1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use chain::channelmonitor;
17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
19 use chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
21 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
25 use ln::chan_utils::HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT;
26 use routing::network_graph::{NetworkUpdate, RoutingFees};
27 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
28 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
30 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
31 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
32 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
33 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
34 use util::errors::APIError;
35 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
36 use util::config::UserConfig;
38 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
39 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
43 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
45 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
46 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
56 use core::default::Default;
57 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
59 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
60 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
63 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
64 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
65 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
66 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
67 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
68 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
70 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
72 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
73 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
74 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
76 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
77 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
79 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
80 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
82 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
83 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
84 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
85 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
86 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
87 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
88 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
89 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
91 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
92 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
94 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
96 } else { assert!(false); }
99 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
100 use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
102 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
103 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
105 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
107 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
109 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
111 insane_open_helper(r"Bogus; channel reserve \(\d+\) is less than dust limit \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis + 1; msg });
113 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
115 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
117 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
119 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
123 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
124 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
125 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
126 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
127 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
128 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
131 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
135 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
136 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
137 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
138 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
139 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
140 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
141 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
142 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
143 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
144 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
146 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
148 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
150 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
152 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
155 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
158 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
159 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
160 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
161 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
162 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
164 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
167 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
169 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
170 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
171 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
172 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
174 let payment_event = {
175 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
176 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
177 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
179 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
180 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
182 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
183 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
184 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
185 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
186 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
187 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
189 // deliver(1), generate (3):
190 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
191 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
192 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
195 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
196 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
197 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
198 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
199 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
200 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
201 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
202 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
204 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
205 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
206 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
207 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
208 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
209 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
210 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
211 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
213 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
214 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
215 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
216 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
218 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
219 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
220 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
222 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
225 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
226 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
228 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
229 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
232 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
233 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
237 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
238 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
239 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
240 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
241 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
242 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
243 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
244 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
247 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
249 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
251 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
254 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
255 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
257 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
258 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
259 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
260 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
263 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
266 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
268 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
269 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
270 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
273 let payment_event = {
274 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
275 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
276 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
278 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
279 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
281 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
282 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
283 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
284 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
285 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
286 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
288 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
291 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
295 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
296 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
297 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
298 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
299 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
300 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
303 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
304 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
305 // update_fee (never committed) ->
307 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
308 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
309 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
310 // <- (1) RAA delivered
311 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
312 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
313 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
314 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
316 // B should send no response here
317 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
318 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
321 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
324 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
325 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
326 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
328 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
329 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
331 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
332 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
333 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
334 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
335 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
337 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
340 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
341 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
342 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
343 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
344 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
346 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
349 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
350 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
352 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
353 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
354 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
356 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
357 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
358 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
359 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
362 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
364 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
366 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
368 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
369 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
370 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
371 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
372 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
373 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
374 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
375 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
376 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
377 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
378 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
380 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
381 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
382 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
383 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
384 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
386 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
387 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
388 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
391 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
392 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
393 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
395 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
396 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
397 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
399 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
400 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
401 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
402 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
404 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
405 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
406 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
409 fn do_test_1_conf_open(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
410 // Previously, if the minium_depth config was set to 1, we'd never send a funding_locked. This
411 // tests that we properly send one in that case.
412 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
413 alice_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
414 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
415 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
416 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
417 bob_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
418 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
419 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
420 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
421 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
422 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
423 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
424 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
426 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
427 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
428 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
430 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
431 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
432 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
435 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
436 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
437 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
441 fn test_1_conf_open() {
442 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst);
443 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst);
444 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
447 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
448 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
449 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
450 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
453 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
454 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
455 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
456 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
458 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
460 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
463 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
464 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
467 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
468 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
469 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
471 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
472 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
473 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
475 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
476 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
478 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
480 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
481 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
483 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
485 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
486 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
488 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
489 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
490 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
491 added_monitors.clear();
493 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
495 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
496 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
498 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
499 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
500 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
501 added_monitors.clear();
504 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
505 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
507 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
508 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
510 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
511 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
512 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
513 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
517 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
518 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
519 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
520 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
521 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
522 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
523 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
524 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
525 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
526 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
527 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
528 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
529 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
530 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
531 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
532 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
533 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
534 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
535 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
539 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
540 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
541 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
542 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
543 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
544 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
547 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
550 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
551 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
553 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
554 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
555 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
556 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
557 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
559 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
561 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
563 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
564 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
565 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
567 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
568 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
569 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
571 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
572 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
573 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
574 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
576 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
577 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
578 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
582 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
583 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
584 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
585 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
586 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
587 let channel_value = 1888;
588 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 700000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
589 let channel_id = chan.2;
593 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
594 *feerate_lock = feerate;
596 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
597 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
598 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
600 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
602 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
604 //Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate of 260 set above.
605 //This value results in a fee that is exactly what the funder can afford (277 sat + 1000 sat channel reserve)
607 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
609 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit so -2 non-HTLC txns from number of outputs
610 let num_htlcs = commitment_tx.output.len() - 2;
611 let total_fee: u64 = feerate as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
612 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
613 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
614 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
617 //Add 2 to the previous fee rate to the final fee increases by 1 (with no HTLCs the fee is essentially
618 //fee_rate*(724/1000) so the increment of 1*0.724 is rounded back down)
620 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
621 *feerate_lock = feerate + 2;
623 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
624 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
626 let update2_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
628 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
630 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
631 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
632 //Should produce and error.
633 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.commitment_signed);
634 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
635 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
636 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
637 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
641 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
642 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
643 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
644 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
645 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
646 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
649 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
652 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
655 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
658 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
659 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
660 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
661 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
662 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
664 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
666 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
667 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
668 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
669 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
671 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
673 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
674 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
676 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
677 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
678 added_monitors.clear();
680 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
681 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
682 // node[1] has nothing to do
684 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
685 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
686 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
688 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
689 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
690 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
691 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
692 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
693 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
694 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
696 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
697 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
698 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
699 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
700 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
701 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
703 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
704 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
705 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
706 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
708 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
709 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
710 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
712 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
713 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
714 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
715 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
717 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
718 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
719 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
721 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
723 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
724 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
726 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
727 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
730 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
732 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
733 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
734 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
735 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
736 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
740 fn test_update_fee() {
741 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
742 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
743 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
744 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
745 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
746 let channel_id = chan.2;
749 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
750 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
751 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
752 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
753 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
754 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
755 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
756 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
757 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
758 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
759 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
762 // Create and deliver (1)...
765 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
766 feerate = *feerate_lock;
767 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
769 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
770 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
772 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
773 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
774 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
775 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
776 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
778 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
780 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
782 // Generate (2) and (3):
783 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
784 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
785 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
788 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
789 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
790 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
792 // Create and deliver (4)...
794 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
795 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
797 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
798 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
799 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
800 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
801 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
802 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
803 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
805 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
808 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
809 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
810 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
812 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
813 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
815 // Handle (3), creating (6):
816 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
817 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
818 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
819 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
822 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
823 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
824 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
826 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
827 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
828 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
829 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
830 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
831 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
832 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
833 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
834 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
837 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
838 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
839 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
840 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
842 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
843 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
844 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
846 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
847 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
848 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
849 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
850 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
854 fn fake_network_test() {
855 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
856 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
857 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
858 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
859 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
860 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
862 // Create some initial channels
863 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
864 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
865 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
867 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
868 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
869 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
870 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
871 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
873 // Send some more payments
874 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
875 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
876 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
878 // Test failure packets
879 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
880 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
882 // Add a new channel that skips 3
883 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
885 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
886 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
887 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
888 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
889 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
890 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
891 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
893 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
894 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
896 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
897 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
898 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
899 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
901 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
904 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
905 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
906 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
907 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
909 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
912 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
913 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
914 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
915 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
917 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
919 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
920 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
921 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
923 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
925 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
926 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
927 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
928 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
930 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
933 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
934 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
935 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
936 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
938 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
941 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
942 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
943 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
944 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
946 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
948 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
949 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
950 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
952 // Claim the rebalances...
953 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
954 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
956 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
957 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
959 // Send some payments across both channels
960 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
961 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
962 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
965 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
966 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
967 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
968 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
970 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
972 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
973 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
974 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
976 // Close down the channels...
977 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
978 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
979 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
980 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
981 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
982 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
983 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
984 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
985 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
986 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
987 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
988 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
989 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
990 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
991 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
995 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
996 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
997 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
998 // commitment dance rounds.
999 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1000 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1001 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1002 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1003 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1004 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1006 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1007 for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1008 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1009 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1010 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1012 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1014 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1015 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1016 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1017 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1019 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1020 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1022 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1024 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1025 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1026 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1027 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1030 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1031 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1033 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1034 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1037 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1038 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1039 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1040 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1042 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1043 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1044 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1045 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1046 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1047 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1048 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1050 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1051 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1052 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1054 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1056 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1057 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1058 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1059 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1061 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1062 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1063 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1064 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1066 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1067 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1068 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1070 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1071 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1073 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1074 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1075 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1076 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1077 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1079 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1081 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1082 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1083 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1085 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1086 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1088 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1090 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1091 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1092 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1094 &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1095 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1097 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1101 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1102 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1105 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1109 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1110 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1111 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1112 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1113 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1114 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1115 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1117 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1118 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1119 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1120 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1121 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1122 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1124 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1126 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1127 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1129 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1130 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1132 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1133 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1134 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1138 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1139 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1140 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1141 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1142 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1143 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1144 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1145 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1147 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1150 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1152 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1154 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1155 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
1156 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1158 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1159 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1162 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1163 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1165 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1166 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1167 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1168 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1169 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1170 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1171 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1174 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1176 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1177 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1178 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1179 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1181 // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1182 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1183 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1184 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1185 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1186 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1187 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1188 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1190 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1191 assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1192 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1194 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1195 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1196 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1197 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1198 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1199 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1200 check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1201 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1203 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1204 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1207 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1208 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1209 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1210 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1212 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1213 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1214 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1215 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1216 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1217 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1219 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1225 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1226 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1227 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1228 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1229 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1230 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1232 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1233 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1235 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1236 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1);
1237 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1238 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1239 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1241 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1243 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1244 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1245 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1248 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1250 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1251 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1253 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1257 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1258 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1259 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1260 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1261 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1262 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1264 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1265 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1266 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1267 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1269 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1271 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1272 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1273 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1274 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1277 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1278 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1279 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1280 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1283 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1285 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1286 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1287 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1289 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1291 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1293 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1294 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1295 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1296 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1297 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1298 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1299 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1300 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1302 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1303 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1304 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1305 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1306 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1308 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1309 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1310 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1311 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1312 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1313 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1314 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1315 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1318 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1319 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1320 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1322 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1323 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1324 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1326 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1328 amount_msat: 3460001,
1329 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1331 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1334 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1337 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1338 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1339 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1340 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1344 false, local_funding, remote_funding,
1345 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1347 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1348 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1350 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1353 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1356 htlc_signatures: res.1
1359 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1360 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1361 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1363 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1364 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1366 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1367 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1369 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1371 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1372 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1373 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1375 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1376 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1377 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1379 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1381 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1382 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1384 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1388 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1389 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1390 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1391 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1392 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1394 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
1395 chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1396 chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1397 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1398 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1399 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1401 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1402 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
1403 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1405 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1407 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1408 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1410 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1411 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1412 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1413 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1414 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1415 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1419 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1420 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1421 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the funder
1422 // receiving 1 update_add_htlc would result in them closing the channel due
1423 // to channel reserve violation. This close could also happen if the fee went
1424 // up a more realistic amount, but many HTLCs were outstanding at the time of
1425 // the update_add_htlc.
1426 chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(6000) };
1427 chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(6000) };
1428 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1429 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1430 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1431 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1433 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1000);
1434 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1435 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1436 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1437 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1438 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1439 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 1000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1440 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1441 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1444 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1445 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1446 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1447 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1450 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1451 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1452 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1453 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1454 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1455 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1457 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1461 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1462 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1463 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1464 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1465 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
1466 chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1467 chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1469 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1470 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1471 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1473 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1474 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1475 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1476 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1477 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT) / 1000 * 1000;
1478 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1479 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1481 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1482 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1483 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1484 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1485 // commitment transaction fee.
1486 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1488 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1489 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1490 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1491 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1495 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1496 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1497 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1498 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1499 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1500 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1501 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1502 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1504 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1505 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1506 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1507 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1508 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1509 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1511 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1512 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1513 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1514 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1515 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1516 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1518 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1519 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1520 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1521 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1525 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1526 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1527 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1528 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1529 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1530 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1531 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1534 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1535 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1536 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1538 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1539 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1540 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1541 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1543 // Add a pending HTLC.
1544 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1545 let payment_event_1 = {
1546 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1547 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1549 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1550 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1551 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1553 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1555 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1556 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2);
1557 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1558 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1559 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1561 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1562 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1563 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1564 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1565 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1566 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1567 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1568 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1571 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1572 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1573 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1574 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1577 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1578 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1579 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1580 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1581 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1582 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1583 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1584 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1588 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1589 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1590 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1591 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1592 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1593 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1594 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1595 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1596 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1597 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1599 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1600 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1601 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1603 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1604 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1607 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64) -> u64 {
1608 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1612 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1613 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1614 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1615 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1616 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1617 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1618 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1619 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1620 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1621 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1622 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1624 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1625 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1627 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1628 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1630 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1632 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1633 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1634 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1635 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1640 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1641 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1642 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1644 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1646 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1648 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1649 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1650 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1651 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1652 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1653 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1654 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1657 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1658 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1660 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1661 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1662 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1663 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1664 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1665 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1666 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1669 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1671 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1672 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1673 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1674 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1675 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1678 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1679 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1680 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1681 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1682 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1685 // adding pending output.
1686 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1687 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1688 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1689 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1690 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1691 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1692 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1693 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1694 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1696 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1697 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1698 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1700 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1701 let payment_event_1 = {
1702 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1703 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1705 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1706 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1707 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1709 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1711 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1712 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1714 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1715 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1716 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1717 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1720 // split the rest to test holding cell
1721 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1722 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1723 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1724 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1726 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1727 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1730 // now see if they go through on both sides
1731 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1732 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1733 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1734 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1735 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1736 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1738 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1740 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1741 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1742 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1743 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1744 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1747 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1748 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1749 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1750 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1751 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1752 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1754 // flush the pending htlc
1755 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1756 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1757 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1759 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1760 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1761 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1762 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1764 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1765 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1766 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1767 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1769 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1770 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1771 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1773 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1775 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1776 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1777 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1779 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1780 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1782 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1783 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1784 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1785 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1786 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1787 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1789 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1790 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1791 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1792 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1794 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1795 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1797 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1798 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1800 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1801 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1802 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
1804 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1805 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1806 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1808 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1811 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1814 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1815 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1816 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
1818 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1819 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1820 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1822 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1825 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1828 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1829 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1830 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1832 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1);
1833 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1834 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1836 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
1837 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1838 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1839 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
1840 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
1842 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1843 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
1847 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
1848 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
1849 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
1850 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
1851 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
1852 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
1853 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
1854 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
1856 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
1857 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
1858 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
1859 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
1860 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
1861 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
1862 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
1863 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
1865 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
1866 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
1867 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
1868 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
1869 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
1870 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1871 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1872 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1873 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1874 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1876 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1877 // Route the first two HTLCs.
1878 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
1879 let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
1881 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
1882 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
1884 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
1885 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1886 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1887 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1888 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1891 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
1892 // initial fulfill/CS.
1893 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
1894 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1895 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1897 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
1898 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
1899 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
1900 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1901 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1903 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
1904 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
1905 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1906 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1907 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
1909 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
1910 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
1911 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1912 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
1913 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1915 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1916 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1917 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1919 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
1920 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1921 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1923 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
1924 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1925 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1927 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
1928 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
1929 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
1930 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
1931 // on-chain as necessary).
1932 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
1933 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
1934 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1935 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1936 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
1938 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1939 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1940 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1942 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1943 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
1945 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
1946 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
1947 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
1948 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1949 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1951 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
1952 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
1953 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
1955 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
1956 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1957 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1958 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1959 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1962 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
1963 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
1964 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1965 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1967 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
1969 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
1970 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1971 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1973 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1974 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1976 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
1977 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1978 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1980 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
1981 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1982 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1984 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
1985 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1987 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
1988 expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
1990 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
1991 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
1995 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
1996 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
1997 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
1998 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
1999 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2000 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2001 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2003 // Create some initial channels
2004 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2005 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2006 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2007 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2009 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2010 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2011 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2012 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2013 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2014 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2016 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2017 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2018 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2019 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2020 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2022 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2023 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2024 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2025 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2027 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2028 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2029 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2030 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2031 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2033 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2034 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2035 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2036 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2037 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2039 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2040 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2042 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2043 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2044 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2045 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2046 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2048 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2049 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2050 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2051 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2052 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2053 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2055 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2056 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2057 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2058 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2059 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2061 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2062 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2064 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2065 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2067 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2068 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2070 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2071 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2072 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2073 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2075 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2081 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2082 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2083 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2084 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2085 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
2086 let node2_commitment_txid;
2088 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2089 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2090 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2091 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2093 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2094 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2095 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2096 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2097 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2099 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2100 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2101 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2102 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2103 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2105 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2106 // confusing us in the following tests.
2107 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2109 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2110 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2111 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2114 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2115 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2116 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2117 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2118 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2119 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2122 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2125 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2126 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2128 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2132 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2134 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2135 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2136 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2142 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2144 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2145 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2147 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2148 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2149 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2150 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2151 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2154 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2157 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2158 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2160 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2163 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2165 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2166 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2167 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2169 nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2170 nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2171 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2172 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2174 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2175 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2176 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2180 fn test_justice_tx() {
2181 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2182 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2183 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2184 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2185 alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2186 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2187 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2188 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2189 bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2190 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2191 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2192 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2193 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2194 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2195 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2196 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2197 // Create some new channels:
2198 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2200 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2201 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2202 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2203 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2204 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2205 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2206 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2207 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2208 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2209 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2210 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2211 // Revoke the old state
2212 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2215 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2217 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2218 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2219 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2221 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2222 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2223 node_txn.truncate(1);
2225 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2226 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2227 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2229 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2230 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2231 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2232 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2233 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2234 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2235 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2236 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2237 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2239 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2241 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2242 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2244 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2245 // Create some new channels:
2246 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2248 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2252 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2253 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2254 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2255 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2256 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2257 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2258 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2259 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2260 // Revoke the old state
2261 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2263 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2265 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2266 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2267 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2269 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2270 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2273 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2275 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2276 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2277 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2278 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2279 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2280 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2281 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2283 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2284 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2285 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2289 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2290 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2291 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2292 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2293 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2294 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2295 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2296 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2297 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2298 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2299 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2300 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2301 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2302 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2303 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2305 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2306 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2307 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2308 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2309 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2310 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2312 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2313 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2315 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2316 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2317 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2319 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2323 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2324 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2325 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2326 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2327 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2328 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2329 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2331 // Create some new channel:
2332 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2334 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2335 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2336 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2337 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2338 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2340 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2341 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2342 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2343 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2344 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2345 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2346 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2347 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2348 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2350 //Revoke the old state
2351 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2354 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2355 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2356 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2357 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2358 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2359 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2360 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2361 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2363 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2364 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2366 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2367 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2369 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2370 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2371 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2372 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2373 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2374 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2375 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2376 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2378 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2379 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2380 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2382 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2383 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2384 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2388 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2389 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2390 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2391 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2392 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2393 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2394 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2396 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2398 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2399 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2400 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2401 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2402 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2403 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2405 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2406 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2408 //Revoke the old state
2409 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2412 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2413 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2414 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2415 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2416 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2417 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2418 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2420 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2421 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2424 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2425 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2427 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2428 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2429 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2430 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2431 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2432 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2434 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2435 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2436 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2437 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2438 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2439 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2440 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2442 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2443 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2444 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2445 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2447 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2448 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2449 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2451 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2452 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2453 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2454 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2455 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2456 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2457 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2458 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2460 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2461 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2462 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2466 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2467 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2468 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2469 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2470 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2471 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2472 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2473 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2474 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2476 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2477 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2478 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2479 // PaymentSent event).
2481 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2482 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2483 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2484 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2486 // Create some initial channels
2487 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2488 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2490 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2491 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2492 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2493 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2494 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2496 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2497 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2498 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2500 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2501 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2503 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2504 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2505 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2506 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2507 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2508 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2509 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2510 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2511 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2512 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2513 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2514 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2515 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2517 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2518 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2519 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2520 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2521 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2522 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2523 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2524 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2525 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2526 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2527 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2528 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2529 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2530 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2531 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2532 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2533 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2535 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2536 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2537 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2538 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2540 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2541 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2542 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2543 added_monitors.clear();
2545 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2546 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2547 match forwarded_events[0] {
2548 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2549 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2551 if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[1] {
2552 } else { panic!(); }
2553 if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[2] {
2554 } else { panic!(); }
2555 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2557 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2558 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2559 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2560 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2561 added_monitors.clear();
2563 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2565 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2566 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2569 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2570 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2574 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2575 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2576 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2577 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2578 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2579 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2581 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2583 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2584 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2585 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2586 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2587 // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2588 // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2589 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2590 check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2591 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2592 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2594 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2595 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2596 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2597 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2599 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2600 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2601 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2602 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2604 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2605 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2609 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2610 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2611 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2612 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2614 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2615 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2616 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2617 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2618 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2619 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2620 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2621 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2622 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2623 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2624 let commitment_spend =
2625 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2626 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2627 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2628 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2631 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2632 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2633 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2637 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2638 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2639 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2640 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2641 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2642 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2643 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2644 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2645 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2646 check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2647 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2648 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2650 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2651 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2652 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2653 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2654 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2655 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2656 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2657 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2658 let mut first_claimed = false;
2659 for event in events {
2661 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2662 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2663 assert!(!first_claimed);
2664 first_claimed = true;
2666 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2667 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2670 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2671 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2674 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2677 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2678 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2679 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2680 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2681 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2682 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2684 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2686 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2687 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2688 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2689 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2690 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2691 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2692 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2694 // Create some intial channels
2695 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2696 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2698 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2699 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2700 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2702 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2704 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2705 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2706 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2707 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2708 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2709 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2710 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2712 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2713 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2715 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2716 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2717 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2718 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2719 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2720 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2722 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2724 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2725 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2726 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2727 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2728 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2729 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2730 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2731 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2733 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2734 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2735 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2736 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2737 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2740 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2741 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2742 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2743 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2745 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2746 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2748 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2749 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2750 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2751 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2753 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2757 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2758 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2759 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2761 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2762 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2763 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2764 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2767 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2769 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2770 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2771 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2772 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2773 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2774 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2775 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2777 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2781 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2782 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2783 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2784 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2786 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2787 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2788 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2789 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2790 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2791 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2793 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2796 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2797 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2798 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2800 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2801 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2803 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2804 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2805 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2806 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2807 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2808 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2809 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2810 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2811 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2815 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2816 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2817 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2818 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2822 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
2823 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
2824 // and fail backward accordingly.
2826 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2827 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2828 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2829 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2831 // Create some initial channels
2832 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2833 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2835 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2836 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
2837 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2838 // Revoke the old state
2839 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
2841 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2843 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2844 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2845 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2846 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2847 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2849 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2850 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2851 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2852 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2854 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
2855 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2856 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2857 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2858 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2859 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2861 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2862 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
2863 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
2865 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2869 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
2870 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
2871 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
2872 // commitment transaction anymore.
2873 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
2874 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
2875 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
2876 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
2877 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
2878 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
2880 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
2881 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
2882 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
2883 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
2884 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
2885 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2886 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2887 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2888 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2890 // Create some initial channels
2891 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2892 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2894 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
2895 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
2896 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2897 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
2898 // Revoke the old state
2899 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
2901 let value = if use_dust {
2902 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
2903 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
2904 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
2907 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2908 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2909 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2911 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
2912 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2913 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2914 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2915 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2916 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2917 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2918 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2919 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
2920 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2921 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
2922 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
2924 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
2925 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2927 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2928 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2929 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2930 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2931 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2932 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
2933 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2934 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
2935 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2936 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
2937 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
2938 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2939 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2941 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
2942 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2943 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2944 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2945 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2946 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2947 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2948 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2949 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
2950 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2951 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
2952 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
2953 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
2954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2955 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
2956 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
2957 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2958 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2960 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
2961 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
2962 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
2963 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
2964 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2965 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2966 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
2969 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2970 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
2971 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
2972 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2973 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2974 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2976 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2977 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2979 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
2980 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
2983 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
2984 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2986 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2987 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2988 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2990 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2991 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 3 });
2993 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
2994 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
2997 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
2998 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3000 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3002 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3004 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3005 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3008 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3009 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3011 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3012 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3013 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3014 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3015 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3017 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3018 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3019 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3020 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3022 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3026 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3027 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3028 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3029 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3030 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3031 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3033 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3036 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3037 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3038 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3039 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3040 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3041 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3042 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3044 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3045 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3046 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3048 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3050 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3051 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3053 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3054 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3055 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3056 // that we should update our routing table for.
3057 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3058 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3061 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3064 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3065 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3066 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3068 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3071 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3072 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3073 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3075 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3078 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3081 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3082 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3083 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3087 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3088 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3089 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3090 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3091 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3095 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3096 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3097 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3098 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3099 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3103 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3104 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3105 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3106 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3107 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3108 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3110 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3112 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3113 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3114 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3116 let payment_event = {
3117 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3118 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3119 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3121 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3122 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3125 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3126 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3128 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3129 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3131 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3134 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3136 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3138 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3139 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3140 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3141 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3142 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3143 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3145 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3146 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3152 onion_routing_packet,
3154 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3156 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3157 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3158 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3160 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3161 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3163 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3166 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3167 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3169 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3171 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3172 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3176 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3177 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3178 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3179 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3180 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3181 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3182 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3183 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3185 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3186 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3187 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3188 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3189 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3190 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3192 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3193 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3194 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3196 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3197 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3198 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3200 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3202 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3203 // registering new transactions
3204 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3205 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3209 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3210 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3211 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3212 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3213 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3214 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3215 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3216 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3218 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3220 let mut payment_event = {
3221 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3222 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3224 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3225 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3226 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3229 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3230 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3232 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3234 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3235 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3236 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3237 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3239 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3240 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3241 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3242 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3243 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3245 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3246 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3247 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3249 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3250 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3251 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3252 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3254 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3255 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3256 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3257 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3258 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3262 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3264 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3265 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3266 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3267 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3269 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3271 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3272 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3274 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3275 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3276 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3277 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3278 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3279 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3280 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3282 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3286 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3287 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3288 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3289 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3290 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3292 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3293 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3294 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3295 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3296 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3298 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3300 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3302 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3303 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3304 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3306 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3307 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3309 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3310 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3314 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3315 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3316 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3317 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3318 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3319 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3320 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3321 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3323 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3324 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3325 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3327 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3328 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3329 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3330 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3332 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3333 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3334 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3336 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3337 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3338 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3339 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3341 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3342 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3344 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3345 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3347 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3349 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3350 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3352 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3353 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3354 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3356 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3359 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3360 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3361 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3363 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3367 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3368 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3371 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3372 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3373 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3374 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3375 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3376 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3378 let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3379 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3380 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3381 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3382 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3383 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3384 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3386 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3389 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3391 let payment_event = {
3392 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3393 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3395 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3396 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3397 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3399 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3401 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3402 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3404 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3405 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3406 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3408 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3410 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3411 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3412 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3413 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3415 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3416 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3417 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3418 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3419 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3421 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3422 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3423 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3424 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3431 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3432 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3433 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3434 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3435 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3436 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3438 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3439 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3440 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3442 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3443 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3445 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3446 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3447 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3448 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3449 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3450 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3451 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3452 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3453 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3454 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3455 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3456 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3457 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3458 // Everything was delivered...
3459 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3462 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3463 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3465 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3466 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3469 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3470 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3471 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3473 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3475 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3476 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3478 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3479 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3480 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3482 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3483 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3484 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3486 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3489 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3492 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3493 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3495 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3496 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3497 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3498 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3499 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3500 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3501 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3502 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3503 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3504 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3505 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3507 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3510 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3511 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3513 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3514 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3516 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3517 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3518 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3520 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3523 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3524 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3525 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3526 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3528 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3529 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3530 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3531 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3533 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3534 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3535 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3536 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3537 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3539 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3540 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3541 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3542 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3549 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3550 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3551 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3552 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3553 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3554 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3555 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3557 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3558 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3559 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3561 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3564 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3566 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3567 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3568 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3569 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3570 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3571 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3572 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3573 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3574 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3575 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3576 // Everything was delivered...
3577 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3580 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3581 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3582 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3584 // Channel should still work fine...
3585 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3586 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3587 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3591 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3592 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3593 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3594 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3595 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3599 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3600 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3601 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3602 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3603 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3607 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3608 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3609 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3610 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3611 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3612 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3613 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3614 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3615 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3616 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3618 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3619 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3621 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3622 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3624 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3626 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3627 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3628 chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3630 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3633 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3635 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3636 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3638 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3639 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3640 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
3641 let funding_locked = match events_2[0] {
3642 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3643 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3646 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3648 let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_2[1] {
3649 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3650 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3653 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3656 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3658 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_locked);
3659 nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3660 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3661 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
3662 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_3[0] {
3663 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3664 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3667 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3669 let (as_announcement, as_update) = match events_3[1] {
3670 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3671 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3673 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3676 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3677 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3678 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3679 let (_, bs_update) = match events_4[0] {
3680 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3681 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3683 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3686 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&as_announcement).unwrap();
3687 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3688 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3690 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3691 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3692 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3694 // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3695 // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3696 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3698 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3699 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3700 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3702 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3703 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3704 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3705 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3706 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3707 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3708 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3709 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3711 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3712 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3713 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3714 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3715 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3716 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3718 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3719 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3720 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3721 logger: nodes[0].logger,
3725 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
3726 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
3728 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
3729 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
3730 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3732 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3734 // as_announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
3735 nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
3736 let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3737 let mut found_announcement = false;
3738 for event in msgs.iter() {
3740 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
3741 if *msg == as_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
3743 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
3744 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3747 assert!(found_announcement);
3751 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3752 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3753 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3754 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3755 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3756 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3757 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3758 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3760 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
3762 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3763 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3764 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
3765 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3767 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3768 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3770 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3771 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3774 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
3775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3777 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3778 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3780 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3781 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3782 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3783 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3784 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3785 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3786 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3788 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3789 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3790 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3792 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3793 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3794 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3796 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3799 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3800 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3801 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3804 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3807 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3808 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3810 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3811 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3812 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3813 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3814 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3815 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3817 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3818 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3819 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3820 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3822 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
3823 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
3825 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
3826 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
3828 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
3830 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3831 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3832 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3833 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3834 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
3835 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
3836 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
3837 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3838 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3839 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3841 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
3842 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3843 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3844 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3845 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3846 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3847 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3848 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3850 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3851 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3852 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3853 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3854 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3855 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3856 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3857 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3859 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3860 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3861 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3862 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3864 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3865 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3866 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3867 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3869 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3870 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3871 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3873 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3875 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3876 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3878 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
3879 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
3881 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3882 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3883 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
3885 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3888 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3891 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
3892 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3893 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3895 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3898 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
3899 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
3900 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
3901 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3902 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3903 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3904 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3906 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3908 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
3909 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
3910 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
3911 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
3912 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
3913 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
3914 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
3915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3916 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3917 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3918 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
3919 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
3920 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
3923 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
3926 let mut block = Block {
3927 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
3930 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
3931 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3932 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
3933 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
3934 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
3935 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
3936 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3939 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3941 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3942 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3943 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3944 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3945 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3946 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
3948 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3949 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
3950 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
3951 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
3952 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
3953 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
3957 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
3958 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
3959 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
3962 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
3963 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
3964 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3965 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3966 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3967 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3968 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3969 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3971 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
3972 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
3973 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
3974 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
3976 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
3977 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
3979 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3981 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
3982 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3984 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
3985 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
3986 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
3987 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3990 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
3991 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3992 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3993 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3995 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3997 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
3998 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3999 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4000 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4003 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4004 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4005 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4006 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4007 match fail_commit[0] {
4008 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4009 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4010 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4012 _ => unreachable!(),
4014 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4016 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, true);
4021 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4022 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4023 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4027 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4028 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4029 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4030 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4031 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4032 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4033 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4034 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4035 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4036 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4038 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4040 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4042 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4043 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4044 get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4045 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4047 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4048 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4049 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4050 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4051 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4052 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4053 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4054 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4055 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4056 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4058 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4059 let config = UserConfig::default();
4060 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4061 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4062 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4063 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4064 default_config: config,
4066 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4067 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4068 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4073 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4074 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4076 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4077 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4078 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4079 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4081 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4082 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4083 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4084 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4086 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4087 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4088 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4089 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4091 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4092 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4093 for node in nodes.iter() {
4094 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4095 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4096 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4099 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4103 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4104 // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4105 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4106 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4107 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4108 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4109 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4110 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4111 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4112 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4113 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4115 // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4116 let channel_value = 100000;
4117 let push_msat = 10001;
4118 let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4119 let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4120 let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4121 let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4122 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4123 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4124 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4126 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
4128 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4129 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4131 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4133 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4134 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4135 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4136 added_monitors.clear();
4139 let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4140 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4142 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4143 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4144 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4145 added_monitors.clear();
4147 // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4152 // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4153 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4154 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4155 get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4157 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4158 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4159 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4160 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4161 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4162 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4163 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4164 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4165 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4166 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4168 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4169 let config = UserConfig::default();
4170 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4171 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4172 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4173 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4174 default_config: config,
4176 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4177 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4178 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4183 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4184 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4186 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4188 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4189 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4191 // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4192 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4193 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4194 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4195 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4197 // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4198 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4201 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4202 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4203 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4204 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4206 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4207 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4208 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4209 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4211 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4212 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4213 for node in nodes.iter() {
4214 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4215 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4216 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4219 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4223 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4224 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4225 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4226 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4227 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4228 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4229 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4230 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4231 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4232 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4233 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4235 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4236 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4238 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4240 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4241 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4242 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4244 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4245 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4246 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4247 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4248 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4249 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4250 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4251 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4252 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4253 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4255 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4256 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4257 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4258 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4259 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4260 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4262 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4263 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4264 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4269 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4270 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4272 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4273 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4274 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4276 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4278 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4279 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4283 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4284 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4285 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4286 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4287 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4288 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4289 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4290 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4291 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4292 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4293 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4294 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4295 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4296 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4298 let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4299 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4300 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4301 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4302 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4305 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4307 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4308 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4310 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4311 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4312 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4313 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4315 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4317 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4318 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4319 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4320 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4321 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4324 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4325 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4326 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4327 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4328 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4329 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4332 let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4333 for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4334 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4335 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4336 assert!(read.is_empty());
4337 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4340 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4341 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4342 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4343 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4344 assert!(read.is_empty());
4345 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4348 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4349 if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4350 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4351 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4353 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4354 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4355 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4357 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4359 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4362 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4363 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4364 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4365 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4367 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4368 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4369 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4371 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4373 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4374 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4376 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4377 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4378 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4379 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4380 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4383 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4384 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4387 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4388 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4390 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4391 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4392 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4393 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4394 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4396 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4397 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4398 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4399 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4400 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4401 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4402 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4404 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4405 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4407 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4412 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4413 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4415 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4416 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4417 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4418 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4419 for event in events.drain(..) {
4421 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4422 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4423 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4424 all_outputs.push(outp);
4427 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4430 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4431 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4441 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4442 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4443 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4444 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4445 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4446 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4448 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4449 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4450 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4451 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4452 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4453 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4454 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4455 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4456 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4458 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4459 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4461 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4462 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4463 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4464 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4465 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4469 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4470 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4471 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4472 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4473 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4474 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4475 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4477 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4478 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4479 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4480 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4481 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4483 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4484 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4485 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4486 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4488 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4489 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4490 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4491 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4492 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4494 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4495 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4496 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4500 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4501 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4502 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4504 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4505 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4506 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4507 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4509 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4510 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4511 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4512 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4513 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4515 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4516 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4517 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4518 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4519 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4521 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4522 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4523 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4525 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4526 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4527 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4528 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4529 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4533 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4534 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4535 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4536 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4537 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4539 // Create some initial channels
4540 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4542 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4544 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4545 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4546 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4548 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4549 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4550 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4551 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4552 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4553 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4555 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4556 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4559 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4560 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4563 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4564 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4565 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4566 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4567 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4568 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4569 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4571 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4572 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4573 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4575 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4576 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4577 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4581 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4582 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4583 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4584 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4585 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4587 // Create some initial channels
4588 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4590 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4591 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4593 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4595 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4596 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4597 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4599 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4600 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4601 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4602 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4604 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4605 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4607 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4609 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4610 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4611 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4612 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4613 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4614 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4616 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4617 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4618 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4619 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4621 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4622 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4623 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4624 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4625 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4629 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4630 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4631 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4632 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4633 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4635 // Create some initial channels
4636 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4638 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4639 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4640 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4641 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4643 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4645 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4646 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4647 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4648 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4650 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4651 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4652 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4653 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4655 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4656 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4658 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4659 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4660 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4664 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4665 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4666 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4667 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4668 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4669 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4671 // Create some initial channels
4672 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4674 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4675 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4676 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4677 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4679 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4681 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4682 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4683 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4684 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4685 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4686 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4688 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4689 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4690 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4691 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4692 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4693 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4694 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4696 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4697 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4698 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4699 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4700 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4701 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4703 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4704 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4705 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4706 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4707 // transactions next...
4708 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4709 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4711 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4712 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4713 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4714 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4716 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4717 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4720 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4721 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4723 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4724 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4726 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4727 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4728 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4729 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4730 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4734 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4735 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4736 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4737 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4738 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4739 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4741 // Create some initial channels
4742 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4744 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4745 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4746 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4747 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4749 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4750 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4752 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4754 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4755 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4756 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4757 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4758 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4759 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4761 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4762 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4763 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4764 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4766 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4767 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4768 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4770 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4771 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4772 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4773 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4774 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4775 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4777 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4778 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4780 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4781 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4782 // transactions next...
4783 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4784 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4785 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4786 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4788 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4789 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4792 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4793 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4795 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4797 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4798 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4800 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4801 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4803 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4804 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4805 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4806 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4807 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4808 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4809 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4810 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4814 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4815 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4816 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4817 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4818 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4820 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4823 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4824 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4825 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4826 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4828 // Create some initial channels
4829 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4830 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4832 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4833 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4834 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4835 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4836 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4838 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4839 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4840 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4842 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
4843 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4844 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4845 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4846 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4847 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4848 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4849 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4850 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4851 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4853 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4854 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4855 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4856 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4858 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4859 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
4860 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
4861 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
4862 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
4863 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
4864 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
4865 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4866 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4867 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
4869 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4870 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
4871 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
4872 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4873 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4874 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4876 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4877 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4880 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
4881 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4882 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4884 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4887 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4888 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
4889 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4890 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
4893 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4894 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4895 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4896 match msg_events[0] {
4897 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4898 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4900 match msg_events[1] {
4901 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4902 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4904 match msg_events[2] {
4905 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4906 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4907 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4908 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4909 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4910 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4912 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4914 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4915 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4916 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4917 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4918 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4919 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
4920 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
4921 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4922 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
4923 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4924 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4925 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4926 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
4928 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4929 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4933 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4934 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4935 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4936 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4937 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4938 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4939 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4940 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4941 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4942 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4943 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4944 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
4945 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4946 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4948 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4949 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4950 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4952 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4953 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4954 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4955 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4956 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
4958 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
4960 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
4961 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
4962 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
4963 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
4964 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], vec![], 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
4965 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
4967 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4968 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4969 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
4971 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
4972 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4973 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4974 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4975 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4977 let htlc_timeout_tx;
4978 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
4979 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4980 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4981 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
4982 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
4984 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4985 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4986 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4987 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4988 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
4989 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
4990 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
4992 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4993 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4994 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4995 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
4998 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
4999 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5000 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5001 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5002 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5004 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5005 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5008 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5009 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5011 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5012 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5013 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5014 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5015 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5016 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5017 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5018 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5019 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5020 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5021 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5022 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5023 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5025 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5026 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5027 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5028 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5029 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5030 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5031 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5032 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5033 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5034 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5036 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5037 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5039 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5041 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5043 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5044 // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5045 // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5046 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5047 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], Some(196*2), true);
5048 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5049 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5050 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5051 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5052 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5053 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5054 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5056 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5057 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5059 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5061 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5062 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5063 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5065 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5070 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5071 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5072 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5073 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5074 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5076 // Create some initial channels
5077 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5079 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5080 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5081 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5082 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5083 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5085 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5086 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5087 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5088 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5089 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5090 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5091 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5093 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5094 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5097 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5098 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5101 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5102 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5103 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5104 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5105 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5106 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5107 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5111 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5112 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5114 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5115 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5116 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5117 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5118 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5119 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5122 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5123 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5124 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5125 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5126 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5127 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5128 // use the same payment hashes.
5129 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5134 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5135 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5136 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5137 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5138 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5139 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5140 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5141 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5142 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5143 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5145 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5146 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5147 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5148 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5149 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5151 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5152 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5153 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5154 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5156 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5158 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5160 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5161 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5163 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, 0).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5165 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, 0).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5167 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5169 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5170 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5172 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, 0).unwrap());
5174 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, 0).unwrap());
5177 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5179 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5180 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, 0).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5183 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5185 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5186 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, 0).unwrap());
5188 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5189 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5190 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5191 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5192 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5194 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5195 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5196 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5197 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5198 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5199 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5200 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5201 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5202 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5204 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5205 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5206 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5207 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5208 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5209 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5211 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5212 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5213 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5214 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5215 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5216 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5218 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5219 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5220 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5221 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5223 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5225 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5226 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5227 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5228 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5229 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5230 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5231 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5232 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5233 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5234 if deliver_last_raa {
5235 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5237 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5240 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5241 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5242 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5243 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5245 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5246 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5247 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5249 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5250 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5251 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5253 if announce_latest {
5254 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5256 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5258 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5259 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5260 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5263 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5267 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5268 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5271 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5272 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5273 if deliver_last_raa {
5274 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5276 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5278 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5280 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5281 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5282 let mut a_done = false;
5283 for msg in cs_msgs {
5285 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5286 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5287 // should be failed-backwards here.
5288 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5289 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5290 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5291 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5293 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5298 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5299 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5300 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5302 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5303 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5306 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5307 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5308 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5309 if announce_latest {
5310 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5311 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5312 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5315 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5317 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5321 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5322 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5323 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5324 let mut as_updates = 0;
5325 for event in as_events.iter() {
5326 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5327 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5328 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5329 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5331 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5333 if network_update.is_some() {
5336 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5338 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5339 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5340 if announce_latest {
5341 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5342 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5344 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5346 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5347 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5348 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5349 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5350 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5351 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5352 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5353 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5354 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5356 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5358 if network_update.is_some() {
5361 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5363 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5364 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5365 if announce_latest {
5366 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5368 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5370 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5371 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5372 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5373 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5374 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5375 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5379 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5380 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5384 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5385 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5389 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5390 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5391 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5392 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5396 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5397 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5398 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5399 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5400 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5402 // Create some initial channels
5403 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5405 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5406 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5407 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5408 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5410 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5411 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5412 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5413 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5414 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5415 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5417 let htlc_timeout = {
5418 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5419 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5420 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5421 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5422 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5423 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5427 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5428 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5429 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5431 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5432 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5433 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5434 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5435 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5436 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5437 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5438 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5439 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5440 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5441 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5445 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5446 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5447 // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5448 // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5450 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5452 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5453 let seed = [42; 32];
5454 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5455 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5456 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph: &chanmon_cfgs[0].network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5457 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5458 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5459 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5461 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5462 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5464 // Create some initial channels
5465 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5467 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5468 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5469 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5471 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5472 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5473 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5474 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5475 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5477 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5478 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5479 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5480 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5481 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5483 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5484 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5485 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5486 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5487 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5488 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5489 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5490 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5493 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5494 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5495 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5496 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5497 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5498 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5500 let htlc_timeout = {
5501 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5502 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5503 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5504 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5508 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5509 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5510 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5512 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5513 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5514 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5515 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5516 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5517 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5518 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5519 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5520 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5521 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5522 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5523 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5527 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5528 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5529 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5530 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5531 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5533 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5535 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5536 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5538 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5539 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5540 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5542 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5543 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5544 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5546 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5547 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5548 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5550 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5551 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5552 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5555 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5556 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5557 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5558 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5559 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5560 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5562 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5564 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5565 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5566 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
5567 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5569 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5570 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5571 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5572 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5574 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
5575 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5576 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5578 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5581 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5582 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5583 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5584 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5585 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5587 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5588 let mut block = Block {
5589 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5592 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5593 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5594 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5596 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5597 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5598 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5599 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5602 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5603 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5604 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5605 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5606 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5607 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5609 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5610 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5611 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5613 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5615 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5616 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5617 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5619 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5620 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5622 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5623 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5624 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5626 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5627 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5628 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5629 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5632 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5633 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5634 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5635 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5636 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5637 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5639 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5640 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5641 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5642 // actually revoked.
5643 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5644 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5645 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5646 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5647 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5649 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5650 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5651 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5652 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5653 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5654 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5655 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5656 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5657 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5658 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5660 if check_revoke_no_close {
5661 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5662 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5665 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5666 let mut block = Block {
5667 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5670 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5671 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5672 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5674 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5675 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5676 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5677 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5678 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5680 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5684 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5685 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5686 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5687 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5688 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5689 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5690 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5692 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5693 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5694 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5696 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5697 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5698 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5700 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5701 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5705 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5706 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5707 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5708 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5709 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5714 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5715 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5716 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5717 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5718 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5719 //Force duplicate channel ids
5720 for node in nodes.iter() {
5721 *node.keys_manager.override_channel_id_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5724 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5725 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5726 let push_msat=10001;
5727 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5728 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5729 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5731 //Create a second channel with a channel_id collision
5732 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5736 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5737 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5738 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5739 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5740 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5742 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5743 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5744 let push_msat=10001;
5745 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5747 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5748 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5749 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5750 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5751 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5753 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5754 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5755 let push_msat=10001;
5756 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5757 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5758 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5760 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5761 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5762 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5764 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5765 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5766 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5768 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5769 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5770 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5772 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5773 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5774 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5775 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5776 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5777 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5781 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5782 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5783 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5784 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5785 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5787 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5788 let push_msat=10001;
5789 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5790 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5791 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5792 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5794 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5795 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5796 let err_msg = match events[0] {
5797 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5800 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5802 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5805 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5806 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5807 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5808 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5810 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5811 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5812 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5813 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5814 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5815 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5817 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5818 // pending_update_fee.
5820 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5821 *feerate_lock += 20;
5823 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5824 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5826 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5827 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5828 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5829 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5830 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5832 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5835 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5837 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5838 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5839 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5841 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5842 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
5843 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5845 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5846 let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
5847 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5848 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5850 // Flush the pending fee update.
5851 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5852 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5853 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5854 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5855 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5857 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5858 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5859 // us to surface its failure to the user.
5860 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5861 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5862 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5863 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5864 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5865 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5867 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5868 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5869 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5871 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
5872 assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5873 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5874 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
5875 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5876 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5877 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
5878 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
5879 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
5881 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5885 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5886 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5887 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5889 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5890 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5891 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5892 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5893 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5894 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5896 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5897 // pending_update_fee.
5899 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5900 *feerate_lock += 200;
5902 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5903 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5905 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5906 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5907 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5908 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5909 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5911 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5914 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5916 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5917 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5918 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5920 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5922 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1) - amt_1;
5923 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
5924 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
5926 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
5927 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
5928 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5929 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
5930 let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
5931 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5932 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
5934 // Flush the pending fee update.
5935 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5936 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5937 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5938 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
5939 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
5942 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
5943 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
5944 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
5945 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5946 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5947 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5948 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5949 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5950 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5952 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
5953 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5954 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5956 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
5957 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5958 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5959 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
5960 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5961 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5962 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
5963 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
5964 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
5966 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5969 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
5970 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
5971 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5972 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
5973 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
5975 let raa = match send_raa_event {
5976 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
5977 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5979 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5980 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5981 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5982 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5983 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5984 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5986 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5987 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5989 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5990 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5991 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5993 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
5994 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5996 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5997 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5998 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5999 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6000 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6001 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6002 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6004 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6005 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6006 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
6008 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6012 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6013 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6014 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6017 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6018 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6019 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6020 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6021 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6022 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6023 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6024 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6025 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6026 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6027 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6029 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6030 // pending_update_fee.
6032 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6033 *feerate_lock += 20;
6035 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6036 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6038 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6039 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6040 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6041 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6042 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6044 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6047 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6049 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6050 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6051 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6053 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6055 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6056 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6057 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6058 let payment_event = {
6059 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6060 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6062 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6063 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6065 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6067 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6068 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6069 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6070 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6072 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6073 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6075 // Flush the pending fee update.
6076 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6077 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6078 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6079 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6080 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6081 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6083 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6084 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6085 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6087 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6088 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6091 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6094 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6095 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6096 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6098 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6099 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6100 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6101 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6102 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6103 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6106 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6107 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6108 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6110 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6111 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6112 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6113 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6114 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6115 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6116 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6117 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6118 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6119 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6121 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6124 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6125 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6126 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6128 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6129 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6131 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6132 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6133 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6134 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6135 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6136 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6137 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6138 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6140 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6141 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6142 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6145 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6146 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6147 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6150 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6151 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6152 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6153 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6154 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6155 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6156 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6158 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6159 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6161 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6162 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6163 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6164 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6168 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6169 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6170 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6171 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6172 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6173 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6174 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6176 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6177 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6178 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6179 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6181 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6182 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6186 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6187 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6188 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6189 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6190 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6191 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6192 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6194 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6195 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6196 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6197 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6198 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6200 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6201 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6202 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6203 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6204 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6208 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6209 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6210 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6211 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6212 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6213 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6214 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6215 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6217 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], vec![], 100000000, 500000001);
6218 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6219 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6223 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6224 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6225 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6226 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6227 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6228 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6229 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6230 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6231 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6232 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6234 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6235 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6236 let payment_event = {
6237 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6238 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6240 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6241 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6242 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6243 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6247 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6249 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6250 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6251 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6253 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6254 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6256 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6257 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6258 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6260 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6261 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6265 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6266 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6267 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6268 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6269 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6270 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6271 let channel_value = 100000;
6272 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6273 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6275 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6277 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6278 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6280 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6281 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6282 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6284 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6285 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6287 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6290 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6292 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6293 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6294 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6295 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6296 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6297 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6298 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6299 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6301 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6302 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6303 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6306 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6307 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6309 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6310 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6311 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6312 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6313 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6314 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6315 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6316 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6320 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6321 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6322 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6323 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6324 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6325 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6326 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6328 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6329 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6330 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6331 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6332 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
6334 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6335 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6336 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6337 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6338 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6340 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6341 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6342 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6343 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6344 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6346 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6347 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6348 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6349 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6350 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6354 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6355 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6356 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6357 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6358 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6359 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6360 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6361 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6363 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6364 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6365 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6366 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6367 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6368 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6370 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6374 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6375 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6376 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6379 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6380 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6381 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6383 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6384 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6386 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6387 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6388 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6389 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6390 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6394 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6395 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6396 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6397 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6398 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6399 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6400 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6402 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6403 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6404 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6405 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6406 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6407 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6409 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6410 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6411 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6412 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6413 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6417 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6418 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6419 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6420 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6421 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6422 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6424 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6425 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6426 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6428 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6429 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6430 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6432 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6433 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6434 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6435 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6436 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6440 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6441 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6442 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6443 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6444 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6445 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6446 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6447 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6449 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6450 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6451 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6452 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6453 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6454 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6456 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6457 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6458 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6459 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6460 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6461 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6462 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6463 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6464 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6465 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6466 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6467 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6468 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6471 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6472 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6473 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6474 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6475 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6477 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6479 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6480 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6481 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6483 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6487 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6488 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6490 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6491 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6492 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6493 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6494 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6495 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6496 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6498 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6499 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6500 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6502 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6505 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6508 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6510 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6511 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6512 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6513 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6514 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6518 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6519 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6521 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6522 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6523 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6524 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6525 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6527 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6528 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6530 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6531 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6533 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6536 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6539 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6541 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6542 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6543 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6544 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6545 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6549 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6550 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6552 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6553 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6554 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6555 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6556 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6558 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6559 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6560 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6561 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6562 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6563 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6566 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6567 failure_code: 0x8000,
6570 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6572 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6573 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6574 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6575 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6576 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6580 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6581 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6583 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6584 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6585 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6586 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6587 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6589 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6591 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6592 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6594 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6595 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6596 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6598 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6599 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6600 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6601 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6602 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6603 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6604 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6606 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6610 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6612 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6614 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6615 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6616 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6617 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6618 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6622 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6623 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6625 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6626 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6627 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6628 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6629 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6631 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6633 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6634 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6636 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6637 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6638 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6640 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6641 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6642 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6643 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6644 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6645 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6646 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6648 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6652 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6654 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6656 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6657 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6658 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6659 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6660 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6664 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6665 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6667 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6668 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6669 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6670 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6671 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6673 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6674 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6675 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6677 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6678 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6680 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6681 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6682 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6684 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6686 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6688 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6689 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6690 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6691 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6692 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6693 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6694 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6696 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6699 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6700 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6702 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6703 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6704 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6705 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6706 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6710 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6711 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6712 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6714 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6715 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6716 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6717 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6718 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6719 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6721 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6724 let mut payment_event = {
6725 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6726 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6727 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6728 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6729 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6731 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6732 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6733 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6734 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6735 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6736 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6737 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6738 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6739 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6742 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6743 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6744 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6745 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6747 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6748 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6749 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6751 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6752 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6753 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6754 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6755 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6756 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6757 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6759 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6763 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6765 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6766 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6767 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6768 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6769 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6771 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6773 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6774 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6775 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6776 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6777 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6778 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6780 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6783 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6786 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6787 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6788 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6789 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6791 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6792 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6793 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6794 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6795 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6796 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6798 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6800 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6801 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6802 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6803 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6805 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6806 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6808 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6809 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
6810 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6811 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6812 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6814 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6815 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6816 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6817 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6819 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6820 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6822 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6824 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6825 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6827 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6830 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6831 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6833 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6836 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6837 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6838 if announce_latest {
6839 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6841 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6844 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6845 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6846 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6848 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6849 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6850 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6851 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6852 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6853 let mut first_failed = false;
6854 for event in events {
6856 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6857 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6858 assert!(!first_failed);
6859 first_failed = true;
6861 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6864 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6870 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6871 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6872 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6875 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6876 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6877 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6878 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6879 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6880 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6881 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6883 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6884 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6885 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6886 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6887 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6889 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6891 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6892 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6894 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6895 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6897 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6899 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6900 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6903 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
6905 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
6906 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
6907 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6908 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6909 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
6911 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
6912 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6913 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6914 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6915 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
6916 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6917 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
6918 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6919 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6920 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6921 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
6923 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
6924 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6925 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6927 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6928 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6929 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
6930 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
6932 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
6933 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6934 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
6935 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6936 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6937 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6938 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
6940 // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
6942 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6943 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6946 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6947 if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
6948 else { first = false; }
6950 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6953 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6954 if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
6955 else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
6957 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6964 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
6965 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
6966 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
6967 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
6971 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
6972 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
6974 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6975 low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
6976 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6977 high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
6978 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
6979 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6980 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6981 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
6982 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6984 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
6985 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, &low_our_to_self_config) {
6987 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6988 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6990 } else { assert!(false) }
6992 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6993 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6994 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6995 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6996 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &low_our_to_self_config) {
6998 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6999 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7001 } else { assert!(false); }
7003 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7004 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7005 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7006 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7007 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7008 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7010 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7012 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7013 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7014 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7018 } else { panic!(); }
7019 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7021 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7022 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7023 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7024 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7025 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &high_their_to_self_config) {
7027 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7028 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7030 } else { assert!(false); }
7034 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7035 // We want to be sure that :
7036 // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7037 // (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7038 // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7039 // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7040 // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7046 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7047 // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7048 // during signing due to revoked tx
7049 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7050 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7053 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7054 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7055 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7057 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7059 // Cache node A state before any channel update
7060 let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7061 let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7062 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7064 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7065 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7067 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7068 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7070 // Restore node A from previous state
7071 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7072 let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7073 chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7074 tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7075 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7076 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7077 monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7079 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7080 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7081 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7082 keys_manager: keys_manager,
7083 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7084 chain_monitor: &monitor,
7086 tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7087 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7091 nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7092 assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7093 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7094 nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7096 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7098 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7099 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7101 let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7103 // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7104 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7108 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7109 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7112 let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7113 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7114 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7115 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7116 reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7117 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7118 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7120 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7121 assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7123 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7126 panic!("Unexpected event")
7130 // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7131 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7132 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_string() });
7133 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
7134 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7136 // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7137 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7138 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7139 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
7140 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
7141 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
7142 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7143 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting".to_string() });
7144 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
7145 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7146 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
7150 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7151 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7152 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7153 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7155 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7156 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7157 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7158 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7160 // Create some initial channels
7161 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7163 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7164 let payee = Payee::new(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7165 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[0].network_graph, None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7166 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7167 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, 0).unwrap();
7168 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7171 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7172 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7173 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7174 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7175 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7177 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7178 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7179 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7180 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7182 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7183 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7184 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7186 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7187 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7188 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7189 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7190 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7191 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7192 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7193 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7194 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7195 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7197 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7201 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7202 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7204 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7205 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7206 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7207 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7211 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7212 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7213 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7215 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7216 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7217 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7218 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7220 let short_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7221 let short_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7222 let short_id_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7225 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7226 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7228 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7229 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7230 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7231 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7232 let mut chans_disabled: HashSet<u64> = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7233 for e in msg_events {
7235 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7236 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7237 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7238 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7239 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7242 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7246 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7247 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7248 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7249 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7250 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7251 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7253 // Reestablish chan_1
7254 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7255 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7256 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7257 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7258 // Reestablish chan_2
7259 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7260 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7261 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7262 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7263 // Reestablish chan_3
7264 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7265 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7266 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7267 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7269 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7270 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7271 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7272 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7273 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7274 chans_disabled = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7275 for e in msg_events {
7277 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7278 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7279 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7280 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7281 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7284 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7290 fn test_priv_forwarding_rejection() {
7291 // If we have a private channel with outbound liquidity, and
7292 // UserConfig::accept_forwards_to_priv_channels is set to false, we should reject any attempts
7293 // to forward through that channel.
7294 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7295 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7296 let mut no_announce_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
7297 no_announce_cfg.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
7298 no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = false;
7299 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(no_announce_cfg), None]);
7300 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
7301 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
7302 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
7303 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7305 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7307 // Note that the create_*_chan functions in utils requires announcement_signatures, which we do
7308 // not send for private channels.
7309 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7310 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7311 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
7312 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7313 nodes[1].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7315 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[1], 1_000_000, 42);
7316 nodes[1].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7317 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()));
7318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7320 let cs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7321 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_funding_signed);
7322 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7324 let conf_height = core::cmp::max(nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1, nodes[2].best_block_info().1 + 1);
7325 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, conf_height);
7326 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7327 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[2], &tx, conf_height);
7328 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7329 let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7330 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7331 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7332 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
7333 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7335 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7336 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
7337 assert!(!nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7339 // We should always be able to forward through nodes[1] as long as its out through a public
7341 send_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], 10_000);
7343 // ... however, if we send to nodes[2], we will have to pass the private channel from nodes[1]
7344 // to nodes[2], which should be rejected:
7345 let route_hint = RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
7346 src_node_id: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
7347 short_channel_id: nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(),
7348 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 1000, proportional_millionths: 0 },
7349 cltv_expiry_delta: MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
7350 htlc_minimum_msat: None,
7351 htlc_maximum_msat: None,
7353 let last_hops = vec![route_hint];
7354 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], last_hops, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
7356 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7357 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7358 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
7359 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7360 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7362 let htlc_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7363 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7364 assert_eq!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7365 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7366 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fee.is_none());
7368 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7369 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7370 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(), true);
7372 // Now disconnect nodes[1] from its peers and restart with accept_forwards_to_priv_channels set
7373 // to true. Sadly there is currently no way to change it at runtime.
7375 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7376 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7378 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
7379 let mut monitor_a_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7380 let mut monitor_b_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7381 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut monitor_a_serialized).unwrap();
7382 get_monitor!(nodes[1], cs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut monitor_b_serialized).unwrap();
7384 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7385 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
7386 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7387 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
7389 let mut monitor_a_read = &monitor_a_serialized.0[..];
7390 let mut monitor_b_read = &monitor_b_serialized.0[..];
7391 let (_, mut monitor_a) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_a_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7392 let (_, mut monitor_b) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_b_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7393 assert!(monitor_a_read.is_empty());
7394 assert!(monitor_b_read.is_empty());
7396 no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = true;
7398 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
7399 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
7400 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7401 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_a);
7402 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_b);
7403 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7404 default_config: no_announce_cfg,
7406 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
7407 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
7408 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7409 logger: nodes[1].logger,
7413 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
7414 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
7416 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_a).is_ok());
7417 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_b).is_ok());
7418 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7419 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
7421 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7422 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7423 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7424 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7425 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
7426 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7427 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7428 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7430 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7431 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7432 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7433 let cs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7434 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7435 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_reestablish);
7436 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7437 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7439 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7440 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7441 pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], 10_000, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret);
7442 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], our_payment_preimage);
7446 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7447 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7448 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7450 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7451 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7452 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7453 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7455 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7457 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7458 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], vec![], 3000000, 30);
7459 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7461 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7462 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7463 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7464 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7465 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7466 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7468 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7469 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7470 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7471 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7475 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7476 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7478 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7479 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7480 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7481 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7484 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7488 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7489 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7490 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7491 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7492 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7493 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7494 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7495 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7499 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7500 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7501 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7502 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7504 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7505 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7506 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7507 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7508 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7509 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7510 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7511 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7512 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7513 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7514 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7515 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7516 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7520 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7522 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7523 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7525 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7527 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7528 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7529 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7530 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7531 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7532 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7533 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7534 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7535 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7536 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7537 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7538 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7539 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7543 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7545 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7546 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7550 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7551 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7552 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7554 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7555 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7556 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7557 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7558 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7560 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7561 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7562 let payee = Payee::new(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7563 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7564 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7565 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7566 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7567 let payee = Payee::new(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7568 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[1].network_graph, None,
7569 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7570 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7572 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7573 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7574 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7576 // Revoke local commitment tx
7577 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7579 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7580 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7581 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7582 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7583 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7584 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7585 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7587 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7588 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7589 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7591 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7592 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7593 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7595 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7596 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7597 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7598 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7600 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7601 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7602 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7603 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7604 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7605 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7606 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7607 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7609 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7610 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7616 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7617 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7618 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7620 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7621 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7622 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7623 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7625 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7626 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7627 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7628 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7629 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7630 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7632 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7633 // available, which we check here:
7634 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7635 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7636 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7638 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7639 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7641 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7642 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7643 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7644 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7646 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7647 // output, checked above).
7648 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7649 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7650 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7652 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7653 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7654 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7655 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
7656 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7660 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7661 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7662 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7663 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7664 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7666 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7667 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7669 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7670 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7671 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7672 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7673 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7675 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7676 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7682 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7683 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7684 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7685 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7687 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7688 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7690 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7691 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7692 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7693 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7694 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7695 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7696 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7697 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7701 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7702 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7703 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7704 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7706 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7707 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7708 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7709 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7710 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7711 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7712 // up bumped justice generation.
7713 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7716 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7717 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7721 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7722 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7723 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7726 // Provide preimage for one
7727 // Check aggregation
7729 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7730 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7731 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7732 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7734 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7735 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7736 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7738 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7739 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7740 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7741 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7742 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7744 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7745 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7746 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7747 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7748 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7750 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7754 let feerate_timeout;
7755 let feerate_preimage;
7757 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7758 // 9 transactions including:
7759 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
7760 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
7761 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
7763 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
7764 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7765 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
7766 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7767 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
7768 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
7769 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
7771 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
7772 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
7773 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
7774 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
7776 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
7777 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7778 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
7779 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
7781 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7782 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7783 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7784 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7788 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7789 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7791 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7792 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7794 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7795 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7796 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7797 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7798 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7799 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7801 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7802 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7803 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
7804 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7805 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7807 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7808 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7809 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7810 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7811 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7816 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7817 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7821 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7822 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7823 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7824 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7825 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7826 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7827 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7828 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7830 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7831 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7832 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7833 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7834 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7836 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7837 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7839 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7841 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7842 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7843 let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7845 // Must revoke without gaps
7846 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7847 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7849 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7850 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7851 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7853 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7854 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7855 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7856 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7857 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7861 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7862 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7863 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7865 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7866 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7867 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7868 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7870 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7871 // Lock HTLC in both directions
7872 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7873 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7875 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7876 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7877 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7879 // Revoke local commitment tx
7880 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7882 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7883 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7884 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
7885 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7887 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7888 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7889 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7890 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7892 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7893 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
7894 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7895 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7896 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7897 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7901 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7902 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7903 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7905 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7906 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7907 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7912 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7913 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7914 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7915 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7916 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7918 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7919 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7920 override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7922 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7924 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7925 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7926 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
7927 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
7931 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7932 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7933 zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7934 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7935 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7936 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7937 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7939 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7940 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7941 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7943 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
7944 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7945 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7949 fn test_simple_mpp() {
7950 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
7951 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7952 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7953 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7954 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7956 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7957 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7958 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7959 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7961 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7962 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7963 route.paths.push(path);
7964 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7965 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7966 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7967 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7968 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7969 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7970 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
7971 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
7975 fn test_preimage_storage() {
7976 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
7977 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7978 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7979 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7980 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7982 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7985 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, 42);
7986 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7987 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7988 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7989 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7990 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7991 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7992 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7994 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
7995 // values from previous calls.
7996 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7997 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7998 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8000 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8002 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, user_payment_id, .. } => {
8003 assert_eq!(*user_payment_id, 42);
8004 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8006 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8009 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8014 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8015 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs
8016 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8017 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8018 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8019 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8021 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8023 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, 0);
8025 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8026 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8027 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2, 0) {
8028 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8029 } else { panic!(); }
8031 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8033 header: BlockHeader {
8035 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8036 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8037 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8041 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8042 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2, 0) {
8043 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8044 } else { panic!(); }
8046 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8047 // again with a different user_payment_id (this time getting a new payment secret).
8048 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8049 block.header.time += 1;
8050 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8051 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2, 42).unwrap();
8052 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8055 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8056 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8057 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8058 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8059 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8060 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8061 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8063 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8064 // values from previous calls.
8065 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8066 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8067 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8069 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, user_payment_id }, .. } => {
8070 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8071 assert_eq!(user_payment_id, 42);
8072 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8073 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8075 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8080 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8081 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8082 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8083 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8084 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8085 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8087 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8089 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8090 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8091 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, 0);
8092 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8094 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8095 // resulting events.
8096 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8099 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8100 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8101 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8102 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8104 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8105 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8106 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8107 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8108 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8110 // We should fail the payment back
8111 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8112 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8113 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8114 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8115 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8117 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8122 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8123 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8124 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8126 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8127 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8128 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8129 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8131 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8132 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8133 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8134 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8136 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8137 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8138 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8139 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8143 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8144 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8145 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8146 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8148 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8149 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8150 // commitment at same time.
8152 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8153 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8154 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8155 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8157 // Create some initial channel
8158 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8159 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8161 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8162 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8164 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8165 let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8167 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8168 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8169 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8170 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8172 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8173 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8174 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8175 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8176 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8177 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8178 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8179 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8182 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8183 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8184 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8185 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8186 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8188 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8189 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8190 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8191 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8192 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8193 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8194 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8195 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8196 if let Err(_) = watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8197 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8198 } else { assert!(false); }
8199 } else { assert!(false); };
8200 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8201 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8202 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8203 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8207 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8208 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8209 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8210 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8211 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8213 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8214 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8215 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8216 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8218 // Create some initial channel
8219 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8220 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8222 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8223 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8225 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8226 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8228 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8229 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8230 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8231 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8232 let watchtower_alice = {
8233 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8234 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8235 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8236 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8237 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8238 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8239 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8240 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8243 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8244 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8245 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8246 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8247 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8249 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8251 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8252 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8256 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8257 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8258 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8259 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8260 let watchtower_bob = {
8261 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8262 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8263 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8264 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8265 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8266 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8267 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8268 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8271 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8272 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8274 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8275 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8277 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8281 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8282 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8283 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8284 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8285 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8286 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8287 if let Err(_) = watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8288 if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8289 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8290 } else { assert!(false); }
8291 } else { assert!(false); };
8292 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8293 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8295 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8296 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8297 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8299 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8302 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8303 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8304 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8308 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8309 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8310 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8312 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8313 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8314 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8315 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8316 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8317 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8322 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8323 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8324 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8327 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8328 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8330 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8331 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8332 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8333 // before receiving funding_signed.
8334 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8335 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8336 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8337 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8339 // Create an initial channel
8340 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8341 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8342 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8343 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8344 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8346 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8347 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8349 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8350 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8352 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8353 let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8354 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8355 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8356 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8360 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8361 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8362 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8363 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8364 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8365 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8366 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8368 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8369 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8370 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8371 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8373 // Create some initial channels
8374 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8376 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8377 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8378 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8379 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8380 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8381 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8383 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8384 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8385 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8386 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8387 // this test before #653 fix.
8388 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8389 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8390 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8391 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8392 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8394 let htlc_timeout = {
8395 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8396 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8397 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8398 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8402 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8403 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8404 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8405 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8408 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8409 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8410 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8411 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8413 // Steps of the test:
8414 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8415 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8416 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8417 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8418 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8419 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8420 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8421 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8422 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8423 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8424 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8425 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8427 // Create some initial channels
8428 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8429 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8431 // Steps (1) and (2):
8432 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8433 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8435 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8436 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8437 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8438 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8439 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8440 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8441 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8443 // Steps (3) and (4):
8444 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8445 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8446 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8447 if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
8448 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
8449 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8450 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8451 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8452 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8453 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8454 true => alice_txn.clone(),
8455 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8457 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8458 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8459 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8460 if broadcast_alice {
8461 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8462 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8463 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8465 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8466 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8470 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8471 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8472 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8474 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8475 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8476 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8477 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8478 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8479 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8481 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8482 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false);
8483 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8484 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8485 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8486 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8488 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8489 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8491 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8494 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8495 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8496 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8497 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8499 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8500 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8501 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8502 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8503 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8506 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8508 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8509 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8510 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8513 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8516 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8517 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8518 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8519 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8521 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8522 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8523 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8524 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8525 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8528 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8530 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8531 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8533 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8534 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8535 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8536 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8537 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8538 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8539 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8540 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8541 if broadcast_alice {
8542 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8543 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8544 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8546 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8547 if broadcast_alice {
8548 // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8549 // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8550 // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8551 // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8553 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8554 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8556 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8557 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8562 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8563 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8565 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8566 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8567 // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8568 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8570 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8571 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8572 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8574 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8575 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8576 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8577 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8578 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8579 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8580 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8582 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8583 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8589 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8590 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8591 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8592 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8593 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8597 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8598 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8599 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8601 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8602 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8603 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8604 // updating logic for the existing channel.
8605 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8606 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8607 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8608 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8610 // Create an initial channel
8611 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8612 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8613 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8614 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8616 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8617 // that it is rejected.
8618 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8620 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8621 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8623 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8624 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8625 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8626 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8627 // move forward with it.
8628 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8629 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8631 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8635 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8636 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8638 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8639 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8641 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8642 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8644 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8645 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8646 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8647 added_monitors.clear();
8649 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8651 let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8652 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8654 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8657 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8658 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8659 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8660 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8661 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8663 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8664 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8666 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8667 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8668 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8669 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8670 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8672 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8676 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8677 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8678 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8679 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8680 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8681 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8683 let funding_created = {
8684 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8685 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8686 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8687 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8689 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8690 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8691 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8692 // still needs to be cleared here.
8693 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8695 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8697 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8698 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8700 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8701 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8702 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8703 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8704 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8706 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8710 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8711 // everything is functional.
8712 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8714 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8715 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8716 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8717 added_monitors.clear();
8720 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8721 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8722 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8723 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
8725 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8726 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
8727 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8728 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8732 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8733 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8735 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8736 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8737 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8738 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8739 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8740 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8741 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8743 // Create some initial channels
8744 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8745 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8746 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8748 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8749 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8750 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8752 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8753 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8754 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8756 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8757 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8758 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8759 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8760 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8761 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8762 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8763 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8764 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8766 // A null channel ID should close all channels
8767 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8768 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8769 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8770 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8771 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8772 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8774 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8775 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8777 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8780 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8781 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8783 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8785 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8786 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
8787 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
8788 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
8789 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8790 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8792 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
8793 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8794 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8798 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
8799 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
8801 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
8802 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
8803 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
8804 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
8805 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8806 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8807 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8808 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8810 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8811 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8812 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8814 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
8815 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
8816 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
8817 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
8820 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
8821 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8822 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8824 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8825 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8827 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8828 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
8830 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8831 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8832 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
8834 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
8835 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8836 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8837 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8838 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8839 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
8840 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8841 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
8842 assert_eq!(msg.data, "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index");
8843 } else { panic!(); }
8844 } else { panic!(); }
8845 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
8848 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
8849 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
8850 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
8851 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
8852 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
8853 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
8854 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
8855 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
8856 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
8857 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
8858 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
8859 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
8860 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
8861 // until we learned about an additional block.
8863 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
8864 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
8865 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8866 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8867 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8868 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8869 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
8871 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8872 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8873 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
8874 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8875 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8877 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
8878 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8879 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8880 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8881 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8882 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8884 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
8885 if !test_height_before_timelock {
8886 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
8888 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8889 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
8890 if test_height_before_timelock {
8891 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
8892 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
8893 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8894 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8896 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
8897 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8898 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
8899 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
8900 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
8901 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
8903 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
8904 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
8906 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
8907 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
8908 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
8909 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8910 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
8911 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8912 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8914 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8915 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8916 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8917 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8918 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8919 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8920 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8921 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8922 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
8927 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
8928 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
8929 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
8933 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
8934 // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
8935 // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
8937 // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
8939 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8940 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8941 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8942 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
8943 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
8944 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
8945 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8946 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
8947 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
8949 // First send a payment to nodes[1]
8950 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8951 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8952 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8954 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8955 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8956 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8957 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8958 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8960 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
8962 // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
8963 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
8964 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
8965 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8967 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8968 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8969 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8970 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8971 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8973 // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
8975 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8977 // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
8978 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8979 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8981 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
8982 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8983 let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8984 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
8985 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
8987 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8988 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
8989 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
8990 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
8992 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
8993 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8994 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
8995 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
8996 let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
8997 let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8998 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
8999 assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9001 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9002 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9003 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9004 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9005 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9006 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9007 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9009 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9010 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9011 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9012 logger: nodes[1].logger,
9016 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9017 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9019 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9020 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9021 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9022 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9024 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9025 // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9026 // the commitment state.
9027 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9029 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9031 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9032 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9033 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9035 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9036 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9037 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9038 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9039 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9040 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9041 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9043 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9044 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9048 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9049 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9050 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9051 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9052 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9054 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9055 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9056 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9057 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9058 let params = RouteParameters {
9059 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9060 final_value_msat: 10000,
9061 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9063 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9064 let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
9066 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9067 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9068 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9069 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9070 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9071 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9072 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9073 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9074 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9078 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9079 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9080 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9081 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9082 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9084 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9085 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9086 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9087 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9089 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9090 let params = RouteParameters {
9091 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9092 final_value_msat: 10000,
9093 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9095 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9096 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9097 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9098 let route = find_route(
9099 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9100 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
9103 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9104 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9106 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9107 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9108 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9109 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9110 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9111 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);