1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Test that monitor update failures don't get our channel state out of sync.
11 //! One of the biggest concern with the monitor update failure handling code is that messages
12 //! resent after monitor updating is restored are delivered out-of-order, resulting in
13 //! commitment_signed messages having "invalid signatures".
14 //! To test this we stand up a network of three nodes and read bytes from the fuzz input to denote
15 //! actions such as sending payments, handling events, or changing monitor update return values on
16 //! a per-node basis. This should allow it to find any cases where the ordering of actions results
17 //! in us getting out of sync with ourselves, and, assuming at least one of our recieve- or
18 //! send-side handling is correct, other peers. We consider it a failure if any action results in a
19 //! channel being force-closed.
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, ScriptBuf};
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
26 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash as TraitImport;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
33 use lightning::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
34 use lightning::blinded_path::message::ForwardNode;
35 use lightning::blinded_path::payment::ReceiveTlvs;
37 use lightning::chain::{BestBlock, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, chainmonitor, channelmonitor, Confirm, Watch};
38 use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, MonitorEvent};
39 use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
40 use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use lightning::sign::{KeyMaterial, InMemorySigner, Recipient, EntropySource, NodeSigner, SignerProvider};
42 use lightning::events;
43 use lightning::events::MessageSendEventsProvider;
44 use lightning::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelDetails, ChannelManager, PaymentSendFailure, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
46 use lightning::ln::channel::FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
47 use lightning::ln::msgs::{self, CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, UpdateAddHTLC, Init};
48 use lightning::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
49 use lightning::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
50 use lightning::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
51 use lightning::offers::invoice_request::UnsignedInvoiceRequest;
52 use lightning::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, OnionMessagePath};
53 use lightning::util::test_channel_signer::{TestChannelSigner, EnforcementState};
54 use lightning::util::errors::APIError;
55 use lightning::util::hash_tables::*;
56 use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
57 use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
58 use lightning::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
59 use lightning::routing::router::{InFlightHtlcs, Path, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
61 use crate::utils::test_logger::{self, Output};
62 use crate::utils::test_persister::TestPersister;
64 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Message, PublicKey, SecretKey, Scalar, Secp256k1, self};
65 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
66 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::{RecoverableSignature, Signature};
67 use bitcoin::secp256k1::schnorr;
70 use std::cmp::{self, Ordering};
71 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
72 use std::sync::atomic;
74 use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
76 const MAX_FEE: u32 = 10_000;
77 struct FuzzEstimator {
78 ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32,
80 impl FeeEstimator for FuzzEstimator {
81 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, conf_target: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
82 // We force-close channels if our counterparty sends us a feerate which is a small multiple
83 // of our HighPriority fee estimate or smaller than our Background fee estimate. Thus, we
84 // always return a HighPriority feerate here which is >= the maximum Normal feerate and a
85 // Background feerate which is <= the minimum Normal feerate.
87 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep => MAX_FEE,
88 ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum|ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee|ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee|ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee|ConfirmationTarget::OutputSpendingFee => 253,
89 ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee => cmp::min(self.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire), MAX_FEE),
96 impl Router for FuzzRouter {
98 &self, _payer: &PublicKey, _params: &RouteParameters, _first_hops: Option<&[&ChannelDetails]>,
99 _inflight_htlcs: InFlightHtlcs
100 ) -> Result<Route, msgs::LightningError> {
101 Err(msgs::LightningError {
102 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
103 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
107 fn create_blinded_payment_paths<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(
108 &self, _recipient: PublicKey, _first_hops: Vec<ChannelDetails>, _tlvs: ReceiveTlvs,
109 _amount_msats: u64, _secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
110 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
115 impl MessageRouter for FuzzRouter {
117 &self, _sender: PublicKey, _peers: Vec<PublicKey>, _destination: Destination
118 ) -> Result<OnionMessagePath, ()> {
122 fn create_blinded_paths<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(
123 &self, _recipient: PublicKey, _peers: Vec<ForwardNode>, _secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
124 ) -> Result<Vec<BlindedPath>, ()> {
129 pub struct TestBroadcaster {}
130 impl BroadcasterInterface for TestBroadcaster {
131 fn broadcast_transactions(&self, _txs: &[&Transaction]) { }
134 pub struct VecWriter(pub Vec<u8>);
135 impl Writer for VecWriter {
136 fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
137 self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
142 struct TestChainMonitor {
143 pub logger: Arc<dyn Logger>,
144 pub keys: Arc<KeyProvider>,
145 pub persister: Arc<TestPersister>,
146 pub chain_monitor: Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<TestChannelSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
147 // If we reload a node with an old copy of ChannelMonitors, the ChannelManager deserialization
148 // logic will automatically force-close our channels for us (as we don't have an up-to-date
149 // monitor implying we are not able to punish misbehaving counterparties). Because this test
150 // "fails" if we ever force-close a channel, we avoid doing so, always saving the latest
151 // fully-serialized monitor state here, as well as the corresponding update_id.
152 pub latest_monitors: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, (u64, Vec<u8>)>>,
154 impl TestChainMonitor {
155 pub fn new(broadcaster: Arc<TestBroadcaster>, logger: Arc<dyn Logger>, feeest: Arc<FuzzEstimator>, persister: Arc<TestPersister>, keys: Arc<KeyProvider>) -> Self {
157 chain_monitor: Arc::new(chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::new(None, broadcaster, logger.clone(), feeest, Arc::clone(&persister))),
161 latest_monitors: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
165 impl chain::Watch<TestChannelSigner> for TestChainMonitor {
166 fn watch_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>) -> Result<chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, ()> {
167 let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
168 monitor.write(&mut ser).unwrap();
169 if let Some(_) = self.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().insert(funding_txo, (monitor.get_latest_update_id(), ser.0)) {
170 panic!("Already had monitor pre-watch_channel");
172 self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_txo, monitor)
175 fn update_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: &channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus {
176 let mut map_lock = self.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap();
177 let map_entry = map_lock.get_mut(&funding_txo).expect("Didn't have monitor on update call");
178 let deserialized_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::
179 read(&mut Cursor::new(&map_entry.1), (&*self.keys, &*self.keys)).unwrap().1;
180 deserialized_monitor.update_monitor(update, &&TestBroadcaster{}, &&FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) }, &self.logger).unwrap();
181 let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
182 deserialized_monitor.write(&mut ser).unwrap();
183 *map_entry = (update.update_id, ser.0);
184 self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update)
187 fn release_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<(OutPoint, ChannelId, Vec<MonitorEvent>, Option<PublicKey>)> {
188 return self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
193 node_secret: SecretKey,
194 rand_bytes_id: atomic::AtomicU32,
195 enforcement_states: Mutex<HashMap<[u8;32], Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>>>>,
198 impl EntropySource for KeyProvider {
199 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
200 let id = self.rand_bytes_id.fetch_add(1, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
201 let mut res = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 11, self.node_secret[31]];
202 res[30-4..30].copy_from_slice(&id.to_le_bytes());
207 impl NodeSigner for KeyProvider {
208 fn get_node_id(&self, recipient: Recipient) -> Result<PublicKey, ()> {
209 let node_secret = match recipient {
210 Recipient::Node => Ok(&self.node_secret),
211 Recipient::PhantomNode => Err(())
213 Ok(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), node_secret))
216 fn ecdh(&self, recipient: Recipient, other_key: &PublicKey, tweak: Option<&Scalar>) -> Result<SharedSecret, ()> {
217 let mut node_secret = match recipient {
218 Recipient::Node => Ok(self.node_secret.clone()),
219 Recipient::PhantomNode => Err(())
221 if let Some(tweak) = tweak {
222 node_secret = node_secret.mul_tweak(tweak).map_err(|_| ())?;
224 Ok(SharedSecret::new(other_key, &node_secret))
227 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial {
228 KeyMaterial([0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, self.node_secret[31]])
231 fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5], _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> {
235 fn sign_bolt12_invoice_request(
236 &self, _invoice_request: &UnsignedInvoiceRequest
237 ) -> Result<schnorr::Signature, ()> {
241 fn sign_bolt12_invoice(
242 &self, _invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice,
243 ) -> Result<schnorr::Signature, ()> {
247 fn sign_gossip_message(&self, msg: lightning::ln::msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
248 let msg_hash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]).map_err(|_| ())?;
249 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
250 Ok(secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msg_hash, &self.node_secret))
254 impl SignerProvider for KeyProvider {
255 type EcdsaSigner = TestChannelSigner;
257 type TaprootSigner = TestChannelSigner;
259 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
260 let id = self.rand_bytes_id.fetch_add(1, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed) as u8;
264 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
265 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
266 let id = channel_keys_id[0];
267 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
269 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
270 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
271 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
272 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
273 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
274 [id, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 9, self.node_secret[31]],
275 channel_value_satoshis,
279 let revoked_commitment = self.make_enforcement_state_cell(keys.commitment_seed);
280 TestChannelSigner::new_with_revoked(keys, revoked_commitment, false)
283 fn read_chan_signer(&self, buffer: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> {
284 let mut reader = std::io::Cursor::new(buffer);
286 let inner: InMemorySigner = ReadableArgs::read(&mut reader, self)?;
287 let state = self.make_enforcement_state_cell(inner.commitment_seed);
289 Ok(TestChannelSigner {
292 disable_revocation_policy_check: false,
293 available: Arc::new(Mutex::new(true)),
297 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
298 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
299 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap();
300 let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
301 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
304 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
305 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
306 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap();
307 let pubkey_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &secret_key).serialize());
308 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh(&pubkey_hash))
313 fn make_enforcement_state_cell(&self, commitment_seed: [u8; 32]) -> Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>> {
314 let mut revoked_commitments = self.enforcement_states.lock().unwrap();
315 if !revoked_commitments.contains_key(&commitment_seed) {
316 revoked_commitments.insert(commitment_seed, Arc::new(Mutex::new(EnforcementState::new())));
318 let cell = revoked_commitments.get(&commitment_seed).unwrap();
324 fn check_api_err(api_err: APIError, sendable_bounds_violated: bool) {
326 APIError::APIMisuseError { .. } => panic!("We can't misuse the API"),
327 APIError::FeeRateTooHigh { .. } => panic!("We can't send too much fee?"),
328 APIError::InvalidRoute { .. } => panic!("Our routes should work"),
329 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err } => {
330 // Test the error against a list of errors we can hit, and reject
331 // all others. If you hit this panic, the list of acceptable errors
332 // is probably just stale and you should add new messages here.
334 "Peer for first hop currently disconnected" => {},
335 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - ") => {},
336 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - ") => {},
337 _ => panic!("{}", err),
339 assert!(sendable_bounds_violated);
341 APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress => {
342 // We can (obviously) temp-fail a monitor update
344 APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { .. } => panic!("Cannot send an incompatible shutdown script"),
348 fn check_payment_err(send_err: PaymentSendFailure, sendable_bounds_violated: bool) {
350 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(api_err) => check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated),
351 PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(per_path_results) => {
352 for res in per_path_results { if let Err(api_err) = res { check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated); } }
354 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(per_path_results) => {
355 for api_err in per_path_results { check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated); }
357 PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure { results, .. } => {
358 for res in results { if let Err(api_err) = res { check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated); } }
360 PaymentSendFailure::DuplicatePayment => panic!(),
364 type ChanMan<'a> = ChannelManager<Arc<TestChainMonitor>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, &'a FuzzRouter, Arc<dyn Logger>>;
367 fn get_payment_secret_hash(dest: &ChanMan, payment_id: &mut u8) -> Option<(PaymentSecret, PaymentHash)> {
368 let mut payment_hash;
370 payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[*payment_id; 1]).to_byte_array());
371 if let Ok(payment_secret) = dest.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 3600, None) {
372 return Some((payment_secret, payment_hash));
374 *payment_id = payment_id.wrapping_add(1);
380 fn send_payment(source: &ChanMan, dest: &ChanMan, dest_chan_id: u64, amt: u64, payment_id: &mut u8, payment_idx: &mut u64) -> bool {
381 let (payment_secret, payment_hash) =
382 if let Some((secret, hash)) = get_payment_secret_hash(dest, payment_id) { (secret, hash) } else { return true; };
383 let mut payment_id = [0; 32];
384 payment_id[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_idx.to_ne_bytes());
386 let (min_value_sendable, max_value_sendable) = source.list_usable_channels()
387 .iter().find(|chan| chan.short_channel_id == Some(dest_chan_id))
389 (chan.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, chan.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat))
391 if let Err(err) = source.send_payment_with_route(&Route {
392 paths: vec![Path { hops: vec![RouteHop {
393 pubkey: dest.get_our_node_id(),
394 node_features: dest.node_features(),
395 short_channel_id: dest_chan_id,
396 channel_features: dest.channel_features(),
398 cltv_expiry_delta: 200,
399 maybe_announced_channel: true,
400 }], blinded_tail: None }],
402 }, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_id)) {
403 check_payment_err(err, amt > max_value_sendable || amt < min_value_sendable);
406 // Note that while the max is a strict upper-bound, we can occasionally send substantially
407 // below the minimum, with some gap which is unusable immediately below the minimum. Thus,
408 // we don't check against min_value_sendable here.
409 assert!(amt <= max_value_sendable);
414 fn send_hop_payment(source: &ChanMan, middle: &ChanMan, middle_chan_id: u64, dest: &ChanMan, dest_chan_id: u64, amt: u64, payment_id: &mut u8, payment_idx: &mut u64) -> bool {
415 let (payment_secret, payment_hash) =
416 if let Some((secret, hash)) = get_payment_secret_hash(dest, payment_id) { (secret, hash) } else { return true; };
417 let mut payment_id = [0; 32];
418 payment_id[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_idx.to_ne_bytes());
420 let (min_value_sendable, max_value_sendable) = source.list_usable_channels()
421 .iter().find(|chan| chan.short_channel_id == Some(middle_chan_id))
423 (chan.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, chan.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat))
425 let first_hop_fee = 50_000;
426 if let Err(err) = source.send_payment_with_route(&Route {
427 paths: vec![Path { hops: vec![RouteHop {
428 pubkey: middle.get_our_node_id(),
429 node_features: middle.node_features(),
430 short_channel_id: middle_chan_id,
431 channel_features: middle.channel_features(),
432 fee_msat: first_hop_fee,
433 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
434 maybe_announced_channel: true,
436 pubkey: dest.get_our_node_id(),
437 node_features: dest.node_features(),
438 short_channel_id: dest_chan_id,
439 channel_features: dest.channel_features(),
441 cltv_expiry_delta: 200,
442 maybe_announced_channel: true,
443 }], blinded_tail: None }],
445 }, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_id)) {
446 let sent_amt = amt + first_hop_fee;
447 check_payment_err(err, sent_amt < min_value_sendable || sent_amt > max_value_sendable);
450 // Note that while the max is a strict upper-bound, we can occasionally send substantially
451 // below the minimum, with some gap which is unusable immediately below the minimum. Thus,
452 // we don't check against min_value_sendable here.
453 assert!(amt + first_hop_fee <= max_value_sendable);
459 pub fn do_test<Out: Output>(data: &[u8], underlying_out: Out, anchors: bool) {
460 let out = SearchingOutput::new(underlying_out);
461 let broadcast = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{});
462 let router = FuzzRouter {};
464 macro_rules! make_node {
465 ($node_id: expr, $fee_estimator: expr) => { {
466 let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new($node_id.to_string(), out.clone()));
467 let node_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, $node_id]).unwrap();
468 let keys_manager = Arc::new(KeyProvider { node_secret, rand_bytes_id: atomic::AtomicU32::new(0), enforcement_states: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()) });
469 let monitor = Arc::new(TestChainMonitor::new(broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), $fee_estimator.clone(),
470 Arc::new(TestPersister {
471 update_ret: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed)
472 }), Arc::clone(&keys_manager)));
474 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
475 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
476 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
478 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
479 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
481 let network = Network::Bitcoin;
482 let best_block_timestamp = genesis_block(network).header.time;
483 let params = ChainParameters {
485 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
487 (ChannelManager::new($fee_estimator.clone(), monitor.clone(), broadcast.clone(), &router, Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), config, params, best_block_timestamp),
488 monitor, keys_manager)
492 macro_rules! reload_node {
493 ($ser: expr, $node_id: expr, $old_monitors: expr, $keys_manager: expr, $fee_estimator: expr) => { {
494 let keys_manager = Arc::clone(& $keys_manager);
495 let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new($node_id.to_string(), out.clone()));
496 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(TestChainMonitor::new(broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), $fee_estimator.clone(),
497 Arc::new(TestPersister {
498 update_ret: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed)
499 }), Arc::clone(& $keys_manager)));
501 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
502 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
503 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
505 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
506 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
509 let mut monitors = new_hash_map();
510 let mut old_monitors = $old_monitors.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap();
511 for (outpoint, (update_id, monitor_ser)) in old_monitors.drain() {
512 monitors.insert(outpoint, <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&monitor_ser), (&*$keys_manager, &*$keys_manager)).expect("Failed to read monitor").1);
513 chain_monitor.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().insert(outpoint, (update_id, monitor_ser));
515 let mut monitor_refs = new_hash_map();
516 for (outpoint, monitor) in monitors.iter_mut() {
517 monitor_refs.insert(*outpoint, monitor);
520 let read_args = ChannelManagerReadArgs {
521 entropy_source: keys_manager.clone(),
522 node_signer: keys_manager.clone(),
523 signer_provider: keys_manager.clone(),
524 fee_estimator: $fee_estimator.clone(),
525 chain_monitor: chain_monitor.clone(),
526 tx_broadcaster: broadcast.clone(),
529 default_config: config,
530 channel_monitors: monitor_refs,
533 let res = (<(BlockHash, ChanMan)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&$ser.0), read_args).expect("Failed to read manager").1, chain_monitor.clone());
534 for (funding_txo, mon) in monitors.drain() {
535 assert_eq!(chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_txo, mon),
536 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
542 let mut channel_txn = Vec::new();
543 macro_rules! make_channel {
544 ($source: expr, $dest: expr, $dest_keys_manager: expr, $chan_id: expr) => { {
545 $source.peer_connected(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
546 features: $dest.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
548 $dest.peer_connected(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
549 features: $source.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
552 $source.create_channel($dest.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42, 0, None, None).unwrap();
554 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
555 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
556 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
558 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
561 $dest.handle_open_channel(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
562 let accept_channel = {
564 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_events();
565 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
566 if let events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
567 ref temporary_channel_id, ref counterparty_node_id, ..
569 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
570 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&$dest_keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
571 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
572 $dest.accept_inbound_channel(
573 temporary_channel_id,
574 counterparty_node_id,
577 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
579 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
580 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
581 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
583 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
586 $source.handle_accept_channel(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
589 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_events();
590 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
591 if let events::Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } = events[0] {
592 let tx = Transaction { version: $chan_id, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
593 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
595 funding_output = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
596 $source.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &$dest.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
597 channel_txn.push(tx);
598 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
601 let funding_created = {
602 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
603 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
604 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
606 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
608 $dest.handle_funding_created(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
610 let funding_signed = {
611 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
612 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
613 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
615 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
617 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_events();
618 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
619 if let events::Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } = events[0] {
620 assert_eq!(counterparty_node_id, &$source.get_our_node_id());
621 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
623 $source.handle_funding_signed(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
624 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_events();
625 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
626 if let events::Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } = events[0] {
627 assert_eq!(counterparty_node_id, &$dest.get_our_node_id());
628 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
634 macro_rules! confirm_txn {
636 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash();
637 let mut header = create_dummy_header(chain_hash, 42);
638 let txdata: Vec<_> = channel_txn.iter().enumerate().map(|(i, tx)| (i + 1, tx)).collect();
639 $node.transactions_confirmed(&header, &txdata, 1);
641 header = create_dummy_header(header.block_hash(), 42);
643 $node.best_block_updated(&header, 99);
647 macro_rules! lock_fundings {
648 ($nodes: expr) => { {
649 let mut node_events = Vec::new();
650 for node in $nodes.iter() {
651 node_events.push(node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events());
653 for (idx, node_event) in node_events.iter().enumerate() {
654 for event in node_event {
655 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } = event {
656 for node in $nodes.iter() {
657 if node.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
658 node.handle_channel_ready(&$nodes[idx].get_our_node_id(), msg);
661 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
665 for node in $nodes.iter() {
666 let events = node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
667 for event in events {
668 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = event {
669 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
675 let fee_est_a = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
676 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_a = 253;
677 let fee_est_b = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
678 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_b = 253;
679 let fee_est_c = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
680 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_c = 253;
682 // 3 nodes is enough to hit all the possible cases, notably unknown-source-unknown-dest
684 let (node_a, mut monitor_a, keys_manager_a) = make_node!(0, fee_est_a);
685 let (node_b, mut monitor_b, keys_manager_b) = make_node!(1, fee_est_b);
686 let (node_c, mut monitor_c, keys_manager_c) = make_node!(2, fee_est_c);
688 let mut nodes = [node_a, node_b, node_c];
690 let chan_1_funding = make_channel!(nodes[0], nodes[1], keys_manager_b, 0);
691 let chan_2_funding = make_channel!(nodes[1], nodes[2], keys_manager_c, 1);
693 for node in nodes.iter() {
697 lock_fundings!(nodes);
699 let chan_a = nodes[0].list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap();
700 let chan_b = nodes[2].list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap();
702 let mut payment_id: u8 = 0;
703 let mut payment_idx: u64 = 0;
705 let mut chan_a_disconnected = false;
706 let mut chan_b_disconnected = false;
707 let mut ab_events = Vec::new();
708 let mut ba_events = Vec::new();
709 let mut bc_events = Vec::new();
710 let mut cb_events = Vec::new();
712 let mut node_a_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
713 nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
714 let mut node_b_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
715 nodes[1].write(&mut node_b_ser).unwrap();
716 let mut node_c_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
717 nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
719 macro_rules! test_return {
721 assert_eq!(nodes[0].list_channels().len(), 1);
722 assert_eq!(nodes[1].list_channels().len(), 2);
723 assert_eq!(nodes[2].list_channels().len(), 1);
728 let mut read_pos = 0;
729 macro_rules! get_slice {
732 let slice_len = $len as usize;
733 if data.len() < read_pos + slice_len {
736 read_pos += slice_len;
737 &data[read_pos - slice_len..read_pos]
743 // Push any events from Node B onto ba_events and bc_events
744 macro_rules! push_excess_b_events {
745 ($excess_events: expr, $expect_drop_node: expr) => { {
746 let a_id = nodes[0].get_our_node_id();
747 let expect_drop_node: Option<usize> = $expect_drop_node;
748 let expect_drop_id = if let Some(id) = expect_drop_node { Some(nodes[id].get_our_node_id()) } else { None };
749 for event in $excess_events {
750 let push_a = match event {
751 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
752 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
755 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => {
756 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
759 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => {
760 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
763 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => continue,
764 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => continue,
765 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
766 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
767 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
770 _ => panic!("Unhandled message event {:?}", event),
772 if push_a { ba_events.push(event); } else { bc_events.push(event); }
777 // While delivering messages, we select across three possible message selection processes
778 // to ensure we get as much coverage as possible. See the individual enum variants for more
781 enum ProcessMessages {
782 /// Deliver all available messages, including fetching any new messages from
783 /// `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` (which may have side effects).
785 /// Call `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` first, and then deliver up to one
786 /// message (which may already be queued).
788 /// Deliver up to one already-queued message. This avoids any potential side-effects
789 /// of `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` (eg freeing the HTLC holding cell), which
790 /// provides potentially more coverage.
794 macro_rules! process_msg_events {
795 ($node: expr, $corrupt_forward: expr, $limit_events: expr) => { {
796 let mut events = if $node == 1 {
797 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
798 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut ba_events);
799 new_events.extend_from_slice(&bc_events[..]);
802 } else if $node == 0 {
803 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
804 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut ab_events);
807 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
808 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut cb_events);
811 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
812 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage {
813 new_events = nodes[$node].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
815 let mut had_events = false;
816 let mut events_iter = events.drain(..).chain(new_events.drain(..));
817 let mut extra_ev = None;
818 for event in &mut events_iter {
821 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee, commitment_signed } } => {
822 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
823 if dest.get_our_node_id() == node_id {
824 for update_add in update_add_htlcs.iter() {
825 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_add_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
826 if !$corrupt_forward {
827 dest.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_add);
829 // Corrupt the update_add_htlc message so that its HMAC
830 // check will fail and we generate a
831 // update_fail_malformed_htlc instead of an
832 // update_fail_htlc as we do when we reject a payment.
833 let mut msg_ser = update_add.encode();
834 msg_ser[1000] ^= 0xff;
835 let new_msg = UpdateAddHTLC::read(&mut Cursor::new(&msg_ser)).unwrap();
836 dest.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &new_msg);
839 for update_fulfill in update_fulfill_htlcs.iter() {
840 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fulfill_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
841 dest.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fulfill);
843 for update_fail in update_fail_htlcs.iter() {
844 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fail_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
845 dest.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fail);
847 for update_fail_malformed in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.iter() {
848 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fail_malformed_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
849 dest.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fail_malformed);
851 if let Some(msg) = update_fee {
852 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fee to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
853 dest.handle_update_fee(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &msg);
855 let processed_change = !update_add_htlcs.is_empty() || !update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() ||
856 !update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() || !update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty();
857 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::AllMessages && processed_change {
858 // If we only want to process some messages, don't deliver the CS until later.
859 extra_ev = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: CommitmentUpdate {
860 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
861 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
862 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
863 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
869 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering commitment_signed to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
870 dest.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
875 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
876 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
877 if dest.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
878 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering revoke_and_ack to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
879 dest.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), msg);
883 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
884 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
885 if dest.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
886 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering channel_reestablish to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
887 dest.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), msg);
891 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => {
892 // Can be generated as a reestablish response
894 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {
895 // Can be generated as a reestablish response
897 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
898 // When we reconnect we will resend a channel_update to make sure our
899 // counterparty has the latest parameters for receiving payments
900 // through us. We do, however, check that the message does not include
901 // the "disabled" bit, as we should never ever have a channel which is
902 // disabled when we send such an update (or it may indicate channel
903 // force-close which we should detect as an error).
904 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0);
906 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
909 panic!("Unhandled message event {:?}", event)
912 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::AllMessages {
917 push_excess_b_events!(extra_ev.into_iter().chain(events_iter), None);
918 } else if $node == 0 {
919 if let Some(ev) = extra_ev { ab_events.push(ev); }
920 for event in events_iter { ab_events.push(event); }
922 if let Some(ev) = extra_ev { cb_events.push(ev); }
923 for event in events_iter { cb_events.push(event); }
929 macro_rules! drain_msg_events_on_disconnect {
930 ($counterparty_id: expr) => { {
931 if $counterparty_id == 0 {
932 for event in nodes[0].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
934 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
935 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => {},
936 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => {},
937 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => {},
938 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {},
939 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
940 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
942 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
945 panic!("Unhandled message event")
949 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(0));
953 for event in nodes[2].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
955 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
956 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => {},
957 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => {},
958 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => {},
959 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {},
960 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
961 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
963 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
966 panic!("Unhandled message event")
970 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(2));
977 macro_rules! process_events {
978 ($node: expr, $fail: expr) => { {
979 // In case we get 256 payments we may have a hash collision, resulting in the
980 // second claim/fail call not finding the duplicate-hash HTLC, so we have to
981 // deduplicate the calls here.
982 let mut claim_set = new_hash_map();
983 let mut events = nodes[$node].get_and_clear_pending_events();
984 // Sort events so that PendingHTLCsForwardable get processed last. This avoids a
985 // case where we first process a PendingHTLCsForwardable, then claim/fail on a
986 // PaymentClaimable, claiming/failing two HTLCs, but leaving a just-generated
987 // PaymentClaimable event for the second HTLC in our pending_events (and breaking
988 // our claim_set deduplication).
989 events.sort_by(|a, b| {
990 if let events::Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } = a {
991 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = b {
993 } else { Ordering::Equal }
994 } else if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = a {
995 if let events::Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } = b {
997 } else { Ordering::Equal }
998 } else { Ordering::Equal }
1000 let had_events = !events.is_empty();
1001 for event in events.drain(..) {
1003 events::Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, .. } => {
1004 if claim_set.insert(payment_hash.0, ()).is_none() {
1006 nodes[$node].fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
1008 nodes[$node].claim_funds(PaymentPreimage(payment_hash.0));
1012 events::Event::PaymentSent { .. } => {},
1013 events::Event::PaymentClaimed { .. } => {},
1014 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
1015 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } => {},
1016 events::Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {},
1017 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful { .. } | events::Event::ProbeFailed { .. } => {
1018 // Even though we don't explicitly send probes, because probes are
1019 // detected based on hashing the payment hash+preimage, its rather
1020 // trivial for the fuzzer to build payments that accidentally end up
1021 // looking like probes.
1023 events::Event::PaymentForwarded { .. } if $node == 1 => {},
1024 events::Event::ChannelReady { .. } => {},
1025 events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {
1026 nodes[$node].process_pending_htlc_forwards();
1028 events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => {},
1029 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
1032 panic!("Unhandled event")
1040 let v = get_slice!(1)[0];
1041 out.locked_write(format!("READ A BYTE! HANDLING INPUT {:x}...........\n", v).as_bytes());
1043 // In general, we keep related message groups close together in binary form, allowing
1044 // bit-twiddling mutations to have similar effects. This is probably overkill, but no
1045 // harm in doing so.
1047 0x00 => *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress,
1048 0x01 => *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress,
1049 0x02 => *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress,
1050 0x04 => *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed,
1051 0x05 => *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed,
1052 0x06 => *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed,
1055 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_a.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1056 monitor_a.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1057 nodes[0].process_monitor_events();
1061 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1062 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1063 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1067 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1068 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1069 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1073 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_c.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1074 monitor_c.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1075 nodes[2].process_monitor_events();
1080 if !chan_a_disconnected {
1081 nodes[0].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1082 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id());
1083 chan_a_disconnected = true;
1084 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(0);
1088 if !chan_b_disconnected {
1089 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id());
1090 nodes[2].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1091 chan_b_disconnected = true;
1092 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(2);
1096 if chan_a_disconnected {
1097 nodes[0].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1098 features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1100 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1101 features: nodes[0].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1103 chan_a_disconnected = false;
1107 if chan_b_disconnected {
1108 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1109 features: nodes[2].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1111 nodes[2].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1112 features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1114 chan_b_disconnected = false;
1118 0x10 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1119 0x11 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1120 0x12 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1121 0x13 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1122 0x14 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1123 0x15 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1125 0x16 => { process_events!(0, true); },
1126 0x17 => { process_events!(0, false); },
1128 0x18 => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1129 0x19 => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1130 0x1a => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1131 0x1b => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1132 0x1c => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1133 0x1d => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1135 0x1e => { process_events!(1, true); },
1136 0x1f => { process_events!(1, false); },
1138 0x20 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1139 0x21 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1140 0x22 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1141 0x23 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1142 0x24 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1143 0x25 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1145 0x26 => { process_events!(2, true); },
1146 0x27 => { process_events!(2, false); },
1149 if !chan_a_disconnected {
1150 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id());
1151 chan_a_disconnected = true;
1152 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(0));
1156 let (new_node_a, new_monitor_a) = reload_node!(node_a_ser, 0, monitor_a, keys_manager_a, fee_est_a);
1157 nodes[0] = new_node_a;
1158 monitor_a = new_monitor_a;
1161 if !chan_a_disconnected {
1162 nodes[0].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1163 chan_a_disconnected = true;
1164 nodes[0].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1168 if !chan_b_disconnected {
1169 nodes[2].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1170 chan_b_disconnected = true;
1171 nodes[2].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1175 let (new_node_b, new_monitor_b) = reload_node!(node_b_ser, 1, monitor_b, keys_manager_b, fee_est_b);
1176 nodes[1] = new_node_b;
1177 monitor_b = new_monitor_b;
1180 if !chan_b_disconnected {
1181 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id());
1182 chan_b_disconnected = true;
1183 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(2));
1187 let (new_node_c, new_monitor_c) = reload_node!(node_c_ser, 2, monitor_c, keys_manager_c, fee_est_c);
1188 nodes[2] = new_node_c;
1189 monitor_c = new_monitor_c;
1192 // 1/10th the channel size:
1193 0x30 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1194 0x31 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1195 0x32 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1196 0x33 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1197 0x34 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1198 0x35 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1200 0x38 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1201 0x39 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1202 0x3a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1203 0x3b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1204 0x3c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1205 0x3d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1207 0x40 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1208 0x41 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1209 0x42 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1210 0x43 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1211 0x44 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1212 0x45 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1214 0x48 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1215 0x49 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1216 0x4a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1217 0x4b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1218 0x4c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1219 0x4d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1221 0x50 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1222 0x51 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1223 0x52 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1224 0x53 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1225 0x54 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1226 0x55 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1228 0x58 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1229 0x59 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1230 0x5a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1231 0x5b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1232 0x5c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1233 0x5d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1235 0x60 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1236 0x61 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1237 0x62 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1238 0x63 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1239 0x64 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1240 0x65 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1242 0x68 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1243 0x69 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1244 0x6a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1245 0x6b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1246 0x6c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1247 0x6d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1250 let mut max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_a;
1252 max_feerate *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1254 if fee_est_a.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1255 fee_est_a.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1257 nodes[0].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1259 0x81 => { fee_est_a.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[0].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1262 let mut max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_b;
1264 max_feerate *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1266 if fee_est_b.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1267 fee_est_b.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1269 nodes[1].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1271 0x85 => { fee_est_b.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[1].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1274 let mut max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_c;
1276 max_feerate *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1278 if fee_est_c.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1279 fee_est_c.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1281 nodes[2].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1283 0x89 => { fee_est_c.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[2].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1286 let pending_updates = monitor_a.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_1_funding).unwrap();
1287 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.get(0) {
1288 monitor_a.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id).unwrap();
1290 nodes[0].process_monitor_events();
1293 let pending_updates = monitor_a.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_1_funding).unwrap();
1294 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.get(1) {
1295 monitor_a.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id).unwrap();
1297 nodes[0].process_monitor_events();
1300 let pending_updates = monitor_a.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_1_funding).unwrap();
1301 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.last() {
1302 monitor_a.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id).unwrap();
1304 nodes[0].process_monitor_events();
1308 let pending_updates = monitor_b.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_1_funding).unwrap();
1309 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.get(0) {
1310 monitor_b.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id).unwrap();
1312 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1315 let pending_updates = monitor_b.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_1_funding).unwrap();
1316 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.get(1) {
1317 monitor_b.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id).unwrap();
1319 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1322 let pending_updates = monitor_b.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_1_funding).unwrap();
1323 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.last() {
1324 monitor_b.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id).unwrap();
1326 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1330 let pending_updates = monitor_b.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_2_funding).unwrap();
1331 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.get(0) {
1332 monitor_b.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id).unwrap();
1334 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1337 let pending_updates = monitor_b.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_2_funding).unwrap();
1338 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.get(1) {
1339 monitor_b.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id).unwrap();
1341 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1344 let pending_updates = monitor_b.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_2_funding).unwrap();
1345 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.last() {
1346 monitor_b.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id).unwrap();
1348 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1352 let pending_updates = monitor_c.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_2_funding).unwrap();
1353 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.get(0) {
1354 monitor_c.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id).unwrap();
1356 nodes[2].process_monitor_events();
1359 let pending_updates = monitor_c.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_2_funding).unwrap();
1360 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.get(1) {
1361 monitor_c.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id).unwrap();
1363 nodes[2].process_monitor_events();
1366 let pending_updates = monitor_c.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_2_funding).unwrap();
1367 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.last() {
1368 monitor_c.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id).unwrap();
1370 nodes[2].process_monitor_events();
1374 // Test that no channel is in a stuck state where neither party can send funds even
1375 // after we resolve all pending events.
1376 // First make sure there are no pending monitor updates, resetting the error state
1377 // and calling force_channel_monitor_updated for each monitor.
1378 *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed;
1379 *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed;
1380 *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed;
1382 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_a.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1383 monitor_a.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1384 nodes[0].process_monitor_events();
1386 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1387 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1388 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1390 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1391 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1392 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1394 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_c.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1395 monitor_c.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1396 nodes[2].process_monitor_events();
1399 // Next, make sure peers are all connected to each other
1400 if chan_a_disconnected {
1401 nodes[0].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1402 features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1404 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1405 features: nodes[0].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1407 chan_a_disconnected = false;
1409 if chan_b_disconnected {
1410 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1411 features: nodes[2].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1413 nodes[2].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1414 features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1416 chan_b_disconnected = false;
1419 for i in 0..std::usize::MAX {
1420 if i == 100 { panic!("It may take may iterations to settle the state, but it should not take forever"); }
1421 // Then, make sure any current forwards make their way to their destination
1422 if process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1423 if process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1424 if process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1425 // ...making sure any pending PendingHTLCsForwardable events are handled and
1426 // payments claimed.
1427 if process_events!(0, false) { continue; }
1428 if process_events!(1, false) { continue; }
1429 if process_events!(2, false) { continue; }
1433 // Finally, make sure that at least one end of each channel can make a substantial payment
1435 send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx) ||
1436 send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx));
1438 send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx) ||
1439 send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx));
1441 last_htlc_clear_fee_a = fee_est_a.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1442 last_htlc_clear_fee_b = fee_est_b.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1443 last_htlc_clear_fee_c = fee_est_c.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1445 _ => test_return!(),
1448 if nodes[0].get_and_clear_needs_persistence() == true {
1449 node_a_ser.0.clear();
1450 nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
1452 if nodes[1].get_and_clear_needs_persistence() == true {
1453 node_b_ser.0.clear();
1454 nodes[1].write(&mut node_b_ser).unwrap();
1456 if nodes[2].get_and_clear_needs_persistence() == true {
1457 node_c_ser.0.clear();
1458 nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
1463 /// We actually have different behavior based on if a certain log string has been seen, so we have
1464 /// to do a bit more tracking.
1466 struct SearchingOutput<O: Output> {
1468 may_fail: Arc<atomic::AtomicBool>,
1470 impl<O: Output> Output for SearchingOutput<O> {
1471 fn locked_write(&self, data: &[u8]) {
1472 // We hit a design limitation of LN state machine (see CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER)
1473 if std::str::from_utf8(data).unwrap().contains("Outbound update_fee HTLC buffer overflow - counterparty should force-close this channel") {
1474 self.may_fail.store(true, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1476 self.output.locked_write(data)
1479 impl<O: Output> SearchingOutput<O> {
1480 pub fn new(output: O) -> Self {
1481 Self { output, may_fail: Arc::new(atomic::AtomicBool::new(false)) }
1485 pub fn chanmon_consistency_test<Out: Output>(data: &[u8], out: Out) {
1486 do_test(data, out.clone(), false);
1487 do_test(data, out, true);
1491 pub extern "C" fn chanmon_consistency_run(data: *const u8, datalen: usize) {
1492 do_test(unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(data, datalen) }, test_logger::DevNull{}, false);
1493 do_test(unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(data, datalen) }, test_logger::DevNull{}, true);