1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
13 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
14 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
15 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
17 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
18 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
19 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
20 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
21 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
26 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
36 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
37 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
39 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCType, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
40 use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
42 use chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
43 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
44 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
45 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, Sign, KeysInterface};
46 use chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
47 use chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput};
49 use util::logger::Logger;
50 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48, OptionDeserWrapper};
52 use util::events::Event;
56 use io::{self, Error};
60 /// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
61 /// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
62 #[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
65 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
66 pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
67 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
68 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
69 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with one exception specified below.
71 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
72 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
73 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
75 /// The only instance where update_id values are not strictly increasing is the case where we
76 /// allow post-force-close updates with a special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. See
77 /// its docs for more details.
82 /// (1) a channel has been force closed and
83 /// (2) we receive a preimage from a forward link that allows us to spend an HTLC output on
84 /// this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted commitment transaction
85 /// then we allow the `ChannelManager` to send a `ChannelMonitorUpdate` with this update ID,
86 /// with the update providing said payment preimage. No other update types are allowed after
88 pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = core::u64::MAX;
90 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
91 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
92 write_ver_prefix!(w, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
93 self.update_id.write(w)?;
94 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
95 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
96 update_step.write(w)?;
98 write_tlv_fields!(w, {});
102 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
103 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
104 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(r, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
105 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
106 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
107 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::core::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
109 if let Some(upd) = MaybeReadable::read(r)? {
113 read_tlv_fields!(r, {});
114 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
118 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
119 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::update_monitor this
120 /// means you tried to update a monitor for a different channel or the ChannelMonitorUpdate was
122 /// Contains a developer-readable error message.
123 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
124 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
126 /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
127 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
128 pub enum MonitorEvent {
129 /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
130 HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
132 /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was confirmed.
133 CommitmentTxConfirmed(OutPoint),
136 /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
137 /// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
138 /// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
139 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
140 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
141 pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
142 pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
143 pub(crate) source: HTLCSource,
144 pub(crate) onchain_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
146 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCUpdate, {
147 (0, payment_hash, required),
148 (1, onchain_value_satoshis, option),
149 (2, source, required),
150 (4, payment_preimage, option),
153 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
154 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
155 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
156 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
157 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
158 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
159 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
160 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 18;
161 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
162 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
163 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
164 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
165 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
166 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
167 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
168 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
169 /// accurate block height.
170 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
171 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
172 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
173 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
174 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding
175 /// inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us
178 /// Note that this is a library-wide security assumption. If a reorg deeper than this number of
179 /// blocks occurs, counterparties may be able to steal funds or claims made by and balances exposed
180 /// by a [`ChannelMonitor`] may be incorrect.
181 // We also use this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
182 // It may cause spurious generation of bumped claim txn but that's alright given the outpoint is already
183 // solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
184 // keep bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
185 pub const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
186 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
187 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
189 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
190 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
191 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
193 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
194 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
195 /// 3) if we are waiting on a connection or a channel state update to send an HTLC to a peer, and
196 /// that HTLC expires within this many blocks, we will simply fail the HTLC instead.
198 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
199 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
201 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
202 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
203 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
205 /// (3) is about our counterparty - we don't want to relay an HTLC to a counterparty when they may
206 /// end up force-closing the channel on us to claim it.
207 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
209 // TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction
210 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
211 struct HolderSignedTx {
212 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
214 revocation_key: PublicKey,
215 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
216 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
217 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
218 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
219 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
220 to_self_value_sat: u64,
223 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderSignedTx, {
225 // Note that this is filled in with data from OnchainTxHandler if it's missing.
226 // For HolderSignedTx objects serialized with 0.0.100+, this should be filled in.
227 (1, to_self_value_sat, (default_value, u64::max_value())),
228 (2, revocation_key, required),
229 (4, a_htlc_key, required),
230 (6, b_htlc_key, required),
231 (8, delayed_payment_key, required),
232 (10, per_commitment_point, required),
233 (12, feerate_per_kw, required),
234 (14, htlc_outputs, vec_type)
237 /// We use this to track static counterparty commitment transaction data and to generate any
238 /// justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
240 struct CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
241 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
242 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
243 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
246 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
247 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
248 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
249 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
250 (0, self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
251 (2, self.counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
252 (4, self.on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
257 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
258 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
259 let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
260 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 had some per-HTLC state stored here, which is no longer
261 // used. Read it for compatibility.
262 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
263 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
264 let _txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
265 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
266 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
267 let _htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(r)?;
271 let mut counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
272 let mut counterparty_htlc_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
273 let mut on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = 0;
274 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
275 (0, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
276 (2, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
277 (4, on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
279 CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
280 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.0.unwrap(),
281 counterparty_htlc_base_key: counterparty_htlc_base_key.0.unwrap(),
282 on_counterparty_tx_csv,
285 Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
289 /// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height when the event was observed and the
290 /// transaction causing it.
292 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
294 struct OnchainEventEntry {
300 impl OnchainEventEntry {
301 fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
302 let mut conf_threshold = self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
304 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
305 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor)
307 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
308 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
309 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + descriptor.to_self_delay as u32 - 1);
311 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { on_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } |
312 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { on_to_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } => {
313 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
314 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
315 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + csv as u32 - 1);
322 fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, best_block: &BestBlock) -> bool {
323 best_block.height() >= self.confirmation_threshold()
327 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
328 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
331 /// An outbound HTLC failing after a transaction is confirmed. Used
332 /// * when an outbound HTLC output is spent by us after the HTLC timed out
333 /// * an outbound HTLC which was not present in the commitment transaction which appeared
334 /// on-chain (either because it was not fully committed to or it was dust).
335 /// Note that this is *not* used for preimage claims, as those are passed upstream immediately,
336 /// appearing only as an `HTLCSpendConfirmation`, below.
339 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
340 onchain_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
341 /// None in the second case, above, ie when there is no relevant output in the commitment
342 /// transaction which appeared on chain.
343 input_idx: Option<u32>,
346 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
348 /// A spend of the funding output, either a commitment transaction or a cooperative closing
350 FundingSpendConfirmation {
351 /// The CSV delay for the output of the funding spend transaction (implying it is a local
352 /// commitment transaction, and this is the delay on the to_self output).
353 on_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
355 /// A spend of a commitment transaction HTLC output, set in the cases where *no* `HTLCUpdate`
356 /// is constructed. This is used when
357 /// * an outbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty with a preimage, causing us to
358 /// immediately claim the HTLC on the inbound edge and track the resolution here,
359 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty (with a timeout),
360 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by us (with a preimage).
361 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by the revocation
363 HTLCSpendConfirmation {
365 /// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
366 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
367 /// If the claim was made by us on an inbound HTLC against a local commitment transaction,
368 /// we set this to the output CSV value which we will have to wait until to spend the
369 /// output (and generate a SpendableOutput event).
370 on_to_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
374 impl Writeable for OnchainEventEntry {
375 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
376 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
377 (0, self.txid, required),
378 (2, self.height, required),
379 (4, self.event, required),
385 impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry {
386 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
387 let mut txid = Default::default();
389 let mut event = None;
390 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
392 (2, height, required),
393 (4, event, ignorable),
395 if let Some(ev) = event {
396 Ok(Some(Self { txid, height, event: ev }))
403 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
405 (0, source, required),
406 (1, onchain_value_satoshis, option),
407 (2, payment_hash, required),
408 (3, input_idx, option),
410 (1, MaturingOutput) => {
411 (0, descriptor, required),
413 (3, FundingSpendConfirmation) => {
414 (0, on_local_output_csv, option),
416 (5, HTLCSpendConfirmation) => {
417 (0, input_idx, required),
418 (2, preimage, option),
419 (4, on_to_local_output_csv, option),
424 #[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
426 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
427 LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
428 commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
429 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
431 LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
432 commitment_txid: Txid,
433 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
434 commitment_number: u64,
435 their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
438 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
444 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
445 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
447 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
448 /// think we've fallen behind!
449 should_broadcast: bool,
452 scriptpubkey: Script,
456 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
457 (0, LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo) => {
458 (0, commitment_tx, required),
459 (2, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
461 (1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
462 (0, commitment_txid, required),
463 (2, commitment_number, required),
464 (4, their_revocation_point, required),
465 (6, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
467 (2, PaymentPreimage) => {
468 (0, payment_preimage, required),
470 (3, CommitmentSecret) => {
472 (2, secret, required),
474 (4, ChannelForceClosed) => {
475 (0, should_broadcast, required),
477 (5, ShutdownScript) => {
478 (0, scriptpubkey, required),
482 /// Details about the balance(s) available for spending once the channel appears on chain.
484 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] for more details on when these will or will not
486 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
487 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialOrd, Ord))]
489 /// The channel is not yet closed (or the commitment or closing transaction has not yet
490 /// appeared in a block). The given balance is claimable (less on-chain fees) if the channel is
491 /// force-closed now.
492 ClaimableOnChannelClose {
493 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
494 /// required to do so.
495 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
497 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance is ours but awaiting confirmations until
498 /// we consider it spendable.
499 ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
500 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, possibly excluding the on-chain fees which
501 /// were spent in broadcasting the transaction.
502 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
503 /// The height at which an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event will be generated for this
505 confirmation_height: u32,
507 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance should be ours but awaiting spending
508 /// transaction confirmation. If the spending transaction does not confirm in time, it is
509 /// possible our counterparty can take the funds by broadcasting an HTLC timeout on-chain.
511 /// Once the spending transaction confirms, before it has reached enough confirmations to be
512 /// considered safe from chain reorganizations, the balance will instead be provided via
513 /// [`Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`].
514 ContentiousClaimable {
515 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
516 /// required to do so.
517 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
518 /// The height at which the counterparty may be able to claim the balance if we have not
522 /// HTLCs which we sent to our counterparty which are claimable after a timeout (less on-chain
523 /// fees) if the counterparty does not know the preimage for the HTLCs. These are somewhat
524 /// likely to be claimed by our counterparty before we do.
525 MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
526 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
527 /// required to do so.
528 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
529 /// The height at which we will be able to claim the balance if our counterparty has not
531 claimable_height: u32,
535 /// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
537 struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
539 /// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
540 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
543 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC, {
544 (0, input_idx, required),
545 (2, payment_preimage, option),
548 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
549 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
551 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
552 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
554 /// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
555 /// get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
556 /// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
557 /// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
559 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor), which
560 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
561 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
562 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
563 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
564 pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: Sign> {
566 pub(crate) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
568 inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
571 pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: Sign> {
572 latest_update_id: u64,
573 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
575 destination_script: Script,
576 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
577 counterparty_payment_script: Script,
578 shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
580 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
581 holder_revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
582 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
583 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
584 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
586 counterparty_commitment_params: CounterpartyCommitmentParameters,
587 funding_redeemscript: Script,
588 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
589 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
590 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
592 on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
594 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
595 /// The set of outpoints in each counterparty commitment transaction. We always need at least
596 /// the payment hash from `HTLCOutputInCommitment` to claim even a revoked commitment
597 /// transaction broadcast as we need to be able to construct the witness script in all cases.
598 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
599 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
600 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
601 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
602 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
603 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
604 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, u64>,
605 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
606 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
607 /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
608 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
609 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
611 // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
612 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
613 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
614 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
615 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
616 current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
618 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
620 current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
621 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
623 current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
625 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
627 pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
628 pending_events: Vec<Event>,
630 // Used to track on-chain events (i.e., transactions part of channels confirmed on chain) on
631 // which to take actions once they reach enough confirmations. Each entry includes the
632 // transaction's id and the height when the transaction was confirmed on chain.
633 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,
635 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
636 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
637 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
638 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
639 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>>,
642 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
644 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
646 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
647 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
648 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
649 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
651 // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
652 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
653 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
655 // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
656 // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
657 // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
658 holder_tx_signed: bool,
660 funding_spend_confirmed: Option<Txid>,
661 /// The set of HTLCs which have been either claimed or failed on chain and have reached
662 /// the requisite confirmations on the claim/fail transaction (either ANTI_REORG_DELAY or the
663 /// spending CSV for revocable outputs).
664 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec<IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC>,
666 // We simply modify best_block in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
667 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
668 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
669 // their best_block from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
670 // the full block_connected).
671 best_block: BestBlock,
673 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
676 /// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends.
677 pub type TransactionOutputs = (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>);
679 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
680 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
681 /// underlying object
682 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
683 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
684 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
685 let other = other.inner.lock().unwrap();
690 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
691 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
692 /// underlying object
693 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
694 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
695 if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
696 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
697 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
698 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script ||
699 self.counterparty_payment_script != other.counterparty_payment_script ||
700 self.channel_keys_id != other.channel_keys_id ||
701 self.holder_revocation_basepoint != other.holder_revocation_basepoint ||
702 self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
703 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.current_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
704 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
705 self.counterparty_commitment_params != other.counterparty_commitment_params ||
706 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
707 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
708 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
709 self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
710 self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
711 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
712 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
713 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number != other.counterparty_hash_commitment_number ||
714 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx ||
715 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number != other.current_counterparty_commitment_number ||
716 self.current_holder_commitment_number != other.current_holder_commitment_number ||
717 self.current_holder_commitment_tx != other.current_holder_commitment_tx ||
718 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
719 self.pending_monitor_events != other.pending_monitor_events ||
720 self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
721 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf ||
722 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
723 self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
724 self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed ||
725 self.funding_spend_confirmed != other.funding_spend_confirmed ||
726 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain != other.htlcs_resolved_on_chain
735 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
736 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
737 self.inner.lock().unwrap().write(writer)
741 // These are also used for ChannelMonitorUpdate, above.
742 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
743 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
745 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
746 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
747 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
749 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
751 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
752 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
754 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
755 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
756 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
757 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
758 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
759 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
761 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
764 self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
765 match &self.shutdown_script {
766 Some(script) => script.write(writer)?,
767 None => Script::new().write(writer)?,
770 self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
771 self.holder_revocation_basepoint.write(writer)?;
772 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
773 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
774 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
775 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
776 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
778 self.counterparty_commitment_params.write(writer)?;
779 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
780 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
782 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
783 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
784 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
785 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
786 match second_option {
787 Some(second_pubkey) => {
788 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
791 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
796 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
800 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_holder_tx_csv))?;
802 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
804 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
805 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
806 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
807 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
808 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
809 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
810 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
814 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
815 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
816 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
817 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
818 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
819 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
820 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
824 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
825 for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
826 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
827 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
830 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
831 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
832 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
833 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
836 if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
837 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
838 prev_holder_tx.write(writer)?;
840 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
843 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.write(writer)?;
845 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
846 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
848 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
849 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
850 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
853 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_monitor_events.len() as u64))?;
854 for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
856 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
860 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?
864 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
865 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
866 event.write(writer)?;
869 self.best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
870 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.height()))?;
872 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
873 for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
874 entry.write(writer)?;
877 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
878 for (txid, idx_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
880 (idx_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
881 for (idx, script) in idx_scripts.iter() {
883 script.write(writer)?;
886 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
888 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
889 self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
891 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
892 (1, self.funding_spend_confirmed, option),
893 (3, self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
900 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
901 pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
902 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
903 channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
904 funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
905 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
906 initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
907 best_block: BestBlock) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
909 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
910 let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
911 let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
913 let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
914 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
915 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.htlc_basepoint;
916 let counterparty_commitment_params = CounterpartyCommitmentParameters { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv };
918 let channel_keys_id = keys.channel_keys_id();
919 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
921 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
922 let (holder_commitment_tx, current_holder_commitment_number) = {
923 let trusted_tx = initial_holder_commitment_tx.trust();
924 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
926 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
927 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
929 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
930 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
931 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
932 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
933 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
934 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
935 to_self_value_sat: initial_holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
936 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
938 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
941 let onchain_tx_handler =
942 OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys,
943 channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx.clone());
945 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
946 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
949 inner: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorImpl {
951 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
953 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
954 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
955 counterparty_payment_script,
959 holder_revocation_basepoint,
961 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
962 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
964 counterparty_commitment_params,
965 funding_redeemscript,
966 channel_value_satoshis,
967 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
969 on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
971 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
972 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
973 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
974 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
976 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
977 current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
978 current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
979 current_holder_commitment_number,
981 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
982 pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
983 pending_events: Vec::new(),
985 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
990 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
991 holder_tx_signed: false,
992 funding_spend_confirmed: None,
993 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
1003 fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1004 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret)
1007 /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1008 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1009 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1010 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1011 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1014 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1015 commitment_number: u64,
1016 their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
1018 ) where L::Target: Logger {
1019 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
1020 txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger)
1024 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
1026 holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1027 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
1028 ) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1029 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
1030 holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)
1034 pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1036 payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
1037 payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
1042 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1043 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1046 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_payment_preimage(
1047 payment_hash, payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1050 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(
1055 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1058 self.inner.lock().unwrap().broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger)
1061 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1064 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1065 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1067 updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1071 ) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
1073 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1074 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1077 self.inner.lock().unwrap().update_monitor(updates, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1080 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1082 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1083 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_update_id()
1086 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1087 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, Script) {
1088 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone()
1091 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1092 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1093 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>)> {
1094 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_outputs_to_watch()
1095 .iter().map(|(txid, outputs)| (*txid, outputs.clone())).collect()
1098 /// Loads the funding txo and outputs to watch into the given `chain::Filter` by repeatedly
1099 /// calling `chain::Filter::register_output` and `chain::Filter::register_tx` until all outputs
1100 /// have been registered.
1101 pub fn load_outputs_to_watch<F: Deref>(&self, filter: &F) where F::Target: chain::Filter {
1102 let lock = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1103 filter.register_tx(&lock.get_funding_txo().0.txid, &lock.get_funding_txo().1);
1104 for (txid, outputs) in lock.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
1105 for (index, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
1106 assert!(*index <= u16::max_value() as u32);
1107 filter.register_output(WatchedOutput {
1109 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: *index as u16 },
1110 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
1116 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1117 /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
1118 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1119 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events()
1122 /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
1125 /// This is called by ChainMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
1126 /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
1127 /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
1128 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
1129 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_events()
1132 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1133 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_min_seen_secret()
1136 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1137 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number()
1140 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1141 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
1144 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
1145 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable holder toxic tx in case of
1146 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our counterparty side knows
1147 /// a higher revocation secret than the holder commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
1148 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
1149 /// broadcast them if counterparty don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
1150 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
1151 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
1152 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
1153 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1154 where L::Target: Logger {
1155 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1158 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1159 /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1160 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1161 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1162 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1163 where L::Target: Logger {
1164 self.inner.lock().unwrap().unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1167 /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
1168 /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
1169 /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
1170 /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
1171 /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
1172 /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
1174 /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
1175 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1177 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1178 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1180 header: &BlockHeader,
1181 txdata: &TransactionData,
1186 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1188 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1189 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1192 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_connected(
1193 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1196 /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1198 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1200 header: &BlockHeader,
1206 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1207 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1210 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_disconnected(
1211 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1214 /// Processes transactions confirmed in a block with the given header and height, returning new
1215 /// outputs to watch. See [`block_connected`] for details.
1217 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1218 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1220 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1221 pub fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1223 header: &BlockHeader,
1224 txdata: &TransactionData,
1229 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1231 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1232 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1235 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transactions_confirmed(
1236 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1239 /// Processes a transaction that was reorganized out of the chain.
1241 /// Used instead of [`block_disconnected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather
1242 /// than blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1244 /// [`block_disconnected`]: Self::block_disconnected
1245 pub fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1252 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1253 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1256 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transaction_unconfirmed(
1257 txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1260 /// Updates the monitor with the current best chain tip, returning new outputs to watch. See
1261 /// [`block_connected`] for details.
1263 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1264 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1266 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1267 pub fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1269 header: &BlockHeader,
1274 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1276 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1277 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1280 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block_updated(
1281 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1284 /// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
1285 pub fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
1286 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1287 let mut txids: Vec<Txid> = inner.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
1289 .map(|entry| entry.txid)
1290 .chain(inner.onchain_tx_handler.get_relevant_txids().into_iter())
1292 txids.sort_unstable();
1297 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
1298 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
1299 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
1300 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone()
1303 /// Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to
1304 /// force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting
1307 /// Any balances in the channel which are available on-chain (excluding on-chain fees) are
1308 /// included here until an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event has been generated for the
1309 /// balance, or until our counterparty has claimed the balance and accrued several
1310 /// confirmations on the claim transaction.
1312 /// Note that the balances available when you or your counterparty have broadcasted revoked
1313 /// state(s) may not be fully captured here.
1316 /// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
1317 /// may be returned here and their meanings.
1318 pub fn get_claimable_balances(&self) -> Vec<Balance> {
1319 let mut res = Vec::new();
1320 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1322 let mut confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed;
1323 let mut pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = None;
1324 let funding_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1325 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
1326 Some((event.txid, event.confirmation_threshold()))
1329 if let Some((txid, conf_thresh)) = funding_spend_pending {
1330 debug_assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_none(),
1331 "We have a pending funding spend awaiting anti-reorg confirmation, we can't have confirmed it already!");
1332 confirmed_txid = Some(txid);
1333 pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = Some(conf_thresh);
1336 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
1337 ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
1338 for htlc in $htlc_iter {
1339 if let Some(htlc_input_idx) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1340 if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.input_idx == htlc_input_idx) {
1341 assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
1342 } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
1343 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1344 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1345 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
1346 let htlc_update_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1347 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { input_idx: Some(input_idx), .. } = event.event {
1348 if input_idx == htlc_input_idx { Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
1351 if let Some(conf_thresh) = htlc_update_pending {
1352 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1353 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1354 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1357 res.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
1358 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1359 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1362 } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
1363 // Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if
1364 // we know the preimage.
1365 // Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the
1366 // preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
1367 // to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
1368 let htlc_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1369 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { input_idx, preimage, .. } = event.event {
1370 if input_idx == htlc_input_idx {
1371 Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()))
1375 if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
1376 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1377 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1378 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1381 res.push(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
1382 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1383 timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1392 if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
1393 let mut found_commitment_tx = false;
1394 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1395 walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
1396 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1397 if let Some(value) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1398 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1399 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(descriptor)
1401 Some(descriptor.output.value)
1404 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1405 claimable_amount_satoshis: value,
1406 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1409 // If a counterparty commitment transaction is awaiting confirmation, we
1410 // should either have a StaticPaymentOutput MaturingOutput event awaiting
1411 // confirmation with the same height or have never met our dust amount.
1414 found_commitment_tx = true;
1415 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
1416 walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
1417 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1418 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1419 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
1420 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1423 found_commitment_tx = true;
1424 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1425 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
1426 walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
1427 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1428 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1429 claimable_amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat,
1430 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1433 found_commitment_tx = true;
1436 if !found_commitment_tx {
1437 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1438 // We blindly assume this is a cooperative close transaction here, and that
1439 // neither us nor our counterparty misbehaved. At worst we've under-estimated
1440 // the amount we can claim as we'll punish a misbehaving counterparty.
1441 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1442 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
1443 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1447 // TODO: Add logic to provide claimable balances for counterparty broadcasting revoked
1450 let mut claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat = 0;
1451 for (htlc, _, _) in us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1452 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { continue; }
1454 res.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
1455 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1456 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1458 } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
1459 claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1462 res.push(Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1463 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat + claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat,
1471 /// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
1472 /// failing any HTLCs which didn't make it into the broadcasted commitment transaction back
1473 /// after ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
1475 /// We always compare against the set of HTLCs in counterparty commitment transactions, as those
1476 /// are the commitment transactions which are generated by us. The off-chain state machine in
1477 /// `Channel` will automatically resolve any HTLCs which were never included in a commitment
1478 /// transaction when it detects channel closure, but it is up to us to ensure any HTLCs which were
1479 /// included in a remote commitment transaction are failed back if they are not present in the
1480 /// broadcasted commitment transaction.
1482 /// Specifically, the removal process for HTLCs in `Channel` is always based on the counterparty
1483 /// sending a `revoke_and_ack`, which causes us to clear `prev_counterparty_commitment_txid`. Thus,
1484 /// as long as we examine both the current counterparty commitment transaction and, if it hasn't
1485 /// been revoked yet, the previous one, we we will never "forget" to resolve an HTLC.
1486 macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
1487 ($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
1488 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1489 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1490 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = $self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1491 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1492 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1493 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1494 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1495 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1496 // payment_preimage.
1497 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1498 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1499 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1500 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1502 let confirmed_htlcs_iter: &mut Iterator<Item = (&HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = &mut $confirmed_htlcs_list;
1503 let mut matched_htlc = false;
1504 for (ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in confirmed_htlcs_iter {
1505 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source {
1506 matched_htlc = true;
1510 if matched_htlc { continue; }
1511 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
1512 if entry.height != $commitment_tx_conf_height { return true; }
1514 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref update_source, .. } => {
1515 *update_source != **source
1520 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
1522 height: $commitment_tx_conf_height,
1523 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
1524 source: (**source).clone(),
1525 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
1526 onchain_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
1530 log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
1531 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type, entry.confirmation_threshold());
1532 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
1538 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1539 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1541 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1542 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous");
1547 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
1548 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
1549 /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
1550 /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
1551 fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1552 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
1553 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
1556 // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
1557 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
1558 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
1559 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
1564 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
1565 let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
1566 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
1567 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1568 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
1570 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
1571 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1572 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1576 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1577 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1578 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1583 let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
1590 counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
1599 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
1600 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
1601 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
1602 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
1604 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
1605 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
1608 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
1609 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
1610 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(txid);
1611 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
1612 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
1613 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
1614 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1615 Some(old_points) => {
1616 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
1617 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1618 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
1619 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
1620 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1622 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1625 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1629 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1632 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
1633 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
1634 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
1640 /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
1641 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
1642 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
1643 /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
1644 /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
1645 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1646 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1647 let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = {
1648 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1649 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1650 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1651 self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
1654 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1655 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1656 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1657 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1658 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1660 to_self_value_sat: holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
1661 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1664 self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(holder_commitment_tx);
1665 mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1666 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
1667 if self.holder_tx_signed {
1668 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected"));
1673 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
1674 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
1675 fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L)
1676 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1677 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1680 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
1682 // If the channel is force closed, try to claim the output from this preimage.
1683 // First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
1684 macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
1685 ($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
1686 let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs($commitment_number, $txid, None);
1687 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1690 if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1691 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
1692 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
1696 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1697 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
1698 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
1703 // Then if a holder commitment transaction has been seen on-chain, broadcast transactions
1704 // claiming the HTLC output from each of the holder commitment transactions.
1705 // Note that we can't just use `self.holder_tx_signed`, because that only covers the case where
1706 // *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
1707 // holder commitment transactions.
1708 if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
1709 // Assume that the broadcasted commitment transaction confirmed in the current best
1710 // block. Even if not, its a reasonable metric for the bump criteria on the HTLC
1712 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
1713 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1714 if let Some(ref tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1715 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&tx, self.best_block.height());
1716 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1721 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
1722 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1725 for tx in self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
1726 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting local {}", log_tx!(tx));
1727 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1729 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
1732 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
1733 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1734 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1737 // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a
1738 // preimage for a broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd
1739 // like to claim on-chain. If this is the case, we no longer have guaranteed
1740 // access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a sentinel value instead.
1741 if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
1742 match updates.updates[0] {
1743 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => {},
1744 _ => panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage"),
1746 assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
1747 } else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
1748 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
1750 for update in updates.updates.iter() {
1752 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
1753 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
1754 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
1755 self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone())?
1757 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } => {
1758 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
1759 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_revocation_point, logger)
1761 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
1762 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
1763 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1765 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
1766 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
1767 self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret)?
1769 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
1770 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
1771 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
1772 if *should_broadcast {
1773 self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
1774 } else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
1775 log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic holder commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
1777 // If we generated a MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed, the ChannelManager
1778 // will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we
1779 // shouldn't print the scary warning above.
1780 log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction.");
1783 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { scriptpubkey } => {
1784 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with shutdown script");
1785 if let Some(shutdown_script) = self.shutdown_script.replace(scriptpubkey.clone()) {
1786 panic!("Attempted to replace shutdown script {} with {}", shutdown_script, scriptpubkey);
1791 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
1795 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1796 self.latest_update_id
1799 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
1803 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>> {
1804 // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
1805 // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
1806 // its trivial to do, double-check that here.
1807 for (txid, _) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1808 self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered");
1810 &self.outputs_to_watch
1813 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1814 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1815 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
1819 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
1820 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1821 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
1825 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1826 fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1827 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
1830 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1831 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
1834 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1835 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
1838 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1839 self.current_holder_commitment_number
1842 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1843 /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1844 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1845 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1846 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1847 /// revoked counterparty commitment tx
1848 fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs) where L::Target: Logger {
1849 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1850 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1851 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1852 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1854 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1855 let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1857 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1858 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1861 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1866 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1867 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1868 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1869 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1870 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1871 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint));
1872 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key));
1874 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
1875 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1877 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
1878 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1879 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1880 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, outp.value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
1881 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
1882 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
1886 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
1887 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1888 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1889 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1890 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1891 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
1892 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1894 let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone());
1895 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(revk_htlc_outp), htlc.cltv_expiry, true, height);
1896 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
1901 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
1902 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1903 // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
1904 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
1905 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1906 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
1908 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
1910 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", height, [].iter().map(|a| *a), logger);
1912 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1913 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1914 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1915 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1916 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1917 // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1918 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1920 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1921 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
1923 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
1925 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1926 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", height, per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(a, b)| (a, b.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()))), logger);
1928 let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
1929 for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
1930 claimable_outpoints.push(req);
1934 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1937 fn get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>) -> Vec<PackageTemplate> {
1938 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1939 if let Some(htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
1940 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1941 let revocation_point_option =
1942 // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
1943 // per-commitment point
1944 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1945 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1946 // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
1947 // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
1948 // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
1949 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1951 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1952 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
1953 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1954 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
1955 if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
1956 transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
1957 return claimable_outpoints; // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1960 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
1961 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
1962 let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered { PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*revocation_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone())) } else { PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*revocation_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, htlc.clone())) };
1963 let aggregation = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
1964 let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry,aggregation, 0);
1965 claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
1975 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
1976 fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<TransactionOutputs>) where L::Target: Logger {
1977 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
1978 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
1979 return (Vec::new(), None)
1982 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1983 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1986 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
1991 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
1992 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1993 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1995 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty HTLC transaction, spending {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
1996 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, tx.output[0].value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
1997 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(htlc_txid, 0, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
1998 let claimable_outpoints = vec!(justice_package);
1999 let outputs = vec![(0, tx.output[0].clone())];
2000 (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, outputs)))
2003 // Returns (1) `PackageTemplate`s that can be given to the OnChainTxHandler, so that the handler can
2004 // broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
2005 // script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
2006 fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, conf_height: u32) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
2007 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2009 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
2010 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
2012 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2013 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2014 let htlc_output = if htlc.offered {
2015 HolderHTLCOutput::build_offered(htlc.amount_msat, htlc.cltv_expiry)
2017 let payment_preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
2020 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2023 HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat)
2025 let htlc_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(holder_tx.txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(htlc_output), htlc.cltv_expiry, false, conf_height);
2026 claim_requests.push(htlc_package);
2030 (claim_requests, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
2033 // Returns holder HTLC outputs to watch and react to in case of spending.
2034 fn get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, commitment_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(u32, TxOut)> {
2035 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2036 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2037 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2038 watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
2044 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
2045 /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
2046 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
2047 /// Returns None unless the transaction is definitely one of our commitment transactions.
2048 fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<(Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs)> where L::Target: Logger {
2049 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
2050 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
2051 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2053 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
2054 ($updates: expr, $to_watch: expr) => {
2055 claim_requests = $updates.0;
2056 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.1;
2057 watch_outputs.append(&mut $to_watch);
2061 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
2062 let mut is_holder_tx = false;
2064 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2065 is_holder_tx = true;
2066 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of latest holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
2067 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, height);
2068 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
2069 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
2070 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", height, self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, c)| (a, c.as_ref())), logger);
2071 } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2072 if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2073 is_holder_tx = true;
2074 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of previous holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
2075 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height);
2076 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
2077 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
2078 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", height, holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, c)| (a, c.as_ref())), logger);
2083 Some((claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)))
2089 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2090 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
2091 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2092 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2093 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2094 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
2095 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2096 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2097 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2098 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2099 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2102 } else if htlc.0.cltv_expiry > self.best_block.height() + 1 {
2103 // Don't broadcast HTLC-Timeout transactions immediately as they don't meet the
2104 // current locktime requirements on-chain. We will broadcast them in
2105 // `block_confirmed` when `should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn` returns true.
2106 // Note that we add + 1 as transactions are broadcastable when they can be
2107 // confirmed in the next block.
2110 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2111 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2112 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
2116 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
2117 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
2121 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
2122 /// Note that this includes possibly-locktimed-in-the-future transactions!
2123 fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2124 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
2125 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2126 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2127 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
2128 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2129 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2130 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2131 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2132 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2136 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2137 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2138 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
2145 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2146 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2147 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2150 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2151 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2153 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
2156 fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2158 header: &BlockHeader,
2163 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2165 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2166 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2169 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2171 if height > self.best_block.height() {
2172 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2173 self.block_confirmed(height, vec![], vec![], vec![], &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
2174 } else if block_hash != self.best_block.block_hash() {
2175 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2176 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height <= height);
2177 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height + 1, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2179 } else { Vec::new() }
2182 fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2184 header: &BlockHeader,
2185 txdata: &TransactionData,
2190 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2192 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2193 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2196 let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
2197 for tx in &txn_matched {
2198 let mut output_val = 0;
2199 for out in tx.output.iter() {
2200 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2201 output_val += out.value;
2202 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2206 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2208 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2209 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2210 for tx in &txn_matched {
2211 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
2212 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
2213 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
2214 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
2216 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
2217 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
2218 let mut balance_spendable_csv = None;
2219 log_info!(logger, "Channel closed by funding output spend in txid {}.", log_bytes!(tx.txid()));
2220 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
2221 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
2222 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2223 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2225 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2226 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
2227 if let Some((mut new_outpoints, new_outputs)) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &logger) {
2228 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2229 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2231 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2232 balance_spendable_csv = Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv);
2236 let txid = tx.txid();
2237 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
2240 event: OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation {
2241 on_local_output_csv: balance_spendable_csv,
2245 if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
2246 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
2247 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2248 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
2249 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2254 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
2255 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
2256 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
2257 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &logger);
2259 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger);
2262 if height > self.best_block.height() {
2263 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2266 self.block_confirmed(height, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
2269 /// Update state for new block(s)/transaction(s) confirmed. Note that the caller must update
2270 /// `self.best_block` before calling if a new best blockchain tip is available. More
2271 /// concretely, `self.best_block` must never be at a lower height than `conf_height`, avoiding
2272 /// complexity especially in `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`.
2274 /// `conf_height` should be set to the height at which any new transaction(s)/block(s) were
2275 /// confirmed at, even if it is not the current best height.
2276 fn block_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2279 txn_matched: Vec<&Transaction>,
2280 mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
2281 mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<PackageTemplate>,
2285 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2287 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2288 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2291 log_trace!(logger, "Processing {} matched transactions for block at height {}.", txn_matched.len(), conf_height);
2292 debug_assert!(self.best_block.height() >= conf_height);
2294 let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
2295 if should_broadcast {
2296 let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone());
2297 let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), self.best_block.height(), false, self.best_block.height());
2298 claimable_outpoints.push(commitment_package);
2299 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
2300 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2301 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2302 // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
2303 // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
2304 // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
2305 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
2306 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
2307 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2308 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2310 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2313 // Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold.
2314 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
2315 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2316 let mut onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf = Vec::new();
2317 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
2318 if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self.best_block) {
2319 onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2321 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2325 // Used to check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
2326 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2327 let unmatured_htlcs: Vec<_> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
2329 .filter_map(|entry| match &entry.event {
2330 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source, .. } => Some(source),
2334 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2335 let mut matured_htlcs = Vec::new();
2337 // Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
2338 for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
2340 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, onchain_value_satoshis, input_idx } => {
2341 // Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
2342 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2345 unmatured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &source).is_none(),
2346 "An unmature HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
2347 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
2348 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
2350 matured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == source).is_none(),
2351 "A matured HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
2352 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
2353 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
2354 matured_htlcs.push(source.clone());
2357 log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2358 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2360 payment_preimage: None,
2361 source: source.clone(),
2362 onchain_value_satoshis,
2364 if let Some(idx) = input_idx {
2365 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { input_idx: idx, payment_preimage: None });
2368 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
2369 log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
2370 self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
2371 outputs: vec![descriptor]
2374 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { input_idx, preimage, .. } => {
2375 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { input_idx, payment_preimage: preimage });
2377 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => {
2378 self.funding_spend_confirmed = Some(entry.txid);
2383 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, conf_height, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2385 // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
2386 // updating the latter in the process.
2387 watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
2388 let idx_and_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| (o.0, o.1.script_pubkey.clone())).collect();
2389 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), idx_and_scripts).is_none()
2393 // If we see a transaction for which we registered outputs previously,
2394 // make sure the registered scriptpubkey at the expected index match
2395 // the actual transaction output one. We failed this case before #653.
2396 for tx in &txn_matched {
2397 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&tx.txid()) {
2398 for idx_and_script in outputs.iter() {
2399 assert!((idx_and_script.0 as usize) < tx.output.len());
2400 assert_eq!(tx.output[idx_and_script.0 as usize].script_pubkey, idx_and_script.1);
2408 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
2409 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2410 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2413 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", header.block_hash(), height);
2416 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
2417 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
2418 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height < height);
2420 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2422 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
2425 fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2432 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2433 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2436 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.txid != *txid);
2437 self.onchain_tx_handler.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2440 /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
2441 /// transactions thereof.
2442 fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
2443 let mut matched_txn = HashSet::new();
2444 txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
2445 let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
2446 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2447 if matches { break; }
2448 if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2453 matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
2456 }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
2459 /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
2460 fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
2461 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2462 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2463 for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
2464 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
2467 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
2468 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
2469 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
2470 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
2471 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().clone()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
2472 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
2473 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
2474 } else { panic!(); }
2485 fn should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
2486 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
2487 // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
2488 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
2489 // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
2490 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
2491 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
2492 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
2493 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
2494 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
2495 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
2496 let height = self.best_block.height();
2497 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2498 ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
2499 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
2500 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
2501 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
2502 // time out the HTLC first.
2503 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
2504 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
2505 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
2506 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
2507 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
2508 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
2509 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
2510 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
2511 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
2512 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
2513 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
2514 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
2515 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2516 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2517 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2518 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
2519 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
2520 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
2521 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
2522 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
2523 let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
2524 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
2525 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
2526 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2533 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2535 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2536 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2537 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2540 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2541 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2542 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2549 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
2550 /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2551 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2552 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2553 let mut payment_data = None;
2554 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
2555 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
2556 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
2557 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
2558 let accepted_timeout_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
2559 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
2560 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
2561 let offered_timeout_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
2563 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2564 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2565 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2566 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2567 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2570 macro_rules! log_claim {
2571 ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2572 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
2573 // HTLCs must either be claimed by a matching script type or through the
2575 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
2576 debug_assert!(!$htlc.offered || offered_preimage_claim || offered_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
2577 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
2578 debug_assert!($htlc.offered || accepted_preimage_claim || accepted_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
2579 // Further, only exactly one of the possible spend paths should have been
2580 // matched by any HTLC spend:
2581 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
2582 debug_assert_eq!(accepted_preimage_claim as u8 + accepted_timeout_claim as u8 +
2583 offered_preimage_claim as u8 + offered_timeout_claim as u8 +
2584 revocation_sig_claim as u8, 1);
2585 if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2586 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2587 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2588 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2589 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2590 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2592 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2593 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2594 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2595 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2600 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
2601 ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2602 if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
2603 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2604 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2605 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2606 log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2607 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash, $htlc_output.amount_msat));
2616 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2617 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
2618 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2619 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2620 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2621 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
2622 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2623 // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
2624 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2625 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2626 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2627 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash, htlc_output.amount_msat));
2628 } else if !$holder_tx {
2629 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2630 if payment_data.is_none() {
2631 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2634 if payment_data.is_none() {
2635 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
2636 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == htlc_output.offered;
2637 if !outbound_htlc || revocation_sig_claim {
2638 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
2639 txid: tx.txid(), height,
2640 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
2641 input_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
2642 preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
2643 Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
2644 // If this is a payment to us (!outbound_htlc, above),
2645 // wait for the CSV delay before dropping the HTLC from
2646 // claimable balance if the claim was an HTLC-Success
2648 on_to_local_output_csv: if accepted_preimage_claim {
2649 Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv) } else { None },
2653 // Outbound claims should always have payment_data, unless
2654 // we've already failed the HTLC as the commitment transaction
2655 // which was broadcasted was revoked. In that case, we should
2656 // spend the HTLC output here immediately, and expose that fact
2657 // as a Balance, something which we do not yet do.
2658 // TODO: Track the above as claimable!
2660 continue 'outer_loop;
2667 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
2668 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2669 "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
2671 if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2672 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2673 scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2674 "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
2677 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2678 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2679 "counterparty commitment tx", false);
2682 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2683 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2684 if let Some((source, payment_hash, amount_msat)) = payment_data {
2685 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2686 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
2687 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
2688 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
2691 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
2692 input_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
2693 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2694 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
2697 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2699 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2701 onchain_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
2704 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2705 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
2706 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
2707 upd.source == source
2709 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
2712 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
2713 input_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
2714 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2715 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
2718 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2720 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2722 onchain_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
2726 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
2727 if entry.height != height { return true; }
2729 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref htlc_source, .. } => {
2730 *htlc_source != source
2735 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
2738 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2739 source, payment_hash,
2740 onchain_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
2741 input_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
2744 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.confirmation_threshold());
2745 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2751 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
2752 fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2753 let mut spendable_output = None;
2754 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
2755 if i > ::core::u16::MAX as usize {
2756 // While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the
2757 // 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not
2758 // in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who
2759 // wishes to give us money for no reason.
2760 // Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere
2761 // near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's
2762 // scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently
2763 // non-standard due to their size.
2764 // Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in
2765 // us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills
2766 // nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case.
2769 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
2770 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2771 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2772 output: outp.clone(),
2776 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
2777 if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
2778 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
2779 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2780 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
2781 to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
2782 output: outp.clone(),
2783 revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.clone(),
2784 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
2785 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2790 if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
2791 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
2792 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2793 output: outp.clone(),
2794 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
2795 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2799 if self.shutdown_script.as_ref() == Some(&outp.script_pubkey) {
2800 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2801 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2802 output: outp.clone(),
2807 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2808 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
2811 event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
2813 log_info!(logger, "Received spendable output {}, spendable at height {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());
2814 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2819 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
2821 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2822 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2825 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
2826 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
2827 self.0.block_connected(&block.header, &txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
2830 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
2831 self.0.block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
2835 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
2837 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2838 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2841 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
2842 self.0.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
2845 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
2846 self.0.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
2849 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
2850 self.0.best_block_updated(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
2853 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
2854 self.0.get_relevant_txids()
2858 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
2860 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>> ReadableArgs<&'a K>
2861 for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<Signer>) {
2862 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_manager: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2863 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
2867 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2872 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
2874 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2875 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2877 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2878 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2880 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
2881 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2882 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2883 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
2886 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2888 let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2889 let shutdown_script = {
2890 let script = <Script as Readable>::read(reader)?;
2891 if script.is_empty() { None } else { Some(script) }
2894 let channel_keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
2895 let holder_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
2896 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
2897 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
2898 let outpoint = OutPoint {
2899 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
2900 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
2902 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
2903 let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2904 let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2906 let counterparty_commitment_params = Readable::read(reader)?;
2907 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
2908 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
2910 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
2911 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2915 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2916 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2917 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
2918 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
2920 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
2925 let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2927 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
2929 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
2932 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
2933 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2934 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2935 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2936 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
2938 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2939 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
2945 let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2946 let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
2947 for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
2948 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2949 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2950 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2951 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
2952 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
2954 if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
2955 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2959 let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2960 let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2961 for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
2962 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2963 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2964 if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
2965 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2969 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2970 let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2971 for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
2972 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2973 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2974 if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
2975 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2979 let mut prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx> =
2980 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2983 Some(Readable::read(reader)?)
2985 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2987 let mut current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx = Readable::read(reader)?;
2989 let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2990 let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2992 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2993 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2994 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
2995 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2996 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2997 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
2998 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3002 let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3003 let mut pending_monitor_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3)));
3004 for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
3005 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3006 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
3007 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_info.0),
3008 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
3010 pending_monitor_events.push(ev);
3013 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3014 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
3015 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
3016 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3017 pending_events.push(event);
3021 let best_block = BestBlock::new(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
3023 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3024 let mut onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3025 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
3026 if let Some(val) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3027 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(val);
3031 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3032 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
3033 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
3034 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3035 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3036 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Script>())));
3037 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
3038 outputs.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3040 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
3041 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3044 let onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, keys_manager)?;
3046 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
3047 let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
3049 if let Some(prev_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_mut() {
3050 let prev_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_prev_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
3051 if prev_holder_value.is_none() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
3052 if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
3053 prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = prev_holder_value.unwrap();
3054 } else if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != prev_holder_value.unwrap() {
3055 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3059 let cur_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_cur_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
3060 if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
3061 current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = cur_holder_value;
3062 } else if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != cur_holder_value {
3063 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3066 let mut funding_spend_confirmed = None;
3067 let mut htlcs_resolved_on_chain = Some(Vec::new());
3068 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
3069 (1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
3070 (3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
3073 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3074 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3076 Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor {
3077 inner: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorImpl {
3079 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
3082 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
3083 counterparty_payment_script,
3087 holder_revocation_basepoint,
3089 current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
3090 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
3092 counterparty_commitment_params,
3093 funding_redeemscript,
3094 channel_value_satoshis,
3095 their_cur_revocation_points,
3100 counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
3101 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
3102 counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
3104 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
3105 current_holder_commitment_tx,
3106 current_counterparty_commitment_number,
3107 current_holder_commitment_number,
3110 pending_monitor_events,
3113 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
3118 lockdown_from_offchain,
3120 funding_spend_confirmed,
3121 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
3133 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
3134 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3135 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
3136 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
3137 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3138 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
3139 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
3140 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
3141 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
3142 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3144 use chain::BestBlock;
3145 use chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
3146 use chain::package::{WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
3147 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3148 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3150 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
3151 use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
3152 use util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
3153 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
3154 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
3155 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3156 use chain::keysinterface::InMemorySigner;
3160 fn test_prune_preimages() {
3161 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3162 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3163 let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))});
3164 let fee_estimator = Arc::new(TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) });
3166 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3167 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3169 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
3172 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
3173 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3174 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
3178 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
3179 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3181 let mut res = Vec::new();
3182 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
3183 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3187 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
3188 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
3195 macro_rules! preimages_to_holder_htlcs {
3196 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3198 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
3199 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
3205 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
3206 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
3207 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
3208 assert!($monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
3213 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
3215 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3216 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3217 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3218 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3219 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3225 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
3226 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
3227 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
3228 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
3229 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap()),
3230 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())
3232 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Default::default(), index: u16::max_value() };
3233 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
3234 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
3235 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
3236 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
3237 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
3238 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
3239 selected_contest_delay: 67,
3241 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
3243 // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
3245 let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3246 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(Network::Testnet);
3247 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
3248 Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &Script::new(),
3249 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
3250 &channel_parameters,
3251 Script::new(), 46, 0,
3252 HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), best_block);
3254 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
3255 let dummy_txid = dummy_tx.txid();
3256 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
3257 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
3258 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
3259 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
3260 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
3261 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger);
3264 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
3265 let mut secret = [0; 32];
3266 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3267 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3268 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 15);
3269 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3270 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
3272 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
3273 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3274 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3275 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 13);
3276 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3277 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
3279 // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
3280 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
3281 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
3282 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3283 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3284 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 12);
3285 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3286 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
3288 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
3289 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
3290 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3291 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3292 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 5);
3293 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
3297 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
3298 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
3299 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
3301 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3302 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3303 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
3304 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3306 macro_rules! sign_input {
3307 ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $weight: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
3308 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3309 offered: if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC || *$weight == WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC { true } else { false },
3311 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
3312 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
3313 transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
3315 let redeem_script = if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
3316 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3317 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
3318 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3319 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3320 sum_actual_sigs += $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len();
3321 if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT {
3322 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec!(1));
3323 } else if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC || *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC {
3324 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
3325 } else if *$weight == WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC {
3326 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec![0]);
3328 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
3330 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
3331 println!("witness[0] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len());
3332 println!("witness[1] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[1].len());
3333 println!("witness[2] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[2].len());
3337 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
3338 let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
3340 // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
3341 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3343 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3344 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3348 script_sig: Script::new(),
3349 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3350 witness: Vec::new(),
3353 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3354 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3357 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3358 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC];
3359 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
3361 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3362 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
3363 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
3364 inputs_total_weight += inp;
3367 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3369 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
3370 claim_tx.input.clear();
3371 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3373 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3374 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3378 script_sig: Script::new(),
3379 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3380 witness: Vec::new(),
3383 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3384 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC, WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC, WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC];
3385 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
3387 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3388 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
3389 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
3390 inputs_total_weight += inp;
3393 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3395 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
3396 claim_tx.input.clear();
3397 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3398 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3399 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3403 script_sig: Script::new(),
3404 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3405 witness: Vec::new(),
3407 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3408 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
3409 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
3411 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3412 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
3413 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
3414 inputs_total_weight += inp;
3417 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3420 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.