1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use chain::channelmonitor;
17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
19 use chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
21 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
25 use ln::chan_utils::HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT;
26 use routing::network_graph::{NetworkUpdate, RoutingFees};
27 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, get_route, get_keysend_route};
28 use routing::scorer::Scorer;
29 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
31 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
32 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
33 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
34 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
35 use util::errors::APIError;
36 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
37 use util::config::UserConfig;
39 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
43 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
44 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
46 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
47 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
50 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
56 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
57 use core::default::Default;
58 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
60 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
61 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
64 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
65 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
66 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
67 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
68 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
69 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
71 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
73 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
74 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
75 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
77 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
78 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
80 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
81 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
83 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
84 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
85 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
86 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
87 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
88 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
89 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
90 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
92 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
93 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
95 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
97 } else { assert!(false); }
100 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
101 use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
103 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
104 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
106 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
108 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
110 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
112 insane_open_helper(r"Bogus; channel reserve \(\d+\) is less than dust limit \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis + 1; msg });
114 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
116 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
118 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
120 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
124 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
125 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
126 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
127 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
128 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
129 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
132 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
136 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
137 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
138 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
139 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
140 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
141 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
142 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
143 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
144 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
145 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
147 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
149 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
151 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
153 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
156 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
157 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
159 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
160 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
161 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
162 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
163 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
165 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
168 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
170 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
171 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
172 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
175 let payment_event = {
176 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
177 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
178 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
180 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
181 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
183 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
184 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
185 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
186 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
187 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
190 // deliver(1), generate (3):
191 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
192 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
193 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
194 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
196 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
197 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
198 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
199 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
200 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
201 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
202 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
203 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
205 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
206 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
207 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
208 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
209 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
210 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
211 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
212 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
214 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
215 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
216 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
217 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
219 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
220 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
221 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
223 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
224 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
226 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
227 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
229 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
230 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
233 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
234 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
238 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
239 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
240 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
241 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
242 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
243 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
244 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
245 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
248 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
250 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
252 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
255 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
256 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
258 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
259 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
260 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
261 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
264 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
267 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
269 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
270 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
271 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
274 let payment_event = {
275 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
276 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
277 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
279 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
280 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
282 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
283 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
284 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
285 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
286 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
287 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
289 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
290 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
292 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
296 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
297 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
298 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
299 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
300 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
301 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
304 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
305 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
306 // update_fee (never committed) ->
308 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
309 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
310 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
311 // <- (1) RAA delivered
312 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
313 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
314 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
315 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
317 // B should send no response here
318 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
319 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
322 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
325 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
326 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
327 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
329 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
330 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
332 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
333 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
334 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
335 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
336 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
338 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
341 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
342 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
343 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
344 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
345 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
347 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
350 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
351 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
353 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
354 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
355 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
357 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
358 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
359 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
360 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
363 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
365 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
367 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
369 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
370 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
371 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
372 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
373 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
374 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
375 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
376 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
377 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
378 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
379 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
381 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
382 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
383 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
384 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
385 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
387 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
388 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
389 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
392 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
393 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
394 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
396 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
397 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
398 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
400 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
401 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
402 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
403 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
405 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
406 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
410 fn do_test_1_conf_open(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
411 // Previously, if the minium_depth config was set to 1, we'd never send a funding_locked. This
412 // tests that we properly send one in that case.
413 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
414 alice_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
415 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
416 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
417 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
418 bob_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
419 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
420 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
421 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
422 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
423 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
424 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
425 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
427 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
428 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
429 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
431 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
432 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
433 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
436 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
437 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
438 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
442 fn test_1_conf_open() {
443 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst);
444 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst);
445 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
448 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
449 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
450 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
451 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
454 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
455 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
456 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
457 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
459 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
461 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
464 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
465 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
468 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
469 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
470 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
472 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
473 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
474 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
476 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
477 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
479 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
481 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
482 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
483 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
484 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
486 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
487 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
489 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
490 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
491 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
492 added_monitors.clear();
494 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
496 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
497 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
499 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
500 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
501 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
502 added_monitors.clear();
505 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
506 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
508 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
509 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
511 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
512 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
513 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
514 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
518 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
519 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
520 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
521 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
522 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
523 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
524 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
525 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
526 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
527 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
528 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
529 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
530 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
531 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
532 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
533 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
534 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
535 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
536 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
540 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
541 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
542 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
543 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
544 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
545 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
548 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
551 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
552 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
554 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
555 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
556 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
557 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
558 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
560 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
562 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
564 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
565 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
566 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
568 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
569 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
570 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
572 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
573 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
574 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
575 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
577 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
578 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
579 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
583 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
584 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
585 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
586 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
587 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
588 let channel_value = 1888;
589 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 700000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
590 let channel_id = chan.2;
594 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
595 *feerate_lock = feerate;
597 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
598 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
599 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
601 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
603 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
605 //Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate of 260 set above.
606 //This value results in a fee that is exactly what the funder can afford (277 sat + 1000 sat channel reserve)
608 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
610 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit so -2 non-HTLC txns from number of outputs
611 let num_htlcs = commitment_tx.output.len() - 2;
612 let total_fee: u64 = feerate as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
613 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
614 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
615 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
618 //Add 2 to the previous fee rate to the final fee increases by 1 (with no HTLCs the fee is essentially
619 //fee_rate*(724/1000) so the increment of 1*0.724 is rounded back down)
621 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
622 *feerate_lock = feerate + 2;
624 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
625 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
627 let update2_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
629 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
631 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
632 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
633 //Should produce and error.
634 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.commitment_signed);
635 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
636 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
637 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
638 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
642 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
643 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
644 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
645 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
646 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
647 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
650 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
653 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
656 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
657 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
659 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
660 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
661 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
662 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
663 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
665 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
667 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
668 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
669 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
670 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
672 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
674 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
675 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
677 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
678 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
679 added_monitors.clear();
681 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
682 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
683 // node[1] has nothing to do
685 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
686 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
687 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
689 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
690 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
691 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
692 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
693 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
694 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
695 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
697 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
698 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
699 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
700 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
701 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
702 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
704 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
705 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
706 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
707 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
709 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
710 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
711 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
713 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
714 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
715 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
716 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
718 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
719 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
720 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
722 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
724 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
725 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
727 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
728 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
731 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
733 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
734 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
735 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
736 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
737 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
741 fn test_update_fee() {
742 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
743 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
744 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
745 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
746 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
747 let channel_id = chan.2;
750 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
751 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
752 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
753 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
754 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
755 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
756 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
757 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
758 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
759 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
760 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
763 // Create and deliver (1)...
766 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
767 feerate = *feerate_lock;
768 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
770 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
771 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
773 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
774 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
775 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
776 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
777 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
779 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
781 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
783 // Generate (2) and (3):
784 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
785 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
786 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
789 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
790 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
791 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
793 // Create and deliver (4)...
795 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
796 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
798 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
799 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
800 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
801 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
802 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
803 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
804 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
806 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
809 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
810 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
811 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
813 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
814 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
816 // Handle (3), creating (6):
817 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
818 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
819 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
820 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
823 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
824 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
825 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
827 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
828 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
829 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
830 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
831 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
832 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
833 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
834 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
835 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
838 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
839 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
840 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
841 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
843 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
844 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
845 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
847 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
848 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
849 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
850 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
851 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
855 fn fake_network_test() {
856 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
857 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
858 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
859 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
860 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
861 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
863 // Create some initial channels
864 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
865 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
866 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
868 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
869 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
870 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
871 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
872 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
874 // Send some more payments
875 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
876 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
877 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
879 // Test failure packets
880 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
881 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
883 // Add a new channel that skips 3
884 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
886 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
887 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
888 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
889 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
890 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
891 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
892 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
894 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
895 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
897 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
898 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
899 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
900 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
902 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
905 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
906 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
907 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
908 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
910 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
913 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
914 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
915 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
916 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
918 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
920 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
921 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
922 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops] }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
924 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
926 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
927 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
928 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
929 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
931 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
934 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
935 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
936 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
937 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
939 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
942 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
943 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
944 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
945 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
947 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
949 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
950 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
951 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops] }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
953 // Claim the rebalances...
954 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
955 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
957 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
958 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
960 // Send some payments across both channels
961 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
962 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
963 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
966 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
967 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
968 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
969 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
971 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
973 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
974 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
975 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
977 // Close down the channels...
978 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
979 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
980 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
981 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
982 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
983 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
984 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
985 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
986 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
987 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
988 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
989 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
990 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
991 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
992 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
996 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
997 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
998 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
999 // commitment dance rounds.
1000 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1001 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1002 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1003 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1004 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1005 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1007 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1008 for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1009 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1010 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1011 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1013 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1015 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1016 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1017 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1018 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1020 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1021 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1023 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1025 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1026 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1027 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1028 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1031 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1032 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1034 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1035 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1038 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1039 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1040 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1041 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1043 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1044 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1045 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1046 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1047 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1048 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1049 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1051 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1052 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1053 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1055 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1057 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1058 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1059 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1060 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1062 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1063 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1064 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1065 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1067 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1068 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1069 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1071 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1072 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1074 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1075 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1076 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1078 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1080 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1081 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1082 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1083 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1084 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1086 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1087 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1089 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1091 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1092 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1093 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1095 &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1096 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1098 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1102 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1103 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1106 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1110 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1111 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1112 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1113 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1114 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1115 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1116 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1118 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1119 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1120 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1121 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1122 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1123 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1125 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1127 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1128 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1130 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1131 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1133 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1134 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1135 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1139 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1140 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1141 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1142 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1143 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1144 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1145 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1146 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1148 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1151 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1153 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1155 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1156 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
1157 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1159 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1160 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1163 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1164 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1166 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1167 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1168 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1169 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1170 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1171 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1172 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1175 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1177 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1179 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1180 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1182 // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1183 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1184 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1185 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1186 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1187 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1188 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1189 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1191 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1192 assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1193 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1195 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1196 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1197 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1198 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1199 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1200 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1201 check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1202 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1204 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1205 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1208 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1209 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1210 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1211 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1213 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1214 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1215 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1216 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1217 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1218 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1220 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1226 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1227 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1228 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1229 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1230 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1231 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1233 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1234 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1236 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1237 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1);
1238 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1239 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1240 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1242 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1244 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1245 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1246 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1249 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1251 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1252 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1254 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1258 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1259 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1260 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1261 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1262 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1263 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1265 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1266 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1267 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1268 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1270 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1272 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1273 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1274 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1275 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1278 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1279 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1280 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1281 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1284 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1286 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1287 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1288 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1290 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1292 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1294 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1295 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1296 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1297 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1298 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1299 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1300 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1301 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1303 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1304 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1305 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1306 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1307 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1309 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1310 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1311 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1312 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1313 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1314 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1315 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1316 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1319 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1320 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1321 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1323 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1324 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1325 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1327 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1329 amount_msat: 3460001,
1330 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1332 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1335 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1338 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1339 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1340 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1341 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1345 false, local_funding, remote_funding,
1346 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1348 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1349 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1351 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1354 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1357 htlc_signatures: res.1
1360 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1361 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1362 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1364 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1365 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1367 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1368 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1370 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1372 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1373 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1374 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1376 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1377 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1378 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1380 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1382 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1383 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1389 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1390 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1391 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1392 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1393 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1395 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
1396 chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1397 chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1398 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1399 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1400 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1402 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1403 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
1404 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1406 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1408 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1409 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1411 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1412 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1413 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1414 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1415 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1416 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1420 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1421 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1422 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the funder
1423 // receiving 1 update_add_htlc would result in them closing the channel due
1424 // to channel reserve violation. This close could also happen if the fee went
1425 // up a more realistic amount, but many HTLCs were outstanding at the time of
1426 // the update_add_htlc.
1427 chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(6000) };
1428 chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(6000) };
1429 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1430 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1431 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1432 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1434 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1000);
1435 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1436 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1437 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1438 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1439 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1440 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 1000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1441 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1442 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1445 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1446 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1447 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1448 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1451 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1452 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1453 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1454 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1455 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1456 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1457 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1458 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1462 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1463 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1464 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1465 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1466 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
1467 chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1468 chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1470 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1471 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1472 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1474 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1475 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1476 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1477 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1478 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT) / 1000 * 1000;
1479 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1480 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1482 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1483 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1484 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1485 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1486 // commitment transaction fee.
1487 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1489 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1490 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1491 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1492 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1496 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1497 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1498 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1499 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1500 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1501 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1502 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1503 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1505 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1506 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1507 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1508 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1509 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1510 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1512 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1513 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1514 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1515 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1516 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1517 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1519 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1520 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1521 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1522 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1526 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1527 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1528 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1529 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1530 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1531 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1532 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1535 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1536 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1537 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1539 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1540 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1541 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1542 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1544 // Add a pending HTLC.
1545 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1546 let payment_event_1 = {
1547 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1548 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1550 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1551 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1552 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1554 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1556 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1557 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2);
1558 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1559 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1560 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1562 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1563 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1564 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1565 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1566 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1567 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1568 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1569 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1572 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1573 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1574 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1575 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1578 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1579 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1580 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1581 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1582 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1583 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1584 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1585 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1589 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1590 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1591 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1592 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1593 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1594 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1595 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1596 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1597 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1598 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1600 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1601 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1602 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1604 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1605 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1608 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64) -> u64 {
1609 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1613 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1614 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1615 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1616 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1617 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1618 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1619 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1620 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1621 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1622 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1623 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1625 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1626 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1628 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1629 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1631 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1633 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1634 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1635 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1636 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1641 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1642 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1643 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1645 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1647 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1649 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1650 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1651 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1652 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1653 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1654 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1655 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1658 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1659 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1661 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1662 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1663 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1664 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1665 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1666 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1667 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1670 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1672 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1673 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1674 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1675 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1676 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1679 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1680 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1681 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1682 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1683 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1686 // adding pending output.
1687 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1688 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1689 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1690 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1691 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1692 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1693 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1694 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1695 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1697 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1698 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1699 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1701 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1702 let payment_event_1 = {
1703 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1704 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1706 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1707 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1708 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1710 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1712 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1713 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1715 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1716 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1717 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1718 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1721 // split the rest to test holding cell
1722 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1723 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1724 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1725 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1727 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1728 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1731 // now see if they go through on both sides
1732 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1733 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1734 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1735 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1736 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1737 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1739 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1741 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1742 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1743 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1744 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1745 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1748 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1749 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1750 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1751 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1752 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1753 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1755 // flush the pending htlc
1756 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1757 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1758 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1760 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1761 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1762 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1763 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1765 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1766 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1767 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1768 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1770 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1771 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1772 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1774 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1776 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1777 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1778 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1780 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1781 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1783 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1784 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1785 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1786 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1787 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1788 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1790 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1791 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1792 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1793 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1795 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1796 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1798 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1799 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1801 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1802 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1803 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
1805 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1806 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1807 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1809 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1812 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1815 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1816 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1817 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
1819 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1820 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1821 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1823 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1826 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1829 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1830 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1831 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1833 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1);
1834 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1835 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1837 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
1838 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1839 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1840 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
1841 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
1843 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1844 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
1848 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
1849 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
1850 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
1851 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
1852 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
1853 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
1854 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
1855 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
1857 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
1858 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
1859 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
1860 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
1861 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
1862 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
1863 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
1864 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
1866 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
1867 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
1868 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
1869 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
1870 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
1871 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1872 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1873 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1874 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1875 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1877 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1878 // Route the first two HTLCs.
1879 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
1880 let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
1882 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
1883 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
1885 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
1886 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1887 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1888 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1889 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1892 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
1893 // initial fulfill/CS.
1894 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
1895 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1896 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1898 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
1899 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
1900 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
1901 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1902 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1904 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
1905 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
1906 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1907 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1908 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
1910 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
1911 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
1912 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1913 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
1914 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1916 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1917 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1918 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1920 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
1921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1922 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1924 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
1925 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1926 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1928 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
1929 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
1930 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
1931 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
1932 // on-chain as necessary).
1933 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
1934 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
1935 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1936 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1937 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
1939 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1941 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1943 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1944 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
1946 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
1947 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
1948 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
1949 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1950 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1952 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
1953 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
1954 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
1956 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
1957 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1958 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1959 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1960 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1963 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
1964 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
1965 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1966 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1968 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
1970 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
1971 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1972 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1974 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1975 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1977 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
1978 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1979 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1981 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
1982 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1983 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1985 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
1986 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1988 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
1989 expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
1991 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
1992 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
1996 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
1997 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
1998 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
1999 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2000 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2001 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2002 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2004 // Create some initial channels
2005 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2006 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2007 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2008 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2010 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2011 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2012 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2013 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2014 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2015 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2017 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2018 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2019 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2020 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2021 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2023 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2024 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2025 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2026 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2028 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2029 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2030 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2031 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2032 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2034 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2035 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2036 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2037 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2038 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2040 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2041 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2043 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2044 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2045 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2046 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2047 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2049 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2050 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2051 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2052 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2053 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2054 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2056 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2057 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2058 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2059 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2060 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2062 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2063 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2065 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2066 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2068 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2069 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2071 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2072 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2073 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2074 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2076 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2082 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2083 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2084 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2085 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2086 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
2087 let node2_commitment_txid;
2089 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2090 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2091 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2092 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2094 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2095 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2096 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2097 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2098 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2100 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2101 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2102 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2103 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2104 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2106 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2107 // confusing us in the following tests.
2108 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2110 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2111 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2112 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2115 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2116 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2117 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2118 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2119 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2120 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2123 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2126 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2127 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2129 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2131 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2133 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2135 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2136 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2137 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2143 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2145 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2146 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2148 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2149 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2150 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2151 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2152 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2155 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2158 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2159 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2161 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2163 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2164 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2166 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2167 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2168 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2170 nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2171 nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2172 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2173 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2175 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2176 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2177 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2181 fn test_justice_tx() {
2182 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2183 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2184 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2185 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2186 alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2187 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2188 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2189 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2190 bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2191 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2192 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2193 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2194 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2195 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2196 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2197 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2198 // Create some new channels:
2199 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2201 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2202 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2203 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2204 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2205 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2206 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2207 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2208 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2209 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2210 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2211 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2212 // Revoke the old state
2213 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2216 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2218 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2219 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2220 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2222 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2223 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2224 node_txn.truncate(1);
2226 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2227 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2228 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2230 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2231 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2232 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2233 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2234 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2235 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2236 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2237 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2238 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2240 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2242 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2243 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2245 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2246 // Create some new channels:
2247 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2249 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2253 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2254 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2255 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2256 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2257 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2258 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2259 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2260 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2261 // Revoke the old state
2262 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2264 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2266 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2267 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2268 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2270 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2271 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2273 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2274 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2276 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2277 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2278 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2280 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2281 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2282 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2284 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2285 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2286 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2290 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2291 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2292 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2293 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2294 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2295 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2296 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2297 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2298 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2299 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2300 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2301 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2302 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2303 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2304 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2306 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2307 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2309 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2310 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2311 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2313 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2314 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2316 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2317 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2318 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2319 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2320 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2324 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2325 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2326 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2327 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2328 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2329 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2330 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2332 // Create some new channel:
2333 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2335 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2336 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2337 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2338 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2339 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2341 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2342 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2343 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2344 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2345 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2346 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2347 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2348 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2349 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2351 //Revoke the old state
2352 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2355 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2357 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2358 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2359 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2360 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2361 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2362 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2364 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2365 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2367 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2368 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2370 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2371 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2372 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2373 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2374 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2375 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2376 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2377 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2379 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2380 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2381 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2383 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2384 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2385 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2389 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2390 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2391 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2392 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2393 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2394 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2395 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2397 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2399 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2400 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2401 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2402 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2403 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2404 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2406 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2407 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2409 //Revoke the old state
2410 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2413 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2414 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2415 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2416 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2417 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2418 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2419 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2421 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2422 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2425 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2426 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2428 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2429 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2430 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2431 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2432 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2433 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2435 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2436 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2437 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2438 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2439 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2440 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2441 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2443 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2444 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2445 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2446 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2448 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2449 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2450 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2452 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2453 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2454 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2455 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2456 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2457 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2458 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2459 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2461 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2462 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2463 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2467 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2468 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2469 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2470 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2471 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2472 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2473 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2474 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2475 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2477 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2478 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2479 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2480 // PaymentSent event).
2482 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2483 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2484 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2485 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2487 // Create some initial channels
2488 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2489 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2491 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2492 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2493 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2494 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2495 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2497 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2498 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2499 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2501 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2502 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2504 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2505 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2506 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2507 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2508 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2509 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2510 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2511 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2512 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2513 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2514 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2515 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2516 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2518 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2519 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2520 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2521 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2522 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2523 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2524 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2525 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2526 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2527 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2528 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2529 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2530 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2531 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2532 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2533 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2534 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2536 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2537 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2538 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2539 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2541 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2542 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2543 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2544 added_monitors.clear();
2546 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2547 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2548 match forwarded_events[0] {
2549 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2550 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2552 if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[1] {
2553 } else { panic!(); }
2554 if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[2] {
2555 } else { panic!(); }
2556 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2558 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2559 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2560 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2561 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2562 added_monitors.clear();
2564 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2566 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2567 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2570 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2571 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2575 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2576 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2577 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2578 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2579 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2580 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2582 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2584 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2585 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2586 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2587 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2588 // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2589 // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2590 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2591 check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2592 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2593 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2595 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2596 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2597 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2598 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2600 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2601 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2602 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2603 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2605 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2606 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2610 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2611 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2612 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2613 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2615 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2616 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2617 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2618 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2619 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2620 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2621 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2622 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2623 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2624 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2625 let commitment_spend =
2626 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2627 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2628 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2629 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2632 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2633 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2634 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2638 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2639 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2640 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2641 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2642 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2643 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2644 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2645 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2646 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2647 check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2648 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2649 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2651 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2652 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2653 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2654 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2655 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2657 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2658 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2659 let mut first_claimed = false;
2660 for event in events {
2662 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash } => {
2663 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2664 assert!(!first_claimed);
2665 first_claimed = true;
2667 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2668 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2671 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2672 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2675 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2678 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2679 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2680 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2681 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2682 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2683 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2685 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2687 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2688 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2689 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2690 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2691 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2692 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2693 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2695 // Create some intial channels
2696 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2697 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2699 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2700 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2701 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2703 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2705 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2706 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2707 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2708 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2709 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2710 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2711 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2713 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2714 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2716 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2717 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2718 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2719 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2720 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2721 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2723 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2725 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2726 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2727 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2728 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2729 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2730 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2731 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2732 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2734 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2735 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2736 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2737 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2738 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2741 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2742 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2743 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2744 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2746 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2747 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2749 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2750 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2751 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2752 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2754 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2758 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2759 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2760 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2762 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2763 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2764 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2765 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2768 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2770 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2771 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2772 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2773 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2774 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2775 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2776 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2778 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2782 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2783 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2784 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2785 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2787 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2788 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2789 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2790 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2791 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2792 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2794 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2797 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2798 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2799 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2801 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2802 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2804 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2805 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2806 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2807 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2808 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2809 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2810 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2811 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2812 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2816 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2817 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2818 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2819 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2823 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
2824 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
2825 // and fail backward accordingly.
2827 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2828 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2829 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2830 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2832 // Create some initial channels
2833 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2834 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2836 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2837 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
2838 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2839 // Revoke the old state
2840 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
2842 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2844 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2845 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2846 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2847 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2848 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2850 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2851 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2852 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2853 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2855 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
2856 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2857 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2858 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2859 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2860 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2862 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2863 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
2864 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
2866 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2870 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
2871 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
2872 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
2873 // commitment transaction anymore.
2874 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
2875 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
2876 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
2877 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
2878 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
2879 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
2881 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
2882 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
2883 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
2884 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
2885 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
2886 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2887 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2888 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2889 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2891 // Create some initial channels
2892 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2893 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2895 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
2896 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
2897 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2898 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
2899 // Revoke the old state
2900 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
2902 let value = if use_dust {
2903 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
2904 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
2905 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
2908 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2909 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2910 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2912 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
2913 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2914 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2915 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2916 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2917 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2918 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2919 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2920 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
2921 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2922 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
2923 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
2925 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
2926 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2928 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2929 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2930 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2931 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2932 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2933 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
2934 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2935 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
2936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2937 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
2938 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
2939 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2942 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
2943 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2944 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2945 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2946 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2947 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2948 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2949 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2950 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
2951 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2952 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
2953 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
2954 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
2955 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2956 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
2957 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
2958 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2959 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2961 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
2962 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
2963 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
2964 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
2965 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2966 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2967 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
2970 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2971 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
2972 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
2973 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2974 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2975 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2977 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2978 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2980 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
2981 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
2984 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
2985 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2987 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2988 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2989 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2991 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2992 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 3 });
2994 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
2995 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
2998 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
2999 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3001 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3003 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3005 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3006 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3009 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3010 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3012 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3013 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3014 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3015 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3016 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3018 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3019 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3020 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3021 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3023 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3027 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3028 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3029 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3030 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3031 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3032 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3034 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3037 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3038 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3039 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3040 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3041 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3042 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3043 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3045 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3046 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3047 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3049 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3051 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3052 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3054 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3055 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3056 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3057 // that we should update our routing table for.
3058 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3059 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3062 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3065 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3066 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3067 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3069 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3072 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3073 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3074 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3076 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3079 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3082 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3083 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3084 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3088 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3089 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3090 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3091 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3092 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3096 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3097 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3098 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3099 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3100 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3104 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3105 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3106 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3107 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3108 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3109 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3111 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3113 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3114 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3115 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3117 let payment_event = {
3118 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3119 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3120 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3122 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3123 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3126 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3127 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3129 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3132 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3135 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3137 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3139 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3140 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3141 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3142 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3143 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3144 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3146 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3147 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3153 onion_routing_packet,
3155 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3157 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3158 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3159 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3161 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3162 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3164 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3167 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3168 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3170 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3172 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3177 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3178 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3179 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3180 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3181 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3182 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3183 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3184 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3186 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3187 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3188 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3189 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3190 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3191 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3193 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3194 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3195 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3197 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3198 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3199 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3200 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3201 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3203 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3204 // registering new transactions
3205 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3206 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3210 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3211 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3212 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3213 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3214 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3215 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3216 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3217 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3219 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3221 let mut payment_event = {
3222 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3225 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3226 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3227 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3230 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3231 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3233 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3235 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3236 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3237 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3238 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3240 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3241 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3242 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3243 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3244 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3246 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3247 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3248 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3250 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3251 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3252 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3253 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3255 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3256 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3257 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3258 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3259 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3263 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3265 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3266 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3268 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3270 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3272 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3273 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3275 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3276 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3277 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3278 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3279 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3280 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3281 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3283 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3287 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3288 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3289 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3290 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3291 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3293 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3294 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3295 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3296 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3297 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3299 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3301 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3302 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3303 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3304 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3305 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3307 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3308 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3310 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3311 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3315 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3316 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3317 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3318 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3319 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3320 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3321 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3322 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3324 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3325 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3326 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3328 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3329 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3330 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3331 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3333 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3334 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3335 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3337 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3338 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3339 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3340 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3342 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3343 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3345 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3346 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3348 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3350 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3351 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3353 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash } => {
3354 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3355 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3357 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3360 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3361 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3362 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3364 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3368 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3369 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3372 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3373 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3374 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3375 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3376 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3377 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3379 let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3380 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3381 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3382 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3383 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3384 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3385 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3387 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3390 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3392 let payment_event = {
3393 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3394 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3396 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3397 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3398 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3400 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3402 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3403 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3405 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3406 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3407 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3408 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3409 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3411 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3412 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3413 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3414 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3416 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3417 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3418 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3419 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3420 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3422 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3423 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3424 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3425 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3432 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3433 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3434 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3435 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3436 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3437 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3439 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3440 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3441 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3443 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3444 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3446 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3447 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3448 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3449 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3450 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3451 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3452 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3453 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3454 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3455 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3456 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3457 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3458 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3459 // Everything was delivered...
3460 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3463 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3464 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3466 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3467 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3470 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3471 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3472 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3474 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3476 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3477 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3479 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3480 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3481 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3483 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3484 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3485 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3487 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3490 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3493 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3494 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3496 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3497 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3498 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3499 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3500 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3501 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3502 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3503 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3504 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3505 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3506 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3508 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3511 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3512 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3514 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3515 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3517 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash } => {
3518 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3519 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3521 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3524 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3525 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3526 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3527 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3529 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3530 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3531 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3532 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3534 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3535 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3536 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3537 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3538 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3540 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3541 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3542 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3543 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3550 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3551 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3552 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3553 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3554 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3555 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3556 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3558 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash } => {
3559 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3560 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3562 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3565 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3567 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3568 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3569 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3570 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3571 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3572 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3573 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3574 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3575 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3576 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3577 // Everything was delivered...
3578 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3581 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3582 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3583 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3585 // Channel should still work fine...
3586 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3587 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3588 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3592 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3593 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3594 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3595 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3596 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3600 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3601 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3602 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3603 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3604 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3608 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3609 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3610 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3611 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3612 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3613 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3614 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3615 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3616 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3617 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3619 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3620 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3622 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3623 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3625 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3627 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3628 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3629 chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3631 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3634 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3636 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3637 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3639 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3640 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3641 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
3642 let funding_locked = match events_2[0] {
3643 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3644 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3647 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3649 let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_2[1] {
3650 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3651 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3654 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3657 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3659 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_locked);
3660 nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3661 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3662 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
3663 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_3[0] {
3664 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3665 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3668 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3670 let (as_announcement, as_update) = match events_3[1] {
3671 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3672 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3674 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3677 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3678 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3679 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3680 let (_, bs_update) = match events_4[0] {
3681 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3682 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3684 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3687 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&as_announcement).unwrap();
3688 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3689 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3691 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3692 let (payment_preimage, _, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
3693 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3695 // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3696 // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3697 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3699 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3700 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3701 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3703 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3704 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3705 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3706 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3707 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3708 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3709 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3710 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3712 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3713 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3714 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3715 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3716 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3717 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3719 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3720 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3721 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3722 logger: nodes[0].logger,
3726 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
3727 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
3729 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
3730 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
3731 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3733 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3735 // as_announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
3736 nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
3737 let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3738 let mut found_announcement = false;
3739 for event in msgs.iter() {
3741 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
3742 if *msg == as_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
3744 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
3745 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3748 assert!(found_announcement);
3752 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3753 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3754 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3755 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3756 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3757 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3758 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3759 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3761 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
3763 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3764 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3765 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
3766 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3768 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3769 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3771 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3772 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3775 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
3776 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3778 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3779 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3781 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3782 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3783 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3784 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3785 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3786 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3787 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3789 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3790 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3791 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3793 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash } => {
3794 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3795 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3797 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3800 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3801 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3802 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3803 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3805 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3808 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3809 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3811 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3812 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3813 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3814 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3815 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3816 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3818 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3819 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3820 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3821 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3823 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
3824 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
3826 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
3827 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
3829 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
3831 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3832 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3833 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3834 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3835 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
3836 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
3837 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
3838 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3839 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3840 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3842 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
3843 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3844 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3845 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3846 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3847 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3848 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3849 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3851 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3852 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3853 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3854 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3855 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3856 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3857 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3858 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3860 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3861 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3862 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3863 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3865 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3866 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3867 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3868 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3870 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3871 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3872 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3874 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3876 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3877 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3879 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
3880 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
3882 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3883 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3884 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
3886 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3889 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3892 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
3893 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3894 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3896 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3899 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
3900 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
3901 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
3902 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3903 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3904 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3905 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3907 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3909 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
3910 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
3911 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
3912 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
3913 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
3914 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
3915 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
3916 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3917 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3918 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3919 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
3920 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
3921 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
3924 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
3927 let mut block = Block {
3928 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
3931 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
3932 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3933 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
3934 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
3935 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
3936 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
3937 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3940 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3942 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3943 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3944 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3945 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3946 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3947 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
3949 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3950 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
3951 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
3952 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
3953 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
3954 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
3958 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
3959 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
3960 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
3963 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
3964 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
3965 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3966 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3967 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3968 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3969 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3970 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3972 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
3973 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
3974 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
3975 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
3977 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
3978 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
3980 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3982 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
3983 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3985 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
3986 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
3987 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
3988 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3990 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3991 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
3992 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3993 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3994 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3996 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3998 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
3999 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4000 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4001 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4004 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4005 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4006 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4007 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4008 match fail_commit[0] {
4009 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4010 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4011 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4013 _ => unreachable!(),
4015 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4017 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, true);
4022 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4023 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4024 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4028 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4029 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4030 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4031 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4032 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4033 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4034 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4035 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4036 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4037 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4039 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4041 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4043 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4044 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4045 get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4046 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4048 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4049 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4050 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4051 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4052 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4053 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4054 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4055 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4056 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4057 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4059 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4060 let config = UserConfig::default();
4061 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4062 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4063 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4064 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4065 default_config: config,
4067 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4068 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4069 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4074 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4075 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4077 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4078 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4079 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4082 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4083 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4084 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4085 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4087 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4088 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4089 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4090 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4092 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4093 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4094 for node in nodes.iter() {
4095 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4096 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4097 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4100 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4104 fn test_dup_htlc_onchain_fails_on_reload() {
4105 // When a Channel is closed, any outbound HTLCs which were relayed through it are simply
4106 // dropped when the Channel is. From there, the ChannelManager relies on the ChannelMonitor
4107 // having a copy of the relevant fail-/claim-back data and processes the HTLC fail/claim when
4108 // the ChannelMonitor tells it to.
4110 // If, due to an on-chain event, an HTLC is failed/claimed, and then we serialize the
4111 // ChannelManager, we generally expect there not to be a duplicate HTLC fail/claim (eg via a
4112 // PaymentPathFailed event appearing). However, because we may not serialize the relevant
4113 // ChannelMonitor at the same time, this isn't strictly guaranteed. In order to provide this
4114 // consistency, the ChannelManager explicitly tracks pending-onchain-resolution outbound HTLCs
4115 // and de-duplicates ChannelMonitor events.
4117 // This tests that explicit tracking behavior.
4118 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4119 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4120 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4121 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4122 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4123 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4124 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4126 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4128 // Route a payment, but force-close the channel before the HTLC fulfill message arrives at
4130 let (payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
4131 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
4132 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4133 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4134 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4136 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4137 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4139 // Connect blocks until the CLTV timeout is up so that we get an HTLC-Timeout transaction
4140 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
4141 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4142 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4143 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4145 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4146 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4148 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4149 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
4150 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4152 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4153 let claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4155 header.prev_blockhash = nodes[0].best_block_hash();
4156 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
4158 // Serialize out the ChannelMonitor before connecting the on-chain claim transactions. This is
4159 // fairly normal behavior as ChannelMonitor(s) are often not re-serialized when on-chain events
4160 // happen, unlike ChannelManager which tends to be re-serialized after any relevant event(s).
4161 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4162 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4164 header.prev_blockhash = nodes[0].best_block_hash();
4165 let claim_block = Block { header, txdata: claim_txn};
4166 connect_block(&nodes[0], &claim_block);
4167 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
4169 // ChannelManagers generally get re-serialized after any relevant event(s). Since we just
4170 // connected a highly-relevant block, it likely gets serialized out now.
4171 let mut chan_manager_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4172 nodes[0].node.write(&mut chan_manager_serialized).unwrap();
4174 // Now reload nodes[0]...
4175 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4176 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4177 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4178 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4179 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4180 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4181 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4182 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4184 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4185 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4186 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4187 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>
4188 ::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&chan_manager_serialized.0[..]), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4189 default_config: Default::default(),
4191 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
4192 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4193 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4194 logger: nodes[0].logger,
4198 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4200 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4201 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4202 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4204 // Note that if we re-connect the block which exposed nodes[0] to the payment preimage (but
4205 // which the current ChannelMonitor has not seen), the ChannelManager's de-duplication of
4206 // payment events should kick in, leaving us with no pending events here.
4207 let height = nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().len() as u32 - 1;
4208 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.block_connected(&claim_block, height);
4209 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4213 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4214 // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4215 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4216 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4217 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4218 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4219 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4220 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4221 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4222 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4223 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4225 // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4226 let channel_value = 100000;
4227 let push_msat = 10001;
4228 let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4229 let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4230 let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4231 let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4232 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4233 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4234 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4236 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
4238 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4239 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4241 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4243 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4244 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4245 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4246 added_monitors.clear();
4249 let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4250 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4252 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4253 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4254 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4255 added_monitors.clear();
4257 // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4262 // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4263 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4264 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4265 get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4267 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4268 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4269 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4270 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4271 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4272 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4273 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4274 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4275 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4276 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4278 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4279 let config = UserConfig::default();
4280 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4281 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4282 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4283 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4284 default_config: config,
4286 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4287 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4288 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4293 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4294 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4296 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4298 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4299 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4301 // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4302 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4303 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4304 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4305 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4307 // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4308 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4309 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4311 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4312 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4313 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4314 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4316 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4317 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4318 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4319 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4321 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4322 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4323 for node in nodes.iter() {
4324 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4325 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4326 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4329 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4333 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4334 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4335 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4336 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4337 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4338 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4339 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4340 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4341 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4342 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4343 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4345 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4346 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4348 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4350 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4351 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4352 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4354 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4355 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4356 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4357 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4358 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4359 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4360 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4361 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4362 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4363 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4365 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4366 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4367 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4368 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4369 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4370 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4372 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4373 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4374 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4379 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4380 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4382 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4383 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4384 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4386 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4388 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4389 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4393 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4394 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4395 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4396 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4397 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4398 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4399 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4400 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4401 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4402 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4403 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4404 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4405 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4406 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4408 let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4409 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4410 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4411 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4412 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4415 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4417 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4418 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4420 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4421 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4422 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4423 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4425 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4427 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4428 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4429 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4430 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4431 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4434 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4435 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4436 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4437 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4438 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4439 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4442 let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4443 for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4444 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4445 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4446 assert!(read.is_empty());
4447 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4450 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4451 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4452 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4453 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4454 assert!(read.is_empty());
4455 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4458 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4459 if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4460 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4461 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4463 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4464 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4465 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4467 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4469 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4472 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4473 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4474 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4475 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4477 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4478 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4479 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4481 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4483 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4484 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4486 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4487 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4488 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4489 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4490 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4493 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4494 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4495 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4497 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4498 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4500 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4501 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4502 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4503 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4504 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4506 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4507 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4508 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4509 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4510 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4511 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4512 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4514 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4515 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4517 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4522 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4523 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4525 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4526 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4527 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4528 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4529 for event in events.drain(..) {
4531 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4532 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4533 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4534 all_outputs.push(outp);
4537 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4540 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4541 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4551 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4552 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4553 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4554 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4555 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4556 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4558 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4559 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4560 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4561 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4562 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4563 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4564 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4565 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4566 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4568 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4569 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4571 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4572 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4573 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4574 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4575 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4579 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4580 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4581 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4582 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4583 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4584 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4585 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4587 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4588 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4589 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4590 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4591 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4593 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4594 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4595 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4596 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4598 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4599 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4600 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4601 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4602 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4604 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4605 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4606 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4610 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4611 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4612 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4614 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4615 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4616 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4617 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4619 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4620 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4621 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4622 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4623 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4625 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4626 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4627 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4628 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4629 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4631 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4632 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4633 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4635 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4636 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4637 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4638 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4639 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4643 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4644 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4645 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4646 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4647 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4649 // Create some initial channels
4650 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4652 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4654 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4655 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4656 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4658 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4659 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4660 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4661 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4662 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4663 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4665 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4666 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4669 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4670 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4673 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4674 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4675 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4676 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4677 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4678 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4679 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4681 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4682 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4683 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4685 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4686 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4687 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4691 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4692 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4693 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4694 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4695 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4697 // Create some initial channels
4698 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4700 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4701 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4703 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4705 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4706 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4707 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4709 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4710 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4711 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4712 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4714 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4715 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4717 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4719 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4720 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4721 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4722 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4723 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4724 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4726 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4727 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4728 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4729 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4731 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4732 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4733 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4734 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4735 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4739 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4740 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4741 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4742 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4743 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4745 // Create some initial channels
4746 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4748 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4749 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4750 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4751 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4753 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4755 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4756 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4757 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4758 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4760 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4761 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4762 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4763 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4765 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4766 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4768 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4769 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4770 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4774 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4775 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4776 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4777 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4778 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4779 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4781 // Create some initial channels
4782 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4784 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4785 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4786 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4787 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4789 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4791 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4792 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4793 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4794 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4795 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4796 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4798 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4799 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4800 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4801 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4802 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4803 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4804 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4806 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4807 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4808 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4809 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4810 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4811 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4813 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4814 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4815 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4816 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4817 // transactions next...
4818 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4819 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4821 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4822 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4823 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4824 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4826 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4827 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4830 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4831 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4833 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4834 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4836 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4837 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4838 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4839 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4840 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4844 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4845 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4846 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4847 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4848 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4849 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4851 // Create some initial channels
4852 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4854 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4855 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4856 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4857 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4859 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4860 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4862 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4864 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4865 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4866 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4867 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4868 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4869 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4871 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4872 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4873 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4874 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4876 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4877 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4878 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4880 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4881 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4882 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4883 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4884 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4885 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4887 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4888 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4890 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4891 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4892 // transactions next...
4893 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4894 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4895 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4896 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4898 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4899 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4902 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4903 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4905 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4907 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4908 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4910 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4911 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4913 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4914 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4915 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4916 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4917 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4918 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4919 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4920 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4924 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4925 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4926 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4927 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4928 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4930 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4933 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4934 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4935 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4936 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4938 // Create some initial channels
4939 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4940 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4942 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4943 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4944 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4945 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4946 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4948 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4949 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4950 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4952 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
4953 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4954 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4955 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4956 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4957 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4958 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4959 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4960 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4961 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4963 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4964 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4965 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4966 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4968 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4969 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
4970 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
4971 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
4972 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
4973 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
4974 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
4975 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4976 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4977 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
4979 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4980 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
4981 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
4982 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4983 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4984 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4986 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4987 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4990 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
4991 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4992 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4994 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4997 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4998 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
4999 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5000 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5003 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5004 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5005 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5006 match msg_events[0] {
5007 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5008 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5010 match msg_events[1] {
5011 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5012 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5014 match msg_events[2] {
5015 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5016 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5017 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5018 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5019 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5020 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5022 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5024 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5025 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5026 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5027 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5028 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5029 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5030 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5031 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5032 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5033 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5034 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5035 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5036 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5038 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5039 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5043 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5044 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5045 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5046 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5047 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5048 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5049 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5050 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5051 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5052 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5053 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5054 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5055 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5056 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5058 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5059 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5060 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5062 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5063 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5064 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5065 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5066 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5068 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5070 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
5071 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5072 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5073 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5074 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], vec![], 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5075 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5077 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5078 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5079 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5081 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5082 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5083 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5084 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5085 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5087 let htlc_timeout_tx;
5088 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5089 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5090 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5091 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5092 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5094 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5095 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5096 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5097 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5098 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5099 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5100 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5102 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5103 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5104 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5105 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5108 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5109 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5110 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5111 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5112 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5114 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5115 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5118 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5119 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5121 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5122 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5123 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5124 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5125 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5126 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5127 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5128 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5129 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5130 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5131 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5132 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5133 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5135 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5136 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5137 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5138 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5139 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5140 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5141 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5142 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5143 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5144 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5146 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5147 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5149 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5151 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5153 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5154 // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5155 // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5156 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5157 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], Some(196*2), true);
5158 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5159 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5160 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5161 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5162 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5163 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5166 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5167 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5169 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5171 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash } => {
5172 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5173 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5175 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5180 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5181 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5182 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5183 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5184 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5186 // Create some initial channels
5187 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5189 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5190 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5191 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5192 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5193 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5195 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5196 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5197 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5198 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5200 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5201 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5203 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5204 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5207 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5208 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5211 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5212 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5213 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5214 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5215 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5216 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5217 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5221 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5222 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5224 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5225 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5226 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5227 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5228 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5229 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5232 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5233 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5234 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5235 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5236 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5237 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5238 // use the same payment hashes.
5239 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5244 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5245 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5246 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5247 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5248 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5249 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5250 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5251 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5252 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5253 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5255 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5256 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5257 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5258 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5259 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5261 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5262 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5263 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5264 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5266 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5268 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5270 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5271 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5273 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, 0).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5275 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, 0).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5277 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5279 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5280 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5282 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, 0).unwrap());
5284 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, 0).unwrap());
5287 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5289 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5290 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, 0).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5293 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5295 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5296 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, 0).unwrap());
5298 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5299 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5300 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5301 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5302 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5304 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5305 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5306 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5307 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5308 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5309 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5310 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5311 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5312 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5314 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5315 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5316 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5317 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5318 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5319 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5321 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5322 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5323 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5324 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5325 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5326 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5328 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5329 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5330 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5331 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5333 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5335 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5336 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5337 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5338 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5339 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5340 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5341 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5342 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5343 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5344 if deliver_last_raa {
5345 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5347 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5350 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5351 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5352 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5353 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5355 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5356 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5357 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5359 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5360 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5361 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5363 if announce_latest {
5364 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5366 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5368 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5369 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5370 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5373 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5377 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5378 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5381 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5382 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5383 if deliver_last_raa {
5384 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5386 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5388 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5390 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5391 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5392 let mut a_done = false;
5393 for msg in cs_msgs {
5395 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5396 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5397 // should be failed-backwards here.
5398 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5399 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5400 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5401 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5403 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5408 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5409 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5410 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5412 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5413 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5416 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5417 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5418 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5419 if announce_latest {
5420 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5421 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5422 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5425 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5427 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5431 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5432 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5433 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5434 let mut as_updates = 0;
5435 for event in as_events.iter() {
5436 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5437 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5438 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5439 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5441 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5443 if network_update.is_some() {
5446 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5448 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5449 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5450 if announce_latest {
5451 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5452 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5454 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5456 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5457 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5458 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5459 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5460 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5461 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5462 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5463 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5464 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5466 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5468 if network_update.is_some() {
5471 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5473 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5474 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5475 if announce_latest {
5476 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5478 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5480 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5481 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5482 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5483 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5484 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5485 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5489 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5490 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5494 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5495 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5499 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5500 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5501 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5502 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5506 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5507 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5508 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5509 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5510 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5512 // Create some initial channels
5513 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5515 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5516 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5517 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5518 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5520 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5521 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5522 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5523 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5524 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5525 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5527 let htlc_timeout = {
5528 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5529 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5530 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5531 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5532 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5533 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5537 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5538 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5539 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5541 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5542 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5543 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5544 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5545 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5546 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5547 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5548 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5549 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5550 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5551 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5555 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5556 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5557 // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5558 // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5560 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5562 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5563 let seed = [42; 32];
5564 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5565 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5566 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5567 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5568 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5569 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5571 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5572 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5574 // Create some initial channels
5575 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5577 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5578 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5579 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5581 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5582 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5583 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5584 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5585 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5587 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5588 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5589 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5590 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5591 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5593 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5594 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5595 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5596 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5597 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5598 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5599 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5600 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5603 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5604 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5605 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5606 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5607 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5608 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5610 let htlc_timeout = {
5611 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5612 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5613 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5614 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5618 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5619 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5620 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5622 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5623 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5624 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5625 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5626 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5627 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5628 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5629 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5630 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5631 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5632 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5633 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5637 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5638 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5639 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5640 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5641 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5643 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5645 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5646 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5648 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5649 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5650 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5652 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5653 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5654 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5656 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5657 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5658 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5660 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5661 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5662 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5665 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5666 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5667 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5668 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5669 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5670 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5672 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5674 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5675 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5676 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
5677 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5679 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5680 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5681 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5682 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5684 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash } => {
5685 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5686 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5688 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5691 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5692 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5693 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5694 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5695 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5697 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5698 let mut block = Block {
5699 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5702 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5703 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5704 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5706 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5707 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5708 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5709 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5712 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5713 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5714 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5715 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5716 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5717 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5719 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5720 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5721 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5723 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5725 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5726 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5727 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5729 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5730 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5732 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5733 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5734 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5736 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5737 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5738 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5739 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5742 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5743 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5744 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5745 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5746 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5747 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5749 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5750 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5751 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5752 // actually revoked.
5753 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5754 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5755 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5756 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5757 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5759 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5760 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5761 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5762 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5763 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5764 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5765 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5766 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5767 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5768 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5770 if check_revoke_no_close {
5771 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5772 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5775 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5776 let mut block = Block {
5777 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5780 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5781 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5782 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5784 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5785 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5786 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5787 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5788 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5790 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5794 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5795 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5796 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5797 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5798 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5799 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5800 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5802 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5803 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5804 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5806 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5807 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5808 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5810 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5811 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5815 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5816 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5817 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5818 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5819 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5824 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5825 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5826 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5827 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5828 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5829 //Force duplicate channel ids
5830 for node in nodes.iter() {
5831 *node.keys_manager.override_channel_id_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5834 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5835 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5836 let push_msat=10001;
5837 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5838 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5839 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5841 //Create a second channel with a channel_id collision
5842 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5846 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5847 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5848 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5849 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5850 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5852 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5853 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5854 let push_msat=10001;
5855 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5857 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5858 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5859 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5860 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5861 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5863 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5864 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5865 let push_msat=10001;
5866 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5867 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5868 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5870 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5871 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5872 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5874 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5875 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5876 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5878 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5879 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5880 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5882 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5883 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5884 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5885 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5886 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5887 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5891 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5892 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5893 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5894 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5895 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5897 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5898 let push_msat=10001;
5899 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5900 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5901 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5902 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5904 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5905 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5906 let err_msg = match events[0] {
5907 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5910 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5912 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5915 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5916 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5917 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5918 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5920 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5921 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5922 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5923 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5924 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5925 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5927 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5928 // pending_update_fee.
5930 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5931 *feerate_lock += 20;
5933 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5934 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5936 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5937 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5938 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5939 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5940 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5942 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5945 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5947 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5948 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5949 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5951 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5952 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
5953 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5955 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5956 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
5957 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5958 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5960 // Flush the pending fee update.
5961 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5962 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5963 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5964 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5965 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5967 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5968 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5969 // us to surface its failure to the user.
5970 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5971 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5972 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5973 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5974 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5975 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5977 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5978 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5979 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5981 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, path: _, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data } => {
5982 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5983 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
5984 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5985 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5986 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
5987 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
5988 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
5990 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5994 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5995 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5996 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5998 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5999 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6000 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6001 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6002 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6003 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6005 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6006 // pending_update_fee.
6008 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6009 *feerate_lock += 200;
6011 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6012 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6014 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6015 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6016 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6017 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6018 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6020 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6023 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6025 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6026 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6027 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6029 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6031 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1) - amt_1;
6032 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6033 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6035 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6036 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6037 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6038 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6039 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6040 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6041 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6043 // Flush the pending fee update.
6044 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6045 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6046 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6047 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6048 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6049 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6051 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6052 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6053 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6054 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6055 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6056 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6057 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6058 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6059 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6061 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6062 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6063 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6065 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, path: _, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data } => {
6066 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6067 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6068 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6069 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6070 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6071 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6072 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6074 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6077 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6078 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6079 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6080 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6081 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6083 let raa = match send_raa_event {
6084 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6085 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6087 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6088 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6089 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6090 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6091 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6092 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6094 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6095 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6097 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6098 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6099 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6101 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6102 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6104 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6106 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6107 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6108 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6109 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6110 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6112 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash } => {
6113 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6114 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
6116 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6120 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6121 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6122 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6125 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6126 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6127 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6128 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6129 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6130 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6131 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6132 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6133 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6134 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6135 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6137 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6138 // pending_update_fee.
6140 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6141 *feerate_lock += 20;
6143 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6144 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6146 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6147 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6148 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6149 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6150 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6152 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6155 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6157 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6158 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6159 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6161 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6163 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6164 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6165 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6166 let payment_event = {
6167 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6170 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6171 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6173 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6175 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6176 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6177 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6178 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6180 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6181 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6183 // Flush the pending fee update.
6184 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6185 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6186 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6187 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6188 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6189 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6191 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6192 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6193 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6195 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6196 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6199 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6202 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6203 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6204 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6206 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6207 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6208 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6209 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6210 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6211 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6214 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6215 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6216 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6218 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6219 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6220 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6221 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6222 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6223 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6224 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6225 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6226 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6227 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6229 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6232 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6233 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6234 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6236 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6237 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6238 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6239 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6240 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6241 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6242 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6243 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6244 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6245 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6246 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6248 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6249 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6250 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6253 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6254 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6255 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6258 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6259 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6260 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6261 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6262 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6263 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6264 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6266 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6267 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6269 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6270 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6271 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6272 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6276 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6277 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6278 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6279 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6280 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6281 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6282 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6284 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6285 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6286 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6287 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6289 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6290 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6294 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6295 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6296 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6297 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6298 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6299 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6300 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6302 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6303 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6304 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6305 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6306 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6308 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6309 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6310 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6312 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6316 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6317 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6318 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6319 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6320 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6321 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6322 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6323 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6325 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], vec![], 100000000, 500000001);
6326 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6327 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6331 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6332 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6333 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6334 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6335 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6336 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6337 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6338 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6339 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6340 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6342 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6343 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6344 let payment_event = {
6345 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6346 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6348 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6349 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6350 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6351 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6355 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6357 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6358 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6359 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6361 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6362 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6364 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6365 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6366 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6368 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6369 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6373 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6374 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6375 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6376 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6377 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6378 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6379 let channel_value = 100000;
6380 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6381 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6383 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6385 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6386 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6388 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6389 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6390 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6392 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6393 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6395 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6398 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6400 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6401 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6402 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6403 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6404 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6405 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6406 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6407 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6409 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6410 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6411 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6414 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6415 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6416 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6417 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6418 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6419 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6420 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6421 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6422 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6423 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6424 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6428 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6429 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6430 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6431 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6432 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6433 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6434 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6436 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6437 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6438 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6439 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6440 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
6442 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6443 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6444 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6445 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6446 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6448 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6449 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6450 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6451 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6452 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6454 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6455 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6456 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6457 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6458 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6462 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6463 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6464 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6465 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6466 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6467 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6468 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6469 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6471 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6472 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6473 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6474 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6475 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6476 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6478 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6482 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6483 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6484 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6487 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6488 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6489 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6491 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6492 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6494 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6495 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6496 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6497 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6498 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6502 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6503 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6504 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6505 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6506 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6507 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6508 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6510 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6511 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6512 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6513 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6514 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6515 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6517 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6518 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6519 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6520 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6521 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6525 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6526 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6527 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6528 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6529 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6530 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6532 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6533 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6534 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6535 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6536 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6537 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6538 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6540 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6541 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6542 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6543 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6544 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6548 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6549 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6550 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6551 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6552 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6553 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6554 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6555 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6557 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6558 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6559 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6560 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6561 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6562 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6564 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6565 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6566 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6567 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6568 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6569 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6570 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6571 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6572 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6573 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6574 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6575 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6576 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6579 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6580 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6581 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6582 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6583 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6585 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6587 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6588 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6589 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6590 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6591 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6595 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6596 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6598 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6599 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6600 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6601 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6602 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6603 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6604 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6606 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6607 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6608 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6610 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6613 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6616 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6618 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6619 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6620 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6621 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6622 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6626 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6627 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6629 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6630 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6631 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6632 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6633 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6635 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6636 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6637 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6638 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6639 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6641 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6644 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6647 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6649 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6650 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6651 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6652 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6653 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6657 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6658 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6660 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6661 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6662 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6663 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6664 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6666 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6667 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6668 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6669 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6670 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6671 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6674 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6675 failure_code: 0x8000,
6678 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6680 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6681 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6682 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6683 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6684 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6688 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6689 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6691 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6692 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6693 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6694 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6695 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6697 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6699 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6700 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6702 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6703 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6704 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6706 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6707 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6708 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6709 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6710 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6711 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6712 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6714 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6718 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6720 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6722 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6723 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6724 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6725 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6726 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6730 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6731 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6733 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6734 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6735 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6736 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6737 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6739 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6741 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6742 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6744 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6745 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6746 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6748 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6749 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6750 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6751 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6752 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6753 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6754 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6756 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6760 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6762 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6764 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6765 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6766 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6767 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6768 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6772 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6773 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6775 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6776 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6777 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6778 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6779 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6781 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6782 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6783 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6785 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6786 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6788 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6789 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6790 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6792 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6794 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6796 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6797 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6798 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6799 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6800 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6801 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6802 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6804 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6807 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6808 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6810 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6811 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6812 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6813 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6814 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6818 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6819 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6820 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6822 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6823 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6824 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6825 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6826 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6827 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6829 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6832 let mut payment_event = {
6833 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6834 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6835 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6836 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6837 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6839 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6840 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6841 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6842 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6843 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6844 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6845 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6846 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6847 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6850 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6851 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6852 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6853 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6855 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6856 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6857 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6859 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6860 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6861 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6862 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6863 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6864 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6865 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6867 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6871 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6873 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6874 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6875 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6876 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6877 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6879 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6881 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6882 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6883 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6884 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6885 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6886 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6888 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6891 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6894 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6895 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6896 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6897 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6899 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6900 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6901 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6902 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6903 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6904 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6906 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6908 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6909 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6910 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6911 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6913 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6914 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6916 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6917 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
6918 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6919 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6920 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6922 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6923 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6924 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6925 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6927 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6928 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6930 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6932 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6933 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6935 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6938 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6939 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6941 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6944 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6945 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6946 if announce_latest {
6947 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6949 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6952 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6953 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6954 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6956 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6957 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6958 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6959 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6960 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6961 let mut first_failed = false;
6962 for event in events {
6964 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6965 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6966 assert!(!first_failed);
6967 first_failed = true;
6969 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6972 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6978 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6979 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6980 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6983 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6984 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6985 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6986 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6987 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6988 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6989 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6991 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6992 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6993 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6994 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6995 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6997 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6999 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7000 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7002 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7003 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7005 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7007 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7008 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7011 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7013 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7014 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7015 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7016 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7017 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7019 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7020 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7021 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7022 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7023 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7024 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7025 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7026 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7027 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7028 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7029 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7031 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7032 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7033 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7034 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7035 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7036 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7037 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7038 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7040 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7041 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7042 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
7043 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7044 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7045 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7046 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7048 // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7050 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7051 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7054 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7055 if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7056 else { first = false; }
7058 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7061 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7062 if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7063 else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7065 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7072 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7073 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7074 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7075 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7079 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7080 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7082 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7083 low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7084 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7085 high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7086 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7087 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7088 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7089 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7090 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7092 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7093 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, &low_our_to_self_config) {
7095 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7096 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7098 } else { assert!(false) }
7100 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7101 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7102 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7103 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7104 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &low_our_to_self_config) {
7106 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7107 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7109 } else { assert!(false); }
7111 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7112 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7113 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7114 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7115 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7116 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7118 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7120 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7121 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7122 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7126 } else { panic!(); }
7127 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7129 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7130 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7131 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7132 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7133 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &high_their_to_self_config) {
7135 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7136 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7138 } else { assert!(false); }
7142 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7143 // We want to be sure that :
7144 // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7145 // (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7146 // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7147 // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7148 // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7154 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7155 // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7156 // during signing due to revoked tx
7157 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7158 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7161 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7162 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7163 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7165 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7167 // Cache node A state before any channel update
7168 let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7169 let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7170 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7172 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7173 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7175 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7176 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7178 // Restore node A from previous state
7179 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7180 let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7181 chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7182 tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7183 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7184 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7185 monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7187 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7188 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7189 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7190 keys_manager: keys_manager,
7191 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7192 chain_monitor: &monitor,
7194 tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7195 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7199 nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7200 assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7201 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7202 nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7206 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7207 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7209 let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7211 // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7212 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7213 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7216 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7217 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7220 let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7221 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7222 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7223 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7224 reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7225 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7226 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7228 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7229 assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7231 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7234 panic!("Unexpected event")
7238 // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7239 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7240 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_string() });
7241 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
7242 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7244 // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7245 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7246 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7247 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
7248 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
7249 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
7250 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7251 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting".to_string() });
7252 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
7253 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7254 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
7258 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7259 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7260 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7261 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7263 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7264 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7265 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7266 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7268 // Create some initial channels
7269 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7271 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
7272 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7273 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7274 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, 0).unwrap();
7275 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7276 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7278 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7279 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7280 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7281 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7282 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7284 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7285 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7286 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7287 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7289 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7290 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7291 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7293 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7294 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7295 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7296 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7297 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7298 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7299 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7300 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7301 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7302 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7304 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7308 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7309 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7311 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7312 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7313 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7314 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7318 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7319 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7320 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7322 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7323 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7324 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7325 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7327 let short_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7328 let short_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7329 let short_id_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7332 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7333 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7335 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7336 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7337 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7338 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7339 let mut chans_disabled: HashSet<u64> = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7340 for e in msg_events {
7342 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7343 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7344 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7345 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7346 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7349 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7353 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7354 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7355 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7356 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7357 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7358 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7360 // Reestablish chan_1
7361 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7362 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7363 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7364 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7365 // Reestablish chan_2
7366 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7367 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7368 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7369 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7370 // Reestablish chan_3
7371 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7372 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7373 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7374 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7376 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7377 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7378 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7379 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7380 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7381 chans_disabled = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7382 for e in msg_events {
7384 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7385 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7386 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7387 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7388 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7391 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7397 fn test_priv_forwarding_rejection() {
7398 // If we have a private channel with outbound liquidity, and
7399 // UserConfig::accept_forwards_to_priv_channels is set to false, we should reject any attempts
7400 // to forward through that channel.
7401 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7402 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7403 let mut no_announce_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
7404 no_announce_cfg.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
7405 no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = false;
7406 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(no_announce_cfg), None]);
7407 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
7408 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
7409 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
7410 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7412 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7414 // Note that the create_*_chan functions in utils requires announcement_signatures, which we do
7415 // not send for private channels.
7416 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7417 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7418 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
7419 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7420 nodes[1].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7422 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[1], 1_000_000, 42);
7423 nodes[1].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7424 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()));
7425 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7427 let cs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7428 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_funding_signed);
7429 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7431 let conf_height = core::cmp::max(nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1, nodes[2].best_block_info().1 + 1);
7432 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, conf_height);
7433 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7434 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[2], &tx, conf_height);
7435 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7436 let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7437 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7438 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7439 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
7440 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7442 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7443 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
7444 assert!(!nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7446 // We should always be able to forward through nodes[1] as long as its out through a public
7448 send_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], 10_000);
7450 // ... however, if we send to nodes[2], we will have to pass the private channel from nodes[1]
7451 // to nodes[2], which should be rejected:
7452 let route_hint = RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
7453 src_node_id: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
7454 short_channel_id: nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(),
7455 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 1000, proportional_millionths: 0 },
7456 cltv_expiry_delta: MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
7457 htlc_minimum_msat: None,
7458 htlc_maximum_msat: None,
7460 let last_hops = vec![&route_hint];
7461 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], last_hops, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
7463 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7464 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7465 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
7466 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7467 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7469 let htlc_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7470 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7471 assert_eq!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7472 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7473 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fee.is_none());
7475 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7476 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7477 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(), true);
7479 // Now disconnect nodes[1] from its peers and restart with accept_forwards_to_priv_channels set
7480 // to true. Sadly there is currently no way to change it at runtime.
7482 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7483 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7485 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
7486 let mut monitor_a_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7487 let mut monitor_b_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7488 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut monitor_a_serialized).unwrap();
7489 get_monitor!(nodes[1], cs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut monitor_b_serialized).unwrap();
7491 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7492 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
7493 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7494 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
7496 let mut monitor_a_read = &monitor_a_serialized.0[..];
7497 let mut monitor_b_read = &monitor_b_serialized.0[..];
7498 let (_, mut monitor_a) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_a_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7499 let (_, mut monitor_b) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_b_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7500 assert!(monitor_a_read.is_empty());
7501 assert!(monitor_b_read.is_empty());
7503 no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = true;
7505 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
7506 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
7507 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7508 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_a);
7509 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_b);
7510 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7511 default_config: no_announce_cfg,
7513 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
7514 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
7515 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7516 logger: nodes[1].logger,
7520 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
7521 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
7523 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_a).is_ok());
7524 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_b).is_ok());
7525 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7526 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
7528 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7529 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7530 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7531 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7532 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
7533 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7534 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7535 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7537 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7538 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7539 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7540 let cs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7541 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7542 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_reestablish);
7543 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7544 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7546 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7547 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7548 pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], 10_000, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret);
7549 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], our_payment_preimage);
7553 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7554 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7555 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7557 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7558 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7559 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7560 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7562 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7564 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7565 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], vec![], 3000000, 30);
7566 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7568 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7569 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7570 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7571 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7572 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7573 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7575 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7576 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7577 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7578 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7582 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7583 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7585 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7586 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7587 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7588 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7589 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7591 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7595 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7596 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7597 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7598 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7599 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7600 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7601 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7602 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7606 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7607 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7608 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7609 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7611 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7612 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7613 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7614 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7615 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7616 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7617 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7618 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7619 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7620 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7621 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7622 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7623 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7627 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7629 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7630 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7632 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7634 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7635 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7636 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7637 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7638 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7639 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7640 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7641 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7642 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7643 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7644 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7645 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7646 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7650 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7652 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7653 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7657 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7658 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7659 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7661 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7662 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7663 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7664 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7665 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7667 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7668 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7669 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
7670 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph,
7671 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7672 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7673 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph,
7674 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7675 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7677 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7678 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7679 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7681 // Revoke local commitment tx
7682 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7684 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7685 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7686 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7687 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7688 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7689 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7690 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7692 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7693 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7694 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7696 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7697 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7698 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7700 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7701 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7702 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7703 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7705 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7706 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7707 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7708 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7709 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7710 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7711 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7712 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7714 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7715 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7721 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7722 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7723 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7725 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7726 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7727 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7728 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7730 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7731 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7732 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7733 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7734 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7735 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7737 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7738 // available, which we check here:
7739 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7740 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7741 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7743 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7744 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7746 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7747 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7748 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7749 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7751 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7752 // output, checked above).
7753 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7754 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7755 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7757 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7758 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7759 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7760 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
7761 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7765 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7766 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7767 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7768 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7769 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7771 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7772 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7774 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7775 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7776 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7777 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7778 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7780 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7781 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7787 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7788 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7789 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7790 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7792 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7793 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7795 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7796 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7797 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7798 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7799 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7800 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7801 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7802 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7806 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7807 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7808 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7809 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7811 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7812 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7813 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7814 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7815 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7816 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7817 // up bumped justice generation.
7818 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7821 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7822 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7826 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7827 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7828 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7831 // Provide preimage for one
7832 // Check aggregation
7834 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7835 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7836 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7837 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7839 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7840 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7841 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7843 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7844 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7845 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7846 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7847 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7849 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7850 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7851 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7852 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7853 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7855 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7859 let feerate_timeout;
7860 let feerate_preimage;
7862 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7863 // 9 transactions including:
7864 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
7865 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
7866 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
7868 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
7869 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7870 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
7871 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7872 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
7873 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
7874 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
7876 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
7877 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
7878 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
7879 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
7881 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
7882 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7883 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
7884 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
7886 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7887 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7888 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7889 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7893 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7894 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7896 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7897 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7899 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7900 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7901 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7902 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7903 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7904 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7906 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7907 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7908 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
7909 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7910 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7912 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7913 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7914 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7915 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7916 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7921 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7922 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7926 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7927 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7928 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7929 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7930 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7931 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7932 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7933 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7935 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7936 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7937 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7938 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7939 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7941 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7942 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7944 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7946 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7947 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7948 let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7950 // Must revoke without gaps
7951 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7952 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7954 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7955 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7956 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7958 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7959 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7960 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7961 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7962 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7966 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7967 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7968 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7970 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7971 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7972 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7973 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7975 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7976 // Lock HTLC in both directions
7977 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7978 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7980 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7981 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7982 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7984 // Revoke local commitment tx
7985 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7987 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7988 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7989 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
7990 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7992 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7993 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7994 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7995 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7997 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7998 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
7999 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8000 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8001 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8002 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8006 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8007 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8008 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8010 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8011 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8012 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8017 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8018 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8019 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8020 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8021 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8023 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8024 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8025 override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8027 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8029 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8030 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8031 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8032 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8036 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8037 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8038 zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8039 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8040 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8041 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8042 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8044 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8045 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8046 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8048 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8049 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8050 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8054 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8055 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8056 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8057 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8058 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8059 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8061 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8062 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8063 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8064 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8066 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8067 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8068 route.paths.push(path);
8069 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8070 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8071 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8072 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8073 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8074 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8075 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8076 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8080 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8081 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8082 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8083 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8084 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8085 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8087 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8090 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, 42);
8091 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8092 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8093 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8094 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8095 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8096 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8097 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8099 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8100 // values from previous calls.
8101 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8102 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8103 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8105 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8107 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, user_payment_id, .. } => {
8108 assert_eq!(*user_payment_id, 42);
8109 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8111 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8114 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8119 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8120 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs
8121 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8122 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8123 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8124 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8126 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8128 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, 0);
8130 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8131 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8132 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2, 0) {
8133 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8134 } else { panic!(); }
8136 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8138 header: BlockHeader {
8140 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8141 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8142 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8146 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8147 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2, 0) {
8148 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8149 } else { panic!(); }
8151 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8152 // again with a different user_payment_id (this time getting a new payment secret).
8153 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8154 block.header.time += 1;
8155 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8156 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2, 42).unwrap();
8157 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8160 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8161 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8163 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8164 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8165 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8166 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8168 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8169 // values from previous calls.
8170 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8171 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8172 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8174 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, user_payment_id }, .. } => {
8175 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8176 assert_eq!(user_payment_id, 42);
8177 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8178 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8180 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8185 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8186 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8187 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8188 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8189 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8190 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8192 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8194 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8195 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8196 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, 0);
8197 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8199 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8200 // resulting events.
8201 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8203 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8204 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8205 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8206 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8207 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8209 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8210 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8211 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8212 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8213 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8215 // We should fail the payment back
8216 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8217 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8218 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8219 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8220 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8222 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8227 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8228 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8229 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8231 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8232 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8233 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8234 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8236 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8237 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8238 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8239 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8241 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8242 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8243 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8244 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8248 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8249 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8250 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8251 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8253 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8254 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8255 // commitment at same time.
8257 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8258 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8259 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8260 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8262 // Create some initial channel
8263 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8264 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8266 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8267 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8269 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8270 let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8272 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8273 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8274 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8275 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8277 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8278 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8279 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8280 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8281 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8282 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8283 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8284 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8287 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8288 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8289 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8290 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8291 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8293 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8294 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8295 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8296 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8297 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8298 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8299 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8300 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8301 if let Err(_) = watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8302 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8303 } else { assert!(false); }
8304 } else { assert!(false); };
8305 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8307 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8308 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8312 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8313 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8314 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8315 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8316 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8318 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8319 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8320 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8321 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8323 // Create some initial channel
8324 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8325 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8327 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8328 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8330 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8331 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8333 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8334 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8335 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8336 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8337 let watchtower_alice = {
8338 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8339 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8340 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8341 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8342 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8343 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8344 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8345 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8348 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8349 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8350 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8351 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8352 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8354 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8356 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8357 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8361 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8362 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8363 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8364 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8365 let watchtower_bob = {
8366 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8367 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8368 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8369 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8370 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8371 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8372 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8373 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8376 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8377 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8379 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8380 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8382 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8384 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8386 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8387 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8388 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8389 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8390 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8391 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8392 if let Err(_) = watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8393 if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8394 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8395 } else { assert!(false); }
8396 } else { assert!(false); };
8397 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8398 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8400 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8401 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8402 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8404 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8407 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8408 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8409 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8413 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8414 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8415 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8417 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8418 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8419 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8420 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8421 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8422 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8427 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8428 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8429 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8432 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8433 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8435 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8436 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8437 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8438 // before receiving funding_signed.
8439 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8440 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8441 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8442 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8444 // Create an initial channel
8445 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8446 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8447 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8448 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8449 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8451 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8452 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8454 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8455 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8457 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8458 let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8459 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8460 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8461 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8465 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8466 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8467 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8468 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8469 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8470 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8471 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8473 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8474 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8475 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8476 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8478 // Create some initial channels
8479 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8481 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8482 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8483 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8484 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8485 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8486 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8488 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8489 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8490 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8491 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8492 // this test before #653 fix.
8493 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8494 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8495 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8496 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8497 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8499 let htlc_timeout = {
8500 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8501 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8502 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8503 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8507 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8508 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8509 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8510 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8513 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8514 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8515 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8516 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8518 // Steps of the test:
8519 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8520 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8521 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8522 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8523 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8524 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8525 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8526 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8527 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8528 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8529 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8530 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8532 // Create some initial channels
8533 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8534 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8536 // Steps (1) and (2):
8537 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8538 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8540 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8541 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8542 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8543 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8544 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8545 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8546 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8548 // Steps (3) and (4):
8549 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8550 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8551 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8552 if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
8553 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
8554 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8555 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8556 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8557 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8558 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8559 true => alice_txn.clone(),
8560 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8562 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8563 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8564 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8565 if broadcast_alice {
8566 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8567 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8568 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8570 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8571 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8575 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8576 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8577 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8578 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8579 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8580 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8581 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8582 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8583 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8584 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8586 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8587 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false);
8588 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8589 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8590 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8591 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8593 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8594 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8596 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8599 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8600 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8601 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8602 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8604 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8605 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8606 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8607 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8608 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8611 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8613 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8614 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8615 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8618 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8621 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8622 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8623 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8624 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8626 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8627 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8628 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8629 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8630 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8633 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8635 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8636 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8638 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8639 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8640 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8641 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8642 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8643 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8644 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8645 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8646 if broadcast_alice {
8647 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8648 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8649 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8651 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8652 if broadcast_alice {
8653 // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8654 // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8655 // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8656 // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8658 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8659 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8661 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8662 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8667 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8668 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8670 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8671 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8672 // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8673 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8675 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8676 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8677 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8679 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8680 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8681 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8682 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8683 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8684 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8685 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8687 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8688 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8694 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8695 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8696 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8697 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8698 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8702 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8703 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8704 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8706 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8707 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8708 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8709 // updating logic for the existing channel.
8710 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8711 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8712 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8713 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8715 // Create an initial channel
8716 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8717 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8718 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8719 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8721 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8722 // that it is rejected.
8723 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8725 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8726 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8728 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8729 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8730 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8731 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8732 // move forward with it.
8733 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8734 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8736 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8740 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8741 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8743 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8744 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8746 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8747 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8749 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8750 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8751 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8752 added_monitors.clear();
8754 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8756 let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8757 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8759 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8762 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8763 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8764 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8765 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8766 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8768 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8769 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8771 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8772 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8773 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8774 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8775 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8777 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8781 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8782 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8783 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8784 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8785 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8786 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8788 let funding_created = {
8789 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8790 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8791 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8792 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8794 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8795 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8796 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8797 // still needs to be cleared here.
8798 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8800 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8802 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8803 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8805 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8806 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8807 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8808 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8809 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8811 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8815 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8816 // everything is functional.
8817 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8819 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8820 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8821 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8822 added_monitors.clear();
8825 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8826 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8827 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8828 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
8830 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8831 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
8832 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8833 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8837 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8838 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8840 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8841 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8842 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8843 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8844 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8845 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8846 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8848 // Create some initial channels
8849 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8850 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8851 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8853 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8854 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8855 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8857 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8858 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8859 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8861 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8862 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8863 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8864 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8865 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8866 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8867 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8868 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8869 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8871 // A null channel ID should close all channels
8872 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8873 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8874 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8875 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8876 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8877 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8879 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8880 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8882 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8885 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8886 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8888 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8890 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8891 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
8892 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
8893 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
8894 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8895 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8897 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
8898 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8899 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8903 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
8904 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
8906 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
8907 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
8908 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
8909 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
8910 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8911 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8912 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8913 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8915 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8916 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8917 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8919 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
8920 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
8921 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
8922 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
8925 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
8926 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8929 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8930 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8932 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8933 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
8935 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8936 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8937 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
8939 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
8940 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8941 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8942 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8943 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8944 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
8945 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8946 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
8947 assert_eq!(msg.data, "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index");
8948 } else { panic!(); }
8949 } else { panic!(); }
8950 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
8953 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
8954 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
8955 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
8956 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
8957 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
8958 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
8959 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
8960 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
8961 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
8962 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
8963 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
8964 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
8965 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
8966 // until we learned about an additional block.
8968 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
8969 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
8970 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8971 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8972 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8973 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8974 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
8976 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8977 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8978 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
8979 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8980 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8982 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
8983 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8984 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8985 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8986 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8987 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8989 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
8990 if !test_height_before_timelock {
8991 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
8993 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8994 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
8995 if test_height_before_timelock {
8996 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
8997 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
8998 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8999 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9001 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9002 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9003 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9004 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9005 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9006 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9008 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9009 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9011 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9012 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9013 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9014 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9015 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9016 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9017 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9019 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9020 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9021 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9022 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9023 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9024 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9025 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9026 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9027 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9032 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9033 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9034 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9038 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9039 // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9040 // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9042 // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9044 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9045 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9046 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9047 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9048 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9049 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9050 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9051 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9052 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9054 // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9055 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9056 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9057 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9059 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9060 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9061 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9062 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9063 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9065 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9067 // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9068 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9069 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9070 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9072 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9073 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9074 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9075 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9076 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9078 // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9080 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9082 // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9083 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9084 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9086 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9087 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9088 let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9089 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9090 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9092 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9093 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9094 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9095 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9097 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9098 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9099 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9100 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9101 let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9102 let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9103 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9104 assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9106 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9107 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9108 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9109 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9110 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9111 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9112 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9114 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9115 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9116 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9117 logger: nodes[1].logger,
9121 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9122 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9124 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9125 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9126 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9127 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9129 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9130 // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9131 // the commitment state.
9132 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9134 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9136 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9137 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9140 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9141 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9142 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9143 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9144 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9145 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9146 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9148 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9149 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9153 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9154 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9155 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9156 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9157 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9159 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9160 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
9161 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9162 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9163 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
9164 let route = get_keysend_route(
9165 &payer_pubkey, &network_graph, &payee_pubkey, None, &vec![], 10000, 40, nodes[0].logger, &scorer
9168 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9169 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9170 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9171 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9172 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9173 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9174 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9175 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9176 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9180 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9181 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9182 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9183 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9184 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9186 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9187 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9188 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9189 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9191 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9192 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
9193 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9194 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
9195 let route = get_keysend_route(
9196 &payer_pubkey, &network_graph, &payee_pubkey, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9197 &vec![], 10000, 40, nodes[0].logger, &scorer
9200 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9201 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9202 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9203 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9204 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9205 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9206 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9207 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9208 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);