1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Test that monitor update failures don't get our channel state out of sync.
11 //! One of the biggest concern with the monitor update failure handling code is that messages
12 //! resent after monitor updating is restored are delivered out-of-order, resulting in
13 //! commitment_signed messages having "invalid signatures".
14 //! To test this we stand up a network of three nodes and read bytes from the fuzz input to denote
15 //! actions such as sending payments, handling events, or changing monitor update return values on
16 //! a per-node basis. This should allow it to find any cases where the ordering of actions results
17 //! in us getting out of sync with ourselves, and, assuming at least one of our recieve- or
18 //! send-side handling is correct, other peers. We consider it a failure if any action results in a
19 //! channel being force-closed.
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::PackedLockTime;
26 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash as TraitImport;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
34 use lightning::chain::{BestBlock, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, chainmonitor, channelmonitor, Confirm, Watch};
35 use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, MonitorEvent};
36 use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
37 use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
38 use lightning::sign::{KeyMaterial, InMemorySigner, Recipient, EntropySource, NodeSigner, SignerProvider};
39 use lightning::events;
40 use lightning::events::MessageSendEventsProvider;
41 use lightning::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
42 use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelDetails, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId};
43 use lightning::ln::outbound_payment::{RecipientOnionFields, PaymentSendFailure};
44 use lightning::ln::channel::FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
45 use lightning::ln::msgs::{self, CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, UpdateAddHTLC, Init};
46 use lightning::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
47 use lightning::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
48 use lightning::util::enforcing_trait_impls::{EnforcingSigner, EnforcementState};
49 use lightning::util::errors::APIError;
50 use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
51 use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
52 use lightning::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
53 use lightning::routing::router::{InFlightHtlcs, Path, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
55 use crate::utils::test_logger::{self, Output};
56 use crate::utils::test_persister::TestPersister;
58 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Message, PublicKey, SecretKey, Scalar, Secp256k1};
59 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
60 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::{RecoverableSignature, Signature};
63 use std::cmp::{self, Ordering};
64 use hashbrown::{HashSet, hash_map, HashMap};
65 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
66 use std::sync::atomic;
68 use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
70 const MAX_FEE: u32 = 10_000;
71 struct FuzzEstimator {
72 ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32,
74 impl FeeEstimator for FuzzEstimator {
75 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, conf_target: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
76 // We force-close channels if our counterparty sends us a feerate which is a small multiple
77 // of our HighPriority fee estimate or smaller than our Background fee estimate. Thus, we
78 // always return a HighPriority feerate here which is >= the maximum Normal feerate and a
79 // Background feerate which is <= the minimum Normal feerate.
81 ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority => MAX_FEE,
82 ConfirmationTarget::Background|ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum => 253,
83 ConfirmationTarget::Normal => cmp::min(self.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire), MAX_FEE),
90 impl Router for FuzzRouter {
92 &self, _payer: &PublicKey, _params: &RouteParameters, _first_hops: Option<&[&ChannelDetails]>,
93 _inflight_htlcs: InFlightHtlcs
94 ) -> Result<Route, msgs::LightningError> {
95 Err(msgs::LightningError {
96 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
97 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
102 pub struct TestBroadcaster {}
103 impl BroadcasterInterface for TestBroadcaster {
104 fn broadcast_transactions(&self, _txs: &[&Transaction]) { }
107 pub struct VecWriter(pub Vec<u8>);
108 impl Writer for VecWriter {
109 fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
110 self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
115 struct TestChainMonitor {
116 pub logger: Arc<dyn Logger>,
117 pub keys: Arc<KeyProvider>,
118 pub persister: Arc<TestPersister>,
119 pub chain_monitor: Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<EnforcingSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
120 // If we reload a node with an old copy of ChannelMonitors, the ChannelManager deserialization
121 // logic will automatically force-close our channels for us (as we don't have an up-to-date
122 // monitor implying we are not able to punish misbehaving counterparties). Because this test
123 // "fails" if we ever force-close a channel, we avoid doing so, always saving the latest
124 // fully-serialized monitor state here, as well as the corresponding update_id.
125 pub latest_monitors: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, (u64, Vec<u8>)>>,
126 pub should_update_manager: atomic::AtomicBool,
128 impl TestChainMonitor {
129 pub fn new(broadcaster: Arc<TestBroadcaster>, logger: Arc<dyn Logger>, feeest: Arc<FuzzEstimator>, persister: Arc<TestPersister>, keys: Arc<KeyProvider>) -> Self {
131 chain_monitor: Arc::new(chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::new(None, broadcaster, logger.clone(), feeest, Arc::clone(&persister))),
135 latest_monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
136 should_update_manager: atomic::AtomicBool::new(false),
140 impl chain::Watch<EnforcingSigner> for TestChainMonitor {
141 fn watch_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>) -> chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus {
142 let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
143 monitor.write(&mut ser).unwrap();
144 if let Some(_) = self.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().insert(funding_txo, (monitor.get_latest_update_id(), ser.0)) {
145 panic!("Already had monitor pre-watch_channel");
147 self.should_update_manager.store(true, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
148 self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_txo, monitor)
151 fn update_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: &channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus {
152 let mut map_lock = self.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap();
153 let mut map_entry = match map_lock.entry(funding_txo) {
154 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => entry,
155 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => panic!("Didn't have monitor on update call"),
157 let deserialized_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::
158 read(&mut Cursor::new(&map_entry.get().1), (&*self.keys, &*self.keys)).unwrap().1;
159 deserialized_monitor.update_monitor(update, &&TestBroadcaster{}, &FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) }, &self.logger).unwrap();
160 let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
161 deserialized_monitor.write(&mut ser).unwrap();
162 map_entry.insert((update.update_id, ser.0));
163 self.should_update_manager.store(true, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
164 self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update)
167 fn release_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<(OutPoint, Vec<MonitorEvent>, Option<PublicKey>)> {
168 return self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
173 node_secret: SecretKey,
174 rand_bytes_id: atomic::AtomicU32,
175 enforcement_states: Mutex<HashMap<[u8;32], Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>>>>,
178 impl EntropySource for KeyProvider {
179 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
180 let id = self.rand_bytes_id.fetch_add(1, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
181 let mut res = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 11, self.node_secret[31]];
182 res[30-4..30].copy_from_slice(&id.to_le_bytes());
187 impl NodeSigner for KeyProvider {
188 fn get_node_id(&self, recipient: Recipient) -> Result<PublicKey, ()> {
189 let node_secret = match recipient {
190 Recipient::Node => Ok(&self.node_secret),
191 Recipient::PhantomNode => Err(())
193 Ok(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), node_secret))
196 fn ecdh(&self, recipient: Recipient, other_key: &PublicKey, tweak: Option<&Scalar>) -> Result<SharedSecret, ()> {
197 let mut node_secret = match recipient {
198 Recipient::Node => Ok(self.node_secret.clone()),
199 Recipient::PhantomNode => Err(())
201 if let Some(tweak) = tweak {
202 node_secret = node_secret.mul_tweak(tweak).map_err(|_| ())?;
204 Ok(SharedSecret::new(other_key, &node_secret))
207 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial {
208 KeyMaterial([0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, self.node_secret[31]])
211 fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5], _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> {
215 fn sign_gossip_message(&self, msg: lightning::ln::msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
216 let msg_hash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]).map_err(|_| ())?;
217 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
218 Ok(secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msg_hash, &self.node_secret))
222 impl SignerProvider for KeyProvider {
223 type Signer = EnforcingSigner;
225 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
226 let id = self.rand_bytes_id.fetch_add(1, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed) as u8;
230 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
231 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
232 let id = channel_keys_id[0];
233 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
235 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
236 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
237 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
238 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
239 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
240 [id, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 9, self.node_secret[31]],
241 channel_value_satoshis,
245 let revoked_commitment = self.make_enforcement_state_cell(keys.commitment_seed);
246 EnforcingSigner::new_with_revoked(keys, revoked_commitment, false)
249 fn read_chan_signer(&self, buffer: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> {
250 let mut reader = std::io::Cursor::new(buffer);
252 let inner: InMemorySigner = ReadableArgs::read(&mut reader, self)?;
253 let state = self.make_enforcement_state_cell(inner.commitment_seed);
258 disable_revocation_policy_check: false,
262 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
263 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
264 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap();
265 let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
266 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
269 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
270 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
271 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap();
272 let pubkey_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &secret_key).serialize());
273 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh(&pubkey_hash))
278 fn make_enforcement_state_cell(&self, commitment_seed: [u8; 32]) -> Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>> {
279 let mut revoked_commitments = self.enforcement_states.lock().unwrap();
280 if !revoked_commitments.contains_key(&commitment_seed) {
281 revoked_commitments.insert(commitment_seed, Arc::new(Mutex::new(EnforcementState::new())));
283 let cell = revoked_commitments.get(&commitment_seed).unwrap();
289 fn check_api_err(api_err: APIError, sendable_bounds_violated: bool) {
291 APIError::APIMisuseError { .. } => panic!("We can't misuse the API"),
292 APIError::FeeRateTooHigh { .. } => panic!("We can't send too much fee?"),
293 APIError::InvalidRoute { .. } => panic!("Our routes should work"),
294 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err } => {
295 // Test the error against a list of errors we can hit, and reject
296 // all others. If you hit this panic, the list of acceptable errors
297 // is probably just stale and you should add new messages here.
299 "Peer for first hop currently disconnected" => {},
300 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - ") => {},
301 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - ") => {},
302 _ => panic!("{}", err),
304 assert!(sendable_bounds_violated);
306 APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress => {
307 // We can (obviously) temp-fail a monitor update
309 APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { .. } => panic!("Cannot send an incompatible shutdown script"),
313 fn check_payment_err(send_err: PaymentSendFailure, sendable_bounds_violated: bool) {
315 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(api_err) => check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated),
316 PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(per_path_results) => {
317 for res in per_path_results { if let Err(api_err) = res { check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated); } }
319 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(per_path_results) => {
320 for api_err in per_path_results { check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated); }
322 PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure { results, .. } => {
323 for res in results { if let Err(api_err) = res { check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated); } }
325 PaymentSendFailure::DuplicatePayment => panic!(),
329 type ChanMan<'a> = ChannelManager<Arc<TestChainMonitor>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, &'a FuzzRouter, Arc<dyn Logger>>;
332 fn get_payment_secret_hash(dest: &ChanMan, payment_id: &mut u8) -> Option<(PaymentSecret, PaymentHash)> {
333 let mut payment_hash;
335 payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[*payment_id; 1]).into_inner());
336 if let Ok(payment_secret) = dest.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 3600, None) {
337 return Some((payment_secret, payment_hash));
339 *payment_id = payment_id.wrapping_add(1);
345 fn send_payment(source: &ChanMan, dest: &ChanMan, dest_chan_id: u64, amt: u64, payment_id: &mut u8, payment_idx: &mut u64) -> bool {
346 let (payment_secret, payment_hash) =
347 if let Some((secret, hash)) = get_payment_secret_hash(dest, payment_id) { (secret, hash) } else { return true; };
348 let mut payment_id = [0; 32];
349 payment_id[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_idx.to_ne_bytes());
351 let (min_value_sendable, max_value_sendable) = source.list_usable_channels()
352 .iter().find(|chan| chan.short_channel_id == Some(dest_chan_id))
354 (chan.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, chan.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat))
356 if let Err(err) = source.send_payment_with_route(&Route {
357 paths: vec![Path { hops: vec![RouteHop {
358 pubkey: dest.get_our_node_id(),
359 node_features: dest.node_features(),
360 short_channel_id: dest_chan_id,
361 channel_features: dest.channel_features(),
363 cltv_expiry_delta: 200,
364 }], blinded_tail: None }],
365 payment_params: None,
366 }, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_id)) {
367 check_payment_err(err, amt > max_value_sendable || amt < min_value_sendable);
370 // Note that while the max is a strict upper-bound, we can occasionally send substantially
371 // below the minimum, with some gap which is unusable immediately below the minimum. Thus,
372 // we don't check against min_value_sendable here.
373 assert!(amt <= max_value_sendable);
378 fn send_hop_payment(source: &ChanMan, middle: &ChanMan, middle_chan_id: u64, dest: &ChanMan, dest_chan_id: u64, amt: u64, payment_id: &mut u8, payment_idx: &mut u64) -> bool {
379 let (payment_secret, payment_hash) =
380 if let Some((secret, hash)) = get_payment_secret_hash(dest, payment_id) { (secret, hash) } else { return true; };
381 let mut payment_id = [0; 32];
382 payment_id[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_idx.to_ne_bytes());
384 let (min_value_sendable, max_value_sendable) = source.list_usable_channels()
385 .iter().find(|chan| chan.short_channel_id == Some(middle_chan_id))
387 (chan.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, chan.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat))
389 let first_hop_fee = 50_000;
390 if let Err(err) = source.send_payment_with_route(&Route {
391 paths: vec![Path { hops: vec![RouteHop {
392 pubkey: middle.get_our_node_id(),
393 node_features: middle.node_features(),
394 short_channel_id: middle_chan_id,
395 channel_features: middle.channel_features(),
396 fee_msat: first_hop_fee,
397 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
399 pubkey: dest.get_our_node_id(),
400 node_features: dest.node_features(),
401 short_channel_id: dest_chan_id,
402 channel_features: dest.channel_features(),
404 cltv_expiry_delta: 200,
405 }], blinded_tail: None }],
406 payment_params: None,
407 }, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_id)) {
408 let sent_amt = amt + first_hop_fee;
409 check_payment_err(err, sent_amt < min_value_sendable || sent_amt > max_value_sendable);
412 // Note that while the max is a strict upper-bound, we can occasionally send substantially
413 // below the minimum, with some gap which is unusable immediately below the minimum. Thus,
414 // we don't check against min_value_sendable here.
415 assert!(amt + first_hop_fee <= max_value_sendable);
421 pub fn do_test<Out: Output>(data: &[u8], underlying_out: Out) {
422 let out = SearchingOutput::new(underlying_out);
423 let broadcast = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{});
424 let router = FuzzRouter {};
426 macro_rules! make_node {
427 ($node_id: expr, $fee_estimator: expr) => { {
428 let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new($node_id.to_string(), out.clone()));
429 let node_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, $node_id]).unwrap();
430 let keys_manager = Arc::new(KeyProvider { node_secret, rand_bytes_id: atomic::AtomicU32::new(0), enforcement_states: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()) });
431 let monitor = Arc::new(TestChainMonitor::new(broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), $fee_estimator.clone(),
432 Arc::new(TestPersister {
433 update_ret: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed)
434 }), Arc::clone(&keys_manager)));
436 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
437 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
438 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
439 let network = Network::Bitcoin;
440 let best_block_timestamp = genesis_block(network).header.time;
441 let params = ChainParameters {
443 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
445 (ChannelManager::new($fee_estimator.clone(), monitor.clone(), broadcast.clone(), &router, Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), config, params, best_block_timestamp),
446 monitor, keys_manager)
450 macro_rules! reload_node {
451 ($ser: expr, $node_id: expr, $old_monitors: expr, $keys_manager: expr, $fee_estimator: expr) => { {
452 let keys_manager = Arc::clone(& $keys_manager);
453 let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new($node_id.to_string(), out.clone()));
454 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(TestChainMonitor::new(broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), $fee_estimator.clone(),
455 Arc::new(TestPersister {
456 update_ret: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed)
457 }), Arc::clone(& $keys_manager)));
459 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
460 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
461 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
463 let mut monitors = HashMap::new();
464 let mut old_monitors = $old_monitors.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap();
465 for (outpoint, (update_id, monitor_ser)) in old_monitors.drain() {
466 monitors.insert(outpoint, <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&monitor_ser), (&*$keys_manager, &*$keys_manager)).expect("Failed to read monitor").1);
467 chain_monitor.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().insert(outpoint, (update_id, monitor_ser));
469 let mut monitor_refs = HashMap::new();
470 for (outpoint, monitor) in monitors.iter_mut() {
471 monitor_refs.insert(*outpoint, monitor);
474 let read_args = ChannelManagerReadArgs {
475 entropy_source: keys_manager.clone(),
476 node_signer: keys_manager.clone(),
477 signer_provider: keys_manager.clone(),
478 fee_estimator: $fee_estimator.clone(),
479 chain_monitor: chain_monitor.clone(),
480 tx_broadcaster: broadcast.clone(),
483 default_config: config,
484 channel_monitors: monitor_refs,
487 let res = (<(BlockHash, ChanMan)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&$ser.0), read_args).expect("Failed to read manager").1, chain_monitor.clone());
488 for (funding_txo, mon) in monitors.drain() {
489 assert_eq!(chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_txo, mon),
490 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
496 let mut channel_txn = Vec::new();
497 macro_rules! make_channel {
498 ($source: expr, $dest: expr, $chan_id: expr) => { {
499 $source.peer_connected(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
500 features: $dest.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
502 $dest.peer_connected(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
503 features: $source.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
506 $source.create_channel($dest.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42, 0, None).unwrap();
508 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
509 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
510 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
512 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
515 $dest.handle_open_channel(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
516 let accept_channel = {
517 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
518 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
519 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
521 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
524 $source.handle_accept_channel(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
527 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_events();
528 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
529 if let events::Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } = events[0] {
530 let tx = Transaction { version: $chan_id, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
531 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
533 funding_output = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
534 $source.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &$dest.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
535 channel_txn.push(tx);
536 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
539 let funding_created = {
540 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
541 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
542 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
544 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
546 $dest.handle_funding_created(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
548 let funding_signed = {
549 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
550 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
551 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
553 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
555 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_events();
556 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
557 if let events::Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } = events[0] {
558 assert_eq!(counterparty_node_id, &$source.get_our_node_id());
559 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
561 $source.handle_funding_signed(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
562 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_events();
563 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
564 if let events::Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } = events[0] {
565 assert_eq!(counterparty_node_id, &$dest.get_our_node_id());
566 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
572 macro_rules! confirm_txn {
574 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash();
575 let mut header = create_dummy_header(chain_hash, 42);
576 let txdata: Vec<_> = channel_txn.iter().enumerate().map(|(i, tx)| (i + 1, tx)).collect();
577 $node.transactions_confirmed(&header, &txdata, 1);
579 header = create_dummy_header(header.block_hash(), 42);
581 $node.best_block_updated(&header, 99);
585 macro_rules! lock_fundings {
586 ($nodes: expr) => { {
587 let mut node_events = Vec::new();
588 for node in $nodes.iter() {
589 node_events.push(node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events());
591 for (idx, node_event) in node_events.iter().enumerate() {
592 for event in node_event {
593 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } = event {
594 for node in $nodes.iter() {
595 if node.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
596 node.handle_channel_ready(&$nodes[idx].get_our_node_id(), msg);
599 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
603 for node in $nodes.iter() {
604 let events = node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
605 for event in events {
606 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = event {
607 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
613 let fee_est_a = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
614 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_a = 253;
615 let fee_est_b = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
616 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_b = 253;
617 let fee_est_c = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
618 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_c = 253;
620 // 3 nodes is enough to hit all the possible cases, notably unknown-source-unknown-dest
622 let (node_a, mut monitor_a, keys_manager_a) = make_node!(0, fee_est_a);
623 let (node_b, mut monitor_b, keys_manager_b) = make_node!(1, fee_est_b);
624 let (node_c, mut monitor_c, keys_manager_c) = make_node!(2, fee_est_c);
626 let mut nodes = [node_a, node_b, node_c];
628 let chan_1_funding = make_channel!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 0);
629 let chan_2_funding = make_channel!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1);
631 for node in nodes.iter() {
635 lock_fundings!(nodes);
637 let chan_a = nodes[0].list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap();
638 let chan_b = nodes[2].list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap();
640 let mut payment_id: u8 = 0;
641 let mut payment_idx: u64 = 0;
643 let mut chan_a_disconnected = false;
644 let mut chan_b_disconnected = false;
645 let mut ab_events = Vec::new();
646 let mut ba_events = Vec::new();
647 let mut bc_events = Vec::new();
648 let mut cb_events = Vec::new();
650 let mut node_a_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
651 nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
652 let mut node_b_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
653 nodes[1].write(&mut node_b_ser).unwrap();
654 let mut node_c_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
655 nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
657 macro_rules! test_return {
659 assert_eq!(nodes[0].list_channels().len(), 1);
660 assert_eq!(nodes[1].list_channels().len(), 2);
661 assert_eq!(nodes[2].list_channels().len(), 1);
666 let mut read_pos = 0;
667 macro_rules! get_slice {
670 let slice_len = $len as usize;
671 if data.len() < read_pos + slice_len {
674 read_pos += slice_len;
675 &data[read_pos - slice_len..read_pos]
681 // Push any events from Node B onto ba_events and bc_events
682 macro_rules! push_excess_b_events {
683 ($excess_events: expr, $expect_drop_node: expr) => { {
684 let a_id = nodes[0].get_our_node_id();
685 let expect_drop_node: Option<usize> = $expect_drop_node;
686 let expect_drop_id = if let Some(id) = expect_drop_node { Some(nodes[id].get_our_node_id()) } else { None };
687 for event in $excess_events {
688 let push_a = match event {
689 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
690 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
693 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => {
694 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
697 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => {
698 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
701 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => continue,
702 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => continue,
703 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
704 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
705 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
708 _ => panic!("Unhandled message event {:?}", event),
710 if push_a { ba_events.push(event); } else { bc_events.push(event); }
715 // While delivering messages, we select across three possible message selection processes
716 // to ensure we get as much coverage as possible. See the individual enum variants for more
719 enum ProcessMessages {
720 /// Deliver all available messages, including fetching any new messages from
721 /// `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` (which may have side effects).
723 /// Call `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` first, and then deliver up to one
724 /// message (which may already be queued).
726 /// Deliver up to one already-queued message. This avoids any potential side-effects
727 /// of `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` (eg freeing the HTLC holding cell), which
728 /// provides potentially more coverage.
732 macro_rules! process_msg_events {
733 ($node: expr, $corrupt_forward: expr, $limit_events: expr) => { {
734 let mut events = if $node == 1 {
735 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
736 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut ba_events);
737 new_events.extend_from_slice(&bc_events[..]);
740 } else if $node == 0 {
741 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
742 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut ab_events);
745 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
746 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut cb_events);
749 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
750 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage {
751 new_events = nodes[$node].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
753 let mut had_events = false;
754 let mut events_iter = events.drain(..).chain(new_events.drain(..));
755 let mut extra_ev = None;
756 for event in &mut events_iter {
759 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee, commitment_signed } } => {
760 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
761 if dest.get_our_node_id() == node_id {
762 for update_add in update_add_htlcs.iter() {
763 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_add_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
764 if !$corrupt_forward {
765 dest.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_add);
767 // Corrupt the update_add_htlc message so that its HMAC
768 // check will fail and we generate a
769 // update_fail_malformed_htlc instead of an
770 // update_fail_htlc as we do when we reject a payment.
771 let mut msg_ser = update_add.encode();
772 msg_ser[1000] ^= 0xff;
773 let new_msg = UpdateAddHTLC::read(&mut Cursor::new(&msg_ser)).unwrap();
774 dest.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &new_msg);
777 for update_fulfill in update_fulfill_htlcs.iter() {
778 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fulfill_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
779 dest.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fulfill);
781 for update_fail in update_fail_htlcs.iter() {
782 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fail_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
783 dest.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fail);
785 for update_fail_malformed in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.iter() {
786 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fail_malformed_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
787 dest.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fail_malformed);
789 if let Some(msg) = update_fee {
790 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fee to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
791 dest.handle_update_fee(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &msg);
793 let processed_change = !update_add_htlcs.is_empty() || !update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() ||
794 !update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() || !update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty();
795 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::AllMessages && processed_change {
796 // If we only want to process some messages, don't deliver the CS until later.
797 extra_ev = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: CommitmentUpdate {
798 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
799 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
800 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
801 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
807 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering commitment_signed to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
808 dest.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
813 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
814 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
815 if dest.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
816 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering revoke_and_ack to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
817 dest.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), msg);
821 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
822 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
823 if dest.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
824 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering channel_reestablish to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
825 dest.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), msg);
829 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => {
830 // Can be generated as a reestablish response
832 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {
833 // Can be generated as a reestablish response
835 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
836 // When we reconnect we will resend a channel_update to make sure our
837 // counterparty has the latest parameters for receiving payments
838 // through us. We do, however, check that the message does not include
839 // the "disabled" bit, as we should never ever have a channel which is
840 // disabled when we send such an update (or it may indicate channel
841 // force-close which we should detect as an error).
842 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0);
844 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
847 panic!("Unhandled message event {:?}", event)
850 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::AllMessages {
855 push_excess_b_events!(extra_ev.into_iter().chain(events_iter), None);
856 } else if $node == 0 {
857 if let Some(ev) = extra_ev { ab_events.push(ev); }
858 for event in events_iter { ab_events.push(event); }
860 if let Some(ev) = extra_ev { cb_events.push(ev); }
861 for event in events_iter { cb_events.push(event); }
867 macro_rules! drain_msg_events_on_disconnect {
868 ($counterparty_id: expr) => { {
869 if $counterparty_id == 0 {
870 for event in nodes[0].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
872 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
873 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => {},
874 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => {},
875 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => {},
876 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {},
877 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
878 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
880 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
883 panic!("Unhandled message event")
887 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(0));
891 for event in nodes[2].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
893 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
894 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => {},
895 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => {},
896 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => {},
897 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {},
898 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
899 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
901 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
904 panic!("Unhandled message event")
908 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(2));
915 macro_rules! process_events {
916 ($node: expr, $fail: expr) => { {
917 // In case we get 256 payments we may have a hash collision, resulting in the
918 // second claim/fail call not finding the duplicate-hash HTLC, so we have to
919 // deduplicate the calls here.
920 let mut claim_set = HashSet::new();
921 let mut events = nodes[$node].get_and_clear_pending_events();
922 // Sort events so that PendingHTLCsForwardable get processed last. This avoids a
923 // case where we first process a PendingHTLCsForwardable, then claim/fail on a
924 // PaymentClaimable, claiming/failing two HTLCs, but leaving a just-generated
925 // PaymentClaimable event for the second HTLC in our pending_events (and breaking
926 // our claim_set deduplication).
927 events.sort_by(|a, b| {
928 if let events::Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } = a {
929 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = b {
931 } else { Ordering::Equal }
932 } else if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = a {
933 if let events::Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } = b {
935 } else { Ordering::Equal }
936 } else { Ordering::Equal }
938 let had_events = !events.is_empty();
939 for event in events.drain(..) {
941 events::Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, .. } => {
942 if claim_set.insert(payment_hash.0) {
944 nodes[$node].fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
946 nodes[$node].claim_funds(PaymentPreimage(payment_hash.0));
950 events::Event::PaymentSent { .. } => {},
951 events::Event::PaymentClaimed { .. } => {},
952 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
953 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } => {},
954 events::Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {},
955 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful { .. } | events::Event::ProbeFailed { .. } => {
956 // Even though we don't explicitly send probes, because probes are
957 // detected based on hashing the payment hash+preimage, its rather
958 // trivial for the fuzzer to build payments that accidentally end up
959 // looking like probes.
961 events::Event::PaymentForwarded { .. } if $node == 1 => {},
962 events::Event::ChannelReady { .. } => {},
963 events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {
964 nodes[$node].process_pending_htlc_forwards();
966 events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => {},
967 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
970 panic!("Unhandled event")
978 let v = get_slice!(1)[0];
979 out.locked_write(format!("READ A BYTE! HANDLING INPUT {:x}...........\n", v).as_bytes());
981 // In general, we keep related message groups close together in binary form, allowing
982 // bit-twiddling mutations to have similar effects. This is probably overkill, but no
985 0x00 => *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress,
986 0x01 => *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress,
987 0x02 => *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress,
988 0x04 => *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed,
989 0x05 => *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed,
990 0x06 => *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed,
993 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_a.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
994 monitor_a.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
995 nodes[0].process_monitor_events();
999 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1000 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1001 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1005 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1006 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1007 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1011 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_c.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1012 monitor_c.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1013 nodes[2].process_monitor_events();
1018 if !chan_a_disconnected {
1019 nodes[0].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1020 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id());
1021 chan_a_disconnected = true;
1022 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(0);
1026 if !chan_b_disconnected {
1027 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id());
1028 nodes[2].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1029 chan_b_disconnected = true;
1030 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(2);
1034 if chan_a_disconnected {
1035 nodes[0].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1036 features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1038 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1039 features: nodes[0].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1041 chan_a_disconnected = false;
1045 if chan_b_disconnected {
1046 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1047 features: nodes[2].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1049 nodes[2].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1050 features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1052 chan_b_disconnected = false;
1056 0x10 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1057 0x11 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1058 0x12 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1059 0x13 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1060 0x14 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1061 0x15 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1063 0x16 => { process_events!(0, true); },
1064 0x17 => { process_events!(0, false); },
1066 0x18 => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1067 0x19 => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1068 0x1a => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1069 0x1b => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1070 0x1c => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1071 0x1d => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1073 0x1e => { process_events!(1, true); },
1074 0x1f => { process_events!(1, false); },
1076 0x20 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1077 0x21 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1078 0x22 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1079 0x23 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1080 0x24 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1081 0x25 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1083 0x26 => { process_events!(2, true); },
1084 0x27 => { process_events!(2, false); },
1087 if !chan_a_disconnected {
1088 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id());
1089 chan_a_disconnected = true;
1090 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(0);
1092 if monitor_a.should_update_manager.load(atomic::Ordering::Relaxed) {
1093 node_a_ser.0.clear();
1094 nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
1096 let (new_node_a, new_monitor_a) = reload_node!(node_a_ser, 0, monitor_a, keys_manager_a, fee_est_a);
1097 nodes[0] = new_node_a;
1098 monitor_a = new_monitor_a;
1101 if !chan_a_disconnected {
1102 nodes[0].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1103 chan_a_disconnected = true;
1104 nodes[0].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1108 if !chan_b_disconnected {
1109 nodes[2].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1110 chan_b_disconnected = true;
1111 nodes[2].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1115 let (new_node_b, new_monitor_b) = reload_node!(node_b_ser, 1, monitor_b, keys_manager_b, fee_est_b);
1116 nodes[1] = new_node_b;
1117 monitor_b = new_monitor_b;
1120 if !chan_b_disconnected {
1121 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id());
1122 chan_b_disconnected = true;
1123 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(2);
1125 if monitor_c.should_update_manager.load(atomic::Ordering::Relaxed) {
1126 node_c_ser.0.clear();
1127 nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
1129 let (new_node_c, new_monitor_c) = reload_node!(node_c_ser, 2, monitor_c, keys_manager_c, fee_est_c);
1130 nodes[2] = new_node_c;
1131 monitor_c = new_monitor_c;
1134 // 1/10th the channel size:
1135 0x30 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1136 0x31 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1137 0x32 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1138 0x33 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1139 0x34 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1140 0x35 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1142 0x38 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1143 0x39 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1144 0x3a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1145 0x3b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1146 0x3c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1147 0x3d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1149 0x40 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1150 0x41 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1151 0x42 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1152 0x43 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1153 0x44 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1154 0x45 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1156 0x48 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1157 0x49 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1158 0x4a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1159 0x4b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1160 0x4c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1161 0x4d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1163 0x50 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1164 0x51 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1165 0x52 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1166 0x53 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1167 0x54 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1168 0x55 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1170 0x58 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1171 0x59 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1172 0x5a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1173 0x5b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1174 0x5c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1175 0x5d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1177 0x60 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1178 0x61 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1179 0x62 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1180 0x63 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1181 0x64 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1182 0x65 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1184 0x68 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1185 0x69 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1186 0x6a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1187 0x6b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1188 0x6c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1189 0x6d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1192 let max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_a * FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1193 if fee_est_a.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1194 fee_est_a.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1196 nodes[0].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1198 0x81 => { fee_est_a.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[0].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1201 let max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_b * FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1202 if fee_est_b.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1203 fee_est_b.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1205 nodes[1].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1207 0x85 => { fee_est_b.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[1].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1210 let max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_c * FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1211 if fee_est_c.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1212 fee_est_c.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1214 nodes[2].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1216 0x89 => { fee_est_c.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[2].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1219 // Test that no channel is in a stuck state where neither party can send funds even
1220 // after we resolve all pending events.
1221 // First make sure there are no pending monitor updates, resetting the error state
1222 // and calling force_channel_monitor_updated for each monitor.
1223 *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed;
1224 *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed;
1225 *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed;
1227 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_a.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1228 monitor_a.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1229 nodes[0].process_monitor_events();
1231 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1232 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1233 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1235 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1236 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1237 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1239 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_c.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1240 monitor_c.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1241 nodes[2].process_monitor_events();
1244 // Next, make sure peers are all connected to each other
1245 if chan_a_disconnected {
1246 nodes[0].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1247 features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1249 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1250 features: nodes[0].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1252 chan_a_disconnected = false;
1254 if chan_b_disconnected {
1255 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1256 features: nodes[2].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1258 nodes[2].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1259 features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1261 chan_b_disconnected = false;
1264 for i in 0..std::usize::MAX {
1265 if i == 100 { panic!("It may take may iterations to settle the state, but it should not take forever"); }
1266 // Then, make sure any current forwards make their way to their destination
1267 if process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1268 if process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1269 if process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1270 // ...making sure any pending PendingHTLCsForwardable events are handled and
1271 // payments claimed.
1272 if process_events!(0, false) { continue; }
1273 if process_events!(1, false) { continue; }
1274 if process_events!(2, false) { continue; }
1278 // Finally, make sure that at least one end of each channel can make a substantial payment
1280 send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx) ||
1281 send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx));
1283 send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx) ||
1284 send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx));
1286 last_htlc_clear_fee_a = fee_est_a.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1287 last_htlc_clear_fee_b = fee_est_b.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1288 last_htlc_clear_fee_c = fee_est_c.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1290 _ => test_return!(),
1293 node_a_ser.0.clear();
1294 nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
1295 monitor_a.should_update_manager.store(false, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
1296 node_b_ser.0.clear();
1297 nodes[1].write(&mut node_b_ser).unwrap();
1298 monitor_b.should_update_manager.store(false, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
1299 node_c_ser.0.clear();
1300 nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
1301 monitor_c.should_update_manager.store(false, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
1305 /// We actually have different behavior based on if a certain log string has been seen, so we have
1306 /// to do a bit more tracking.
1308 struct SearchingOutput<O: Output> {
1310 may_fail: Arc<atomic::AtomicBool>,
1312 impl<O: Output> Output for SearchingOutput<O> {
1313 fn locked_write(&self, data: &[u8]) {
1314 // We hit a design limitation of LN state machine (see CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER)
1315 if std::str::from_utf8(data).unwrap().contains("Outbound update_fee HTLC buffer overflow - counterparty should force-close this channel") {
1316 self.may_fail.store(true, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1318 self.output.locked_write(data)
1321 impl<O: Output> SearchingOutput<O> {
1322 pub fn new(output: O) -> Self {
1323 Self { output, may_fail: Arc::new(atomic::AtomicBool::new(false)) }
1327 pub fn chanmon_consistency_test<Out: Output>(data: &[u8], out: Out) {
1332 pub extern "C" fn chanmon_consistency_run(data: *const u8, datalen: usize) {
1333 do_test(unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(data, datalen) }, test_logger::DevNull{});