1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Test that monitor update failures don't get our channel state out of sync.
11 //! One of the biggest concern with the monitor update failure handling code is that messages
12 //! resent after monitor updating is restored are delivered out-of-order, resulting in
13 //! commitment_signed messages having "invalid signatures".
14 //! To test this we stand up a network of three nodes and read bytes from the fuzz input to denote
15 //! actions such as sending payments, handling events, or changing monitor update return values on
16 //! a per-node basis. This should allow it to find any cases where the ordering of actions results
17 //! in us getting out of sync with ourselves, and, assuming at least one of our recieve- or
18 //! send-side handling is correct, other peers. We consider it a failure if any action results in a
19 //! channel being force-closed.
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::PackedLockTime;
26 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash as TraitImport;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
34 use lightning::chain::{BestBlock, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, chainmonitor, channelmonitor, Confirm, Watch};
35 use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, MonitorEvent};
36 use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
37 use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
38 use lightning::sign::{KeyMaterial, InMemorySigner, Recipient, EntropySource, NodeSigner, SignerProvider};
39 use lightning::events;
40 use lightning::events::MessageSendEventsProvider;
41 use lightning::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
42 use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelDetails, ChannelManager, PaymentSendFailure, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
43 use lightning::ln::channel::FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
44 use lightning::ln::msgs::{self, CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, UpdateAddHTLC, Init};
45 use lightning::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
46 use lightning::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
47 use lightning::util::enforcing_trait_impls::{EnforcingSigner, EnforcementState};
48 use lightning::util::errors::APIError;
49 use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
50 use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
51 use lightning::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
52 use lightning::routing::router::{InFlightHtlcs, Path, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
54 use crate::utils::test_logger::{self, Output};
55 use crate::utils::test_persister::TestPersister;
57 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Message, PublicKey, SecretKey, Scalar, Secp256k1};
58 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
59 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::{RecoverableSignature, Signature};
62 use std::cmp::{self, Ordering};
63 use hashbrown::{HashSet, hash_map, HashMap};
64 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
65 use std::sync::atomic;
67 use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
69 const MAX_FEE: u32 = 10_000;
70 struct FuzzEstimator {
71 ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32,
73 impl FeeEstimator for FuzzEstimator {
74 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, conf_target: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
75 // We force-close channels if our counterparty sends us a feerate which is a small multiple
76 // of our HighPriority fee estimate or smaller than our Background fee estimate. Thus, we
77 // always return a HighPriority feerate here which is >= the maximum Normal feerate and a
78 // Background feerate which is <= the minimum Normal feerate.
80 ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority => MAX_FEE,
81 ConfirmationTarget::Background => 253,
82 ConfirmationTarget::Normal => cmp::min(self.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire), MAX_FEE),
89 impl Router for FuzzRouter {
91 &self, _payer: &PublicKey, _params: &RouteParameters, _first_hops: Option<&[&ChannelDetails]>,
92 _inflight_htlcs: &InFlightHtlcs
93 ) -> Result<Route, msgs::LightningError> {
94 Err(msgs::LightningError {
95 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
96 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
101 pub struct TestBroadcaster {}
102 impl BroadcasterInterface for TestBroadcaster {
103 fn broadcast_transaction(&self, _tx: &Transaction) { }
106 pub struct VecWriter(pub Vec<u8>);
107 impl Writer for VecWriter {
108 fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
109 self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
114 struct TestChainMonitor {
115 pub logger: Arc<dyn Logger>,
116 pub keys: Arc<KeyProvider>,
117 pub persister: Arc<TestPersister>,
118 pub chain_monitor: Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<EnforcingSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
119 // If we reload a node with an old copy of ChannelMonitors, the ChannelManager deserialization
120 // logic will automatically force-close our channels for us (as we don't have an up-to-date
121 // monitor implying we are not able to punish misbehaving counterparties). Because this test
122 // "fails" if we ever force-close a channel, we avoid doing so, always saving the latest
123 // fully-serialized monitor state here, as well as the corresponding update_id.
124 pub latest_monitors: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, (u64, Vec<u8>)>>,
125 pub should_update_manager: atomic::AtomicBool,
127 impl TestChainMonitor {
128 pub fn new(broadcaster: Arc<TestBroadcaster>, logger: Arc<dyn Logger>, feeest: Arc<FuzzEstimator>, persister: Arc<TestPersister>, keys: Arc<KeyProvider>) -> Self {
130 chain_monitor: Arc::new(chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::new(None, broadcaster, logger.clone(), feeest, Arc::clone(&persister))),
134 latest_monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
135 should_update_manager: atomic::AtomicBool::new(false),
139 impl chain::Watch<EnforcingSigner> for TestChainMonitor {
140 fn watch_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>) -> chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus {
141 let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
142 monitor.write(&mut ser).unwrap();
143 if let Some(_) = self.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().insert(funding_txo, (monitor.get_latest_update_id(), ser.0)) {
144 panic!("Already had monitor pre-watch_channel");
146 self.should_update_manager.store(true, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
147 self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_txo, monitor)
150 fn update_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: &channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus {
151 let mut map_lock = self.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap();
152 let mut map_entry = match map_lock.entry(funding_txo) {
153 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => entry,
154 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => panic!("Didn't have monitor on update call"),
156 let deserialized_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::
157 read(&mut Cursor::new(&map_entry.get().1), (&*self.keys, &*self.keys)).unwrap().1;
158 deserialized_monitor.update_monitor(update, &&TestBroadcaster{}, &FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) }, &self.logger).unwrap();
159 let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
160 deserialized_monitor.write(&mut ser).unwrap();
161 map_entry.insert((update.update_id, ser.0));
162 self.should_update_manager.store(true, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
163 self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update)
166 fn release_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<(OutPoint, Vec<MonitorEvent>, Option<PublicKey>)> {
167 return self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
172 node_secret: SecretKey,
173 rand_bytes_id: atomic::AtomicU32,
174 enforcement_states: Mutex<HashMap<[u8;32], Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>>>>,
177 impl EntropySource for KeyProvider {
178 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
179 let id = self.rand_bytes_id.fetch_add(1, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
180 let mut res = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 11, self.node_secret[31]];
181 res[30-4..30].copy_from_slice(&id.to_le_bytes());
186 impl NodeSigner for KeyProvider {
187 fn get_node_id(&self, recipient: Recipient) -> Result<PublicKey, ()> {
188 let node_secret = match recipient {
189 Recipient::Node => Ok(&self.node_secret),
190 Recipient::PhantomNode => Err(())
192 Ok(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), node_secret))
195 fn ecdh(&self, recipient: Recipient, other_key: &PublicKey, tweak: Option<&Scalar>) -> Result<SharedSecret, ()> {
196 let mut node_secret = match recipient {
197 Recipient::Node => Ok(self.node_secret.clone()),
198 Recipient::PhantomNode => Err(())
200 if let Some(tweak) = tweak {
201 node_secret = node_secret.mul_tweak(tweak).map_err(|_| ())?;
203 Ok(SharedSecret::new(other_key, &node_secret))
206 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial {
207 KeyMaterial([0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, self.node_secret[31]])
210 fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5], _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> {
214 fn sign_gossip_message(&self, msg: lightning::ln::msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
215 let msg_hash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]).map_err(|_| ())?;
216 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
217 Ok(secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msg_hash, &self.node_secret))
221 impl SignerProvider for KeyProvider {
222 type Signer = EnforcingSigner;
224 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
225 let id = self.rand_bytes_id.fetch_add(1, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed) as u8;
229 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
230 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
231 let id = channel_keys_id[0];
232 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
234 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
235 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
236 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
237 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
238 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
239 [id, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 9, self.node_secret[31]],
240 channel_value_satoshis,
244 let revoked_commitment = self.make_enforcement_state_cell(keys.commitment_seed);
245 EnforcingSigner::new_with_revoked(keys, revoked_commitment, false)
248 fn read_chan_signer(&self, buffer: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> {
249 let mut reader = std::io::Cursor::new(buffer);
251 let inner: InMemorySigner = ReadableArgs::read(&mut reader, self)?;
252 let state = self.make_enforcement_state_cell(inner.commitment_seed);
257 disable_revocation_policy_check: false,
261 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
262 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
263 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap();
264 let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
265 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
268 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
269 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
270 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap();
271 let pubkey_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &secret_key).serialize());
272 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh(&pubkey_hash))
277 fn make_enforcement_state_cell(&self, commitment_seed: [u8; 32]) -> Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>> {
278 let mut revoked_commitments = self.enforcement_states.lock().unwrap();
279 if !revoked_commitments.contains_key(&commitment_seed) {
280 revoked_commitments.insert(commitment_seed, Arc::new(Mutex::new(EnforcementState::new())));
282 let cell = revoked_commitments.get(&commitment_seed).unwrap();
288 fn check_api_err(api_err: APIError) {
290 APIError::APIMisuseError { .. } => panic!("We can't misuse the API"),
291 APIError::FeeRateTooHigh { .. } => panic!("We can't send too much fee?"),
292 APIError::InvalidRoute { .. } => panic!("Our routes should work"),
293 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err } => {
294 // Test the error against a list of errors we can hit, and reject
295 // all others. If you hit this panic, the list of acceptable errors
296 // is probably just stale and you should add new messages here.
298 "Peer for first hop currently disconnected" => {},
299 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ") => {},
300 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ") => {},
301 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value") => {},
302 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value") => {},
303 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds.") => {},
304 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees.") => {},
305 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at") => {},
306 _ => panic!("{}", err),
309 APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress => {
310 // We can (obviously) temp-fail a monitor update
312 APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { .. } => panic!("Cannot send an incompatible shutdown script"),
316 fn check_payment_err(send_err: PaymentSendFailure) {
318 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(api_err) => check_api_err(api_err),
319 PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(per_path_results) => {
320 for res in per_path_results { if let Err(api_err) = res { check_api_err(api_err); } }
322 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(per_path_results) => {
323 for api_err in per_path_results { check_api_err(api_err); }
325 PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure { results, .. } => {
326 for res in results { if let Err(api_err) = res { check_api_err(api_err); } }
328 PaymentSendFailure::DuplicatePayment => panic!(),
332 type ChanMan<'a> = ChannelManager<Arc<TestChainMonitor>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, &'a FuzzRouter, Arc<dyn Logger>>;
335 fn get_payment_secret_hash(dest: &ChanMan, payment_id: &mut u8) -> Option<(PaymentSecret, PaymentHash)> {
336 let mut payment_hash;
338 payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[*payment_id; 1]).into_inner());
339 if let Ok(payment_secret) = dest.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 3600, None) {
340 return Some((payment_secret, payment_hash));
342 *payment_id = payment_id.wrapping_add(1);
348 fn send_payment(source: &ChanMan, dest: &ChanMan, dest_chan_id: u64, amt: u64, payment_id: &mut u8, payment_idx: &mut u64) -> bool {
349 let (payment_secret, payment_hash) =
350 if let Some((secret, hash)) = get_payment_secret_hash(dest, payment_id) { (secret, hash) } else { return true; };
351 let mut payment_id = [0; 32];
352 payment_id[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_idx.to_ne_bytes());
354 if let Err(err) = source.send_payment_with_route(&Route {
355 paths: vec![Path { hops: vec![RouteHop {
356 pubkey: dest.get_our_node_id(),
357 node_features: dest.node_features(),
358 short_channel_id: dest_chan_id,
359 channel_features: dest.channel_features(),
361 cltv_expiry_delta: 200,
362 }], blinded_tail: None }],
363 payment_params: None,
364 }, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_id)) {
365 check_payment_err(err);
370 fn send_hop_payment(source: &ChanMan, middle: &ChanMan, middle_chan_id: u64, dest: &ChanMan, dest_chan_id: u64, amt: u64, payment_id: &mut u8, payment_idx: &mut u64) -> bool {
371 let (payment_secret, payment_hash) =
372 if let Some((secret, hash)) = get_payment_secret_hash(dest, payment_id) { (secret, hash) } else { return true; };
373 let mut payment_id = [0; 32];
374 payment_id[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_idx.to_ne_bytes());
376 if let Err(err) = source.send_payment_with_route(&Route {
377 paths: vec![Path { hops: vec![RouteHop {
378 pubkey: middle.get_our_node_id(),
379 node_features: middle.node_features(),
380 short_channel_id: middle_chan_id,
381 channel_features: middle.channel_features(),
383 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
385 pubkey: dest.get_our_node_id(),
386 node_features: dest.node_features(),
387 short_channel_id: dest_chan_id,
388 channel_features: dest.channel_features(),
390 cltv_expiry_delta: 200,
391 }], blinded_tail: None }],
392 payment_params: None,
393 }, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_id)) {
394 check_payment_err(err);
400 pub fn do_test<Out: Output>(data: &[u8], underlying_out: Out) {
401 let out = SearchingOutput::new(underlying_out);
402 let broadcast = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{});
403 let router = FuzzRouter {};
405 macro_rules! make_node {
406 ($node_id: expr, $fee_estimator: expr) => { {
407 let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new($node_id.to_string(), out.clone()));
408 let node_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, $node_id]).unwrap();
409 let keys_manager = Arc::new(KeyProvider { node_secret, rand_bytes_id: atomic::AtomicU32::new(0), enforcement_states: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()) });
410 let monitor = Arc::new(TestChainMonitor::new(broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), $fee_estimator.clone(),
411 Arc::new(TestPersister {
412 update_ret: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed)
413 }), Arc::clone(&keys_manager)));
415 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
416 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
417 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
418 let network = Network::Bitcoin;
419 let params = ChainParameters {
421 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
423 (ChannelManager::new($fee_estimator.clone(), monitor.clone(), broadcast.clone(), &router, Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), config, params),
424 monitor, keys_manager)
428 macro_rules! reload_node {
429 ($ser: expr, $node_id: expr, $old_monitors: expr, $keys_manager: expr, $fee_estimator: expr) => { {
430 let keys_manager = Arc::clone(& $keys_manager);
431 let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new($node_id.to_string(), out.clone()));
432 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(TestChainMonitor::new(broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), $fee_estimator.clone(),
433 Arc::new(TestPersister {
434 update_ret: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed)
435 }), Arc::clone(& $keys_manager)));
437 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
438 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
439 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
441 let mut monitors = HashMap::new();
442 let mut old_monitors = $old_monitors.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap();
443 for (outpoint, (update_id, monitor_ser)) in old_monitors.drain() {
444 monitors.insert(outpoint, <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&monitor_ser), (&*$keys_manager, &*$keys_manager)).expect("Failed to read monitor").1);
445 chain_monitor.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().insert(outpoint, (update_id, monitor_ser));
447 let mut monitor_refs = HashMap::new();
448 for (outpoint, monitor) in monitors.iter_mut() {
449 monitor_refs.insert(*outpoint, monitor);
452 let read_args = ChannelManagerReadArgs {
453 entropy_source: keys_manager.clone(),
454 node_signer: keys_manager.clone(),
455 signer_provider: keys_manager.clone(),
456 fee_estimator: $fee_estimator.clone(),
457 chain_monitor: chain_monitor.clone(),
458 tx_broadcaster: broadcast.clone(),
461 default_config: config,
462 channel_monitors: monitor_refs,
465 let res = (<(BlockHash, ChanMan)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&$ser.0), read_args).expect("Failed to read manager").1, chain_monitor.clone());
466 for (funding_txo, mon) in monitors.drain() {
467 assert_eq!(chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_txo, mon),
468 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
474 let mut channel_txn = Vec::new();
475 macro_rules! make_channel {
476 ($source: expr, $dest: expr, $chan_id: expr) => { {
477 $source.peer_connected(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: $dest.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
478 $dest.peer_connected(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: $source.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
480 $source.create_channel($dest.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42, 0, None).unwrap();
482 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
483 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
484 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
486 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
489 $dest.handle_open_channel(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
490 let accept_channel = {
491 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
492 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
493 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
495 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
498 $source.handle_accept_channel(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
501 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_events();
502 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
503 if let events::Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } = events[0] {
504 let tx = Transaction { version: $chan_id, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
505 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
507 funding_output = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
508 $source.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &$dest.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
509 channel_txn.push(tx);
510 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
513 let funding_created = {
514 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
515 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
516 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
518 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
520 $dest.handle_funding_created(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
522 let funding_signed = {
523 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
524 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
525 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
527 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
529 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_events();
530 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
531 if let events::Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } = events[0] {
532 assert_eq!(counterparty_node_id, &$source.get_our_node_id());
533 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
535 $source.handle_funding_signed(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
536 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_events();
537 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
538 if let events::Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } = events[0] {
539 assert_eq!(counterparty_node_id, &$dest.get_our_node_id());
540 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
546 macro_rules! confirm_txn {
548 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash();
549 let mut header = create_dummy_header(chain_hash, 42);
550 let txdata: Vec<_> = channel_txn.iter().enumerate().map(|(i, tx)| (i + 1, tx)).collect();
551 $node.transactions_confirmed(&header, &txdata, 1);
553 header = create_dummy_header(header.block_hash(), 42);
555 $node.best_block_updated(&header, 99);
559 macro_rules! lock_fundings {
560 ($nodes: expr) => { {
561 let mut node_events = Vec::new();
562 for node in $nodes.iter() {
563 node_events.push(node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events());
565 for (idx, node_event) in node_events.iter().enumerate() {
566 for event in node_event {
567 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } = event {
568 for node in $nodes.iter() {
569 if node.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
570 node.handle_channel_ready(&$nodes[idx].get_our_node_id(), msg);
573 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
577 for node in $nodes.iter() {
578 let events = node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
579 for event in events {
580 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = event {
581 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
587 let fee_est_a = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
588 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_a = 253;
589 let fee_est_b = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
590 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_b = 253;
591 let fee_est_c = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
592 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_c = 253;
594 // 3 nodes is enough to hit all the possible cases, notably unknown-source-unknown-dest
596 let (node_a, mut monitor_a, keys_manager_a) = make_node!(0, fee_est_a);
597 let (node_b, mut monitor_b, keys_manager_b) = make_node!(1, fee_est_b);
598 let (node_c, mut monitor_c, keys_manager_c) = make_node!(2, fee_est_c);
600 let mut nodes = [node_a, node_b, node_c];
602 let chan_1_funding = make_channel!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 0);
603 let chan_2_funding = make_channel!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1);
605 for node in nodes.iter() {
609 lock_fundings!(nodes);
611 let chan_a = nodes[0].list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap();
612 let chan_b = nodes[2].list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap();
614 let mut payment_id: u8 = 0;
615 let mut payment_idx: u64 = 0;
617 let mut chan_a_disconnected = false;
618 let mut chan_b_disconnected = false;
619 let mut ab_events = Vec::new();
620 let mut ba_events = Vec::new();
621 let mut bc_events = Vec::new();
622 let mut cb_events = Vec::new();
624 let mut node_a_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
625 nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
626 let mut node_b_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
627 nodes[1].write(&mut node_b_ser).unwrap();
628 let mut node_c_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
629 nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
631 macro_rules! test_return {
633 assert_eq!(nodes[0].list_channels().len(), 1);
634 assert_eq!(nodes[1].list_channels().len(), 2);
635 assert_eq!(nodes[2].list_channels().len(), 1);
640 let mut read_pos = 0;
641 macro_rules! get_slice {
644 let slice_len = $len as usize;
645 if data.len() < read_pos + slice_len {
648 read_pos += slice_len;
649 &data[read_pos - slice_len..read_pos]
655 // Push any events from Node B onto ba_events and bc_events
656 macro_rules! push_excess_b_events {
657 ($excess_events: expr, $expect_drop_node: expr) => { {
658 let a_id = nodes[0].get_our_node_id();
659 let expect_drop_node: Option<usize> = $expect_drop_node;
660 let expect_drop_id = if let Some(id) = expect_drop_node { Some(nodes[id].get_our_node_id()) } else { None };
661 for event in $excess_events {
662 let push_a = match event {
663 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
664 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
667 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => {
668 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
671 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => {
672 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
675 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => continue,
676 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => continue,
677 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
678 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
679 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
682 _ => panic!("Unhandled message event {:?}", event),
684 if push_a { ba_events.push(event); } else { bc_events.push(event); }
689 // While delivering messages, we select across three possible message selection processes
690 // to ensure we get as much coverage as possible. See the individual enum variants for more
693 enum ProcessMessages {
694 /// Deliver all available messages, including fetching any new messages from
695 /// `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` (which may have side effects).
697 /// Call `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` first, and then deliver up to one
698 /// message (which may already be queued).
700 /// Deliver up to one already-queued message. This avoids any potential side-effects
701 /// of `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` (eg freeing the HTLC holding cell), which
702 /// provides potentially more coverage.
706 macro_rules! process_msg_events {
707 ($node: expr, $corrupt_forward: expr, $limit_events: expr) => { {
708 let mut events = if $node == 1 {
709 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
710 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut ba_events);
711 new_events.extend_from_slice(&bc_events[..]);
714 } else if $node == 0 {
715 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
716 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut ab_events);
719 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
720 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut cb_events);
723 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
724 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage {
725 new_events = nodes[$node].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
727 let mut had_events = false;
728 let mut events_iter = events.drain(..).chain(new_events.drain(..));
729 let mut extra_ev = None;
730 for event in &mut events_iter {
733 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee, commitment_signed } } => {
734 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
735 if dest.get_our_node_id() == node_id {
736 for update_add in update_add_htlcs.iter() {
737 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_add_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
738 if !$corrupt_forward {
739 dest.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_add);
741 // Corrupt the update_add_htlc message so that its HMAC
742 // check will fail and we generate a
743 // update_fail_malformed_htlc instead of an
744 // update_fail_htlc as we do when we reject a payment.
745 let mut msg_ser = update_add.encode();
746 msg_ser[1000] ^= 0xff;
747 let new_msg = UpdateAddHTLC::read(&mut Cursor::new(&msg_ser)).unwrap();
748 dest.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &new_msg);
751 for update_fulfill in update_fulfill_htlcs.iter() {
752 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fulfill_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
753 dest.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fulfill);
755 for update_fail in update_fail_htlcs.iter() {
756 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fail_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
757 dest.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fail);
759 for update_fail_malformed in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.iter() {
760 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fail_malformed_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
761 dest.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fail_malformed);
763 if let Some(msg) = update_fee {
764 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fee to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
765 dest.handle_update_fee(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &msg);
767 let processed_change = !update_add_htlcs.is_empty() || !update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() ||
768 !update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() || !update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty();
769 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::AllMessages && processed_change {
770 // If we only want to process some messages, don't deliver the CS until later.
771 extra_ev = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: CommitmentUpdate {
772 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
773 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
774 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
775 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
781 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering commitment_signed to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
782 dest.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
787 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
788 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
789 if dest.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
790 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering revoke_and_ack to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
791 dest.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), msg);
795 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
796 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
797 if dest.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
798 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering channel_reestablish to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
799 dest.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), msg);
803 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => {
804 // Can be generated as a reestablish response
806 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {
807 // Can be generated as a reestablish response
809 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
810 // When we reconnect we will resend a channel_update to make sure our
811 // counterparty has the latest parameters for receiving payments
812 // through us. We do, however, check that the message does not include
813 // the "disabled" bit, as we should never ever have a channel which is
814 // disabled when we send such an update (or it may indicate channel
815 // force-close which we should detect as an error).
816 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0);
818 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
821 panic!("Unhandled message event {:?}", event)
824 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::AllMessages {
829 push_excess_b_events!(extra_ev.into_iter().chain(events_iter), None);
830 } else if $node == 0 {
831 if let Some(ev) = extra_ev { ab_events.push(ev); }
832 for event in events_iter { ab_events.push(event); }
834 if let Some(ev) = extra_ev { cb_events.push(ev); }
835 for event in events_iter { cb_events.push(event); }
841 macro_rules! drain_msg_events_on_disconnect {
842 ($counterparty_id: expr) => { {
843 if $counterparty_id == 0 {
844 for event in nodes[0].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
846 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
847 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => {},
848 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => {},
849 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => {},
850 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {},
851 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
852 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
854 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
857 panic!("Unhandled message event")
861 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(0));
865 for event in nodes[2].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
867 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
868 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => {},
869 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => {},
870 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => {},
871 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {},
872 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
873 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
875 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
878 panic!("Unhandled message event")
882 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(2));
889 macro_rules! process_events {
890 ($node: expr, $fail: expr) => { {
891 // In case we get 256 payments we may have a hash collision, resulting in the
892 // second claim/fail call not finding the duplicate-hash HTLC, so we have to
893 // deduplicate the calls here.
894 let mut claim_set = HashSet::new();
895 let mut events = nodes[$node].get_and_clear_pending_events();
896 // Sort events so that PendingHTLCsForwardable get processed last. This avoids a
897 // case where we first process a PendingHTLCsForwardable, then claim/fail on a
898 // PaymentClaimable, claiming/failing two HTLCs, but leaving a just-generated
899 // PaymentClaimable event for the second HTLC in our pending_events (and breaking
900 // our claim_set deduplication).
901 events.sort_by(|a, b| {
902 if let events::Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } = a {
903 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = b {
905 } else { Ordering::Equal }
906 } else if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = a {
907 if let events::Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } = b {
909 } else { Ordering::Equal }
910 } else { Ordering::Equal }
912 let had_events = !events.is_empty();
913 for event in events.drain(..) {
915 events::Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, .. } => {
916 if claim_set.insert(payment_hash.0) {
918 nodes[$node].fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
920 nodes[$node].claim_funds(PaymentPreimage(payment_hash.0));
924 events::Event::PaymentSent { .. } => {},
925 events::Event::PaymentClaimed { .. } => {},
926 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
927 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } => {},
928 events::Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {},
929 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful { .. } | events::Event::ProbeFailed { .. } => {
930 // Even though we don't explicitly send probes, because probes are
931 // detected based on hashing the payment hash+preimage, its rather
932 // trivial for the fuzzer to build payments that accidentally end up
933 // looking like probes.
935 events::Event::PaymentForwarded { .. } if $node == 1 => {},
936 events::Event::ChannelReady { .. } => {},
937 events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {
938 nodes[$node].process_pending_htlc_forwards();
940 events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => {},
941 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
944 panic!("Unhandled event")
952 let v = get_slice!(1)[0];
953 out.locked_write(format!("READ A BYTE! HANDLING INPUT {:x}...........\n", v).as_bytes());
955 // In general, we keep related message groups close together in binary form, allowing
956 // bit-twiddling mutations to have similar effects. This is probably overkill, but no
959 0x00 => *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress,
960 0x01 => *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress,
961 0x02 => *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress,
962 0x04 => *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed,
963 0x05 => *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed,
964 0x06 => *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed,
967 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_a.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
968 monitor_a.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
969 nodes[0].process_monitor_events();
973 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
974 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
975 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
979 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
980 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
981 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
985 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_c.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
986 monitor_c.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
987 nodes[2].process_monitor_events();
992 if !chan_a_disconnected {
993 nodes[0].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
994 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id());
995 chan_a_disconnected = true;
996 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(0);
1000 if !chan_b_disconnected {
1001 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id());
1002 nodes[2].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1003 chan_b_disconnected = true;
1004 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(2);
1008 if chan_a_disconnected {
1009 nodes[0].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: nodes[1].init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
1010 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: nodes[0].init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
1011 chan_a_disconnected = false;
1015 if chan_b_disconnected {
1016 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: nodes[2].init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
1017 nodes[2].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: nodes[1].init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
1018 chan_b_disconnected = false;
1022 0x10 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1023 0x11 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1024 0x12 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1025 0x13 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1026 0x14 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1027 0x15 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1029 0x16 => { process_events!(0, true); },
1030 0x17 => { process_events!(0, false); },
1032 0x18 => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1033 0x19 => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1034 0x1a => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1035 0x1b => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1036 0x1c => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1037 0x1d => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1039 0x1e => { process_events!(1, true); },
1040 0x1f => { process_events!(1, false); },
1042 0x20 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1043 0x21 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1044 0x22 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1045 0x23 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1046 0x24 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1047 0x25 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1049 0x26 => { process_events!(2, true); },
1050 0x27 => { process_events!(2, false); },
1053 if !chan_a_disconnected {
1054 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id());
1055 chan_a_disconnected = true;
1056 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(0);
1058 if monitor_a.should_update_manager.load(atomic::Ordering::Relaxed) {
1059 node_a_ser.0.clear();
1060 nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
1062 let (new_node_a, new_monitor_a) = reload_node!(node_a_ser, 0, monitor_a, keys_manager_a, fee_est_a);
1063 nodes[0] = new_node_a;
1064 monitor_a = new_monitor_a;
1067 if !chan_a_disconnected {
1068 nodes[0].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1069 chan_a_disconnected = true;
1070 nodes[0].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1074 if !chan_b_disconnected {
1075 nodes[2].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1076 chan_b_disconnected = true;
1077 nodes[2].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1081 let (new_node_b, new_monitor_b) = reload_node!(node_b_ser, 1, monitor_b, keys_manager_b, fee_est_b);
1082 nodes[1] = new_node_b;
1083 monitor_b = new_monitor_b;
1086 if !chan_b_disconnected {
1087 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id());
1088 chan_b_disconnected = true;
1089 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(2);
1091 if monitor_c.should_update_manager.load(atomic::Ordering::Relaxed) {
1092 node_c_ser.0.clear();
1093 nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
1095 let (new_node_c, new_monitor_c) = reload_node!(node_c_ser, 2, monitor_c, keys_manager_c, fee_est_c);
1096 nodes[2] = new_node_c;
1097 monitor_c = new_monitor_c;
1100 // 1/10th the channel size:
1101 0x30 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1102 0x31 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1103 0x32 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1104 0x33 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1105 0x34 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1106 0x35 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1108 0x38 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1109 0x39 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1110 0x3a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1111 0x3b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1112 0x3c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1113 0x3d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1115 0x40 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1116 0x41 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1117 0x42 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1118 0x43 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1119 0x44 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1120 0x45 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1122 0x48 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1123 0x49 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1124 0x4a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1125 0x4b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1126 0x4c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1127 0x4d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1129 0x50 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1130 0x51 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1131 0x52 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1132 0x53 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1133 0x54 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1134 0x55 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1136 0x58 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1137 0x59 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1138 0x5a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1139 0x5b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1140 0x5c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1141 0x5d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1143 0x60 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1144 0x61 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1145 0x62 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1146 0x63 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1147 0x64 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1148 0x65 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1150 0x68 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1151 0x69 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1152 0x6a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1153 0x6b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1154 0x6c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1155 0x6d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1158 let max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_a * FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1159 if fee_est_a.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1160 fee_est_a.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1162 nodes[0].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1164 0x81 => { fee_est_a.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[0].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1167 let max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_b * FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1168 if fee_est_b.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1169 fee_est_b.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1171 nodes[1].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1173 0x85 => { fee_est_b.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[1].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1176 let max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_c * FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1177 if fee_est_c.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1178 fee_est_c.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1180 nodes[2].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1182 0x89 => { fee_est_c.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[2].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1185 // Test that no channel is in a stuck state where neither party can send funds even
1186 // after we resolve all pending events.
1187 // First make sure there are no pending monitor updates, resetting the error state
1188 // and calling force_channel_monitor_updated for each monitor.
1189 *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed;
1190 *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed;
1191 *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed;
1193 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_a.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1194 monitor_a.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1195 nodes[0].process_monitor_events();
1197 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1198 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1199 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1201 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1202 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1203 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1205 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_c.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1206 monitor_c.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1207 nodes[2].process_monitor_events();
1210 // Next, make sure peers are all connected to each other
1211 if chan_a_disconnected {
1212 nodes[0].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: nodes[1].init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
1213 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: nodes[0].init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
1214 chan_a_disconnected = false;
1216 if chan_b_disconnected {
1217 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: nodes[2].init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
1218 nodes[2].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: nodes[1].init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
1219 chan_b_disconnected = false;
1222 for i in 0..std::usize::MAX {
1223 if i == 100 { panic!("It may take may iterations to settle the state, but it should not take forever"); }
1224 // Then, make sure any current forwards make their way to their destination
1225 if process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1226 if process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1227 if process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1228 // ...making sure any pending PendingHTLCsForwardable events are handled and
1229 // payments claimed.
1230 if process_events!(0, false) { continue; }
1231 if process_events!(1, false) { continue; }
1232 if process_events!(2, false) { continue; }
1236 // Finally, make sure that at least one end of each channel can make a substantial payment
1238 send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx) ||
1239 send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx));
1241 send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx) ||
1242 send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx));
1244 last_htlc_clear_fee_a = fee_est_a.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1245 last_htlc_clear_fee_b = fee_est_b.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1246 last_htlc_clear_fee_c = fee_est_c.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1248 _ => test_return!(),
1251 node_a_ser.0.clear();
1252 nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
1253 monitor_a.should_update_manager.store(false, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
1254 node_b_ser.0.clear();
1255 nodes[1].write(&mut node_b_ser).unwrap();
1256 monitor_b.should_update_manager.store(false, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
1257 node_c_ser.0.clear();
1258 nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
1259 monitor_c.should_update_manager.store(false, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
1263 /// We actually have different behavior based on if a certain log string has been seen, so we have
1264 /// to do a bit more tracking.
1266 struct SearchingOutput<O: Output> {
1268 may_fail: Arc<atomic::AtomicBool>,
1270 impl<O: Output> Output for SearchingOutput<O> {
1271 fn locked_write(&self, data: &[u8]) {
1272 // We hit a design limitation of LN state machine (see CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER)
1273 if std::str::from_utf8(data).unwrap().contains("Outbound update_fee HTLC buffer overflow - counterparty should force-close this channel") {
1274 self.may_fail.store(true, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1276 self.output.locked_write(data)
1279 impl<O: Output> SearchingOutput<O> {
1280 pub fn new(output: O) -> Self {
1281 Self { output, may_fail: Arc::new(atomic::AtomicBool::new(false)) }
1285 pub fn chanmon_consistency_test<Out: Output>(data: &[u8], out: Out) {
1290 pub extern "C" fn chanmon_consistency_run(data: *const u8, datalen: usize) {
1291 do_test(unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(data, datalen) }, test_logger::DevNull{});