, idx_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
948 (idx_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
949 for (idx, script) in idx_scripts.iter() {
951 script.write(writer)?;
954 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
956 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
957 self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
959 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
960 (1, self.funding_spend_confirmed, option),
961 (3, self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
962 (5, self.pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
963 (7, self.funding_spend_seen, required),
964 (9, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
971 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
972 /// For lockorder enforcement purposes, we need to have a single site which constructs the
973 /// `inner` mutex, otherwise cases where we lock two monitors at the same time (eg in our
974 /// PartialEq implementation) we may decide a lockorder violation has occurred.
975 fn from_impl(imp: ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>) -> Self {
976 ChannelMonitor { inner: Mutex::new(imp) }
979 pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
980 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
981 channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
982 funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
983 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
984 initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
985 best_block: BestBlock, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
987 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
988 let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
989 let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
991 let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
992 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
993 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.htlc_basepoint;
994 let counterparty_commitment_params = CounterpartyCommitmentParameters { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv };
996 let channel_keys_id = keys.channel_keys_id();
997 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
999 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1000 let (holder_commitment_tx, current_holder_commitment_number) = {
1001 let trusted_tx = initial_holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1002 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1004 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1005 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
1007 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1008 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1009 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1010 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1011 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1012 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
1013 to_self_value_sat: initial_holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
1014 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1016 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
1019 let onchain_tx_handler =
1020 OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys,
1021 channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx.clone());
1023 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
1024 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
1026 Self::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
1027 latest_update_id: 0,
1028 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1030 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
1031 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
1032 counterparty_payment_script,
1036 holder_revocation_basepoint,
1038 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1039 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1041 counterparty_commitment_params,
1042 funding_redeemscript,
1043 channel_value_satoshis,
1044 their_cur_per_commitment_points: None,
1046 on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
1048 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1049 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1050 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1051 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1053 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1054 current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
1055 current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1056 current_holder_commitment_number,
1058 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1059 pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
1060 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1062 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
1067 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1068 holder_tx_signed: false,
1069 funding_spend_seen: false,
1070 funding_spend_confirmed: None,
1071 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
1074 counterparty_node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id),
1081 fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
1082 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret)
1085 /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1086 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1087 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1088 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1089 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1092 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1093 commitment_number: u64,
1094 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
1096 ) where L::Target: Logger {
1097 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
1098 txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, logger)
1102 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
1103 &self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1104 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
1105 ) -> Result<(), ()> {
1106 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs).map_err(|_| ())
1109 /// This is used to provide payment preimage(s) out-of-band during startup without updating the
1110 /// off-chain state with a new commitment transaction.
1111 pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1113 payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
1114 payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
1116 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1119 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1120 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1123 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_payment_preimage(
1124 payment_hash, payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1127 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(
1132 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1135 self.inner.lock().unwrap().broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger)
1138 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1141 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1142 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1144 updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1150 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1151 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1154 self.inner.lock().unwrap().update_monitor(updates, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1157 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1159 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1160 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_update_id()
1163 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1164 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, Script) {
1165 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone()
1168 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1169 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1170 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>)> {
1171 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_outputs_to_watch()
1172 .iter().map(|(txid, outputs)| (*txid, outputs.clone())).collect()
1175 /// Loads the funding txo and outputs to watch into the given `chain::Filter` by repeatedly
1176 /// calling `chain::Filter::register_output` and `chain::Filter::register_tx` until all outputs
1177 /// have been registered.
1178 pub fn load_outputs_to_watch<F: Deref>(&self, filter: &F) where F::Target: chain::Filter {
1179 let lock = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1180 filter.register_tx(&lock.get_funding_txo().0.txid, &lock.get_funding_txo().1);
1181 for (txid, outputs) in lock.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
1182 for (index, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
1183 assert!(*index <= u16::max_value() as u32);
1184 filter.register_output(WatchedOutput {
1186 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: *index as u16 },
1187 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
1193 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1194 /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
1195 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1196 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events()
1199 /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
1202 /// This is called by ChainMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
1203 /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
1204 /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
1205 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
1206 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_events()
1209 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1210 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_min_seen_secret()
1213 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1214 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number()
1217 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1218 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
1221 /// Gets the `node_id` of the counterparty for this channel.
1223 /// Will be `None` for channels constructed on LDK versions prior to 0.0.110 and always `Some`
1225 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> Option<PublicKey> {
1226 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_node_id
1229 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
1230 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable holder toxic tx in case of
1231 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our counterparty side knows
1232 /// a higher revocation secret than the holder commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
1233 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
1234 /// broadcast them if counterparty don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
1235 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
1236 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
1237 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
1238 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1239 where L::Target: Logger {
1240 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1243 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1244 /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1245 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1246 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1247 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1248 where L::Target: Logger {
1249 self.inner.lock().unwrap().unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1252 /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
1253 /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
1254 /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
1255 /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
1256 /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
1257 /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
1259 /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
1260 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1262 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1263 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1265 header: &BlockHeader,
1266 txdata: &TransactionData,
1271 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1273 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1274 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1277 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_connected(
1278 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1281 /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1283 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1285 header: &BlockHeader,
1291 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1292 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1295 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_disconnected(
1296 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1299 /// Processes transactions confirmed in a block with the given header and height, returning new
1300 /// outputs to watch. See [`block_connected`] for details.
1302 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1303 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1305 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1306 pub fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1308 header: &BlockHeader,
1309 txdata: &TransactionData,
1314 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1316 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1317 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1320 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1321 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transactions_confirmed(
1322 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
1325 /// Processes a transaction that was reorganized out of the chain.
1327 /// Used instead of [`block_disconnected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather
1328 /// than blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1330 /// [`block_disconnected`]: Self::block_disconnected
1331 pub fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1338 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1339 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1342 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1343 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transaction_unconfirmed(
1344 txid, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
1347 /// Updates the monitor with the current best chain tip, returning new outputs to watch. See
1348 /// [`block_connected`] for details.
1350 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1351 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1353 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1354 pub fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1356 header: &BlockHeader,
1361 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1363 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1364 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1367 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1368 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block_updated(
1369 header, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
1372 /// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
1373 pub fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
1374 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1375 let mut txids: Vec<Txid> = inner.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
1377 .map(|entry| entry.txid)
1378 .chain(inner.onchain_tx_handler.get_relevant_txids().into_iter())
1380 txids.sort_unstable();
1385 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
1386 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
1387 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
1388 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone()
1391 /// Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to
1392 /// force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting
1395 /// Any balances in the channel which are available on-chain (excluding on-chain fees) are
1396 /// included here until an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event has been generated for the
1397 /// balance, or until our counterparty has claimed the balance and accrued several
1398 /// confirmations on the claim transaction.
1400 /// Note that the balances available when you or your counterparty have broadcasted revoked
1401 /// state(s) may not be fully captured here.
1404 /// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
1405 /// may be returned here and their meanings.
1406 pub fn get_claimable_balances(&self) -> Vec<Balance> {
1407 let mut res = Vec::new();
1408 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1410 let mut confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed;
1411 let mut pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = None;
1412 let funding_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1413 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
1414 Some((event.txid, event.confirmation_threshold()))
1417 if let Some((txid, conf_thresh)) = funding_spend_pending {
1418 debug_assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_none(),
1419 "We have a pending funding spend awaiting anti-reorg confirmation, we can't have confirmed it already!");
1420 confirmed_txid = Some(txid);
1421 pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = Some(conf_thresh);
1424 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
1425 ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
1426 for htlc in $htlc_iter {
1427 if let Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1428 if let Some(conf_thresh) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1429 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(descriptor) } = &event.event {
1430 if descriptor.outpoint.index as u32 == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx { Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
1433 debug_assert!($holder_commitment);
1434 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1435 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1436 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1438 } else if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) {
1439 // Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
1440 // HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
1441 // commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
1442 // reached, even though HTLCs may be resolved after only
1443 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
1444 debug_assert!($holder_commitment || us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
1445 } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
1446 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1447 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1448 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
1449 let htlc_update_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1450 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
1451 if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx {
1452 Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
1455 if let Some(conf_thresh) = htlc_update_pending {
1456 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1457 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1458 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1461 res.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
1462 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1463 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1466 } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
1467 // Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if
1468 // we know the preimage.
1469 // Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the
1470 // preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
1471 // to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
1472 let htlc_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1473 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } = event.event {
1474 if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx {
1475 Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()))
1479 if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
1480 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1481 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1482 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1485 res.push(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
1486 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1487 timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1496 if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
1497 let mut found_commitment_tx = false;
1498 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1499 walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
1500 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1501 if let Some(value) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1502 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1503 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(descriptor)
1505 Some(descriptor.output.value)
1508 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1509 claimable_amount_satoshis: value,
1510 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1513 // If a counterparty commitment transaction is awaiting confirmation, we
1514 // should either have a StaticPaymentOutput MaturingOutput event awaiting
1515 // confirmation with the same height or have never met our dust amount.
1518 found_commitment_tx = true;
1519 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
1520 walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
1521 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1522 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1523 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
1524 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1527 found_commitment_tx = true;
1528 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1529 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
1530 walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
1531 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1532 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1533 claimable_amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat,
1534 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1537 found_commitment_tx = true;
1540 if !found_commitment_tx {
1541 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1542 // We blindly assume this is a cooperative close transaction here, and that
1543 // neither us nor our counterparty misbehaved. At worst we've under-estimated
1544 // the amount we can claim as we'll punish a misbehaving counterparty.
1545 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1546 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
1547 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1551 // TODO: Add logic to provide claimable balances for counterparty broadcasting revoked
1554 let mut claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat = 0;
1555 for (htlc, _, _) in us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1556 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { continue; }
1558 res.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
1559 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1560 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1562 } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
1563 claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1566 res.push(Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1567 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat + claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat,
1574 /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which are pending resolution in this channel.
1575 /// This is used to reconstruct pending outbound payments on restart in the ChannelManager.
1576 pub(crate) fn get_pending_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
1577 let mut res = HashMap::new();
1578 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1580 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
1581 ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
1582 for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter {
1583 if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| Some(v.commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
1584 // We should assert that funding_spend_confirmed is_some() here, but we
1585 // have some unit tests which violate HTLC transaction CSVs entirely and
1587 // TODO: Once tests all connect transactions at consensus-valid times, we
1588 // should assert here like we do in `get_claimable_balances`.
1589 } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
1590 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1591 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1592 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
1593 let htlc_update_confd = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|event| {
1594 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
1595 // If the HTLC was timed out, we wait for ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks
1596 // before considering it "no longer pending" - this matches when we
1597 // provide the ChannelManager an HTLC failure event.
1598 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
1599 us.best_block.height() >= event.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
1600 } else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, .. } = event.event {
1601 // If the HTLC was fulfilled with a preimage, we consider the HTLC
1602 // immediately non-pending, matching when we provide ChannelManager
1604 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
1607 if !htlc_update_confd {
1608 res.insert(source.clone(), htlc.clone());
1615 // We're only concerned with the confirmation count of HTLC transactions, and don't
1616 // actually care how many confirmations a commitment transaction may or may not have. Thus,
1617 // we look for either a FundingSpendConfirmation event or a funding_spend_confirmed.
1618 let confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
1619 us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1620 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
1625 if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
1626 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1627 walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().filter_map(|(a, b)| {
1628 if let &Some(ref source) = b {
1629 Some((a, &**source))
1632 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
1633 walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
1634 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
1636 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1637 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
1638 walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
1639 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
1644 // If we have not seen a commitment transaction on-chain (ie the channel is not yet
1645 // closed), just examine the available counterparty commitment transactions. See docs
1646 // on `fail_unbroadcast_htlcs`, below, for justification.
1647 macro_rules! walk_counterparty_commitment {
1649 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1650 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1651 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1652 res.insert((**source).clone(), htlc.clone());
1658 if let Some(ref txid) = us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1659 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
1661 if let Some(ref txid) = us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1662 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
1669 pub(crate) fn get_stored_preimages(&self) -> HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage> {
1670 self.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.clone()
1674 /// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
1675 /// failing any HTLCs which didn't make it into the broadcasted commitment transaction back
1676 /// after ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
1678 /// We always compare against the set of HTLCs in counterparty commitment transactions, as those
1679 /// are the commitment transactions which are generated by us. The off-chain state machine in
1680 /// `Channel` will automatically resolve any HTLCs which were never included in a commitment
1681 /// transaction when it detects channel closure, but it is up to us to ensure any HTLCs which were
1682 /// included in a remote commitment transaction are failed back if they are not present in the
1683 /// broadcasted commitment transaction.
1685 /// Specifically, the removal process for HTLCs in `Channel` is always based on the counterparty
1686 /// sending a `revoke_and_ack`, which causes us to clear `prev_counterparty_commitment_txid`. Thus,
1687 /// as long as we examine both the current counterparty commitment transaction and, if it hasn't
1688 /// been revoked yet, the previous one, we we will never "forget" to resolve an HTLC.
1689 macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
1690 ($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_txid_confirmed: expr, $commitment_tx_confirmed: expr,
1691 $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
1692 debug_assert_eq!($commitment_tx_confirmed.txid(), $commitment_txid_confirmed);
1694 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1695 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1696 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = $self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1697 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1698 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1699 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1700 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1701 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1702 // payment_preimage.
1703 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1704 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1705 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1706 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1708 let confirmed_htlcs_iter: &mut Iterator<Item = (&HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = &mut $confirmed_htlcs_list;
1710 let mut matched_htlc = false;
1711 for (ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in confirmed_htlcs_iter {
1712 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() &&
1713 (Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source ||
1714 (broadcast_source.is_none() &&
1715 broadcast_htlc.payment_hash == htlc.payment_hash &&
1716 broadcast_htlc.amount_msat == htlc.amount_msat)) {
1717 matched_htlc = true;
1721 if matched_htlc { continue; }
1722 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
1723 if entry.height != $commitment_tx_conf_height { return true; }
1725 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref update_source, .. } => {
1726 *update_source != **source
1731 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
1732 txid: $commitment_txid_confirmed,
1733 transaction: Some($commitment_tx_confirmed.clone()),
1734 height: $commitment_tx_conf_height,
1735 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
1736 source: (**source).clone(),
1737 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
1738 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
1739 commitment_tx_output_idx: None,
1742 log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction {}, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
1743 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type,
1744 $commitment_txid_confirmed, entry.confirmation_threshold());
1745 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
1751 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1752 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1754 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1755 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous");
1760 // In the `test_invalid_funding_tx` test, we need a bogus script which matches the HTLC-Accepted
1761 // witness length match (ie is 136 bytes long). We generate one here which we also use in some
1762 // in-line tests later.
1765 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
1766 let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.to_u8(); 136];
1767 ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
1768 ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
1769 ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
1770 ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
1771 ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.to_u8();
1776 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness() -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
1777 vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
1780 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
1781 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
1782 /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
1783 /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
1784 fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
1785 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
1786 return Err("Previous secret did not match new one");
1789 // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
1790 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
1791 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
1792 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
1797 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
1798 let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
1799 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
1800 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1801 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
1803 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
1804 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1805 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1809 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1810 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1811 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1816 let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
1823 counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
1832 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
1833 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
1834 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
1835 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
1837 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
1838 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
1841 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
1842 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
1843 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(txid);
1844 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
1845 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
1846 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
1847 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
1848 Some(old_points) => {
1849 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
1850 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
1851 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
1852 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
1853 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
1855 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
1858 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
1862 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
1865 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
1866 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
1867 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
1873 /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
1874 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
1875 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
1876 /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
1877 /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
1878 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
1879 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1880 let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = {
1881 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1882 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1883 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1884 self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
1887 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1888 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1889 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1890 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1891 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1893 to_self_value_sat: holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
1894 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1897 self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(holder_commitment_tx);
1898 mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1899 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
1900 if self.holder_tx_signed {
1901 return Err("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected");
1906 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
1907 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
1908 fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1909 &mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B,
1910 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
1911 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1912 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1915 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
1917 // If the channel is force closed, try to claim the output from this preimage.
1918 // First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
1919 macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
1920 ($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
1921 let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs($commitment_number, $txid, None);
1922 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1925 if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1926 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
1927 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
1931 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1932 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
1933 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
1938 // Then if a holder commitment transaction has been seen on-chain, broadcast transactions
1939 // claiming the HTLC output from each of the holder commitment transactions.
1940 // Note that we can't just use `self.holder_tx_signed`, because that only covers the case where
1941 // *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
1942 // holder commitment transactions.
1943 if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
1944 // Assume that the broadcasted commitment transaction confirmed in the current best
1945 // block. Even if not, its a reasonable metric for the bump criteria on the HTLC
1947 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
1948 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1949 if let Some(ref tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1950 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&tx, self.best_block.height());
1951 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1956 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
1957 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1960 for tx in self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
1961 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting local {}", log_tx!(tx));
1962 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1964 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
1967 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()>
1968 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1969 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1972 log_info!(logger, "Applying update to monitor {}, bringing update_id from {} to {} with {} changes.",
1973 log_funding_info!(self), self.latest_update_id, updates.update_id, updates.updates.len());
1974 // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a
1975 // preimage for a broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd
1976 // like to claim on-chain. If this is the case, we no longer have guaranteed
1977 // access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a sentinel value instead.
1978 if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
1979 assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
1980 match updates.updates[0] {
1981 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => {},
1983 log_error!(logger, "Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate of type {}", updates.updates[0].variant_name());
1984 panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage");
1987 } else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
1988 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
1990 let mut ret = Ok(());
1991 for update in updates.updates.iter() {
1993 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
1994 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
1995 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
1996 if let Err(e) = self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone()) {
1997 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest holder commitment transaction failed/was refused:");
1998 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2002 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point } => {
2003 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
2004 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_per_commitment_point, logger)
2006 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
2007 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
2008 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&*fee_estimator);
2009 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
2011 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
2012 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
2013 if let Err(e) = self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret) {
2014 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest counterparty commitment secret failed/was refused:");
2015 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2019 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
2020 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
2021 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
2022 if *should_broadcast {
2023 self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
2024 } else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
2025 log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic holder commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
2027 // If we generated a MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed, the ChannelManager
2028 // will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we
2029 // shouldn't print the scary warning above.
2030 log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction.");
2033 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { scriptpubkey } => {
2034 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with shutdown script");
2035 if let Some(shutdown_script) = self.shutdown_script.replace(scriptpubkey.clone()) {
2036 panic!("Attempted to replace shutdown script {} with {}", shutdown_script, scriptpubkey);
2041 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
2043 if ret.is_ok() && self.funding_spend_seen {
2044 log_error!(logger, "Refusing Channel Monitor Update as counterparty attempted to update commitment after funding was spent");
2049 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
2050 self.latest_update_id
2053 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
2057 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>> {
2058 // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
2059 // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
2060 // its trivial to do, double-check that here.
2061 for (txid, _) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
2062 self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered");
2064 &self.outputs_to_watch
2067 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
2068 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2069 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
2073 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
2074 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2075 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
2079 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
2080 fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
2081 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
2084 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
2085 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
2088 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
2089 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
2092 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
2093 self.current_holder_commitment_number
2096 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
2097 /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
2098 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
2099 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
2100 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
2101 /// revoked counterparty commitment tx
2102 fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs) where L::Target: Logger {
2103 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
2104 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
2105 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2106 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2108 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
2109 let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
2111 macro_rules! ignore_error {
2112 ( $thing : expr ) => {
2115 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
2120 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence.0 as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time.0 as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
2121 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
2122 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
2123 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
2124 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2125 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint));
2126 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key));
2128 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
2129 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2131 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
2132 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2133 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2134 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, outp.value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
2135 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
2136 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
2140 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
2141 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2142 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
2143 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2144 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
2145 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
2146 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
2148 let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
2149 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(revk_htlc_outp), htlc.cltv_expiry, true, height);
2150 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
2155 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
2156 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
2157 // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
2158 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
2159 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2160 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
2162 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
2164 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2165 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked_counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2166 per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
2167 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
2170 debug_assert!(false, "We should have per-commitment option for any recognized old commitment txn");
2171 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2172 [].iter().map(|reference| *reference), logger);
2175 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2176 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
2177 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
2178 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
2179 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
2180 // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
2181 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
2183 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2184 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
2186 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
2188 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
2189 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2190 per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
2191 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
2194 let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
2195 for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
2196 claimable_outpoints.push(req);
2200 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
2203 fn get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>) -> Vec<PackageTemplate> {
2204 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2205 if let Some(htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
2206 if let Some(per_commitment_points) = self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
2207 let per_commitment_point_option =
2208 // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
2209 // per-commitment point
2210 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&per_commitment_points.1) }
2211 else if let Some(point) = per_commitment_points.2.as_ref() {
2212 // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
2213 // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
2214 // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
2215 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
2217 if let Some(per_commitment_point) = per_commitment_point_option {
2218 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
2219 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2220 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
2221 if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
2222 transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
2223 return claimable_outpoints; // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
2226 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
2227 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
2228 let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered {
2229 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(
2230 CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
2231 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
2232 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
2233 preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone()))
2235 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
2236 CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
2237 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
2238 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
2241 let aggregation = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
2242 let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry,aggregation, 0);
2243 claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
2253 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
2254 fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<TransactionOutputs>) where L::Target: Logger {
2255 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
2256 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
2257 return (Vec::new(), None)
2260 macro_rules! ignore_error {
2261 ( $thing : expr ) => {
2264 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
2269 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
2270 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
2271 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2273 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty HTLC transaction, spending {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
2274 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, tx.output[0].value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
2275 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(htlc_txid, 0, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
2276 let claimable_outpoints = vec!(justice_package);
2277 let outputs = vec![(0, tx.output[0].clone())];
2278 (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, outputs)))
2281 // Returns (1) `PackageTemplate`s that can be given to the OnChainTxHandler, so that the handler can
2282 // broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
2283 // script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
2284 fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, conf_height: u32) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
2285 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2287 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
2288 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
2290 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2291 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2292 let htlc_output = if htlc.offered {
2293 HolderHTLCOutput::build_offered(htlc.amount_msat, htlc.cltv_expiry)
2295 let payment_preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
2298 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2301 HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat)
2303 let htlc_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(holder_tx.txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(htlc_output), htlc.cltv_expiry, false, conf_height);
2304 claim_requests.push(htlc_package);
2308 (claim_requests, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
2311 // Returns holder HTLC outputs to watch and react to in case of spending.
2312 fn get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, commitment_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(u32, TxOut)> {
2313 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2314 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2315 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2316 watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
2322 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
2323 /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
2324 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
2325 /// Returns None unless the transaction is definitely one of our commitment transactions.
2326 fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<(Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs)> where L::Target: Logger {
2327 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
2328 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
2329 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2331 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
2332 ($updates: expr, $to_watch: expr) => {
2333 claim_requests = $updates.0;
2334 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.1;
2335 watch_outputs.append(&mut $to_watch);
2339 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
2340 let mut is_holder_tx = false;
2342 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2343 is_holder_tx = true;
2344 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of latest holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
2345 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, height);
2346 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
2347 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
2348 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2349 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter()
2350 .map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())), logger);
2351 } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2352 if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2353 is_holder_tx = true;
2354 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of previous holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
2355 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height);
2356 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
2357 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
2358 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2359 holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())),
2365 Some((claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)))
2371 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2372 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
2373 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2374 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2375 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2376 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
2377 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2378 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2379 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2380 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2381 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2384 } else if htlc.0.cltv_expiry > self.best_block.height() + 1 {
2385 // Don't broadcast HTLC-Timeout transactions immediately as they don't meet the
2386 // current locktime requirements on-chain. We will broadcast them in
2387 // `block_confirmed` when `should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn` returns true.
2388 // Note that we add + 1 as transactions are broadcastable when they can be
2389 // confirmed in the next block.
2392 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2393 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2394 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
2398 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
2399 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
2403 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
2404 /// Note that this includes possibly-locktimed-in-the-future transactions!
2405 fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2406 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
2407 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2408 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2409 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
2410 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2411 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2412 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2413 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2414 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2418 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2419 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2420 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
2427 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2428 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2429 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2432 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2433 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2435 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
2436 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
2439 fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2441 header: &BlockHeader,
2444 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2446 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2448 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2449 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2452 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2454 if height > self.best_block.height() {
2455 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2456 self.block_confirmed(height, vec![], vec![], vec![], &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
2457 } else if block_hash != self.best_block.block_hash() {
2458 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2459 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height <= height);
2460 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height + 1, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2462 } else { Vec::new() }
2465 fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2467 header: &BlockHeader,
2468 txdata: &TransactionData,
2471 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2473 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2475 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2476 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2479 let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
2480 for tx in &txn_matched {
2481 let mut output_val = 0;
2482 for out in tx.output.iter() {
2483 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2484 output_val += out.value;
2485 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2489 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2491 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2492 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2493 for tx in &txn_matched {
2494 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
2495 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
2496 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
2497 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
2499 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
2500 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
2501 let mut balance_spendable_csv = None;
2502 log_info!(logger, "Channel {} closed by funding output spend in txid {}.",
2503 log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()), tx.txid());
2504 self.funding_spend_seen = true;
2505 if (tx.input[0].sequence.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
2506 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
2507 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2508 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2510 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2511 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
2512 if let Some((mut new_outpoints, new_outputs)) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &logger) {
2513 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2514 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2516 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2517 balance_spendable_csv = Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv);
2521 let txid = tx.txid();
2522 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
2524 transaction: Some((*tx).clone()),
2526 event: OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation {
2527 on_local_output_csv: balance_spendable_csv,
2531 if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
2532 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
2533 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2534 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
2535 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2540 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
2541 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
2542 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
2543 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &logger);
2545 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger);
2548 if height > self.best_block.height() {
2549 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2552 self.block_confirmed(height, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
2555 /// Update state for new block(s)/transaction(s) confirmed. Note that the caller must update
2556 /// `self.best_block` before calling if a new best blockchain tip is available. More
2557 /// concretely, `self.best_block` must never be at a lower height than `conf_height`, avoiding
2558 /// complexity especially in `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`.
2560 /// `conf_height` should be set to the height at which any new transaction(s)/block(s) were
2561 /// confirmed at, even if it is not the current best height.
2562 fn block_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2565 txn_matched: Vec<&Transaction>,
2566 mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
2567 mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<PackageTemplate>,
2569 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2571 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2573 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2574 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2577 log_trace!(logger, "Processing {} matched transactions for block at height {}.", txn_matched.len(), conf_height);
2578 debug_assert!(self.best_block.height() >= conf_height);
2580 let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
2581 if should_broadcast {
2582 let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone());
2583 let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), self.best_block.height(), false, self.best_block.height());
2584 claimable_outpoints.push(commitment_package);
2585 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
2586 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2587 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2588 // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
2589 // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
2590 // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
2591 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
2592 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
2593 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2594 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2596 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2599 // Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold.
2600 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
2601 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2602 let mut onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf = Vec::new();
2603 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
2604 if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self.best_block) {
2605 onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2607 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2611 // Used to check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
2612 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2613 let unmatured_htlcs: Vec<_> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
2615 .filter_map(|entry| match &entry.event {
2616 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source, .. } => Some(source),
2620 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2621 let mut matured_htlcs = Vec::new();
2623 // Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
2624 for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
2626 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, htlc_value_satoshis, commitment_tx_output_idx } => {
2627 // Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
2628 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2631 unmatured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &source).is_none(),
2632 "An unmature HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
2633 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
2634 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
2636 matured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == source).is_none(),
2637 "A matured HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
2638 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
2639 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
2640 matured_htlcs.push(source.clone());
2643 log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update in {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream",
2644 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.txid);
2645 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2647 payment_preimage: None,
2648 source: source.clone(),
2649 htlc_value_satoshis,
2651 if let Some(idx) = commitment_tx_output_idx {
2652 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { commitment_tx_output_idx: idx, payment_preimage: None });
2655 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
2656 log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
2657 self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
2658 outputs: vec![descriptor]
2661 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } => {
2662 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { commitment_tx_output_idx, payment_preimage: preimage });
2664 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => {
2665 self.funding_spend_confirmed = Some(entry.txid);
2670 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, conf_height, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2672 // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
2673 // updating the latter in the process.
2674 watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
2675 let idx_and_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| (o.0, o.1.script_pubkey.clone())).collect();
2676 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), idx_and_scripts).is_none()
2680 // If we see a transaction for which we registered outputs previously,
2681 // make sure the registered scriptpubkey at the expected index match
2682 // the actual transaction output one. We failed this case before #653.
2683 for tx in &txn_matched {
2684 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&tx.txid()) {
2685 for idx_and_script in outputs.iter() {
2686 assert!((idx_and_script.0 as usize) < tx.output.len());
2687 assert_eq!(tx.output[idx_and_script.0 as usize].script_pubkey, idx_and_script.1);
2695 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
2696 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2697 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2700 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", header.block_hash(), height);
2703 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
2704 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
2705 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height < height);
2707 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
2708 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
2710 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
2713 fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2717 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2720 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2721 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2724 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| if entry.txid == *txid {
2725 log_info!(logger, "Removing onchain event with txid {}", txid);
2728 self.onchain_tx_handler.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2731 /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
2732 /// transactions thereof.
2733 fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
2734 let mut matched_txn = HashSet::new();
2735 txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
2736 let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
2737 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2738 if matches { break; }
2739 if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2744 matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
2747 }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
2750 /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
2751 fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
2752 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2753 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2754 for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
2755 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
2758 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
2759 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
2760 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
2761 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
2762 if input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec() == deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() {
2763 // In at least one test we use a deliberately bogus witness
2764 // script which hit an old panic. Thus, we check for that here
2765 // and avoid the assert if its the expected bogus script.
2769 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
2770 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
2771 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
2772 } else { panic!(); }
2783 fn should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
2784 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
2785 // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
2786 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
2787 // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
2788 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
2789 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
2790 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
2791 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
2792 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
2793 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
2794 let height = self.best_block.height();
2795 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2796 ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
2797 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
2798 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
2799 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
2800 // time out the HTLC first.
2801 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
2802 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
2803 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
2804 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
2805 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
2806 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
2807 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
2808 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
2809 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
2810 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
2811 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
2812 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
2813 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2814 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2815 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2816 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
2817 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
2818 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
2819 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
2820 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
2821 let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
2822 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
2823 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
2824 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2831 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2833 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2834 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2835 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2838 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2839 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2840 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2847 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
2848 /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2849 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2850 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2851 let mut payment_data = None;
2852 let witness_items = input.witness.len();
2853 let htlctype = input.witness.last().map(|w| w.len()).and_then(HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype);
2854 let prev_last_witness_len = input.witness.second_to_last().map(|w| w.len()).unwrap_or(0);
2855 let revocation_sig_claim = (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33)
2856 || (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33);
2857 let accepted_preimage_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
2858 && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;
2859 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
2860 let accepted_timeout_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
2861 let offered_preimage_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) &&
2862 !revocation_sig_claim && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;
2864 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
2865 let offered_timeout_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
2867 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2868 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2869 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
2870 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2871 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
2874 macro_rules! log_claim {
2875 ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2876 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
2877 // HTLCs must either be claimed by a matching script type or through the
2879 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
2880 debug_assert!(!$htlc.offered || offered_preimage_claim || offered_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
2881 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
2882 debug_assert!($htlc.offered || accepted_preimage_claim || accepted_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
2883 // Further, only exactly one of the possible spend paths should have been
2884 // matched by any HTLC spend:
2885 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
2886 debug_assert_eq!(accepted_preimage_claim as u8 + accepted_timeout_claim as u8 +
2887 offered_preimage_claim as u8 + offered_timeout_claim as u8 +
2888 revocation_sig_claim as u8, 1);
2889 if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2890 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2891 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2892 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2893 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2894 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2896 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2897 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2898 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2899 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2904 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
2905 ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2906 if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
2907 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2908 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2909 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2910 log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2911 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash, $htlc_output.amount_msat));
2920 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2921 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
2922 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2923 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2924 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2925 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
2926 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2927 // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
2928 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2929 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2930 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2931 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash, htlc_output.amount_msat));
2932 } else if !$holder_tx {
2933 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2934 if payment_data.is_none() {
2935 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2938 if payment_data.is_none() {
2939 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
2940 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == htlc_output.offered;
2941 if !outbound_htlc || revocation_sig_claim {
2942 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
2943 txid: tx.txid(), height, transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
2944 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
2945 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
2946 preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
2947 Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
2948 // If this is a payment to us (!outbound_htlc, above),
2949 // wait for the CSV delay before dropping the HTLC from
2950 // claimable balance if the claim was an HTLC-Success
2952 on_to_local_output_csv: if accepted_preimage_claim {
2953 Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv) } else { None },
2957 // Outbound claims should always have payment_data, unless
2958 // we've already failed the HTLC as the commitment transaction
2959 // which was broadcasted was revoked. In that case, we should
2960 // spend the HTLC output here immediately, and expose that fact
2961 // as a Balance, something which we do not yet do.
2962 // TODO: Track the above as claimable!
2964 continue 'outer_loop;
2971 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
2972 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2973 "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
2975 if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2976 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2977 scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2978 "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
2981 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2982 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2983 "counterparty commitment tx", false);
2986 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2987 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2988 if let Some((source, payment_hash, amount_msat)) = payment_data {
2989 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2990 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
2991 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
2992 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
2995 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
2996 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
2997 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
2998 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2999 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
3002 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3004 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3006 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3009 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
3010 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
3011 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
3012 upd.source == source
3014 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3016 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3018 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3019 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3020 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3021 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
3024 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3026 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3028 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3032 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
3033 if entry.height != height { return true; }
3035 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref htlc_source, .. } => {
3036 *htlc_source != source
3041 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
3043 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3045 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
3046 source, payment_hash,
3047 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3048 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
3051 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.confirmation_threshold());
3052 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3058 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
3059 fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3060 let mut spendable_output = None;
3061 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
3062 if i > ::core::u16::MAX as usize {
3063 // While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the
3064 // 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not
3065 // in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who
3066 // wishes to give us money for no reason.
3067 // Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere
3068 // near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's
3069 // scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently
3070 // non-standard due to their size.
3071 // Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in
3072 // us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills
3073 // nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case.
3076 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
3077 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
3078 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3079 output: outp.clone(),
3083 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
3084 if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
3085 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
3086 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3087 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
3088 to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
3089 output: outp.clone(),
3090 revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.clone(),
3091 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3092 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3097 if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
3098 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
3099 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3100 output: outp.clone(),
3101 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3102 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3106 if self.shutdown_script.as_ref() == Some(&outp.script_pubkey) {
3107 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
3108 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3109 output: outp.clone(),
3114 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
3115 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
3117 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3119 event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
3121 log_info!(logger, "Received spendable output {}, spendable at height {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());
3122 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3127 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
3129 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3130 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3133 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3134 self.0.block_connected(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3137 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3138 self.0.block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3142 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
3144 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3145 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3148 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3149 self.0.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3152 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
3153 self.0.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3156 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3157 self.0.best_block_updated(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3160 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
3161 self.0.get_relevant_txids()
3165 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
3167 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>> ReadableArgs<&'a K>
3168 for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<Signer>) {
3169 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_manager: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3170 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
3174 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3179 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
3181 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3182 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3184 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3185 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3187 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
3188 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3189 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3190 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
3193 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3195 let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3196 let shutdown_script = {
3197 let script = <Script as Readable>::read(reader)?;
3198 if script.is_empty() { None } else { Some(script) }
3201 let channel_keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3202 let holder_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3203 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
3204 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
3205 let outpoint = OutPoint {
3206 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
3207 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
3209 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
3210 let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3211 let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3213 let counterparty_commitment_params = Readable::read(reader)?;
3214 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
3215 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3217 let their_cur_per_commitment_points = {
3218 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3222 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3223 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
3224 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
3225 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
3227 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
3232 let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3234 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
3236 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
3239 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
3240 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3241 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3242 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3243 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
3245 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3246 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
3252 let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3253 let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
3254 for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
3255 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3256 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3257 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3258 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
3259 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
3261 if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
3262 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3266 let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3267 let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3268 for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
3269 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3270 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3271 if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
3272 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3276 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3277 let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3278 for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
3279 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3280 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3281 if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
3282 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3286 let mut prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx> =
3287 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3290 Some(Readable::read(reader)?)
3292 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3294 let mut current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx = Readable::read(reader)?;
3296 let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3297 let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3299 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3300 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3301 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
3302 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
3303 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3304 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
3305 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3309 let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3310 let mut pending_monitor_events = Some(
3311 Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3))));
3312 for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
3313 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3314 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
3315 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_info.0),
3316 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
3318 pending_monitor_events.as_mut().unwrap().push(ev);
3321 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3322 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
3323 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
3324 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3325 pending_events.push(event);
3329 let best_block = BestBlock::new(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
3331 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3332 let mut onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3333 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
3334 if let Some(val) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3335 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(val);
3339 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3340 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
3341 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
3342 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3343 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3344 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Script>())));
3345 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
3346 outputs.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3348 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
3349 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3352 let onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, keys_manager)?;
3354 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
3355 let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
3357 if let Some(prev_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_mut() {
3358 let prev_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_prev_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
3359 if prev_holder_value.is_none() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
3360 if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
3361 prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = prev_holder_value.unwrap();
3362 } else if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != prev_holder_value.unwrap() {
3363 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3367 let cur_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_cur_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
3368 if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
3369 current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = cur_holder_value;
3370 } else if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != cur_holder_value {
3371 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3374 let mut funding_spend_confirmed = None;
3375 let mut htlcs_resolved_on_chain = Some(Vec::new());
3376 let mut funding_spend_seen = Some(false);
3377 let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
3378 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
3379 (1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
3380 (3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
3381 (5, pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
3382 (7, funding_spend_seen, option),
3383 (9, counterparty_node_id, option),
3386 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3387 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3389 Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
3391 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
3394 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
3395 counterparty_payment_script,
3399 holder_revocation_basepoint,
3401 current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
3402 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
3404 counterparty_commitment_params,
3405 funding_redeemscript,
3406 channel_value_satoshis,
3407 their_cur_per_commitment_points,
3412 counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
3413 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
3414 counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
3416 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
3417 current_holder_commitment_tx,
3418 current_counterparty_commitment_number,
3419 current_holder_commitment_number,
3422 pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
3425 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
3430 lockdown_from_offchain,
3432 funding_spend_seen: funding_spend_seen.unwrap(),
3433 funding_spend_confirmed,
3434 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
3437 counterparty_node_id,
3446 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
3447 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
3448 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3449 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, EcdsaSighashType};
3450 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
3451 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
3452 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
3453 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
3454 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
3455 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
3456 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3457 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
3458 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
3462 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
3464 use super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStep;
3465 use ::{check_added_monitors, check_closed_broadcast, check_closed_event, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
3466 use chain::{BestBlock, Confirm};
3467 use chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
3468 use chain::package::{weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc, weight_revoked_offered_htlc, weight_revoked_received_htlc, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
3469 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3470 use chain::keysinterface::InMemorySigner;
3471 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3473 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
3474 use ln::channelmanager::PaymentSendFailure;
3475 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
3476 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
3477 use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
3478 use util::errors::APIError;
3479 use util::events::{ClosureReason, MessageSendEventsProvider};
3480 use util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
3481 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
3482 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3484 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, TxMerkleNode, Witness};
3487 fn do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(use_local_txn: bool) {
3488 // Previously, monitor updates were allowed freely even after a funding-spend transaction
3489 // confirmed. This would allow a race condition where we could receive a payment (including
3490 // the counterparty revoking their broadcasted state!) and accept it without recourse as
3491 // long as the ChannelMonitor receives the block first, the full commitment update dance
3492 // occurs after the block is connected, and before the ChannelManager receives the block.
3493 // Obviously this is an incredibly contrived race given the counterparty would be risking
3494 // their full channel balance for it, but its worth fixing nonetheless as it makes the
3495 // potential ChannelMonitor states simpler to reason about.
3497 // This test checks said behavior, as well as ensuring a ChannelMonitorUpdate with multiple
3498 // updates is handled correctly in such conditions.
3499 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3500 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3501 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3502 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3503 let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(
3504 &nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3505 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(
3506 &nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3508 // Rebalance somewhat
3509 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
3511 // First route two payments for testing at the end
3512 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
3513 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
3515 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel.2);
3516 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
3517 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel.2);
3518 assert_eq!(remote_txn.len(), 3); // Commitment and two HTLC-Timeouts
3519 check_spends!(remote_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
3520 check_spends!(remote_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
3521 let broadcast_tx = if use_local_txn { &local_txn[0] } else { &remote_txn[0] };
3523 // Connect a commitment transaction, but only to the ChainMonitor/ChannelMonitor. The
3524 // channel is now closed, but the ChannelManager doesn't know that yet.
3525 let new_header = BlockHeader {
3526 version: 2, time: 0, bits: 0, nonce: 0,
3527 prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_info().0,
3528 merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros() };
3529 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3530 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(&new_header,
3531 &[(0, broadcast_tx)], conf_height);
3533 let (_, pre_update_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<InMemorySigner>)>::read(
3534 &mut io::Cursor::new(&get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel.2).encode()),
3535 &nodes[1].keys_manager.backing).unwrap();
3537 // If the ChannelManager tries to update the channel, however, the ChainMonitor will pass
3538 // the update through to the ChannelMonitor which will refuse it (as the channel is closed).
3539 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
3540 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)),
3541 true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
3542 assert!(err.contains("ChannelMonitor storage failure")));
3543 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2); // After the failure we generate a close-channel monitor update
3544 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3545 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_string() });
3547 // Build a new ChannelMonitorUpdate which contains both the failing commitment tx update
3548 // and provides the claim preimages for the two pending HTLCs. The first update generates
3549 // an error, but the point of this test is to ensure the later updates are still applied.
3550 let monitor_updates = nodes[1].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
3551 let mut replay_update = monitor_updates.get(&channel.2).unwrap().iter().rev().skip(1).next().unwrap().clone();
3552 assert_eq!(replay_update.updates.len(), 1);
3553 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } = replay_update.updates[0] {
3554 } else { panic!(); }
3555 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_1 });
3556 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_2 });
3558 let broadcaster = TestBroadcaster::new(Arc::clone(&nodes[1].blocks));
3560 pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
3562 // Even though we error'd on the first update, we should still have generated an HTLC claim
3564 let txn_broadcasted = broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3565 assert!(txn_broadcasted.len() >= 2);
3566 let htlc_txn = txn_broadcasted.iter().filter(|tx| {
3567 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1);
3568 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == broadcast_tx.txid()
3569 }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
3570 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
3571 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], broadcast_tx);
3572 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], broadcast_tx);
3575 fn test_funding_spend_refuses_updates() {
3576 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(true);
3577 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(false);
3581 fn test_prune_preimages() {
3582 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3583 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3584 let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))});
3585 let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
3587 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3588 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3590 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
3593 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
3594 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3595 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
3599 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
3600 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3602 let mut res = Vec::new();
3603 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
3604 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3608 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
3609 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
3616 macro_rules! preimages_to_holder_htlcs {
3617 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3619 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
3620 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
3626 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
3627 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
3628 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
3629 assert!($monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
3634 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
3636 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3637 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3638 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3639 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3640 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3641 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3647 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
3648 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
3649 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
3650 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
3651 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap()),
3652 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())
3654 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() };
3655 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
3656 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
3657 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
3658 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
3659 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
3660 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
3661 selected_contest_delay: 67,
3663 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
3666 // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
3668 let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3669 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(Network::Testnet);
3670 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
3671 Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &Script::new(),
3672 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
3673 &channel_parameters,
3674 Script::new(), 46, 0,
3675 HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), best_block, dummy_key);
3677 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
3678 let dummy_txid = dummy_tx.txid();
3679 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
3680 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
3681 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
3682 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
3683 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
3684 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_estimator);
3685 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger);
3688 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
3689 let mut secret = [0; 32];
3690 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3691 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3692 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 15);
3693 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3694 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
3696 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
3697 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3698 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3699 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 13);
3700 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3701 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
3703 // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
3704 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
3705 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
3706 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3707 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3708 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 12);
3709 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3710 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
3712 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
3713 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
3714 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3715 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3716 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 5);
3717 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
3721 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
3722 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
3723 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
3725 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3726 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3727 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
3729 macro_rules! sign_input {
3730 ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $weight: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
3731 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3732 offered: if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) { true } else { false },
3734 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
3735 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
3736 transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
3738 let redeem_script = if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
3739 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.segwit_signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
3740 let sig = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &privkey);
3741 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
3742 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
3743 $sum_actual_sigs += ser_sig.len();
3744 let witness = $sighash_parts.witness_mut($idx).unwrap();
3745 witness.push(ser_sig);
3746 if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT {
3747 witness.push(vec!(1));
3748 } else if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_revoked_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
3749 witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
3750 } else if *$weight == weight_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
3751 witness.push(vec![0]);
3753 witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
3755 witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
3756 let witness = witness.to_vec();
3757 println!("witness[0] {}", witness[0].len());
3758 println!("witness[1] {}", witness[1].len());
3759 println!("witness[2] {}", witness[2].len());
3763 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
3764 let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
3766 // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
3767 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
3768 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3769 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3771 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3772 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3776 script_sig: Script::new(),
3777 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
3778 witness: Witness::new(),
3781 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3782 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3785 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
3786 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
3787 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
3789 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3790 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
3791 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
3792 inputs_total_weight += inp;
3795 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3798 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
3799 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
3800 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3801 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3803 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3804 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3808 script_sig: Script::new(),
3809 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
3810 witness: Witness::new(),
3813 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3814 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3817 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
3818 let inputs_weight = vec![weight_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
3819 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
3821 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3822 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
3823 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
3824 inputs_total_weight += inp;
3827 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3830 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
3831 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
3832 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3833 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3834 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3835 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3839 script_sig: Script::new(),
3840 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
3841 witness: Witness::new(),
3843 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3844 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3847 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
3848 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
3849 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
3851 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3852 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
3853 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
3854 inputs_total_weight += inp;
3857 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3861 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.