1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use chain::channelmonitor;
17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
19 use chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, KeysInterface};
20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
21 use ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS };
23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
25 use ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
26 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
27 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
29 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, OptionalField, ErrorAction};
30 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
31 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
32 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
33 use util::errors::APIError;
34 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
35 use util::config::UserConfig;
37 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
38 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
39 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
42 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
44 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
45 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
51 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
52 use core::default::Default;
53 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
55 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
56 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
59 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
60 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
61 use ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
62 let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
63 cfg.peer_channel_config_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
64 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
65 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
66 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
67 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
69 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
71 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
72 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
73 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
75 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
76 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
78 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
79 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
81 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
82 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
83 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
84 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
85 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
86 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
87 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
88 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
90 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
91 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
93 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
95 } else { assert!(false); }
98 use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
100 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
101 insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
102 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
104 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
106 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
108 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
110 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
112 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
114 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
116 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
120 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
121 // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
123 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
124 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
125 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
126 node_cfgs[1].features = InitFeatures::known().clear_wumbo();
127 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
128 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
130 match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
131 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
132 assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
138 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
139 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
140 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
141 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
142 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
143 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
144 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
145 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
146 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
148 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
149 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
150 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
151 let opt_anchors = false;
152 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
153 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
155 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
156 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
157 if !send_from_initiator {
158 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
159 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
161 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
163 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
164 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
165 if send_from_initiator {
166 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
167 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
169 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
172 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
173 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
174 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
177 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
178 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
179 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
181 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
182 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
183 if send_from_initiator {
184 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
185 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
186 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
187 // well as an additional HTLC.
188 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
190 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
195 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
196 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
197 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
201 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
202 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
203 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
204 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
205 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
206 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
209 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
213 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
214 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
215 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
216 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
217 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
218 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
219 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
220 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
221 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
222 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
224 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
226 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
228 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
230 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
233 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
234 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
236 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
237 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
238 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
239 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
240 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
242 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
245 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
247 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
248 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
249 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
250 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
252 let payment_event = {
253 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
254 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
255 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
257 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
258 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
260 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
261 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
262 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
263 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
264 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
265 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
267 // deliver(1), generate (3):
268 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
269 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
270 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
273 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
274 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
275 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
276 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
277 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
278 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
279 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
280 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
282 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
283 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
284 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
285 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
286 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
287 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
288 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
291 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
292 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
293 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
294 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
296 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
297 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
298 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
300 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
303 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
304 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
306 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
307 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
310 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
315 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
316 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
317 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
318 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
319 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
320 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
321 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
322 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
325 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
327 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
329 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
332 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
335 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
336 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
337 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
338 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
341 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
344 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
346 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
347 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
348 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
349 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
351 let payment_event = {
352 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
353 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
354 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
356 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
357 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
359 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
360 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
361 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
362 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
363 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
364 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
366 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
367 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
369 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
373 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
374 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
375 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
376 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
377 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
378 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
381 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
382 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
383 // update_fee (never committed) ->
385 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
386 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
387 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
388 // <- (1) RAA delivered
389 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
390 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
391 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
392 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
394 // B should send no response here
395 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
396 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
399 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
402 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
403 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
404 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
406 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
409 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
410 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
411 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
412 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
413 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
415 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
418 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
419 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
420 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
421 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
422 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
424 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
427 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
428 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
430 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
431 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
432 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
434 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
435 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
436 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
437 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
440 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
442 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
444 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
446 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
447 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
448 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
449 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
450 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
451 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
452 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
453 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
454 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
455 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
456 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
458 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
459 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
460 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
461 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
462 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
464 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
465 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
466 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
469 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
470 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
473 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
474 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
475 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
477 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
478 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
479 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
480 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
482 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
483 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
484 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
487 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
488 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
489 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
490 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
493 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
494 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
495 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
496 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
498 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
500 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
503 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
504 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
507 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
508 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
509 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
511 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
512 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
513 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
515 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
516 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
518 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
520 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
521 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
522 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
523 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
525 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
526 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
528 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
529 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
530 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
531 added_monitors.clear();
533 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
535 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
536 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
538 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
539 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
540 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
541 added_monitors.clear();
544 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
545 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
547 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
548 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
550 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
551 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
552 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
553 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
557 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
558 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
559 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
560 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
561 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
562 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
563 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
564 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
565 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
566 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
567 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
568 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
569 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
570 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
571 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
572 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
573 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
574 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
575 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
579 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
580 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
581 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
582 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
583 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
584 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
587 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
590 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
591 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
593 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
594 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
595 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
596 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
597 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
599 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
601 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
603 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
604 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
605 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
607 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
608 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
609 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
611 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
612 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
613 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
614 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
616 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
617 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
618 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
622 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
623 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
624 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
625 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
626 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
627 let channel_value = 5000;
629 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
630 let channel_id = chan.2;
631 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
632 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value);
634 let opt_anchors = false;
636 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
637 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
638 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
640 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
641 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
643 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
644 *feerate_lock = feerate;
646 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
647 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
648 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
650 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
652 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
654 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
656 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
658 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
659 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
660 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
661 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
662 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
663 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
667 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
668 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
671 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
672 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
673 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
675 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
677 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
678 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
679 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
680 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
681 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
682 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
683 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
684 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
685 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
687 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
688 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
689 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
690 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
691 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
692 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
693 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
694 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
697 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
698 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
699 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
702 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
703 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
704 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
705 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
706 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
707 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
709 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
710 opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
711 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
712 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
714 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
716 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
719 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
722 htlc_signatures: res.1
725 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
727 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
730 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
732 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
733 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
734 //Should produce and error.
735 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
736 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
737 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
738 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
739 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
743 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
744 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
745 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
746 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
747 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
748 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
751 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
754 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
757 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
758 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
760 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
761 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
762 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
763 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
764 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
766 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
768 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
769 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
770 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
771 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
773 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
775 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
776 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
778 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
779 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
780 added_monitors.clear();
782 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
783 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
784 // node[1] has nothing to do
786 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
787 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
788 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
790 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
791 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
792 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
793 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
794 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
795 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
796 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
798 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
799 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
800 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
801 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
802 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
803 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
805 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
806 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
807 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
808 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
810 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
811 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
812 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
814 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
815 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
816 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
817 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
819 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
820 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
821 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
823 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
825 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
826 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
828 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
829 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
832 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
834 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
835 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
836 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
837 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
838 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
842 fn test_update_fee() {
843 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
844 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
845 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
846 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
847 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
848 let channel_id = chan.2;
851 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
852 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
853 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
854 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
855 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
856 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
857 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
858 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
859 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
860 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
861 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
864 // Create and deliver (1)...
867 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
868 feerate = *feerate_lock;
869 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
871 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
872 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
874 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
875 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
876 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
877 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
878 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
880 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
882 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
884 // Generate (2) and (3):
885 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
886 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
887 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
890 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
891 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
892 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
894 // Create and deliver (4)...
896 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
897 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
899 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
900 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
901 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
902 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
903 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
904 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
905 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
907 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
910 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
911 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
912 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
914 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
915 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
917 // Handle (3), creating (6):
918 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
919 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
920 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
921 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
924 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
925 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
928 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
929 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
930 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
931 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
932 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
933 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
934 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
935 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
939 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
941 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
942 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
944 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
945 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
946 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
948 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
949 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
950 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
951 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
952 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
956 fn fake_network_test() {
957 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
958 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
959 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
960 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
961 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
962 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
964 // Create some initial channels
965 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
966 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
967 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
969 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
970 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
971 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
972 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
973 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
975 // Send some more payments
976 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
977 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
978 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
980 // Test failure packets
981 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
982 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
984 // Add a new channel that skips 3
985 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
987 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
988 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
989 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
990 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
991 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
992 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
993 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
995 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
996 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
998 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
999 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1000 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1001 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1003 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1005 hops.push(RouteHop {
1006 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1007 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1008 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1009 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1011 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1013 hops.push(RouteHop {
1014 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1015 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1016 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1017 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1019 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1021 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1022 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1023 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1025 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1026 hops.push(RouteHop {
1027 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1028 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1029 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1030 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1032 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1034 hops.push(RouteHop {
1035 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1036 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1037 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1038 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1040 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1042 hops.push(RouteHop {
1043 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1044 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1045 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1046 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1048 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1050 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1051 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1052 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1054 // Claim the rebalances...
1055 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1056 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1058 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1059 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1061 // Send some payments across both channels
1062 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1063 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1064 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1067 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1068 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1069 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1070 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1072 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1074 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1075 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1076 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1078 // Close down the channels...
1079 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1080 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1081 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1082 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1083 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1084 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1085 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1086 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1087 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1088 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1089 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1090 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1091 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1092 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1093 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1097 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1098 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1099 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1100 // commitment dance rounds.
1101 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1102 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1103 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1104 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1105 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1106 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1108 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1109 for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1110 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1111 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1112 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1114 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1116 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1117 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1118 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1119 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1121 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1122 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1124 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1126 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1127 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1128 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1129 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1132 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1133 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1135 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1136 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1139 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1140 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1141 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1142 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1144 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1145 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1146 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1147 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1148 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1149 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1152 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1153 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1154 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1156 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1158 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1159 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1160 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1163 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1164 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1165 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1166 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1168 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1170 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1172 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1173 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1175 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1176 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1177 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1179 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1181 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1183 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1184 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1185 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1187 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1190 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1192 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1193 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1194 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1196 &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1197 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1199 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1203 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1204 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1207 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1211 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1212 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1213 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1214 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1215 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1216 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1217 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1219 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1220 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1221 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1222 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1223 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1224 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1226 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1228 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1229 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1231 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1232 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1234 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1235 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1236 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1240 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1241 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1242 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1243 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1244 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1245 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1246 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1247 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1249 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1252 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1254 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1256 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1257 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1258 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1260 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1261 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1262 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1263 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1265 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1266 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1268 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1269 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1270 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1271 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1272 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1273 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1274 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1277 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1279 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1280 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1281 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1282 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1284 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1285 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1287 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1289 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Alternative commitment tx
1290 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC spend in alternative commitment tx
1292 let bump_tx = if claim_txn[1] == claim_txn[4] {
1293 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1294 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1296 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC timeout on alternative commitment tx
1298 check_spends!(claim_txn[3], remote_txn[0]); // HTLC timeout on broadcasted commitment tx
1301 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[3]);
1302 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[4]);
1304 check_spends!(claim_txn[5], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC timeout on alternative commitment tx
1306 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], remote_txn[0]); // HTLC timeout on broadcasted commitment tx
1311 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1312 assert_eq!(bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1313 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, bump_tx.input[0].previous_output);
1315 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1316 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1317 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1319 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1320 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1321 check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1322 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1324 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1325 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1328 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1329 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1330 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1331 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1333 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1334 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1335 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1336 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1337 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1338 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1340 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1346 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1347 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1348 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1349 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1350 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1351 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1353 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1354 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1356 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1357 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2));
1358 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1359 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1360 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1362 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1364 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1365 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1366 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1369 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1371 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1372 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1374 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1378 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1379 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1380 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1381 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1382 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1383 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1385 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1386 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1387 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1388 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1390 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1392 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1393 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1394 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1395 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1398 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1399 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1400 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1401 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1404 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1406 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1407 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1408 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1410 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1412 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1414 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1415 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1416 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1417 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1418 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1419 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1420 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1421 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1423 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1424 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1425 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1426 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1427 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1429 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1430 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1431 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1432 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1433 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1434 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1435 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1436 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1439 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1440 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1441 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1443 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1444 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1445 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1447 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1449 amount_msat: 3460001,
1450 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1452 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1455 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1458 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1459 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1460 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1461 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1465 local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1466 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1468 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1469 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1471 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1474 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1477 htlc_signatures: res.1
1480 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1481 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1482 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1484 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1485 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1487 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1488 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1490 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1492 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1493 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1494 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1496 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1497 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1498 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1500 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1502 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1503 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1505 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1509 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1510 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1511 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1512 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1513 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1515 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1516 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1517 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1518 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1520 let opt_anchors = false;
1522 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1523 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1524 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1526 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1528 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1529 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1530 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1533 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1534 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1535 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1536 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1537 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1538 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1542 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1543 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1544 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1545 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1546 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1547 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1549 let opt_anchors = false;
1551 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1552 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1553 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1554 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1555 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1556 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1557 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1559 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1560 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1561 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1564 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1565 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1566 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1567 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1568 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1569 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1570 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1571 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1572 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1574 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1575 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1576 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1577 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1578 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1581 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1582 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1583 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1584 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1585 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1586 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1587 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1588 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1592 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1593 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1594 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1595 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1596 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1598 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1599 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1600 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1602 let opt_anchors = false;
1604 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1605 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1606 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1607 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1608 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1609 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1610 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1612 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1613 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1614 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1615 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1616 // commitment transaction fee.
1617 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1619 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1620 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1621 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1624 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1625 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1626 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1627 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1631 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1632 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1633 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1634 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1635 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1636 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1637 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1638 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1640 let opt_anchors = false;
1642 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1644 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1645 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1646 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1647 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1649 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1650 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1651 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1652 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1653 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1654 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1655 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg);
1657 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1658 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1659 match msg_events[0] {
1660 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1661 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1663 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1668 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1669 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1670 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1671 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1672 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1673 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1674 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1675 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1677 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1678 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1679 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1680 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1681 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1682 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1684 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1685 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1686 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1687 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1688 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1689 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1691 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1692 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1693 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1694 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1698 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1699 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1700 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1701 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1702 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1703 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1704 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1707 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1708 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1709 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1710 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1712 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1713 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1714 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1715 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1717 // Add a pending HTLC.
1718 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1719 let payment_event_1 = {
1720 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1721 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1723 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1724 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1725 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1727 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1729 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1730 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1731 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1732 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1733 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1735 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1736 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1737 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1738 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1739 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1740 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1741 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1742 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1745 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1746 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1747 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1748 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1751 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1752 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1753 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1754 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1755 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1756 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1757 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1758 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1762 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1763 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1764 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1765 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1766 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1767 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1768 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1769 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1770 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1771 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1773 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1774 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1775 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1777 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1778 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1781 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1782 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1786 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1787 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1788 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1789 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1790 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1791 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1792 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1793 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1794 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1795 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1796 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1798 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1799 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1801 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1802 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1804 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1806 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1807 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1808 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1809 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1814 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1815 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1816 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1817 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1819 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1821 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1823 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1824 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1825 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1826 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1827 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1828 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1829 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1832 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1833 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1835 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1836 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1837 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1838 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1839 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1840 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1841 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1844 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1846 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1847 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1848 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1849 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1850 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1853 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1854 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1855 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1856 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1857 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1860 // adding pending output.
1861 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1862 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1863 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1864 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1865 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1866 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1867 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1868 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1869 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1871 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1872 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1873 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1875 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1876 let payment_event_1 = {
1877 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1878 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1880 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1881 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1882 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1884 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1886 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1887 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1889 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1890 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1891 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1892 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1895 // split the rest to test holding cell
1896 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1897 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1898 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1899 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1901 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1902 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1905 // now see if they go through on both sides
1906 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1907 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1908 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1909 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1910 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1911 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1913 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1915 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1916 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1917 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1918 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1919 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1922 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1923 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1924 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1925 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1926 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1927 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1929 // flush the pending htlc
1930 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1931 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1932 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1934 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1935 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1937 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1939 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1940 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1941 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1942 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1944 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1945 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1946 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1948 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1950 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1951 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1952 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1954 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1955 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1957 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1958 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1959 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1960 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1961 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1962 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1964 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1965 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1966 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1967 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1969 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1970 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1972 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1973 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1975 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
1976 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1977 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
1979 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1980 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1981 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1983 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1986 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1989 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
1990 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1991 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
1993 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1994 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1995 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1997 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2000 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2003 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2004 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2005 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2007 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
2008 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2009 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2011 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
2012 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2013 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2014 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2015 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2017 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2018 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2022 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2023 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2024 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2025 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2026 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2027 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2028 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2029 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2031 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2032 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2033 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2034 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2035 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2036 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2037 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
2038 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2040 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2041 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2042 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2043 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2044 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2045 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2046 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2047 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2048 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2049 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2051 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2052 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2053 let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2054 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2055 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2057 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2058 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2060 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
2061 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2062 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2063 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2064 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2067 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2068 // initial fulfill/CS.
2069 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2070 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2071 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2072 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2074 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2075 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2076 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2077 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2078 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2079 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2081 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2082 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2083 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2084 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2085 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2087 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2088 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2089 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2090 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2091 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2093 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2094 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2095 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2097 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2099 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2101 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2102 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2103 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2105 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2106 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2107 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2108 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2109 // on-chain as necessary).
2110 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2111 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2112 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2113 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2114 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2116 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2118 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2120 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2121 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2123 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2124 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2125 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2126 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2127 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2128 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2130 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2131 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2132 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2134 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2135 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2136 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2137 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2138 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2141 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2142 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2144 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2146 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2148 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2149 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2150 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2152 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2155 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2157 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2158 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2160 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2162 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2164 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2165 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2167 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2168 expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2170 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2171 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2175 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2176 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2177 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2178 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2179 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2180 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2181 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2183 // Create some initial channels
2184 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2185 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2186 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2187 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2189 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2190 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2191 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2192 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2193 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2194 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2196 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2197 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2198 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2199 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2200 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2202 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2203 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2205 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2207 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2208 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2209 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2210 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2211 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2213 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2214 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2215 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2216 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2217 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2219 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2220 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2222 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2223 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2224 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2225 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2226 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2228 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2229 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2230 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2231 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2232 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2233 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2235 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2236 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2237 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2238 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2239 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2241 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2242 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2244 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2245 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2246 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2248 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2249 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2251 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2252 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2253 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2254 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2256 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2262 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2263 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2264 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2265 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2266 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2267 let node2_commitment_txid;
2269 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2270 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2271 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2272 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2274 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2275 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2276 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2277 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2278 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2280 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2281 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2282 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2283 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2284 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2286 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2287 // confusing us in the following tests.
2288 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2290 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2291 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2292 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2295 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2296 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2297 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2298 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2299 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2300 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2303 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2306 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2307 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2309 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2313 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2315 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2316 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2317 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2323 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2325 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2326 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2328 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2329 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2330 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2331 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2332 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2335 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2338 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2339 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2341 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2344 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2346 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2347 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2348 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2350 nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2351 nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2352 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2353 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2355 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2356 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2357 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2361 fn test_justice_tx() {
2362 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2363 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2364 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2365 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2366 alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2367 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2368 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2369 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2370 bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2371 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2372 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2373 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2374 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2375 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2376 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2377 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2378 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen;
2379 // Create some new channels:
2380 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2382 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2383 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2384 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2385 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2386 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2387 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2388 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2389 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2390 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2391 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2392 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2393 // Revoke the old state
2394 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2397 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2399 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2400 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2401 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2403 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2404 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2405 node_txn.truncate(1);
2407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2408 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2409 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2411 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2412 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2413 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2414 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2415 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2416 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2417 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2418 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2419 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2421 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2423 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2424 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2426 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2427 // Create some new channels:
2428 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2430 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2434 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2435 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2436 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2437 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2438 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2439 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2440 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2441 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2442 // Revoke the old state
2443 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2445 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2447 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2448 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2449 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2451 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2452 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2454 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2455 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2457 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2458 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2459 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2460 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2461 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2462 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2463 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2465 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2466 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2467 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2471 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2472 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2473 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2474 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2475 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2476 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2477 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2478 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2479 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2480 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2481 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2482 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2483 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2484 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2485 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2487 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2488 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2489 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2490 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2491 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2492 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2494 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2495 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2497 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2498 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2499 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2500 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2501 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2505 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2506 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2507 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2508 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2509 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2510 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2511 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2513 // Create some new channel:
2514 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2516 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2517 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2518 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2519 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2520 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2522 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2523 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2524 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2525 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2526 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2527 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2528 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2529 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2530 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2532 //Revoke the old state
2533 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2536 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2537 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2538 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2539 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2540 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2541 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2542 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2543 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2545 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2546 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2548 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2549 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2551 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2552 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2553 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2554 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2555 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2556 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2557 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2558 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2560 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2561 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2562 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2564 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2565 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2566 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2570 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2571 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2572 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2573 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2574 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2575 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2576 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2578 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2580 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2581 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2582 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2583 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2584 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2585 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2587 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2588 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2590 //Revoke the old state
2591 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2594 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2595 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2596 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2597 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2598 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2599 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2600 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2602 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2603 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2606 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2607 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2609 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2610 assert!(node_txn.len() == 9 || node_txn.len() == 10);
2612 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2613 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2614 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2615 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2616 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2617 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2618 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2620 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2621 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2622 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2623 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2625 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2626 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2627 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2629 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2630 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2631 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2632 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2633 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2634 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2635 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2636 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2638 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2639 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2640 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2644 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2645 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2646 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2647 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2648 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2649 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2650 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2651 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2652 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2654 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2655 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2656 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2657 // PaymentSent event).
2659 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2660 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2661 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2662 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2664 // Create some initial channels
2665 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2666 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2668 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2669 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2670 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2671 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2672 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2674 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2675 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2676 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2678 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2679 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2681 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2682 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2683 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2684 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2685 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2686 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2687 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2688 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2689 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2690 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2691 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2692 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2693 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2694 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2695 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2697 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2698 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2699 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2700 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2701 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2702 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2703 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2704 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2705 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2706 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2707 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2708 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2709 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2710 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2711 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2712 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2713 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2715 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2716 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2717 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2718 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2720 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2721 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2722 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2723 added_monitors.clear();
2725 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2726 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2727 match forwarded_events[0] {
2728 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2729 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2731 let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2732 match forwarded_events[1] {
2733 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2734 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2735 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2736 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2737 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2741 match forwarded_events[2] {
2742 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2743 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2744 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2745 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2746 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2750 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2752 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2753 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2754 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2755 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2756 added_monitors.clear();
2758 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2760 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2761 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2764 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2765 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2769 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2770 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2771 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2772 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2773 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2774 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2776 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2778 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2779 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2780 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2781 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2782 // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2783 // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2784 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2785 check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2786 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2787 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2789 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2790 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2791 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2792 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2794 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2795 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2796 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2797 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2799 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2800 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2804 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2805 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2806 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2807 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2809 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2810 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2811 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2812 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2813 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2814 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2815 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2816 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2817 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2818 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2819 let commitment_spend =
2820 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2821 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2822 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2823 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2826 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2827 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2828 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2832 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2833 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2834 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2835 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2836 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2837 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2838 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2839 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2840 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2841 check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2842 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2843 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2845 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2846 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2847 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2848 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2849 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2850 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2851 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2852 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2853 let mut first_claimed = false;
2854 for event in events {
2856 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2857 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2858 assert!(!first_claimed);
2859 first_claimed = true;
2861 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2862 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2865 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2866 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2867 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2870 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2873 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2874 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2875 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2876 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2877 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2878 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2880 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2882 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2883 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2884 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2885 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2886 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2887 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2888 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2890 // Create some intial channels
2891 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2892 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2894 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2895 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2896 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2898 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2900 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2901 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2902 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2903 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2905 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2906 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2908 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2909 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2911 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2912 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2913 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2914 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2915 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2916 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2918 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2920 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2921 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2922 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2923 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2924 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2925 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2926 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2927 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2929 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2930 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2931 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2932 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2933 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2936 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2937 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2938 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2939 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2941 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2942 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2944 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2945 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2946 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2947 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2949 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2953 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2955 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2957 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2958 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2959 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2960 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2963 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2965 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2966 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2967 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2968 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2969 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2970 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2971 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2973 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2977 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2978 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2979 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2980 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2982 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2983 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2984 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2985 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2986 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2987 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2989 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2992 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2993 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2994 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2996 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2997 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2999 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3000 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3001 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3002 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
3003 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3004 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
3005 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
3006 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
3007 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3011 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3012 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3013 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3014 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3018 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3019 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3020 // and fail backward accordingly.
3022 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3023 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3024 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3025 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3027 // Create some initial channels
3028 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3029 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3031 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3032 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3033 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3034 // Revoke the old state
3035 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3037 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3039 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3040 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3041 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3042 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3043 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3045 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3046 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3047 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3048 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3050 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3051 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3052 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3053 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3054 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3055 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3057 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3058 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3059 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3061 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3065 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3066 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3067 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3068 // commitment transaction anymore.
3069 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3070 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3071 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3072 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3073 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3074 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3076 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3077 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3078 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3079 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3080 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3081 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3082 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3083 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3084 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3086 // Create some initial channels
3087 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3088 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3090 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3091 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3092 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3093 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3094 // Revoke the old state
3095 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3097 let value = if use_dust {
3098 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3099 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3100 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3103 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3104 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3105 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3107 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3108 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3109 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3110 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3111 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3112 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3113 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3114 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3115 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3116 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3117 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3118 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3120 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3121 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3122 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3123 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3124 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3125 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3126 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3127 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3128 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3129 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3130 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3131 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3132 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3133 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3134 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3135 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3137 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3138 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3139 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3140 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3141 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3142 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3143 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3144 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3145 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3146 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3147 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3148 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3149 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3151 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3152 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3153 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3154 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3156 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3157 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3158 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3159 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3160 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3161 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3165 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3166 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3167 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3169 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3170 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3172 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3173 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3175 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3176 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3179 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3180 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3182 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3183 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3184 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3185 assert!(ANTI_REORG_DELAY > PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS); // We assume payments will also expire
3187 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3188 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 4 });
3190 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3191 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3194 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3195 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3197 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3199 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3201 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3202 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3204 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3207 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3208 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3211 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3212 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3214 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3215 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3216 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3217 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3218 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3220 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3221 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3222 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3223 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3225 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3229 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3230 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3231 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3232 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3233 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3234 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3236 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3239 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3240 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3241 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3242 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3243 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3244 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3245 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3247 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3248 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3249 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3251 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3253 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3254 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3256 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3257 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3258 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3259 // that we should update our routing table for.
3260 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3261 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3264 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3267 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3268 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3269 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3271 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3274 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3275 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3276 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3278 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3281 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3284 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3285 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3286 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3290 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3291 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3292 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3293 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3294 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3298 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3299 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3300 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3301 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3302 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3306 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3307 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3308 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3309 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3310 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3311 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3313 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3315 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3316 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3317 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3319 let payment_event = {
3320 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3321 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3322 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3324 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3325 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3328 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3329 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3331 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3332 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3334 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3337 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3339 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3341 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3342 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3343 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3344 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3345 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3346 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3348 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3349 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3355 onion_routing_packet,
3357 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3359 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3360 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3361 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3363 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3364 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3366 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3369 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3370 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3372 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3374 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3375 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3379 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3380 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3381 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3382 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3383 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3384 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3385 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3386 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3388 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3389 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3390 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3391 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3392 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3393 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3395 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3396 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3397 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3399 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3400 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3401 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3402 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3403 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3405 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3406 // registering new transactions
3407 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3408 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3412 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3413 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3414 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3415 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3416 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3417 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3418 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3419 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3421 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3423 let mut payment_event = {
3424 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3425 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3427 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3428 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3429 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3432 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3433 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3435 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3437 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3438 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3439 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3440 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3442 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3443 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3444 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3445 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3446 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3448 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3449 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3450 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3452 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3453 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3454 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3455 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3457 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3458 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3459 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3460 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3461 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3465 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3467 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3468 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3469 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3470 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3472 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3474 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3475 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3477 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3478 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3479 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3480 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3481 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3482 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3483 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3485 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3489 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3490 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3491 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3492 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3493 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3495 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3496 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3497 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3498 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3499 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3501 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3503 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3504 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3505 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3506 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3507 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3508 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3510 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3511 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3513 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3514 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3518 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3519 // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3520 // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3521 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3522 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3523 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3524 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3526 // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3527 // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3528 let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3529 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3530 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
3531 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3532 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
3534 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3535 assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3537 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3539 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3540 assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3542 // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3543 // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3546 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3549 // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3550 // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3551 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3552 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3554 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3555 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3559 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3560 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3561 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3562 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3563 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3564 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3565 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3566 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3568 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3569 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3570 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3572 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3573 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3574 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3575 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3577 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3578 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3579 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3581 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3582 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3583 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3584 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3586 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3587 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3589 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3590 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3592 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3594 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3595 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3597 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3598 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3599 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3601 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3604 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3605 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3606 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3608 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3611 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3612 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3616 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3617 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3620 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3621 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3622 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3623 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3624 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3625 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3627 let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3628 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3629 let (channel_ready, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3630 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3631 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3632 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3633 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3635 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3638 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3640 let payment_event = {
3641 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3642 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3644 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3645 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3646 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3648 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3650 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3651 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3653 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3654 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3655 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3657 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3659 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3660 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3661 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3662 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3664 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3665 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3666 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3667 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3668 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3670 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3671 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3672 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3673 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3680 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3681 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3682 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3683 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3684 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3685 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3687 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3688 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3689 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3691 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3692 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3694 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3695 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3696 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3697 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3698 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3699 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3700 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3701 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3702 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3703 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3704 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3705 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3706 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3707 // Everything was delivered...
3708 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3711 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3712 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3714 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3715 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3718 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3719 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3720 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3722 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3724 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3725 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3727 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
3728 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3729 assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3731 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3732 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3733 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3735 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3738 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3741 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3742 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3743 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3745 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3746 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3747 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3748 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3749 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3750 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3751 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3752 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3753 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3754 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3755 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3757 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3760 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3761 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3763 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3764 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3766 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3767 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3768 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3770 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3773 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3774 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3776 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3778 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3779 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3780 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3781 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3783 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3784 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3785 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3786 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3787 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3789 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3790 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3791 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3792 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3799 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3800 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3801 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3802 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3803 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3804 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3806 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3808 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3809 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3810 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3811 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3812 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3813 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3814 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3815 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3816 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3817 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3818 // Everything was delivered...
3819 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3822 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3823 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3826 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3827 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3828 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3830 if messages_delivered > 2 {
3831 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3834 // Channel should still work fine...
3835 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3836 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3837 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3841 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3842 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3843 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3844 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3845 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3849 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3850 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3851 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3852 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3853 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3857 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3858 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3859 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3860 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3861 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3862 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3863 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3864 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3865 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3866 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3868 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3869 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3871 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3872 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3873 assert!(events_1.is_empty());
3875 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3877 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3878 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3880 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3881 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3882 assert!(events_2.is_empty());
3884 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
3885 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3886 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
3887 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3889 // nodes[0] hasn't yet received a channel_ready, so it only sends that on reconnect.
3890 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
3891 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3892 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3893 let as_channel_ready = match events_3[0] {
3894 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3895 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3898 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_3[0]),
3901 // nodes[1] received nodes[0]'s channel_ready on the first reconnect above, so it should send
3902 // announcement_signatures as well as channel_update.
3903 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
3904 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3905 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 3);
3907 let bs_channel_ready = match events_4[0] {
3908 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3909 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3910 chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3913 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[0]),
3915 let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_4[1] {
3916 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3917 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3920 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[1]),
3923 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3924 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3926 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[2]),
3929 // Re-deliver nodes[0]'s channel_ready, which nodes[1] can safely ignore. It currently
3930 // generates a duplicative private channel_update
3931 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3932 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3933 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3935 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3936 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3938 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_5[0]),
3941 // When we deliver nodes[1]'s channel_ready, however, nodes[0] will generate its
3942 // announcement_signatures.
3943 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_channel_ready);
3944 let events_6 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3945 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
3946 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
3947 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3948 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3951 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_6[0]),
3954 // When we deliver nodes[1]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[0], nodes[0] should immediately
3955 // broadcast the channel announcement globally, as well as re-send its (now-public)
3957 nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3958 let events_7 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3959 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3960 let (chan_announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
3961 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3962 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3964 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_7[0]),
3967 // Finally, deliver nodes[0]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[1] and make sure it creates the
3968 // same channel_announcement.
3969 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3970 let events_8 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3971 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3972 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
3973 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3974 assert_eq!(*msg, chan_announcement);
3977 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_8[0]),
3980 // Provide the channel announcement and public updates to the network graph
3981 nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap();
3982 nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3983 nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3985 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3986 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3987 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3989 // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3990 // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3991 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3993 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3994 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3995 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3997 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3998 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3999 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4000 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4001 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4002 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4003 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4004 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4006 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4007 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4008 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4009 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4010 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4011 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4013 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
4014 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4015 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4016 logger: nodes[0].logger,
4020 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4021 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4023 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4024 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4025 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4027 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4029 // The channel announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
4030 nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
4031 let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4032 let mut found_announcement = false;
4033 for event in msgs.iter() {
4035 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
4036 if *msg == chan_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
4038 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
4039 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4042 assert!(found_announcement);
4046 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
4047 // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
4048 // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
4049 // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
4050 // channel_ready immediately instead.
4051 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4052 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4053 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4054 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4055 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
4057 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4059 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4060 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4061 let block_txn = [funding_tx];
4062 let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
4063 let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
4064 nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
4066 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4067 let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4068 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4072 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4073 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4074 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4075 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4076 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4077 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4078 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4079 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4081 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
4083 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4084 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4085 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
4086 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4088 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4089 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4091 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4092 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4095 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4096 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
4097 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4099 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4100 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4102 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4103 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4104 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4105 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4106 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4107 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4108 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4110 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4111 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4112 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4114 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4115 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4116 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4118 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4121 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4122 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4123 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4124 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4126 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4129 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4130 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4132 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4133 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4134 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4135 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4136 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4137 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4139 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4140 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4141 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4142 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4144 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4145 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4147 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4148 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4150 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4152 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4153 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4154 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4155 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4156 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4157 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4158 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4159 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4160 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4163 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4164 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4165 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4166 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4167 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4168 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4169 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4170 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4172 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4173 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4174 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4175 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4176 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4177 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4178 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4179 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4181 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4182 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4183 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4184 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4186 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4187 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4188 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4189 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4191 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4192 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4195 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4197 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4198 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4200 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4201 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4203 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4204 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4205 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4207 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4210 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4213 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4214 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4215 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4217 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4218 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4221 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4222 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4223 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4224 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4225 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4226 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4227 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4229 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4231 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4232 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4233 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4234 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4235 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4236 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4237 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4238 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4239 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4240 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4241 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4242 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4243 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4246 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4249 let mut block = Block {
4250 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4253 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4254 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4255 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4256 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4257 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4258 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4259 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4262 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4264 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4265 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4266 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4267 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4268 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4269 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4271 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4272 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4273 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4274 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4275 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4276 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4280 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4281 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4282 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4285 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4286 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4287 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4288 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4289 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4290 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4291 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4292 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4294 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4295 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4296 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4297 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4299 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4300 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4302 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4304 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4307 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4308 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4309 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4310 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4312 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4313 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4314 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4315 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4316 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4320 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4321 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4322 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4323 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4326 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4327 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4328 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4329 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4330 match fail_commit[0] {
4331 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4332 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4333 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4335 _ => unreachable!(),
4337 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4339 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4340 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4341 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
4342 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4343 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4344 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
4345 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4346 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4351 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4352 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4353 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4357 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4358 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4359 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4360 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4361 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4362 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4363 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4364 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4365 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4366 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4368 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4370 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4372 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4373 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4374 get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4375 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4377 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4378 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4379 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4380 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4381 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4382 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4383 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4384 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4385 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4386 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4388 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4389 let config = UserConfig::default();
4390 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4391 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4392 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4393 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4394 default_config: config,
4396 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4397 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4398 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4403 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4404 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4406 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4407 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4408 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4409 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4411 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4412 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4413 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4414 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4416 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4417 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4418 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4419 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4421 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4422 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
4423 for node in nodes.iter() {
4424 assert!(node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4425 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4426 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4429 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4433 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4434 // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4435 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4436 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4437 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4438 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4439 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4440 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4441 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4442 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4443 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4445 // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4446 let channel_value = 100000;
4447 let push_msat = 10001;
4448 let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4449 let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4450 let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4451 let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4452 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4453 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4454 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4456 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, 42);
4458 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
4459 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4461 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4463 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4464 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4465 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4466 added_monitors.clear();
4469 let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4470 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4472 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4473 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4474 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4475 added_monitors.clear();
4477 // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4482 // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4483 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4484 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4485 get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4487 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4488 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4489 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4490 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4491 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4492 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4493 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4494 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4495 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4496 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4498 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4499 let config = UserConfig::default();
4500 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4501 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4502 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4503 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4504 default_config: config,
4506 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4507 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4508 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4513 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4514 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4516 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4518 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4519 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4521 // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4522 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4523 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4524 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4525 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4527 // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4528 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4531 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4532 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4533 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4534 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4536 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4537 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4538 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4539 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4541 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4542 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
4543 for node in nodes.iter() {
4544 assert!(node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4545 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4546 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4549 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4553 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4554 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4555 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4556 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4557 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4558 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4559 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4560 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4561 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4562 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4563 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4565 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4566 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4568 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4570 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4571 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4572 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4574 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4575 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4576 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4577 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4578 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4579 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4580 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4581 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4582 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4583 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4585 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4586 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4587 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4588 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4589 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4590 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4592 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4593 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4594 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4599 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4600 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4602 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4603 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4604 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4606 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4608 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4609 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4613 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4614 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4615 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4616 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4617 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4618 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4619 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4620 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4621 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4622 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4623 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4624 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4625 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4626 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4628 let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4629 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4630 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4631 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4632 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4635 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4637 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4638 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4640 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4641 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4642 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4643 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4645 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4647 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4648 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4649 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4650 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4651 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4654 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4655 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4656 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4657 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4658 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4659 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4662 let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4663 for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4664 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4665 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4666 assert!(read.is_empty());
4667 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4670 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4671 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4672 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4673 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4674 assert!(read.is_empty());
4675 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4678 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4679 if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4680 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4681 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4683 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4684 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4685 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4687 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4689 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4692 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4693 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4694 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4695 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4697 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4698 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4699 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4701 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4703 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4704 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4706 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4707 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4708 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4709 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4710 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4713 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4714 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4715 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4717 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4718 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4720 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4721 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4722 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4723 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4724 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4726 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4727 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4728 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4729 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4730 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4731 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4732 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4734 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4735 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4737 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4742 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4743 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4745 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4746 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4747 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4748 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4749 for event in events.drain(..) {
4751 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4752 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4753 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4754 all_outputs.push(outp);
4757 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4760 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4761 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4771 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4772 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4773 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4774 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4775 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4776 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4778 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4779 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4780 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4781 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4782 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4783 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4784 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4785 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4786 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4788 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4789 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4791 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4792 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4793 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4794 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4795 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4799 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4800 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4801 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4802 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4803 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4804 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4805 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4807 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4808 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4809 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4810 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4811 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4813 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4814 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4815 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4816 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4818 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4819 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4820 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4821 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4822 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4824 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4825 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4826 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4830 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4831 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4832 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4834 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4835 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4836 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4837 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4839 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4840 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4841 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4842 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4843 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4845 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4846 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4847 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4848 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4849 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4851 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4852 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4853 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4855 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4856 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4857 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4858 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4859 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4863 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4864 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4865 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4866 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4867 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4869 // Create some initial channels
4870 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4872 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4874 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4875 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4876 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4878 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4879 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4880 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4881 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4882 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4883 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4884 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4886 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4887 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4890 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4891 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4894 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4895 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4896 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4897 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4898 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4899 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4900 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4902 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4903 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4904 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4906 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4907 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4908 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4912 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4913 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4914 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4915 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4916 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4918 // Create some initial channels
4919 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4921 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4922 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4924 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4926 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4927 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4928 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4930 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4931 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4932 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4933 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4935 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4936 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4938 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4940 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4941 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4942 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4943 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4944 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4945 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4947 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4948 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4949 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4950 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4952 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4953 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4954 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4955 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4956 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4960 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4961 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4962 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4963 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4964 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4966 // Create some initial channels
4967 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4969 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4970 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4971 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4972 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4974 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4976 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4977 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4978 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4979 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4981 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4982 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4983 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4984 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4986 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4987 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4989 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4990 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4991 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4995 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4996 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4997 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4998 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4999 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5000 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5002 // Create some initial channels
5003 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5005 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5006 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5007 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5008 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5010 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5012 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
5013 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5014 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5015 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5016 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5017 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5019 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5020 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5021 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5022 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5023 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5024 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5025 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
5027 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5028 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5029 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
5030 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5031 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5032 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5034 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5035 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5036 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5037 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5038 // transactions next...
5039 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
5040 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5042 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
5043 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5044 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
5045 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5047 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
5048 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5051 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5052 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5054 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
5055 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5057 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5058 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5059 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5060 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5061 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
5065 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
5066 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5067 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
5068 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5069 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5070 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5072 // Create some initial channels
5073 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5075 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5076 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5077 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5078 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5080 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
5081 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
5083 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5085 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
5086 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5087 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5088 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5089 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5090 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5092 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5093 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5094 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5095 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5097 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
5098 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
5099 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
5101 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5102 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5103 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
5104 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5106 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5108 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5109 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5111 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5112 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5113 // transactions next...
5114 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
5115 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5116 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
5117 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5119 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
5120 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5123 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5124 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5126 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5128 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
5129 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5131 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
5132 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
5134 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5135 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5136 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5137 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5138 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
5139 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5140 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
5141 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
5145 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
5146 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
5147 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
5148 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
5149 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
5151 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
5154 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5155 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5156 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5157 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5159 // Create some initial channels
5160 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5161 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5163 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5164 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5165 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5166 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5167 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5169 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5170 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5171 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5173 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
5174 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5175 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5176 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5177 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
5178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5179 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5180 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5181 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5182 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5183 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5185 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5186 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5187 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5188 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5190 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5191 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5192 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5193 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5194 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5195 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5196 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5197 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5198 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5199 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5201 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5202 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5203 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5205 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5206 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5208 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5209 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5212 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
5213 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5214 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
5215 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5216 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
5218 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5221 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5222 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5223 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5224 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5227 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5228 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5229 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5230 match msg_events[0] {
5231 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5232 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5234 match msg_events[1] {
5235 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5236 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5238 match msg_events[2] {
5239 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5240 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5241 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5242 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5243 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5244 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5246 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5248 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5249 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5250 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5251 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5252 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5253 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5254 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5255 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5256 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5257 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5258 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5259 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5260 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5262 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5263 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5267 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5268 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5269 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5270 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5271 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5272 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5273 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5274 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5275 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5276 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5277 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5278 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5279 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5280 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5282 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5283 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5284 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5286 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5287 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5288 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5289 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5290 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5292 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
5294 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5295 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5296 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5297 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5298 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
5299 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
5300 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5301 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5303 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5304 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5305 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5307 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5308 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5309 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5310 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5311 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5313 let htlc_timeout_tx;
5314 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5315 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5316 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5317 assert!(node_txn.len() == 4 || node_txn.len() == 3);
5318 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5320 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5321 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5323 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
5324 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5325 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5326 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5328 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5329 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5331 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5332 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5335 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5336 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5337 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
5338 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5340 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5343 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5344 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
5346 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5347 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5348 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5349 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5351 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5352 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5355 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5356 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5358 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5359 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5360 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5361 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5362 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5363 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5364 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5365 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5366 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5367 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5368 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5369 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5370 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5372 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5373 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5374 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5375 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5376 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5377 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5378 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5379 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5380 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5381 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5383 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5384 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5386 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5388 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5390 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5391 // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5392 // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5393 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5394 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196*2), true, true);
5395 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5396 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5397 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5398 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5399 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5400 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5401 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5403 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5404 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5406 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5408 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5409 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5410 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5412 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5417 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5418 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5419 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5420 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5421 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5423 // Create some initial channels
5424 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5426 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
5427 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5428 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5429 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5430 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5432 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5433 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5434 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
5435 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5437 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5438 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5439 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5440 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5442 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5443 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5446 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5447 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5450 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5451 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5452 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5453 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5454 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5455 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5456 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5460 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5461 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5463 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5464 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5465 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5466 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5467 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5468 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5471 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5472 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5473 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5474 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5475 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5476 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5477 // use the same payment hashes.
5478 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5483 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5484 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5485 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5486 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5487 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5488 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5489 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5490 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5491 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5492 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5494 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5495 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5496 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5497 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5498 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5500 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5501 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5502 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5503 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5505 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5507 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5509 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5510 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5512 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5514 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5516 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5518 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5519 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5521 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5523 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5526 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5528 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5529 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5532 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5534 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5535 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5537 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5538 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5539 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5540 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5541 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5543 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5544 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5545 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5546 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5547 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5548 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5549 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5550 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5551 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5553 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5554 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5555 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5556 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5557 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5558 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5560 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5561 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5562 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5563 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5564 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5565 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5567 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5568 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5569 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5570 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5572 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5574 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5575 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5576 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5577 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5578 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5579 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5580 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5581 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5582 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5583 if deliver_last_raa {
5584 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5586 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5589 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5590 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5591 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5592 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5594 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5595 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5596 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5598 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5599 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5600 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5602 if announce_latest {
5603 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5605 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5607 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5608 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5609 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5612 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5616 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5617 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5620 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5621 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5622 if deliver_last_raa {
5623 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5625 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5627 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5629 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5630 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5631 let mut a_done = false;
5632 for msg in cs_msgs {
5634 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5635 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5636 // should be failed-backwards here.
5637 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5638 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5639 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5640 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5642 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5647 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5648 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5649 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5651 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5652 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5655 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5656 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5657 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5658 if announce_latest {
5659 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5660 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5661 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5664 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5666 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5670 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5671 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5672 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5673 let mut as_updates = 0;
5674 for event in as_events.iter() {
5675 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5676 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5677 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5678 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5680 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5682 if network_update.is_some() {
5685 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5687 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5688 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5689 if announce_latest {
5690 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5691 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5693 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5695 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5696 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5697 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5698 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5699 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5700 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5701 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5702 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5703 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5705 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5707 if network_update.is_some() {
5710 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5712 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5713 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5714 if announce_latest {
5715 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5717 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5719 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5720 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5721 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5722 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5723 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5724 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5728 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5729 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5733 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5734 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5738 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5739 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5740 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5741 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5745 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5746 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5747 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5748 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5749 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5751 // Create some initial channels
5752 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5754 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5755 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5756 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5757 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5759 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5760 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5761 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5762 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5763 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5764 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5766 let htlc_timeout = {
5767 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5768 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5769 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5770 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5771 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5772 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5776 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5777 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5778 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5780 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5781 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5782 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5783 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5784 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5785 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5786 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5787 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5788 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5789 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5790 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5794 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5795 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5796 // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5797 // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5799 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5801 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5802 let seed = [42; 32];
5803 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5804 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5805 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph: &chanmon_cfgs[0].network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5806 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5807 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5808 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5810 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5811 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5813 // Create some initial channels
5814 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5816 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5817 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5818 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5820 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5821 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5822 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5823 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5824 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5826 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5827 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5828 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5829 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5830 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5832 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5833 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5834 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5835 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5836 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5837 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5838 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5839 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5842 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5843 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5844 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5845 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5846 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5847 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5849 let htlc_timeout = {
5850 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5851 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5852 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5853 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5857 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5858 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5859 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5861 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5862 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5863 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5864 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5865 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5866 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5867 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5868 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5869 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5870 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5871 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5872 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5876 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5877 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5878 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5879 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5880 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5882 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5884 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5885 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5887 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5888 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5889 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5891 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5892 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5893 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5895 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5896 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5897 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5899 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5900 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5901 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5904 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5905 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5906 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5907 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5908 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5909 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5911 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5913 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5914 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5915 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5916 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5917 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5919 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5920 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5921 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5923 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5924 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5925 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5926 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5929 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5930 let mut block = Block {
5931 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5934 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5935 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5936 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5938 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5939 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5941 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5944 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5945 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5946 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5947 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5948 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5949 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5951 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5952 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5953 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5955 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5957 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5958 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5959 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5961 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5962 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5964 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5965 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5966 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5968 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5969 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5970 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5971 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5974 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5975 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5976 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5977 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5978 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5979 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5981 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5982 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5983 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5984 // actually revoked.
5985 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5986 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5987 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5988 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5991 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5992 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5993 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5994 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5995 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5996 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5997 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5998 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5999 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6000 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6002 if check_revoke_no_close {
6003 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
6004 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6007 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
6008 let mut block = Block {
6009 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6012 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
6013 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
6014 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
6016 if !check_revoke_no_close {
6017 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
6018 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6019 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6020 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6022 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6023 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6024 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
6025 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6026 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
6027 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
6028 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6029 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
6033 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
6034 // There are only a few cases to test here:
6035 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
6036 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
6037 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
6038 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
6039 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
6041 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
6042 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
6043 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
6045 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
6046 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
6047 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
6049 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
6050 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
6054 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
6055 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
6056 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
6057 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
6058 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
6063 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
6064 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6065 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6066 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6067 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6068 // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
6069 for node in nodes.iter() {
6070 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
6073 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
6074 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6075 let push_msat=10001;
6076 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6077 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6078 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6079 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6081 // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
6082 // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
6083 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6087 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
6088 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6089 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6090 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6091 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6093 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
6094 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
6095 let push_msat=10001;
6096 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6098 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
6099 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6100 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
6101 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
6102 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6104 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
6105 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6106 let push_msat=10001;
6107 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
6108 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6109 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
6111 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
6112 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
6113 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
6115 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
6116 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
6117 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6119 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
6120 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
6121 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
6123 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
6124 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
6125 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6126 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6127 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
6128 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6132 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
6133 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6134 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6135 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6136 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6138 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
6139 let push_msat=10001;
6140 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6141 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6142 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
6143 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
6145 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6146 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6147 let err_msg = match events[0] {
6148 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
6151 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6153 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
6156 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
6157 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
6158 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
6159 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
6161 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
6162 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6163 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6164 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6165 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6166 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6168 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6169 // pending_update_fee.
6171 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6172 *feerate_lock += 20;
6174 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6175 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6177 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6178 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6179 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6180 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6181 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6183 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6186 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6188 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6189 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6190 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6191 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6193 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6194 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6195 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6197 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6198 let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6199 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6200 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6202 // Flush the pending fee update.
6203 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6204 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6205 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6206 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6207 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6209 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6210 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6211 // us to surface its failure to the user.
6212 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6213 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6214 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6215 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6216 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6217 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6219 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6220 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6221 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6223 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6224 assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6225 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6226 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6227 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6228 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6229 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6230 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6231 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6233 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6237 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6238 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6239 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6241 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6242 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6243 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6244 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6245 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6246 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6248 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6249 // pending_update_fee.
6251 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6252 *feerate_lock += 200;
6254 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6255 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6257 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6258 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6259 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6260 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6261 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6263 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6266 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6268 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6269 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6270 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6271 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6273 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6275 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
6276 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6277 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6279 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6280 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6281 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6282 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6283 let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6284 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6285 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6287 // Flush the pending fee update.
6288 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6289 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6290 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6291 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6292 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6293 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6295 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6296 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6297 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6298 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6299 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6300 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6301 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6302 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6303 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6305 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6306 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6307 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6309 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6310 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6311 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6312 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6313 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6314 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6315 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6316 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6317 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6319 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6322 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6323 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6324 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6325 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6326 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6328 let raa = match send_raa_event {
6329 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6330 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6332 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6334 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6335 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6336 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6337 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6339 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6340 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6342 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6343 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6344 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6346 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6347 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6349 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6350 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6351 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
6353 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6354 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6355 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6356 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6359 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6360 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6361 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6364 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6365 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6366 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6367 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6368 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6369 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6370 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6371 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6372 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6373 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6374 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6376 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6377 // pending_update_fee.
6379 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6380 *feerate_lock += 20;
6382 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6383 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6385 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6386 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6387 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6388 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6389 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6391 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6394 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6396 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6397 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6398 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6399 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6401 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6403 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6404 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6405 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6406 let payment_event = {
6407 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6408 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6410 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6411 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6413 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6415 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6416 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6417 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6418 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6420 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6421 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6423 // Flush the pending fee update.
6424 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6425 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6426 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6427 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6428 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6429 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6431 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6432 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6433 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6435 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6436 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6439 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6442 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6443 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6444 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6446 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6447 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6448 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6449 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6450 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6451 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6454 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6455 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6458 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6459 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6460 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6461 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6462 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6463 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6464 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6465 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6466 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6467 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6469 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6472 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6473 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6474 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6476 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6477 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6478 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6479 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6480 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6482 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6483 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6484 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6485 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6486 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6488 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6489 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6490 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6493 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6494 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6495 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6498 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6499 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6500 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6501 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6502 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6503 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6504 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6506 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6507 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6509 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6510 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6511 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6512 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6516 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6517 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6518 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6519 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6520 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6521 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6522 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6524 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6525 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6526 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6527 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6529 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6530 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6534 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6535 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6536 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6537 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6538 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6539 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6540 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6542 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6543 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6544 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6545 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6546 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6548 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6549 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6550 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6551 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6552 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6556 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6557 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6558 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6559 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6560 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6561 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6562 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6563 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6565 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
6566 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
6567 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6568 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6569 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6570 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6574 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6575 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6576 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6577 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6578 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6579 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6580 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6581 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6582 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6583 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6585 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6586 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6587 let payment_event = {
6588 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6589 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6591 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6592 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6593 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6594 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6598 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6600 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6601 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6602 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6604 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6605 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6607 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6608 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6609 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6611 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6612 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6616 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6617 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6618 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6619 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6620 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6621 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6622 let channel_value = 100000;
6623 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6624 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6626 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6628 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6629 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6631 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6632 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6633 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6635 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6636 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6638 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6641 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6643 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6644 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6645 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6646 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6647 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6648 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6649 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6650 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6652 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6653 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6654 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6657 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6658 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6659 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6660 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6661 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6662 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6663 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6664 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6665 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6666 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6667 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6671 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6672 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6673 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6674 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6675 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6676 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6677 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6679 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6680 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6681 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6682 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6683 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6684 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6686 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6687 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6688 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6689 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6690 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6692 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6693 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6694 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6695 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6696 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6698 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6699 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6700 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6701 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6702 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6706 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6707 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6708 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6709 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6710 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6711 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6712 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6713 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6715 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6716 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6717 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6718 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6719 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6720 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6722 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6726 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6727 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6728 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6731 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6732 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6733 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6735 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6736 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6738 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6739 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6740 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6741 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6742 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6746 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6747 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6748 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6749 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6750 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6751 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6752 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6754 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6755 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6756 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6757 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6758 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6759 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6761 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6762 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6763 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6764 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6765 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6769 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6770 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6771 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6772 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6773 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6774 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6776 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6777 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6778 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6779 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6780 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6781 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6782 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6784 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6785 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6786 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6787 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6788 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6792 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6793 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6794 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6795 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6796 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6797 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6798 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6799 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6801 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6802 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6803 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6804 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6805 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6806 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6808 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6809 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6810 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6811 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
6812 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6813 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6814 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
6815 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6816 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6817 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6818 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6819 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6820 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6823 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6824 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6825 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6826 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6827 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6829 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6831 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6832 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6833 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6834 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6835 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6839 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6840 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6842 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6843 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6844 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6845 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6846 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6847 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6848 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6850 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6851 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6852 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6854 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6857 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6860 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6862 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6863 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6864 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6865 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6866 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6870 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6871 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6873 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6874 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6875 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6876 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6877 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6879 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6880 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6881 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6882 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6883 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6885 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6888 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6891 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6893 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6894 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6895 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6896 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6897 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6901 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6902 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6904 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6905 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6906 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6907 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6908 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6910 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6911 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6912 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6913 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6914 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6915 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6918 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6919 failure_code: 0x8000,
6922 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6924 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6925 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6926 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6928 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6932 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6933 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6935 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6936 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6937 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6938 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6939 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6941 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6943 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6944 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6945 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6947 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6948 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6949 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6951 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6952 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6953 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6954 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6955 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6956 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6957 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6959 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6963 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6965 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6967 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6968 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6969 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6970 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6971 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6975 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6976 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6978 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6979 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6980 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6981 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6982 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6984 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6986 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6987 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6988 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6990 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6991 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6992 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6994 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6995 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6996 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6997 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6998 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6999 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7000 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
7002 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7006 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
7008 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
7010 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7011 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7012 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
7013 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7014 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7018 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
7019 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
7021 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7022 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7023 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7024 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7025 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7027 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
7028 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7029 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7031 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7032 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7034 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7035 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7036 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
7038 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7040 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
7042 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7043 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7044 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7045 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7046 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7047 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7048 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
7050 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7053 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
7054 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
7056 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7057 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7058 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
7059 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7060 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7064 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
7065 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
7066 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
7068 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7069 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7070 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7071 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7072 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7073 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7075 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
7078 let mut payment_event = {
7079 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7081 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7082 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7083 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
7085 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7086 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7087 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7088 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7089 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7090 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7091 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7092 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
7093 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
7096 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7097 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
7099 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7101 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7102 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7103 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
7105 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7106 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7107 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7108 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7109 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7110 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7111 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7113 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7117 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
7119 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7120 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
7121 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7122 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7123 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7125 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
7127 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7128 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7129 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7130 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7131 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7132 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7134 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7137 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7140 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7141 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7142 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7143 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7145 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7146 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7147 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7148 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7149 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7150 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7152 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7154 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7155 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7156 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7157 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7159 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7160 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7162 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7163 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
7164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7165 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7166 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7168 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7169 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7170 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7171 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7173 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7174 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7176 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7178 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7179 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7181 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7184 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7185 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7187 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7190 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7191 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7192 if announce_latest {
7193 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7195 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7198 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7200 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7202 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7203 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7204 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7205 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7206 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7207 let mut first_failed = false;
7208 for event in events {
7210 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7211 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7212 assert!(!first_failed);
7213 first_failed = true;
7215 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7218 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7224 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7225 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7226 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7229 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7230 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7231 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7232 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7233 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7234 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7235 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7237 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7238 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7239 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7240 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7241 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7243 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7245 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7246 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7248 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7249 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7251 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7253 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7254 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7257 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7259 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7260 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7261 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7262 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7263 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7265 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7266 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7268 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7269 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7270 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7271 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7272 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7273 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7274 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7275 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7277 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7278 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7279 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7280 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7281 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7282 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7283 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7284 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7286 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7287 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7288 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
7289 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7290 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7291 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7292 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7294 // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7296 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7297 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7300 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7301 if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7302 else { first = false; }
7304 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7307 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7308 if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7309 else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7311 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7318 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7319 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7320 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7321 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7325 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7326 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7328 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7329 low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7330 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7331 high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7332 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7333 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7334 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7335 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7336 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7338 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7339 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7340 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7341 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
7344 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7345 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7347 } else { assert!(false) }
7349 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7350 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7351 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7352 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7353 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7354 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0,
7355 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7358 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7359 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7361 } else { assert!(false); }
7363 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7364 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7365 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7366 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7367 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7368 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7370 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7372 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7373 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7374 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7378 } else { panic!(); }
7379 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7381 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7382 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7383 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7384 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7385 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7386 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0,
7387 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7390 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7391 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7393 } else { assert!(false); }
7397 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7398 // We want to be sure that :
7399 // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7400 // (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7401 // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7402 // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7403 // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7409 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7410 // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7411 // during signing due to revoked tx
7412 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7413 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7416 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7417 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7418 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7420 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7422 // Cache node A state before any channel update
7423 let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7424 let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7425 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7427 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7428 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7430 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7431 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7433 // Restore node A from previous state
7434 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7435 let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7436 chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7437 tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster { txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())) };
7438 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7439 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7440 monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7442 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7443 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7444 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7445 keys_manager: keys_manager,
7446 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7447 chain_monitor: &monitor,
7449 tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7450 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7454 nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7455 assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7456 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7457 nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7459 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7461 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7462 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7464 let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7466 // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7467 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7471 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7472 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7475 let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7476 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7477 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7478 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7479 reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7480 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7481 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7483 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7484 assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7486 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7489 panic!("Unexpected event")
7493 // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7494 // Check that we sent the warning message when we detected that A has fallen behind,
7495 // and give the possibility for A to recover from the warning.
7496 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7497 let warn_msg = "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned();
7498 assert!(check_warn_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), chan.2).contains(&warn_msg));
7500 // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7501 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7502 // The node B should not broadcast the transaction to force close the channel!
7503 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
7504 // B should now detect that there is something wrong and should force close the channel.
7505 let exp_err = "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting";
7506 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: exp_err.to_string() });
7508 // after the warning message sent by B, we should not able to
7509 // use the channel, or reconnect with success to the channel.
7510 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7511 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7512 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7513 let retry_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7515 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &retry_reestablish[0]);
7516 let mut err_msgs_0 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7517 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7518 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7520 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7521 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Failed to find corresponding channel");
7522 err_msgs_0.push(msg.clone());
7524 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7527 panic!("Unexpected event!");
7530 assert_eq!(err_msgs_0.len(), 1);
7531 nodes[1].node.handle_error(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &err_msgs_0[0]);
7532 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7533 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7534 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned() });
7535 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
7539 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7540 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7541 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7542 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7544 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7545 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7546 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7547 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7549 // Create some initial channels
7550 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7552 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7553 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7554 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7555 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7556 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7557 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7558 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7559 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7561 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7562 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7563 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7564 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7565 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7567 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7568 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7569 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7570 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7572 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7573 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7574 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7576 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7577 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7578 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7579 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7580 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7581 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7582 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7583 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7584 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7585 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7587 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7589 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7591 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7592 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7594 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7595 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7596 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7597 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7601 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7602 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7603 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7605 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7606 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7607 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7608 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7610 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7611 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7612 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7615 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7616 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7618 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7619 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7620 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7621 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7622 let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7623 for e in msg_events {
7625 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7626 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7627 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7628 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7629 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7632 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7636 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7637 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7638 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7639 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7640 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7641 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7643 // Reestablish chan_1
7644 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7645 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7646 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7647 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7648 // Reestablish chan_2
7649 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7650 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7651 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7652 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7653 // Reestablish chan_3
7654 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7655 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7656 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7657 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7659 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7660 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7661 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7662 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7663 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7664 for e in msg_events {
7666 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7667 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7668 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7669 // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7671 Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7672 None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7675 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7678 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7679 assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7683 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7684 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7685 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7687 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7688 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7689 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7690 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7692 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7694 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7695 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7696 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7697 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7698 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7700 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7701 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7702 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7703 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7704 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7705 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7707 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7708 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7709 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7710 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7714 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7715 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7717 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7718 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7719 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7720 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7721 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7723 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7727 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7728 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7729 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7730 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7731 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7732 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7733 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7734 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7738 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7739 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7740 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7741 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7743 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7744 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7745 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7746 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7747 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7748 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7749 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7750 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7751 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7752 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7753 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7754 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7755 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7759 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7761 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7762 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7764 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7766 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7767 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7768 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7769 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7770 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7771 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7772 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7773 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7774 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7775 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7776 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7777 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7778 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7782 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7784 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7785 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7789 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7790 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7791 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7793 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7794 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7795 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7796 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7797 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7799 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7800 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7801 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7802 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7803 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7804 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7805 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7806 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7807 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7808 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7809 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7810 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7812 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7813 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7814 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7816 // Revoke local commitment tx
7817 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7819 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7820 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7821 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7822 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7823 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7824 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7825 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7827 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7828 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7829 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7831 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7832 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7833 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7835 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7836 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7837 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7838 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7840 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7841 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7842 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7843 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7844 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7845 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7846 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7847 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7849 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7850 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7856 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7857 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7858 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7860 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7861 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7862 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7863 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7865 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7866 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7867 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7868 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7869 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7870 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7872 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7873 // available, which we check here:
7874 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7875 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7876 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7878 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7879 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7881 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7882 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7883 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7884 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7886 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7887 // output, checked above).
7888 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7889 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7890 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7892 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7893 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7894 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7895 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].weight() as u64;
7896 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7900 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7901 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7902 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7903 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7904 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7906 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7907 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7909 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7910 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7911 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7912 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7913 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7915 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7916 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7922 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7923 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7924 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7925 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7927 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7928 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7930 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7931 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7932 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7933 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7934 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7935 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7936 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7937 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7941 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7942 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7943 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7944 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7946 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7947 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7948 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7949 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7950 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7951 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7952 // up bumped justice generation.
7953 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7956 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7957 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7961 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7962 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7963 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7966 // Provide preimage for one
7967 // Check aggregation
7969 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7970 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7971 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7972 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7974 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7975 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7976 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7978 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7979 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7980 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7981 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7982 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7984 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7985 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7986 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7987 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7988 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7989 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7991 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7995 let feerate_timeout;
7996 let feerate_preimage;
7998 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7999 // 9 transactions including:
8000 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
8001 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
8002 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
8004 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
8005 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8006 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
8007 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8008 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
8010 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
8011 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
8013 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output {
8014 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
8015 check_spends!(node_txn[3], remote_txn[0]);
8017 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
8018 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
8020 preimage_bump = node_txn[7].clone();
8021 check_spends!(node_txn[7], remote_txn[0]);
8022 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[7].input[0].previous_output);
8024 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[3]);
8025 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[4]);
8028 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
8029 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8030 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
8031 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].weight() as u64;
8033 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
8034 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8035 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8036 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8040 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
8041 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
8043 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
8044 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
8046 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8047 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8048 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8049 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
8050 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8051 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
8053 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
8054 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
8055 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
8056 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
8057 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
8059 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8060 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8061 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8062 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
8063 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
8068 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8069 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8073 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
8074 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
8075 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
8076 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
8077 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
8078 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
8079 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
8080 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
8082 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8083 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8084 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8085 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8086 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
8088 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8089 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
8091 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
8093 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
8094 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8095 let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
8097 // Must revoke without gaps
8098 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8099 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
8101 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8102 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
8103 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
8105 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
8106 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
8107 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
8108 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8109 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
8113 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
8114 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
8115 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
8117 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8118 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8119 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8120 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8122 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8123 // Lock HTLC in both directions
8124 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8125 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8127 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
8128 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8129 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8131 // Revoke local commitment tx
8132 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8134 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
8135 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
8136 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
8137 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8139 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
8140 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8141 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8142 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8144 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8145 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
8146 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8147 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8148 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8149 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8153 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8154 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8155 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8157 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8158 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8159 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8164 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
8165 // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
8166 // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
8167 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8168 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8169 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8170 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8171 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8173 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
8174 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8175 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
8176 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8177 let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8179 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8180 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
8181 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
8182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8183 let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8185 // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
8186 // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
8187 // can get our balance.
8189 // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
8190 // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
8191 // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
8192 let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
8193 route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
8194 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8195 let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8196 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
8198 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
8202 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8203 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8204 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8205 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8206 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8207 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8208 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8210 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8212 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8213 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8214 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8215 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8216 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8218 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8219 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8220 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8221 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8223 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8224 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8225 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8226 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8227 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8229 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8230 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8231 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8233 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8238 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8239 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8240 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8241 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8242 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8244 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8245 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8246 override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8248 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8250 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8251 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8252 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8253 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8257 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8258 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8259 zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8260 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8261 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8262 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8263 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8265 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8266 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8267 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8269 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8270 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8271 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8275 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
8276 // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
8277 // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
8278 // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
8279 // 90% of the `channel_value`.
8280 // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
8282 let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
8283 config_30_percent.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
8284 config_30_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
8285 let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
8286 config_50_percent.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
8287 config_50_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
8288 let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
8289 config_95_percent.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
8290 config_95_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
8291 let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
8292 config_100_percent.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
8293 config_100_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
8295 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8296 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8297 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
8298 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8300 let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
8301 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8302 let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
8303 let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
8304 let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
8306 let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8307 let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8309 // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8310 // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8311 assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_50_percent_msat));
8312 // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8313 // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8314 assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_30_percent_msat));
8316 // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8317 // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
8319 assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_90_percent_msat));
8320 // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8321 // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
8323 assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_90_percent_msat));
8327 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
8328 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8329 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8330 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8331 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8332 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8333 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8335 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8336 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8338 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8340 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8341 // accepting the inbound channel request.
8342 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8344 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8346 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8347 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
8349 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8352 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8353 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8355 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8356 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8357 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8359 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8362 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8364 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8365 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8367 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8369 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
8370 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
8372 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8377 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8378 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8379 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8380 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8381 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8382 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8383 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8385 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8386 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8388 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8390 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8391 // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8392 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8394 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8396 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8397 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8399 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8402 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8403 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8405 match close_msg_ev[0] {
8406 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8407 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8409 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8411 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8415 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
8416 // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
8417 // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
8418 // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
8419 // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
8420 // and the channel should be closed.
8421 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8422 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8423 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8424 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8425 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8426 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8428 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8429 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8430 let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
8432 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8434 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
8435 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8437 // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
8438 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8440 // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
8441 // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
8442 // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
8443 // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
8444 // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
8447 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], lock, temp_channel_id);
8448 let accept_chan_msg = channel.get_accept_channel_message();
8449 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8452 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8454 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8455 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8457 // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
8458 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8460 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8461 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8463 let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
8464 match close_msg_ev[0] {
8465 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
8466 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
8467 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8468 assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
8470 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8473 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8477 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8478 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8479 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8480 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8481 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8482 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8483 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8485 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8486 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8488 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8490 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8491 // accepting the inbound channel request.
8492 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8494 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8496 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8497 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
8498 let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8500 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8501 assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
8503 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8504 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8507 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8510 // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8511 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8512 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8514 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8515 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8516 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8518 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8523 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8524 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8525 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8526 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8527 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8529 let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
8530 let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8532 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8533 assert_eq!(err, "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist");
8535 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8536 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8541 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8542 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8543 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8544 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8545 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8546 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8548 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8549 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8550 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8551 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8553 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8554 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8555 route.paths.push(path);
8556 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8557 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8558 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8559 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8560 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8561 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8562 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8563 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8567 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8568 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8569 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8570 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8571 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8572 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8574 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8577 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
8578 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8579 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8580 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8581 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8582 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8583 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8584 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8586 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8587 // values from previous calls.
8588 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8589 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8590 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8592 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8594 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8595 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8597 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8600 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8605 #[allow(deprecated)]
8606 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8607 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8608 // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8609 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8610 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8611 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8612 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8614 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8616 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8618 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8619 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8620 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8621 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8622 } else { panic!(); }
8624 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8626 header: BlockHeader {
8628 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8629 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8630 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8634 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8635 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8636 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8637 } else { panic!(); }
8639 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8640 // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8641 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8642 block.header.time += 1;
8643 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8644 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8645 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8648 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8649 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8650 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8651 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8652 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8653 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8654 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8656 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8657 // values from previous calls.
8658 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8659 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8660 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8662 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8663 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8664 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8665 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8667 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8672 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8673 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8674 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8675 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8676 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8677 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8679 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8681 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8682 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8683 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8684 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8686 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8687 // resulting events.
8688 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8690 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8691 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8692 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8693 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8694 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8696 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8697 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8698 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8699 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8700 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8702 // We should fail the payment back
8703 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8704 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8705 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8706 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8707 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8709 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8714 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8715 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8716 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8718 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8719 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8720 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8721 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8723 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8724 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8725 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8726 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8728 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8729 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8730 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8731 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8735 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8736 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8737 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8738 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8740 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8741 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8742 // commitment at same time.
8744 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8745 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8746 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8747 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8749 // Create some initial channel
8750 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8751 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8753 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8754 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8756 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8757 let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8759 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8760 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8761 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8762 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8764 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8765 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8766 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8767 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8768 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8769 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8770 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8771 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8774 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8775 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8776 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8777 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8778 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 0));
8779 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8781 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8782 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8783 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8784 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8786 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8787 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8788 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8789 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8790 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8791 if let Err(_) = watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8792 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8793 } else { assert!(false); }
8794 } else { assert!(false); };
8795 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8796 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8797 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8798 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8802 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8803 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8804 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8805 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8806 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8808 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8809 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8810 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8811 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8813 // Create some initial channel
8814 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8815 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8817 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8818 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8820 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8821 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8823 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8824 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8825 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8826 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8827 let watchtower_alice = {
8828 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8829 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8830 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8831 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8832 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8833 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8834 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8835 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8838 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8839 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8840 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8841 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8842 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (block.clone(), 0));
8843 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8845 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8847 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8848 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8852 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8853 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8854 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8855 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8856 let watchtower_bob = {
8857 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8858 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8859 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8860 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8861 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8862 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8863 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8864 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8867 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8868 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8870 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8871 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8873 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8875 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8877 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8878 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8879 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8880 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8881 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8882 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8883 if let Err(_) = watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8884 if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8885 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8886 } else { assert!(false); }
8887 } else { assert!(false); };
8888 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8889 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8891 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8892 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8893 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8895 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8898 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8899 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8900 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8904 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8905 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8906 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8908 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8909 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8910 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8911 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8912 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8913 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8918 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8919 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8920 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8923 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8924 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8926 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8927 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8928 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8929 // before receiving funding_signed.
8930 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8931 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8932 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8933 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8935 // Create an initial channel
8936 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8937 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8938 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8939 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8940 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8942 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8943 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8945 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8946 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8948 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8949 let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8950 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8951 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8952 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8956 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8957 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8958 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8959 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8960 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8961 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8962 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8964 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8965 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8966 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8967 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8969 // Create some initial channels
8970 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8972 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8973 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8974 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8975 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8976 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8977 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8979 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8980 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8981 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8982 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8983 // this test before #653 fix.
8984 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8985 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8986 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8987 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8988 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8990 let htlc_timeout = {
8991 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8992 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8993 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8994 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8998 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8999 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
9000 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
9001 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
9004 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
9005 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
9006 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
9007 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
9009 // Steps of the test:
9010 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
9011 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
9012 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
9013 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
9014 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
9015 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
9016 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
9017 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
9018 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9019 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9020 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9021 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9023 // Create some initial channels
9024 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9025 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9027 // Steps (1) and (2):
9028 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
9029 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
9031 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
9032 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
9033 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9034 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
9035 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
9036 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9037 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
9039 // Steps (3) and (4):
9040 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
9041 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
9042 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
9043 let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
9046 if !broadcast_alice {
9047 force_closing_node = 1;
9048 counterparty_node = 0;
9050 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9051 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
9052 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
9053 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9054 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9055 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
9056 true => alice_txn.clone(),
9057 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
9059 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9060 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9061 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9062 if broadcast_alice {
9063 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9064 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9065 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9067 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
9068 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9072 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
9073 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
9074 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9075 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9076 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
9078 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9079 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9080 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9081 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9082 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
9083 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9085 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9086 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
9087 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
9088 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
9089 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9090 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9092 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
9093 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9095 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9098 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
9099 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
9100 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
9101 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9103 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9104 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9105 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
9106 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9107 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9110 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9112 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
9113 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
9114 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9117 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9120 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
9121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9122 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
9123 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9125 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9126 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9127 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
9128 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9129 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9132 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9134 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
9135 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9137 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
9138 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
9139 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
9140 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
9141 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9142 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9143 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9144 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
9145 if broadcast_alice {
9146 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9148 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9150 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9151 if broadcast_alice {
9152 // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
9153 // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
9154 // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
9155 // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
9157 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
9158 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
9160 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9161 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9166 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
9167 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
9169 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9170 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9171 // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
9172 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9174 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
9175 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
9176 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
9178 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
9179 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
9180 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
9181 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
9182 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9183 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9184 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9186 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9187 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9193 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
9194 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
9195 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
9196 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
9197 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
9201 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
9202 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
9203 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
9205 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
9206 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
9207 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
9208 // updating logic for the existing channel.
9209 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9210 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9211 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9212 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9214 // Create an initial channel
9215 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9216 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9217 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9218 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9220 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
9221 // that it is rejected.
9222 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9224 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9225 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9227 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9228 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
9229 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
9230 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
9231 // move forward with it.
9232 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9233 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9235 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9239 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9240 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9242 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9243 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9245 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9246 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9248 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9249 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9250 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9251 added_monitors.clear();
9253 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9255 let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9256 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
9258 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9261 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9262 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9263 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9264 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9265 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9267 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9268 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9270 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9271 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9272 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9273 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9274 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9276 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9280 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9281 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9282 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9283 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9284 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9285 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9287 let funding_created = {
9288 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9289 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
9290 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
9291 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
9292 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
9293 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
9294 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9295 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
9297 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9298 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9299 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
9300 // still needs to be cleared here.
9301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9303 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9305 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9306 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9308 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9309 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9310 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9311 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9312 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9314 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9318 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9319 // everything is functional.
9320 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9322 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9323 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9324 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9325 added_monitors.clear();
9328 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9329 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9330 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9331 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9333 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9334 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9335 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9336 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9340 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9341 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9343 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9344 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9345 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9346 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9347 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9348 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9349 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9351 // Create some initial channels
9352 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9353 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9354 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9356 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9357 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9358 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9360 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9361 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9362 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9364 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9365 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9366 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9367 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9368 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9369 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9370 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9371 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9372 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9374 // A null channel ID should close all channels
9375 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9376 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9377 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9378 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9379 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9380 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9382 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9383 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9385 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9388 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9389 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9391 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9393 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9394 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
9395 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
9396 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
9397 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9398 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9400 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
9401 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9402 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9406 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9407 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9409 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9410 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9411 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9412 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9413 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9414 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9415 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9416 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9418 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9419 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9420 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9422 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9423 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9424 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9425 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
9428 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9429 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9430 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9432 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9433 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9435 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9436 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9438 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9439 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9440 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9442 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9443 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9444 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9445 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9446 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9447 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9448 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9449 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9450 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9451 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9452 } else { panic!(); }
9453 } else { panic!(); }
9454 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9457 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9458 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9459 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9460 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9461 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9462 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9463 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9464 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9465 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9466 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9467 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9468 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9469 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9470 // until we learned about an additional block.
9472 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9473 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9474 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9475 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9476 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9477 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9478 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9480 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9481 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9482 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9483 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9484 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9486 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9487 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9488 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9489 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9490 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9491 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9493 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9494 if !test_height_before_timelock {
9495 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9497 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9498 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9499 if test_height_before_timelock {
9500 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9501 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9502 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9503 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9505 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9506 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9507 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9508 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9509 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9510 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9512 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9513 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9515 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9516 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9517 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9518 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9519 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9520 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9521 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9523 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9524 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9525 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9526 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9527 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9528 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9529 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9530 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9531 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9536 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9537 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9538 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9542 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9543 // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9544 // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9546 // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9548 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9549 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9550 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9551 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9552 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9553 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9554 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9555 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9556 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9558 // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9559 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9560 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9561 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9563 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9564 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9565 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9566 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9567 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9569 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9571 // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9572 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9573 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9574 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9576 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9577 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9578 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9579 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9580 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9582 // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9584 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9586 // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9587 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9588 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9590 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9591 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9592 let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9593 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9594 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9596 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9597 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9598 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9599 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9601 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9602 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9603 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9604 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9605 let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9606 let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9607 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9608 assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9610 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9611 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9612 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9613 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9614 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9615 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9616 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9618 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9619 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9620 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9621 logger: nodes[1].logger,
9625 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9626 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9628 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9629 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9630 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9631 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9633 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9634 // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their channel_ready here since they haven't updated
9635 // the commitment state.
9636 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9638 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9640 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9641 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9642 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9644 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9645 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9646 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9647 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9648 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9649 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9650 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9652 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9653 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9656 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9657 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9658 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9659 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9660 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9662 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9664 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
9665 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
9666 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9668 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9671 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9672 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9673 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9674 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9675 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9676 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9677 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9679 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9680 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9683 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9684 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9685 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9686 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9687 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9688 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9689 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9690 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9691 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9692 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9693 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9696 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9697 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9699 if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9700 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9701 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9703 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9704 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9706 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9707 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9708 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9710 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9711 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9712 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9714 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9715 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
9716 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9717 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9719 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9720 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9721 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9723 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9724 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9725 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9726 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9728 expect_payment_failed_conditions!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9730 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9735 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9736 // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9737 // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentReceived` event.
9738 // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9739 // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9740 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9744 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9745 // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9746 // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9747 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9751 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9752 // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9753 // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9754 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9755 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9756 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9757 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9759 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9760 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9761 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9762 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9764 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
9765 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
9766 let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9767 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9768 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9769 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9770 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9771 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9773 let payment_params_opt = Some(payment_params);
9775 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9777 let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9778 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9780 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9781 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9783 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9784 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9785 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9787 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9790 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9791 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9793 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9794 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9795 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9797 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9798 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9800 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9801 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9803 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9804 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9805 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9807 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9808 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9809 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9811 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9812 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9813 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9815 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9816 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9817 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9818 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9820 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9822 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9823 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9824 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9826 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9827 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9829 let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9830 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9831 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9833 expect_payment_failed_conditions!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9835 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9836 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9838 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9839 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9840 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9842 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9846 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9847 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9848 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9849 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9850 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9852 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9853 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9854 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9855 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9856 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9857 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9858 final_value_msat: 10000,
9859 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9861 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9862 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9863 let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9865 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9866 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9867 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9868 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9869 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9870 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9871 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9872 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9873 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9877 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9878 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9879 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9880 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9881 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9883 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9884 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9885 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
9886 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
9888 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9889 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9890 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9891 final_value_msat: 10000,
9892 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9894 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9895 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9896 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9897 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9898 let route = find_route(
9899 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9900 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9903 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9904 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9905 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9906 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9907 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9908 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9909 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9910 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9911 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9915 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9916 // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentReceived event, the HTLCs
9917 // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9918 // PaymentReceived event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9920 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9921 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9922 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9923 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9925 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9926 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9927 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9928 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9930 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9931 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9932 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9933 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9934 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9935 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9938 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9939 // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentReceived event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9940 // amount of time to respond to.
9942 // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9943 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9944 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9946 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
9948 pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash);
9950 // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9951 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9952 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9954 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9955 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9956 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
9958 // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9959 // that PaymentReceived event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9960 nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9961 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9962 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9965 fn do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(persist_both_monitors: bool) {
9966 // Test what happens if a node receives an MPP payment, claims it, but crashes before
9967 // persisting the ChannelManager. If `persist_both_monitors` is false, also crash after only
9968 // updating one of the two channels' ChannelMonitors. As a result, on startup, we'll (a) still
9969 // have the PaymentReceived event, (b) have one (or two) channel(s) that goes on chain with the
9970 // HTLC preimage in them, and (c) optionally have one channel that is live off-chain but does
9971 // not have the preimage tied to the still-pending HTLC.
9973 // To get to the correct state, on startup we should propagate the preimage to the
9974 // still-off-chain channel, claiming the HTLC as soon as the peer connects, with the monitor
9975 // receiving the preimage without a state update.
9977 // Further, we should generate a `PaymentClaimed` event to inform the user that the payment was
9978 // definitely claimed.
9979 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9980 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9981 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9983 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9984 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9985 let nodes_3_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9987 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9989 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9990 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9991 let chan_id_persisted = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9992 let chan_id_not_persisted = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9994 // Create an MPP route for 15k sats, more than the default htlc-max of 10%
9995 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9996 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9997 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9998 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9999 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
10000 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
10003 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10004 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
10006 // Send the payment through to nodes[3] *without* clearing the PaymentReceived event
10007 let mut send_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10008 assert_eq!(send_events.len(), 2);
10009 do_pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), send_events[0].clone(), true, false, None);
10010 do_pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), send_events[1].clone(), true, false, None);
10012 // Now that we have an MPP payment pending, get the latest encoded copies of nodes[3]'s
10013 // monitors and ChannelManager, for use later, if we don't want to persist both monitors.
10014 let mut original_monitor = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10015 if !persist_both_monitors {
10016 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10017 if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_not_persisted {
10018 assert!(original_monitor.0.is_empty());
10019 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut original_monitor).unwrap();
10024 let mut original_manager = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10025 nodes[3].node.write(&mut original_manager).unwrap();
10027 expect_payment_received!(nodes[3], payment_hash, payment_secret, 15_000_000);
10029 nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10030 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 2);
10031 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[3], payment_hash, 15_000_000);
10033 // Now fetch one of the two updated ChannelMonitors from nodes[3], and restart pretending we
10034 // crashed in between the two persistence calls - using one old ChannelMonitor and one new one,
10035 // with the old ChannelManager.
10036 let mut updated_monitor = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10037 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10038 if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_persisted {
10039 assert!(updated_monitor.0.is_empty());
10040 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut updated_monitor).unwrap();
10043 // If `persist_both_monitors` is set, get the second monitor here as well
10044 if persist_both_monitors {
10045 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10046 if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_not_persisted {
10047 assert!(original_monitor.0.is_empty());
10048 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut original_monitor).unwrap();
10053 // Now restart nodes[3].
10054 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
10055 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[3].keys_manager;
10056 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[3].chain_source), nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[3].logger, node_cfgs[3].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
10057 nodes[3].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
10058 let mut monitors = Vec::new();
10059 for mut monitor_data in [original_monitor, updated_monitor].iter() {
10060 let (_, mut deserialized_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut &monitor_data.0[..], keys_manager).unwrap();
10061 monitors.push(deserialized_monitor);
10064 let config = UserConfig::default();
10065 nodes_3_deserialized = {
10066 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
10067 for monitor in monitors.iter_mut() {
10068 channel_monitors.insert(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
10070 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut &original_manager.0[..], ChannelManagerReadArgs {
10071 default_config: config,
10073 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[3].fee_estimator,
10074 chain_monitor: nodes[3].chain_monitor,
10075 tx_broadcaster: nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
10076 logger: nodes[3].logger,
10080 nodes[3].node = &nodes_3_deserialized;
10082 for monitor in monitors {
10083 // On startup the preimage should have been copied into the non-persisted monitor:
10084 assert!(monitor.get_stored_preimages().contains_key(&payment_hash));
10085 nodes[3].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.clone(), monitor).unwrap();
10087 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 2);
10089 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
10090 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
10092 // During deserialization, we should have closed one channel and broadcast its latest
10093 // commitment transaction. We should also still have the original PaymentReceived event we
10094 // never finished processing.
10095 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10096 assert_eq!(events.len(), if persist_both_monitors { 4 } else { 3 });
10097 if let Event::PaymentReceived { amount_msat: 15_000_000, .. } = events[0] { } else { panic!(); }
10098 if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[1] { } else { panic!(); }
10099 if persist_both_monitors {
10100 if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[2] { } else { panic!(); }
10103 // On restart, we should also get a duplicate PaymentClaimed event as we persisted the
10104 // ChannelManager prior to handling the original one.
10105 if let Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: our_payment_hash, amount_msat: 15_000_000, .. } =
10106 events[if persist_both_monitors { 3 } else { 2 }]
10108 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
10109 } else { panic!(); }
10111 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), if persist_both_monitors { 0 } else { 1 });
10112 if !persist_both_monitors {
10113 // If one of the two channels is still live, reveal the payment preimage over it.
10115 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
10116 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2]);
10117 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
10118 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[3]);
10120 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
10121 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
10122 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10124 nodes[3].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
10126 // Once we call `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` the holding cell is cleared and the HTLC
10127 // claim should fly.
10128 let ds_msgs = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10129 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
10130 assert_eq!(ds_msgs.len(), 2);
10131 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } = ds_msgs[1] {} else { panic!(); }
10133 let cs_updates = match ds_msgs[0] {
10134 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
10135 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10136 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
10137 let cs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10138 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[2], nodes[0], nodes[3], Some(1000), false, false);
10139 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10145 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10146 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], cs_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10147 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
10152 fn test_partial_claim_before_restart() {
10153 do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(false);
10154 do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(true);
10157 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
10158 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
10159 enum ExposureEvent {
10160 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
10162 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
10164 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
10165 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
10168 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
10169 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
10172 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
10173 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
10174 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
10175 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
10176 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
10177 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
10178 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
10179 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
10181 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10182 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
10183 config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
10184 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10185 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
10186 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10188 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10189 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10190 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
10191 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
10193 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10195 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
10196 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10197 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
10199 let opt_anchors = false;
10201 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
10204 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
10205 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10209 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10210 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10211 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10213 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10214 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10216 let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10217 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10218 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
10220 let dust_buffer_feerate = {
10221 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
10222 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
10223 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
10225 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
10226 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10228 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
10229 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10231 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
10232 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
10235 if dust_outbound_balance {
10236 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10237 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10238 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
10239 for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10240 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10241 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
10244 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10245 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10246 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
10247 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10248 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10252 if dust_outbound_balance {
10253 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10254 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10255 for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
10256 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10257 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
10260 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10261 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10262 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
10263 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10268 let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
10269 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
10270 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
10271 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10272 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10274 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10275 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10276 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
10278 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
10280 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
10281 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
10282 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10283 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10284 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10285 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10286 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
10287 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10288 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10290 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
10291 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10292 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10293 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10295 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
10296 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10298 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
10299 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
10300 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
10302 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10303 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
10305 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10307 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
10310 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10311 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
10312 added_monitors.clear();
10316 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
10317 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10318 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10319 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10320 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10321 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10322 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10323 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10324 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10325 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
10326 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10327 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10328 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);