1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
20 use crate::sign::{ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
21 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
22 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
23 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, COINBASE_MATURITY, ChannelPhase};
24 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
25 use crate::ln::channel::{DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS, ChannelError};
26 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
27 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
28 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
29 use crate::routing::router::{Path, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, get_route, RouteParameters};
30 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
32 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
33 use crate::util::test_channel_signer::TestChannelSigner;
34 use crate::util::test_utils::{self, WatchtowerPersister};
35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
37 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
38 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
40 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, ScriptBuf};
43 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
44 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
45 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
46 use bitcoin::{Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
47 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
50 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
55 use crate::prelude::*;
56 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
57 use core::default::Default;
58 use core::iter::repeat;
59 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
60 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
62 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
63 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
65 use super::channel::UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS;
68 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
69 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
70 use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
71 let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
72 cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
73 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
74 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
75 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
76 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
78 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
80 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
81 let channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
82 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
84 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
85 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
87 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
88 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
90 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
91 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
92 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
93 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
94 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
95 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
96 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
97 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
99 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
100 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager", expected_regex, 1);
102 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
104 } else { assert!(false); }
107 use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
109 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
110 insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
111 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
113 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
115 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
117 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
119 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
121 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
123 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
125 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
129 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
130 // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
132 use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
133 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
134 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
135 *node_cfgs[1].override_init_features.borrow_mut() = Some(channelmanager::provided_init_features(&test_default_channel_config()).clear_wumbo());
136 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
137 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
139 match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None, None) {
140 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
141 assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
147 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
148 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
149 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
150 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
151 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
152 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
153 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
154 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
155 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
156 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
158 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
159 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
160 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
161 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
162 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
163 push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
165 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None, None).unwrap();
166 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
167 if !send_from_initiator {
168 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
169 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
171 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
173 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
174 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
175 if send_from_initiator {
176 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
177 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
179 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
181 let sender_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] };
182 let counterparty_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
183 let mut sender_node_per_peer_lock;
184 let mut sender_node_peer_state_lock;
186 let channel_phase = get_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
187 match channel_phase {
188 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
189 let chan_context = channel_phase.context_mut();
190 chan_context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
191 chan_context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
193 ChannelPhase::Funded(_) => assert!(false),
197 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
198 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
199 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
201 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
202 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
203 if send_from_initiator {
204 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
205 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
206 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
207 // well as an additional HTLC.
208 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, &channel_type_features));
210 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
215 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
216 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
217 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
221 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
222 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
223 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
224 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
225 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
226 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
229 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
233 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
234 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
235 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
236 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
237 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
238 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
239 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
240 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
241 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
242 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
244 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
246 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
248 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
250 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
253 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
254 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
256 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
257 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
258 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
259 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
260 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
262 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
265 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
267 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
268 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
269 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
270 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
273 let payment_event = {
274 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
275 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
276 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
278 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
279 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
281 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
282 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
283 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
284 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
285 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
286 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
288 // deliver(1), generate (3):
289 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
290 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
291 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
292 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
294 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
295 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
296 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
297 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
298 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
299 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
300 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
303 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
304 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
305 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
306 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
307 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
308 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
309 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
310 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
312 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
313 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
314 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
315 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
317 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
318 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
319 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
321 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
322 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
324 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
325 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
327 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
328 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
331 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
332 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
336 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
337 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
338 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
339 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
340 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
341 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
342 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
343 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
346 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
348 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
350 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
353 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
354 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
356 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
357 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
358 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
359 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
362 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
365 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
367 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
368 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
369 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
370 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
371 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
373 let payment_event = {
374 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
375 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
376 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
378 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
379 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
381 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
382 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
383 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
384 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
385 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
386 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
388 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
389 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
391 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
395 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
396 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
397 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
398 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
399 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
400 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
403 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
404 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
405 // update_fee (never committed) ->
407 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
408 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
409 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
410 // <- (1) RAA delivered
411 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
412 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
413 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
414 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
416 // B should send no response here
417 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
418 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
421 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
424 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
425 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
426 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
428 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
429 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
431 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
432 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
433 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
434 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
435 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
437 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
440 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
441 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
442 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
443 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
444 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
446 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
449 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
450 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
452 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
453 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
454 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
456 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
457 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
458 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
459 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
462 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
464 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
466 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
468 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
469 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
470 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
472 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
473 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
474 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
475 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
476 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
477 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
478 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
480 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
481 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
482 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
483 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
484 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
486 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
487 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
488 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
491 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
492 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
493 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
495 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
496 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
497 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
499 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
500 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
501 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
502 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
504 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
505 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
506 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
509 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
510 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
511 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
512 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
515 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
516 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
517 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
518 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
520 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
521 let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
522 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
523 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
526 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
527 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
528 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
530 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
531 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
532 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
534 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
535 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
537 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
539 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
540 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
541 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
542 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
544 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
545 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
547 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
548 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
549 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
550 added_monitors.clear();
552 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
554 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
556 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
557 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
559 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
560 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
561 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
562 added_monitors.clear();
565 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
566 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
567 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
569 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
570 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
572 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
573 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
574 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
575 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
576 expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
580 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
581 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
582 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
583 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
584 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
585 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
586 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
587 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
588 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
589 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
590 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
591 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
592 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
593 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
594 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
595 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
596 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
597 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
598 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
602 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
603 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
604 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
605 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
606 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
607 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
610 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
613 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
614 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
616 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
617 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
618 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
619 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
620 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
622 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
624 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
626 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
627 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
628 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
630 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
631 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
632 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
634 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
635 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
636 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
637 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
639 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
640 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
641 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
645 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
646 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
647 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
648 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
649 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
650 let channel_value = 5000;
652 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000);
653 let channel_id = chan.2;
654 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
655 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
656 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
658 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
660 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
661 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
662 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
664 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
665 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features)) as u32;
667 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
668 *feerate_lock = feerate;
670 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
671 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
672 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
674 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
676 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
678 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
680 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
682 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
683 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
684 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000;
685 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
686 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
687 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
691 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
692 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
695 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
696 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
697 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
699 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
701 // Get the TestChannelSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
702 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
703 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
704 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
705 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
706 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
707 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
708 ).flatten().unwrap();
709 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
710 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
711 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
712 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
714 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
715 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
716 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
717 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
718 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
719 ).flatten().unwrap();
720 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
721 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
722 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
723 chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
724 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
727 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
728 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
729 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
732 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
733 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
734 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
735 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
736 ).flatten().unwrap();
737 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
738 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
739 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
740 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
742 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000,
743 local_funding, remote_funding,
744 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
745 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
747 &local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
749 local_chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
752 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
755 htlc_signatures: res.1,
757 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
760 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
762 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
765 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
767 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
768 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
769 //Should produce and error.
770 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
771 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee", 3);
772 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
773 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
774 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") },
775 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], channel_value);
779 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
780 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
781 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
782 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
783 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
784 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
787 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
790 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
793 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
794 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
796 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
797 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
798 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
799 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
800 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
802 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
804 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
805 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
806 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
807 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
809 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
811 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
812 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
813 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
815 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
816 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
817 added_monitors.clear();
819 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
820 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
821 // node[1] has nothing to do
823 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
824 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
825 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
827 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
828 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
829 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
830 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
831 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
832 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
833 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
835 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
836 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
837 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
838 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
839 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
840 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
842 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
843 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
844 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
845 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
847 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
848 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
849 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
851 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
852 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
853 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
854 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
856 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
857 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
858 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
860 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
862 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
863 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
865 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => { },
866 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
869 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
871 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
872 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
873 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
874 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
875 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
879 fn test_update_fee() {
880 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
881 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
882 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
883 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
884 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
885 let channel_id = chan.2;
888 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
889 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
890 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
891 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
892 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
893 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
894 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
895 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
896 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
897 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
898 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
901 // Create and deliver (1)...
904 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
905 feerate = *feerate_lock;
906 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
908 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
909 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
911 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
912 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
913 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
914 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
915 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
917 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
919 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
921 // Generate (2) and (3):
922 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
923 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
924 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
927 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
928 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
929 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
931 // Create and deliver (4)...
933 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
934 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
936 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
937 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
938 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
939 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
940 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
941 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
942 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
944 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
947 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
948 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
949 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
951 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
952 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
954 // Handle (3), creating (6):
955 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
956 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
957 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
958 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
961 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
962 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
963 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
965 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
966 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
967 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
968 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
969 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
970 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
971 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
972 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
973 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
976 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
977 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
978 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
979 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
981 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
982 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
983 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
985 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
986 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
987 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
988 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
989 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
993 fn fake_network_test() {
994 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
995 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
996 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
997 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
998 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
999 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1001 // Create some initial channels
1002 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1003 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1004 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1006 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
1007 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1008 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1009 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1010 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1012 // Send some more payments
1013 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1014 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
1015 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
1017 // Test failure packets
1018 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
1019 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
1021 // Add a new channel that skips 3
1022 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1024 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1025 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1026 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1027 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1028 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1029 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1030 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1032 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1033 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1034 hops.push(RouteHop {
1035 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1036 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1037 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1038 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1040 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1041 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1043 hops.push(RouteHop {
1044 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1045 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1046 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1047 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1049 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1050 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1052 hops.push(RouteHop {
1053 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1054 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1055 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1056 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1058 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1059 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1061 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1062 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1063 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1],
1064 Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], route_params: None },
1065 &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1067 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1068 hops.push(RouteHop {
1069 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1070 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1071 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1072 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1074 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1075 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1077 hops.push(RouteHop {
1078 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1079 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1080 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1081 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1083 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1084 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1086 hops.push(RouteHop {
1087 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1088 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1089 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1090 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1092 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1093 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1095 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1096 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1097 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1],
1098 Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], route_params: None },
1099 &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1101 // Claim the rebalances...
1102 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1103 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1105 // Close down the channels...
1106 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1107 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1108 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1109 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1110 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1111 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1112 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1113 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1114 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1115 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1116 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1117 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1121 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1122 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1123 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1124 // commitment dance rounds.
1125 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1126 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1127 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1128 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1129 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1130 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1132 // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
1133 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1135 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1137 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1138 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
1139 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1140 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1142 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1144 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1145 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1146 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1147 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1149 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1150 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1153 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
1154 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)
1155 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1156 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1159 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1160 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1162 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
1163 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1167 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1168 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1169 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1170 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1172 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1173 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1174 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1175 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1176 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1177 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1180 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1181 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1182 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1184 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1186 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1187 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1188 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1189 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1191 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1192 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1194 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1196 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1197 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1198 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1200 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1201 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1203 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1205 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1206 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1207 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1209 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1210 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1211 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1212 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1213 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1215 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1216 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1218 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1220 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1221 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1222 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1224 &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1225 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1227 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1231 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1232 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1235 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1239 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1240 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1241 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1242 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1243 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1244 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1245 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1247 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1248 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
1249 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1250 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1251 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
1252 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
1254 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1256 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1257 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1259 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1260 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1262 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1263 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1264 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1268 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1269 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1270 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1271 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1272 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1273 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1274 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1275 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1277 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1280 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1282 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1284 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1285 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
1286 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1288 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1289 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1290 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1291 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1293 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1294 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1296 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1297 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1298 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1299 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1300 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1301 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1302 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1305 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1307 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1309 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1310 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1312 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1313 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 3);
1315 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1316 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
1317 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
1318 let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1319 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1320 (&claim_txn[1], &claim_txn[2])
1322 (&claim_txn[2], &claim_txn[1])
1325 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1326 assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1328 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1329 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1330 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1332 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1333 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1334 check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1335 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1337 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1338 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1341 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1342 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { ref msg } } => {
1343 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1344 assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1346 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1347 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1348 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1349 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1350 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1351 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1353 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1359 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1360 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1361 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1362 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1363 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1364 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1366 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1367 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1369 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1370 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2), 1 + 1, &get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2));
1371 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1372 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1373 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
1374 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1375 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1376 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1378 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
1379 if let &APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. } = &fails[0] {}
1380 else { panic!("Unexpected error variant"); }
1382 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1384 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1386 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1390 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1391 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1392 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1393 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1394 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1395 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1397 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
1398 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460000);
1399 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
1400 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1401 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1402 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1404 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1406 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1407 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1408 3460001, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1409 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1410 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1413 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1414 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1415 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1416 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1417 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1418 blinding_point: None,
1421 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1423 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1424 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1425 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1427 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1429 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1431 // Get the TestChannelSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1432 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1433 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1434 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1435 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1436 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
1437 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
1438 ).flatten().unwrap();
1439 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1440 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1441 chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1443 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
1444 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1445 chan_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1446 chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1447 chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1449 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1450 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1451 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1452 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
1453 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
1454 ).flatten().unwrap();
1455 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1456 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
1457 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1458 chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1459 chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1462 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1463 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1464 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
1466 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1467 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1468 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1470 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1472 amount_msat: 3460001,
1473 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1475 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1478 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1481 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1482 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1483 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
1484 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
1485 ).flatten().unwrap();
1486 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1487 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1491 local_funding, remote_funding,
1492 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1494 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1495 &local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1497 local_chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1500 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1503 htlc_signatures: res.1,
1505 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
1508 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1509 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1510 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1512 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1513 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1515 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1516 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point,
1518 next_local_nonce: None,
1520 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1522 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1523 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1524 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1526 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1527 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1528 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1530 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1532 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel",
1533 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", raa_msg.channel_id), 1);
1535 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1539 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1540 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1541 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1542 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1543 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1545 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1546 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1547 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1548 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1549 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1550 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1552 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1553 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1555 push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1557 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1559 // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
1560 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1561 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1562 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1563 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1566 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1567 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1568 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1569 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1570 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1574 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1575 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1576 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1577 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1578 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1579 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1580 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1581 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1583 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1584 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1585 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1586 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1587 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1588 push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1589 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1591 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1592 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1593 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1596 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
1597 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1000);
1598 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 700_000;
1599 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1600 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1601 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1602 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1603 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1604 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1605 700_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1606 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1607 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1609 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1610 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1611 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1612 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1613 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1614 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1615 blinding_point: None,
1618 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1619 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1620 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value", 3);
1621 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1622 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1623 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1624 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1625 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() },
1626 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1630 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1631 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1632 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1633 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1634 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1636 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1637 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1638 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1639 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1640 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1642 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1643 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1644 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1645 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1646 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1647 push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1648 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt);
1650 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1651 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1652 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1653 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1654 // commitment transaction fee.
1655 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1657 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1658 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1659 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1662 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1663 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1664 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt);
1665 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
1666 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1667 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1668 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1672 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1673 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1674 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1675 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1676 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1677 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1678 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1679 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1680 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1681 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1683 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1685 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1686 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1687 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None, None).unwrap_err(),
1688 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1690 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1691 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1692 push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1693 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None, None).unwrap();
1694 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1695 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1696 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
1698 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1699 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1700 match msg_events[0] {
1701 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1702 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1704 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1709 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1710 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1711 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1712 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1713 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1714 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1715 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1716 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000);
1718 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1719 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1720 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1721 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1722 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1723 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1725 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1726 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1727 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1728 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1729 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1730 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1732 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1733 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1734 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1735 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1739 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1740 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1741 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1742 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1743 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1744 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1745 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
1748 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1749 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1750 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1751 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1753 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1754 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1755 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1756 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1758 // Add a pending HTLC.
1759 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1760 let payment_event_1 = {
1761 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1762 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1763 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1765 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1766 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1767 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1769 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1771 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1772 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, &channel_type_features);
1773 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1774 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1775 let mut route_2 = route_1.clone();
1776 route_2.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = amt_msat_2;
1778 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1779 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1780 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1781 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1782 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1783 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
1784 &route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1785 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
1786 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1789 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1790 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1791 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1792 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1793 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1794 blinding_point: None,
1797 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1798 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1799 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value", 3);
1800 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1801 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1802 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1803 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1804 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() },
1805 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1809 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1810 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1811 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1812 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1813 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1814 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1815 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1816 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1817 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1818 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1819 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1821 let reserve = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1822 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1823 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1825 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1826 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1829 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
1830 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1834 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1835 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1836 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1837 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1838 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1839 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1840 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1841 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1842 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1843 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001);
1844 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001);
1846 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1847 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1849 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1850 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1852 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1854 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1855 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1856 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1857 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1862 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1863 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1864 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1865 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1867 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1869 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1871 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1872 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1873 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0);
1874 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1875 assert!(route.paths[0].hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1877 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1878 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1879 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1880 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1883 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1884 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1886 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1887 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1888 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1889 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1890 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1891 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1892 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1896 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1897 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1898 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0).unwrap();
1899 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1900 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1902 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1903 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1904 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1905 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1906 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1909 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1910 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1911 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1912 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1913 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1916 // adding pending output.
1917 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1918 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1919 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1920 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1921 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1922 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1923 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1924 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1925 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1927 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1928 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1929 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1931 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1932 let payment_event_1 = {
1933 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1934 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1935 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1937 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1938 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1939 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1941 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1943 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1944 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1946 let mut route = route_1.clone();
1947 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = recv_value_2 + 1;
1948 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
1949 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1950 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1951 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1952 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1955 // split the rest to test holding cell
1956 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1957 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1958 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1959 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1961 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1962 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1965 // now see if they go through on both sides
1966 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1967 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1968 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21,
1969 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
1970 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1971 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1972 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1974 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1976 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1977 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1978 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1979 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1980 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1981 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1982 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1985 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1986 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1987 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22,
1988 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
1989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1990 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1991 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1993 // flush the pending htlc
1994 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1995 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1996 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1998 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1999 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
2000 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2001 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2003 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
2004 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2005 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
2006 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2008 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
2009 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2010 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2012 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2014 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
2015 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
2016 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
2018 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2019 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
2021 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
2022 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
2023 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
2024 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
2025 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
2026 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2028 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
2029 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
2030 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
2031 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
2033 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
2034 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2036 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2037 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2039 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2040 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
2041 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
2042 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2043 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2045 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2046 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2047 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
2049 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2052 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2055 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2056 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
2057 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
2058 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2059 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2061 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2062 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2063 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
2065 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2068 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2071 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2072 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2073 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2075 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, &channel_type_features);
2076 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2077 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2079 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
2080 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2081 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2082 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2083 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2085 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
2086 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2090 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2091 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2092 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2093 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2094 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2095 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2096 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2097 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2099 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2100 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2101 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2102 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2103 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2104 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2105 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
2106 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2108 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2109 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2110 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2111 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2112 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2113 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2114 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2115 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2116 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2117 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2119 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2120 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2121 let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2122 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2123 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2125 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2126 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2128 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_3,
2129 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2131 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2132 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2133 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2136 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2137 // initial fulfill/CS.
2138 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2139 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2140 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2141 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2143 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2144 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2145 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2146 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2148 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2150 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2151 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2152 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2153 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2154 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_1, None, false, false);
2156 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2157 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2158 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2159 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2160 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2162 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2163 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2164 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2166 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2167 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2168 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2170 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2171 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2172 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2174 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2175 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2176 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2177 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2178 // on-chain as necessary).
2179 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2180 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2181 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2182 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2183 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, false, false);
2185 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2186 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2187 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2189 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2190 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2192 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2193 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2194 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2195 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2196 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2197 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2199 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2200 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2201 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2203 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_4,
2204 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2205 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2206 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2207 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2208 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2211 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2212 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2213 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2214 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2216 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2218 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2219 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2220 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2222 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2225 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2226 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2227 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2228 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2230 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2231 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2232 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2234 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2235 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2237 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2238 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2240 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2241 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2245 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2246 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2247 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2248 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2249 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2250 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2251 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2253 // Create some initial channels
2254 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2255 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2256 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2257 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2259 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2260 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2261 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2262 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2263 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2264 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2266 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2267 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2268 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2269 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2270 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2272 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2273 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2274 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2275 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2276 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2278 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2279 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2280 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2281 if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2282 let _ = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2285 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2286 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2287 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2289 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2290 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2291 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2292 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2294 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2295 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2297 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2298 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2299 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2300 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2303 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2304 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2305 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2306 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2307 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2308 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2310 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2311 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2312 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2313 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2314 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2316 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2317 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2319 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2320 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2321 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2323 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2324 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2326 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2327 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2328 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2329 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2331 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2337 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2338 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2339 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2341 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2342 let node2_commitment_txid;
2344 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2345 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2346 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2347 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2349 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2350 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2351 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2352 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2353 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2355 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2356 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2357 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2358 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2359 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2361 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2362 // confusing us in the following tests.
2363 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2365 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2366 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2367 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2370 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2371 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2372 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2373 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2374 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2375 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2378 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2381 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id } => {
2382 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2384 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2386 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2388 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2390 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2391 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2392 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2398 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2400 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2401 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2403 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2404 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2405 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2406 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2407 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2410 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2413 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id } => {
2414 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2416 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2418 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2419 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2420 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2422 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2423 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2424 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2426 nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2427 nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2428 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2429 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2431 assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2432 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
2433 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2437 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_timeout() {
2438 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Timeout tx, against both sides
2439 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2440 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2441 alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2442 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2443 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2444 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2445 bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2446 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2447 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2448 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2449 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2450 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2451 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2452 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2453 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2454 // Create some new channels:
2455 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2457 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2458 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2459 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2460 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2461 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2462 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2463 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2464 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2465 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2466 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2467 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2468 // Revoke the old state
2469 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2472 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2474 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2475 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2476 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2477 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2478 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2480 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2481 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2482 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2484 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2485 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2486 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2487 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2488 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2489 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2490 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2491 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2492 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2494 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2495 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2496 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2500 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_success() {
2501 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2502 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2503 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2504 alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2505 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2506 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2507 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2508 bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2509 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2510 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2511 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2512 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2513 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2514 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2515 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2516 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2517 // Create some new channels:
2518 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2520 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2521 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2522 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2523 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2524 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2525 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2526 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2527 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2528 // Revoke the old state
2529 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2531 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2533 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2534 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2535 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2537 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2538 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2540 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2541 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2543 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2544 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2545 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2546 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2547 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2548 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2549 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2551 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2552 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2553 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2557 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2558 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2559 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2560 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2561 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2562 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2563 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2564 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2565 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2566 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2567 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2568 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2569 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2570 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2571 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2573 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2574 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2575 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2576 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2577 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2578 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output
2580 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2582 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2583 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2584 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2585 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2586 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2590 fn test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates() {
2591 do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(true);
2592 do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(false);
2595 fn do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(broadcast_initial_commitment: bool) {
2596 // Simple test to make sure that the justice tx formed in WatchtowerPersister
2597 // is properly formed and can be broadcasted/confirmed successfully in the event
2598 // that a revoked commitment transaction is broadcasted
2599 // (Similar to `revoked_output_claim` test but we get the justice tx + broadcast manually)
2600 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2601 let destination_script0 = chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.get_destination_script([0; 32]).unwrap();
2602 let destination_script1 = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_destination_script([0; 32]).unwrap();
2603 let persisters = vec![WatchtowerPersister::new(destination_script0),
2604 WatchtowerPersister::new(destination_script1)];
2605 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs_with_persisters(2, &chanmon_cfgs, persisters.iter().collect());
2606 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2607 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2608 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2609 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
2611 if !broadcast_initial_commitment {
2612 // Send a payment to move the channel forward
2613 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5_000_000);
2616 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output.
2617 // We'll keep this commitment transaction to broadcast once it's revoked.
2618 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel_id);
2619 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2620 let revoked_commitment_tx = &revoked_local_txn[0];
2622 // Send another payment, now revoking the previous commitment tx
2623 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5_000_000);
2625 let justice_tx = persisters[1].justice_tx(funding_txo, &revoked_commitment_tx.txid()).unwrap();
2626 check_spends!(justice_tx, revoked_commitment_tx);
2628 mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[revoked_commitment_tx, &justice_tx]);
2629 mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[revoked_commitment_tx, &justice_tx]);
2631 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2632 check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2633 &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100_000);
2634 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 0);
2636 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2637 check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2638 &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100_000);
2640 // Check that the justice tx has sent the revoked output value to nodes[1]
2641 let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel_id);
2642 let total_claimable_balance = monitor.get_claimable_balances().iter().fold(0, |sum, balance| {
2644 channelmonitor::Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { amount_satoshis, .. } => sum + amount_satoshis,
2645 _ => panic!("Unexpected balance type"),
2648 // On the first commitment, node[1]'s balance was below dust so it didn't have an output
2649 let node1_channel_balance = if broadcast_initial_commitment { 0 } else { revoked_commitment_tx.output[0].value };
2650 let expected_claimable_balance = node1_channel_balance + justice_tx.output[0].value;
2651 assert_eq!(total_claimable_balance, expected_claimable_balance);
2656 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2657 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2658 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2659 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2660 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2661 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2662 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2664 // Create some new channel:
2665 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2667 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2668 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2669 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2670 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2671 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2673 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2674 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2675 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2676 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2677 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2678 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2679 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2680 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2681 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2683 //Revoke the old state
2684 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2687 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2688 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2689 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2690 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2691 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2692 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2693 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2694 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2696 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2697 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2699 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2700 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2702 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2703 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2704 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2705 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2706 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2707 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2708 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2709 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2711 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2712 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2713 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2714 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2715 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2717 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2718 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2719 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2723 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2724 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2725 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2726 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2727 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2728 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2729 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2731 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2733 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2734 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2735 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2736 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2737 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2738 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2740 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2741 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2743 //Revoke the old state
2744 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2747 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2748 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2749 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2750 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2751 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2752 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2753 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2754 match events.last().unwrap() {
2755 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2756 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2759 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2760 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2762 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2764 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2765 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2766 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2767 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2768 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2769 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2770 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2772 // Filter out any non justice transactions.
2773 node_txn.retain(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2774 assert!(node_txn.len() > 3);
2776 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2777 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2778 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2780 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2781 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2782 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2784 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2785 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2786 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2787 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2788 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2789 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2790 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2791 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2793 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2794 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2795 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2796 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2797 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2798 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2799 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2801 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2802 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2803 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2807 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2808 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2809 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2810 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2811 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2812 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2813 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2814 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2815 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2817 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2818 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2819 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2820 // PaymentSent event).
2822 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2823 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2824 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2825 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2827 // Create some initial channels
2828 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2829 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2831 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2832 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2833 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2834 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2835 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2837 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2838 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2839 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2841 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2842 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2844 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2845 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2846 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2847 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2848 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2849 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2850 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2851 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2852 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2853 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2854 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2855 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2856 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2857 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2858 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2860 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2861 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2862 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2863 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2864 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2865 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2866 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2867 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2868 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2869 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2870 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2871 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2872 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2873 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2875 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2876 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]));
2877 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2879 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2880 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2881 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2882 added_monitors.clear();
2884 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2885 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2886 match forwarded_events[0] {
2887 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2888 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2890 let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2891 match forwarded_events[1] {
2892 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
2893 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2894 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2895 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2896 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2897 assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2901 match forwarded_events[2] {
2902 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
2903 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2904 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2905 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2906 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2907 assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2911 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2913 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2914 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2915 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2916 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2917 added_monitors.clear();
2919 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2921 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2922 let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2924 match nodes_2_event {
2925 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2926 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2929 match nodes_0_event {
2930 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2931 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2932 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2933 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2934 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2935 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2937 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2940 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
2942 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2943 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2946 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2947 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => { {
2948 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2949 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2950 // Node[1]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2951 // Node[0]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2952 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx);
2953 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2954 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2955 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2957 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2958 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2959 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2960 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2962 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2963 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2964 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2965 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2970 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2971 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0]);
2973 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2974 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2975 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2976 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2977 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2978 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2979 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2980 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2981 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2982 assert!(node_txn.len() == 1 || node_txn.len() == 3); // HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn
2983 let commitment_spend =
2984 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2987 // Certain `ConnectStyle`s will cause RBF bumps of the previous HTLC transaction to be broadcast.
2988 // FullBlockViaListen
2989 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2990 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2991 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2992 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2995 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2996 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2997 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
3002 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
3003 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
3004 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3005 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3006 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
3007 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
3008 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
3009 // we already checked the same situation with A.
3011 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
3012 connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()]));
3013 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3014 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3015 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3016 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3017 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
3018 let mut first_claimed = false;
3019 for event in events {
3021 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3022 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
3023 assert!(!first_claimed);
3024 first_claimed = true;
3026 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
3027 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
3030 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3031 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
3032 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3035 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
3038 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
3039 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
3040 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
3041 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
3042 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
3043 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
3045 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
3047 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3048 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3049 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3050 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3051 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3052 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3053 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3055 // Create some intial channels
3056 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3057 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3059 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
3060 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
3061 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
3063 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
3065 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
3066 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3067 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
3068 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
3069 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
3070 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
3071 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3073 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3074 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3076 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3077 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3078 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3079 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3080 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3081 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3083 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3085 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
3086 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3087 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3088 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3089 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
3090 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
3092 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
3093 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
3094 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
3095 check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false
3096 , [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3097 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
3099 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
3100 if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
3101 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
3103 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 3); // Two extra fee bumps for timeout transaction
3105 txn.iter().for_each(|tx| check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx[0]));
3106 assert_eq!(txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3110 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
3111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3112 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3114 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3116 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3118 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3119 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3121 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3122 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3123 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3124 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3125 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3126 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3128 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3131 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
3132 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3133 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
3135 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
3136 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3138 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3139 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3140 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3141 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // 1 timeout tx
3142 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3143 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
3144 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3148 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3149 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3150 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3151 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3155 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3156 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3157 // and fail backward accordingly.
3159 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3160 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3161 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3162 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3164 // Create some initial channels
3165 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3166 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3168 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3169 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3170 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3171 // Revoke the old state
3172 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3174 let (_, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3176 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3177 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3178 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3179 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3180 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3182 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3183 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3184 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3185 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3187 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3188 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3189 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3190 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3191 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3192 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3194 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3195 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3196 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3198 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3202 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3203 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3204 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3205 // commitment transaction anymore.
3206 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3207 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3208 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3209 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3210 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3211 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3213 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3214 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3215 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3216 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3217 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3218 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3219 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3220 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3221 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3223 // Create some initial channels
3224 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3225 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3227 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3228 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3229 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3230 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3231 // Revoke the old state
3232 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3234 let value = if use_dust {
3235 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3236 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3237 nodes[2].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
3238 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3241 let (_, first_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3242 let (_, second_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3243 let (_, third_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3245 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3246 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3247 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3248 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3249 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3250 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3251 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3252 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3253 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3254 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3255 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3256 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3258 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3259 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3260 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3261 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3262 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3263 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3264 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3265 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3266 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3267 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3268 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3269 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3270 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3271 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3272 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3273 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3275 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3276 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3277 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3278 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3279 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3280 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3281 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3282 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3283 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3284 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3285 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3286 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3287 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3288 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3289 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3290 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3291 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3292 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3294 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3295 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3296 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3297 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, fourth_payment_hash,
3298 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3299 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3300 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3304 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3305 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3306 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3307 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3308 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3309 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3311 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3312 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3315 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3316 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3318 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3319 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3322 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3323 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3325 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3326 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3327 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3329 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3330 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
3331 assert!(events.iter().any(|ev| matches!(
3333 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. }
3335 assert!(events.iter().any(|ev| matches!(
3337 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } if *payment_hash == fourth_payment_hash
3339 assert!(events.iter().any(|ev| matches!(
3341 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } if *payment_hash == fourth_payment_hash
3344 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3345 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3347 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3348 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3351 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3352 match nodes_2_event {
3353 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3354 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3355 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3356 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3357 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3358 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3360 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3364 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3365 match nodes_2_event {
3366 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data }) }, node_id: _ } => {
3367 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3368 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3370 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3373 let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3374 match nodes_0_event {
3375 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3376 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3377 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3378 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3379 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3380 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3382 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3383 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3384 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3386 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3388 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3389 assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
3391 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref failure, .. } => {
3392 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3393 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3394 // that we should update our routing table for.
3395 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3396 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure { } else { panic!("Unexpected path failure") }
3399 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3402 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3403 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, first_payment_hash);
3405 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3408 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3409 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3411 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3414 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3415 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
3417 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3420 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3421 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3423 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3426 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3427 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, third_payment_hash);
3429 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3432 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3435 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
3437 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3438 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3441 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3442 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3443 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3447 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3448 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3449 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3450 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3451 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3455 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3456 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3457 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3458 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3459 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3463 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3464 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3465 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3466 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3467 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3468 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
3470 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3472 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3473 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
3474 PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3475 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3477 let payment_event = {
3478 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3479 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3480 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3482 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3483 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3486 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3487 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3489 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, failed_payment_hash,
3490 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3493 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3496 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3498 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3500 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3501 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3502 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3503 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
3504 &route.paths[0], 50_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3505 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3506 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
3508 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3509 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3515 onion_routing_packet,
3516 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
3517 blinding_point: None,
3519 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3521 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3522 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3523 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3525 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3526 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3528 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3531 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3532 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3534 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3537 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3538 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3540 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3542 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3543 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3547 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3548 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3549 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3550 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3551 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3552 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3553 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3554 if *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
3555 // We rely on the ability to connect a block redundantly, which isn't allowed via
3556 // `chain::Listen`, so we never run the test if we randomly get assigned that
3560 let funding_tx = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).3;
3562 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3563 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3564 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3565 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3566 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3567 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3569 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
3570 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3571 check_spends!(node_txn[0], funding_tx);
3572 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
3574 let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_txn[0].clone()]);
3575 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3576 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3577 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3578 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3580 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3581 // registering new transactions
3582 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3586 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3587 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3588 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3589 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3590 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3591 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3592 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3593 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3595 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3597 let mut payment_event = {
3598 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
3599 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3600 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3602 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3603 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3604 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3607 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3608 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3610 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3612 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3613 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3614 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3615 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3617 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3618 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3619 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3620 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3621 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3623 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3624 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3625 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3627 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3628 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3629 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3630 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3631 let commitment_tx = {
3632 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3633 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3634 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3635 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3636 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3640 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx);
3642 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3643 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3644 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3645 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3647 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3649 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3650 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3652 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx);
3653 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
3654 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), if nodes[2].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 2 } else { 1 });
3655 let htlc_tx = node_txn.pop().unwrap();
3656 assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input.len(), 1);
3657 assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, commitment_tx.txid());
3658 assert_eq!(htlc_tx.lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3659 assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3661 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx);
3665 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3666 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3667 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3668 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3669 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3671 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3672 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3673 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3674 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3675 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3677 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3679 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3680 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3681 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3682 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3683 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3684 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
3686 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3687 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3689 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3690 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
3691 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3692 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3696 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3697 // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3698 // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3699 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3700 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3701 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3702 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3704 // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3705 // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3706 let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
3707 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3708 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
3709 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3710 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
3712 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3713 assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3715 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3717 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3718 assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3720 // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3721 // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3724 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3727 // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3728 // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3729 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3730 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3732 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, true
3733 , [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
3734 check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, false
3735 , [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
3739 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3740 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3741 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3742 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3743 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3744 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3745 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3746 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3748 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3749 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3750 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3751 reconnect_args.send_channel_ready = (true, true);
3752 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3754 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3755 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3756 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3757 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3759 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3760 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3761 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3763 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3764 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3765 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3766 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3768 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3769 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3771 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3772 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3774 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3775 reconnect_args.pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 = 1;
3776 reconnect_args.pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
3777 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3779 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3780 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
3782 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3783 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3784 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3786 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3789 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3790 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3793 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3794 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3795 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3797 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3800 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3801 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3803 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3806 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
3808 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3809 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3812 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3813 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3814 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3815 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3816 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3817 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3819 let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3820 let channel_id = if messages_delivered == 0 {
3821 let (channel_ready, chan_id, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
3822 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3823 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3824 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3825 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3828 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2
3831 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3833 let payment_event = {
3834 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
3835 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3836 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3838 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3839 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3840 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3842 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3844 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3845 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3847 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3848 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3849 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3850 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3851 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3853 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3854 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3855 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3856 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3858 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3859 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3860 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3861 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3862 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3864 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3865 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3866 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3867 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3874 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3875 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3876 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3877 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3878 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3879 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3881 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3882 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3883 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3885 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3886 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3888 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3889 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3890 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3891 reconnect_args.send_channel_ready = (true, true);
3892 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.1 = 1;
3893 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3894 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3895 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3896 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3897 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.0 = true;
3898 reconnect_args.pending_raa.0 = true;
3899 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3900 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3901 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3902 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3903 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.0 = true;
3904 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3905 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3906 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3907 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3908 reconnect_args.pending_raa.1 = true;
3909 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3910 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3911 // Everything was delivered...
3912 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3915 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3916 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3917 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3919 Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3920 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3923 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3924 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3927 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3929 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3930 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3934 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3935 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3936 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3938 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3940 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3941 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3943 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
3944 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3945 assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3946 assert_eq!(receiver_node_id.unwrap(), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3947 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(channel_id));
3949 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3950 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3951 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3953 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3956 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3959 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3960 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3961 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3963 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3964 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3965 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3966 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3967 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3968 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3969 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3970 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3971 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3972 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3973 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3975 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3978 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3979 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3981 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3982 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3984 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3985 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3986 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3988 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3991 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3992 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3993 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3994 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3996 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3997 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3998 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3999 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4001 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
4002 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
4003 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4004 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4005 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4007 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
4008 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4009 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4010 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4017 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4018 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4019 if messages_delivered < 2 {
4020 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4021 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
4022 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4023 if messages_delivered < 1 {
4024 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
4026 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4028 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
4029 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
4030 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4031 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.1 = true;
4032 reconnect_args.pending_raa.1 = true;
4033 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4034 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
4035 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
4036 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4037 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.1 = true;
4038 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4039 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
4040 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
4041 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4042 reconnect_args.pending_raa.0 = true;
4043 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4044 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
4045 // Everything was delivered...
4046 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
4049 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
4050 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4052 if messages_delivered <= 5 {
4053 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4054 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4056 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
4058 if messages_delivered > 2 {
4059 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4062 // Channel should still work fine...
4063 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4064 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
4065 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4069 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
4070 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
4071 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
4072 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
4073 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
4077 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
4078 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
4079 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
4080 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
4081 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
4085 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
4086 // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
4087 // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
4088 // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
4089 // channel_ready immediately instead.
4090 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4091 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4092 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4093 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4094 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
4096 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
4098 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4099 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4100 let block_txn = [funding_tx];
4101 let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
4102 let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
4103 nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
4105 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4106 let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4107 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4111 fn test_channel_monitor_skipping_block_when_channel_manager_is_leading() {
4112 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4113 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4114 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4115 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4117 // Let channel_manager get ahead of chain_monitor by 1 block.
4118 // This is to emulate race-condition where newly added channel_monitor skips processing 1 block,
4119 // in case where client calls block_connect on channel_manager first and then on chain_monitor.
4120 let height_1 = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4121 let mut block_1 = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), height_1, Vec::new());
4123 nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().push((block_1.clone(), height_1));
4124 nodes[0].node.block_connected(&block_1, height_1);
4126 // Create channel, and it gets added to chain_monitor in funding_created.
4127 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
4129 // Now, newly added channel_monitor in chain_monitor hasn't processed block_1,
4130 // but it's best_block is block_1, since that was populated by channel_manager, and channel_manager
4131 // was running ahead of chain_monitor at the time of funding_created.
4132 // Later on, subsequent blocks are connected to both channel_manager and chain_monitor.
4133 // Hence, this channel's channel_monitor skipped block_1, directly tries to process subsequent blocks.
4134 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &funding_tx, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
4135 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4137 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4138 let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4139 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4143 fn test_channel_monitor_skipping_block_when_channel_manager_is_lagging() {
4144 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4145 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4146 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4147 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4149 // Let chain_monitor get ahead of channel_manager by 1 block.
4150 // This is to emulate race-condition where newly added channel_monitor skips processing 1 block,
4151 // in case where client calls block_connect on chain_monitor first and then on channel_manager.
4152 let height_1 = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4153 let mut block_1 = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), height_1, Vec::new());
4155 nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().push((block_1.clone(), height_1));
4156 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block_1, height_1);
4158 // Create channel, and it gets added to chain_monitor in funding_created.
4159 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
4161 // channel_manager can't really skip block_1, it should get it eventually.
4162 nodes[0].node.block_connected(&block_1, height_1);
4164 // Now, newly added channel_monitor in chain_monitor hasn't processed block_1, it's best_block is
4165 // the block before block_1, since that was populated by channel_manager, and channel_manager was
4166 // running behind at the time of funding_created.
4167 // Later on, subsequent blocks are connected to both channel_manager and chain_monitor.
4168 // Hence, this channel's channel_monitor skipped block_1, directly tries to process subsequent blocks.
4169 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &funding_tx, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
4170 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4172 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4173 let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4174 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4178 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4179 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4180 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4181 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4182 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4183 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4184 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4185 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4187 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
4189 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4190 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4191 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
4192 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
4193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4195 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4196 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4198 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4199 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4202 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4203 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
4204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4206 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4207 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4209 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4210 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4211 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4212 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4213 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4214 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4215 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4217 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4218 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4219 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4221 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4222 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4223 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4225 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4228 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4229 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4230 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4231 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4233 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4236 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4237 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4239 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
4240 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
4242 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4243 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4244 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
4245 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
4247 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4248 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4250 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4251 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4252 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4253 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4255 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4256 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4258 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4259 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4261 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4263 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4264 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4265 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4266 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4267 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4268 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4269 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4270 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4271 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4274 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4275 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4276 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4277 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4278 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4279 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4280 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4281 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4283 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4284 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4285 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4286 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4287 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4288 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4289 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4290 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4292 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4293 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4294 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4295 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4297 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4298 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4299 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4300 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4302 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4303 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4304 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4306 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4308 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4309 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4311 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4312 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4314 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4315 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4316 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4318 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4321 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4324 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4325 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4326 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4328 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4329 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4332 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4333 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4334 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4335 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4336 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4337 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4338 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4340 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4342 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4343 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4344 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4345 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4346 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4347 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4348 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
4349 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4350 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
4351 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id,
4352 &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4353 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4354 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4355 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4356 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4357 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentClaimable event(s).
4358 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4361 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4364 let mut block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
4365 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4366 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4367 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4368 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4369 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4370 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4371 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4374 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4376 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4377 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4378 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4379 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4380 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4381 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4383 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4384 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4385 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4386 let mut expected_failure_data = (100_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4387 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&(block_count - 1).to_be_bytes());
4388 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4392 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4393 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4394 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4397 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4398 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4399 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4400 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4401 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4402 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4403 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4404 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4406 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4407 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4408 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4409 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4411 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4412 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4413 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, first_payment_hash,
4414 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4415 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4416 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4418 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4419 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4420 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4421 sending_node.node.send_payment_with_route(&route, second_payment_hash,
4422 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4424 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4425 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4426 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4427 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4428 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4430 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4432 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4433 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4434 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4435 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4438 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4439 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4440 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4441 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4442 match fail_commit[0] {
4443 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4444 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4445 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4447 _ => unreachable!(),
4449 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4451 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4456 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4457 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4458 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4461 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4462 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4464 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4465 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4466 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4467 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4468 for event in events.drain(..) {
4470 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs, channel_id: _ } => {
4471 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4472 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4473 all_outputs.push(outp);
4476 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4479 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4480 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx) {
4490 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4491 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4492 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4493 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4494 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4495 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4497 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4498 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4499 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4500 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4501 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4502 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4503 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4504 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4505 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4507 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4508 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4510 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4511 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4512 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4513 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4514 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4518 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4519 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4520 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4521 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4522 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4523 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4524 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4526 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4527 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4528 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4530 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4532 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4533 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4534 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4535 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4537 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4538 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4539 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4540 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4541 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4543 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4544 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4545 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4549 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4550 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4551 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4553 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4554 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4555 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4556 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4558 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
4559 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4560 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4561 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4562 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4564 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4565 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4566 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4567 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4568 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4570 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4571 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4572 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4574 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4575 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4576 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4577 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4578 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4582 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4583 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4584 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4585 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4586 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4588 // Create some initial channels
4589 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4591 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4593 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4594 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4595 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4597 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4598 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4599 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4600 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4601 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4602 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4603 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4605 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4606 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4609 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4610 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4613 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4614 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4615 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4616 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4617 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4619 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4620 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4621 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4623 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4624 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4625 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4629 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4630 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4631 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4632 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4633 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4635 // Create some initial channels
4636 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4638 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4639 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4641 let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4643 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4644 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4645 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4647 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4648 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4649 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4650 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4652 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4653 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4655 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4657 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4658 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4659 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4660 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4661 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4663 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4664 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4665 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4666 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4668 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4669 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4670 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4671 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4672 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4676 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4677 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4678 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4679 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4680 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4682 // Create some initial channels
4683 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4685 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4686 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4687 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4688 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4690 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4692 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4693 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4694 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4695 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4697 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4698 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4699 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4700 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4702 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4703 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4705 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4706 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4707 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4711 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4712 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4713 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4714 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4715 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4716 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4718 // Create some initial channels
4719 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4721 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4722 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4723 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4724 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4726 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4728 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4729 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4730 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4731 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4732 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4733 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4735 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4736 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4737 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4738 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4739 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4740 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // HTLC-Timeout
4742 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4743 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4744 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4745 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4746 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4748 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4749 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs
4750 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4751 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4752 // transactions next...
4753 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4754 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4756 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4757 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4758 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4759 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4761 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4762 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4765 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4766 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4768 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4769 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4770 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4771 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4772 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4776 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4777 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4778 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4779 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4780 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4781 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4783 // Create some initial channels
4784 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4786 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4787 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4788 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4789 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4791 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4792 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4794 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4796 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4797 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4798 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4799 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4800 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4801 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4803 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4804 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4805 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4806 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4808 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4809 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4810 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4812 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4813 connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4814 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4815 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4816 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4818 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4819 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success
4821 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4822 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4823 // transactions next...
4824 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4825 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4826 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4827 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4829 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4830 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4833 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4834 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4836 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4837 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4839 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4840 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4842 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4843 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4844 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4845 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4846 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4847 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4848 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4849 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4853 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4854 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4855 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4856 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4857 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4859 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4862 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4863 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4864 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4865 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4867 // Create some initial channels
4868 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4869 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4871 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4872 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4873 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4874 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4875 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4877 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4878 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4879 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4881 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4882 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4883 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4884 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4885 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4886 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4887 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4888 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4889 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4890 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4891 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4893 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4894 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4895 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4896 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4898 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4899 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 1);
4900 check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4901 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4902 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4903 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // Success tx
4905 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4906 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), c_txn[0].clone()]));
4907 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4908 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4909 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4911 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4912 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4915 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
4916 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4917 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4918 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4919 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4920 assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
4922 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4924 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4925 let mut msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4926 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4927 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4928 let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4930 match nodes_2_event {
4931 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4932 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4935 match nodes_0_event {
4936 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4937 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4938 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4939 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4940 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4941 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4943 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4946 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
4947 match msg_events[0] {
4948 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4949 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4952 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4953 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4954 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4955 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4956 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4957 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx
4958 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4959 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4960 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4961 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4962 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), nodes[1].best_block_info().1); // Success tx
4964 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4965 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4969 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4970 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4971 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4972 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4973 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4974 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4975 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4976 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4977 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4978 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4979 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4980 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
4981 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4982 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4984 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4985 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4986 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4988 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4989 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4990 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4991 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4992 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
4994 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
4996 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
4997 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
4998 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
4999 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5000 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40)
5001 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
5002 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 800_000);
5003 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 800_000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5005 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5006 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5007 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5009 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5010 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5011 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5012 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5013 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5015 let htlc_timeout_tx;
5016 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5017 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5018 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3
5019 assert!(node_txn.len() == 2 || node_txn.len() == 3);
5021 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5022 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5023 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
5025 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
5026 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5027 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5028 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
5029 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5031 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5032 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5033 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
5034 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5036 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5037 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5038 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
5039 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5042 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5043 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5044 // Assign htlc_timeout_tx to the forwarded HTLC (with value ~800 sats). The received HTLC
5045 // (with value 900 sats) will be claimed in the below `claim_funds` call.
5046 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
5047 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5048 htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[2].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[2].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
5050 htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[0].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[1].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
5054 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5055 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
5057 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5058 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5059 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5060 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5062 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5063 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5066 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5067 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5069 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5070 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5071 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5072 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5073 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5074 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5075 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5076 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5077 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5078 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5080 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5081 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5082 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
5083 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5084 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5085 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5086 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5087 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5088 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5089 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5091 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5092 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5094 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5096 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5098 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5099 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[1]);
5100 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196), true, true);
5101 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5102 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5103 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5104 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5105 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5106 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5107 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5109 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5110 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5111 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, None, true, true);
5115 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5116 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5117 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5118 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5119 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5121 // Create some initial channels
5122 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5124 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
5125 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5126 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5127 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5128 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5130 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5131 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5132 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
5133 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5135 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5136 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5137 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5138 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5140 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5141 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5144 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5145 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5148 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5149 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5150 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5151 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5152 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5156 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5157 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5159 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5160 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5161 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5162 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5163 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5164 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5167 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5168 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5169 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5170 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5171 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5172 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5173 // use the same payment hashes.
5174 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5179 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5180 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5181 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5182 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5183 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5184 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5185 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5186 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5187 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5188 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5190 let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5191 let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5192 let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5193 let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5194 let chan_3_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
5196 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5197 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5198 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5199 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5201 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
5202 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5204 let (_, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5206 let (_, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5207 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5209 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5211 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5213 let (_, payment_hash_3, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5215 let (_, payment_hash_4, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5216 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5218 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5220 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5223 let (_, payment_hash_5, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5225 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5226 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5229 let (_, payment_hash_6, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5231 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5232 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5234 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5235 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5236 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5237 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
5238 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5240 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5241 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5242 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5243 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5244 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5245 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5246 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5248 let failed_destinations = vec![
5249 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
5250 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
5251 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
5252 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5254 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5255 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5257 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5258 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5259 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5260 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5261 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5262 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5264 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5265 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5266 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5269 let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5270 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5271 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5273 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5274 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5276 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5277 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5278 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5279 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5281 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5283 // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5284 let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5285 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5286 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5287 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5288 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5289 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5290 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5292 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5293 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5294 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5295 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5296 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5297 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5298 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5299 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5300 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5301 if deliver_last_raa {
5302 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5304 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5307 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5308 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5309 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5310 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5312 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5313 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5314 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5316 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5317 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5318 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5320 if announce_latest {
5321 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5323 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5325 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5326 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5327 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5328 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5330 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5331 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5334 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5335 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5338 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5339 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5340 if deliver_last_raa {
5341 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5343 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5344 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5346 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5347 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5349 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5352 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5354 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5356 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5357 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5358 let mut a_done = false;
5359 for msg in cs_msgs {
5361 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5362 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5363 // should be failed-backwards here.
5364 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5365 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5366 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5367 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5369 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5374 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5375 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5376 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5378 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5379 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5382 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5383 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5384 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5385 if announce_latest {
5386 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5387 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5388 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5391 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5393 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5397 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5398 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 10 } else { 6 });
5399 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5400 let mut as_updates = 0;
5401 for event in as_events.iter() {
5402 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5403 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5404 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5405 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5407 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5409 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5412 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5413 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5415 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5416 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5417 if announce_latest {
5418 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5419 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5421 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5423 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5424 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 8 } else { 6 });
5425 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5426 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5427 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5428 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5429 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5430 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5431 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5433 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5435 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5438 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5439 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5441 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5442 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5443 if announce_latest {
5444 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5446 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5448 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5449 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5450 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5451 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5452 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5453 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5457 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5458 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5462 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5463 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5467 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5468 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5469 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5470 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5474 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5475 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5476 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5477 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5478 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5480 // Create some initial channels
5481 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5483 let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5484 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5485 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5486 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5488 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5489 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5490 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5492 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5493 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5495 let htlc_timeout = {
5496 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5497 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5498 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5499 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5500 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5504 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5505 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5506 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5508 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5509 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5510 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5511 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5512 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5513 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5514 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5515 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5516 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5517 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5518 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5522 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5523 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with a key
5524 // manager rotation to test that `channel_keys_id` returned in
5525 // [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] let us re-derive the channel key set to
5526 // then derive a `delayed_payment_key`.
5528 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5530 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5531 let seed = [42; 32];
5532 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5533 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5534 let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger));
5535 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
5536 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &scorer);
5537 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, router, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, override_init_features: alloc::rc::Rc::new(core::cell::RefCell::new(None)) };
5538 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5539 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5540 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5542 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5543 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5545 // Create some initial channels
5546 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5548 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5549 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5550 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5552 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5553 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5554 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5555 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5556 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5558 let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5559 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5560 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5561 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5562 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5564 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5565 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5566 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5567 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5568 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5569 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5570 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5571 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5574 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5575 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5576 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5577 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5578 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5579 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5581 let htlc_timeout = {
5582 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5583 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5584 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5585 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5586 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5590 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5591 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5592 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5594 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5595 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5596 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5597 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5598 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5599 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5600 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5601 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5602 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5603 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5604 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5605 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5609 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5610 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5611 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5612 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5613 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5615 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5617 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5618 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5620 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5621 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5622 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5624 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5625 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5626 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5628 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5629 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5630 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5632 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5633 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5634 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5637 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5638 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5639 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5640 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5641 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5642 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5644 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5646 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5647 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5648 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5649 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5650 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5652 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5653 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5654 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
5656 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5657 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5658 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5659 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5660 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5662 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5663 let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5664 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5665 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5666 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5668 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5669 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5670 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5671 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5674 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5675 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5676 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5677 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5678 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5679 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5681 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5682 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
5683 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5684 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5686 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5688 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5689 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5690 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5692 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5693 let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5695 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5696 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5697 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5699 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5700 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5701 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5702 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5705 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5706 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5707 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5708 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5709 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5710 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5712 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5713 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5714 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5715 // actually revoked.
5716 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5717 let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5718 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5719 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5720 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5722 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5723 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5724 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5725 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5726 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5727 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5728 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5729 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5730 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5731 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5733 if check_revoke_no_close {
5734 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5735 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5738 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5739 let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5740 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5741 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5742 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5744 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5745 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5746 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5747 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5748 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5750 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5754 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5755 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5756 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5757 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5758 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5759 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5760 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5762 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5763 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5764 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5766 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5767 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5768 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5770 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5771 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5775 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5776 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5777 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5778 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5779 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5784 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5785 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5786 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5787 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5788 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5789 // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5790 for node in nodes.iter() {
5791 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5794 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5795 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5796 let push_msat=10001;
5797 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
5798 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5799 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5800 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5802 // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5803 // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5804 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
5808 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5809 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5810 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5811 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5812 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5814 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5815 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5816 let push_msat=10001;
5817 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
5819 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5820 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5821 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5822 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5823 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
5825 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5826 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5827 let push_msat=10001;
5828 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5829 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5830 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5832 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5833 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5834 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5836 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5837 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5838 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5840 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5841 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
5842 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash, chain_hash);
5844 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5845 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5846 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5847 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5848 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5849 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5853 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5854 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5855 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5856 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5857 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5859 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5860 let push_msat=10001;
5861 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
5862 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5863 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5864 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5866 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5867 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5868 let err_msg = match events[0] {
5869 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5872 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5874 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5877 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5878 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5879 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5880 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5882 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5883 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5884 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5885 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5886 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5887 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5889 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5890 // pending_update_fee.
5892 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5893 *feerate_lock += 20;
5895 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5896 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5898 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5899 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5900 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5901 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5902 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5904 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5907 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5909 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5910 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5911 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5912 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5914 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5915 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
5916 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5918 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5919 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
5920 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5921 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5922 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5924 // Flush the pending fee update.
5925 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5926 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5928 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5929 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5931 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5932 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5933 // us to surface its failure to the user.
5934 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5935 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5936 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", chan.2), 1);
5938 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5939 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5940 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5942 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5943 assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5944 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5945 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5946 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
5948 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5951 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5952 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5954 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5958 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5959 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5960 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5962 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5963 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5964 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5965 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5966 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5967 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5969 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5970 // pending_update_fee.
5972 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5973 *feerate_lock += 200;
5975 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5976 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5978 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5979 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5980 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5981 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5982 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5984 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5987 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5989 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5990 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5991 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5992 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5994 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5996 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features) - amt_1;
5997 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
5998 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6000 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6001 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, payment_hash_1,
6002 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
6003 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6004 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6005 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6006 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
6007 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
6008 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6009 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6011 // Flush the pending fee update.
6012 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6013 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6014 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6015 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6016 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6017 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6019 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6020 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6021 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6022 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6023 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6024 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", chan.2), 1);
6026 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6027 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6028 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6030 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
6031 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6032 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6033 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
6034 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
6036 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6039 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6040 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6042 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6045 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6046 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6047 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6048 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6049 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6051 let raa = match send_raa_event {
6052 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6053 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6055 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6056 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6057 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6058 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6059 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6060 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6062 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6063 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6065 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6066 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6067 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6069 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => {},
6070 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6072 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6073 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6074 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
6076 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6077 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6078 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6079 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6082 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6083 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6084 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6087 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6088 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6089 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6090 // Avoid having to include routing fees in calculations
6091 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6092 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 0;
6093 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
6094 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6095 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6096 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6097 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
6099 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6100 // pending_update_fee.
6102 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6103 *feerate_lock += 20;
6105 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6106 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6108 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6109 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6110 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6111 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6112 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6114 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6117 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6119 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6120 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6121 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6122 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6124 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6125 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
6126 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6127 let payment_event = {
6128 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6129 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6132 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6133 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6135 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6137 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6139 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6140 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6142 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_1_2.2);
6143 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6145 // Flush the pending fee update.
6146 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6147 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6148 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6149 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6150 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6153 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6154 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6155 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6157 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6158 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6161 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6164 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6165 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6166 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6168 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6169 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6170 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
6171 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6172 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6173 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6176 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6177 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6180 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6181 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6182 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6183 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6184 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6185 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6186 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6187 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6188 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6189 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6191 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6194 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6195 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6196 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6198 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6199 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6200 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6201 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6202 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6203 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6204 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6205 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6206 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6207 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6208 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6210 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6211 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6212 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6216 fn test_payment_route_reaching_same_channel_twice() {
6217 //A route should not go through the same channel twice
6218 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6219 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6220 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6221 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6222 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6223 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6225 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6226 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
6227 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
6229 // Extend the path by itself, essentially simulating route going through same channel twice
6230 let cloned_hops = route.paths[0].hops.clone();
6231 route.paths[0].hops.extend_from_slice(&cloned_hops);
6233 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6234 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6235 ), false, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6236 assert_eq!(err, &"Path went through the same channel twice"));
6239 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6240 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6241 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6244 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6245 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6246 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6247 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6248 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6249 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6250 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6252 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6253 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 100;
6255 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6256 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6257 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6258 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6262 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6263 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6264 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6265 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6266 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6267 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6268 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6270 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6271 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 0;
6272 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6273 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)),
6274 true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6275 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6277 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6278 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC", 1);
6282 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6283 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6284 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6285 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6286 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6287 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6288 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6290 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6291 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6292 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6293 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6294 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6295 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6297 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6298 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC", 3);
6299 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6300 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6301 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() },
6302 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6306 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6307 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6308 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6309 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6310 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6311 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6312 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6313 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6315 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6316 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
6317 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
6318 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6319 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6320 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6321 ), true, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6322 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6326 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6327 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6328 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6329 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6330 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6331 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6332 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6333 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6334 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6335 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6336 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6338 // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
6339 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6340 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6341 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6342 let payment_event = {
6343 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6344 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6345 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6347 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6348 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6349 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6350 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6354 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6356 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6357 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6358 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6360 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6361 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6363 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6364 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6365 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6367 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6371 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6372 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6373 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6374 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6375 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6376 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6377 let channel_value = 100000;
6378 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0);
6379 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6381 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6383 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6384 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6386 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6387 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6388 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6389 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6390 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6392 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6395 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6397 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6398 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6399 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6400 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6401 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6402 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6403 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6404 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6406 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6407 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6408 let channel = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6409 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.context().get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6412 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6413 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6414 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6415 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6416 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6417 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6418 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6419 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6420 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6421 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6422 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6423 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6427 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6428 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6429 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6430 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6431 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6432 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6433 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6435 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6436 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6437 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6438 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6439 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6440 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
6442 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6443 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6444 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6445 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6446 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6447 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6449 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6450 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6451 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6452 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6453 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6455 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6456 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6457 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6458 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6459 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6463 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6464 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6465 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6466 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6467 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6468 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6469 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6470 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6472 let send_amt = 3999999;
6473 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
6474 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
6475 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = send_amt;
6476 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6477 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6478 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6479 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
6480 &route.paths[0], send_amt, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6481 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6483 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6487 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6488 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6489 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6490 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6491 blinding_point: None,
6495 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6496 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6498 msg.htlc_id = (50) as u64;
6499 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6501 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6502 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6503 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6504 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6505 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6509 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6510 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6511 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6512 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6513 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6514 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6515 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6517 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6518 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6519 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6520 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6521 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6522 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6523 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6525 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6526 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6527 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6528 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6529 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
6533 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6534 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6535 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6536 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6537 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6538 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6540 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6541 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6542 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6543 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6544 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6545 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6546 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6547 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6549 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6550 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6551 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6552 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6553 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6557 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6558 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6559 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6560 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6561 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6562 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6563 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6564 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6566 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6567 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6568 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6569 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6570 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6571 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6572 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6574 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6575 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6576 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6577 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
6578 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
6580 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6581 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6582 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
6583 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
6585 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6586 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6587 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6588 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6589 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6590 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6593 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6594 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6595 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6596 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6597 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6599 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6601 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6602 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6603 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6604 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6605 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6609 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6610 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6612 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6613 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6614 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6615 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6616 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6617 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6618 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6619 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6621 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6622 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6623 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6625 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6628 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6631 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6633 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6634 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6635 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6636 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6637 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6641 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6642 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6644 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6645 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6646 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6647 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6648 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6650 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6651 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6652 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6653 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6654 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6655 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6657 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6660 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6663 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6665 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6666 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6667 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6668 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6669 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6673 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6674 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6676 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6677 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6678 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6679 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6680 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6682 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6683 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6684 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6685 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6686 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6687 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6688 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6691 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6692 failure_code: 0x8000,
6695 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6697 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6698 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6699 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6700 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6701 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6705 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6706 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6708 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6709 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6710 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6711 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6712 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6714 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6716 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6717 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6718 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6720 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6721 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6722 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6724 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6725 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6726 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6727 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6728 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6729 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6730 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6732 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6736 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6738 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6740 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6741 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6742 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6743 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6744 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6748 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6749 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6751 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6752 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6753 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6754 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6755 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6757 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6759 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6760 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6761 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6763 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6764 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6765 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6767 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6768 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6769 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6770 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6771 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6772 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6773 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6775 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6779 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6781 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6783 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6784 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6785 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6786 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6787 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6791 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6792 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6794 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6795 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6796 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6797 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6798 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6800 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6801 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6802 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6803 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6805 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6806 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6808 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6809 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6810 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6812 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6814 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6816 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6817 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6818 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6819 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6820 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6821 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6822 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6824 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6827 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6828 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6830 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6831 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6832 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6833 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6834 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
6838 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6839 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6840 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6842 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6843 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6844 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6845 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6846 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6847 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000);
6849 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6852 let mut payment_event = {
6853 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6854 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6855 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6856 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6857 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6858 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6860 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6861 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6862 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6863 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6864 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6865 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6866 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6867 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6868 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6871 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6872 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6873 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6874 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6876 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6877 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6878 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6880 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6881 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6882 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6883 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6884 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6885 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6886 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6888 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6892 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6894 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6895 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6896 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6897 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6898 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6900 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6902 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6903 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6904 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6905 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6906 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6907 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6909 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6912 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6916 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6917 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6918 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6919 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6920 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6921 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6922 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6924 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6927 let mut payment_event = {
6928 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6929 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6930 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6931 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6934 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6935 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6936 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6937 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6938 payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6939 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6942 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
6943 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6944 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6945 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6947 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6948 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6950 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6951 let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
6952 // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
6953 update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
6955 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6956 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6958 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6961 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
6962 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
6963 node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6964 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6965 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6966 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6969 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6970 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6971 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6973 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6976 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6977 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 2);
6979 // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
6980 // the node originating the error to its next hop.
6982 Event::PaymentPathFailed { error_code, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }) }, ..
6984 assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
6985 assert!(is_permanent);
6986 assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
6988 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6991 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6992 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6994 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6997 // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
7000 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7001 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7002 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7003 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7005 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7006 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7007 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7008 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7009 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7010 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7012 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7013 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7015 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7016 let (_, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7017 let (_, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7018 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7020 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7021 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7023 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7024 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
7025 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7026 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7027 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7029 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7030 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7031 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7032 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7034 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7035 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7037 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7039 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7040 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7042 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7045 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7046 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7048 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7051 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7052 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7053 if announce_latest {
7054 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7056 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7059 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7060 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7061 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7063 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7064 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7065 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7066 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7067 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
7068 let mut first_failed = false;
7069 for event in events {
7071 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7072 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7073 assert!(!first_failed);
7074 first_failed = true;
7076 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7079 Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {}
7080 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7086 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7087 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7088 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7091 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7092 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7093 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7094 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7095 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7096 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7097 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7099 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7100 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7101 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7102 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7103 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7105 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7106 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7108 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7109 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7111 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7112 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7114 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7116 let (payment_preimage_3, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7117 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7120 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7122 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7123 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7124 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7125 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7126 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7128 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7129 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7131 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7132 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
7133 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7134 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7135 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7136 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7137 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7138 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7140 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7141 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7142 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7144 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7145 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7147 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7148 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
7149 .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
7150 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7151 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
7152 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
7153 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7156 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7158 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), 11);
7160 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
7161 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7162 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7163 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7164 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7169 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7170 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7171 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7172 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7176 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7177 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7179 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7180 low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7181 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7182 high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7183 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7184 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7185 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7186 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7187 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7189 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in OutboundV1Channel::new()
7190 if let Err(error) = OutboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7191 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7192 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42, None)
7195 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7196 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7198 } else { assert!(false) }
7200 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
7201 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
7202 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7203 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7204 if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7205 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7206 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7209 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7210 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7212 } else { assert!(false); }
7214 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7215 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
7216 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7217 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7218 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7219 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
7221 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7223 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7224 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7225 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7229 } else { panic!(); }
7230 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7232 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
7233 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
7234 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7235 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7236 if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7237 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7238 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7241 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7242 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7244 } else { assert!(false); }
7248 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7249 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7250 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7251 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7253 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7254 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7255 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7256 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7258 // Create some initial channels
7259 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7261 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7262 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7263 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
7264 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7265 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000);
7266 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(),
7267 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7268 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7269 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
7270 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
7271 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7274 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7275 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7276 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7277 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7278 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7280 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7281 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7282 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7283 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7285 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7286 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7287 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7289 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7290 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7291 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7292 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7293 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7294 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7295 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7296 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7297 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7298 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7300 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7302 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7304 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7305 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7307 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7308 let mut expected_failure_data = (10_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7309 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH.to_be_bytes());
7310 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7314 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7315 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7316 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7318 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7319 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7320 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7321 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7323 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7324 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0);
7325 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7328 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7329 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7331 for _ in 0..DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS + 1 {
7332 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7334 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7335 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7336 let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7337 for e in msg_events {
7339 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7340 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7341 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7342 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7343 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7346 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7350 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
7351 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
7353 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7354 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7355 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
7356 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
7358 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7359 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7361 // Reestablish chan_1
7362 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7363 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7364 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7365 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7366 // Reestablish chan_2
7367 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7368 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7369 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7370 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7371 // Reestablish chan_3
7372 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7373 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7374 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7375 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7377 for _ in 0..ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
7378 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7380 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7381 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7382 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7383 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7384 for e in msg_events {
7386 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7387 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7388 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7389 // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7391 Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7392 None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7395 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7398 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7399 assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7403 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7404 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7405 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7407 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7408 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7409 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7410 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7412 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7414 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7415 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 30)
7416 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7417 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000);
7418 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7420 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7421 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7422 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7423 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7424 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7425 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7427 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7428 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7429 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7430 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7434 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7435 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7437 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7438 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7439 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(header_114, 42, vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()]));
7440 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7442 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7446 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7447 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor)
7448 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7449 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7450 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7451 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7452 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7453 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7457 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7458 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7459 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7460 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7462 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7463 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7464 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7465 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7466 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7467 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7468 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7469 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7470 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7471 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7472 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7473 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7474 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7478 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7480 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7481 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7483 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7485 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7486 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7487 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7488 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7489 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7490 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7491 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7492 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7493 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7494 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7495 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7496 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7497 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7501 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7503 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7504 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7508 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7509 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7510 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7512 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7513 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7514 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7515 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7516 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7518 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7519 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7520 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7521 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7522 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7523 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 3_000_000);
7524 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7525 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7526 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7527 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 50)
7528 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7529 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 3_000_000);
7530 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7531 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7532 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7534 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7535 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7536 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7538 // Revoke local commitment tx
7539 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7541 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7542 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]));
7543 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7544 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7545 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7546 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 50); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7548 let revoked_htlc_txn = {
7549 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
7550 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
7552 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7553 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7554 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7556 assert_eq!(txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7557 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7558 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 1);
7559 check_spends!(txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7564 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7565 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7566 let block_11 = create_dummy_block(hash_128, 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]);
7567 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_11);
7568 let block_129 = create_dummy_block(block_11.block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()]);
7569 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_129);
7570 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7571 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7572 match events.last().unwrap() {
7573 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7574 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7580 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7581 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7582 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7584 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7585 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7586 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7587 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7589 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7590 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7591 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7592 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7593 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7594 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7596 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7597 // available, which we check here:
7598 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7599 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7600 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7602 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7603 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7605 // node_txn[3] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7606 // output, checked above).
7607 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 2);
7608 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].output.len(), 1);
7609 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7611 first = node_txn[3].txid();
7612 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7613 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
7614 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight().to_wu();
7615 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7619 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7620 let block_130 = create_dummy_block(block_129.block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn);
7621 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_130);
7622 let block_131 = create_dummy_block(block_130.block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
7623 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_131);
7625 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7626 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7627 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7628 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7630 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7631 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7633 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7634 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7635 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7636 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7637 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7638 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7639 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7640 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7644 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7645 connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(header_144, 42, node_txn));
7646 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7648 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7649 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7650 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7651 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7652 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7653 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7654 // up bumped justice generation.
7655 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7658 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7659 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7663 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7664 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7665 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7668 // Provide preimage for one
7669 // Check aggregation
7671 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7672 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7673 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7674 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7676 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7677 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7678 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7680 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7681 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7682 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7683 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7684 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7686 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7687 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7688 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7689 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7690 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7691 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7693 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7697 let feerate_timeout;
7698 let feerate_preimage;
7700 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7701 // 3 transactions including:
7702 // preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7703 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7704 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7705 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7706 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7707 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7708 check_spends!(node_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
7709 check_spends!(node_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
7711 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7712 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7713 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7714 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7716 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7717 (node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[1].clone())
7719 (node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone())
7722 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7723 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7724 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7726 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7727 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7728 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
7729 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight().to_wu();
7733 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7734 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7736 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7737 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7739 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7740 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7741 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7742 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7743 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7744 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7746 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7747 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7748 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight().to_wu();
7749 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7750 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7752 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7753 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7754 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7755 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7756 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7761 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7762 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7766 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7767 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7768 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7769 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7770 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7771 // TestChannelSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7772 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7773 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7775 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7776 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7777 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7778 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7779 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
7781 let per_commitment_secret;
7782 let next_per_commitment_point;
7784 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7785 let mut guard = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7786 let keys = guard.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).map(
7787 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7788 ).flatten().unwrap().get_signer();
7790 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7792 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7793 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7794 per_commitment_secret = keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7796 // Must revoke without gaps
7797 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7798 keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7800 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7801 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7802 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7805 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7806 &msgs::RevokeAndACK {
7808 per_commitment_secret,
7809 next_per_commitment_point,
7811 next_local_nonce: None,
7813 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7814 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7815 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() }
7816 , [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7820 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7821 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7822 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7824 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7825 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7826 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7827 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7829 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7830 // Lock HTLC in both directions
7831 let (payment_preimage_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7832 let (_, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7834 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7835 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7836 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7838 // Revoke local commitment tx
7839 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7841 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7842 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7843 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7844 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7846 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7847 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7848 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7849 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7851 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7852 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3
7853 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7854 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7855 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7856 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7860 connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn));
7861 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7863 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7864 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7865 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7870 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7871 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7872 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7873 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7874 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7875 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7876 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7878 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000);
7880 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7881 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7882 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7883 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7884 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7886 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7887 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7888 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7889 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7891 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7892 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7893 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7894 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7895 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7897 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7898 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7899 assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7901 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7906 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7907 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7908 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7909 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7910 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7912 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7913 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7914 override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7916 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, None, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7918 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7919 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7920 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
7921 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
7925 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7926 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7927 zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7928 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7929 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7930 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7931 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7933 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, None, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7934 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7935 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7937 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7938 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7939 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7943 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
7944 // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
7945 // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
7946 // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
7947 // 90% of the `channel_value`.
7948 // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
7950 let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
7951 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7952 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
7953 let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
7954 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7955 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
7956 let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
7957 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7958 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
7959 let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
7960 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7961 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
7963 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7964 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7965 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
7966 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7968 let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
7969 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7970 let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
7971 let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
7972 let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
7974 let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7975 let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7977 // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7978 // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7979 assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
7980 // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7981 // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7982 assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
7984 // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7985 // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
7987 assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7988 // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7989 // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
7991 assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7995 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
7996 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7997 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7998 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7999 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8000 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8001 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8003 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8004 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8006 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
8008 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8009 // accepting the inbound channel request.
8010 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8012 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8014 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8015 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
8017 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8020 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8021 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8023 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8024 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8025 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8027 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8030 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8032 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8033 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8035 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8037 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
8038 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
8040 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8045 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8046 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8047 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8048 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8049 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8050 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8051 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8053 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8054 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8056 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
8058 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8059 // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8060 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8062 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8064 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8065 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8067 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8070 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8071 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8073 match close_msg_ev[0] {
8074 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8075 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8077 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8080 // There should be no more events to process, as the channel was never opened.
8081 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8085 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8086 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8087 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8088 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8089 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8090 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8091 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8093 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8094 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8096 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
8098 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8099 // accepting the inbound channel request.
8100 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8102 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8104 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8105 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
8106 let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8108 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8109 assert_eq!(err, "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.");
8111 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8112 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected Error {:?}", e),
8115 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8118 // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8119 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8120 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8122 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8123 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8124 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8126 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8131 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8132 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8133 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8134 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8135 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8137 let unknown_channel_id = ChannelId::new_zero();
8138 let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8140 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8141 assert_eq!(err, "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.");
8143 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8144 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected Error: {:?}", e),
8149 fn test_onion_value_mpp_set_calculation() {
8150 // Test that we use the onion value `amt_to_forward` when
8151 // calculating whether we've reached the `total_msat` of an MPP
8152 // by having a routing node forward more than `amt_to_forward`
8153 // and checking that the receiving node doesn't generate
8154 // a PaymentClaimable event too early
8156 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8157 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8158 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8159 let mut nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8161 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8162 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8163 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8164 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8166 let total_msat = 100_000;
8167 let expected_paths: &[&[&Node]] = &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]];
8168 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], total_msat);
8169 let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8171 let mut path_1 = sample_path.clone();
8172 path_1.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8173 path_1.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8174 path_1.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8175 path_1.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8176 path_1.hops[1].fee_msat = 100_000;
8177 route.paths.push(path_1);
8179 let mut path_2 = sample_path.clone();
8180 path_2.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8181 path_2.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8182 path_2.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8183 path_2.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8184 path_2.hops[1].fee_msat = 1_000;
8185 route.paths.push(path_2);
8188 let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8189 let onion_session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8190 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8191 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8192 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], expected_paths.len());
8195 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8196 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8199 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[0][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8200 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8201 let mut prev_node = &nodes[0];
8203 for (idx, &node) in expected_paths[0].iter().enumerate() {
8204 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
8206 if idx == 0 { // routing node
8207 let session_priv = [3; 32];
8208 let height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
8209 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv).unwrap();
8210 let mut onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
8211 let (mut onion_payloads, _, _) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 100_000,
8212 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), height + 1, &None).unwrap();
8213 // Edit amt_to_forward to simulate the sender having set
8214 // the final amount and the routing node taking less fee
8215 if let msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive {
8216 ref mut sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat, ..
8217 } = onion_payloads[1] {
8218 *sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat = 99_000;
8220 let new_onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
8221 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet = new_onion_packet;
8224 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8225 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
8226 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8227 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(node);
8230 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8231 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8232 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
8233 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
8234 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
8236 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8237 assert!(events_2.is_empty());
8244 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[1][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8245 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], expected_paths[1], 101_000, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, true, None);
8247 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8250 fn do_test_overshoot_mpp(msat_amounts: &[u64], total_msat: u64) {
8252 let routing_node_count = msat_amounts.len();
8253 let node_count = routing_node_count + 2;
8255 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8256 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8257 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8258 let nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8263 // Create channels for each amount
8264 let mut expected_paths = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8265 let mut src_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8266 let mut dst_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8267 for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8268 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8269 let src_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, src_idx, routing_node).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8270 src_chan_ids.push(src_chan_id);
8271 let dst_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, routing_node, dst_idx).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8272 dst_chan_ids.push(dst_chan_id);
8273 let path = vec![&nodes[routing_node], &nodes[dst_idx]];
8274 expected_paths.push(path);
8276 let expected_paths: Vec<&[&Node]> = expected_paths.iter().map(|route| route.as_slice()).collect();
8278 // Create a route for each amount
8279 let example_amount = 100000;
8280 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[src_idx], nodes[dst_idx], example_amount);
8281 let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8282 for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8283 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8284 let mut path = sample_path.clone();
8285 path.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[routing_node].node.get_our_node_id();
8286 path.hops[0].short_channel_id = src_chan_ids[i];
8287 path.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[dst_idx].node.get_our_node_id();
8288 path.hops[1].short_channel_id = dst_chan_ids[i];
8289 path.hops[1].fee_msat = msat_amounts[i];
8290 route.paths.push(path);
8293 // Send payment with manually set total_msat
8294 let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[src_idx].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8295 let onion_session_privs = nodes[src_idx].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8296 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8297 nodes[src_idx].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8298 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8299 check_added_monitors!(nodes[src_idx], expected_paths.len());
8301 let mut events = nodes[src_idx].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8302 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8303 let mut amount_received = 0;
8304 for (path_idx, expected_path) in expected_paths.iter().enumerate() {
8305 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_path[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8307 let current_path_amount = msat_amounts[path_idx];
8308 amount_received += current_path_amount;
8309 let became_claimable_now = amount_received >= total_msat && amount_received - current_path_amount < total_msat;
8310 pass_along_path(&nodes[src_idx], expected_path, amount_received, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, became_claimable_now, None);
8313 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[src_idx], &expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8317 fn test_overshoot_mpp() {
8318 do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 101_000], 200_000);
8319 do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 10_000, 100_000], 200_000);
8323 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8324 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8325 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8326 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8327 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8328 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8330 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8331 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8332 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8333 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8335 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8336 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8337 route.paths.push(path);
8338 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8339 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8340 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8341 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8342 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8343 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8344 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8345 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8349 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8350 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8351 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8352 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8353 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8354 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8356 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8359 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
8360 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8361 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8362 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8363 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8364 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8365 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8366 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8367 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8369 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8370 // values from previous calls.
8371 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8372 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8373 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8375 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref purpose, .. } => {
8377 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8378 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8380 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8383 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8388 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8389 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8390 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8391 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8392 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8393 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8395 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8397 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8398 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8399 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, None).unwrap();
8400 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8402 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8403 // resulting events.
8404 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8405 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8406 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8407 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8408 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8409 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8410 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8412 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8413 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8414 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8415 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8416 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8418 // We should fail the payment back
8419 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8420 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8421 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8422 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8423 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8425 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8430 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8431 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8432 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8434 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8435 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
8436 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8437 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8438 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8440 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8441 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8442 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8443 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8444 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8446 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8447 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8448 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8449 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8450 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8454 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8455 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8456 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8457 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8460 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8461 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8462 // commitment at same time.
8464 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8465 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8466 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8467 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8469 // Create some initial channel
8470 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8471 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8473 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8474 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8476 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8477 let (preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8479 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8480 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8481 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8482 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8485 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8486 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8487 &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8488 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8491 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8492 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
8495 let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8496 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8497 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8498 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 200));
8499 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8501 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8502 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8503 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8504 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8506 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8507 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8508 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8510 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8511 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8512 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut channel) = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2) {
8513 if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8514 assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
8515 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8516 } else { assert!(false); }
8521 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8522 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8523 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8524 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8528 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8529 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8530 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8531 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8532 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8534 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8535 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8536 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8537 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8539 // Create some initial channel
8540 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8541 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8543 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8544 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8546 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8547 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8549 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8550 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8551 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8552 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8553 let alice_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(
8554 Arc::new(Mutex::new(nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().clone())),
8556 let watchtower_alice = {
8558 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8559 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8560 &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8561 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8564 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &alice_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8565 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
8568 let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8569 // Make Alice aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating transaction lock time
8570 // requirements here.
8571 const HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST: u32 = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8572 alice_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST) as usize, (block.clone(), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST));
8573 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8575 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8577 let mut txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8578 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8579 check_spends!(txn[0], chan_1.3);
8580 check_spends!(txn[1], txn[0]);
8583 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8584 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8585 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8586 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8587 let bob_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(Arc::clone(&alice_broadcaster.blocks));
8588 let watchtower_bob = {
8590 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8591 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8592 &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8593 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8596 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &bob_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8597 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
8600 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST - 1);
8602 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8603 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8604 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8605 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8606 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8608 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8609 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8610 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8612 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8613 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8614 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut channel) = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2) {
8615 if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8616 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8617 assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
8618 assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8619 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8620 } else { assert!(false); }
8625 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8626 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8628 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8629 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8631 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8634 let mut txn = bob_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8635 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8636 bob_state_y = txn.remove(0);
8639 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8640 let height = HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST + 1;
8641 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
8642 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
8643 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
8644 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8645 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, vec![bob_state_y.clone()]), height);
8646 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
8648 let htlc_txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8649 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
8650 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8655 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8656 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8657 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8660 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8661 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8663 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8664 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8665 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8666 // before receiving funding_signed.
8667 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8668 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8669 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8670 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8672 // Create an initial channel
8673 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
8674 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8675 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8676 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8677 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
8679 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8680 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8682 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8683 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8685 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8686 let channel_id = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8687 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8688 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8689 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("Hi".to_string()) }, true,
8690 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8694 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8695 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8696 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8697 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8698 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8699 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8700 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8702 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8703 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8704 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8705 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8707 // Create some initial channels
8708 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8710 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8711 let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8712 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8713 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8714 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8715 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8717 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8718 let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![local_txn[0].clone()]);
8719 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
8720 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8721 // this test before #653 fix.
8722 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &block, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8723 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8724 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8725 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8726 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
8728 let htlc_timeout = {
8729 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8730 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8731 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8732 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8733 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
8737 connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![htlc_timeout.clone()]));
8738 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8739 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8742 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8743 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8744 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8745 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8747 // Steps of the test:
8748 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8749 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8750 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8751 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8752 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8753 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8754 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8755 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8756 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8757 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8758 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8759 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8761 // Create some initial channels
8762 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8763 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001);
8765 // Steps (1) and (2):
8766 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8767 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8769 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8770 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8771 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8772 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8773 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8774 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8775 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8777 // Steps (3) and (4):
8778 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8779 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8780 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8781 let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8784 if !broadcast_alice {
8785 force_closing_node = 1;
8786 counterparty_node = 0;
8788 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8789 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8790 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8791 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8792 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8793 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8794 true => alice_txn.clone(),
8795 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8797 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8798 if broadcast_alice {
8799 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8800 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8801 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8806 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8807 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8808 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8809 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8810 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8812 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8813 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8814 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8815 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8816 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8817 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8819 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8820 let went_onchain = go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1;
8821 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if went_onchain { None } else { Some(1000) }, went_onchain, false);
8822 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8823 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8824 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8825 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8827 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8828 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8830 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8833 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8834 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8835 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8836 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8838 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8839 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8840 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8841 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8842 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8845 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8847 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8848 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8849 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8852 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8855 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8856 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8857 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8858 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8860 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8861 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8862 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8863 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8864 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8867 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8869 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8870 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8872 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8873 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8874 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8875 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8876 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8877 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8878 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8879 if broadcast_alice {
8880 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8881 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8882 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8884 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8885 if broadcast_alice {
8886 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8887 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8889 if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
8890 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8891 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].txid(), bob_txn[1].txid());
8893 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8895 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8900 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8901 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8903 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8904 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8905 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8907 // If Alice force-closed, Bob only broadcasts a HTLC-output-claiming transaction. Otherwise,
8908 // Bob force-closed and broadcasts the commitment transaction along with a
8909 // HTLC-output-claiming transaction.
8910 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8911 if broadcast_alice {
8912 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8913 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8914 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8916 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 });
8917 let htlc_tx = bob_txn.pop().unwrap();
8918 check_spends!(htlc_tx, txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8919 assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8925 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8926 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8927 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8928 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8929 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8933 fn test_duplicate_temporary_channel_id_from_different_peers() {
8934 // Tests that we can accept two different `OpenChannel` requests with the same
8935 // `temporary_channel_id`, as long as they are from different peers.
8936 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8937 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8938 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8939 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8941 // Create an first channel channel
8942 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
8943 let mut open_chan_msg_chan_1_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8945 // Create an second channel
8946 nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None, None).unwrap();
8947 let mut open_chan_msg_chan_2_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8949 // Modify the `OpenChannel` from `nodes[2]` to `nodes[0]` to ensure that it uses the same
8950 // `temporary_channel_id` as the `OpenChannel` from nodes[1] to nodes[0].
8951 open_chan_msg_chan_2_0.temporary_channel_id = open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id;
8953 // Assert that `nodes[0]` can accept both `OpenChannel` requests, even though they use the same
8954 // `temporary_channel_id` as they are from different peers.
8955 nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_1_0);
8957 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8958 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8960 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8961 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8962 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8964 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8968 nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_2_0);
8970 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8971 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8973 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8974 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8975 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8977 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8983 fn test_peer_funding_sidechannel() {
8984 // Test that if a peer somehow learns which txid we'll use for our channel funding before we
8985 // receive `funding_transaction_generated` the peer cannot cause us to crash. We'd previously
8986 // assumed that LDK would receive `funding_transaction_generated` prior to our peer learning
8987 // the txid and panicked if the peer tried to open a redundant channel to us with the same
8988 // funding outpoint.
8990 // While this assumption is generally safe, some users may have out-of-band protocols where
8991 // they notify their LSP about a funding outpoint first, or this may be violated in the future
8992 // with collaborative transaction construction protocols, i.e. dual-funding.
8993 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8994 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8995 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8996 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8998 let temp_chan_id_ab = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
8999 let temp_chan_id_ca = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[2], &nodes[0], 1_000_000, 0);
9001 let (_, tx, funding_output) =
9002 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9004 let cs_funding_events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9005 assert_eq!(cs_funding_events.len(), 1);
9006 match cs_funding_events[0] {
9007 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => {}
9008 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", cs_funding_events),
9011 nodes[2].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temp_chan_id_ca, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), funding_output.index).unwrap();
9012 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9013 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9014 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9015 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9016 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9018 let res = nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_chan_id_ab, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone());
9019 let err_msg = format!("{:?}", res.unwrap_err());
9020 assert!(err_msg.contains("An existing channel using outpoint "));
9021 assert!(err_msg.contains(" is open with peer"));
9022 // Even though the last funding_transaction_generated errored, it still generated a
9023 // SendFundingCreated. However, when the peer responds with a funding_signed it will send the
9024 // appropriate error message.
9025 let as_funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9026 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_created);
9027 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9028 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9029 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: format!("An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}", funding_output, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), };
9030 check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(funding_output.to_channel_id(), true, reason)]);
9032 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9033 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9034 get_err_msg(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9038 fn test_duplicate_conflicting_funding_from_second_peer() {
9039 // Test that if a user tries to fund a channel with a funding outpoint they'd previously used
9040 // we don't try to remove the previous ChannelMonitor. This is largely a test to ensure we
9041 // don't regress in the fuzzer, as such funding getting passed our outpoint-matches checks
9042 // implies the user (and our counterparty) has reused cryptographic keys across channels, which
9043 // we require the user not do.
9044 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9045 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9046 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9047 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9049 let temp_chan_id = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
9051 let (_, tx, funding_output) =
9052 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9054 // Now that we have a funding outpoint, create a dummy `ChannelMonitor` and insert it into
9055 // nodes[0]'s ChainMonitor so that the initial `ChannelMonitor` write fails.
9056 let dummy_chan_id = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[2], &nodes[3]).3;
9057 let dummy_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[2], dummy_chan_id).clone();
9058 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_output, dummy_monitor).unwrap();
9060 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9062 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9063 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9064 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9065 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9066 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9068 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9069 // At this point, the channel should be closed, after having generated one monitor write (the
9070 // watch_channel call which failed), but zero monitor updates.
9071 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9072 get_err_msg(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9073 let err_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned() };
9074 check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(funding_signed_msg.channel_id, true, err_reason)]);
9078 fn test_duplicate_funding_err_in_funding() {
9079 // Test that if we have a live channel with one peer, then another peer comes along and tries
9080 // to create a second channel with the same txid we'll fail and not overwrite the
9081 // outpoint_to_peer map in `ChannelManager`.
9083 // This was previously broken.
9084 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9085 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9086 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9087 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9089 let (_, _, _, real_channel_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9090 let real_chan_funding_txo = chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9091 assert_eq!(real_chan_funding_txo.to_channel_id(), real_channel_id);
9093 nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9094 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9095 let node_c_temp_chan_id = open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id;
9096 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = real_channel_id;
9097 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9098 let mut accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9099 accept_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = node_c_temp_chan_id;
9100 nodes[2].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
9102 // Now that we have a second channel with the same funding txo, send a bogus funding message
9103 // and let nodes[1] remove the inbound channel.
9104 let (_, funding_tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[2], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9106 nodes[2].node.funding_transaction_generated(&node_c_temp_chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), funding_tx).unwrap();
9108 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9109 funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id = real_channel_id;
9110 // Make the signature invalid by changing the funding output
9111 funding_created_msg.funding_output_index += 10;
9112 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9113 get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9114 let err = "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned();
9115 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err };
9116 let expected_closing = ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(real_channel_id, false, reason);
9117 check_closed_events(&nodes[1], &[expected_closing]);
9120 *nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().get(&real_chan_funding_txo).unwrap(),
9121 nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
9126 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
9127 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
9128 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
9130 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
9131 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
9132 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
9133 // updating logic for the existing channel.
9134 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9135 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9136 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9137 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9139 // Create an initial channel
9140 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9141 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9142 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9143 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9145 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
9146 // that it is rejected.
9147 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9149 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9150 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9152 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9153 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
9154 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
9155 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
9156 // move forward with it.
9157 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9158 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9160 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9164 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9165 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9167 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9170 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9171 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9173 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9174 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9175 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9176 added_monitors.clear();
9178 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9180 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9182 let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9183 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
9185 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9188 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9189 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9190 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9191 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9192 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9194 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9195 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9197 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9198 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9199 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9200 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9201 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9203 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9207 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9208 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9209 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9210 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9211 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9212 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9214 let funding_created = {
9215 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9216 let mut a_peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9217 // Once we call `get_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
9218 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
9219 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
9220 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
9221 match a_peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap() {
9222 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan) => {
9223 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9224 chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap()
9226 _ => panic!("Unexpected ChannelPhase variant"),
9229 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9230 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9231 // At this point we'll look up if the channel_id is present and immediately fail the channel
9232 // without trying to persist the `ChannelMonitor`.
9233 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9235 check_closed_events(&nodes[1], &[
9236 ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(funding_created.temporary_channel_id, false, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
9237 err: "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned()
9241 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9243 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9244 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9246 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9247 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9248 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9249 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9250 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9252 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9256 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9257 // everything is functional.
9258 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9260 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9261 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9262 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9263 added_monitors.clear();
9265 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9267 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9268 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9269 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9270 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9272 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9273 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9274 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9276 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9280 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9281 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9283 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9284 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9285 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9286 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9287 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9288 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9289 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9291 // Create some initial channels
9292 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9293 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9294 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001);
9296 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9297 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9298 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9300 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9301 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9302 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9304 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9305 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9307 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9308 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) },
9309 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9310 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9311 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9312 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9313 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9315 // A null channel ID should close all channels
9316 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9317 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(), data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9319 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) },
9320 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 100000);
9321 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9322 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9324 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9325 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9327 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9330 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9331 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9333 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9335 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9336 // peer_disconnected.
9337 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9338 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9340 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9341 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9342 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9346 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9347 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9349 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9350 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9351 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9352 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9354 // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9355 // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9356 // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9357 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9358 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9359 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9360 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9362 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9363 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9364 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9366 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9368 // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9369 // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9370 // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9372 let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9373 let wit_program_script: ScriptBuf = wit_program.into();
9374 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9375 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9376 output.script_pubkey = ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9379 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9380 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9381 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9382 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9384 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9386 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9388 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9389 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9391 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9392 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9393 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9395 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9396 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9397 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() },
9398 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9399 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9400 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9401 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9402 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9403 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9404 if let msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg } = action {
9405 assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9406 } else { panic!(); }
9407 } else { panic!(); }
9408 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9410 // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9411 // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9412 // as its not 32 bytes long.
9413 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9414 version: 2i32, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
9415 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9416 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9420 script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
9421 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
9422 witness: Witness::from_slice(&channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9424 output: vec![TxOut {
9426 script_pubkey: ScriptBuf::new(),
9429 check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9430 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9434 fn test_coinbase_funding_tx() {
9435 // Miners are able to fund channels directly from coinbase transactions, however
9436 // by consensus rules, outputs of a coinbase transaction are encumbered by a 100
9437 // block maturity timelock. To ensure that a (non-0conf) channel like this is enforceable
9438 // on-chain, the minimum depth is updated to 100 blocks for coinbase funding transactions.
9440 // Note that 0conf channels with coinbase funding transactions are unaffected and are
9441 // immediately operational after opening.
9442 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9443 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9444 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9445 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9447 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9448 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9450 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9451 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9453 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9455 // Create the coinbase funding transaction.
9456 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_coinbase_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9458 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9459 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9460 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9462 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9463 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9464 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9466 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9468 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9469 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9471 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9472 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9474 // Starting at height 0, we "confirm" the coinbase at height 1.
9475 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 1);
9476 // We connect 98 more blocks to have 99 confirmations for the coinbase transaction.
9477 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], COINBASE_MATURITY - 2);
9478 // Check that we have no pending message events (we have not queued a `channel_ready` yet).
9479 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9480 // Now connect one more block which results in 100 confirmations of the coinbase transaction.
9481 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
9482 // There should now be a `channel_ready` which can be handled.
9483 let _ = &nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(&nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9485 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9486 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], COINBASE_MATURITY - 2);
9487 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9488 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
9489 expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9490 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9493 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9494 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9495 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9496 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9497 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9498 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9499 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9500 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9501 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9502 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9503 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9504 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9505 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9506 // until we learned about an additional block.
9508 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9509 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9510 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9511 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9512 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9513 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9514 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9516 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9517 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9518 let (_, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9519 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9520 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9522 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9523 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9524 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9525 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9526 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9527 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9529 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9530 if !test_height_before_timelock {
9531 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9533 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9534 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9535 if test_height_before_timelock {
9536 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9537 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9538 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9539 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9541 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9542 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9543 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9544 let htlc_tx = if spending_txn[0].txid() == node_txn[0].txid() {
9549 check_spends!(htlc_tx, node_txn[0]);
9550 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9552 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9553 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9555 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9556 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9557 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9558 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9559 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, htlc_tx)], conf_height + 1);
9560 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
9561 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9563 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9564 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9565 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9566 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9567 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9568 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9569 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9570 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9571 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9576 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9577 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9578 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9581 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9582 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9583 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9584 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9585 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9587 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9589 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9590 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
9591 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000).unwrap();
9593 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9596 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9597 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9598 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9599 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9600 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9601 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9602 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9603 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9605 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9606 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9609 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
9610 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9611 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
9612 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9613 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9614 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9615 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9616 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9617 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9618 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9619 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9620 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9621 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9624 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9625 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9627 if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9628 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9629 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9631 let expected_destinations = vec![
9632 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9633 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9635 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], expected_destinations);
9636 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9638 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9639 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9640 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9642 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9643 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9644 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9646 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9647 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 4);
9648 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9649 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9650 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
9651 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
9653 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9654 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9655 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9657 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9658 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9659 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9660 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9662 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
9664 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9669 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9670 // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9671 // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentClaimable` event.
9672 // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9673 // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9674 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9678 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9679 // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9680 // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9681 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9685 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9686 // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9687 // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9688 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9689 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9690 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9691 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9693 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9694 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9695 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9696 let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9698 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9699 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
9700 let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000).unwrap();
9701 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9702 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9703 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9704 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9705 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9708 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9710 let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9711 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9713 let session_privs = {
9714 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9715 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9716 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9717 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9718 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9719 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9721 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9722 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9723 &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9724 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9727 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9728 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9729 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9731 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9733 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9734 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9735 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9738 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9739 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9740 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9742 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9743 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9745 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9746 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9748 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9749 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9750 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9752 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9753 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9754 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9756 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9757 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9758 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9760 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9761 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9762 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9763 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9765 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9767 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9768 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9769 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9771 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9772 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9774 let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9775 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9776 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9778 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9780 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9781 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9782 &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9783 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9785 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9786 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9787 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9789 do_claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9790 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, Some(None), true, true);
9794 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9795 // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentClaimable event, the HTLCs
9796 // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9797 // PaymentClaimable event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9799 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9800 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9801 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9802 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9804 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9805 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9806 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9807 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9809 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9810 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9811 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9812 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9813 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9814 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9817 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9818 // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentClaimable event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9819 // amount of time to respond to.
9821 // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9822 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9823 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9825 let failed_destinations = vec![
9826 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9827 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9829 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9831 pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash, PaymentFailureReason::RecipientRejected);
9833 // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9834 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9835 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9836 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9838 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9839 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9840 let node_1_msgs = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
9841 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), node_1_msgs, false, None);
9843 // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9844 // that PaymentClaimable event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9845 nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9846 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9847 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9850 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9851 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9852 enum ExposureEvent {
9853 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9855 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9857 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9858 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9861 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool, multiplier_dust_limit: bool) {
9862 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9865 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9866 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9867 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9868 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9869 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9870 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9871 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9872 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9874 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9875 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9876 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = if multiplier_dust_limit {
9877 // Default test fee estimator rate is 253 sat/kw, so we set the multiplier to 5_000_000 / 253
9878 // to get roughly the same initial value as the default setting when this test was
9879 // originally written.
9880 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253)
9881 } else { MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(5_000_000) }; // initial default setting value
9882 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9883 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9884 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9886 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9887 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9888 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9889 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9891 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9893 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9894 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9895 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9897 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9899 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9902 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
9903 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
9904 match get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id) {
9905 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
9906 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9908 _ => panic!("Unexpected ChannelPhase variant"),
9912 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9913 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9914 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9915 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9917 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9918 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9919 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9921 let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9922 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9923 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9925 // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
9926 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
9927 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
9929 let (dust_buffer_feerate, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat) = {
9930 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9931 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9932 let chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9933 (chan.context().get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64,
9934 chan.context().get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator(nodes[0].fee_estimator)))
9936 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9937 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9939 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9940 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9942 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 4;
9943 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9946 if dust_outbound_balance {
9947 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9948 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9949 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9950 for _ in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9951 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9952 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9953 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9956 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9957 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9958 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9959 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9960 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9964 if dust_outbound_balance {
9965 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9966 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9967 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
9968 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9969 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9970 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9973 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9974 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9975 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
9976 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9981 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9982 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat =
9983 if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 1 };
9984 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9986 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9987 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
9988 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
9990 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9991 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
9992 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
9994 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9995 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 4 });
9996 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9997 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9998 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9999 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10000 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10001 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
10002 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10003 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10005 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
10006 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10007 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10008 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10010 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
10011 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel",
10012 format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
10013 dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1) + dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 4,
10014 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10016 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
10017 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = 2_500_000;
10018 // For the multiplier dust exposure limit, since it scales with feerate,
10019 // we need to add a lot of HTLCs that will become dust at the new feerate
10020 // to cross the threshold.
10022 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash(&nodes[1], Some(1_000), None);
10023 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10024 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10027 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10028 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
10030 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10031 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10032 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel", "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure", 1);
10035 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10036 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
10037 added_monitors.clear();
10040 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(multiplier_dust_limit: bool) {
10041 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10042 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10043 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10044 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10045 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10046 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10047 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10048 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10049 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10050 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10051 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10052 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10056 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
10057 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(false);
10058 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(true);
10062 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
10063 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10064 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10065 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10066 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10068 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10069 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10070 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10071 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10072 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10074 let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
10076 let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
10077 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10078 let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::ScriptBuf::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_slice(&[&[1]]) };
10079 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10080 let mut tx = match events[0] {
10081 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
10082 // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 1.
10083 Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: LockTime::from_height(best_height + 2).unwrap(), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
10084 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10087 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10089 // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
10090 match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
10091 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10092 assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
10096 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10097 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10099 Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, .. } => {
10100 assert_eq!(channel_id, temp_channel_id);
10102 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10107 fn test_non_final_funding_tx_within_headroom() {
10108 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10109 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10110 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10111 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10113 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10114 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10115 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10116 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10117 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10119 let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
10121 let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
10122 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10123 let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::ScriptBuf::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_slice(&[[1]]) };
10124 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10125 let mut tx = match events[0] {
10126 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
10127 // Timelock the transaction within a +1 headroom from the best block.
10128 Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: LockTime::from_consensus(best_height + 1), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
10129 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10132 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10135 // Transaction should be accepted if it's in a +1 headroom from best block.
10136 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
10137 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10141 fn accept_busted_but_better_fee() {
10142 // If a peer sends us a fee update that is too low, but higher than our previous channel
10143 // feerate, we should accept it. In the future we may want to consider closing the channel
10144 // later, but for now we only accept the update.
10145 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10146 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10147 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10148 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10150 create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10152 // Set nodes[1] to expect 5,000 sat/kW.
10154 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10155 *feerate_lock = 5000;
10158 // If nodes[0] increases their feerate, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept it.
10160 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10161 *feerate_lock = 1000;
10163 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10166 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10167 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10169 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
10170 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10171 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
10173 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10176 // If nodes[0] increases their feerate further, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept
10179 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10180 *feerate_lock = 2000;
10182 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10183 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10185 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10186 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10188 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
10189 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10190 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
10192 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10195 // However, if nodes[0] decreases their feerate, nodes[1] should reject it and close the
10198 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10199 *feerate_lock = 1000;
10201 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10202 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10204 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10205 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10207 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
10208 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10209 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
10210 err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000".to_owned() },
10211 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10212 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
10213 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10215 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10219 fn do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(valid_delta: bool, use_user_hash: bool) {
10220 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10221 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10222 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10223 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10224 let min_final_cltv_expiry_delta = 120;
10225 let final_cltv_expiry_delta = if valid_delta { min_final_cltv_expiry_delta + 2 } else {
10226 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta - 2 };
10227 let recv_value = 100_000;
10229 create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10231 let payment_parameters = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32);
10232 let (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = if use_user_hash {
10233 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1],
10234 Some(recv_value), Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta));
10235 (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret)
10237 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(recv_value), 7200, Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)).unwrap();
10238 (payment_hash, nodes[1].node.get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret).unwrap(), payment_secret)
10240 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_parameters, recv_value).unwrap();
10241 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10242 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10243 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10244 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10245 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10246 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
10247 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10248 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10249 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10252 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, recv_value, if use_user_hash {
10253 None } else { Some(payment_preimage) }, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10255 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
10257 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10261 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10262 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10263 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10265 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10270 fn test_payment_with_custom_min_cltv_expiry_delta() {
10271 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, false);
10272 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, true);
10273 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, false);
10274 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, true);
10278 fn test_disconnects_peer_awaiting_response_ticks() {
10279 // Tests that nodes which are awaiting on a response critical for channel responsiveness
10280 // disconnect their counterparty after `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10281 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10282 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10283 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10284 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10286 // Asserts a disconnect event is queued to the user.
10287 let check_disconnect_event = |node: &Node, should_disconnect: bool| {
10288 let disconnect_event = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
10289 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action, .. } = event {
10290 if let msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning { .. } = action {
10299 assert_eq!(disconnect_event.is_some(), should_disconnect);
10302 // Fires timer ticks ensuring we only attempt to disconnect peers after reaching
10303 // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10304 let check_disconnect = |node: &Node| {
10305 // No disconnect without any timer ticks.
10306 check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10308 // No disconnect with 1 timer tick less than required.
10309 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS - 1 {
10310 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10311 check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10314 // Disconnect after reaching the required ticks.
10315 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10316 check_disconnect_event(node, true);
10318 // Disconnect again on the next tick if the peer hasn't been disconnected yet.
10319 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10320 check_disconnect_event(node, true);
10323 create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10325 // We'll start by performing a fee update with Alice (nodes[0]) on the channel.
10326 *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
10327 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10328 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
10329 let alice_fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10330 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), alice_fee_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10331 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_fee_update.commitment_signed);
10332 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
10334 // This will prompt Bob (nodes[1]) to respond with his `CommitmentSigned` and `RevokeAndACK`.
10335 let (bob_revoke_and_ack, bob_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10336 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revoke_and_ack);
10337 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
10338 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_commitment_signed);
10339 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10341 // Alice then needs to send her final `RevokeAndACK` to complete the commitment dance. We
10342 // pretend Bob hasn't received the message and check whether he'll disconnect Alice after
10343 // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10344 let alice_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10345 check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
10347 // Now, we'll reconnect them to test awaiting a `ChannelReestablish` message.
10349 // Note that since the commitment dance didn't complete above, Alice is expected to resend her
10350 // final `RevokeAndACK` to Bob to complete it.
10351 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10352 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10353 let bob_init = msgs::Init {
10354 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10356 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_init, true).unwrap();
10357 let alice_init = msgs::Init {
10358 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10360 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_init, true).unwrap();
10362 // Upon reconnection, Alice sends her `ChannelReestablish` to Bob. Alice, however, hasn't
10363 // received Bob's yet, so she should disconnect him after reaching
10364 // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10365 let alice_channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
10366 nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()
10368 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_channel_reestablish);
10369 check_disconnect(&nodes[0]);
10371 // Bob now sends his `ChannelReestablish` to Alice to resume the channel and consider it "live".
10372 let bob_channel_reestablish = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
10373 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = event {
10374 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10380 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_channel_reestablish);
10382 // Sanity check that Alice won't disconnect Bob since she's no longer waiting for any messages.
10383 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
10384 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10385 check_disconnect_event(&nodes[0], false);
10388 // However, Bob is still waiting on Alice's `RevokeAndACK`, so he should disconnect her after
10389 // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10390 check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
10392 // Finally, have Bob process the last message.
10393 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_revoke_and_ack);
10394 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10396 // At this point, neither node should attempt to disconnect each other, since they aren't
10397 // waiting on any messages.
10398 for node in &nodes {
10399 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
10400 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10401 check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10407 fn test_remove_expired_outbound_unfunded_channels() {
10408 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10409 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10410 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10411 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10413 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10414 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10415 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10416 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10417 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10419 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10420 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10422 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => (),
10423 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10426 // Asserts the outbound channel has been removed from a nodes[0]'s peer state map.
10427 let check_outbound_channel_existence = |should_exist: bool| {
10428 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10429 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10430 assert_eq!(chan_lock.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temp_channel_id), should_exist);
10433 // Channel should exist without any timer ticks.
10434 check_outbound_channel_existence(true);
10436 // Channel should exist with 1 timer tick less than required.
10437 for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS - 1 {
10438 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10439 check_outbound_channel_existence(true)
10442 // Remove channel after reaching the required ticks.
10443 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10444 check_outbound_channel_existence(false);
10446 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10447 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10448 match msg_events[0] {
10449 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
10450 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake");
10452 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10454 check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10458 fn test_remove_expired_inbound_unfunded_channels() {
10459 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10460 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10461 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10462 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10464 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10465 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10466 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10467 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10468 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10470 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10471 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10473 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => (),
10474 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10477 // Asserts the inbound channel has been removed from a nodes[1]'s peer state map.
10478 let check_inbound_channel_existence = |should_exist: bool| {
10479 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10480 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10481 assert_eq!(chan_lock.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temp_channel_id), should_exist);
10484 // Channel should exist without any timer ticks.
10485 check_inbound_channel_existence(true);
10487 // Channel should exist with 1 timer tick less than required.
10488 for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS - 1 {
10489 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10490 check_inbound_channel_existence(true)
10493 // Remove channel after reaching the required ticks.
10494 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10495 check_inbound_channel_existence(false);
10497 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10498 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10499 match msg_events[0] {
10500 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
10501 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake");
10503 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10505 check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10508 fn do_test_multi_post_event_actions(do_reload: bool) {
10509 // Tests handling multiple post-Event actions at once.
10510 // There is specific code in ChannelManager to handle channels where multiple post-Event
10511 // `ChannelMonitorUpdates` are pending at once. This test exercises that code.
10513 // Specifically, we test calling `get_and_clear_pending_events` while there are two
10514 // PaymentSents from different channels and one channel has two pending `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s
10515 // - one from an RAA and one from an inbound commitment_signed.
10516 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10517 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10518 let (persister, chain_monitor);
10519 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10520 let nodes_0_deserialized;
10521 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10523 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
10524 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).2;
10526 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
10527 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
10529 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
10530 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
10532 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
10533 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10534 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 1_000_000);
10536 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
10537 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
10538 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 1_000_000);
10540 for dest in &[1, 2] {
10541 let htlc_fulfill_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[*dest], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10542 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[*dest].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fulfill_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10543 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[*dest], htlc_fulfill_updates.commitment_signed, false);
10544 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 0);
10547 let (route, payment_hash_3, _, payment_secret_3) =
10548 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
10549 let payment_id = PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0);
10550 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_3,
10551 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_3), payment_id).unwrap();
10552 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10554 let send_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
10555 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]);
10556 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg);
10557 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10560 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
10561 let chan_0_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).encode();
10562 let chan_1_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_2).encode();
10563 reload_node!(nodes[0], test_default_channel_config(), &nodes_0_serialized, &[&chan_0_monitor_serialized, &chan_1_monitor_serialized], persister, chain_monitor, nodes_0_deserialized);
10565 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10566 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10568 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
10569 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[2]));
10572 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10573 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
10574 if let Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } = events[0] {
10575 assert!(payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage || payment_preimage == payment_preimage_2);
10576 } else { panic!(); }
10577 if let Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } = events[1] {
10578 assert!(payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage || payment_preimage == payment_preimage_2);
10579 } else { panic!(); }
10580 if let Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } = events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
10581 if let Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } = events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
10583 // After the events are processed, the ChannelMonitorUpdates will be released and, upon their
10584 // completion, we'll respond to nodes[1] with an RAA + CS.
10585 get_revoke_commit_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10586 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 3);
10590 fn test_multi_post_event_actions() {
10591 do_test_multi_post_event_actions(true);
10592 do_test_multi_post_event_actions(false);
10596 fn test_batch_channel_open() {
10597 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10598 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10599 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10600 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10602 // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
10603 let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
10604 (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
10605 (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
10608 // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
10609 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
10610 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10611 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10613 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10614 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10615 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10617 // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
10618 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10620 // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 2.
10621 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[1]);
10622 check_added_monitors(&nodes[2], 1);
10623 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[2], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10625 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10626 chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
10627 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10628 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10630 // The transaction should not have been broadcast before persisting all monitors has been
10632 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
10633 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
10635 // Complete the persistence of the monitor.
10636 nodes[0].chain_monitor.complete_sole_pending_chan_update(
10637 &OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 }.to_channel_id()
10639 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10641 // The transaction should only have been broadcast now.
10642 let broadcasted_txs = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
10643 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs.len(), 1);
10644 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0], tx);
10646 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10647 assert!(events.iter().any(|e| matches!(
10649 crate::events::Event::ChannelPending {
10650 ref counterparty_node_id,
10652 } if counterparty_node_id == &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
10654 assert!(events.iter().any(|e| matches!(
10656 crate::events::Event::ChannelPending {
10657 ref counterparty_node_id,
10659 } if counterparty_node_id == &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
10664 fn test_disconnect_in_funding_batch() {
10665 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10666 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10667 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10668 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10670 // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
10671 let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
10672 (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
10673 (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
10676 // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
10677 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
10678 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10679 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10681 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10682 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10683 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10685 // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
10686 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
10688 // The remaining peer in the batch disconnects.
10689 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
10691 // The channels in the batch will close immediately.
10692 let channel_id_1 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id();
10693 let channel_id_2 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 }.to_channel_id();
10694 check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[
10695 ExpectedCloseEvent {
10696 channel_id: Some(channel_id_1),
10697 discard_funding: true,
10698 ..Default::default()
10700 ExpectedCloseEvent {
10701 channel_id: Some(channel_id_2),
10702 discard_funding: true,
10703 ..Default::default()
10707 // The monitor should become closed.
10708 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10710 let mut monitor_updates = nodes[0].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
10711 let monitor_updates_1 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_1).unwrap();
10712 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1.len(), 1);
10713 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
10716 // The funding transaction should not have been broadcast, and therefore, we don't need
10717 // to broadcast a force-close transaction for the closed monitor.
10718 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
10720 // Ensure the channels don't exist anymore.
10721 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
10725 fn test_batch_funding_close_after_funding_signed() {
10726 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10727 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10728 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10729 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10731 // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
10732 let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
10733 (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
10734 (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
10737 // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
10738 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
10739 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10740 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10742 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10743 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10744 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10746 // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 2.
10747 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[1]);
10748 check_added_monitors(&nodes[2], 1);
10749 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[2], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10751 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10752 chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
10753 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10754 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10756 // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
10757 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
10759 // Force-close the channel for which we've completed the initial monitor.
10760 let channel_id_1 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id();
10761 let channel_id_2 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 }.to_channel_id();
10762 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id_1, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10763 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 2);
10765 let mut monitor_updates = nodes[0].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
10766 let monitor_updates_1 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_1).unwrap();
10767 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1.len(), 1);
10768 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
10769 let monitor_updates_2 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_2).unwrap();
10770 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_2.len(), 1);
10771 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_2[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
10773 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10774 match msg_events[0] {
10775 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => (),
10776 _ => panic!("Unexpected message."),
10779 // We broadcast the commitment transaction as part of the force-close.
10781 let broadcasted_txs = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
10782 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs.len(), 1);
10783 assert!(broadcasted_txs[0].txid() != tx.txid());
10784 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input.len(), 1);
10785 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
10788 // All channels in the batch should close immediately.
10789 check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[
10790 ExpectedCloseEvent {
10791 channel_id: Some(channel_id_1),
10792 discard_funding: true,
10793 ..Default::default()
10795 ExpectedCloseEvent {
10796 channel_id: Some(channel_id_2),
10797 discard_funding: true,
10798 ..Default::default()
10802 // Ensure the channels don't exist anymore.
10803 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
10806 fn do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(confirm_remote_commitment: bool) {
10807 // Tests that a node will forget the channel (when it only requires 1 confirmation) if the
10808 // funding and commitment transaction confirm in the same block.
10809 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10810 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10811 let mut min_depth_1_block_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10812 min_depth_1_block_cfg.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
10813 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(min_depth_1_block_cfg), Some(min_depth_1_block_cfg)]);
10814 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10816 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
10817 let chan_id = chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id();
10819 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
10820 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
10822 let (closing_node, other_node) = if confirm_remote_commitment {
10823 (&nodes[1], &nodes[0])
10825 (&nodes[0], &nodes[1])
10828 closing_node.node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &other_node.node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10829 let mut msg_events = closing_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10830 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10831 match msg_events.pop().unwrap() {
10832 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, .. } => {},
10833 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10835 check_added_monitors(closing_node, 1);
10836 check_closed_event(closing_node, 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[other_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
10838 let commitment_tx = {
10839 let mut txn = closing_node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
10840 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
10841 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
10842 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
10846 mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&funding_tx, &commitment_tx]);
10847 mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&funding_tx, &commitment_tx]);
10849 check_closed_broadcast(other_node, 1, true);
10850 check_added_monitors(other_node, 1);
10851 check_closed_event(other_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false, &[closing_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
10853 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
10854 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
10858 fn test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block() {
10859 do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(false);
10860 do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(true);