1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
17 use chain::channelmonitor;
18 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
19 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
20 use chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, KeysInterface};
21 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
22 use ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
23 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS };
24 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
25 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
26 use ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
27 use routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
28 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
29 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
31 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, OptionalField, ErrorAction};
32 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
33 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
34 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
35 use util::errors::APIError;
36 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
37 use util::config::UserConfig;
39 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
43 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
44 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
45 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
46 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
56 use core::default::Default;
57 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
59 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
60 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
63 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
64 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
65 use ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
66 let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
67 cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
68 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
69 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
70 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
71 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
73 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
75 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
76 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
77 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
79 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
80 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
82 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
83 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
85 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
86 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
87 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
88 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
89 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
90 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
91 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
92 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
94 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
95 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
97 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
99 } else { assert!(false); }
102 use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
104 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
105 insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
106 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
108 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
110 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
112 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
114 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
116 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
118 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
120 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
124 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
125 // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
127 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
128 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
129 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
130 node_cfgs[1].features = InitFeatures::known().clear_wumbo();
131 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
132 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
134 match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
135 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
136 assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
142 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
143 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
144 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
145 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
146 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
147 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
148 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
149 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
150 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
152 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
153 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
154 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
155 let opt_anchors = false;
156 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
157 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
159 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
160 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
161 if !send_from_initiator {
162 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
163 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
165 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
167 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
168 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
169 if send_from_initiator {
170 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
171 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
173 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
176 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
177 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
178 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
181 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
182 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
183 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
185 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
186 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
187 if send_from_initiator {
188 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
189 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
190 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
191 // well as an additional HTLC.
192 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
194 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
199 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
200 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
201 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
205 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
206 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
207 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
208 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
209 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
210 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
213 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
217 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
218 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
219 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
220 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
221 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
222 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
223 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
224 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
225 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
226 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
228 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
230 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
232 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
234 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
237 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
238 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
240 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
241 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
242 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
243 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
244 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
246 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
249 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
251 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
252 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
253 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
254 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
256 let payment_event = {
257 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
258 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
259 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
261 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
262 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
264 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
265 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
266 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
267 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
268 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
269 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
271 // deliver(1), generate (3):
272 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
273 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
274 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
275 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
277 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
278 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
279 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
280 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
281 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
282 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
283 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
284 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
286 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
287 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
288 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
289 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
290 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
291 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
292 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
293 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
295 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
296 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
297 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
298 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
300 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
301 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
302 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
304 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
307 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
308 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
310 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
311 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
314 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
315 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
319 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
320 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
321 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
322 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
323 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
324 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
325 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
326 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
329 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
331 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
333 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
336 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
337 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
339 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
340 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
341 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
342 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
345 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
348 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
350 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
351 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
352 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
353 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
355 let payment_event = {
356 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
357 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
358 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
360 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
361 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
363 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
364 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
365 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
366 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
367 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
368 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
370 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
371 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
373 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
377 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
378 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
379 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
380 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
381 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
382 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
385 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
386 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
387 // update_fee (never committed) ->
389 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
390 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
391 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
392 // <- (1) RAA delivered
393 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
394 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
395 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
396 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
398 // B should send no response here
399 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
400 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
403 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
406 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
407 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
408 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
410 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
411 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
413 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
414 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
415 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
416 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
417 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
419 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
422 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
423 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
424 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
425 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
426 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
428 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
431 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
432 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
434 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
435 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
436 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
438 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
439 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
440 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
441 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
444 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
446 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
448 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
450 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
451 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
452 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
453 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
454 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
455 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
456 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
457 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
458 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
459 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
460 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
462 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
463 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
464 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
465 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
466 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
468 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
469 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
470 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
473 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
474 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
475 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
477 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
478 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
479 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
481 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
482 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
483 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
484 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
486 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
487 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
488 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
491 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
492 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
493 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
494 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
497 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
498 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
499 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
500 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
502 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
504 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
507 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
508 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
511 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
512 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
513 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
515 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
516 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
517 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
519 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
520 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
522 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
524 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
525 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
526 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
527 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
529 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
530 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
532 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
533 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
534 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
535 added_monitors.clear();
537 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
539 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
540 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
542 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
543 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
544 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
545 added_monitors.clear();
548 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
549 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
551 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
552 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
554 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
555 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
556 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
557 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
561 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
562 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
563 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
564 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
565 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
566 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
567 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
568 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
569 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
570 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
571 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
572 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
573 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
574 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
575 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
576 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
577 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
578 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
579 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
583 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
584 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
585 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
586 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
587 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
588 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
591 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
594 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
595 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
597 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
598 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
599 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
600 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
601 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
603 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
605 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
607 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
608 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
609 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
611 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
612 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
613 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
615 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
616 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
617 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
618 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
620 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
621 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
622 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
626 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
627 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
628 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
629 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
630 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
631 let channel_value = 5000;
633 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
634 let channel_id = chan.2;
635 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
636 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value);
638 let opt_anchors = false;
640 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
641 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
642 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
644 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
645 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
647 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
648 *feerate_lock = feerate;
650 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
651 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
652 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
654 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
656 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
658 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
660 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
662 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
663 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
664 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
665 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
666 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
667 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
671 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
672 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
675 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
676 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
677 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
679 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
681 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
682 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
683 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
684 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
685 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
686 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
687 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
688 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
689 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
691 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
692 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
693 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
694 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
695 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
696 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
697 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
698 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
701 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
702 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
703 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
706 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
707 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
708 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
709 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
710 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
711 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
713 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
714 opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
715 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
716 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
718 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
720 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
723 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
726 htlc_signatures: res.1
729 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
731 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
734 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
736 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
737 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
738 //Should produce and error.
739 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
740 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
741 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
742 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
743 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
747 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
748 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
749 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
750 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
751 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
752 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
755 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
758 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
761 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
762 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
764 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
765 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
766 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
767 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
768 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
770 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
772 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
773 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
774 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
777 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
779 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
780 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
782 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
783 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
784 added_monitors.clear();
786 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
787 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
788 // node[1] has nothing to do
790 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
791 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
792 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
794 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
795 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
796 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
797 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
798 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
799 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
800 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
802 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
803 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
804 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
805 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
806 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
807 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
809 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
810 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
811 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
812 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
814 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
815 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
816 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
818 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
819 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
820 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
821 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
823 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
824 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
825 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
827 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
829 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
830 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
832 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
833 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
836 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
838 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
839 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
840 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
841 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
842 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
846 fn test_update_fee() {
847 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
848 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
849 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
850 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
851 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
852 let channel_id = chan.2;
855 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
856 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
857 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
858 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
859 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
860 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
861 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
862 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
863 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
864 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
865 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
868 // Create and deliver (1)...
871 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
872 feerate = *feerate_lock;
873 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
875 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
876 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
878 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
879 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
880 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
881 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
882 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
884 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
886 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
888 // Generate (2) and (3):
889 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
890 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
891 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
894 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
895 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
896 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
898 // Create and deliver (4)...
900 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
901 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
903 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
905 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
906 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
907 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
908 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
909 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
911 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
914 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
915 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
916 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
918 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
919 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
921 // Handle (3), creating (6):
922 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
923 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
924 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
925 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
928 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
929 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
930 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
932 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
933 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
934 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
935 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
936 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
937 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
938 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
939 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
943 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
944 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
945 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
946 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
948 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
949 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
950 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
952 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
953 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
954 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
955 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
956 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
960 fn fake_network_test() {
961 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
962 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
963 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
964 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
965 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
966 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
968 // Create some initial channels
969 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
970 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
971 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
973 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
974 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
975 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
976 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
977 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
979 // Send some more payments
980 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
981 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
982 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
984 // Test failure packets
985 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
986 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
988 // Add a new channel that skips 3
989 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
991 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
992 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
993 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
994 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
995 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
996 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
997 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
999 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1000 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1001 hops.push(RouteHop {
1002 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1003 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1004 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1005 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1007 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1009 hops.push(RouteHop {
1010 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1011 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1012 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1013 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1015 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1017 hops.push(RouteHop {
1018 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1019 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1020 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1021 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1023 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1025 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1026 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1027 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1029 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1030 hops.push(RouteHop {
1031 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1032 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1033 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1034 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1036 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1038 hops.push(RouteHop {
1039 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1040 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1041 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1042 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1044 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1046 hops.push(RouteHop {
1047 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1048 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1049 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1050 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1052 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1054 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1055 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1056 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1058 // Claim the rebalances...
1059 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1060 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1062 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1063 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1065 // Send some payments across both channels
1066 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1067 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1068 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1071 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1072 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1073 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1074 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1076 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1078 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1079 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1080 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1082 // Close down the channels...
1083 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1084 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1085 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1086 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1087 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1088 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1089 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1090 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1091 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1092 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1093 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1094 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1095 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1096 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1097 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1101 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1102 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1103 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1104 // commitment dance rounds.
1105 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1106 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1107 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1108 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1109 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1110 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1112 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1113 for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1114 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1115 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1116 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1118 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1120 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1121 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1122 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1123 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1125 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1126 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1128 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1130 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1131 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1132 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1133 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1136 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1137 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1139 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1140 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1143 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1144 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1145 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1146 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1148 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1149 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1150 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1151 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1152 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1153 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1154 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1156 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1157 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1158 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1160 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1162 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1163 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1164 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1165 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1167 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1168 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1170 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1172 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1174 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1176 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1177 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1179 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1180 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1181 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1183 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1185 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1186 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1187 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1189 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1191 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1192 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1194 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1196 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1197 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1198 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1200 &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1201 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1203 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1207 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1208 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1211 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1215 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1216 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1217 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1218 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1219 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1220 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1221 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1223 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1224 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1225 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1226 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1227 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1228 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1230 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1232 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1233 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1235 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1236 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1238 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1239 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1240 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1244 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1245 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1246 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1247 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1248 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1249 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1250 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1251 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1253 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1256 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1258 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1260 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1261 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1262 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1264 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1265 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1266 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1269 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1270 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1272 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1273 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1274 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1275 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1276 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1277 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1278 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1281 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1283 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1284 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1285 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1286 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1288 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1289 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1291 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1293 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Alternative commitment tx
1294 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC spend in alternative commitment tx
1296 let bump_tx = if claim_txn[1] == claim_txn[4] {
1297 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1298 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1300 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC timeout on alternative commitment tx
1302 check_spends!(claim_txn[3], remote_txn[0]); // HTLC timeout on broadcasted commitment tx
1305 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[3]);
1306 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[4]);
1308 check_spends!(claim_txn[5], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC timeout on alternative commitment tx
1310 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], remote_txn[0]); // HTLC timeout on broadcasted commitment tx
1315 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1316 assert_eq!(bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1317 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, bump_tx.input[0].previous_output);
1319 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1320 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1321 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1323 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1324 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1325 check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1326 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1328 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1329 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1332 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1333 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1334 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1335 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1337 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1338 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1339 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1340 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1341 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1342 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1344 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1350 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1351 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1352 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1353 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1354 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1355 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1357 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1358 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1360 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1361 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2));
1362 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1363 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1364 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1366 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1368 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1369 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1370 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1373 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1375 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1376 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1378 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1382 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1383 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1384 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1385 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1386 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1387 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1389 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1390 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1391 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1392 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1394 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1396 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1397 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1398 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1399 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1402 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1403 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1404 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1405 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1408 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1410 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1411 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1412 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1414 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1416 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1418 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1419 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1420 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1421 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1422 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1423 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1424 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1425 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1427 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1428 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1429 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1430 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1431 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1433 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1434 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1435 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1436 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1437 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1438 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1439 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1440 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1443 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1444 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1445 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1447 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1448 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1449 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1451 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1453 amount_msat: 3460001,
1454 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1456 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1459 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1462 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1463 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1464 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1465 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1469 local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1470 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1472 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1473 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1475 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1478 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1481 htlc_signatures: res.1
1484 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1485 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1486 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1488 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1489 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1491 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1492 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1494 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1496 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1497 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1498 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1500 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1501 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1502 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1504 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1506 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1507 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1509 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1513 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1514 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1515 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1516 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1517 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1519 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1520 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1521 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1522 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1524 let opt_anchors = false;
1526 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1527 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1528 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1530 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1532 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1533 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1534 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1537 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1538 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1539 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1540 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1541 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1542 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1546 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1547 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1548 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1549 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1550 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1551 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1553 let opt_anchors = false;
1555 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1556 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1557 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1558 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1559 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1560 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1561 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1563 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1564 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1565 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1568 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1569 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1570 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1571 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1572 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1573 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1574 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1575 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1576 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1578 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1579 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1580 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1581 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1582 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1585 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1586 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1587 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1588 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1589 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1590 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1591 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1592 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1596 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1597 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1598 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1599 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1600 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1602 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1603 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1604 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1606 let opt_anchors = false;
1608 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1609 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1610 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1611 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1612 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1613 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1614 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1616 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1617 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1618 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1619 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1620 // commitment transaction fee.
1621 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1623 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1624 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1625 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1628 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1629 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1630 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1631 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1635 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1636 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1637 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1638 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1639 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1640 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1641 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1642 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1644 let opt_anchors = false;
1646 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1648 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1649 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1650 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1651 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1653 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1654 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1655 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1656 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1657 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1658 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1659 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg);
1661 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1662 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1663 match msg_events[0] {
1664 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1665 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1667 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1672 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1673 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1674 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1675 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1676 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1677 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1678 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1679 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1681 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1682 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1683 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1684 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1685 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1686 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1688 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1689 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1690 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1691 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1692 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1693 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1695 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1696 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1697 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1698 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1702 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1703 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1704 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1705 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1706 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1707 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1708 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1711 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1712 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1713 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1714 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1716 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1717 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1718 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1719 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1721 // Add a pending HTLC.
1722 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1723 let payment_event_1 = {
1724 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1725 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1727 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1728 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1729 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1731 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1733 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1734 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1735 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1736 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1737 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1739 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1740 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1741 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1742 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1743 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1744 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1745 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1746 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1749 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1750 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1751 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1752 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1755 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1756 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1757 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1758 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1759 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1760 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1761 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1762 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1766 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1767 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1768 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1769 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1770 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1771 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1772 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1773 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1774 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1775 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1777 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1778 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1779 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1781 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1782 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1785 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1786 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1790 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1791 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1792 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1793 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1794 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1795 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1796 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1797 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1798 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1799 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1800 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1802 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1803 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1805 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1806 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1808 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1810 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1811 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1812 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1813 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1818 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1819 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1820 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1821 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1823 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1825 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1827 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1828 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1829 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1830 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1831 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1833 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1834 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1835 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1836 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1839 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1840 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1842 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1843 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1844 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1845 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1846 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1847 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1848 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1852 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1853 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1854 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
1855 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1856 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1858 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1859 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1860 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1861 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1862 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1865 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1866 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1867 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1868 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1869 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1872 // adding pending output.
1873 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1874 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1875 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1876 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1877 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1878 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1879 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1880 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1881 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1883 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1884 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1885 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1887 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1888 let payment_event_1 = {
1889 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1890 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1892 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1893 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1894 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1896 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1898 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1899 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1901 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1902 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1903 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1904 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1907 // split the rest to test holding cell
1908 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1909 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1910 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1911 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1913 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1914 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1917 // now see if they go through on both sides
1918 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1919 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1920 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1922 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1923 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1925 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1927 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1928 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1929 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1930 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1931 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1934 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1935 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1936 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1937 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1938 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1939 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1941 // flush the pending htlc
1942 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1943 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1944 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1946 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1947 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1948 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1949 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1951 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1952 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1953 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1956 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1957 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1958 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1960 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1962 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1963 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1964 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1966 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1967 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1969 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1970 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1971 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1972 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1973 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1974 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1976 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1977 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1978 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1979 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1981 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1982 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1984 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1985 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1987 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
1988 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1989 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
1991 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1992 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1993 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1995 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1998 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2001 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
2002 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
2003 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
2005 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2006 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2007 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
2009 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2012 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2015 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2016 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2017 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2019 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
2020 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2021 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2023 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
2024 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2025 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2026 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2027 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2029 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2030 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2034 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2035 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2036 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2037 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2038 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2039 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2040 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2041 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2043 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2044 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2045 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2046 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2047 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2048 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2049 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
2050 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2052 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2053 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2054 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2055 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2056 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2057 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2058 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2059 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2060 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2061 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2063 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2064 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2065 let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2066 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2067 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2069 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2070 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2072 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
2073 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2074 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2075 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2076 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2079 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2080 // initial fulfill/CS.
2081 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2082 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2083 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2084 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2086 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2087 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2088 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2089 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2090 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2091 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2093 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2094 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2095 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2096 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2097 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2099 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2100 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2101 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2102 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2103 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2105 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2106 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2107 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2109 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2110 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2111 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2113 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2114 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2115 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2117 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2118 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2119 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2120 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2121 // on-chain as necessary).
2122 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2123 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2124 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2125 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2126 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2128 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2129 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2130 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2132 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2133 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2135 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2136 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2137 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2139 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2140 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2142 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2143 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2144 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2146 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2148 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2149 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2150 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2153 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2154 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2155 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2156 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2158 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2160 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2162 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2164 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2165 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2167 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2169 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2170 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2172 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2174 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2176 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2177 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2179 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2180 expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2182 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2183 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2187 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2188 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2189 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2190 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2191 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2192 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2193 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2195 // Create some initial channels
2196 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2197 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2198 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2199 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2201 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2202 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2203 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2204 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2205 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2206 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2208 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2209 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2210 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2211 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2212 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2214 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2215 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2216 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2217 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2219 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2220 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2221 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2222 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2223 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2225 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2226 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2227 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2228 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2229 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2231 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2232 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2234 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2235 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2236 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2237 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2238 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2240 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2241 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2242 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2243 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2244 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2245 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2247 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2248 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2249 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2250 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2251 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2253 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2254 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2256 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2257 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2258 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2260 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2261 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2263 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2264 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2265 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2266 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2268 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2274 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2275 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2276 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2277 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2278 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2279 let node2_commitment_txid;
2281 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2282 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2283 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2284 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2286 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2287 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2288 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2290 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2292 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2293 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2294 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2295 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2296 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2298 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2299 // confusing us in the following tests.
2300 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2302 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2303 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2304 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2307 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2308 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2309 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2310 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2311 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2312 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2315 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2318 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2319 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2321 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2323 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2325 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2327 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2328 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2329 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2335 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2337 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2338 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2340 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2341 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2342 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2343 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2344 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2347 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2350 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2351 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2353 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2355 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2356 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2358 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2359 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2360 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2362 nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2363 nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2364 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2365 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2367 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2368 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2369 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2373 fn test_justice_tx() {
2374 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2375 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2376 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2377 alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2378 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2379 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2380 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2381 bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2382 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2383 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2384 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2385 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2386 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2387 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2388 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2389 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2390 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen;
2391 // Create some new channels:
2392 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2394 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2395 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2396 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2397 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2398 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2399 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2400 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2401 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2402 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2403 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2404 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2405 // Revoke the old state
2406 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2409 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2411 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2412 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2413 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2415 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2416 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2417 node_txn.truncate(1);
2419 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2420 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2421 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2423 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2424 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2425 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2426 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2428 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2429 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2430 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2431 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2433 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2435 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2436 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2438 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2439 // Create some new channels:
2440 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2442 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2446 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2447 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2448 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2449 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2450 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2451 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2452 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2453 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2454 // Revoke the old state
2455 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2457 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2459 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2460 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2461 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2463 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2464 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2466 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2467 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2469 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2470 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2471 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2472 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2473 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2474 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2475 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2477 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2478 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2479 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2483 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2484 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2485 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2486 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2487 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2488 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2489 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2490 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2491 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2492 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2493 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2494 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2495 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2496 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2497 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2499 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2500 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2501 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2502 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2503 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2504 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2506 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2507 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2509 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2510 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2511 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2512 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2513 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2517 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2518 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2519 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2520 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2521 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2522 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2523 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2525 // Create some new channel:
2526 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2528 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2529 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2530 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2531 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2532 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2534 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2535 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2536 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2537 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2538 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2539 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2540 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2541 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2542 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2544 //Revoke the old state
2545 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2548 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2549 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2550 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2551 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2552 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2553 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2554 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2555 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2557 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2558 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2560 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2561 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2563 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2564 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2565 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2566 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2567 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2568 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2569 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2570 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2572 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2573 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2574 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2576 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2577 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2578 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2579 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2580 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2582 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2583 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2584 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2588 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2589 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2590 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2591 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2592 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2593 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2594 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2596 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2598 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2599 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2600 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2601 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2602 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2603 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2605 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2606 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2608 //Revoke the old state
2609 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2612 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2613 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2614 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2615 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2616 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2617 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2618 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2620 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2621 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2624 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2625 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2627 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2628 assert!(node_txn.len() == 9 || node_txn.len() == 10);
2630 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2631 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2632 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2633 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2634 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2635 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2636 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2638 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2639 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2640 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2641 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2643 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2644 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2645 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2647 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2648 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2649 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2650 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2651 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2652 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2653 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2654 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2656 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2657 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2658 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2659 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[3]);
2660 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[4]);
2661 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2662 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2664 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2665 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2666 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2670 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2671 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2672 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2673 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2674 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2675 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2676 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2677 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2678 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2680 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2681 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2682 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2683 // PaymentSent event).
2685 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2686 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2687 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2688 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2690 // Create some initial channels
2691 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2692 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2694 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2695 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2696 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2697 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2698 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2700 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2701 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2702 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2704 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2705 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2707 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2708 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2709 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2710 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2711 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2712 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2713 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2714 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2715 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2716 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2717 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2718 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2719 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2720 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2721 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2723 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2724 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2725 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2726 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2727 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2728 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2729 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2730 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2731 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2732 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2733 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2734 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2735 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2736 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2737 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2738 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2739 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2741 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2742 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2743 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2744 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2746 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2747 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2748 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2749 added_monitors.clear();
2751 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2752 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2753 match forwarded_events[0] {
2754 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2755 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2757 let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2758 match forwarded_events[1] {
2759 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2760 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2761 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2762 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2763 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2767 match forwarded_events[2] {
2768 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2769 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2770 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2771 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2772 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2776 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2778 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2779 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2780 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2781 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2782 added_monitors.clear();
2784 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2786 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2787 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2790 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2791 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2795 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2796 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2797 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2798 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2799 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2800 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2802 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2804 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2805 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2806 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2807 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2808 // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2809 // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2810 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2811 check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2812 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2813 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2815 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2816 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2817 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2818 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2820 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2821 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2822 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2823 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2825 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2826 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2830 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2831 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2832 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2833 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2835 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2836 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2837 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2838 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2839 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2840 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2841 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2842 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2843 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2844 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2845 let commitment_spend =
2846 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2847 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2848 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2849 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2852 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2853 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2854 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2858 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2859 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2860 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2861 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2862 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2863 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2864 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2865 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2866 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2867 check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2868 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2869 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2871 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2872 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2873 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2874 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2875 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2876 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2877 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2878 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2879 let mut first_claimed = false;
2880 for event in events {
2882 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2883 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2884 assert!(!first_claimed);
2885 first_claimed = true;
2887 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2888 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2891 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2892 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2893 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2896 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2899 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2900 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2901 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2902 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2903 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2904 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2906 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2908 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2909 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2910 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2911 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2912 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2913 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2914 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2916 // Create some intial channels
2917 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2918 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2920 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2921 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2922 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2924 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2926 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2927 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2928 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2929 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2930 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2931 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2932 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2934 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2935 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2937 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2938 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2939 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2940 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2941 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2942 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2944 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2946 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2947 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2948 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2949 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2950 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2951 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2952 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2953 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2955 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2956 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2957 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2958 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2959 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2962 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2963 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2964 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2965 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2967 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2968 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2970 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2971 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2972 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2973 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2975 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2979 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2980 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2981 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2983 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2984 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2985 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2986 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2989 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2991 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2992 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2993 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2994 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2995 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2996 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2997 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2999 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
3003 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3004 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3005 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3006 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3008 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3009 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3010 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3011 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3012 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3013 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3015 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3018 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
3019 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3020 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
3022 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
3023 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3025 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3026 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3027 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3028 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
3029 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3030 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
3031 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
3032 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
3033 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3037 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3038 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3039 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3040 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3044 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3045 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3046 // and fail backward accordingly.
3048 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3049 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3050 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3051 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3053 // Create some initial channels
3054 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3055 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3057 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3058 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3059 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3060 // Revoke the old state
3061 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3063 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3065 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3066 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3067 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3068 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3069 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3071 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3072 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3073 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3074 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3076 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3077 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3078 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3079 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3080 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3081 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3083 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3084 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3085 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3087 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3091 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3092 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3093 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3094 // commitment transaction anymore.
3095 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3096 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3097 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3098 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3099 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3100 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3102 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3103 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3104 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3105 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3106 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3107 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3108 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3109 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3110 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3112 // Create some initial channels
3113 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3114 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3116 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3117 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3118 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3119 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3120 // Revoke the old state
3121 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3123 let value = if use_dust {
3124 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3125 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3126 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3129 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3130 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3131 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3133 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3134 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3135 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3136 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3137 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3138 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3139 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3140 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3141 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3142 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3143 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3144 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3146 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3147 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3148 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3149 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3150 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3151 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3152 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3153 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3154 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3155 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3156 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3157 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3158 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3159 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3160 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3163 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3164 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3165 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3166 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3167 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3168 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3169 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3170 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3171 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3172 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3173 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3174 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3175 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3176 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3177 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3178 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3179 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3180 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3182 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3183 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3184 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3185 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3186 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3187 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3191 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3192 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3193 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3194 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3195 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3196 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3198 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3199 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3201 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3202 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3205 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3206 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3208 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3209 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3210 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3211 assert!(ANTI_REORG_DELAY > PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS); // We assume payments will also expire
3213 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3214 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 4 });
3216 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3217 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3220 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3221 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3223 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3225 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3227 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3228 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3230 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3233 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3234 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3237 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3238 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3240 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3241 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3242 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3243 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3244 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3246 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3247 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3248 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3249 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3251 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3255 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3256 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3257 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3258 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3259 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3260 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3262 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3265 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3266 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3267 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3268 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3269 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3270 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3271 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3273 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3274 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3275 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3277 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3279 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3280 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3282 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3283 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3284 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3285 // that we should update our routing table for.
3286 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3287 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3290 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3293 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3294 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3295 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3297 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3300 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3301 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3302 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3304 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3307 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3310 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3311 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3312 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3316 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3317 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3318 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3319 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3320 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3324 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3325 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3326 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3327 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3328 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3332 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3333 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3334 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3335 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3336 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3337 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3339 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3341 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3342 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3345 let payment_event = {
3346 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3347 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3348 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3350 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3351 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3354 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3355 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3357 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3358 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3360 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3363 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3365 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3367 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3368 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3369 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3370 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3371 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3372 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3374 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3375 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3381 onion_routing_packet,
3383 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3385 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3386 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3387 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3389 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3390 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3392 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3395 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3396 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3398 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3400 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3401 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3405 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3406 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3407 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3408 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3409 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3410 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3411 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3412 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3414 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3415 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3416 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3417 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3418 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3419 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3421 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3422 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3423 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3425 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3426 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3427 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3428 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3429 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3431 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3432 // registering new transactions
3433 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3434 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3438 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3439 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3440 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3441 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3442 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3443 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3444 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3445 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3447 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3449 let mut payment_event = {
3450 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3451 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3453 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3454 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3455 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3458 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3459 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3461 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3463 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3464 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3465 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3466 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3469 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3470 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3472 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3474 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3475 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3476 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3478 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3479 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3480 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3481 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3483 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3484 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3485 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3486 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3487 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3491 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3493 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3494 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3495 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3496 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3498 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3500 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3501 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3503 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3504 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3505 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3506 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3507 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3508 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3509 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3511 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3515 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3516 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3517 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3518 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3519 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3521 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3522 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3523 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3524 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3525 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3527 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3529 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3530 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3531 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3532 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3533 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3534 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3536 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3537 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3539 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3540 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3544 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3545 // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3546 // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3547 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3548 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3549 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3550 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3552 // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3553 // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3554 let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3555 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3556 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
3557 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3558 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
3560 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3561 assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3563 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3565 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3566 assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3568 // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3569 // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3572 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3575 // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3576 // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3577 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3578 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3580 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3581 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3585 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3586 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3587 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3588 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3589 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3590 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3591 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3592 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3594 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3595 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3596 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3598 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3599 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3600 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3601 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3603 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3604 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3605 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3607 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3608 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3609 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3610 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3612 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3613 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3615 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3616 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3618 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3620 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3621 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3623 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3624 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3625 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3627 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3630 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3631 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3632 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3634 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3637 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3638 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3642 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3643 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3646 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3647 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3648 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3649 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3650 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3651 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3653 let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3654 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3655 let (channel_ready, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3656 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3657 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3658 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3659 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3661 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3664 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3666 let payment_event = {
3667 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3668 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3670 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3671 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3672 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3674 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3676 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3677 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3679 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3680 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3681 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3682 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3683 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3685 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3686 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3687 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3688 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3690 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3691 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3692 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3693 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3694 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3696 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3697 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3698 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3699 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3706 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3707 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3708 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3709 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3710 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3711 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3713 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3714 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3715 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3717 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3718 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3720 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3721 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3722 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3723 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3724 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3725 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3726 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3727 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3728 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3729 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3730 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3731 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3732 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3733 // Everything was delivered...
3734 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3737 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3738 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3740 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3741 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3744 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3745 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3746 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3748 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3750 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3751 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3753 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
3754 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3755 assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3757 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3758 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3759 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3761 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3764 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3767 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3768 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3769 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3771 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3772 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3773 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3774 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3775 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3776 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3777 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3778 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3779 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3780 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3781 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3783 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3786 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3787 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3789 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3790 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3792 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3793 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3794 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3796 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3799 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3800 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3801 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3802 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3804 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3805 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3806 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3807 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3809 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3810 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3811 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3812 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3813 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3815 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3816 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3817 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3818 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3825 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3826 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3827 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3828 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3829 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3830 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3832 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3834 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3835 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3836 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3837 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3838 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3839 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3840 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3841 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3842 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3843 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3844 // Everything was delivered...
3845 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3848 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3849 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3852 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3853 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3854 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3856 if messages_delivered > 2 {
3857 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3860 // Channel should still work fine...
3861 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3862 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3863 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3867 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3868 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3869 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3870 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3871 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3875 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3876 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3877 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3878 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3879 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3883 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3884 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3885 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3886 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3887 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3888 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3889 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3890 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3891 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3892 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3894 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3895 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3897 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3898 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3899 assert!(events_1.is_empty());
3901 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3903 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3904 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3906 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3907 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3908 assert!(events_2.is_empty());
3910 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
3911 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3912 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
3913 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3915 // nodes[0] hasn't yet received a channel_ready, so it only sends that on reconnect.
3916 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
3917 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3918 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3919 let as_channel_ready = match events_3[0] {
3920 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3921 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3924 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_3[0]),
3927 // nodes[1] received nodes[0]'s channel_ready on the first reconnect above, so it should send
3928 // announcement_signatures as well as channel_update.
3929 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
3930 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3931 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 3);
3933 let bs_channel_ready = match events_4[0] {
3934 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3935 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3936 chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3939 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[0]),
3941 let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_4[1] {
3942 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3943 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3946 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[1]),
3949 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3950 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3952 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[2]),
3955 // Re-deliver nodes[0]'s channel_ready, which nodes[1] can safely ignore. It currently
3956 // generates a duplicative private channel_update
3957 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3958 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3959 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3961 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3962 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3964 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_5[0]),
3967 // When we deliver nodes[1]'s channel_ready, however, nodes[0] will generate its
3968 // announcement_signatures.
3969 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_channel_ready);
3970 let events_6 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3971 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
3972 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
3973 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3974 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3977 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_6[0]),
3980 // When we deliver nodes[1]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[0], nodes[0] should immediately
3981 // broadcast the channel announcement globally, as well as re-send its (now-public)
3983 nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3984 let events_7 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3985 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3986 let (chan_announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
3987 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3988 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3990 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_7[0]),
3993 // Finally, deliver nodes[0]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[1] and make sure it creates the
3994 // same channel_announcement.
3995 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3996 let events_8 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3997 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3998 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
3999 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
4000 assert_eq!(*msg, chan_announcement);
4003 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_8[0]),
4006 // Provide the channel announcement and public updates to the network graph
4007 nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap();
4008 nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4009 nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4011 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4012 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
4013 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
4015 // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
4016 // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
4017 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4019 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4020 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4021 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4023 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4024 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4025 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4026 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4027 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4028 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4029 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4030 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4032 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4033 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4034 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4035 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4036 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4037 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4039 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
4040 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4041 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4042 logger: nodes[0].logger,
4046 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4047 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4049 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4050 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4051 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4053 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4055 // The channel announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
4056 nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
4057 let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4058 let mut found_announcement = false;
4059 for event in msgs.iter() {
4061 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
4062 if *msg == chan_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
4064 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
4065 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4068 assert!(found_announcement);
4072 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
4073 // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
4074 // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
4075 // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
4076 // channel_ready immediately instead.
4077 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4078 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4079 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4080 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4081 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
4083 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4085 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4086 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4087 let block_txn = [funding_tx];
4088 let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
4089 let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
4090 nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
4092 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4093 let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4094 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4098 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4099 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4100 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4101 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4102 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4103 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4104 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4105 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4107 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
4109 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4110 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4111 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
4112 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4114 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4115 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4117 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4118 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4121 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4122 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
4123 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4125 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4126 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4128 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4129 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4130 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4131 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4132 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4133 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4134 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4136 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4137 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4138 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4140 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4141 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4142 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4144 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4147 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4148 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4149 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4152 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4155 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4156 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4158 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4159 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4160 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4161 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4162 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4163 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4165 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4166 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4167 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4168 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4170 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4171 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4173 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4174 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4176 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4178 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4179 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4180 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4181 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4182 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4183 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4184 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4185 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4186 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4187 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4189 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4190 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4191 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4192 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4193 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4194 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4195 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4196 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4198 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4199 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4200 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4201 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4202 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4203 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4204 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4205 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4207 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4208 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4209 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4210 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4212 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4213 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4214 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4215 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4217 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4218 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4219 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4221 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4223 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4224 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4226 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4227 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4229 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4230 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4231 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4233 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4236 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4239 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4240 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4241 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4243 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4244 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4247 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4248 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4249 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4250 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4251 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4252 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4253 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4255 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4257 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4258 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4259 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4260 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4261 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4262 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4263 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4264 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4265 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4266 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4267 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4268 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4269 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4272 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4275 let mut block = Block {
4276 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4279 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4280 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4281 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4282 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4283 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4284 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4285 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4288 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4290 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4291 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4292 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4293 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4294 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4295 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4297 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4298 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4299 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4300 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4301 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4302 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4306 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4307 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4308 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4311 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4312 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4313 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4314 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4315 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4316 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4317 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4318 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4320 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4321 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4322 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4323 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4325 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4326 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4328 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4330 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4331 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4333 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4334 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4335 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4336 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4338 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4339 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4340 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4341 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4342 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4344 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4346 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4347 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4348 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4349 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4352 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4353 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4354 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4355 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4356 match fail_commit[0] {
4357 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4358 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4359 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4361 _ => unreachable!(),
4363 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4365 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4366 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4367 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
4368 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4369 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4370 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
4371 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4372 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4377 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4378 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4379 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4383 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4384 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4385 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4386 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4387 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4388 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4389 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4390 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4391 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4392 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4394 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4396 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4398 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4399 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4400 get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4401 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4403 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4404 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4405 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4406 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4407 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4408 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4409 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4410 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4411 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4412 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4414 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4415 let config = UserConfig::default();
4416 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4417 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4418 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4419 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4420 default_config: config,
4422 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4423 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4424 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4429 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4430 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4432 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4433 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4434 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4435 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4437 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4438 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4439 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4440 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4442 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4443 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4444 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4445 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4447 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4448 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
4449 for node in nodes.iter() {
4450 assert!(node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4451 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4452 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4455 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4459 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4460 // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4461 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4462 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4463 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4464 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4465 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4466 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4467 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4468 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4469 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4471 // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4472 let channel_value = 100000;
4473 let push_msat = 10001;
4474 let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4475 let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4476 let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4477 let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4478 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4479 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4480 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4482 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, 42);
4484 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
4485 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4487 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4489 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4490 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4491 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4492 added_monitors.clear();
4495 let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4496 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4498 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4499 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4500 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4501 added_monitors.clear();
4503 // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4508 // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4509 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4510 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4511 get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4513 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4514 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4515 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4516 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4517 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4518 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4519 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4520 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4521 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4522 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4524 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4525 let config = UserConfig::default();
4526 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4527 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4528 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4529 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4530 default_config: config,
4532 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4533 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4534 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4539 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4540 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4542 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4544 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4545 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4547 // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4548 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4549 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4550 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4551 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4553 // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4554 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4555 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4557 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4558 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4559 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4560 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4562 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4563 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4564 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4565 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4567 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4568 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
4569 for node in nodes.iter() {
4570 assert!(node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4571 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4572 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4575 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4579 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4580 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4581 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4582 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4583 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4584 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4585 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4586 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4587 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4588 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4589 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4591 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4592 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4594 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4596 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4597 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4598 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4600 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4601 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4602 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4603 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4604 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4605 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4606 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4607 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4608 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4609 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4611 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4612 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4613 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4614 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4615 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4616 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4618 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4619 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4620 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4625 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4626 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4628 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4629 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4630 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4632 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4634 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4635 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4639 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4640 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4641 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4642 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4643 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4644 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4645 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4646 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4647 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4648 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4649 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4650 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4651 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4652 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4654 let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4655 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4656 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4657 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4658 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4661 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4663 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4664 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4666 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4667 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4668 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4669 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4671 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4673 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4674 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4675 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4676 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4677 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4680 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4681 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4682 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4683 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4684 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4685 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4688 let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4689 for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4690 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4691 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4692 assert!(read.is_empty());
4693 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4696 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4697 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4698 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4699 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4700 assert!(read.is_empty());
4701 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4704 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4705 if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4706 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4707 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4709 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4710 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4711 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4713 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4715 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4718 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4719 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4720 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4721 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4723 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4724 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4725 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4727 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4729 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4730 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4732 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4733 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4734 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4735 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4736 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4739 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4740 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4741 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4743 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4744 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4746 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4747 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4748 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4749 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4750 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4752 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4753 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4754 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4755 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4756 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4757 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4758 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4760 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4761 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4763 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4768 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4769 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4771 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4772 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4773 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4774 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4775 for event in events.drain(..) {
4777 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4778 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4779 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4780 all_outputs.push(outp);
4783 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4786 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4787 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4797 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4798 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4799 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4800 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4801 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4802 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4804 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4805 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4806 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4807 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4808 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4809 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4810 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4811 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4812 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4814 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4815 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4817 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4818 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4819 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4820 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4821 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4825 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4826 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4827 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4828 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4829 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4830 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4831 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4833 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4834 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4835 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4836 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4837 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4839 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4840 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4841 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4842 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4844 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4845 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4846 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4847 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4848 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4850 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4851 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4852 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4856 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4857 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4858 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4860 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4861 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4862 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4863 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4865 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4866 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4867 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4868 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4869 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4871 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4872 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4873 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4874 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4875 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4877 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4878 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4879 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4881 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4882 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4883 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4884 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4885 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4889 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4890 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4891 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4892 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4893 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4895 // Create some initial channels
4896 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4898 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4900 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4901 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4902 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4904 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4905 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4906 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4907 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4908 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4909 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4910 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4912 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4913 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4916 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4917 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4920 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4921 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4922 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4923 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4924 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4925 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4926 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4928 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4929 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4930 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4932 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4933 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4934 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4938 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4939 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4940 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4941 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4942 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4944 // Create some initial channels
4945 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4947 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4948 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4950 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4952 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4953 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4954 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4956 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4957 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4958 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4959 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4961 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4962 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4964 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4966 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4967 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4968 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4969 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4970 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4971 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4973 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4974 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4975 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4976 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4978 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4979 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4980 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4981 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4982 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4986 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4987 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4988 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4989 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4990 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4992 // Create some initial channels
4993 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4995 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4996 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4997 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4998 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5000 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5002 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5003 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5004 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5005 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5007 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5008 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5009 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
5010 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5012 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
5013 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5015 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5016 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5017 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
5021 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5022 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5023 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
5024 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5025 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5026 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5028 // Create some initial channels
5029 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5031 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5032 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5033 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5034 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5036 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5038 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
5039 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5040 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5041 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5042 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5043 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5045 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5046 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5047 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5048 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5049 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5050 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5051 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
5053 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5054 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5055 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
5056 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5057 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5058 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5060 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5061 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5062 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5063 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5064 // transactions next...
5065 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
5066 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5068 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
5069 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5070 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
5071 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5073 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
5074 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5077 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5078 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5080 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
5081 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5083 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5084 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5085 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5086 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5087 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
5091 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
5092 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5093 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
5094 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5095 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5096 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5098 // Create some initial channels
5099 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5101 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5102 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5103 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5104 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5106 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
5107 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
5109 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5111 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
5112 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5113 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5114 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5115 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5116 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5118 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5119 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5120 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5121 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5123 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
5124 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
5125 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
5127 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5128 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5129 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
5130 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5131 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5132 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5134 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5135 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5137 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5138 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5139 // transactions next...
5140 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
5141 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5142 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
5143 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5145 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
5146 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5149 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5150 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5152 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5154 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
5155 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5157 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
5158 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
5160 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5161 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5162 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5163 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5164 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
5165 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5166 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
5167 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
5171 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
5172 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
5173 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
5174 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
5175 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
5177 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
5180 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5181 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5182 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5183 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5185 // Create some initial channels
5186 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5187 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5189 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5190 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5191 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5192 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5193 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5195 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5196 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5197 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5199 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
5200 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5201 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5202 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5203 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
5204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5205 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5206 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5207 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5208 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5209 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5211 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5212 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5213 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5214 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5216 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5217 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5218 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5219 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5220 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5221 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5222 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5223 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5224 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5225 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5227 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5228 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5229 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5230 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5231 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5232 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5234 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5235 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5238 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
5239 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5240 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
5241 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5242 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
5244 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5247 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5248 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5249 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5250 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5253 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5254 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5255 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5256 match msg_events[0] {
5257 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5258 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5260 match msg_events[1] {
5261 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5262 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5264 match msg_events[2] {
5265 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5266 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5267 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5268 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5269 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5270 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5272 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5274 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5275 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5276 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5277 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5278 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5279 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5280 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5281 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5282 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5283 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5284 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5285 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5286 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5288 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5293 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5294 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5295 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5296 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5297 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5298 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5299 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5300 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5301 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5302 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5303 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5304 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5305 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5306 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5308 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5309 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5310 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5312 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5313 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5314 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5315 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5316 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5318 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
5320 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5321 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5322 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5323 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5324 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
5325 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
5326 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5327 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5329 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5330 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5331 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5333 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5334 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5335 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5336 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5337 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5339 let htlc_timeout_tx;
5340 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5341 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5342 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5343 assert!(node_txn.len() == 4 || node_txn.len() == 3);
5344 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5346 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5347 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5349 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
5350 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5351 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5352 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5354 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5355 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5357 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5358 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5361 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5362 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5363 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
5364 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5366 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5369 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5370 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
5372 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5373 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5374 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5375 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5377 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5378 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5381 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5382 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5384 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5385 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5386 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5387 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5388 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5389 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5390 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5391 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5392 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5393 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5394 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5395 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5396 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5398 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5399 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5400 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5401 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5402 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5403 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5404 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5405 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5406 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5409 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5410 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5412 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5414 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5416 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5417 // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5418 // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5419 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5420 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196*2), true, true);
5421 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5422 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5423 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5424 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5425 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5426 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5429 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5430 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5432 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5434 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5435 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5436 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5438 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5443 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5444 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5445 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5446 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5447 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5449 // Create some initial channels
5450 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5452 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
5453 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5454 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5455 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5456 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5458 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5459 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5460 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
5461 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5463 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5464 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5465 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5466 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5468 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5469 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5472 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5473 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5476 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5477 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5478 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5479 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5480 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5481 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5482 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5486 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5487 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5489 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5490 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5491 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5492 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5493 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5494 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5497 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5498 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5499 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5500 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5501 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5502 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5503 // use the same payment hashes.
5504 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5509 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5510 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5511 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5512 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5513 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5514 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5515 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5516 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5517 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5518 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5520 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5521 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5522 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5523 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5524 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5526 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5527 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5528 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5529 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5531 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5533 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5535 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5536 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5538 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5540 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5542 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5544 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5545 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5547 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5549 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5552 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5554 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5555 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5558 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5560 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5561 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5563 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5564 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5565 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5566 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5567 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5569 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5570 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5571 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5572 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5573 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5574 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5575 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5576 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5577 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5579 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5580 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5581 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5582 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5583 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5584 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5586 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5587 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5588 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5589 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5590 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5591 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5593 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5594 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5595 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5596 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5598 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5600 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5601 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5602 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5603 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5604 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5605 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5606 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5607 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5608 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5609 if deliver_last_raa {
5610 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5612 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5615 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5616 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5617 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5618 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5620 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5621 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5622 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5624 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5625 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5626 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5628 if announce_latest {
5629 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5631 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5633 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5634 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5635 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5638 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5642 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5643 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5646 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5647 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5648 if deliver_last_raa {
5649 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5651 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5653 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5655 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5656 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5657 let mut a_done = false;
5658 for msg in cs_msgs {
5660 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5661 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5662 // should be failed-backwards here.
5663 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5664 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5665 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5666 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5668 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5673 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5674 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5675 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5677 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5678 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5681 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5682 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5683 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5684 if announce_latest {
5685 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5686 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5687 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5690 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5692 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5696 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5697 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5698 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5699 let mut as_updates = 0;
5700 for event in as_events.iter() {
5701 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5702 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5703 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5704 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5706 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5708 if network_update.is_some() {
5711 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5713 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5714 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5715 if announce_latest {
5716 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5717 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5719 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5721 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5722 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5723 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5724 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5725 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5726 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5727 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5728 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5729 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5731 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5733 if network_update.is_some() {
5736 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5738 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5739 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5740 if announce_latest {
5741 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5743 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5745 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5746 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5747 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5748 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5749 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5750 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5754 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5755 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5759 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5760 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5764 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5765 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5766 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5767 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5771 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5772 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5773 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5774 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5775 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5777 // Create some initial channels
5778 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5780 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5781 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5782 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5783 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5785 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5786 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5787 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5788 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5789 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5790 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5792 let htlc_timeout = {
5793 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5794 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5795 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5796 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5797 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5798 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5802 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5803 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5804 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5806 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5807 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5808 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5809 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5810 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5811 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5812 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5813 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5814 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5815 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5816 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5820 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5821 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5822 // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5823 // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5825 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5827 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5828 let seed = [42; 32];
5829 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5830 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5831 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source.genesis_hash, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger);
5832 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5833 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5834 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5835 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5837 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5838 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5840 // Create some initial channels
5841 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5843 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5844 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5845 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5847 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5848 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5849 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5850 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5851 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5853 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5854 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5855 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5856 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5857 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5859 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5860 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5861 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5862 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5863 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5864 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5865 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5866 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5869 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5870 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5871 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5872 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5873 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5874 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5876 let htlc_timeout = {
5877 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5878 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5879 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5880 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5884 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5885 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5886 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5888 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5889 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5890 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5891 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5892 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5893 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5894 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5895 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5896 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5897 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5898 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5899 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5903 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5904 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5905 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5906 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5907 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5909 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5911 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5912 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5914 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5915 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5916 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5918 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5919 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5920 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5922 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5923 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5924 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5926 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5927 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5928 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5931 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5932 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5933 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5934 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5935 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5936 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5938 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5940 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5941 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5942 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5943 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5944 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5946 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5947 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5948 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5950 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5951 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5952 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5953 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5956 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5957 let mut block = Block {
5958 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5961 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5962 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5963 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5965 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5966 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5967 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5968 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5971 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5972 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5973 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5974 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5975 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5976 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5978 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5979 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5980 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5982 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5984 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5985 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5986 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5988 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5989 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5991 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5992 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5993 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5995 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5996 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5997 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5998 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6001 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
6002 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6003 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6004 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6005 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6006 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6008 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
6009 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
6010 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
6011 // actually revoked.
6012 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
6013 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
6014 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
6015 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6016 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6018 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6019 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6020 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
6021 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6022 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6023 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
6024 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6025 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
6026 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6027 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6029 if check_revoke_no_close {
6030 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
6031 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6034 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
6035 let mut block = Block {
6036 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6039 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
6040 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
6041 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
6043 if !check_revoke_no_close {
6044 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
6045 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6046 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6047 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6049 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6050 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6051 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
6052 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6053 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
6054 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
6055 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6056 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
6060 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
6061 // There are only a few cases to test here:
6062 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
6063 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
6064 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
6065 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
6066 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
6068 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
6069 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
6070 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
6072 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
6073 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
6074 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
6076 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
6077 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
6081 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
6082 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
6083 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
6084 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
6085 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
6090 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
6091 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6092 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6093 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6094 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6095 // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
6096 for node in nodes.iter() {
6097 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
6100 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
6101 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6102 let push_msat=10001;
6103 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6104 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6105 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6106 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6108 // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
6109 // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
6110 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6114 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
6115 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6116 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6117 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6118 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6120 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
6121 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
6122 let push_msat=10001;
6123 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6125 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
6126 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6127 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
6128 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
6129 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6131 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
6132 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6133 let push_msat=10001;
6134 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
6135 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6136 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
6138 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
6139 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
6140 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
6142 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
6143 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
6144 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6146 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
6147 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
6148 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
6150 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
6151 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
6152 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6153 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6154 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
6155 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6159 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
6160 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6161 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6162 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6163 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6165 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
6166 let push_msat=10001;
6167 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6168 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6169 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
6170 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
6172 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6173 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6174 let err_msg = match events[0] {
6175 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
6178 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6180 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
6183 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
6184 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
6185 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
6186 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
6188 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
6189 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6190 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6191 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6192 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6193 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6195 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6196 // pending_update_fee.
6198 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6199 *feerate_lock += 20;
6201 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6202 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6204 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6205 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6206 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6207 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6208 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6210 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6213 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6215 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6216 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6217 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6218 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6220 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6221 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6222 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6224 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6225 let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6226 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6227 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6229 // Flush the pending fee update.
6230 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6231 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6232 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6233 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6234 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6236 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6237 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6238 // us to surface its failure to the user.
6239 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6240 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6241 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6242 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6243 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6244 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6246 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6247 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6248 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6250 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6251 assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6252 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6253 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6254 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6255 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6256 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6257 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6258 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6260 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6264 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6265 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6266 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6268 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6269 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6270 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6271 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6272 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6273 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6275 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6276 // pending_update_fee.
6278 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6279 *feerate_lock += 200;
6281 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6282 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6284 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6285 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6286 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6287 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6288 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6290 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6293 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6295 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6296 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6297 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6298 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6300 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6302 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
6303 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6304 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6306 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6307 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6308 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6309 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6310 let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6311 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6312 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6314 // Flush the pending fee update.
6315 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6316 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6317 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6318 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6319 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6320 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6322 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6323 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6324 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6325 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6326 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6327 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6328 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6329 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6330 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6332 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6333 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6334 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6336 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6337 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6338 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6339 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6340 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6341 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6342 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6343 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6344 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6346 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6349 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6350 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6351 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6352 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6353 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6355 let raa = match send_raa_event {
6356 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6357 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6359 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6360 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6361 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6362 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6363 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6364 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6366 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6367 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6369 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6370 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6371 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6373 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6374 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6376 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6377 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6378 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
6380 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6381 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6382 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6383 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6386 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6387 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6388 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6391 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6392 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6393 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6394 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6395 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6396 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6397 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6398 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6399 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6400 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6401 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6403 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6404 // pending_update_fee.
6406 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6407 *feerate_lock += 20;
6409 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6410 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6412 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6413 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6414 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6415 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6416 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6418 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6421 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6423 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6424 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6425 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6426 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6428 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6430 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6431 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6432 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6433 let payment_event = {
6434 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6435 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6437 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6438 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6440 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6442 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6443 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6444 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6445 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6447 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6448 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6450 // Flush the pending fee update.
6451 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6452 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6453 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6454 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6455 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6458 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6459 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6460 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6462 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6463 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6466 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6469 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6470 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6471 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6473 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6474 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6475 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6476 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6477 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6478 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6481 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6482 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6483 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6485 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6486 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6487 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6488 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6489 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6490 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6491 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6492 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6493 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6494 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6496 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6499 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6500 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6501 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6503 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6504 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6505 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6506 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6507 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6508 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6509 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6510 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6511 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6512 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6513 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6515 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6516 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6517 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6520 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6521 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6522 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6525 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6526 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6527 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6528 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6529 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6530 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6531 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6533 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6534 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6536 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6537 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6538 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6539 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6543 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6544 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6545 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6546 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6547 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6548 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6549 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6551 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6552 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6553 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6554 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6556 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6557 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6561 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6562 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6563 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6564 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6565 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6566 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6567 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6569 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6570 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6571 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6572 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6573 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6575 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6576 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6577 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6578 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6579 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6583 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6584 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6585 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6586 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6587 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6588 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6589 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6590 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6592 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
6593 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
6594 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6595 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6596 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6597 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6601 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6602 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6603 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6604 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6605 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6606 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6607 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6608 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6609 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6610 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6612 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6613 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6614 let payment_event = {
6615 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6618 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6619 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6620 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6621 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6625 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6627 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6628 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6629 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6631 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6632 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6634 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6635 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6636 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6638 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6639 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6643 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6644 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6645 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6646 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6647 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6648 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6649 let channel_value = 100000;
6650 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6651 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6653 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6655 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6656 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6658 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6659 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6660 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6662 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6663 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6665 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6668 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6670 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6671 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6672 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6673 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6674 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6675 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6676 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6677 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6679 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6680 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6681 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6684 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6685 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6686 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6687 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6688 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6689 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6690 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6691 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6692 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6693 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6694 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6698 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6699 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6700 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6701 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6702 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6703 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6704 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6706 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6707 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6708 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6709 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6710 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6711 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6713 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6714 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6715 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6716 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6717 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6719 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6720 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6721 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6722 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6723 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6725 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6726 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6727 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6728 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6729 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6733 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6734 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6735 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6736 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6737 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6738 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6739 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6740 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6742 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6743 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6744 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6745 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6746 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6747 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6749 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6753 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6754 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6755 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6758 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6759 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6760 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6762 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6763 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6765 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6766 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6767 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6768 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6769 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6773 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6774 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6775 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6776 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6777 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6778 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6779 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6781 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6782 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6783 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6784 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6785 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6786 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6788 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6789 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6790 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6791 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6792 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6796 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6797 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6798 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6799 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6800 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6801 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6803 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6804 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6805 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6806 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6807 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6808 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6809 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6811 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6812 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6813 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6814 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6815 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6819 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6820 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6821 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6822 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6823 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6824 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6825 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6826 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6828 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6829 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6830 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6831 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6832 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6833 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6835 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6836 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6837 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6838 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
6839 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6840 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6841 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
6842 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6843 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6844 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6845 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6846 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6847 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6850 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6851 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6852 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6853 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6854 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6856 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6858 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6859 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6860 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6861 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6862 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6866 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6867 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6869 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6870 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6871 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6872 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6873 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6874 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6875 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6877 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6878 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6879 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6881 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6884 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6887 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6889 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6890 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6891 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6892 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6893 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6897 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6898 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6900 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6901 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6902 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6903 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6904 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6906 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6907 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6908 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6909 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6910 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6912 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6915 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6918 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6920 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6921 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6922 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6923 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6924 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6928 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6929 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6931 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6932 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6933 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6934 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6935 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6937 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6938 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6939 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6940 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6941 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6942 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6945 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6946 failure_code: 0x8000,
6949 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6951 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6952 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6953 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6955 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6959 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6960 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6962 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6963 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6964 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6965 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6966 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6968 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6970 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6971 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6972 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6974 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6975 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6976 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6978 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6979 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6980 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6981 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6982 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6983 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6984 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6986 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6990 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6992 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6994 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6995 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6996 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6997 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6998 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7002 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
7003 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
7005 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7006 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7007 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7008 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7009 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7011 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
7013 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
7014 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7015 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
7017 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7018 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7019 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
7021 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7022 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7023 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7024 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7025 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7026 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7027 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
7029 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7033 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
7035 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
7037 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7038 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7039 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
7040 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7041 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7045 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
7046 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
7048 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7049 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7050 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7051 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7052 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7054 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
7055 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7056 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7058 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7059 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7061 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7062 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7063 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
7065 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7067 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
7069 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7070 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7071 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7072 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7073 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7074 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7075 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
7077 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7080 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
7081 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
7083 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7084 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7085 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
7086 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7087 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7091 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
7092 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
7093 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
7095 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7096 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7097 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7098 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7099 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7100 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7102 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
7105 let mut payment_event = {
7106 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7107 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7108 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7109 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7110 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
7112 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7113 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7114 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7115 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7116 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7117 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7118 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7119 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
7120 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
7123 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7124 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7125 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
7126 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7128 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7129 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7130 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
7132 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7133 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7134 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7135 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7136 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7137 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7138 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7140 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7144 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
7146 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7147 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
7148 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7149 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7150 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7152 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
7154 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7155 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7156 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7157 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7158 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7159 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7161 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7167 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7168 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7169 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7170 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7172 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7173 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7174 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7175 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7176 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7177 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7179 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7181 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7182 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7183 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7184 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7186 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7187 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7189 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7190 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
7191 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7192 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7195 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7196 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7197 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7198 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7200 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7201 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7203 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7205 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7206 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7208 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7211 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7212 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7214 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7217 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7218 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7219 if announce_latest {
7220 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7222 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7225 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7226 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7227 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7229 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7230 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7231 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7232 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7233 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7234 let mut first_failed = false;
7235 for event in events {
7237 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7238 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7239 assert!(!first_failed);
7240 first_failed = true;
7242 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7245 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7251 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7252 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7253 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7256 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7257 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7258 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7259 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7260 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7261 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7262 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7264 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7265 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7266 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7267 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7268 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7270 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7272 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7273 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7275 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7276 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7278 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7280 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7281 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7284 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7286 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7287 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7288 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7289 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7290 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7292 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7293 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7294 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7295 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7296 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7297 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7298 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7299 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7300 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7301 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7302 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7304 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7305 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7306 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7307 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7308 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7309 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7311 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7312 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
7313 .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
7314 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7315 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
7316 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
7317 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7320 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7322 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time, 0);
7324 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
7325 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7326 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7327 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7328 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7333 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7334 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7335 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7336 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7340 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7341 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7343 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7344 low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7345 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7346 high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7347 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7348 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7349 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7350 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7351 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7353 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7354 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7355 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7356 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
7359 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7360 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7362 } else { assert!(false) }
7364 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7365 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7366 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7367 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7368 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7369 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0,
7370 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7373 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7374 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7376 } else { assert!(false); }
7378 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7379 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7380 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7381 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7382 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7383 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7385 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7387 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7388 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7389 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7393 } else { panic!(); }
7394 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7396 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7397 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7398 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7399 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7400 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7401 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0,
7402 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7405 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7406 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7408 } else { assert!(false); }
7411 fn do_test_data_loss_protect(reconnect_panicing: bool) {
7412 // When we get a data_loss_protect proving we're behind, we immediately panic as the
7413 // chain::Watch API requirements have been violated (e.g. the user restored from a backup). The
7414 // panic message informs the user they should force-close without broadcasting, which is tested
7415 // if `reconnect_panicing` is not set.
7421 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7422 // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7423 // during signing due to revoked tx
7424 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7425 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7428 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7429 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7430 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7432 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7434 // Cache node A state before any channel update
7435 let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7436 let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7437 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7439 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7440 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7442 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7443 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7445 // Restore node A from previous state
7446 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7447 let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7448 chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7449 tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster { txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())) };
7450 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7451 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7452 monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7454 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7455 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7456 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7457 keys_manager: keys_manager,
7458 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7459 chain_monitor: &monitor,
7461 tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7462 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7466 nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7467 assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7468 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7469 nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7473 if reconnect_panicing {
7474 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7475 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7477 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7479 // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7480 // Check that we sent the warning message when we detected that A has fallen behind,
7481 // and give the possibility for A to recover from the warning.
7482 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7483 let warn_msg = "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned();
7484 assert!(check_warn_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), chan.2).contains(&warn_msg));
7487 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7488 // The node B should not broadcast the transaction to force close the channel!
7489 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
7492 let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7493 // Check A panics upon seeing proof it has fallen behind.
7494 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7495 return; // By this point we should have panic'ed!
7498 nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7499 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7500 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7502 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7503 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7506 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7507 if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7508 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7510 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7511 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel force-closed");
7513 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7516 panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", msg)
7520 // after the warning message sent by B, we should not able to
7521 // use the channel, or reconnect with success to the channel.
7522 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7523 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7524 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7525 let retry_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7527 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &retry_reestablish[0]);
7528 let mut err_msgs_0 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7529 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7530 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7532 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7533 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Failed to find corresponding channel");
7534 err_msgs_0.push(msg.clone());
7536 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7539 panic!("Unexpected event!");
7542 assert_eq!(err_msgs_0.len(), 1);
7543 nodes[1].node.handle_error(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &err_msgs_0[0]);
7544 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7545 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7546 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned() });
7547 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
7552 fn test_data_loss_protect_showing_stale_state_panics() {
7553 do_test_data_loss_protect(true);
7557 fn test_force_close_without_broadcast() {
7558 do_test_data_loss_protect(false);
7562 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7563 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7564 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7565 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7567 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7568 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7569 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7570 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7572 // Create some initial channels
7573 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7575 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7576 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7577 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7578 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7579 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7580 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7581 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7582 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7584 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7585 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7586 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7587 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7588 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7590 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7591 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7592 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7593 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7595 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7596 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7597 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7599 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7600 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7601 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7602 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7603 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7604 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7605 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7606 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7607 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7608 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7610 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7612 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7614 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7615 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7617 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7618 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7619 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7620 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7624 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7625 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7626 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7628 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7629 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7630 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7631 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7633 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7634 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7635 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7638 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7639 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7641 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7642 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7643 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7644 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7645 let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7646 for e in msg_events {
7648 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7649 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7650 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7651 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7652 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7655 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7659 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7660 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7661 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7662 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7663 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7664 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7666 // Reestablish chan_1
7667 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7668 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7669 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7670 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7671 // Reestablish chan_2
7672 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7673 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7674 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7675 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7676 // Reestablish chan_3
7677 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7678 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7679 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7680 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7682 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7683 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7684 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7685 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7686 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7687 for e in msg_events {
7689 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7690 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7691 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7692 // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7694 Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7695 None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7698 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7701 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7702 assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7706 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7707 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7708 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7710 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7711 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7712 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7713 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7715 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7717 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7718 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7719 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7720 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7721 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7723 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7724 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7725 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7726 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7727 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7728 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7730 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7731 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7732 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7733 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7737 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7738 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7740 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7741 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7742 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7743 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7744 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7746 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7750 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7751 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7752 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7753 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7754 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7755 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7756 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7757 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7761 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7762 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7763 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7764 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7766 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7767 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7768 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7769 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7770 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7771 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7772 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7773 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7774 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7775 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7776 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7777 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7778 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7782 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7784 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7785 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7787 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7789 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7790 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7791 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7792 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7793 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7794 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7795 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7796 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7797 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7798 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7799 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7800 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7801 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7805 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7807 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7808 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7812 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7813 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7814 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7816 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7817 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7818 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7819 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7820 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7822 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7823 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7824 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7825 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7826 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7827 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7828 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7829 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7830 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7831 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7832 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7833 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7835 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7836 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7837 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7839 // Revoke local commitment tx
7840 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7842 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7843 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7844 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7845 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7846 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7847 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7848 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7850 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7851 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7852 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7854 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7855 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7856 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7858 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7859 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7860 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7861 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7863 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7864 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7865 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7866 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7867 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7868 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7869 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7870 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7872 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7873 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7879 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7880 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7881 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7883 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7884 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7885 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7886 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7888 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7889 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7890 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7891 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7892 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7893 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7895 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7896 // available, which we check here:
7897 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7898 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7899 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7901 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7902 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7904 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7905 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7906 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7907 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7909 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7910 // output, checked above).
7911 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7912 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7913 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7915 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7916 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7917 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7918 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].weight() as u64;
7919 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7923 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7924 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7925 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7926 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7927 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7929 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7930 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7932 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7933 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7934 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7935 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7936 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7938 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7939 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7945 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7946 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7947 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7948 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7950 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7951 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7953 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7954 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7955 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7956 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7957 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7958 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7959 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7960 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7964 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7965 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7966 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7967 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7969 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7970 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7971 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7972 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7973 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7974 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7975 // up bumped justice generation.
7976 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7979 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7980 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7984 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7985 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7986 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7989 // Provide preimage for one
7990 // Check aggregation
7992 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7993 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7994 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7995 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7997 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7998 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7999 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
8001 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
8002 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
8003 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
8004 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8005 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8007 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
8008 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8009 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8010 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
8011 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8012 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
8014 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
8018 let feerate_timeout;
8019 let feerate_preimage;
8021 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8022 // 9 transactions including:
8023 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
8024 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
8025 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
8027 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
8028 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8029 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
8030 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8031 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
8033 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
8034 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
8036 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output {
8037 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
8038 check_spends!(node_txn[3], remote_txn[0]);
8040 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
8041 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
8043 preimage_bump = node_txn[7].clone();
8044 check_spends!(node_txn[7], remote_txn[0]);
8045 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[7].input[0].previous_output);
8047 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[3]);
8048 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[4]);
8051 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
8052 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8053 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
8054 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].weight() as u64;
8056 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
8057 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8058 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8059 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8063 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
8064 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
8066 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
8067 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
8069 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8070 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8071 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8072 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
8073 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8074 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
8076 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
8077 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
8078 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
8079 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
8080 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
8082 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8083 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8084 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8085 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
8086 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
8091 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8092 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8096 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
8097 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
8098 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
8099 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
8100 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
8101 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
8102 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
8103 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
8105 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8106 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8107 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8108 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8109 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
8111 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8112 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
8114 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
8116 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
8117 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8118 let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
8120 // Must revoke without gaps
8121 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8122 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
8124 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8125 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
8126 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
8128 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
8129 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
8130 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
8131 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8132 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
8136 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
8137 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
8138 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
8140 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8141 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8142 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8143 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8145 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8146 // Lock HTLC in both directions
8147 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8148 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8150 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
8151 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8152 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8154 // Revoke local commitment tx
8155 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8157 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
8158 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
8159 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
8160 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8162 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
8163 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8165 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8167 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8168 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
8169 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8170 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8171 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8172 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8176 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8177 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8178 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8180 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8181 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8182 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8187 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
8188 // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
8189 // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
8190 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8191 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8192 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8193 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8194 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8196 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
8197 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8198 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
8199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8200 let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8202 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8203 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
8204 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
8205 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8206 let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8208 // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
8209 // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
8210 // can get our balance.
8212 // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
8213 // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
8214 // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
8215 let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
8216 route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
8217 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8218 let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8219 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
8221 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
8225 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8226 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8227 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8228 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8229 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8230 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8231 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8233 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8235 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8236 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8237 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8238 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8239 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8241 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8242 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8243 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8244 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8246 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8247 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8248 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8249 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8250 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8252 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8253 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8254 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8256 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8261 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8262 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8263 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8264 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8265 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8267 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8268 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8269 override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8271 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8273 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8274 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8275 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8276 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8280 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8281 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8282 zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8283 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8284 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8285 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8286 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8288 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8289 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8290 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8292 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8293 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8294 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8298 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
8299 // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
8300 // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
8301 // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
8302 // 90% of the `channel_value`.
8303 // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
8305 let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
8306 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8307 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
8308 let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
8309 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8310 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
8311 let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
8312 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8313 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
8314 let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
8315 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8316 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
8318 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8319 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8320 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
8321 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8323 let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
8324 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8325 let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
8326 let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
8327 let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
8329 let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8330 let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8332 // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8333 // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8334 assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_50_percent_msat));
8335 // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8336 // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8337 assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_30_percent_msat));
8339 // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8340 // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
8342 assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_90_percent_msat));
8343 // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8344 // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
8346 assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_90_percent_msat));
8350 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
8351 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8352 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8353 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8354 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8355 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8356 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8358 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8359 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8361 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8363 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8364 // accepting the inbound channel request.
8365 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8367 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8369 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8370 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
8372 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8375 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8376 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8378 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8379 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8380 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8382 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8385 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8387 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8388 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8390 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8392 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
8393 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
8395 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8400 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8401 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8402 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8403 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8404 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8405 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8406 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8408 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8409 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8411 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8413 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8414 // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8415 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8417 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8419 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8420 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8422 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8425 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8426 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8428 match close_msg_ev[0] {
8429 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8430 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8432 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8434 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8438 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
8439 // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
8440 // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
8441 // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
8442 // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
8443 // and the channel should be closed.
8444 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8445 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8446 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8447 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8448 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8449 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8451 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8452 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8453 let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
8455 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8457 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
8458 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8460 // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
8461 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8463 // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
8464 // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
8465 // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
8466 // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
8467 // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
8470 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], lock, temp_channel_id);
8471 let accept_chan_msg = channel.get_accept_channel_message();
8472 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8475 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8477 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8478 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8480 // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
8481 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8483 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8484 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8486 let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
8487 match close_msg_ev[0] {
8488 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
8489 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
8490 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8491 assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
8493 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8496 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8500 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8501 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8502 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8503 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8504 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8505 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8506 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8508 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8509 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8511 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8513 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8514 // accepting the inbound channel request.
8515 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8517 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8519 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8520 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
8521 let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8523 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8524 assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
8526 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8527 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8530 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8533 // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8534 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8535 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8537 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8538 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8539 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8541 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8546 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8547 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8548 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8549 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8550 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8552 let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
8553 let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8555 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8556 assert_eq!(err, "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist");
8558 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8559 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8564 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8565 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8566 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8567 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8568 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8569 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8571 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8572 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8573 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8574 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8576 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8577 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8578 route.paths.push(path);
8579 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8580 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8581 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8582 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8583 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8584 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8585 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8586 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8590 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8591 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8592 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8593 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8594 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8595 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8597 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8600 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
8601 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8602 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8603 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8604 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8605 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8606 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8607 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8609 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8610 // values from previous calls.
8611 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8612 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8613 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8615 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8617 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8618 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8620 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8623 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8628 #[allow(deprecated)]
8629 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8630 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8631 // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8632 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8633 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8634 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8635 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8637 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8639 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8641 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8642 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8643 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8644 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8645 } else { panic!(); }
8647 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8649 header: BlockHeader {
8651 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8652 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8653 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8657 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8658 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8659 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8660 } else { panic!(); }
8662 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8663 // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8664 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8665 block.header.time += 1;
8666 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8667 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8668 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8671 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8672 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8673 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8674 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8675 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8676 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8677 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8679 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8680 // values from previous calls.
8681 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8682 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8683 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8685 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8686 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8687 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8688 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8690 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8695 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8696 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8697 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8698 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8699 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8700 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8702 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8704 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8705 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8706 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8707 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8709 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8710 // resulting events.
8711 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8713 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8714 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8715 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8716 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8717 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8719 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8720 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8721 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8722 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8723 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8725 // We should fail the payment back
8726 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8727 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8728 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8729 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8730 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8732 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8737 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8738 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8739 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8741 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8742 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8743 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8744 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8746 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8747 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8748 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8749 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8751 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8752 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8753 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8754 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8758 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8759 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8760 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8761 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8763 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8764 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8765 // commitment at same time.
8767 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8768 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8769 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8770 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8772 // Create some initial channel
8773 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8774 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8776 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8777 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8779 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8780 let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8782 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8783 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8784 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8785 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8787 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8788 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8789 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8790 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8791 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8792 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8793 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8794 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8797 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8798 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8799 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8800 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8801 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 0));
8802 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8804 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8805 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8806 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8807 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8809 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8810 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8811 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8812 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8813 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8814 if let Err(_) = watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8815 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8816 } else { assert!(false); }
8817 } else { assert!(false); };
8818 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8819 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8820 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8821 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8825 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8826 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8827 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8828 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8829 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8831 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8832 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8833 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8834 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8836 // Create some initial channel
8837 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8838 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8840 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8841 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8843 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8844 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8846 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8847 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8848 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8849 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8850 let watchtower_alice = {
8851 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8852 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8853 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8854 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8855 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8856 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8857 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8858 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8861 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8862 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8863 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8864 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8865 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (block.clone(), 0));
8866 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8868 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8870 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8871 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8875 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8876 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8877 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8878 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8879 let watchtower_bob = {
8880 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8881 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8882 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8883 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8884 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8885 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8886 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8887 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8890 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8891 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8893 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8894 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8896 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8898 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8900 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8901 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8902 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8903 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8904 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8905 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8906 if let Err(_) = watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8907 if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8908 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8909 } else { assert!(false); }
8910 } else { assert!(false); };
8911 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8912 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8914 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8915 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8916 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8918 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8921 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8922 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8923 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8927 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8928 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8929 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8931 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8932 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8933 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8934 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8935 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8936 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8941 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8942 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8943 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8946 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8947 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8949 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8950 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8951 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8952 // before receiving funding_signed.
8953 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8954 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8955 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8956 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8958 // Create an initial channel
8959 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8960 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8961 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8962 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8963 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8965 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8966 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8968 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8969 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8971 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8972 let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8973 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8974 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8975 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8979 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8980 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8981 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8982 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8983 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8984 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8985 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8987 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8988 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8989 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8990 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8992 // Create some initial channels
8993 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8995 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8996 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8997 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8998 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8999 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
9000 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
9002 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
9003 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9004 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
9005 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
9006 // this test before #653 fix.
9007 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
9008 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9009 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9010 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9011 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
9013 let htlc_timeout = {
9014 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9015 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
9016 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9017 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
9021 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9022 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
9023 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
9024 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
9027 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
9028 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
9029 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
9030 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
9032 // Steps of the test:
9033 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
9034 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
9035 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
9036 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
9037 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
9038 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
9039 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
9040 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
9041 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9042 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9043 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9044 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9046 // Create some initial channels
9047 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9048 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9050 // Steps (1) and (2):
9051 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
9052 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
9054 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
9055 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
9056 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9057 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
9058 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
9059 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9060 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
9062 // Steps (3) and (4):
9063 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
9064 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
9065 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
9066 let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
9069 if !broadcast_alice {
9070 force_closing_node = 1;
9071 counterparty_node = 0;
9073 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9074 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
9075 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
9076 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9077 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9078 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
9079 true => alice_txn.clone(),
9080 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
9082 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9083 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9084 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9085 if broadcast_alice {
9086 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9087 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9088 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9090 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
9091 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9095 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
9096 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
9097 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9099 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
9101 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9102 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9103 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9104 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9105 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
9106 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9108 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9109 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
9110 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
9111 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
9112 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9113 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9115 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
9116 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9118 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9121 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
9122 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
9123 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
9124 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9126 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9127 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9128 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
9129 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9130 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9133 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9135 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
9136 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
9137 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9140 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9143 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
9144 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9145 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
9146 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9148 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9149 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9150 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
9151 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9152 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9155 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9157 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
9158 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9160 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
9161 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
9162 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
9163 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
9164 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9165 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9166 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9167 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
9168 if broadcast_alice {
9169 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9170 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9171 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9173 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9174 if broadcast_alice {
9175 // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
9176 // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
9177 // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
9178 // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
9180 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
9181 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
9183 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9184 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9189 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
9190 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
9192 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9193 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9194 // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
9195 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9197 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
9198 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
9199 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
9201 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
9202 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
9203 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
9204 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
9205 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9206 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9207 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9209 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9210 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9216 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
9217 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
9218 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
9219 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
9220 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
9224 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
9225 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
9226 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
9228 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
9229 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
9230 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
9231 // updating logic for the existing channel.
9232 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9233 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9234 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9235 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9237 // Create an initial channel
9238 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9239 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9240 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9241 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9243 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
9244 // that it is rejected.
9245 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9247 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9248 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9250 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9251 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
9252 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
9253 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
9254 // move forward with it.
9255 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9256 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9258 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9262 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9263 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9265 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9266 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9268 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9269 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9271 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9272 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9273 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9274 added_monitors.clear();
9276 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9278 let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9279 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
9281 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9284 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9285 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9286 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9287 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9288 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9290 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9291 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9293 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9294 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9295 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9296 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9297 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9299 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9303 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9304 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9305 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9306 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9307 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9308 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9310 let funding_created = {
9311 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9312 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
9313 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
9314 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
9315 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
9316 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
9317 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9318 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
9320 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9321 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9322 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
9323 // still needs to be cleared here.
9324 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9326 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9328 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9329 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9331 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9332 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9333 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9334 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9335 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9337 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9341 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9342 // everything is functional.
9343 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9345 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9346 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9347 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9348 added_monitors.clear();
9351 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9352 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9353 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9354 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9356 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9357 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9358 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9359 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9363 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9364 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9366 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9367 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9368 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9369 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9370 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9371 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9372 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9374 // Create some initial channels
9375 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9376 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9377 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9379 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9380 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9381 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9383 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9384 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9385 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9387 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9388 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9389 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9390 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9391 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9392 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9393 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9394 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9395 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9397 // A null channel ID should close all channels
9398 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9399 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9401 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9402 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9403 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9405 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9406 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9408 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9411 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9412 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9414 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9416 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9417 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
9418 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
9419 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
9420 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9421 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9423 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
9424 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9425 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9429 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9430 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9432 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9433 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9434 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9435 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9437 // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9438 // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9439 // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9440 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9441 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9442 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9443 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9445 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9446 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9447 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9449 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9451 // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9452 // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9453 // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9455 let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9456 assert!(chan_utils::HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(wit_program.len()).unwrap() ==
9457 chan_utils::HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
9459 let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.clone().into();
9460 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9461 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9462 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9465 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9466 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9467 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9469 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9470 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9472 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9473 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9475 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9476 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9477 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9479 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9480 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9481 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9483 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9484 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9485 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9486 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9487 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9488 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9489 } else { panic!(); }
9490 } else { panic!(); }
9491 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9493 // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9494 // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9495 // as its not 32 bytes long.
9496 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9497 version: 2i32, lock_time: 0,
9498 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9499 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9503 script_sig: Script::new(),
9504 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
9505 witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9507 output: vec![TxOut {
9509 script_pubkey: Script::new(),
9512 check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9513 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9516 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9517 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9518 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9519 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9520 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9521 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9522 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9523 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9524 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9525 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9526 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9527 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9528 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9529 // until we learned about an additional block.
9531 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9532 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9533 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9534 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9535 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9536 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9537 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9539 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9540 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9541 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9542 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9543 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9545 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9546 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9547 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9548 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9549 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9550 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9552 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9553 if !test_height_before_timelock {
9554 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9556 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9557 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9558 if test_height_before_timelock {
9559 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9560 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9561 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9562 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9564 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9565 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9566 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9567 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9568 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9569 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9571 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9572 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9574 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9575 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9576 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9577 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9578 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9579 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9580 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9582 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9583 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9584 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9585 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9586 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9587 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9588 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9589 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9590 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9595 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9596 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9597 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9601 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9602 // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9603 // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9605 // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9607 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9608 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9609 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9610 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9611 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9612 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9613 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9614 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9615 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9617 // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9618 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9619 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9620 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9622 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9623 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9624 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9625 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9626 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9628 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9630 // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9631 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9632 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9633 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9635 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9636 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9637 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9638 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9639 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9641 // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9643 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9645 // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9646 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9647 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9649 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9650 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9651 let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9652 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9653 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9655 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9656 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9657 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9658 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9660 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9661 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9662 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9663 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9664 let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9665 let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9666 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9667 assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9669 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9670 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9671 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9672 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9673 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9674 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9675 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9677 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9678 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9679 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9680 logger: nodes[1].logger,
9684 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9685 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9687 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9688 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9689 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9690 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9692 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9693 // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their channel_ready here since they haven't updated
9694 // the commitment state.
9695 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9697 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9699 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9700 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9701 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9703 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9704 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9705 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9706 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9707 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9708 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9709 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9711 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9712 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9715 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9716 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9717 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9718 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9719 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9721 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9723 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
9724 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
9725 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9727 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9730 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9731 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9732 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9733 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9734 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9735 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9736 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9738 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9739 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9742 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9743 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9744 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9745 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9746 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9747 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9748 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9749 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9750 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9751 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9752 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9755 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9756 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9758 if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9759 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9760 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9762 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9763 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9765 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9766 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9767 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9769 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9770 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9771 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9773 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9774 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
9775 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9776 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9778 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9779 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9780 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9782 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9783 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9784 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9785 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9787 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9789 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9794 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9795 // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9796 // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentReceived` event.
9797 // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9798 // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9799 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9803 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9804 // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9805 // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9806 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9810 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9811 // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9812 // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9813 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9814 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9815 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9816 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9818 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9819 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9820 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9821 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9823 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
9824 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
9825 let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9826 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9827 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9828 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9829 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9830 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9832 let payment_params_opt = Some(payment_params);
9834 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9836 let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9837 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9839 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9840 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9842 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9843 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9844 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9846 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9849 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9850 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9852 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9853 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9854 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9856 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9857 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9859 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9860 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9862 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9863 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9864 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9866 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9867 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9868 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9870 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9871 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9872 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9874 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9875 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9876 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9877 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9879 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9881 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9882 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9883 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9885 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9886 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9888 let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9889 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9890 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9892 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9894 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9895 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9897 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9898 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9899 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9901 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9905 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9906 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9907 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9908 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9909 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9911 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9912 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9913 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9914 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9915 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9916 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9917 final_value_msat: 10000,
9918 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9920 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9921 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9922 let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9924 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9925 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9927 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9928 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9929 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9930 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9931 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9932 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9936 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9937 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9938 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9939 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9940 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9942 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9943 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9944 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
9945 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
9947 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9948 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9949 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9950 final_value_msat: 10000,
9951 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9953 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9954 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9955 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9956 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9957 let route = find_route(
9958 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9959 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9962 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9963 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9964 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9965 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9966 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9967 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9968 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9969 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9970 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9974 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9975 // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentReceived event, the HTLCs
9976 // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9977 // PaymentReceived event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9979 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9980 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9981 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9982 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9984 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9985 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9986 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9987 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9989 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9990 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9991 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9992 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9993 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9994 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9997 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9998 // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentReceived event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9999 // amount of time to respond to.
10001 // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
10002 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
10003 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
10005 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
10007 pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash);
10009 // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
10010 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10011 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
10013 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10014 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10015 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10017 // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
10018 // that PaymentReceived event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
10019 nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10020 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
10021 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10024 fn do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(persist_both_monitors: bool) {
10025 // Test what happens if a node receives an MPP payment, claims it, but crashes before
10026 // persisting the ChannelManager. If `persist_both_monitors` is false, also crash after only
10027 // updating one of the two channels' ChannelMonitors. As a result, on startup, we'll (a) still
10028 // have the PaymentReceived event, (b) have one (or two) channel(s) that goes on chain with the
10029 // HTLC preimage in them, and (c) optionally have one channel that is live off-chain but does
10030 // not have the preimage tied to the still-pending HTLC.
10032 // To get to the correct state, on startup we should propagate the preimage to the
10033 // still-off-chain channel, claiming the HTLC as soon as the peer connects, with the monitor
10034 // receiving the preimage without a state update.
10036 // Further, we should generate a `PaymentClaimed` event to inform the user that the payment was
10037 // definitely claimed.
10038 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10039 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10040 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10042 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
10043 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
10044 let nodes_3_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
10046 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10048 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
10049 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
10050 let chan_id_persisted = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
10051 let chan_id_not_persisted = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
10053 // Create an MPP route for 15k sats, more than the default htlc-max of 10%
10054 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
10055 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
10056 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
10057 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
10058 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
10059 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
10062 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10063 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
10065 // Send the payment through to nodes[3] *without* clearing the PaymentReceived event
10066 let mut send_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10067 assert_eq!(send_events.len(), 2);
10068 do_pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), send_events[0].clone(), true, false, None);
10069 do_pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), send_events[1].clone(), true, false, None);
10071 // Now that we have an MPP payment pending, get the latest encoded copies of nodes[3]'s
10072 // monitors and ChannelManager, for use later, if we don't want to persist both monitors.
10073 let mut original_monitor = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10074 if !persist_both_monitors {
10075 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10076 if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_not_persisted {
10077 assert!(original_monitor.0.is_empty());
10078 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut original_monitor).unwrap();
10083 let mut original_manager = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10084 nodes[3].node.write(&mut original_manager).unwrap();
10086 expect_payment_received!(nodes[3], payment_hash, payment_secret, 15_000_000);
10088 nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10089 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 2);
10090 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[3], payment_hash, 15_000_000);
10092 // Now fetch one of the two updated ChannelMonitors from nodes[3], and restart pretending we
10093 // crashed in between the two persistence calls - using one old ChannelMonitor and one new one,
10094 // with the old ChannelManager.
10095 let mut updated_monitor = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10096 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10097 if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_persisted {
10098 assert!(updated_monitor.0.is_empty());
10099 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut updated_monitor).unwrap();
10102 // If `persist_both_monitors` is set, get the second monitor here as well
10103 if persist_both_monitors {
10104 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10105 if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_not_persisted {
10106 assert!(original_monitor.0.is_empty());
10107 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut original_monitor).unwrap();
10112 // Now restart nodes[3].
10113 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
10114 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[3].keys_manager;
10115 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[3].chain_source), nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[3].logger, node_cfgs[3].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
10116 nodes[3].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
10117 let mut monitors = Vec::new();
10118 for mut monitor_data in [original_monitor, updated_monitor].iter() {
10119 let (_, mut deserialized_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut &monitor_data.0[..], keys_manager).unwrap();
10120 monitors.push(deserialized_monitor);
10123 let config = UserConfig::default();
10124 nodes_3_deserialized = {
10125 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
10126 for monitor in monitors.iter_mut() {
10127 channel_monitors.insert(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
10129 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut &original_manager.0[..], ChannelManagerReadArgs {
10130 default_config: config,
10132 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[3].fee_estimator,
10133 chain_monitor: nodes[3].chain_monitor,
10134 tx_broadcaster: nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
10135 logger: nodes[3].logger,
10139 nodes[3].node = &nodes_3_deserialized;
10141 for monitor in monitors {
10142 // On startup the preimage should have been copied into the non-persisted monitor:
10143 assert!(monitor.get_stored_preimages().contains_key(&payment_hash));
10144 nodes[3].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.clone(), monitor).unwrap();
10146 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 2);
10148 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
10149 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
10151 // During deserialization, we should have closed one channel and broadcast its latest
10152 // commitment transaction. We should also still have the original PaymentReceived event we
10153 // never finished processing.
10154 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10155 assert_eq!(events.len(), if persist_both_monitors { 4 } else { 3 });
10156 if let Event::PaymentReceived { amount_msat: 15_000_000, .. } = events[0] { } else { panic!(); }
10157 if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[1] { } else { panic!(); }
10158 if persist_both_monitors {
10159 if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[2] { } else { panic!(); }
10162 // On restart, we should also get a duplicate PaymentClaimed event as we persisted the
10163 // ChannelManager prior to handling the original one.
10164 if let Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: our_payment_hash, amount_msat: 15_000_000, .. } =
10165 events[if persist_both_monitors { 3 } else { 2 }]
10167 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
10168 } else { panic!(); }
10170 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), if persist_both_monitors { 0 } else { 1 });
10171 if !persist_both_monitors {
10172 // If one of the two channels is still live, reveal the payment preimage over it.
10174 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
10175 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2]);
10176 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
10177 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[3]);
10179 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
10180 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
10181 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10183 nodes[3].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
10185 // Once we call `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` the holding cell is cleared and the HTLC
10186 // claim should fly.
10187 let ds_msgs = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
10189 assert_eq!(ds_msgs.len(), 2);
10190 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } = ds_msgs[1] {} else { panic!(); }
10192 let cs_updates = match ds_msgs[0] {
10193 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
10194 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10195 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
10196 let cs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10197 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[2], nodes[0], nodes[3], Some(1000), false, false);
10198 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10204 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10205 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], cs_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10206 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
10211 fn test_partial_claim_before_restart() {
10212 do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(false);
10213 do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(true);
10216 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
10217 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
10218 enum ExposureEvent {
10219 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
10221 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
10223 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
10224 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
10227 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
10228 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
10231 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
10232 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
10233 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
10234 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
10235 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
10236 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
10237 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
10238 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
10240 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10241 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
10242 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
10243 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10244 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
10245 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10247 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10248 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10249 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
10250 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
10252 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10254 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
10255 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10256 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
10258 let opt_anchors = false;
10260 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
10263 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
10264 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10268 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10269 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10270 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10272 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10273 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10275 let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10276 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10277 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
10279 let dust_buffer_feerate = {
10280 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
10281 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
10282 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
10284 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
10285 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10287 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
10288 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10290 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
10291 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
10294 if dust_outbound_balance {
10295 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10296 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10297 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
10298 for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10299 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10300 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
10303 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10304 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10305 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
10306 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10307 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10311 if dust_outbound_balance {
10312 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10313 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10314 for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
10315 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10316 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
10319 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10320 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10321 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
10322 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10327 let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
10328 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
10329 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
10330 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10331 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10333 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10334 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10335 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
10337 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
10339 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
10340 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
10341 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10342 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10343 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10344 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10345 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
10346 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10347 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10349 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
10350 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10351 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10352 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10354 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
10355 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10357 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
10358 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
10359 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
10361 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10362 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
10364 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10365 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10366 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
10369 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10370 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
10371 added_monitors.clear();
10375 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
10376 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10377 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10378 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10379 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10380 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10381 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10382 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10383 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10384 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
10385 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10386 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10387 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
10391 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
10392 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10393 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10394 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10395 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10397 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10398 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10399 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
10400 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10401 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
10403 let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
10405 let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
10406 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10407 let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: 0x1, witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
10408 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10409 let mut tx = match events[0] {
10410 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
10411 // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 2.
10412 Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: best_height + 3, input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
10413 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10416 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10418 // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
10419 match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
10420 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10421 assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
10426 // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +2 headroom from best block.
10428 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
10429 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());