1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
13 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
14 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
15 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
17 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
18 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
19 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
20 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
21 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
26 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
27 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
37 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
38 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
40 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCClaim, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
41 use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
43 use chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
44 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
45 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
46 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, Sign, KeysInterface};
47 use chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
48 use chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput};
50 use util::logger::Logger;
51 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48, OptionDeserWrapper};
53 use util::events::Event;
57 use io::{self, Error};
58 use core::convert::TryInto;
62 /// An update generated by the underlying channel itself which contains some new information the
63 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] should be made aware of.
65 /// Because this represents only a small number of updates to the underlying state, it is generally
66 /// much smaller than a full [`ChannelMonitor`]. However, for large single commitment transaction
67 /// updates (e.g. ones during which there are hundreds of HTLCs pending on the commitment
68 /// transaction), a single update may reach upwards of 1 MiB in serialized size.
69 #[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
72 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
73 pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
74 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
75 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
76 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with one exception specified below.
78 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
79 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] have been applied to all copies of a given
80 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
82 /// The only instance where update_id values are not strictly increasing is the case where we
83 /// allow post-force-close updates with a special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. See
84 /// its docs for more details.
86 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
91 /// (1) a channel has been force closed and
92 /// (2) we receive a preimage from a forward link that allows us to spend an HTLC output on
93 /// this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted commitment transaction
94 /// then we allow the `ChannelManager` to send a `ChannelMonitorUpdate` with this update ID,
95 /// with the update providing said payment preimage. No other update types are allowed after
97 pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = core::u64::MAX;
99 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
100 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
101 write_ver_prefix!(w, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
102 self.update_id.write(w)?;
103 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
104 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
105 update_step.write(w)?;
107 write_tlv_fields!(w, {});
111 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
112 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
113 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(r, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
114 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
115 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
116 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::core::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
118 if let Some(upd) = MaybeReadable::read(r)? {
122 read_tlv_fields!(r, {});
123 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
127 /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
128 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
129 pub enum MonitorEvent {
130 /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
131 HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
133 /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was confirmed.
134 CommitmentTxConfirmed(OutPoint),
136 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has completed. See
137 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] for more information on how this is used.
139 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
141 /// The funding outpoint of the [`ChannelMonitor`] that was updated
142 funding_txo: OutPoint,
143 /// The Update ID from [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::update_id`] which was applied or
144 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_update_id`].
146 /// Note that this should only be set to a given update's ID if all previous updates for the
147 /// same [`ChannelMonitor`] have been applied and persisted.
148 monitor_update_id: u64,
151 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has failed. See
152 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`] for more information on how this is used.
154 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure
155 UpdateFailed(OutPoint),
157 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorEvent,
158 // Note that Completed and UpdateFailed are currently never serialized to disk as they are
159 // generated only in ChainMonitor
161 (0, funding_txo, required),
162 (2, monitor_update_id, required),
166 (4, CommitmentTxConfirmed),
170 /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
171 /// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
172 /// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
173 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
174 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
175 pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
176 pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
177 pub(crate) source: HTLCSource,
178 pub(crate) htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
180 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCUpdate, {
181 (0, payment_hash, required),
182 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
183 (2, source, required),
184 (4, payment_preimage, option),
187 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
188 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
189 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
190 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
191 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
192 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
193 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
194 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 18;
195 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
196 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
197 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
198 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
199 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
200 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
201 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
202 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
203 /// accurate block height.
204 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
205 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
206 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
207 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
208 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding
209 /// inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us
212 /// Note that this is a library-wide security assumption. If a reorg deeper than this number of
213 /// blocks occurs, counterparties may be able to steal funds or claims made by and balances exposed
214 /// by a [`ChannelMonitor`] may be incorrect.
215 // We also use this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
216 // It may cause spurious generation of bumped claim txn but that's alright given the outpoint is already
217 // solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
218 // keep bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
219 pub const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
220 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
221 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
223 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
224 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
225 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
227 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
228 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
230 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
231 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
233 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
234 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
235 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
236 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
238 // TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction
239 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
240 struct HolderSignedTx {
241 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
243 revocation_key: PublicKey,
244 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
245 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
246 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
247 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
248 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
249 to_self_value_sat: u64,
252 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderSignedTx, {
254 // Note that this is filled in with data from OnchainTxHandler if it's missing.
255 // For HolderSignedTx objects serialized with 0.0.100+, this should be filled in.
256 (1, to_self_value_sat, (default_value, u64::max_value())),
257 (2, revocation_key, required),
258 (4, a_htlc_key, required),
259 (6, b_htlc_key, required),
260 (8, delayed_payment_key, required),
261 (10, per_commitment_point, required),
262 (12, feerate_per_kw, required),
263 (14, htlc_outputs, vec_type)
266 /// We use this to track static counterparty commitment transaction data and to generate any
267 /// justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
269 struct CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
270 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
271 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
272 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
275 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
276 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
277 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
278 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
279 (0, self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
280 (2, self.counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
281 (4, self.on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
286 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
287 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
288 let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
289 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 had some per-HTLC state stored here, which is no longer
290 // used. Read it for compatibility.
291 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
292 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
293 let _txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
294 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
295 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
296 let _htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(r)?;
300 let mut counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
301 let mut counterparty_htlc_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
302 let mut on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = 0;
303 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
304 (0, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
305 (2, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
306 (4, on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
308 CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
309 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.0.unwrap(),
310 counterparty_htlc_base_key: counterparty_htlc_base_key.0.unwrap(),
311 on_counterparty_tx_csv,
314 Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
318 /// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height when the event was observed and the
319 /// transaction causing it.
321 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
323 struct OnchainEventEntry {
327 transaction: Option<Transaction>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in LDK 0.0.110
330 impl OnchainEventEntry {
331 fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
332 let mut conf_threshold = self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
334 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
335 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor)
337 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
338 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
339 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + descriptor.to_self_delay as u32 - 1);
341 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { on_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } |
342 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { on_to_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } => {
343 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
344 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
345 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + csv as u32 - 1);
352 fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, best_block: &BestBlock) -> bool {
353 best_block.height() >= self.confirmation_threshold()
357 /// The (output index, sats value) for the counterparty's output in a commitment transaction.
359 /// This was added as an `Option` in 0.0.110.
360 type CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = Option<(u32, u64)>;
362 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
363 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
366 /// An outbound HTLC failing after a transaction is confirmed. Used
367 /// * when an outbound HTLC output is spent by us after the HTLC timed out
368 /// * an outbound HTLC which was not present in the commitment transaction which appeared
369 /// on-chain (either because it was not fully committed to or it was dust).
370 /// Note that this is *not* used for preimage claims, as those are passed upstream immediately,
371 /// appearing only as an `HTLCSpendConfirmation`, below.
374 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
375 htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
376 /// None in the second case, above, ie when there is no relevant output in the commitment
377 /// transaction which appeared on chain.
378 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
380 /// An output waiting on [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`] confirmations before we hand the user the
381 /// [`SpendableOutputDescriptor`].
383 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
385 /// A spend of the funding output, either a commitment transaction or a cooperative closing
387 FundingSpendConfirmation {
388 /// The CSV delay for the output of the funding spend transaction (implying it is a local
389 /// commitment transaction, and this is the delay on the to_self output).
390 on_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
391 /// If the funding spend transaction was a known remote commitment transaction, we track
392 /// the output index and amount of the counterparty's `to_self` output here.
394 /// This allows us to generate a [`Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`] for the
395 /// counterparty output.
396 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
398 /// A spend of a commitment transaction HTLC output, set in the cases where *no* `HTLCUpdate`
399 /// is constructed. This is used when
400 /// * an outbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty with a preimage, causing us to
401 /// immediately claim the HTLC on the inbound edge and track the resolution here,
402 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty (with a timeout),
403 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by us (with a preimage).
404 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by the revocation
406 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by an
407 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Failure transaction (and is still claimable with a revocation
409 HTLCSpendConfirmation {
410 commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
411 /// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
412 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
413 /// If the claim was made by us on an inbound HTLC against a local commitment transaction,
414 /// we set this to the output CSV value which we will have to wait until to spend the
415 /// output (and generate a SpendableOutput event).
416 on_to_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
420 impl Writeable for OnchainEventEntry {
421 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
422 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
423 (0, self.txid, required),
424 (1, self.transaction, option),
425 (2, self.height, required),
426 (4, self.event, required),
432 impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry {
433 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
434 let mut txid = Txid::all_zeros();
435 let mut transaction = None;
437 let mut event = None;
438 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
440 (1, transaction, option),
441 (2, height, required),
442 (4, event, ignorable),
444 if let Some(ev) = event {
445 Ok(Some(Self { txid, transaction, height, event: ev }))
452 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
454 (0, source, required),
455 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
456 (2, payment_hash, required),
457 (3, commitment_tx_output_idx, option),
459 (1, MaturingOutput) => {
460 (0, descriptor, required),
462 (3, FundingSpendConfirmation) => {
463 (0, on_local_output_csv, option),
464 (1, commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, option),
466 (5, HTLCSpendConfirmation) => {
467 (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
468 (2, preimage, option),
469 (4, on_to_local_output_csv, option),
474 #[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
476 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
477 LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
478 commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
479 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
481 LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
482 commitment_txid: Txid,
483 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
484 commitment_number: u64,
485 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
488 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
494 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
495 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
497 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
498 /// think we've fallen behind!
499 should_broadcast: bool,
502 scriptpubkey: Script,
506 impl ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
507 fn variant_name(&self) -> &'static str {
509 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo",
510 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo",
511 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => "PaymentPreimage",
512 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { .. } => "CommitmentSecret",
513 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => "ChannelForceClosed",
514 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { .. } => "ShutdownScript",
519 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
520 (0, LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo) => {
521 (0, commitment_tx, required),
522 (2, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
524 (1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
525 (0, commitment_txid, required),
526 (2, commitment_number, required),
527 (4, their_per_commitment_point, required),
528 (6, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
530 (2, PaymentPreimage) => {
531 (0, payment_preimage, required),
533 (3, CommitmentSecret) => {
535 (2, secret, required),
537 (4, ChannelForceClosed) => {
538 (0, should_broadcast, required),
540 (5, ShutdownScript) => {
541 (0, scriptpubkey, required),
545 /// Details about the balance(s) available for spending once the channel appears on chain.
547 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] for more details on when these will or will not
549 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
550 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialOrd, Ord))]
552 /// The channel is not yet closed (or the commitment or closing transaction has not yet
553 /// appeared in a block). The given balance is claimable (less on-chain fees) if the channel is
554 /// force-closed now.
555 ClaimableOnChannelClose {
556 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
557 /// required to do so.
558 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
560 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance is ours but awaiting confirmations until
561 /// we consider it spendable.
562 ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
563 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, possibly excluding the on-chain fees which
564 /// were spent in broadcasting the transaction.
565 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
566 /// The height at which an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event will be generated for this
568 confirmation_height: u32,
570 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance should be ours but awaiting spending
571 /// transaction confirmation. If the spending transaction does not confirm in time, it is
572 /// possible our counterparty can take the funds by broadcasting an HTLC timeout on-chain.
574 /// Once the spending transaction confirms, before it has reached enough confirmations to be
575 /// considered safe from chain reorganizations, the balance will instead be provided via
576 /// [`Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`].
577 ContentiousClaimable {
578 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
579 /// required to do so.
580 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
581 /// The height at which the counterparty may be able to claim the balance if we have not
585 /// HTLCs which we sent to our counterparty which are claimable after a timeout (less on-chain
586 /// fees) if the counterparty does not know the preimage for the HTLCs. These are somewhat
587 /// likely to be claimed by our counterparty before we do.
588 MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
589 /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
590 /// which will be required to do so.
591 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
592 /// The height at which we will be able to claim the balance if our counterparty has not
594 claimable_height: u32,
596 /// HTLCs which we received from our counterparty which are claimable with a preimage which we
597 /// do not currently have. This will only be claimable if we receive the preimage from the node
598 /// to which we forwarded this HTLC before the timeout.
599 MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
600 /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
601 /// which will be required to do so.
602 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
603 /// The height at which our counterparty will be able to claim the balance if we have not
604 /// yet received the preimage and claimed it ourselves.
607 /// The channel has been closed, and our counterparty broadcasted a revoked commitment
610 /// Thus, we're able to claim all outputs in the commitment transaction, one of which has the
611 /// following amount.
612 CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
613 /// The amount, in satoshis, of the output which we can claim.
615 /// Note that for outputs from HTLC balances this may be excluding some on-chain fees that
616 /// were already spent.
617 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
621 /// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
623 struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
624 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
625 /// The txid of the transaction which resolved the HTLC, this may be a commitment (if the HTLC
626 /// was not present in the confirmed commitment transaction), HTLC-Success, or HTLC-Timeout
628 resolving_txid: Option<Txid>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in 0.0.110
629 /// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
630 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
633 // In LDK versions prior to 0.0.111 commitment_tx_output_idx was not Option-al and
634 // IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC objects only existed for non-dust HTLCs. This was a bug, but to maintain
635 // backwards compatibility we must ensure we always write out a commitment_tx_output_idx field,
636 // using `u32::max_value()` as a sentinal to indicate the HTLC was dust.
637 impl Writeable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
638 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
639 let mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = self.commitment_tx_output_idx.unwrap_or(u32::max_value());
640 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
641 (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
642 (1, self.resolving_txid, option),
643 (2, self.payment_preimage, option),
649 impl Readable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
650 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
651 let mut mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = 0;
652 let mut resolving_txid = None;
653 let mut payment_preimage = None;
654 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
655 (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
656 (1, resolving_txid, option),
657 (2, payment_preimage, option),
660 commitment_tx_output_idx: if mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx == u32::max_value() { None } else { Some(mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx) },
667 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
668 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
670 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
671 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
673 /// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
674 /// get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
675 /// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
676 /// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
678 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor), which
679 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
680 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
681 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
682 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
683 pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: Sign> {
685 pub(crate) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
687 inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
690 pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: Sign> {
691 latest_update_id: u64,
692 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
694 destination_script: Script,
695 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
696 counterparty_payment_script: Script,
697 shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
699 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
700 holder_revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
701 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
702 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
703 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
705 counterparty_commitment_params: CounterpartyCommitmentParameters,
706 funding_redeemscript: Script,
707 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
708 // first is the idx of the first of the two per-commitment points
709 their_cur_per_commitment_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
711 on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
713 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
714 /// The set of outpoints in each counterparty commitment transaction. We always need at least
715 /// the payment hash from `HTLCOutputInCommitment` to claim even a revoked commitment
716 /// transaction broadcast as we need to be able to construct the witness script in all cases.
717 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
718 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
719 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
720 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
721 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
722 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
723 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, u64>,
724 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
725 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
726 /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
727 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
728 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
730 // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
731 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
732 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
733 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
734 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
735 current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
737 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
739 current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
740 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
742 current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
744 /// The set of payment hashes from inbound payments for which we know the preimage. Payment
745 /// preimages that are not included in any unrevoked local commitment transaction or unrevoked
746 /// remote commitment transactions are automatically removed when commitment transactions are
748 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
750 // Note that `MonitorEvent`s MUST NOT be generated during update processing, only generated
751 // during chain data processing. This prevents a race in `ChainMonitor::update_channel` (and
752 // presumably user implementations thereof as well) where we update the in-memory channel
753 // object, then before the persistence finishes (as it's all under a read-lock), we return
754 // pending events to the user or to the relevant `ChannelManager`. Then, on reload, we'll have
755 // the pre-event state here, but have processed the event in the `ChannelManager`.
756 // Note that because the `event_lock` in `ChainMonitor` is only taken in
757 // block/transaction-connected events and *not* during block/transaction-disconnected events,
758 // we further MUST NOT generate events during block/transaction-disconnection.
759 pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
761 pending_events: Vec<Event>,
763 // Used to track on-chain events (i.e., transactions part of channels confirmed on chain) on
764 // which to take actions once they reach enough confirmations. Each entry includes the
765 // transaction's id and the height when the transaction was confirmed on chain.
766 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,
768 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
769 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
770 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
771 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
772 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>>,
775 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
777 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
779 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
780 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
781 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
782 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
784 // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
785 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
786 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
788 // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
789 // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
790 // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
791 holder_tx_signed: bool,
793 // If a spend of the funding output is seen, we set this to true and reject any further
794 // updates. This prevents any further changes in the offchain state no matter the order
795 // of block connection between ChannelMonitors and the ChannelManager.
796 funding_spend_seen: bool,
798 /// Set to `Some` of the confirmed transaction spending the funding input of the channel after
799 /// reaching `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` confirmations.
800 funding_spend_confirmed: Option<Txid>,
802 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
803 /// The set of HTLCs which have been either claimed or failed on chain and have reached
804 /// the requisite confirmations on the claim/fail transaction (either ANTI_REORG_DELAY or the
805 /// spending CSV for revocable outputs).
806 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec<IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC>,
808 // We simply modify best_block in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
809 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
810 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
811 // their best_block from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
812 // the full block_connected).
813 best_block: BestBlock,
815 /// The node_id of our counterparty
816 counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
818 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
821 /// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends.
822 pub type TransactionOutputs = (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>);
824 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
825 /// Used only in testing and fuzzing to check serialization roundtrips don't change the underlying
827 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
828 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
829 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
830 let other = other.inner.lock().unwrap();
835 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
836 /// Used only in testing and fuzzing to check serialization roundtrips don't change the underlying
838 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
839 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
840 if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
841 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
842 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
843 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script ||
844 self.counterparty_payment_script != other.counterparty_payment_script ||
845 self.channel_keys_id != other.channel_keys_id ||
846 self.holder_revocation_basepoint != other.holder_revocation_basepoint ||
847 self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
848 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.current_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
849 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
850 self.counterparty_commitment_params != other.counterparty_commitment_params ||
851 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
852 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
853 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points != other.their_cur_per_commitment_points ||
854 self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
855 self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
856 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
857 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
858 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number != other.counterparty_hash_commitment_number ||
859 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx ||
860 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number != other.current_counterparty_commitment_number ||
861 self.current_holder_commitment_number != other.current_holder_commitment_number ||
862 self.current_holder_commitment_tx != other.current_holder_commitment_tx ||
863 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
864 self.pending_monitor_events != other.pending_monitor_events ||
865 self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
866 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf ||
867 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
868 self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
869 self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed ||
870 self.funding_spend_seen != other.funding_spend_seen ||
871 self.funding_spend_confirmed != other.funding_spend_confirmed ||
872 self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output != other.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output ||
873 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain != other.htlcs_resolved_on_chain
882 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
883 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
884 self.inner.lock().unwrap().write(writer)
888 // These are also used for ChannelMonitorUpdate, above.
889 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
890 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
892 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
893 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
894 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
896 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
898 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
899 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
901 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
902 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
903 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
904 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
905 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
906 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
908 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
911 self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
912 match &self.shutdown_script {
913 Some(script) => script.write(writer)?,
914 None => Script::new().write(writer)?,
917 self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
918 self.holder_revocation_basepoint.write(writer)?;
919 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
920 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
921 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
922 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
923 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
925 self.counterparty_commitment_params.write(writer)?;
926 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
927 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
929 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
930 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
931 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
932 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
933 match second_option {
934 Some(second_pubkey) => {
935 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
938 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
943 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
947 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_holder_tx_csv))?;
949 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
951 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
952 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
953 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
954 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
955 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
956 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
957 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
961 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
962 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
963 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
964 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
965 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
966 debug_assert!(htlc_source.is_none() || Some(**txid) == self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid
967 || Some(**txid) == self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
968 "HTLC Sources for all revoked commitment transactions should be none!");
969 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
970 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
974 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
975 for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
976 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
977 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
980 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
981 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
982 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
983 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
986 if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
987 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
988 prev_holder_tx.write(writer)?;
990 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
993 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.write(writer)?;
995 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
996 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
998 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
999 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1000 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1003 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_monitor_events.iter().filter(|ev| match ev {
1004 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(_) => true,
1005 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => true,
1007 }).count() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1008 for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
1010 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
1014 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
1015 _ => {}, // Covered in the TLV writes below
1019 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
1020 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
1021 event.write(writer)?;
1024 self.best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
1025 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.height()))?;
1027 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
1028 for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1029 entry.write(writer)?;
1032 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1033 for (txid, idx_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
1034 txid.write(writer)?;
1035 (idx_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1036 for (idx, script) in idx_scripts.iter() {
1038 script.write(writer)?;
1041 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
1043 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
1044 self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
1046 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1047 (1, self.funding_spend_confirmed, option),
1048 (3, self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
1049 (5, self.pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
1050 (7, self.funding_spend_seen, required),
1051 (9, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
1052 (11, self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
1059 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1060 /// For lockorder enforcement purposes, we need to have a single site which constructs the
1061 /// `inner` mutex, otherwise cases where we lock two monitors at the same time (eg in our
1062 /// PartialEq implementation) we may decide a lockorder violation has occurred.
1063 fn from_impl(imp: ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>) -> Self {
1064 ChannelMonitor { inner: Mutex::new(imp) }
1067 pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
1068 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
1069 channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
1070 funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1071 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
1072 initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1073 best_block: BestBlock, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1075 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
1076 let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
1077 let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1079 let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
1080 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
1081 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.htlc_basepoint;
1082 let counterparty_commitment_params = CounterpartyCommitmentParameters { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv };
1084 let channel_keys_id = keys.channel_keys_id();
1085 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1087 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1088 let (holder_commitment_tx, current_holder_commitment_number) = {
1089 let trusted_tx = initial_holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1090 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1092 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1093 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
1095 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1096 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1097 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1098 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1099 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1100 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
1101 to_self_value_sat: initial_holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
1102 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1104 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
1107 let onchain_tx_handler =
1108 OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys,
1109 channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx.clone());
1111 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
1112 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
1114 Self::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
1115 latest_update_id: 0,
1116 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1118 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
1119 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
1120 counterparty_payment_script,
1124 holder_revocation_basepoint,
1126 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1127 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1129 counterparty_commitment_params,
1130 funding_redeemscript,
1131 channel_value_satoshis,
1132 their_cur_per_commitment_points: None,
1134 on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
1136 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1137 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1138 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1139 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1141 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1142 current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
1143 current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1144 current_holder_commitment_number,
1146 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1147 pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
1148 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1150 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
1155 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1156 holder_tx_signed: false,
1157 funding_spend_seen: false,
1158 funding_spend_confirmed: None,
1159 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: None,
1160 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
1163 counterparty_node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id),
1170 fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
1171 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret)
1174 /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1175 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1176 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1177 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1178 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1181 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1182 commitment_number: u64,
1183 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
1185 ) where L::Target: Logger {
1186 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
1187 txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, logger)
1191 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
1192 &self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1193 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
1194 ) -> Result<(), ()> {
1195 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs).map_err(|_| ())
1198 /// This is used to provide payment preimage(s) out-of-band during startup without updating the
1199 /// off-chain state with a new commitment transaction.
1200 pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1202 payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
1203 payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
1205 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1208 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1209 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1212 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_payment_preimage(
1213 payment_hash, payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1216 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(
1221 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1224 self.inner.lock().unwrap().broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger)
1227 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1230 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1231 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1233 updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1239 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1240 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1243 self.inner.lock().unwrap().update_monitor(updates, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1246 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1248 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1249 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_update_id()
1252 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1253 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, Script) {
1254 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone()
1257 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1258 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1259 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>)> {
1260 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_outputs_to_watch()
1261 .iter().map(|(txid, outputs)| (*txid, outputs.clone())).collect()
1264 /// Loads the funding txo and outputs to watch into the given `chain::Filter` by repeatedly
1265 /// calling `chain::Filter::register_output` and `chain::Filter::register_tx` until all outputs
1266 /// have been registered.
1267 pub fn load_outputs_to_watch<F: Deref>(&self, filter: &F) where F::Target: chain::Filter {
1268 let lock = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1269 filter.register_tx(&lock.get_funding_txo().0.txid, &lock.get_funding_txo().1);
1270 for (txid, outputs) in lock.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
1271 for (index, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
1272 assert!(*index <= u16::max_value() as u32);
1273 filter.register_output(WatchedOutput {
1275 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: *index as u16 },
1276 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
1282 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1283 /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
1284 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1285 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events()
1288 /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
1291 /// This is called by ChainMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
1292 /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
1293 /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
1294 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
1295 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_events()
1298 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1299 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_min_seen_secret()
1302 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1303 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number()
1306 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1307 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
1310 /// Gets the `node_id` of the counterparty for this channel.
1312 /// Will be `None` for channels constructed on LDK versions prior to 0.0.110 and always `Some`
1314 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> Option<PublicKey> {
1315 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_node_id
1318 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
1319 /// the Channel was out-of-date.
1321 /// You may also use this to broadcast the latest local commitment transaction, either because
1322 /// a monitor update failed with [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`] or because we've
1323 /// fallen behind (i.e. we've received proof that our counterparty side knows a revocation
1324 /// secret we gave them that they shouldn't know).
1326 /// Broadcasting these transactions in the second case is UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty
1327 /// side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to broadcast them if counterparty doesn't
1328 /// close channel with their commitment transaction after a substantial amount of time. Best
1329 /// may be to contact the other node operator out-of-band to coordinate other options available
1330 /// to you. In any-case, the choice is up to you.
1332 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure
1333 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1334 where L::Target: Logger {
1335 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1338 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1339 /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1340 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1341 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1342 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1343 where L::Target: Logger {
1344 self.inner.lock().unwrap().unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1347 /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
1348 /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
1349 /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
1350 /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
1351 /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
1352 /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
1354 /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
1355 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1357 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1358 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1360 header: &BlockHeader,
1361 txdata: &TransactionData,
1366 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1368 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1369 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1372 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_connected(
1373 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1376 /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1378 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1380 header: &BlockHeader,
1386 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1387 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1390 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_disconnected(
1391 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1394 /// Processes transactions confirmed in a block with the given header and height, returning new
1395 /// outputs to watch. See [`block_connected`] for details.
1397 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1398 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1400 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1401 pub fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1403 header: &BlockHeader,
1404 txdata: &TransactionData,
1409 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1411 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1412 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1415 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1416 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transactions_confirmed(
1417 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
1420 /// Processes a transaction that was reorganized out of the chain.
1422 /// Used instead of [`block_disconnected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather
1423 /// than blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1425 /// [`block_disconnected`]: Self::block_disconnected
1426 pub fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1433 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1434 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1437 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1438 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transaction_unconfirmed(
1439 txid, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
1442 /// Updates the monitor with the current best chain tip, returning new outputs to watch. See
1443 /// [`block_connected`] for details.
1445 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1446 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1448 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1449 pub fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1451 header: &BlockHeader,
1456 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1458 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1459 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1462 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1463 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block_updated(
1464 header, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
1467 /// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
1468 pub fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
1469 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1470 let mut txids: Vec<Txid> = inner.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
1472 .map(|entry| entry.txid)
1473 .chain(inner.onchain_tx_handler.get_relevant_txids().into_iter())
1475 txids.sort_unstable();
1480 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
1481 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
1482 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
1483 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone()
1487 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
1488 /// Helper for get_claimable_balances which does the work for an individual HTLC, generating up
1489 /// to one `Balance` for the HTLC.
1490 fn get_htlc_balance(&self, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, holder_commitment: bool,
1491 counterparty_revoked_commitment: bool, confirmed_txid: Option<Txid>)
1492 -> Option<Balance> {
1493 let htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx =
1494 if let Some(v) = htlc.transaction_output_index { v } else { return None; };
1496 let mut htlc_spend_txid_opt = None;
1497 let mut holder_timeout_spend_pending = None;
1498 let mut htlc_spend_pending = None;
1499 let mut holder_delayed_output_pending = None;
1500 for event in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1502 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx, htlc_value_satoshis, .. }
1503 if commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) => {
1504 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1505 htlc_spend_txid_opt = event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.txid());
1506 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
1507 debug_assert_eq!(htlc_value_satoshis.unwrap(), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1508 holder_timeout_spend_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
1510 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. }
1511 if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
1512 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1513 htlc_spend_txid_opt = event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.txid());
1514 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_pending.is_none());
1515 htlc_spend_pending = Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()));
1517 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1518 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor) }
1519 if descriptor.outpoint.index as u32 == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
1520 debug_assert!(holder_delayed_output_pending.is_none());
1521 holder_delayed_output_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
1526 let htlc_resolved = self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter()
1527 .find(|v| if v.commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) {
1528 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1529 htlc_spend_txid_opt = v.resolving_txid;
1532 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_resolved.is_some() as u8 <= 1);
1534 let htlc_output_to_spend =
1535 if let Some(txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
1537 self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_none(),
1538 "This code needs updating for anchors");
1539 BitcoinOutPoint::new(txid, 0)
1541 BitcoinOutPoint::new(confirmed_txid.unwrap(), htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx)
1543 let htlc_output_spend_pending = self.onchain_tx_handler.is_output_spend_pending(&htlc_output_to_spend);
1545 if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_delayed_output_pending {
1546 debug_assert!(holder_commitment);
1547 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1548 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1549 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1551 } else if htlc_resolved.is_some() && !htlc_output_spend_pending {
1552 // Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
1553 // HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
1554 // commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
1555 // reached, even though HTLCs may be resolved after only
1556 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
1557 debug_assert!(holder_commitment || self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
1558 } else if counterparty_revoked_commitment {
1559 let htlc_output_claim_pending = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1560 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1561 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { .. }
1563 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| {
1564 if let Some(htlc_spend_txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
1565 Some(tx.txid()) == htlc_spend_txid_opt ||
1566 inp.previous_output.txid == htlc_spend_txid
1568 Some(inp.previous_output.txid) == confirmed_txid &&
1569 inp.previous_output.vout == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx
1571 })).unwrap_or(false) {
1576 if htlc_output_claim_pending.is_some() {
1577 // We already push `Balance`s onto the `res` list for every
1578 // `StaticOutput` in a `MaturingOutput` in the revoked
1579 // counterparty commitment transaction case generally, so don't
1580 // need to do so again here.
1582 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none(),
1583 "HTLCUpdate OnchainEvents should never appear for preimage claims");
1584 debug_assert!(!htlc.offered || htlc_spend_pending.is_none() || !htlc_spend_pending.unwrap().1,
1585 "We don't (currently) generate preimage claims against revoked outputs, where did you get one?!");
1586 return Some(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1587 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1590 } else if htlc.offered == holder_commitment {
1591 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1592 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1593 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
1594 if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_timeout_spend_pending {
1595 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1596 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1597 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1600 return Some(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1601 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1602 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1605 } else if self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
1606 // Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if
1607 // we know the preimage.
1608 // Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the
1609 // preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
1610 // to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
1611 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
1612 if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
1613 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1614 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1615 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1618 return Some(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
1619 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1620 timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1623 } else if htlc_resolved.is_none() {
1624 return Some(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
1625 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1626 expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1633 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1634 /// Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to
1635 /// force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting
1638 /// Any balances in the channel which are available on-chain (excluding on-chain fees) are
1639 /// included here until an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event has been generated for the
1640 /// balance, or until our counterparty has claimed the balance and accrued several
1641 /// confirmations on the claim transaction.
1643 /// Note that for `ChannelMonitors` which track a channel which went on-chain with versions of
1644 /// LDK prior to 0.0.111, balances may not be fully captured if our counterparty broadcasted
1645 /// a revoked state.
1647 /// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
1648 /// may be returned here and their meanings.
1649 pub fn get_claimable_balances(&self) -> Vec<Balance> {
1650 let mut res = Vec::new();
1651 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1653 let mut confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed;
1654 let mut confirmed_counterparty_output = us.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output;
1655 let mut pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = None;
1656 let funding_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1657 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } =
1660 confirmed_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
1661 Some((event.txid, event.confirmation_threshold()))
1664 if let Some((txid, conf_thresh)) = funding_spend_pending {
1665 debug_assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_none(),
1666 "We have a pending funding spend awaiting anti-reorg confirmation, we can't have confirmed it already!");
1667 confirmed_txid = Some(txid);
1668 pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = Some(conf_thresh);
1671 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
1672 ($holder_commitment: expr, $counterparty_revoked_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
1673 for htlc in $htlc_iter {
1674 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
1676 if let Some(bal) = us.get_htlc_balance(htlc, $holder_commitment, $counterparty_revoked_commitment, confirmed_txid) {
1684 if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
1685 let mut found_commitment_tx = false;
1686 if let Some(counterparty_tx_htlcs) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
1687 // First look for the to_remote output back to us.
1688 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1689 if let Some(value) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1690 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1691 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(descriptor)
1693 Some(descriptor.output.value)
1696 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1697 claimable_amount_satoshis: value,
1698 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1701 // If a counterparty commitment transaction is awaiting confirmation, we
1702 // should either have a StaticPaymentOutput MaturingOutput event awaiting
1703 // confirmation with the same height or have never met our dust amount.
1706 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1707 walk_htlcs!(false, false, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
1709 walk_htlcs!(false, true, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
1710 // The counterparty broadcasted a revoked state!
1711 // Look for any StaticOutputs first, generating claimable balances for those.
1712 // If any match the confirmed counterparty revoked to_self output, skip
1713 // generating a CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable.
1714 let mut spent_counterparty_output = false;
1715 for event in us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1716 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1717 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { output, .. }
1719 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1720 claimable_amount_satoshis: output.value,
1721 confirmation_height: event.confirmation_threshold(),
1723 if let Some(confirmed_to_self_idx) = confirmed_counterparty_output.map(|(idx, _)| idx) {
1724 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx|
1725 tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.vout == confirmed_to_self_idx)
1726 ).unwrap_or(false) {
1727 spent_counterparty_output = true;
1733 if spent_counterparty_output {
1734 } else if let Some((confirmed_to_self_idx, amt)) = confirmed_counterparty_output {
1735 let output_spendable = us.onchain_tx_handler
1736 .is_output_spend_pending(&BitcoinOutPoint::new(txid, confirmed_to_self_idx));
1737 if output_spendable {
1738 res.push(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1739 claimable_amount_satoshis: amt,
1743 // Counterparty output is missing, either it was broadcasted on a
1744 // previous version of LDK or the counterparty hadn't met dust.
1747 found_commitment_tx = true;
1748 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
1749 walk_htlcs!(true, false, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
1750 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1751 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1752 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
1753 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1756 found_commitment_tx = true;
1757 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1758 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
1759 walk_htlcs!(true, false, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
1760 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1761 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1762 claimable_amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat,
1763 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1766 found_commitment_tx = true;
1769 if !found_commitment_tx {
1770 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1771 // We blindly assume this is a cooperative close transaction here, and that
1772 // neither us nor our counterparty misbehaved. At worst we've under-estimated
1773 // the amount we can claim as we'll punish a misbehaving counterparty.
1774 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1775 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
1776 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1781 let mut claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat = 0;
1782 for (htlc, _, _) in us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1783 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { continue; }
1785 res.push(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1786 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1787 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1789 } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
1790 claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1792 // As long as the HTLC is still in our latest commitment state, treat
1793 // it as potentially claimable, even if it has long-since expired.
1794 res.push(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
1795 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1796 expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1800 res.push(Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1801 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat + claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat,
1808 /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which are pending resolution in this channel.
1809 /// This is used to reconstruct pending outbound payments on restart in the ChannelManager.
1810 pub(crate) fn get_pending_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
1811 let mut res = HashMap::new();
1812 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1814 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
1815 ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
1816 for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter {
1817 if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
1818 // We should assert that funding_spend_confirmed is_some() here, but we
1819 // have some unit tests which violate HTLC transaction CSVs entirely and
1821 // TODO: Once tests all connect transactions at consensus-valid times, we
1822 // should assert here like we do in `get_claimable_balances`.
1823 } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
1824 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1825 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1826 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
1827 let htlc_update_confd = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|event| {
1828 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
1829 // If the HTLC was timed out, we wait for ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks
1830 // before considering it "no longer pending" - this matches when we
1831 // provide the ChannelManager an HTLC failure event.
1832 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
1833 us.best_block.height() >= event.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
1834 } else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, .. } = event.event {
1835 // If the HTLC was fulfilled with a preimage, we consider the HTLC
1836 // immediately non-pending, matching when we provide ChannelManager
1838 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
1841 if !htlc_update_confd {
1842 res.insert(source.clone(), htlc.clone());
1849 // We're only concerned with the confirmation count of HTLC transactions, and don't
1850 // actually care how many confirmations a commitment transaction may or may not have. Thus,
1851 // we look for either a FundingSpendConfirmation event or a funding_spend_confirmed.
1852 let confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
1853 us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1854 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
1859 if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
1860 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1861 walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().filter_map(|(a, b)| {
1862 if let &Some(ref source) = b {
1863 Some((a, &**source))
1866 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
1867 walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
1868 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
1870 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1871 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
1872 walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
1873 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
1878 // If we have not seen a commitment transaction on-chain (ie the channel is not yet
1879 // closed), just examine the available counterparty commitment transactions. See docs
1880 // on `fail_unbroadcast_htlcs`, below, for justification.
1881 macro_rules! walk_counterparty_commitment {
1883 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1884 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1885 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1886 res.insert((**source).clone(), htlc.clone());
1892 if let Some(ref txid) = us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1893 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
1895 if let Some(ref txid) = us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1896 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
1903 pub(crate) fn get_stored_preimages(&self) -> HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage> {
1904 self.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.clone()
1908 /// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
1909 /// failing any HTLCs which didn't make it into the broadcasted commitment transaction back
1910 /// after ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
1912 /// We always compare against the set of HTLCs in counterparty commitment transactions, as those
1913 /// are the commitment transactions which are generated by us. The off-chain state machine in
1914 /// `Channel` will automatically resolve any HTLCs which were never included in a commitment
1915 /// transaction when it detects channel closure, but it is up to us to ensure any HTLCs which were
1916 /// included in a remote commitment transaction are failed back if they are not present in the
1917 /// broadcasted commitment transaction.
1919 /// Specifically, the removal process for HTLCs in `Channel` is always based on the counterparty
1920 /// sending a `revoke_and_ack`, which causes us to clear `prev_counterparty_commitment_txid`. Thus,
1921 /// as long as we examine both the current counterparty commitment transaction and, if it hasn't
1922 /// been revoked yet, the previous one, we we will never "forget" to resolve an HTLC.
1923 macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
1924 ($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_txid_confirmed: expr, $commitment_tx_confirmed: expr,
1925 $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
1926 debug_assert_eq!($commitment_tx_confirmed.txid(), $commitment_txid_confirmed);
1928 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1929 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1930 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = $self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1931 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1932 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1933 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1934 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1935 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1936 // payment_preimage.
1937 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1938 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1939 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1940 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1942 let confirmed_htlcs_iter: &mut Iterator<Item = (&HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = &mut $confirmed_htlcs_list;
1944 let mut matched_htlc = false;
1945 for (ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in confirmed_htlcs_iter {
1946 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() &&
1947 (Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source ||
1948 (broadcast_source.is_none() &&
1949 broadcast_htlc.payment_hash == htlc.payment_hash &&
1950 broadcast_htlc.amount_msat == htlc.amount_msat)) {
1951 matched_htlc = true;
1955 if matched_htlc { continue; }
1956 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
1957 if entry.height != $commitment_tx_conf_height { return true; }
1959 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref update_source, .. } => {
1960 *update_source != **source
1965 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
1966 txid: $commitment_txid_confirmed,
1967 transaction: Some($commitment_tx_confirmed.clone()),
1968 height: $commitment_tx_conf_height,
1969 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
1970 source: (**source).clone(),
1971 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
1972 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
1973 commitment_tx_output_idx: None,
1976 log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction {}, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
1977 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type,
1978 $commitment_txid_confirmed, entry.confirmation_threshold());
1979 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
1985 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1986 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1988 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1989 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous");
1994 // In the `test_invalid_funding_tx` test, we need a bogus script which matches the HTLC-Accepted
1995 // witness length match (ie is 136 bytes long). We generate one here which we also use in some
1996 // in-line tests later.
1999 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
2000 let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.to_u8(); 136];
2001 ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2002 ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2003 ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2004 ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2005 ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.to_u8();
2010 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness() -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
2011 vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
2014 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
2015 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
2016 /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
2017 /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
2018 fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
2019 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
2020 return Err("Previous secret did not match new one");
2023 // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
2024 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
2025 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
2026 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
2031 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
2032 let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
2033 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
2034 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
2035 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
2037 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
2038 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2039 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
2043 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2044 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2045 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
2050 let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
2057 counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
2066 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2067 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
2068 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
2069 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
2071 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
2072 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
2075 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
2076 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
2077 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(txid);
2078 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
2079 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
2080 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
2081 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
2082 Some(old_points) => {
2083 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
2084 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
2085 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
2086 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
2087 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
2089 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2092 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2096 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2099 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
2100 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
2101 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
2107 /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
2108 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
2109 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
2110 /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
2111 /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
2112 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
2113 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
2114 let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = {
2115 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
2116 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
2117 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
2118 self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
2121 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
2122 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
2123 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
2124 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
2125 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
2127 to_self_value_sat: holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2128 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2131 self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(holder_commitment_tx);
2132 mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
2133 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
2134 if self.holder_tx_signed {
2135 return Err("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected");
2140 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
2141 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
2142 fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2143 &mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B,
2144 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
2145 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2146 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2149 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
2151 // If the channel is force closed, try to claim the output from this preimage.
2152 // First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
2153 macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
2154 ($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
2155 let (htlc_claim_reqs, _) = self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info($commitment_number, $txid, None);
2156 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2159 if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2160 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
2161 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
2165 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2166 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
2167 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
2172 // Then if a holder commitment transaction has been seen on-chain, broadcast transactions
2173 // claiming the HTLC output from each of the holder commitment transactions.
2174 // Note that we can't just use `self.holder_tx_signed`, because that only covers the case where
2175 // *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
2176 // holder commitment transactions.
2177 if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
2178 // Assume that the broadcasted commitment transaction confirmed in the current best
2179 // block. Even if not, its a reasonable metric for the bump criteria on the HTLC
2181 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
2182 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2183 if let Some(ref tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2184 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&tx, self.best_block.height());
2185 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2190 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
2191 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2194 for tx in self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
2195 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting local {}", log_tx!(tx));
2196 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
2198 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
2201 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()>
2202 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2203 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2206 log_info!(logger, "Applying update to monitor {}, bringing update_id from {} to {} with {} changes.",
2207 log_funding_info!(self), self.latest_update_id, updates.update_id, updates.updates.len());
2208 // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a
2209 // preimage for a broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd
2210 // like to claim on-chain. If this is the case, we no longer have guaranteed
2211 // access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a sentinel value instead.
2212 if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2213 assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
2214 match updates.updates[0] {
2215 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => {},
2217 log_error!(logger, "Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate of type {}", updates.updates[0].variant_name());
2218 panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage");
2221 } else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
2222 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
2224 let mut ret = Ok(());
2225 for update in updates.updates.iter() {
2227 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
2228 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
2229 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
2230 if let Err(e) = self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone()) {
2231 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest holder commitment transaction failed/was refused:");
2232 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2236 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point } => {
2237 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
2238 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_per_commitment_point, logger)
2240 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
2241 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
2242 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&*fee_estimator);
2243 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
2245 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
2246 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
2247 if let Err(e) = self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret) {
2248 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest counterparty commitment secret failed/was refused:");
2249 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2253 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
2254 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
2255 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
2256 if *should_broadcast {
2257 self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
2258 } else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
2259 log_error!(logger, "WARNING: You have a potentially-unsafe holder commitment transaction available to broadcast");
2260 log_error!(logger, " in channel monitor for channel {}!", log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()));
2261 log_error!(logger, " Read the docs for ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn and take manual action!");
2263 // If we generated a MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed, the ChannelManager
2264 // will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we
2265 // shouldn't print the scary warning above.
2266 log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction.");
2269 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { scriptpubkey } => {
2270 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with shutdown script");
2271 if let Some(shutdown_script) = self.shutdown_script.replace(scriptpubkey.clone()) {
2272 panic!("Attempted to replace shutdown script {} with {}", shutdown_script, scriptpubkey);
2277 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
2279 if ret.is_ok() && self.funding_spend_seen {
2280 log_error!(logger, "Refusing Channel Monitor Update as counterparty attempted to update commitment after funding was spent");
2285 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
2286 self.latest_update_id
2289 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
2293 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>> {
2294 // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
2295 // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
2296 // its trivial to do, double-check that here.
2297 for (txid, _) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
2298 self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered");
2300 &self.outputs_to_watch
2303 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
2304 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2305 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
2309 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
2310 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2311 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
2315 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
2316 fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
2317 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
2320 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
2321 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
2324 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
2325 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
2328 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
2329 self.current_holder_commitment_number
2332 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
2333 /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
2334 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
2335 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
2337 /// Returns packages to claim the revoked output(s), as well as additional outputs to watch and
2338 /// general information about the output that is to the counterparty in the commitment
2340 fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L)
2341 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo)
2342 where L::Target: Logger {
2343 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
2344 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
2345 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2346 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2347 let mut to_counterparty_output_info = None;
2349 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
2350 let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
2352 macro_rules! ignore_error {
2353 ( $thing : expr ) => {
2356 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
2361 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence.0 as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time.0 as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
2362 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
2363 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
2364 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
2365 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2366 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint));
2367 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key));
2369 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
2370 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2372 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
2373 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2374 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2375 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, outp.value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
2376 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
2377 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
2378 to_counterparty_output_info =
2379 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Txn can't have more than 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
2383 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
2384 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2385 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
2386 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2387 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
2388 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
2389 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
2390 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs),
2391 to_counterparty_output_info);
2393 let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
2394 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(revk_htlc_outp), htlc.cltv_expiry, true, height);
2395 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
2400 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
2401 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
2402 // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
2403 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
2404 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2405 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
2407 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
2409 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2410 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked_counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2411 per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
2412 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
2415 debug_assert!(false, "We should have per-commitment option for any recognized old commitment txn");
2416 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2417 [].iter().map(|reference| *reference), logger);
2420 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2421 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
2422 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
2423 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
2424 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
2425 // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
2426 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
2428 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2429 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
2431 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
2433 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
2434 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2435 per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
2436 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
2439 let (htlc_claim_reqs, counterparty_output_info) =
2440 self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
2441 to_counterparty_output_info = counterparty_output_info;
2442 for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
2443 claimable_outpoints.push(req);
2447 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
2450 /// Returns the HTLC claim package templates and the counterparty output info
2451 fn get_counterparty_output_claim_info(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>)
2452 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo) {
2453 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2454 let mut to_counterparty_output_info: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = None;
2456 let htlc_outputs = match self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
2457 Some(outputs) => outputs,
2458 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
2460 let per_commitment_points = match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
2461 Some(points) => points,
2462 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
2465 let per_commitment_point =
2466 // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
2467 // per-commitment point
2468 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number { &per_commitment_points.1 }
2469 else if let Some(point) = per_commitment_points.2.as_ref() {
2470 // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
2471 // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
2472 // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
2473 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
2475 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); }
2476 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); };
2478 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
2479 let revokeable_p2wsh_opt =
2480 if let Ok(revocation_pubkey) = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(
2481 &self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint)
2483 if let Ok(delayed_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx,
2484 &per_commitment_point,
2485 &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key)
2487 Some(chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
2488 self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
2489 &delayed_key).to_v0_p2wsh())
2491 debug_assert!(false, "Failed to derive a delayed payment key for a commitment state we accepted");
2495 debug_assert!(false, "Failed to derive a revocation pubkey key for a commitment state we accepted");
2498 if let Some(revokeable_p2wsh) = revokeable_p2wsh_opt {
2499 for (idx, outp) in transaction.output.iter().enumerate() {
2500 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2501 to_counterparty_output_info =
2502 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Can't have > 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
2508 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
2509 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2510 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
2511 if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
2512 transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
2513 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
2514 return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info);
2517 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
2518 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
2519 let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered {
2520 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(
2521 CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
2522 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
2523 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
2524 preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone()))
2526 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
2527 CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
2528 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
2529 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
2532 let aggregation = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
2533 let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry,aggregation, 0);
2534 claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
2539 (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info)
2542 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
2543 fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<TransactionOutputs>) where L::Target: Logger {
2544 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
2545 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
2546 return (Vec::new(), None)
2549 macro_rules! ignore_error {
2550 ( $thing : expr ) => {
2553 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
2558 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
2559 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
2560 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2562 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty HTLC transaction, spending {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
2563 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, tx.output[0].value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
2564 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(htlc_txid, 0, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
2565 let claimable_outpoints = vec!(justice_package);
2566 let outputs = vec![(0, tx.output[0].clone())];
2567 (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, outputs)))
2570 // Returns (1) `PackageTemplate`s that can be given to the OnChainTxHandler, so that the handler can
2571 // broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
2572 // script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
2573 fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, conf_height: u32) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
2574 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2576 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
2577 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
2579 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2580 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2581 let htlc_output = if htlc.offered {
2582 HolderHTLCOutput::build_offered(htlc.amount_msat, htlc.cltv_expiry)
2584 let payment_preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
2587 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2590 HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat)
2592 let htlc_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(holder_tx.txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(htlc_output), htlc.cltv_expiry, false, conf_height);
2593 claim_requests.push(htlc_package);
2597 (claim_requests, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
2600 // Returns holder HTLC outputs to watch and react to in case of spending.
2601 fn get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, commitment_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(u32, TxOut)> {
2602 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2603 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2604 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2605 watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
2611 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
2612 /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
2613 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
2614 /// Returns None unless the transaction is definitely one of our commitment transactions.
2615 fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<(Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs)> where L::Target: Logger {
2616 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
2617 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
2618 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2620 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
2621 ($updates: expr, $to_watch: expr) => {
2622 claim_requests = $updates.0;
2623 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.1;
2624 watch_outputs.append(&mut $to_watch);
2628 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
2629 let mut is_holder_tx = false;
2631 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2632 is_holder_tx = true;
2633 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of latest holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
2634 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, height);
2635 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
2636 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
2637 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2638 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter()
2639 .map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())), logger);
2640 } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2641 if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2642 is_holder_tx = true;
2643 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of previous holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
2644 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height);
2645 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
2646 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
2647 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2648 holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())),
2654 Some((claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)))
2660 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2661 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
2662 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2663 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2664 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2665 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
2666 // When anchor outputs are present, the HTLC transactions are only valid once the commitment
2667 // transaction confirms.
2668 if self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors() {
2669 return holder_transactions;
2671 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2672 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2673 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2674 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2675 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2678 } else if htlc.0.cltv_expiry > self.best_block.height() + 1 {
2679 // Don't broadcast HTLC-Timeout transactions immediately as they don't meet the
2680 // current locktime requirements on-chain. We will broadcast them in
2681 // `block_confirmed` when `should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn` returns true.
2682 // Note that we add + 1 as transactions are broadcastable when they can be
2683 // confirmed in the next block.
2686 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2687 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2688 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
2692 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
2693 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
2697 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
2698 /// Note that this includes possibly-locktimed-in-the-future transactions!
2699 fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2700 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
2701 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2702 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2703 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
2704 // When anchor outputs are present, the HTLC transactions are only final once the commitment
2705 // transaction confirms due to the CSV 1 encumberance.
2706 if self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors() {
2707 return holder_transactions;
2709 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2710 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2711 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2712 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2713 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2717 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2718 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2719 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
2726 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2727 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2728 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2731 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2732 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2734 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
2735 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
2738 fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2740 header: &BlockHeader,
2743 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2745 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2747 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2748 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2751 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2753 if height > self.best_block.height() {
2754 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2755 self.block_confirmed(height, vec![], vec![], vec![], &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
2756 } else if block_hash != self.best_block.block_hash() {
2757 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2758 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height <= height);
2759 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height + 1, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2761 } else { Vec::new() }
2764 fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2766 header: &BlockHeader,
2767 txdata: &TransactionData,
2770 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2772 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2774 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2775 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2778 let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
2779 for tx in &txn_matched {
2780 let mut output_val = 0;
2781 for out in tx.output.iter() {
2782 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2783 output_val += out.value;
2784 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2788 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2790 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2791 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2792 for tx in &txn_matched {
2793 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
2794 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
2795 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
2796 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
2798 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
2799 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
2800 let mut balance_spendable_csv = None;
2801 log_info!(logger, "Channel {} closed by funding output spend in txid {}.",
2802 log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()), tx.txid());
2803 self.funding_spend_seen = true;
2804 let mut commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = None;
2805 if (tx.input[0].sequence.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
2806 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, counterparty_output_idx_sats) =
2807 self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
2808 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = counterparty_output_idx_sats;
2809 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2810 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2812 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2813 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
2814 if let Some((mut new_outpoints, new_outputs)) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &logger) {
2815 debug_assert!(commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output.is_none(),
2816 "A commitment transaction matched as both a counterparty and local commitment tx?");
2817 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2818 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2820 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2821 balance_spendable_csv = Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv);
2825 let txid = tx.txid();
2826 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
2828 transaction: Some((*tx).clone()),
2830 event: OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation {
2831 on_local_output_csv: balance_spendable_csv,
2832 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output,
2836 if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
2837 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
2838 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2839 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
2840 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2845 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
2846 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
2847 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
2848 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &logger);
2850 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger);
2853 if height > self.best_block.height() {
2854 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2857 self.block_confirmed(height, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
2860 /// Update state for new block(s)/transaction(s) confirmed. Note that the caller must update
2861 /// `self.best_block` before calling if a new best blockchain tip is available. More
2862 /// concretely, `self.best_block` must never be at a lower height than `conf_height`, avoiding
2863 /// complexity especially in `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`.
2865 /// `conf_height` should be set to the height at which any new transaction(s)/block(s) were
2866 /// confirmed at, even if it is not the current best height.
2867 fn block_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2870 txn_matched: Vec<&Transaction>,
2871 mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
2872 mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<PackageTemplate>,
2874 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2876 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2878 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2879 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2882 log_trace!(logger, "Processing {} matched transactions for block at height {}.", txn_matched.len(), conf_height);
2883 debug_assert!(self.best_block.height() >= conf_height);
2885 let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
2886 if should_broadcast {
2887 let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone());
2888 let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), self.best_block.height(), false, self.best_block.height());
2889 claimable_outpoints.push(commitment_package);
2890 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
2891 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2892 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2893 // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
2894 // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
2895 // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
2896 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
2897 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
2898 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2899 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2901 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2904 // Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold.
2905 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
2906 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2907 let mut onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf = Vec::new();
2908 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
2909 if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self.best_block) {
2910 onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2912 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2916 // Used to check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
2917 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2918 let unmatured_htlcs: Vec<_> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
2920 .filter_map(|entry| match &entry.event {
2921 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source, .. } => Some(source),
2925 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2926 let mut matured_htlcs = Vec::new();
2928 // Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
2929 for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
2931 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, htlc_value_satoshis, commitment_tx_output_idx } => {
2932 // Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
2933 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2936 unmatured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &source).is_none(),
2937 "An unmature HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
2938 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
2939 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
2941 matured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == source).is_none(),
2942 "A matured HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
2943 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
2944 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
2945 matured_htlcs.push(source.clone());
2948 log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update in {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream",
2949 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.txid);
2950 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2952 payment_preimage: None,
2953 source: source.clone(),
2954 htlc_value_satoshis,
2956 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
2957 commitment_tx_output_idx, resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
2958 payment_preimage: None,
2961 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
2962 log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
2963 self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
2964 outputs: vec![descriptor]
2967 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } => {
2968 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
2969 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
2970 payment_preimage: preimage,
2973 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } => {
2974 self.funding_spend_confirmed = Some(entry.txid);
2975 self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
2980 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, conf_height, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2982 // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
2983 // updating the latter in the process.
2984 watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
2985 let idx_and_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| (o.0, o.1.script_pubkey.clone())).collect();
2986 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), idx_and_scripts).is_none()
2990 // If we see a transaction for which we registered outputs previously,
2991 // make sure the registered scriptpubkey at the expected index match
2992 // the actual transaction output one. We failed this case before #653.
2993 for tx in &txn_matched {
2994 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&tx.txid()) {
2995 for idx_and_script in outputs.iter() {
2996 assert!((idx_and_script.0 as usize) < tx.output.len());
2997 assert_eq!(tx.output[idx_and_script.0 as usize].script_pubkey, idx_and_script.1);
3005 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
3006 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3007 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3010 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", header.block_hash(), height);
3013 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
3014 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
3015 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height < height);
3017 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
3018 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
3020 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
3023 fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3027 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3030 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3031 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3034 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| if entry.txid == *txid {
3035 log_info!(logger, "Removing onchain event with txid {}", txid);
3038 self.onchain_tx_handler.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3041 /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
3042 /// transactions thereof.
3043 fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
3044 let mut matched_txn = HashSet::new();
3045 txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
3046 let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
3047 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3048 if matches { break; }
3049 if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3054 matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
3057 }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
3060 /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
3061 fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
3062 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3063 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3064 for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
3065 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
3068 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
3069 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
3070 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
3071 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
3072 if input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec() == deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() {
3073 // In at least one test we use a deliberately bogus witness
3074 // script which hit an old panic. Thus, we check for that here
3075 // and avoid the assert if its the expected bogus script.
3079 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
3080 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
3081 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
3082 } else { panic!(); }
3093 fn should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
3094 // There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one confirmed (even
3095 // with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as duplicate/conflicting.
3096 if self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
3097 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
3098 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
3104 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
3105 // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
3106 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
3107 // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
3108 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
3109 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
3110 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
3111 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
3112 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
3113 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
3114 let height = self.best_block.height();
3115 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
3116 ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
3117 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
3118 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
3119 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
3120 // time out the HTLC first.
3121 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
3122 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
3123 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
3124 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
3125 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
3126 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
3127 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
3128 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
3129 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
3130 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
3131 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
3132 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
3133 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3134 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3135 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3136 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
3137 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
3138 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
3139 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
3140 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
3141 let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
3142 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
3143 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
3144 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3151 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
3153 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
3154 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
3155 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
3158 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
3159 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
3160 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
3167 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
3168 /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
3169 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3170 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
3171 let mut payment_data = None;
3172 let htlc_claim = HTLCClaim::from_witness(&input.witness);
3173 let revocation_sig_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::Revocation);
3174 let accepted_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedPreimage);
3175 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
3176 let accepted_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedTimeout);
3177 let offered_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedPreimage);
3178 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
3179 let offered_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedTimeout);
3181 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
3182 if offered_preimage_claim || accepted_preimage_claim {
3183 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
3186 macro_rules! log_claim {
3187 ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
3188 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
3189 // HTLCs must either be claimed by a matching script type or through the
3191 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
3192 debug_assert!(!$htlc.offered || offered_preimage_claim || offered_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
3193 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
3194 debug_assert!($htlc.offered || accepted_preimage_claim || accepted_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
3195 // Further, only exactly one of the possible spend paths should have been
3196 // matched by any HTLC spend:
3197 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
3198 debug_assert_eq!(accepted_preimage_claim as u8 + accepted_timeout_claim as u8 +
3199 offered_preimage_claim as u8 + offered_timeout_claim as u8 +
3200 revocation_sig_claim as u8, 1);
3201 if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
3202 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
3203 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
3204 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
3205 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
3206 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back. We can likely claim the HTLC output with a revocation claim" });
3208 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
3209 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
3210 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
3211 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
3216 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
3217 ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
3218 if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
3219 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
3220 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
3221 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
3222 log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
3223 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash, $htlc_output.amount_msat));
3232 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
3233 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
3234 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
3235 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
3236 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
3237 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
3238 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
3239 // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
3240 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
3241 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
3242 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
3243 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash, htlc_output.amount_msat));
3244 } else if !$holder_tx {
3245 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
3246 if payment_data.is_none() {
3247 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
3250 if payment_data.is_none() {
3251 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
3252 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == htlc_output.offered;
3253 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3254 txid: tx.txid(), height, transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3255 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3256 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3257 preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
3258 Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
3259 // If this is a payment to us (ie !outbound_htlc), wait for
3260 // the CSV delay before dropping the HTLC from claimable
3261 // balance if the claim was an HTLC-Success transaction (ie
3262 // accepted_preimage_claim).
3263 on_to_local_output_csv: if accepted_preimage_claim && !outbound_htlc {
3264 Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv) } else { None },
3267 continue 'outer_loop;
3274 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
3275 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
3276 "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
3278 if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
3279 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
3280 scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
3281 "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
3284 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3285 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
3286 "counterparty commitment tx", false);
3289 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
3290 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
3291 if let Some((source, payment_hash, amount_msat)) = payment_data {
3292 if accepted_preimage_claim {
3293 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
3294 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
3295 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3298 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3299 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3300 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3301 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3302 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
3305 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3307 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3309 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3312 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
3313 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
3314 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
3315 upd.source == source
3317 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3319 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3321 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3322 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3323 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3324 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
3327 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3329 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3331 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3335 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
3336 if entry.height != height { return true; }
3338 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref htlc_source, .. } => {
3339 *htlc_source != source
3344 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
3346 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3348 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
3349 source, payment_hash,
3350 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3351 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
3354 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.confirmation_threshold());
3355 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3361 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
3362 fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3363 let mut spendable_output = None;
3364 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
3365 if i > ::core::u16::MAX as usize {
3366 // While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the
3367 // 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not
3368 // in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who
3369 // wishes to give us money for no reason.
3370 // Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere
3371 // near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's
3372 // scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently
3373 // non-standard due to their size.
3374 // Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in
3375 // us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills
3376 // nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case.
3379 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
3380 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
3381 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3382 output: outp.clone(),
3386 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
3387 if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
3388 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
3389 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3390 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
3391 to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
3392 output: outp.clone(),
3393 revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.clone(),
3394 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3395 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3400 if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
3401 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
3402 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3403 output: outp.clone(),
3404 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3405 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3409 if self.shutdown_script.as_ref() == Some(&outp.script_pubkey) {
3410 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
3411 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3412 output: outp.clone(),
3417 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
3418 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
3420 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3422 event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
3424 log_info!(logger, "Received spendable output {}, spendable at height {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());
3425 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3430 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
3432 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3433 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3436 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3437 self.0.block_connected(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3440 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3441 self.0.block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3445 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
3447 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3448 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3451 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3452 self.0.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3455 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
3456 self.0.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3459 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3460 self.0.best_block_updated(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3463 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
3464 self.0.get_relevant_txids()
3468 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
3470 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>> ReadableArgs<&'a K>
3471 for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<Signer>) {
3472 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_manager: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3473 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
3477 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3482 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
3484 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3485 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3487 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3488 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3490 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
3491 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3492 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3493 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
3496 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3498 let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3499 let shutdown_script = {
3500 let script = <Script as Readable>::read(reader)?;
3501 if script.is_empty() { None } else { Some(script) }
3504 let channel_keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3505 let holder_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3506 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
3507 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
3508 let outpoint = OutPoint {
3509 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
3510 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
3512 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
3513 let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3514 let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3516 let counterparty_commitment_params = Readable::read(reader)?;
3517 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
3518 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3520 let their_cur_per_commitment_points = {
3521 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3525 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3526 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
3527 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
3528 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
3530 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
3535 let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3537 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
3539 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
3542 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
3543 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3544 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3545 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3546 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
3548 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3549 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
3555 let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3556 let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
3557 for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
3558 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3559 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3560 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3561 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
3562 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
3564 if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
3565 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3569 let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3570 let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3571 for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
3572 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3573 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3574 if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
3575 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3579 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3580 let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3581 for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
3582 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3583 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3584 if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
3585 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3589 let mut prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx> =
3590 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3593 Some(Readable::read(reader)?)
3595 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3597 let mut current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx = Readable::read(reader)?;
3599 let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3600 let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3602 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3603 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3604 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
3605 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
3606 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3607 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
3608 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3612 let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3613 let mut pending_monitor_events = Some(
3614 Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3))));
3615 for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
3616 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3617 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
3618 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_info.0),
3619 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
3621 pending_monitor_events.as_mut().unwrap().push(ev);
3624 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3625 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
3626 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
3627 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3628 pending_events.push(event);
3632 let best_block = BestBlock::new(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
3634 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3635 let mut onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3636 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
3637 if let Some(val) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3638 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(val);
3642 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3643 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
3644 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
3645 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3646 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3647 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Script>())));
3648 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
3649 outputs.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3651 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
3652 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3655 let onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, keys_manager)?;
3657 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
3658 let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
3660 if let Some(prev_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_mut() {
3661 let prev_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_prev_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
3662 if prev_holder_value.is_none() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
3663 if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
3664 prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = prev_holder_value.unwrap();
3665 } else if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != prev_holder_value.unwrap() {
3666 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3670 let cur_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_cur_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
3671 if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
3672 current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = cur_holder_value;
3673 } else if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != cur_holder_value {
3674 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3677 let mut funding_spend_confirmed = None;
3678 let mut htlcs_resolved_on_chain = Some(Vec::new());
3679 let mut funding_spend_seen = Some(false);
3680 let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
3681 let mut confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = None;
3682 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
3683 (1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
3684 (3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
3685 (5, pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
3686 (7, funding_spend_seen, option),
3687 (9, counterparty_node_id, option),
3688 (11, confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
3691 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3692 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3694 Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
3696 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
3699 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
3700 counterparty_payment_script,
3704 holder_revocation_basepoint,
3706 current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
3707 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
3709 counterparty_commitment_params,
3710 funding_redeemscript,
3711 channel_value_satoshis,
3712 their_cur_per_commitment_points,
3717 counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
3718 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
3719 counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
3721 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
3722 current_holder_commitment_tx,
3723 current_counterparty_commitment_number,
3724 current_holder_commitment_number,
3727 pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
3730 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
3735 lockdown_from_offchain,
3737 funding_spend_seen: funding_spend_seen.unwrap(),
3738 funding_spend_confirmed,
3739 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output,
3740 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
3743 counterparty_node_id,
3752 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
3753 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
3754 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3755 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, EcdsaSighashType};
3756 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
3757 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
3758 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
3759 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
3760 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
3761 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
3762 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3763 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
3764 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
3768 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
3770 use super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStep;
3771 use ::{check_added_monitors, check_closed_broadcast, check_closed_event, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
3772 use chain::{BestBlock, Confirm};
3773 use chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
3774 use chain::package::{weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc, weight_revoked_offered_htlc, weight_revoked_received_htlc, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
3775 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3776 use chain::keysinterface::InMemorySigner;
3777 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3779 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
3780 use ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentSendFailure};
3781 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
3782 use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
3783 use util::errors::APIError;
3784 use util::events::{ClosureReason, MessageSendEventsProvider};
3785 use util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
3786 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
3787 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3789 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, TxMerkleNode, Witness};
3792 fn do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(use_local_txn: bool) {
3793 // Previously, monitor updates were allowed freely even after a funding-spend transaction
3794 // confirmed. This would allow a race condition where we could receive a payment (including
3795 // the counterparty revoking their broadcasted state!) and accept it without recourse as
3796 // long as the ChannelMonitor receives the block first, the full commitment update dance
3797 // occurs after the block is connected, and before the ChannelManager receives the block.
3798 // Obviously this is an incredibly contrived race given the counterparty would be risking
3799 // their full channel balance for it, but its worth fixing nonetheless as it makes the
3800 // potential ChannelMonitor states simpler to reason about.
3802 // This test checks said behavior, as well as ensuring a ChannelMonitorUpdate with multiple
3803 // updates is handled correctly in such conditions.
3804 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3805 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3806 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3807 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3808 let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(
3809 &nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3810 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(
3811 &nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3813 // Rebalance somewhat
3814 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
3816 // First route two payments for testing at the end
3817 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
3818 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
3820 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel.2);
3821 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
3822 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel.2);
3823 assert_eq!(remote_txn.len(), 3); // Commitment and two HTLC-Timeouts
3824 check_spends!(remote_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
3825 check_spends!(remote_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
3826 let broadcast_tx = if use_local_txn { &local_txn[0] } else { &remote_txn[0] };
3828 // Connect a commitment transaction, but only to the ChainMonitor/ChannelMonitor. The
3829 // channel is now closed, but the ChannelManager doesn't know that yet.
3830 let new_header = BlockHeader {
3831 version: 2, time: 0, bits: 0, nonce: 0,
3832 prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_info().0,
3833 merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros() };
3834 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3835 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(&new_header,
3836 &[(0, broadcast_tx)], conf_height);
3838 let (_, pre_update_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<InMemorySigner>)>::read(
3839 &mut io::Cursor::new(&get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel.2).encode()),
3840 &nodes[1].keys_manager.backing).unwrap();
3842 // If the ChannelManager tries to update the channel, however, the ChainMonitor will pass
3843 // the update through to the ChannelMonitor which will refuse it (as the channel is closed).
3844 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
3845 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)),
3846 true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
3847 assert!(err.contains("ChannelMonitor storage failure")));
3848 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2); // After the failure we generate a close-channel monitor update
3849 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3850 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_string() });
3852 // Build a new ChannelMonitorUpdate which contains both the failing commitment tx update
3853 // and provides the claim preimages for the two pending HTLCs. The first update generates
3854 // an error, but the point of this test is to ensure the later updates are still applied.
3855 let monitor_updates = nodes[1].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
3856 let mut replay_update = monitor_updates.get(&channel.2).unwrap().iter().rev().skip(1).next().unwrap().clone();
3857 assert_eq!(replay_update.updates.len(), 1);
3858 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } = replay_update.updates[0] {
3859 } else { panic!(); }
3860 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_1 });
3861 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_2 });
3863 let broadcaster = TestBroadcaster::new(Arc::clone(&nodes[1].blocks));
3865 pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
3867 // Even though we error'd on the first update, we should still have generated an HTLC claim
3869 let txn_broadcasted = broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3870 assert!(txn_broadcasted.len() >= 2);
3871 let htlc_txn = txn_broadcasted.iter().filter(|tx| {
3872 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1);
3873 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == broadcast_tx.txid()
3874 }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
3875 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
3876 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], broadcast_tx);
3877 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], broadcast_tx);
3880 fn test_funding_spend_refuses_updates() {
3881 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(true);
3882 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(false);
3886 fn test_prune_preimages() {
3887 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3888 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3889 let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))});
3890 let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
3892 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3893 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3895 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
3898 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
3899 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3900 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
3904 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
3905 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3907 let mut res = Vec::new();
3908 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
3909 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3913 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
3914 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
3921 macro_rules! preimages_to_holder_htlcs {
3922 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3924 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
3925 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
3931 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
3932 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
3933 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
3934 assert!($monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
3939 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
3941 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3942 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3943 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3944 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3945 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3946 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3952 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
3953 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
3954 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
3955 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
3956 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap()),
3957 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())
3959 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() };
3960 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
3961 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
3962 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
3963 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
3964 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
3965 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
3966 selected_contest_delay: 67,
3968 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
3971 // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
3973 let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3974 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(Network::Testnet);
3975 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
3976 Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &Script::new(),
3977 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
3978 &channel_parameters,
3979 Script::new(), 46, 0,
3980 HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), best_block, dummy_key);
3982 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
3983 let dummy_txid = dummy_tx.txid();
3984 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
3985 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
3986 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
3987 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
3988 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
3989 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_estimator);
3990 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger);
3993 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
3994 let mut secret = [0; 32];
3995 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3996 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3997 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 15);
3998 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3999 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
4001 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
4002 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
4003 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4004 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 13);
4005 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4006 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
4008 // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
4009 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
4010 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
4011 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
4012 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4013 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 12);
4014 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4015 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
4017 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
4018 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
4019 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
4020 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4021 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 5);
4022 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
4026 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
4027 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
4028 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
4030 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4031 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4032 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
4034 macro_rules! sign_input {
4035 ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $weight: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
4036 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
4037 offered: if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) { true } else { false },
4039 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
4040 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
4041 transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
4043 let redeem_script = if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
4044 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.segwit_signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
4045 let sig = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &privkey);
4046 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4047 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4048 $sum_actual_sigs += ser_sig.len();
4049 let witness = $sighash_parts.witness_mut($idx).unwrap();
4050 witness.push(ser_sig);
4051 if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT {
4052 witness.push(vec!(1));
4053 } else if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_revoked_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
4054 witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
4055 } else if *$weight == weight_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
4056 witness.push(vec![0]);
4058 witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
4060 witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
4061 let witness = witness.to_vec();
4062 println!("witness[0] {}", witness[0].len());
4063 println!("witness[1] {}", witness[1].len());
4064 println!("witness[2] {}", witness[2].len());
4068 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
4069 let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
4071 // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
4072 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
4073 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4074 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4076 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4077 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4081 script_sig: Script::new(),
4082 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4083 witness: Witness::new(),
4086 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4087 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4090 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
4091 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
4092 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
4094 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
4095 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
4096 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
4097 inputs_total_weight += inp;
4100 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
4103 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
4104 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
4105 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4106 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4108 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4109 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4113 script_sig: Script::new(),
4114 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4115 witness: Witness::new(),
4118 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4119 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4122 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
4123 let inputs_weight = vec![weight_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
4124 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
4126 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
4127 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
4128 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
4129 inputs_total_weight += inp;
4132 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
4135 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
4136 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
4137 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4138 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4139 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4140 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4144 script_sig: Script::new(),
4145 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4146 witness: Witness::new(),
4148 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4149 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4152 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
4153 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
4154 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
4156 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
4157 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
4158 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
4159 inputs_total_weight += inp;
4162 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
4166 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.