1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
20 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource};
21 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
22 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
23 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
24 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
25 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
26 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
27 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
28 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
29 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
30 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
32 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
33 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
34 use crate::util::test_utils;
35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
37 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
38 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
40 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
43 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
44 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
45 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
46 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxMerkleNode, TxOut, Witness};
47 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
50 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
55 use crate::prelude::*;
56 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
57 use core::default::Default;
58 use core::iter::repeat;
59 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
60 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
62 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
63 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
66 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
67 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
68 use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
69 let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
70 cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
71 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
72 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
73 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
74 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
76 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
78 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
79 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
80 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
82 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
83 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
85 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
86 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
88 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
89 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
90 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
91 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
92 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
93 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
94 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
95 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
97 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
98 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager", expected_regex, 1);
100 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
102 } else { assert!(false); }
105 use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
107 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
108 insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
109 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
111 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
113 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
115 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
117 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
119 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
121 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
123 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
127 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
128 // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
130 use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
131 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
132 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
133 *node_cfgs[1].override_init_features.borrow_mut() = Some(channelmanager::provided_init_features(&test_default_channel_config()).clear_wumbo());
134 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
135 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
137 match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
138 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
139 assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
145 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
146 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
147 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
148 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
149 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
150 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
151 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
152 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
153 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
154 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
156 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
157 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
158 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
159 let opt_anchors = false;
160 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
161 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
163 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
164 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
165 if !send_from_initiator {
166 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
167 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
169 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
171 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
172 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
173 if send_from_initiator {
174 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
175 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
177 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
179 let sender_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] };
180 let counterparty_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
181 let mut sender_node_per_peer_lock;
182 let mut sender_node_peer_state_lock;
183 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
184 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
185 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
188 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
189 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
190 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
192 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
193 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
194 if send_from_initiator {
195 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
196 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
197 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
198 // well as an additional HTLC.
199 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
201 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
206 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
207 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
208 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
212 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
213 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
214 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
215 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
216 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
217 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
220 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
224 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
225 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
226 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
227 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
228 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
229 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
230 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
231 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
232 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
233 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
235 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
237 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
239 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
241 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
244 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
245 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
247 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
248 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
249 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
250 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
251 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
253 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
256 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
258 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
259 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
260 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
261 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
263 let payment_event = {
264 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
265 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
266 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
268 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
269 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
271 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
272 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
273 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
274 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
275 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
276 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
278 // deliver(1), generate (3):
279 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
280 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
281 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
282 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
284 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
285 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
286 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
287 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
288 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
289 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
290 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
291 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
293 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
294 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
295 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
296 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
297 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
298 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
299 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
300 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
302 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
303 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
304 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
307 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
308 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
309 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
311 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
312 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
314 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
315 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
317 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
318 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
321 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
322 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
326 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
327 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
328 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
329 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
330 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
331 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
332 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
333 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
336 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
338 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
340 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
343 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
344 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
346 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
347 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
348 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
349 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
352 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
355 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
357 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
358 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
359 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
360 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
362 let payment_event = {
363 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
364 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
365 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
367 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
368 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
370 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
371 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
372 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
373 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
374 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
375 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
377 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
378 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
380 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
384 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
385 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
386 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
387 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
388 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
389 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
392 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
393 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
394 // update_fee (never committed) ->
396 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
397 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
398 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
399 // <- (1) RAA delivered
400 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
401 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
402 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
403 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
405 // B should send no response here
406 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
407 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
410 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
413 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
414 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
415 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
417 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
418 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
420 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
421 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
422 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
423 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
424 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
426 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
429 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
430 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
431 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
432 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
433 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
435 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
438 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
439 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
441 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
442 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
443 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
445 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
446 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
447 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
448 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
451 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
453 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
455 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
457 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
458 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
459 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
460 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
461 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
462 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
463 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
464 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
465 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
466 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
467 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
469 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
470 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
471 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
472 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
473 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
475 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
476 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
477 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
480 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
481 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
484 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
485 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
486 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
488 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
489 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
490 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
493 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
494 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
495 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
498 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
499 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
500 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
501 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
504 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
505 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
506 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
507 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
509 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
511 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
514 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
515 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
518 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
519 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
520 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
522 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
523 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
524 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
526 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
527 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
529 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
531 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
532 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
533 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
534 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
536 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
537 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
539 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
540 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
541 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
542 added_monitors.clear();
544 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
546 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
547 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
549 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
550 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
551 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
552 added_monitors.clear();
555 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
556 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
558 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
559 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
561 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
562 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
563 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
564 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
565 expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
569 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
570 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
571 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
572 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
573 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
574 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
575 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
576 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
577 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
578 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
579 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
580 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
581 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
582 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
583 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
584 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
585 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
586 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
587 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
591 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
592 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
593 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
594 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
595 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
596 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
599 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
602 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
603 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
605 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
606 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
607 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
608 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
609 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
611 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
613 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
615 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
616 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
617 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
619 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
620 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
621 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
623 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
624 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
625 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
626 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
628 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
629 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
630 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
634 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
635 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
636 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
637 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
638 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
639 let channel_value = 5000;
641 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000);
642 let channel_id = chan.2;
643 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
644 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
645 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
647 let opt_anchors = false;
649 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
650 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
651 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
653 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
654 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
656 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
657 *feerate_lock = feerate;
659 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
660 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
661 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
663 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
665 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
667 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
669 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
671 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
672 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
673 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
674 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
675 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
676 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
680 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
681 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
684 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
685 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
686 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
688 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
690 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
691 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
692 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
693 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
694 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
695 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
696 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
697 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
698 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
699 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
701 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
702 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
703 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
704 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
705 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
706 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
707 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
708 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
709 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
712 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
713 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
714 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
717 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
718 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
719 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
720 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
721 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
722 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
723 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
725 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
726 opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
727 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
728 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
730 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
732 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
735 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
738 htlc_signatures: res.1
741 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
743 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
746 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
748 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
749 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
750 //Should produce and error.
751 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
752 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
753 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
754 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
755 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
759 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
760 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
761 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
762 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
763 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
764 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
767 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
770 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
773 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
774 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
776 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
777 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
778 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
779 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
780 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
782 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
784 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
785 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
786 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
787 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
789 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
791 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
792 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
794 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
795 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
796 added_monitors.clear();
798 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
799 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
800 // node[1] has nothing to do
802 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
803 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
804 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
806 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
807 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
808 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
809 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
810 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
811 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
812 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
814 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
815 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
816 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
817 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
818 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
819 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
821 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
822 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
823 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
824 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
826 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
827 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
828 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
830 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
831 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
832 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
833 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
835 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
836 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
837 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
839 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
841 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
842 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
844 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => { },
845 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
848 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
850 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
851 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
852 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
853 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
854 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
858 fn test_update_fee() {
859 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
860 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
861 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
862 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
863 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
864 let channel_id = chan.2;
867 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
868 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
869 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
870 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
871 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
872 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
873 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
874 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
875 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
876 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
877 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
880 // Create and deliver (1)...
883 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
884 feerate = *feerate_lock;
885 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
887 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
888 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
890 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
891 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
892 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
893 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
894 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
896 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
898 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
900 // Generate (2) and (3):
901 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
902 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
903 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
906 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
907 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
908 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
910 // Create and deliver (4)...
912 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
913 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
915 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
916 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
917 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
918 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
919 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
920 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
921 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
923 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
926 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
927 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
928 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
930 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
931 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
933 // Handle (3), creating (6):
934 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
935 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
936 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
937 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
940 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
941 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
942 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
944 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
945 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
946 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
947 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
948 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
949 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
950 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
951 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
952 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
955 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
956 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
957 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
958 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
960 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
961 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
962 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
964 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
965 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
966 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
967 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
968 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
972 fn fake_network_test() {
973 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
974 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
975 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
976 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
977 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
978 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
980 // Create some initial channels
981 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
982 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
983 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
985 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
986 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
987 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
988 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
989 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
991 // Send some more payments
992 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
993 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
994 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
996 // Test failure packets
997 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
998 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
1000 // Add a new channel that skips 3
1001 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1003 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1004 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1005 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1006 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1007 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1008 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1009 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1011 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1012 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1013 hops.push(RouteHop {
1014 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1015 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1016 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1017 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1019 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1021 hops.push(RouteHop {
1022 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1023 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1024 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1025 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1027 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1029 hops.push(RouteHop {
1030 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1031 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1032 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1033 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1035 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1037 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1038 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1039 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1041 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1042 hops.push(RouteHop {
1043 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1044 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1045 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1046 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1048 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1050 hops.push(RouteHop {
1051 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1052 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1053 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1054 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1056 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1058 hops.push(RouteHop {
1059 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1060 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1061 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1062 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1064 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1066 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1067 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1068 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1070 // Claim the rebalances...
1071 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1072 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1074 // Close down the channels...
1075 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1076 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1077 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1078 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1079 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1080 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1081 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1082 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1083 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1084 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1085 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1086 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1090 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1091 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1092 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1093 // commitment dance rounds.
1094 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1095 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1096 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1097 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1098 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1099 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1101 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1102 for _ in 0..crate::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1103 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1104 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1105 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1107 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1109 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1110 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1111 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1112 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1114 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1115 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1117 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1119 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1120 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1121 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1122 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs", 1);
1125 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1126 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1128 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1129 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1132 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1133 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1134 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1135 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1137 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1138 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1139 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1140 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1141 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1142 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1145 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1146 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1147 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1149 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1151 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1152 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1153 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1154 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1156 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1157 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1158 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1159 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1161 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1163 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1165 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1166 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1168 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1170 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1171 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1172 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1174 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1175 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1176 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1177 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1178 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1180 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1181 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1183 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1185 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1186 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1187 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1189 &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1190 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1192 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1196 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1197 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1200 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1204 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1205 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1206 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1207 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1208 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1209 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1210 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1212 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1213 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
1214 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1215 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1216 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
1217 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
1219 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1221 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1222 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1224 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1225 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1227 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1228 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1229 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1233 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1234 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1235 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1236 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1237 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1238 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1239 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1240 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1242 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1245 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1247 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1249 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1250 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
1251 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1253 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1254 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1255 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1256 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1258 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1259 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1261 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1262 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1263 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1264 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1265 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1266 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1267 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1270 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1272 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1273 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1274 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1275 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1277 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1278 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 3);
1280 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1281 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
1282 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
1283 let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1284 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1285 (&claim_txn[1], &claim_txn[2])
1287 (&claim_txn[2], &claim_txn[1])
1290 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1291 assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1293 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1294 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1295 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1297 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1298 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1299 check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1300 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1302 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1303 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1306 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1307 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1308 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1309 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1311 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1312 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1313 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1314 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1315 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1316 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1318 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1324 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1325 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1326 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1327 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1328 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1329 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1331 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1332 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1334 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1335 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2));
1336 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1337 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1338 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1340 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
1342 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1343 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1344 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1347 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1349 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1350 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value", 1);
1352 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1356 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1357 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1358 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1359 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1360 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1361 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1363 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1364 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1365 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1366 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1368 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1370 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1371 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1372 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1373 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1376 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1377 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1378 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1379 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1382 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1384 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1385 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1386 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1388 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1390 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1392 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1393 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1394 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1395 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1396 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1397 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1398 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1399 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1400 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1402 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1403 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1404 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1405 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1406 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1408 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1409 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1410 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1411 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1412 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1413 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1414 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1415 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1416 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1419 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1420 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1421 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
1423 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1424 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1425 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1427 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1429 amount_msat: 3460001,
1430 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1432 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1435 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1438 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1439 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1440 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1441 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1442 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1446 local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1447 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1449 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1450 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1452 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1455 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1458 htlc_signatures: res.1
1461 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1462 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1463 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1465 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1466 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1468 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1469 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1471 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1473 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1474 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1475 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1477 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1478 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1479 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1481 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1483 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1484 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1486 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1490 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1491 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1492 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1493 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1494 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1496 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1497 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1498 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1499 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1500 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1501 let opt_anchors = false;
1503 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1504 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1506 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1508 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1510 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1511 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1512 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1515 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1516 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1517 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1518 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1519 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1520 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1524 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1525 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1526 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1527 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1528 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1529 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1530 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1531 let opt_anchors = false;
1533 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1534 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1535 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1536 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1537 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1538 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1539 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1541 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1542 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1543 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1546 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1547 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1548 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1549 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1550 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1551 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1552 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1553 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1554 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1556 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1557 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1558 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1559 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1560 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1563 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1564 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1565 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1566 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1567 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1568 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1569 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1570 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1574 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1575 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1576 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1577 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1578 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1580 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1581 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1582 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1583 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1584 let opt_anchors = false;
1586 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1587 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1588 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1589 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1590 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1591 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1592 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt);
1594 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1595 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1596 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1597 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1598 // commitment transaction fee.
1599 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1601 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1602 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1603 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1606 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1607 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1608 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1609 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1613 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1614 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1615 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1616 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1617 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1618 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1619 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1620 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1621 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1622 let opt_anchors = false;
1624 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1626 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1627 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1628 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1629 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1631 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1632 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1633 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1634 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1635 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1636 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1637 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
1639 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1640 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1641 match msg_events[0] {
1642 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1643 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1645 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1650 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1651 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1652 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1653 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1654 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1655 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1656 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1657 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000);
1659 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1660 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1661 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1662 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1663 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1664 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1666 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1667 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1668 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1669 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1670 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1671 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1673 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1674 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1675 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1676 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1680 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1681 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1682 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1683 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1684 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1685 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1686 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
1689 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1690 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1691 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1692 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1694 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1695 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1696 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1697 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1699 // Add a pending HTLC.
1700 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1701 let payment_event_1 = {
1702 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1703 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1705 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1706 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1707 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1709 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1711 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1712 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1713 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1714 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1715 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1717 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1718 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1719 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1720 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1721 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1722 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1723 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1724 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1727 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1728 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1729 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1730 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1733 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1734 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1735 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1736 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1737 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1738 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1739 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1740 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1744 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1745 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1746 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1747 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1748 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1749 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1750 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1751 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1752 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1753 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1754 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1756 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1757 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1758 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1760 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1761 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1764 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1765 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1769 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1770 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1771 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1772 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1773 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1774 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1775 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1776 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1777 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1778 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001);
1779 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001);
1781 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1782 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1784 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1785 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1787 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1789 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1790 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1791 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1792 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1797 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1798 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1799 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1800 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1802 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1804 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1806 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1807 .with_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1808 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1809 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1810 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1812 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1813 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1814 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1815 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept", 1);
1818 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1819 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1821 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1822 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1823 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1824 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1825 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1826 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1827 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1831 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1832 .with_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1833 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
1834 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1835 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1837 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1838 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1839 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1840 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1841 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1844 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1845 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1846 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1847 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1848 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1851 // adding pending output.
1852 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1853 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1854 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1855 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1856 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1857 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1858 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1859 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1860 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1862 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1863 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1864 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1866 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1867 let payment_event_1 = {
1868 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1869 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1871 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1872 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1873 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1875 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1877 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1878 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1880 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1881 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1882 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1883 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1886 // split the rest to test holding cell
1887 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1888 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1889 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1890 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1892 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1893 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1896 // now see if they go through on both sides
1897 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1898 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1899 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
1900 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1901 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1902 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1904 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1906 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1907 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1908 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1909 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1910 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value", 2);
1913 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1914 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1915 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
1916 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1917 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1918 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1920 // flush the pending htlc
1921 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1922 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1923 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1925 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1926 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1928 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1930 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1931 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1932 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1933 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1935 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1936 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1937 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1939 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1941 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1942 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1943 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1945 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1946 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1948 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1949 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1950 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1951 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1952 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1953 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1955 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1956 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1957 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1958 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1960 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1961 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1963 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1964 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1966 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
1967 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1968 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
1969 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
1970 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
1972 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1973 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1974 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1976 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1979 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1982 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
1983 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1984 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
1985 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
1986 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
1988 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1989 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1990 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1992 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1995 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1998 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1999 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2000 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2002 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
2003 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2004 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2006 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
2007 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2008 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2009 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2010 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2012 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
2013 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2017 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2018 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2019 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2020 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2021 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2022 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2023 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2024 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2026 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2027 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2028 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2029 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2030 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2031 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2032 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
2033 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2035 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2036 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2037 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2038 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2039 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2040 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2041 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2042 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2043 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2044 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2046 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2047 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2048 let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2049 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2050 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2052 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2053 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2055 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2056 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2057 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2058 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2059 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2062 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2063 // initial fulfill/CS.
2064 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2065 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2066 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2067 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2069 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2070 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2071 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2072 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2073 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2074 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2076 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2077 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2078 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2079 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2080 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2082 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2083 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2084 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2085 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2086 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2088 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2089 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2090 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2092 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2093 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2094 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2096 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2097 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2098 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2100 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2101 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2102 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2103 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2104 // on-chain as necessary).
2105 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2106 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2107 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2108 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2109 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2111 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2112 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2113 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2115 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2116 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2118 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2119 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2120 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2122 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2123 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2125 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2126 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2127 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2129 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2131 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2132 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2133 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2136 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2137 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2139 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2141 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2143 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2144 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2145 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2147 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2148 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2150 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2152 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2153 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2155 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2157 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2159 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2162 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2163 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2165 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2166 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2170 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2171 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2172 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2173 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2174 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2175 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2176 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2178 // Create some initial channels
2179 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2180 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2181 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2182 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2184 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2185 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2186 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2187 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2188 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2189 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2191 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2192 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2193 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2194 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2195 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2197 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2198 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2200 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2202 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2203 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2204 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2205 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2206 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2208 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2209 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2210 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2211 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2212 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2214 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2215 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2217 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2218 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2219 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2220 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2221 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2223 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2224 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2225 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2226 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2227 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2228 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2230 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2231 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2232 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2233 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2234 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2236 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2237 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2239 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2240 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2241 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2243 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2244 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2246 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2247 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2248 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2249 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2251 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2257 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2258 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2259 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2260 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2261 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2262 let node2_commitment_txid;
2264 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2265 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2266 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2267 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2269 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2270 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2271 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2273 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2275 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2276 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2277 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2278 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2279 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2281 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2282 // confusing us in the following tests.
2283 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2285 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2286 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2287 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2290 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2291 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2292 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2293 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2294 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2295 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2298 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2301 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2302 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2304 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2308 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2310 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2311 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2312 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2318 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2320 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2321 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2323 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2324 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2325 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2326 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2327 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2330 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2333 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2334 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2336 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2338 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2339 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2341 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2342 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2343 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2345 nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2346 nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2347 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2348 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2350 assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2351 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
2352 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2353 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2357 fn test_justice_tx() {
2358 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2359 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2360 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2361 alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2362 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2363 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2364 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2365 bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2366 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2367 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2368 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2369 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2370 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2371 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2372 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2373 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2374 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen;
2375 // Create some new channels:
2376 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2378 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2379 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2380 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2381 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2382 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2383 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2384 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2385 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2386 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2387 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2388 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2389 // Revoke the old state
2390 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2393 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2395 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2396 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2397 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2399 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2400 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2402 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2403 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2404 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2406 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2407 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2408 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2409 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2410 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2411 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2412 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2413 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2414 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2416 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2418 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2419 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2421 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2422 // Create some new channels:
2423 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2425 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2429 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2430 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2431 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2432 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2433 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2434 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2435 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2436 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2437 // Revoke the old state
2438 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2440 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2442 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2443 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2444 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2446 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2447 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2449 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2450 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2452 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2453 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2454 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2455 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2456 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2457 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2458 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2460 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2461 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2462 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2466 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2467 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2468 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2469 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2470 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2471 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2472 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2473 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2474 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2475 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2476 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2477 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2478 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2479 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2480 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2482 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2483 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2484 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2485 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2486 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2487 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output
2489 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2491 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2492 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2493 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2494 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2495 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2499 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2500 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2501 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2502 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2503 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2504 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2505 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2507 // Create some new channel:
2508 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2510 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2511 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2512 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2513 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2514 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2516 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2517 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2518 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2519 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2520 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2521 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2522 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2523 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2524 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2526 //Revoke the old state
2527 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2530 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2531 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2532 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2533 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2534 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2535 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2536 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2537 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2539 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2540 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2542 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2543 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2545 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2546 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2547 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2548 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2549 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2550 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2551 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2552 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2554 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2555 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2556 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2557 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2558 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2560 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2561 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2562 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2566 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2567 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2568 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2569 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2570 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2571 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2572 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2574 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2576 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2577 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2578 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2579 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2580 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2581 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2583 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2584 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2586 //Revoke the old state
2587 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2590 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2591 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2592 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2593 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2594 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2595 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2596 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2597 match events.last().unwrap() {
2598 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2599 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2602 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2603 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2605 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2606 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7);
2608 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2609 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2610 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2611 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2612 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2613 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2614 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2616 // Justice transactions are indices 2-3-4
2617 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2618 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2619 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2621 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2622 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2623 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2625 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2626 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2627 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2628 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2629 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2630 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2631 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2632 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2634 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2635 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2636 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2637 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[3]);
2638 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[4]);
2639 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2640 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2642 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2643 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2644 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2648 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2649 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2650 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2651 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2652 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2653 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2654 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2655 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2656 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2658 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2659 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2660 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2661 // PaymentSent event).
2663 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2664 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2665 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2666 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2668 // Create some initial channels
2669 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2670 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2672 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2673 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2674 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2675 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2676 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2678 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2679 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2680 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2682 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2683 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2685 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2686 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2687 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2688 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2689 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2690 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2691 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2692 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2693 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2694 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2695 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2696 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2697 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2698 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2699 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2701 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2702 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2703 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2704 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2705 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2706 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2707 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2708 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2709 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2710 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2711 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2712 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2713 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2714 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2716 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2717 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2718 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
2719 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2721 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2722 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2723 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2724 added_monitors.clear();
2726 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2727 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2728 match forwarded_events[0] {
2729 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2730 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2732 let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2733 match forwarded_events[1] {
2734 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
2735 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2736 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2737 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2738 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2739 assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2743 match forwarded_events[2] {
2744 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
2745 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2746 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2747 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2748 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2749 assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2753 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2755 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2756 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2757 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2758 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2759 added_monitors.clear();
2761 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2763 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2764 let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2766 match nodes_2_event {
2767 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2768 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2771 match nodes_0_event {
2772 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2773 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2774 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2775 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2776 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2777 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2779 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2782 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
2784 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2785 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2788 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2789 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => { {
2790 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2791 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2792 // Node[1]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2793 // Node[0]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2794 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx);
2795 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2796 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2797 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2799 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2800 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2801 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2802 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2804 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2805 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2806 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2807 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2812 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2813 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0]);
2815 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2816 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2817 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2818 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2819 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2820 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2821 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2822 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2823 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2824 assert!(node_txn.len() == 1 || node_txn.len() == 3); // HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn
2825 let commitment_spend =
2826 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2829 // Certain `ConnectStyle`s will cause RBF bumps of the previous HTLC transaction to be broadcast.
2830 // FullBlockViaListen
2831 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2832 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2833 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2834 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2837 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2838 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2839 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2844 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2845 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2846 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2847 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2848 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1);
2849 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2850 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2851 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2853 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2854 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2855 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2856 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2857 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2858 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2859 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2860 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2861 let mut first_claimed = false;
2862 for event in events {
2864 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2865 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2866 assert!(!first_claimed);
2867 first_claimed = true;
2869 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2870 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2873 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2874 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2875 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2878 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2881 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2882 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2883 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2884 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2885 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2886 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2888 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2890 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2891 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2892 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2893 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2894 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2895 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2896 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2898 // Create some intial channels
2899 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2900 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2902 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2903 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2904 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2906 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2908 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2909 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2910 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2911 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2912 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2913 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
2914 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2916 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2917 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2919 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2920 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2921 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2922 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2923 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2924 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2926 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2928 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2929 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2930 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2931 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2932 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2933 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2935 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2936 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2937 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2938 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2939 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2942 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2943 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2945 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2946 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2948 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2949 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2950 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2951 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2953 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2957 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2958 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2959 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2961 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2963 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
2964 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2965 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2966 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2968 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2969 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2970 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2971 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2972 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2973 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2975 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2978 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2979 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2980 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2982 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2983 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2985 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2986 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2987 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2988 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // 1 timeout tx
2989 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2990 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2991 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2995 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2996 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2997 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2998 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3002 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3003 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3004 // and fail backward accordingly.
3006 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3007 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3008 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3009 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3011 // Create some initial channels
3012 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3013 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3015 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3016 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3017 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3018 // Revoke the old state
3019 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3021 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3023 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3024 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3025 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3026 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3027 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3029 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3030 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3031 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3032 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3034 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3035 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3036 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3037 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3038 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3039 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3041 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3042 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3043 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3045 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3049 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3050 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3051 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3052 // commitment transaction anymore.
3053 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3054 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3055 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3056 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3057 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3058 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3060 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3061 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3062 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3063 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3064 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3065 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3066 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3067 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3068 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3070 // Create some initial channels
3071 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3072 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3074 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3075 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3076 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3077 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3078 // Revoke the old state
3079 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3081 let value = if use_dust {
3082 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3083 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3084 nodes[2].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
3085 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3088 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3089 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3090 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3092 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3093 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3094 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3095 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3096 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3097 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3098 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3099 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3100 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3101 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3102 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3103 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3105 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3106 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3107 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3108 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3109 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3110 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3111 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3112 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3113 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3114 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3115 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3116 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3117 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3118 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3119 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3120 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3122 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3123 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3124 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3125 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3126 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3127 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3128 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3129 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3130 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3131 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3132 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3133 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3134 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3135 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3136 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3137 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3138 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3139 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3141 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3142 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3143 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3144 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3145 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3146 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3150 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3151 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3152 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3154 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3155 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3157 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3158 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3161 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3162 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3164 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3165 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3168 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3169 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3171 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3172 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3173 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3175 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3176 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
3178 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3179 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3182 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3183 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3185 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3188 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3189 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3191 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3194 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3195 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3197 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3198 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3201 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3202 match nodes_2_event {
3203 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3204 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3205 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3206 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3207 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3208 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3210 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3214 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3215 match nodes_2_event {
3216 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3217 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3218 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3220 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3223 let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3224 match nodes_0_event {
3225 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3226 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3227 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3228 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3229 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3230 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3232 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3233 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3234 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3236 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3238 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3239 assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
3241 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref failure, .. } => {
3242 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3243 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3244 // that we should update our routing table for.
3245 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3246 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure { } else { panic!("Unexpected path failure") }
3249 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3252 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3253 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, first_payment_hash);
3255 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3258 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3259 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3261 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3264 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3265 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
3267 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3270 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3271 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3273 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3276 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3277 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, third_payment_hash);
3279 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3282 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3285 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
3287 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3288 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3291 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3292 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3293 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3297 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3298 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3299 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3300 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3301 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3305 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3306 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3307 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3308 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3309 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3313 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3314 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3315 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3316 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3317 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3318 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
3320 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3322 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3323 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3324 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3326 let payment_event = {
3327 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3328 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3329 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3331 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3332 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3335 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3336 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3338 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3339 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3341 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3344 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3346 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3348 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3349 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3350 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3351 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3352 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3353 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3355 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3356 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3362 onion_routing_packet,
3364 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3366 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3367 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3368 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3370 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3371 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3373 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3376 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3377 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3379 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3382 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3383 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3385 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3387 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3388 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3392 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3393 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3394 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3395 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3396 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3397 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3398 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3399 if *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
3400 // We rely on the ability to connect a block redundantly, which isn't allowed via
3401 // `chain::Listen`, so we never run the test if we randomly get assigned that
3405 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3407 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3408 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3409 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3410 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3411 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3412 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3414 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3415 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3416 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3418 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3419 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3420 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3421 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3422 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3424 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3425 // registering new transactions
3426 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3430 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3431 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3432 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3433 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3434 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3435 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3436 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3437 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3439 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3441 let mut payment_event = {
3442 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3443 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3445 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3446 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3447 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3450 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3451 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3453 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3455 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3456 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3457 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3458 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3460 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3461 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3462 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3463 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3464 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3466 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3467 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3468 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3470 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3471 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3472 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3473 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3475 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3476 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3477 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3478 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3479 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3483 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3485 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3486 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3487 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3488 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3490 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3492 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3493 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3495 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3496 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3497 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3498 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3499 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3500 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3501 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3503 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3507 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3508 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3509 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3510 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3511 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3513 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3514 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3515 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3516 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3517 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3519 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3521 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3522 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3523 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3524 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3525 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3526 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3528 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3529 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3531 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3532 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3536 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3537 // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3538 // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3539 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3540 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3541 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3542 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3544 // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3545 // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3546 let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3547 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3548 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
3549 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3550 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
3552 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3553 assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3555 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3557 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3558 assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3560 // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3561 // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3564 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3567 // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3568 // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3569 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3570 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3572 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3573 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3577 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3578 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3579 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3580 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3581 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3582 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3583 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3584 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3586 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3587 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3588 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3590 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3591 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3592 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3593 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3595 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3596 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3597 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3599 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3600 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3601 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3602 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3604 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3605 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3607 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3608 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3610 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3612 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3613 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
3615 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3616 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3617 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3619 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3622 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3623 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3626 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3627 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3628 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3630 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3633 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3634 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3636 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3640 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3641 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3644 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3645 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3646 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3647 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3648 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3649 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3651 let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3652 let channel_id = if messages_delivered == 0 {
3653 let (channel_ready, chan_id, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
3654 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3655 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3656 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3657 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3660 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2
3663 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3665 let payment_event = {
3666 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3667 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3669 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3670 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3671 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3673 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3675 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3676 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3678 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3679 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3680 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3681 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3682 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3684 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3685 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3686 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3687 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3689 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3690 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3691 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3692 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3693 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3695 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3696 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3697 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3698 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3705 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3706 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3707 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3708 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3709 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3710 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3712 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3713 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3714 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3716 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3717 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3719 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3720 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3721 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3722 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3723 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3724 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3725 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3726 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3727 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3728 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3729 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3730 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3731 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3732 // Everything was delivered...
3733 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3736 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3737 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3738 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3740 Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3741 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3744 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3745 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3748 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3750 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3751 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3755 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3756 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3757 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3759 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3761 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3762 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3764 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
3765 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3766 assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3767 assert_eq!(receiver_node_id.unwrap(), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3768 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(channel_id));
3770 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3771 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3772 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3774 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3777 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3780 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3781 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3782 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3784 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3785 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3786 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3787 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3788 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3789 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3790 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3791 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3792 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3793 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3794 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3796 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3799 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3800 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3802 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3803 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3805 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3806 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3807 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3809 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3812 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3813 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3814 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3815 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3817 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3818 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3819 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3820 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3822 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3823 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3824 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3825 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3826 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3828 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3829 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3830 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3831 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3838 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3839 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3840 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3841 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3842 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3843 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3845 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3847 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3848 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3849 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3850 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3851 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3852 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3853 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3854 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3855 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3856 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3857 // Everything was delivered...
3858 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3861 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3862 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3864 if messages_delivered <= 5 {
3865 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3866 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3868 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3870 if messages_delivered > 2 {
3871 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3874 // Channel should still work fine...
3875 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3876 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3877 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3881 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3882 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3883 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3884 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3885 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3889 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3890 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3891 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3892 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3893 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3897 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
3898 // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
3899 // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
3900 // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
3901 // channel_ready immediately instead.
3902 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3903 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3904 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3905 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3906 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
3908 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
3910 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3911 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
3912 let block_txn = [funding_tx];
3913 let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
3914 let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
3915 nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
3917 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
3918 let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3919 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3923 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3924 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3925 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3926 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3927 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3928 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3929 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3930 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3932 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3934 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3935 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3936 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
3937 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3939 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3940 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3942 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3943 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3946 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3947 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3948 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3950 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3951 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3953 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3954 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3955 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3956 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3957 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3958 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3959 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3961 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3962 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3963 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3965 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3966 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3967 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3969 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3972 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3973 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3974 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3975 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3977 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3980 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3981 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3983 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
3984 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3985 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3986 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
3987 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3988 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3990 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3991 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3992 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3993 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3995 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
3996 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
3998 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
3999 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4001 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4003 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4004 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4005 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4006 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4007 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4008 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4009 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4010 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4011 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4012 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4014 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4015 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4016 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4017 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4018 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4019 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4020 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4021 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4023 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4024 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4025 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4026 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4027 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4028 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4029 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4030 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4032 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4033 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4034 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4035 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4037 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4038 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4039 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4040 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4042 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4043 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4044 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4046 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4048 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4049 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4051 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4052 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4054 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4055 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4056 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4058 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4061 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4064 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4065 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4066 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4068 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4069 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4072 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4073 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4074 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4075 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4076 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4077 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4078 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4080 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4082 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4083 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4084 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4085 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4086 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4087 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4088 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4089 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4090 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4091 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4092 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4093 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4094 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentClaimable event(s).
4095 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4098 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4101 let mut block = Block {
4102 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4105 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4106 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4107 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4108 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4109 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4110 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4111 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4114 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4116 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4117 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4118 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4119 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4120 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4121 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4123 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4124 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4125 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4126 let mut expected_failure_data = (100_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4127 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&(block_count - 1).to_be_bytes());
4128 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4132 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4133 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4134 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4137 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4138 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4139 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4140 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4141 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4142 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4143 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4144 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4146 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4147 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4148 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4149 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4151 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4152 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4154 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4156 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4157 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4159 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4160 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4161 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4162 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4165 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4166 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4167 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4168 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4170 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4172 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4173 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4174 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4175 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4178 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4179 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4180 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4181 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4182 match fail_commit[0] {
4183 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4184 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4185 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4187 _ => unreachable!(),
4189 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4191 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4196 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4197 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4198 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4201 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4202 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4204 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4205 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4206 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4207 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4208 for event in events.drain(..) {
4210 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4211 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4212 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4213 all_outputs.push(outp);
4216 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4219 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4220 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4230 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4231 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4232 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4233 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4234 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4235 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4237 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4238 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4239 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4240 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4241 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4242 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4243 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4244 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4245 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4247 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4248 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4250 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4251 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4252 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4253 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4254 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4258 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4259 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4260 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4261 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4262 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4263 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4264 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4266 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4267 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4268 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4269 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4270 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4272 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4273 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4274 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4275 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4277 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4278 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4280 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4281 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4283 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4284 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4285 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4289 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4290 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4291 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4293 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4294 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4295 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4296 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4298 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
4299 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4300 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4301 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4302 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4304 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4305 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4306 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4307 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4308 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4310 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4311 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4312 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4314 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4315 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4316 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4317 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4318 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4322 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4323 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4324 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4325 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4326 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4328 // Create some initial channels
4329 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4331 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4333 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4334 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4335 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4337 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4338 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4339 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4341 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4342 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4343 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4345 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4346 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4349 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4350 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4353 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4354 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4355 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4356 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4357 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4359 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4360 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4361 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4363 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4364 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4365 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4369 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4370 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4371 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4372 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4373 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4375 // Create some initial channels
4376 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4378 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4379 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4381 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4383 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4384 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4385 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4387 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4388 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4389 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4390 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4392 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4393 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4395 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4397 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4398 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4399 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4400 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4401 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4403 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4404 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4405 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4406 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4408 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4409 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4410 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4411 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4412 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4416 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4417 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4418 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4419 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4420 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4422 // Create some initial channels
4423 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4425 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4426 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4427 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4428 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4430 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4432 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4433 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4434 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4435 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4437 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4438 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4439 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4440 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4442 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4443 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4445 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4446 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4447 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4451 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4452 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4453 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4454 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4455 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4456 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4458 // Create some initial channels
4459 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4461 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4462 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4463 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4464 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4466 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4468 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4469 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4470 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4472 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4473 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4475 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4476 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4477 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4478 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4479 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4480 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4482 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4483 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4484 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4485 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4486 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4487 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4489 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4490 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs
4491 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4492 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4493 // transactions next...
4494 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4495 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4497 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4498 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4499 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4500 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4502 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4503 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4506 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4507 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4509 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4510 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4511 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4512 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4513 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4517 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4518 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4519 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4520 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4521 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4522 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4524 // Create some initial channels
4525 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4527 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4528 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4529 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4530 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4532 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4533 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4535 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4537 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4538 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4539 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4540 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4541 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4542 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4544 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4545 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4546 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4547 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4549 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4550 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4551 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4553 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4554 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4555 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4556 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4557 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4558 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4560 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4561 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success
4563 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4564 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4565 // transactions next...
4566 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4567 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4568 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4569 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4571 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4572 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4575 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4576 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4578 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4579 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4581 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4582 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4584 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4585 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4586 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4587 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4588 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4589 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4590 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4591 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4595 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4596 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4597 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4598 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4599 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4601 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4604 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4605 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4606 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4607 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4609 // Create some initial channels
4610 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4611 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4613 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4614 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4615 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4616 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4617 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4619 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4620 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4621 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4623 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4624 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4625 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4626 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4627 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4628 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4629 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4630 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4631 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4632 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4633 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4635 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4636 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4637 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4638 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4640 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4641 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 1);
4642 check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4643 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4644 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4645 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4647 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4648 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
4649 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), c_txn[0].clone()]});
4650 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4651 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4652 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4654 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4655 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4658 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
4659 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4660 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4661 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4662 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4663 assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
4665 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4667 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4668 let mut msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4669 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4670 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4671 let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4673 match nodes_2_event {
4674 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4675 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4678 match nodes_0_event {
4679 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4680 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4681 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4682 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4683 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4684 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4686 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4689 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
4690 match msg_events[0] {
4691 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4692 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4695 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4696 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4697 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4698 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4699 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4700 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx
4701 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4702 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4703 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4704 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4705 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1); // Success tx
4707 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4708 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4712 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4713 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4714 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4715 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4716 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4717 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4718 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4719 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4720 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4721 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4722 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4723 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
4724 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4725 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4727 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4728 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4729 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4731 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4732 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4733 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4734 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4735 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
4737 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
4739 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
4740 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
4741 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
4742 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
4743 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40)
4744 .with_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features());
4745 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 800_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
4746 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 800_000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
4748 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4749 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4750 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
4752 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
4753 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4754 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4755 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4756 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4758 let htlc_timeout_tx;
4759 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
4760 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4761 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3
4762 assert!(node_txn.len() == 2 || node_txn.len() == 3);
4764 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4765 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4766 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4768 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4769 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4770 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4771 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
4772 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4774 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4775 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4776 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
4777 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
4779 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4780 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4781 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
4782 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4785 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4786 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4787 // Assign htlc_timeout_tx to the forwarded HTLC (with value ~800 sats). The received HTLC
4788 // (with value 900 sats) will be claimed in the below `claim_funds` call.
4789 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4790 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4791 htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[2].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[2].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
4793 htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[0].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[1].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
4797 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
4798 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
4800 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
4801 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
4802 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4803 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4805 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4806 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4809 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4810 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4812 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4813 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
4814 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4815 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4816 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4817 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4818 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4819 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4820 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4821 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
4823 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
4824 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4825 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4826 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4827 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4828 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4829 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
4830 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4831 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4832 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4834 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4835 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4837 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
4839 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
4841 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
4842 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[1]);
4843 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196), true, true);
4844 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4845 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4846 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4847 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4848 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
4849 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4850 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4852 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4853 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
4855 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4857 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4858 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
4859 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
4861 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4866 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
4867 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4868 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4869 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4870 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4872 // Create some initial channels
4873 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4875 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
4876 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4877 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
4878 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4879 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4881 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
4882 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4883 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
4884 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4886 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
4887 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4888 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4889 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4891 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4892 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4895 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4896 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4899 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4900 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4901 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4902 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4903 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
4907 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
4908 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4910 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
4911 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4912 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4913 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4914 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
4915 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4918 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
4919 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
4920 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
4921 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
4922 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
4923 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
4924 // use the same payment hashes.
4925 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
4930 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
4931 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
4932 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
4933 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4934 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4935 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4936 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4937 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
4938 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4939 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4941 let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
4942 let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4943 let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4944 let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4945 let chan_3_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
4947 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
4948 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
4949 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
4950 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
4952 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
4953 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
4955 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4957 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4958 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
4960 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4962 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4964 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4966 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4967 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
4969 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
4971 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
4974 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4976 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
4977 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4980 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4982 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
4983 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
4985 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
4986 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
4987 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
4988 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
4989 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
4991 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
4992 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
4993 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
4994 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
4995 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
4996 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
4997 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
4999 let failed_destinations = vec![
5000 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
5001 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
5002 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
5003 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5005 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5006 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5008 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5009 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5010 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5011 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5012 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5013 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5015 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5016 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5017 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5018 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5020 let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5021 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5022 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5024 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5025 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5027 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5028 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5029 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5030 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5032 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5034 // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5035 let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5036 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5037 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5038 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5039 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5040 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5041 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5043 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5044 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5045 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5046 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5047 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5048 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5049 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5050 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5051 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5052 if deliver_last_raa {
5053 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5055 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5058 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5059 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5060 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5061 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5063 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5064 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5065 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5067 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5068 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5069 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5071 if announce_latest {
5072 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5074 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5076 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5077 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5078 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5079 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5081 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5082 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5085 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5086 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5089 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5090 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5091 if deliver_last_raa {
5092 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5094 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5095 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5097 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5098 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5100 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5103 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5107 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5108 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5109 let mut a_done = false;
5110 for msg in cs_msgs {
5112 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5113 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5114 // should be failed-backwards here.
5115 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5116 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5117 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5118 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5120 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5125 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5126 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5127 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5129 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5130 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5133 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5134 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5135 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5136 if announce_latest {
5137 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5138 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5139 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5142 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5144 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5148 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5149 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 10 } else { 6 });
5150 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5151 let mut as_updates = 0;
5152 for event in as_events.iter() {
5153 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5154 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5155 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5156 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5158 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5160 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5163 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5164 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5166 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5167 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5168 if announce_latest {
5169 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5170 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5172 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5174 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5175 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 8 } else { 6 });
5176 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5177 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5178 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5179 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5180 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5181 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5182 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5184 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5186 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5189 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5190 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5192 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5193 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5194 if announce_latest {
5195 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5197 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5199 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5200 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5201 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5202 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5203 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5204 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5208 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5209 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5213 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5214 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5218 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5219 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5220 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5221 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5225 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5226 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5227 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5228 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5229 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5231 // Create some initial channels
5232 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5234 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5235 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5236 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5237 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5239 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5240 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5241 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5242 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5243 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5244 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5246 let htlc_timeout = {
5247 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5248 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5249 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5250 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5251 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5255 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5256 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5257 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5259 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5260 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5261 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5262 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5263 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5264 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5265 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5266 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5267 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5268 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5269 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5273 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5274 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with a key
5275 // manager rotation to test that `channel_keys_id` returned in
5276 // [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] let us re-derive the channel key set to
5277 // then derive a `delayed_payment_key`.
5279 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5281 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5282 let seed = [42; 32];
5283 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5284 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5285 let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger));
5286 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
5287 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &scorer);
5288 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, router, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, override_init_features: alloc::rc::Rc::new(core::cell::RefCell::new(None)) };
5289 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5290 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5291 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5293 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5294 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5296 // Create some initial channels
5297 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5299 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5300 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5301 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5303 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5304 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5305 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5306 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5307 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5309 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5310 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5311 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5312 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5313 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5315 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5316 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5317 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5318 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5319 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5320 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5321 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5322 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5325 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5326 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5327 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5328 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5329 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5330 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5332 let htlc_timeout = {
5333 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5334 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5335 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5336 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5337 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5341 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5342 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5343 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5345 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5346 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5347 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5348 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5349 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5350 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5351 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5352 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5353 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5354 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5355 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5356 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5360 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5361 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5362 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5363 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5364 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5366 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5368 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5369 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5371 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5372 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5373 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5375 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5376 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5377 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5379 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5380 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5381 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5383 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5384 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5385 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5388 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5389 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5390 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5391 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5392 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5393 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5395 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5397 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5398 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5399 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5401 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5403 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5404 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5405 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5407 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5408 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5409 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5410 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5411 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5413 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5414 let mut block = Block {
5415 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5418 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5419 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5420 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5422 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5423 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5424 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5425 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5428 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5429 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5430 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5431 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5432 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5433 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5435 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5436 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5437 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5439 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5441 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5442 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5443 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5445 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5446 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5448 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5449 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5450 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5452 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5453 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5454 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5455 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5458 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5459 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5460 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5461 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5462 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5463 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5465 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5466 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5467 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5468 // actually revoked.
5469 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5470 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5471 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5472 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5475 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5476 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5477 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5478 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5479 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5480 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5482 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5483 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5484 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5486 if check_revoke_no_close {
5487 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5488 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5491 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5492 let mut block = Block {
5493 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5496 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5497 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5498 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5500 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5501 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5502 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5503 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5504 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5506 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5510 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5511 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5512 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5513 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5514 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5515 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5516 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5518 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5519 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5520 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5522 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5523 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5524 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5526 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5527 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5531 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5532 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5533 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5534 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5535 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5540 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5541 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5542 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5543 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5544 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5545 // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5546 for node in nodes.iter() {
5547 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5550 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5551 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5552 let push_msat=10001;
5553 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5554 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5555 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5556 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5558 // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5559 // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5560 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5564 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5565 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5566 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5567 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5568 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5570 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5571 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5572 let push_msat=10001;
5573 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5575 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5576 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5577 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5578 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5579 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5581 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5582 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5583 let push_msat=10001;
5584 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5585 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5586 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5588 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5589 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5590 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5592 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5593 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5594 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5596 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5597 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5598 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5600 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5601 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5602 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5603 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5604 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5605 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5609 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5610 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5611 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5612 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5613 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5615 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5616 let push_msat=10001;
5617 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5618 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5619 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5620 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5622 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5623 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5624 let err_msg = match events[0] {
5625 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5628 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5630 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5633 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5634 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5635 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5636 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5638 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5639 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5640 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5641 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5642 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5643 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5645 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5646 // pending_update_fee.
5648 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5649 *feerate_lock += 20;
5651 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5652 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5654 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5655 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5656 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5657 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5658 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5660 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5663 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5665 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5666 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5667 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5668 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5670 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5671 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
5672 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5674 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5675 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5676 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5677 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5679 // Flush the pending fee update.
5680 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5681 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5682 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5683 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5684 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5686 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5687 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5688 // us to surface its failure to the user.
5689 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5690 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5691 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5692 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5693 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5694 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5696 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5697 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5698 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5700 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5701 assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5702 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5703 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5704 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
5706 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5709 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5710 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5712 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5716 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5717 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5718 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5720 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5721 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5722 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5723 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5724 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5725 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5727 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5728 // pending_update_fee.
5730 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5731 *feerate_lock += 200;
5733 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5734 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5736 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5737 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5738 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5739 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5740 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5742 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5745 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5747 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5748 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5749 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5750 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5752 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5754 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
5755 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
5756 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
5758 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
5759 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
5760 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5761 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
5762 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5763 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
5764 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5765 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
5767 // Flush the pending fee update.
5768 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5769 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5770 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5771 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
5772 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5773 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
5775 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
5776 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
5777 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
5778 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5779 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5780 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5781 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5782 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5783 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5785 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
5786 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5787 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5789 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5790 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5791 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5792 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5793 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
5795 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5798 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5799 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5801 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5804 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
5805 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
5806 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5807 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
5808 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
5810 let raa = match send_raa_event {
5811 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
5812 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5814 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5815 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5816 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5817 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5818 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5819 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5821 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5822 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5824 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5825 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5826 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5828 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => {},
5829 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5831 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5832 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5833 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
5835 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5836 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5837 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
5838 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
5841 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
5842 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
5843 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
5846 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
5847 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5848 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5849 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5850 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5851 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5852 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5853 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5854 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5855 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5856 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
5858 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5859 // pending_update_fee.
5861 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5862 *feerate_lock += 20;
5864 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5865 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5867 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5868 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5869 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5870 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5871 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5873 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5876 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5878 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5879 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5880 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5881 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5883 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5885 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
5886 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
5887 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
5888 let payment_event = {
5889 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5890 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5892 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5893 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5895 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5897 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5898 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5899 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5900 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5902 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_1_2.2);
5903 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5905 // Flush the pending fee update.
5906 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5907 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5908 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5909 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5910 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5911 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5913 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
5914 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5915 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5917 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
5918 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
5921 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5924 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
5925 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5926 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5928 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
5929 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5930 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
5931 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
5932 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5933 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5936 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
5937 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5938 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5940 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
5941 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5942 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
5943 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
5944 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
5945 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
5946 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
5947 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
5948 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5949 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5951 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5954 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
5955 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
5956 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5958 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
5959 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5960 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5961 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5962 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5963 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5964 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5965 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
5966 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
5967 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
5968 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5970 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5971 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
5972 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5975 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
5976 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
5977 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
5980 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
5981 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
5982 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5983 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5984 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5985 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5986 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5988 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5989 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
5991 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
5992 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
5993 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5994 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value", 1);
5998 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
5999 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6000 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6001 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6002 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6003 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6004 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6006 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6007 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6008 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6009 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6011 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6012 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC", 1);
6016 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6017 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6018 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6019 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6020 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6021 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6022 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6024 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6025 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6026 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6027 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6028 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6030 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6031 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6032 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6033 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6034 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6038 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6039 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6040 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6041 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6042 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6043 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6044 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6045 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6047 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6048 .with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
6049 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6050 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6051 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6052 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6056 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6057 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6058 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6059 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6060 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6061 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6062 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6063 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6064 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6065 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6066 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6068 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6069 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6070 let payment_event = {
6071 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6072 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6074 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6075 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6076 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6077 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6081 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6083 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6084 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6085 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6087 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6088 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6090 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6091 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6092 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6094 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6095 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs", 1);
6099 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6100 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6101 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6102 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6103 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6104 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6105 let channel_value = 100000;
6106 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0);
6107 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6109 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6111 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6112 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6114 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6115 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6116 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6118 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6119 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept", 1);
6121 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6124 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6126 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6127 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6128 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6129 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6130 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6131 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6132 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6133 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6135 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6136 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6137 let channel = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6138 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6141 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6142 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6144 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6145 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6146 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6147 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6148 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6149 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6151 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6155 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6156 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6157 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6158 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6159 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6160 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6161 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6163 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6164 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6165 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6166 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6167 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6168 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6170 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6171 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6172 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6174 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6176 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6177 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6178 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6179 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6180 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6182 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6183 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6184 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6185 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6186 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6190 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6191 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6192 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6193 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6194 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6195 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6196 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6197 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6199 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6200 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6201 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6202 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6203 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6204 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6206 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6210 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6211 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6212 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6215 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6216 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6217 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6219 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6220 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6222 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6223 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6224 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6225 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6226 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6230 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6231 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6232 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6233 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6234 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6235 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6236 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6238 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6239 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6240 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6241 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6242 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6243 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6245 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6246 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6247 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6248 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6249 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6253 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6254 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6255 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6256 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6257 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6258 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6260 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6261 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6262 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6263 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6264 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6265 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6266 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6268 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6269 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6270 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6272 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6276 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6277 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6278 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6279 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6280 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6281 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6282 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6283 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6285 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6286 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6287 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6288 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6289 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6290 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6292 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6293 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6294 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6295 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
6296 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6297 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6298 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
6299 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6300 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6301 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6302 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6303 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6304 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6307 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6308 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6309 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6310 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6311 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6313 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6315 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6316 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6317 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6319 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6323 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6324 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6326 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6327 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6328 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6329 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6330 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6331 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6332 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6334 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6335 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6336 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6338 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6341 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6344 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6346 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6347 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6348 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6349 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6350 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6354 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6355 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6357 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6358 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6359 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6360 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6361 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6363 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6364 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6365 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6366 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6367 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6369 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6372 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6375 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6377 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6378 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6379 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6380 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6381 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6385 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6386 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6388 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6389 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6390 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6391 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6392 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6394 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6395 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6396 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6397 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6398 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6399 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6402 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6403 failure_code: 0x8000,
6406 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6408 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6409 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6410 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6411 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6412 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6416 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6417 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6419 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6420 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6421 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6422 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6423 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6425 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6427 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6428 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6429 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6431 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6432 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6433 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6435 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6436 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6437 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6438 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6439 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6440 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6441 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6443 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6447 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6449 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6451 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6452 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6453 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6454 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6455 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6459 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6460 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6462 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6463 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6464 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6465 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6466 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6468 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6470 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6472 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6474 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6475 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6476 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6478 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6479 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6480 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6481 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6482 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6483 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6484 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6486 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6490 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6492 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6494 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6495 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6496 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6497 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6498 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6502 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6503 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6505 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6506 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6507 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6508 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6509 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6511 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6512 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6513 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6515 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6516 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6518 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6519 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6520 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6522 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6524 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6526 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6527 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6528 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6529 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6530 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6531 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6532 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6534 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6537 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6538 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6540 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6541 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6542 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6543 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6544 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6548 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6549 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6550 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6552 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6553 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6554 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6555 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6556 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6557 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000);
6559 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6562 let mut payment_event = {
6563 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6564 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6565 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6566 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6567 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6569 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6570 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6571 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6572 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6573 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6574 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6575 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6576 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6577 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6580 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6581 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6582 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6583 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6585 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6586 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6587 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6589 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6590 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6591 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6592 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6593 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6594 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6595 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6597 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6601 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6603 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6604 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6605 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6606 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6607 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6609 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6611 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6612 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6613 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6614 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6615 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6616 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6618 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6621 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6625 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6626 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6627 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6628 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6629 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6630 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6631 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6633 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6636 let mut payment_event = {
6637 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6638 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6639 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6642 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6643 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6644 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6645 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6646 payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6647 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6650 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
6651 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6652 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6653 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6655 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6656 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6658 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6659 let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
6660 // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
6661 update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
6663 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6664 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6666 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6669 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
6670 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
6671 node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6672 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6673 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6674 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6677 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6678 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6679 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6681 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6684 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6685 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 2);
6687 // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
6688 // the node originating the error to its next hop.
6690 Event::PaymentPathFailed { error_code, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }) }, ..
6692 assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
6693 assert!(is_permanent);
6694 assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
6696 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6699 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6700 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6702 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6705 // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
6708 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6709 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6710 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6711 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6713 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6714 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6715 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6716 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6717 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6718 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6720 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6721 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6723 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6724 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6725 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6726 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6728 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6729 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6731 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6732 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
6733 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6734 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
6735 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6737 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6738 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6739 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6740 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6742 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6743 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6745 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6747 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6748 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6750 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6753 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6754 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6756 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6759 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6760 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6761 if announce_latest {
6762 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6764 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6767 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6768 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6769 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6771 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6772 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6773 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6774 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6775 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
6776 let mut first_failed = false;
6777 for event in events {
6779 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6780 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6781 assert!(!first_failed);
6782 first_failed = true;
6784 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6787 Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {}
6788 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6794 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6795 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6796 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6799 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6800 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6801 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6802 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6803 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6804 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6805 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6807 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6808 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6809 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6810 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6811 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6813 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6814 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6816 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6817 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6819 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6820 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6822 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6824 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6825 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6828 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
6830 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
6831 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
6832 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6833 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6834 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6836 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
6837 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6838 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6839 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6840 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
6841 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6842 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
6843 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6844 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6845 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6846 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6848 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
6849 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6850 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6851 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6852 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6853 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6855 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
6856 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
6857 .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
6858 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6859 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
6860 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
6861 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6864 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6866 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 12);
6868 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
6869 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6870 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6871 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6872 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6877 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
6878 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
6879 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
6880 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
6884 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
6885 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
6887 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6888 low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
6889 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6890 high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
6891 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
6892 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6893 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6894 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
6895 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6897 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
6898 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6899 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
6900 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
6903 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6904 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6906 } else { assert!(false) }
6908 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6909 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6910 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6911 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6912 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6913 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6914 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6917 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6918 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6920 } else { assert!(false); }
6922 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
6923 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6924 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
6925 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6926 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6927 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
6929 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
6931 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
6932 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
6933 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
6937 } else { panic!(); }
6938 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
6940 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6941 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6942 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6943 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6944 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6945 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6946 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6949 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6950 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6952 } else { assert!(false); }
6956 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
6957 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
6958 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
6959 // to B, B should refuse payment.
6961 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6962 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6963 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6964 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6966 // Create some initial channels
6967 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6969 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
6970 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
6971 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV).with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
6972 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
6973 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6974 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
6975 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6976 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6978 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6979 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6980 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
6981 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6982 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6984 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
6985 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
6986 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6987 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
6989 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
6990 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
6991 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6993 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6994 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6995 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6996 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6997 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6998 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6999 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7000 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7001 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7002 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7004 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7006 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7008 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7009 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7011 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7012 let mut expected_failure_data = (10_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7013 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH.to_be_bytes());
7014 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7018 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7019 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7020 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7022 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7023 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7024 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7025 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7027 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7028 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0);
7029 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7032 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7033 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7035 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7036 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7037 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7038 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7039 let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7040 for e in msg_events {
7042 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7043 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7044 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7045 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7046 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7049 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7053 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
7054 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7055 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7056 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
7057 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7058 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7060 // Reestablish chan_1
7061 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7062 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7063 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7064 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7065 // Reestablish chan_2
7066 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7067 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7068 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7069 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7070 // Reestablish chan_3
7071 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7072 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7073 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7074 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7076 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7077 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7078 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7079 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7080 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7081 for e in msg_events {
7083 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7084 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7085 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7086 // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7088 Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7089 None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7092 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7095 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7096 assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7100 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7101 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7102 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7104 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7105 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7106 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7107 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7109 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7111 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7112 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 30)
7113 .with_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features());
7114 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7115 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7117 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7118 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7119 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7120 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7121 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7122 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7124 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7125 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7126 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7127 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7131 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7132 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7134 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7135 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7136 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7137 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7140 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7144 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7145 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor)
7146 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7147 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7148 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7149 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7150 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7151 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7155 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7156 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7157 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7158 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7160 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7161 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7162 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7163 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7164 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7165 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7166 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7167 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7168 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7169 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7170 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7171 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7172 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7176 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7178 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7179 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7181 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7183 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7184 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7185 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7186 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7187 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7188 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7189 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7190 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7191 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7192 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7193 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7194 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7195 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7199 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7201 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7202 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7206 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7207 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7208 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7210 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7211 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7212 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7213 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7214 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7216 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7217 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7218 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
7219 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7220 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7221 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7222 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7223 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7224 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features());
7225 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7226 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7227 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7229 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7230 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7231 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7233 // Revoke local commitment tx
7234 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7236 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7237 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7238 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7239 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7240 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7241 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7242 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7244 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
7245 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
7247 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7248 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7249 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7251 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7252 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7253 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
7254 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7256 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7257 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7258 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7259 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7260 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7261 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
7262 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7263 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7264 match events.last().unwrap() {
7265 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7266 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7272 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7273 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7274 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7276 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7277 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7278 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7279 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7281 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7282 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7283 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7284 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7285 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7286 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7288 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7289 // available, which we check here:
7290 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7291 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7292 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7294 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7295 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7297 // node_txn[3] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7298 // output, checked above).
7299 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 2);
7300 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].output.len(), 1);
7301 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7303 first = node_txn[3].txid();
7304 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7305 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
7306 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight() as u64;
7307 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7311 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7312 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7313 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7314 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7315 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7317 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7318 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7319 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7320 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7322 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7323 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7325 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7326 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7327 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7328 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7329 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7330 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7331 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7332 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7336 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7337 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7338 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7339 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7341 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7342 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7343 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7344 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7345 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7346 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7347 // up bumped justice generation.
7348 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7351 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7352 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7356 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7357 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7358 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7361 // Provide preimage for one
7362 // Check aggregation
7364 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7365 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7366 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7367 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7369 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7370 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7371 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7373 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7374 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7375 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7376 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7377 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7379 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7380 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7381 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7382 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7383 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7384 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7386 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7390 let feerate_timeout;
7391 let feerate_preimage;
7393 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7394 // 3 transactions including:
7395 // preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7396 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7397 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7398 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7399 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7400 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7401 check_spends!(node_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
7402 check_spends!(node_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
7404 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7405 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7406 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7407 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7409 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7410 (node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[1].clone())
7412 (node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone())
7415 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7416 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7417 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7419 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7420 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7421 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
7422 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;
7426 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7427 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7429 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7430 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7432 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7433 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7434 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7435 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7436 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7437 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7439 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7440 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7441 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
7442 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7443 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7445 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7446 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7447 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7448 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7449 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7454 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7455 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7459 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7460 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7461 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7462 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7463 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7464 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7465 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7466 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7468 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7469 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7470 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7471 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7472 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
7474 let per_commitment_secret;
7475 let next_per_commitment_point;
7477 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7478 let mut guard = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7479 let keys = guard.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7481 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7483 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7484 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7485 per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7487 // Must revoke without gaps
7488 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7489 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7491 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7492 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7493 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7496 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7497 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7498 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7499 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7500 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7504 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7505 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7506 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7508 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7509 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7510 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7511 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7513 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7514 // Lock HTLC in both directions
7515 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7516 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7518 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7519 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7520 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7522 // Revoke local commitment tx
7523 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7525 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7526 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7527 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7528 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7530 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7531 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7532 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7533 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7535 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7536 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3
7537 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7538 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7539 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7540 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7544 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7545 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7546 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7548 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7549 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7550 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7555 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
7556 // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
7557 // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
7558 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7559 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7560 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7561 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7562 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
7564 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
7565 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7566 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
7567 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7568 let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7570 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7571 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
7572 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
7573 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7574 let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7576 // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
7577 // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
7578 // can get our balance.
7580 // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
7581 // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
7582 // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
7583 let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
7584 route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
7585 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7586 let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7587 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
7589 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
7593 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7594 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7595 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7596 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7597 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7598 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7599 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7601 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000);
7603 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7604 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7605 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7606 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7607 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7609 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7610 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7611 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7612 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7614 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7615 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7616 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
7617 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7618 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7620 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7621 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7622 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7624 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7629 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7630 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7631 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7632 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7633 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7635 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7636 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7637 override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7639 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7641 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7642 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7643 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
7644 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
7648 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7649 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7650 zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7651 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7652 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7653 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7654 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7656 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7657 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7658 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7660 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7661 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7662 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7666 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
7667 // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
7668 // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
7669 // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
7670 // 90% of the `channel_value`.
7671 // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
7673 let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
7674 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7675 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
7676 let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
7677 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7678 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
7679 let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
7680 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7681 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
7682 let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
7683 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7684 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
7686 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7687 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7688 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
7689 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7691 let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
7692 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7693 let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
7694 let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
7695 let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
7697 let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7698 let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7700 // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7701 // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7702 assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
7703 // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7704 // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7705 assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
7707 // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7708 // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
7710 assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7711 // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7712 // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
7714 assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7718 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
7719 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7720 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7721 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7722 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7723 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7724 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7726 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7727 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7729 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7731 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7732 // accepting the inbound channel request.
7733 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7735 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7737 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7738 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
7740 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7743 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7744 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7746 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7747 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7748 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7750 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7753 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7755 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7756 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7758 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7760 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
7761 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
7763 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7768 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
7769 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7770 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7771 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7772 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7773 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7774 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7776 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7777 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7779 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7781 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7782 // rejecting the inbound channel request.
7783 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7785 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7787 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7788 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7790 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7793 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7794 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7796 match close_msg_ev[0] {
7797 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
7798 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7800 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7802 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7806 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
7807 // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
7808 // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
7809 // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
7810 // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
7811 // and the channel should be closed.
7812 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7813 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7814 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7815 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7816 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7817 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7819 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7820 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7821 let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
7823 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7825 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
7826 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7828 // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
7829 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7831 // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
7832 // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
7833 // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
7834 // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
7835 // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
7836 let accept_chan_msg = {
7837 let mut node_1_per_peer_lock;
7838 let mut node_1_peer_state_lock;
7839 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[0], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
7840 channel.get_accept_channel_message()
7842 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
7844 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
7846 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7847 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7849 // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
7850 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7852 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7853 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7855 let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
7856 match close_msg_ev[0] {
7857 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
7858 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
7859 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7860 assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
7862 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7865 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
7869 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
7870 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7871 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7872 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7873 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7874 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7875 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7877 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7878 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7880 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7882 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7883 // accepting the inbound channel request.
7884 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7886 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7888 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7889 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
7890 let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7892 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
7893 assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
7895 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
7896 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7899 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7902 // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
7903 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7904 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7906 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7907 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7908 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7910 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7915 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
7916 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7917 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
7918 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
7919 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
7921 let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
7922 let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7924 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
7925 assert_eq!(err, format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(unknown_channel_id), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7927 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
7928 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7933 fn test_onion_value_mpp_set_calculation() {
7934 // Test that we use the onion value `amt_to_forward` when
7935 // calculating whether we've reached the `total_msat` of an MPP
7936 // by having a routing node forward more than `amt_to_forward`
7937 // and checking that the receiving node doesn't generate
7938 // a PaymentClaimable event too early
7940 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
7941 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
7942 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
7943 let mut nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7945 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7946 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7947 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7948 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7950 let total_msat = 100_000;
7951 let expected_paths: &[&[&Node]] = &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]];
7952 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], total_msat);
7953 let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
7955 let mut path_1 = sample_path.clone();
7956 path_1[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7957 path_1[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7958 path_1[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
7959 path_1[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7960 path_1[1].fee_msat = 100_000;
7961 route.paths.push(path_1);
7963 let mut path_2 = sample_path.clone();
7964 path_2[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7965 path_2[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7966 path_2[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
7967 path_2[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7968 path_2[1].fee_msat = 1_000;
7969 route.paths.push(path_2);
7972 let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
7973 let onion_session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
7974 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
7975 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], expected_paths.len());
7977 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7978 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
7981 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[0][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
7982 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7983 let mut prev_node = &nodes[0];
7985 for (idx, &node) in expected_paths[0].iter().enumerate() {
7986 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
7988 if idx == 0 { // routing node
7989 let session_priv = [3; 32];
7990 let height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
7991 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv).unwrap();
7992 let mut onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
7993 let (mut onion_payloads, _, _) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 100_000, &Some(our_payment_secret), height + 1, &None).unwrap();
7994 // Edit amt_to_forward to simulate the sender having set
7995 // the final amount and the routing node taking less fee
7996 onion_payloads[1].amt_to_forward = 99_000;
7997 let new_onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
7998 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet = new_onion_packet;
8001 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8002 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
8003 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8004 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(node);
8007 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8008 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8009 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
8010 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
8011 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
8013 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8014 assert!(events_2.is_empty());
8021 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[1][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8022 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], expected_paths[1], 101_000, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, true, None);
8024 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8027 fn do_test_overshoot_mpp(msat_amounts: &[u64], total_msat: u64) {
8029 let routing_node_count = msat_amounts.len();
8030 let node_count = routing_node_count + 2;
8032 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8033 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8034 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8035 let nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8040 // Create channels for each amount
8041 let mut expected_paths = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8042 let mut src_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8043 let mut dst_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8044 for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8045 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8046 let src_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, src_idx, routing_node).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8047 src_chan_ids.push(src_chan_id);
8048 let dst_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, routing_node, dst_idx).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8049 dst_chan_ids.push(dst_chan_id);
8050 let path = vec![&nodes[routing_node], &nodes[dst_idx]];
8051 expected_paths.push(path);
8053 let expected_paths: Vec<&[&Node]> = expected_paths.iter().map(|route| route.as_slice()).collect();
8055 // Create a route for each amount
8056 let example_amount = 100000;
8057 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[src_idx], nodes[dst_idx], example_amount);
8058 let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8059 for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8060 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8061 let mut path = sample_path.clone();
8062 path[0].pubkey = nodes[routing_node].node.get_our_node_id();
8063 path[0].short_channel_id = src_chan_ids[i];
8064 path[1].pubkey = nodes[dst_idx].node.get_our_node_id();
8065 path[1].short_channel_id = dst_chan_ids[i];
8066 path[1].fee_msat = msat_amounts[i];
8067 route.paths.push(path);
8070 // Send payment with manually set total_msat
8071 let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[src_idx].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8072 let onion_session_privs = nodes[src_idx].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8073 nodes[src_idx].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8074 check_added_monitors!(nodes[src_idx], expected_paths.len());
8076 let mut events = nodes[src_idx].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8077 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8078 let mut amount_received = 0;
8079 for (path_idx, expected_path) in expected_paths.iter().enumerate() {
8080 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_path[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8082 let current_path_amount = msat_amounts[path_idx];
8083 amount_received += current_path_amount;
8084 let became_claimable_now = amount_received >= total_msat && amount_received - current_path_amount < total_msat;
8085 pass_along_path(&nodes[src_idx], expected_path, amount_received, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, became_claimable_now, None);
8088 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[src_idx], &expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8092 fn test_overshoot_mpp() {
8093 do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 101_000], 200_000);
8094 do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 10_000, 100_000], 200_000);
8098 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8099 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8100 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8101 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8102 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8103 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8105 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8106 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8107 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8108 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8110 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8111 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8112 route.paths.push(path);
8113 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8114 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8115 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8116 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8117 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8118 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8119 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8120 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8124 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8125 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8126 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8127 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8128 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8129 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8131 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8134 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
8135 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8136 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8137 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8138 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8139 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8140 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8141 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8143 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8144 // values from previous calls.
8145 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8146 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8147 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8149 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref purpose, .. } => {
8151 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8152 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8154 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8157 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8162 #[allow(deprecated)]
8163 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8164 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8165 // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8166 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8167 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8168 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8169 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8171 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8173 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8175 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8176 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8177 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8178 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8179 } else { panic!(); }
8181 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8183 header: BlockHeader {
8185 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8186 merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(),
8187 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8191 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8192 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8193 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8194 } else { panic!(); }
8196 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8197 // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8198 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8199 block.header.time += 1;
8200 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8201 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8202 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8205 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8206 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8207 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8208 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8209 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8210 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8211 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8213 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8214 // values from previous calls.
8215 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8216 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8217 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8219 Event::PaymentClaimable { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8220 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8221 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8222 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8224 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8229 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8230 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8231 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8232 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8233 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8234 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8236 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8238 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8239 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8240 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, None).unwrap();
8241 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8243 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8244 // resulting events.
8245 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8246 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8247 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8248 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8249 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8250 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8251 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8253 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8254 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8255 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8256 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8257 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8259 // We should fail the payment back
8260 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8261 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8262 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8263 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8264 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8266 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8271 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8272 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8273 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8275 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8276 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8277 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8278 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8280 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8281 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8282 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8283 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8285 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8286 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8287 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8288 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8292 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8293 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8294 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8295 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8298 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8299 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8300 // commitment at same time.
8302 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8303 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8304 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8305 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8307 // Create some initial channel
8308 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8309 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8311 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8312 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8314 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8315 let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8317 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8318 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8319 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8320 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8323 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8324 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8325 &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8326 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8329 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8330 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8333 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8334 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8335 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8336 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8337 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 0));
8338 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8340 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8341 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8342 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8343 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8345 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8346 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8347 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8349 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8350 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8351 let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
8352 if let Ok(update) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8353 assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8354 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8355 } else { assert!(false); }
8357 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8358 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8359 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8360 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8364 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8365 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8366 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8367 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8368 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8370 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8371 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8372 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8373 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8375 // Create some initial channel
8376 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8377 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8379 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8380 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8382 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8383 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8385 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8386 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8387 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8388 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8389 let watchtower_alice = {
8391 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8392 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8393 &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8394 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8397 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8398 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8401 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8402 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8403 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8404 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8405 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (block.clone(), 0));
8406 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8408 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8410 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8411 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8415 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8416 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8417 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8418 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8419 let watchtower_bob = {
8421 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8422 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8423 &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8424 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8427 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8428 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8431 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8432 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8434 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8435 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8437 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8439 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8441 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8442 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8443 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8445 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8446 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8447 let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
8448 if let Ok(update) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8449 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8450 assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8451 assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8452 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8453 } else { assert!(false); }
8455 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8458 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8459 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8460 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8462 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8465 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8466 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8467 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8471 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8472 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8473 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8475 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8476 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
8477 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8482 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8483 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8484 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8487 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8488 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8490 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8491 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8492 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8493 // before receiving funding_signed.
8494 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8495 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8496 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8497 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8499 // Create an initial channel
8500 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8501 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8502 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8503 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8504 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
8506 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8507 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8509 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8510 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8512 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8513 let channel_id = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8514 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8515 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8516 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("Hi".to_string()) }, true);
8520 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8521 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8522 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8523 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8524 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8525 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8526 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8528 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8529 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8530 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8531 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8533 // Create some initial channels
8534 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8536 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8537 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8538 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8539 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8540 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8541 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8543 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8544 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8545 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8546 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8547 // this test before #653 fix.
8548 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8549 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8550 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8551 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8552 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8554 let htlc_timeout = {
8555 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8556 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8557 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8558 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8559 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
8563 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8564 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8565 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8566 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8569 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8570 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8571 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8572 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8574 // Steps of the test:
8575 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8576 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8577 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8578 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8579 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8580 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8581 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8582 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8583 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8584 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8585 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8586 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8588 // Create some initial channels
8589 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8590 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001);
8592 // Steps (1) and (2):
8593 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8594 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8596 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8597 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8598 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8599 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8600 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8601 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8602 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8604 // Steps (3) and (4):
8605 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8606 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8607 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8608 let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8611 if !broadcast_alice {
8612 force_closing_node = 1;
8613 counterparty_node = 0;
8615 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8616 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8617 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8618 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8619 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8620 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8621 true => alice_txn.clone(),
8622 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8624 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8625 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8626 if broadcast_alice {
8627 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8628 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8629 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8634 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8635 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8636 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8637 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8638 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8640 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8641 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8642 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8643 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8644 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8645 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8647 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8648 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
8649 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8650 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8651 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8652 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8654 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8655 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8657 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8660 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8661 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8662 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8663 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8665 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8666 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8667 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8668 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8669 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8672 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8674 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8675 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8676 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8679 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8682 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8683 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8684 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8685 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8687 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8688 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8689 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8690 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8691 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8694 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8696 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8697 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8699 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8700 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8701 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8702 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8703 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8704 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8705 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8706 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8707 if broadcast_alice {
8708 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8709 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8710 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8712 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8713 if broadcast_alice {
8714 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8715 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8717 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8718 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8723 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8724 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8726 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8727 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8728 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8730 // If Alice force-closed, Bob only broadcasts a HTLC-output-claiming transaction. Otherwise,
8731 // Bob force-closed and broadcasts the commitment transaction along with a
8732 // HTLC-output-claiming transaction.
8733 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8734 if broadcast_alice {
8735 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8736 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8737 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8739 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8740 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8741 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8747 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8748 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8749 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8750 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8751 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8755 fn test_duplicate_temporary_channel_id_from_different_peers() {
8756 // Tests that we can accept two different `OpenChannel` requests with the same
8757 // `temporary_channel_id`, as long as they are from different peers.
8758 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8759 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8760 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8761 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8763 // Create an first channel channel
8764 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8765 let mut open_chan_msg_chan_1_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8767 // Create an second channel
8768 nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None).unwrap();
8769 let mut open_chan_msg_chan_2_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8771 // Modify the `OpenChannel` from `nodes[2]` to `nodes[0]` to ensure that it uses the same
8772 // `temporary_channel_id` as the `OpenChannel` from nodes[1] to nodes[0].
8773 open_chan_msg_chan_2_0.temporary_channel_id = open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id;
8775 // Assert that `nodes[0]` can accept both `OpenChannel` requests, even though they use the same
8776 // `temporary_channel_id` as they are from different peers.
8777 nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_1_0);
8779 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8780 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8782 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8783 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8784 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8786 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8790 nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_2_0);
8792 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8793 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8795 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8796 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8797 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8799 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8805 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8806 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8807 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8809 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8810 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8811 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8812 // updating logic for the existing channel.
8813 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8814 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8815 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8816 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8818 // Create an initial channel
8819 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8820 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8821 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8822 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8824 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8825 // that it is rejected.
8826 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8828 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8829 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8831 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8832 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8833 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8834 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8835 // move forward with it.
8836 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8837 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8839 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8843 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8844 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8846 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8847 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8849 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8850 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8852 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8853 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8854 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8855 added_monitors.clear();
8857 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8859 let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8860 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8862 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8865 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8866 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8867 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8868 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8869 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8871 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8872 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8874 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8875 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8876 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8877 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8878 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8880 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8884 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8885 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8886 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8887 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8888 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8889 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8891 let funding_created = {
8892 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8893 let mut a_peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8894 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
8895 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
8896 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
8897 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
8898 let mut as_chan = a_peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8899 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8900 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8902 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8903 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8904 // At this point we'll look up if the channel_id is present and immediately fail the channel
8905 // without trying to persist the `ChannelMonitor`.
8906 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8908 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8910 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8911 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8913 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8914 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8915 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8916 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8917 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8919 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8923 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8924 // everything is functional.
8925 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8927 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8928 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8929 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8930 added_monitors.clear();
8933 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8934 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8935 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8936 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8938 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8939 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8940 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8942 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8946 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8947 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8949 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8950 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8951 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8952 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8953 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8954 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8955 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8957 // Create some initial channels
8958 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8959 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8960 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001);
8962 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8963 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8964 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8966 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8967 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8968 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8970 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8971 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8972 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8973 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8974 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) });
8975 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8976 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8977 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8978 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8980 // A null channel ID should close all channels
8981 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8982 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8983 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8984 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) });
8985 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8986 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8988 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8989 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8991 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8994 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8995 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8997 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8999 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9000 // peer_disconnected.
9001 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9002 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9004 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9005 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9006 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9010 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9011 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9013 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9014 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9015 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9016 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9018 // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9019 // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9020 // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9021 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9022 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9023 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9024 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9026 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9027 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9028 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9030 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9032 // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9033 // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9034 // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9036 let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9037 let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
9038 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9039 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9040 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9043 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9044 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9045 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9047 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9048 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9050 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9051 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9053 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9054 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9055 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9057 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9058 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9059 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9060 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9061 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9062 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9063 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9064 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9065 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9066 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9067 } else { panic!(); }
9068 } else { panic!(); }
9069 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9071 // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9072 // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9073 // as its not 32 bytes long.
9074 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9075 version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9076 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9077 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9081 script_sig: Script::new(),
9082 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
9083 witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9085 output: vec![TxOut {
9087 script_pubkey: Script::new(),
9090 check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9091 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9094 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9095 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9096 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9097 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9098 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9099 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9100 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9101 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9102 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9103 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9104 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9105 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9106 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9107 // until we learned about an additional block.
9109 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9110 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9111 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9112 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9113 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9114 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9115 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9117 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9118 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9119 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9120 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9121 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9123 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9124 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9125 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9126 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9127 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9128 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9130 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9131 if !test_height_before_timelock {
9132 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9134 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9135 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9136 if test_height_before_timelock {
9137 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9138 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9139 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9140 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9142 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9143 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9144 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9145 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9146 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9147 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9149 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9150 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9152 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9153 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9154 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9155 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9156 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9157 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
9158 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9160 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9161 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9162 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9163 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9164 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9165 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9166 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9167 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9168 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9173 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9174 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9175 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9178 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9179 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9180 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9181 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9182 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9184 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9186 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9187 .with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
9188 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9190 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9193 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9194 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9195 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9196 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9197 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9198 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9199 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9201 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9202 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9205 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
9206 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
9207 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9208 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9209 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9210 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9211 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9212 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9213 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9214 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9215 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9216 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9219 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9220 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9222 if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9223 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9224 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9226 let expected_destinations = vec![
9227 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9228 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9230 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], expected_destinations);
9231 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9233 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9234 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9235 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9237 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9238 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9239 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9241 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9242 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 4);
9243 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9244 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9245 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
9246 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
9248 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9249 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9250 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9252 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9253 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9254 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9255 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9257 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
9259 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9264 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9265 // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9266 // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentClaimable` event.
9267 // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9268 // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9269 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9273 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9274 // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9275 // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9276 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9280 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9281 // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9282 // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9283 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9284 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9285 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9286 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9288 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9289 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9290 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9291 let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9293 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9294 .with_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features());
9295 let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9296 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9297 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9298 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9299 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9300 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9303 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9305 let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9306 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9308 let session_privs = {
9309 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9310 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9311 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9312 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9313 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9315 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9316 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9319 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9320 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9321 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9323 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9325 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9326 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9329 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9330 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9331 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9333 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9334 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9336 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9337 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9339 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9340 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9341 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9343 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9344 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9345 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9347 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9348 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9349 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9351 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9352 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9353 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9354 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9358 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9359 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9360 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9362 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9363 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9365 let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9366 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9367 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9369 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9371 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9372 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9374 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9375 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9376 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9378 do_claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9379 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9380 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
9382 Event::PaymentSent { payment_hash, .. } => { // The payment was abandoned earlier, so the fee paid will be None
9383 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
9385 _ => panic!("Unexpected event")
9388 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_hash, .. } => {
9389 assert_eq!(payment_hash.unwrap(), our_payment_hash);
9391 _ => panic!("Unexpected event")
9394 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_hash, .. } => {
9395 assert_eq!(payment_hash.unwrap(), our_payment_hash);
9397 _ => panic!("Unexpected event")
9402 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9403 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9404 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9405 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9406 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9408 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9409 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9410 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9411 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9412 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9413 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
9414 final_value_msat: 10000,
9416 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9417 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9418 let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9420 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9421 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9422 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9423 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9424 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9425 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9426 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9427 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9428 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9432 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9433 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9434 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9435 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9436 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9438 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9439 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9441 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9442 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9443 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
9444 final_value_msat: 10000,
9446 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9447 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9448 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9449 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9450 let route = find_route(
9451 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9452 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9455 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9456 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9457 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9458 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9459 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9460 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9461 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9462 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9463 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9467 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9468 // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentClaimable event, the HTLCs
9469 // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9470 // PaymentClaimable event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9472 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9473 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9474 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9475 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9477 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9478 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9479 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9480 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9482 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9483 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9484 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9485 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9486 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9487 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9490 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9491 // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentClaimable event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9492 // amount of time to respond to.
9494 // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9495 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9496 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9498 let failed_destinations = vec![
9499 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9500 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9502 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9504 pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash);
9506 // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9507 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9508 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9510 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9511 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9512 let node_1_msgs = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
9513 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), node_1_msgs, false, None);
9515 // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9516 // that PaymentClaimable event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9517 nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9518 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9519 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9522 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9523 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9524 enum ExposureEvent {
9525 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9527 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9529 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9530 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9533 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9534 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9537 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9538 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9539 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9540 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9541 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9542 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9543 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9544 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9546 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9547 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9548 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9549 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9550 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9551 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9553 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9554 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9555 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9556 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9558 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9560 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9561 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9562 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9564 let opt_anchors = false;
9566 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9569 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
9570 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
9571 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id);
9572 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9575 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9576 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9577 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9579 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9580 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9582 let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9583 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9584 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9586 let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9587 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9588 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9589 let chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9590 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9592 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9593 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9595 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9596 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9598 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9599 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9602 if dust_outbound_balance {
9603 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9604 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9605 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9606 for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9607 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9608 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9611 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9612 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9613 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9614 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9615 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9619 if dust_outbound_balance {
9620 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9621 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9622 for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9623 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9624 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9627 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9628 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9629 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9630 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9635 let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9636 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9637 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9638 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9639 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9641 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9642 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9643 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9645 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9647 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9648 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9649 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9650 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9651 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9652 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9653 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9654 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9655 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9657 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9658 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9659 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9660 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9662 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9663 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9665 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9666 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9667 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9669 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9670 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9672 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9673 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9674 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel", "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure", 1);
9677 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9678 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9679 added_monitors.clear();
9683 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9684 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9685 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9686 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9687 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9688 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9689 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9690 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9691 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9692 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9693 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9694 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9695 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9699 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
9700 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9701 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9702 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9703 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9705 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9706 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9707 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
9708 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9709 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
9711 let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
9713 let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
9714 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9715 let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
9716 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9717 let mut tx = match events[0] {
9718 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
9719 // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 2.
9720 Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 3), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
9721 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9724 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9726 // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
9727 match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
9728 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9729 assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
9734 // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +2 headroom from best block.
9735 tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
9736 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
9737 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9741 fn accept_busted_but_better_fee() {
9742 // If a peer sends us a fee update that is too low, but higher than our previous channel
9743 // feerate, we should accept it. In the future we may want to consider closing the channel
9744 // later, but for now we only accept the update.
9745 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9746 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9747 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9748 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9750 create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9752 // Set nodes[1] to expect 5,000 sat/kW.
9754 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9755 *feerate_lock = 5000;
9758 // If nodes[0] increases their feerate, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept it.
9760 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9761 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9763 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9764 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9766 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9767 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9769 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9770 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9771 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9773 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9776 // If nodes[0] increases their feerate further, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept
9779 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9780 *feerate_lock = 2000;
9782 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9783 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9785 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9786 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9788 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9789 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9790 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9792 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9795 // However, if nodes[0] decreases their feerate, nodes[1] should reject it and close the
9798 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9799 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9801 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9804 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9805 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9807 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
9808 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9809 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
9810 err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000 (- 250)".to_owned() });
9811 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9812 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9814 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9818 fn do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(valid_delta: bool, use_user_hash: bool) {
9819 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9820 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9821 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9822 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9823 let min_final_cltv_expiry_delta = 120;
9824 let final_cltv_expiry_delta = if valid_delta { min_final_cltv_expiry_delta + 2 } else {
9825 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta - 2 };
9826 let recv_value = 100_000;
9828 create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9830 let payment_parameters = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32);
9831 let (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = if use_user_hash {
9832 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1],
9833 Some(recv_value), Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta));
9834 (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret)
9836 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(recv_value), 7200, Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)).unwrap();
9837 (payment_hash, nodes[1].node.get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret).unwrap(), payment_secret)
9839 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_parameters, recv_value, final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32).unwrap();
9840 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9841 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9842 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9843 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9844 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9845 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9846 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9847 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9850 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, recv_value, if use_user_hash {
9851 None } else { Some(payment_preimage) }, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9853 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9855 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9857 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9859 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9860 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9861 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
9863 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9868 fn test_payment_with_custom_min_cltv_expiry_delta() {
9869 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, false);
9870 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, true);
9871 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, false);
9872 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, true);