1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Test that monitor update failures don't get our channel state out of sync.
11 //! One of the biggest concern with the monitor update failure handling code is that messages
12 //! resent after monitor updating is restored are delivered out-of-order, resulting in
13 //! commitment_signed messages having "invalid signatures".
14 //! To test this we stand up a network of three nodes and read bytes from the fuzz input to denote
15 //! actions such as sending payments, handling events, or changing monitor update return values on
16 //! a per-node basis. This should allow it to find any cases where the ordering of actions results
17 //! in us getting out of sync with ourselves, and, assuming at least one of our recieve- or
18 //! send-side handling is correct, other peers. We consider it a failure if any action results in a
19 //! channel being force-closed.
21 use bitcoin::TxMerkleNode;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
26 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
27 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::PackedLockTime;
28 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash as TraitImport;
31 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
32 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
35 use lightning::chain::{BestBlock, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, chainmonitor, channelmonitor, Confirm, Watch};
36 use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, MonitorEvent};
37 use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
38 use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
39 use lightning::chain::keysinterface::{KeyMaterial, InMemorySigner, Recipient, EntropySource, NodeSigner, SignerProvider};
40 use lightning::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
41 use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelDetails, ChannelManager, PaymentSendFailure, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId};
42 use lightning::ln::channel::FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
43 use lightning::ln::msgs::{self, CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, UpdateAddHTLC, Init};
44 use lightning::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
45 use lightning::util::enforcing_trait_impls::{EnforcingSigner, EnforcementState};
46 use lightning::util::errors::APIError;
47 use lightning::util::events;
48 use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
49 use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
50 use lightning::util::events::MessageSendEventsProvider;
51 use lightning::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
52 use lightning::routing::router::{InFlightHtlcs, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
54 use crate::utils::test_logger::{self, Output};
55 use crate::utils::test_persister::TestPersister;
57 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey, Scalar};
58 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
59 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::RecoverableSignature;
60 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
63 use std::cmp::{self, Ordering};
64 use std::collections::{HashSet, hash_map, HashMap};
65 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
66 use std::sync::atomic;
68 use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
70 const MAX_FEE: u32 = 10_000;
71 struct FuzzEstimator {
72 ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32,
74 impl FeeEstimator for FuzzEstimator {
75 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, conf_target: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
76 // We force-close channels if our counterparty sends us a feerate which is a small multiple
77 // of our HighPriority fee estimate or smaller than our Background fee estimate. Thus, we
78 // always return a HighPriority feerate here which is >= the maximum Normal feerate and a
79 // Background feerate which is <= the minimum Normal feerate.
81 ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority => MAX_FEE,
82 ConfirmationTarget::Background => 253,
83 ConfirmationTarget::Normal => cmp::min(self.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire), MAX_FEE),
90 impl Router for FuzzRouter {
92 &self, _payer: &PublicKey, _params: &RouteParameters, _first_hops: Option<&[&ChannelDetails]>,
93 _inflight_htlcs: &InFlightHtlcs
94 ) -> Result<Route, msgs::LightningError> {
95 Err(msgs::LightningError {
96 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
97 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
100 fn notify_payment_path_failed(&self, _path: &[&RouteHop], _short_channel_id: u64) {}
101 fn notify_payment_path_successful(&self, _path: &[&RouteHop]) {}
102 fn notify_payment_probe_successful(&self, _path: &[&RouteHop]) {}
103 fn notify_payment_probe_failed(&self, _path: &[&RouteHop], _short_channel_id: u64) {}
106 pub struct TestBroadcaster {}
107 impl BroadcasterInterface for TestBroadcaster {
108 fn broadcast_transaction(&self, _tx: &Transaction) { }
111 pub struct VecWriter(pub Vec<u8>);
112 impl Writer for VecWriter {
113 fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
114 self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
119 struct TestChainMonitor {
120 pub logger: Arc<dyn Logger>,
121 pub keys: Arc<KeyProvider>,
122 pub persister: Arc<TestPersister>,
123 pub chain_monitor: Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<EnforcingSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
124 // If we reload a node with an old copy of ChannelMonitors, the ChannelManager deserialization
125 // logic will automatically force-close our channels for us (as we don't have an up-to-date
126 // monitor implying we are not able to punish misbehaving counterparties). Because this test
127 // "fails" if we ever force-close a channel, we avoid doing so, always saving the latest
128 // fully-serialized monitor state here, as well as the corresponding update_id.
129 pub latest_monitors: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, (u64, Vec<u8>)>>,
130 pub should_update_manager: atomic::AtomicBool,
132 impl TestChainMonitor {
133 pub fn new(broadcaster: Arc<TestBroadcaster>, logger: Arc<dyn Logger>, feeest: Arc<FuzzEstimator>, persister: Arc<TestPersister>, keys: Arc<KeyProvider>) -> Self {
135 chain_monitor: Arc::new(chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::new(None, broadcaster, logger.clone(), feeest, Arc::clone(&persister))),
139 latest_monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
140 should_update_manager: atomic::AtomicBool::new(false),
144 impl chain::Watch<EnforcingSigner> for TestChainMonitor {
145 fn watch_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>) -> chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus {
146 let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
147 monitor.write(&mut ser).unwrap();
148 if let Some(_) = self.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().insert(funding_txo, (monitor.get_latest_update_id(), ser.0)) {
149 panic!("Already had monitor pre-watch_channel");
151 self.should_update_manager.store(true, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
152 self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_txo, monitor)
155 fn update_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus {
156 let mut map_lock = self.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap();
157 let mut map_entry = match map_lock.entry(funding_txo) {
158 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => entry,
159 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => panic!("Didn't have monitor on update call"),
161 let deserialized_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::
162 read(&mut Cursor::new(&map_entry.get().1), (&*self.keys, &*self.keys)).unwrap().1;
163 deserialized_monitor.update_monitor(&update, &&TestBroadcaster{}, &FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) }, &self.logger).unwrap();
164 let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
165 deserialized_monitor.write(&mut ser).unwrap();
166 map_entry.insert((update.update_id, ser.0));
167 self.should_update_manager.store(true, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
168 self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update)
171 fn release_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<(OutPoint, Vec<MonitorEvent>, Option<PublicKey>)> {
172 return self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
178 rand_bytes_id: atomic::AtomicU32,
179 enforcement_states: Mutex<HashMap<[u8;32], Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>>>>,
182 impl EntropySource for KeyProvider {
183 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
184 let id = self.rand_bytes_id.fetch_add(1, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
185 let mut res = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 11, self.node_id];
186 res[30-4..30].copy_from_slice(&id.to_le_bytes());
191 impl NodeSigner for KeyProvider {
192 fn get_node_secret(&self, _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<SecretKey, ()> {
193 Ok(SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, self.node_id]).unwrap())
196 fn get_node_id(&self, recipient: Recipient) -> Result<PublicKey, ()> {
197 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
198 Ok(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &self.get_node_secret(recipient)?))
201 fn ecdh(&self, recipient: Recipient, other_key: &PublicKey, tweak: Option<&Scalar>) -> Result<SharedSecret, ()> {
202 let mut node_secret = self.get_node_secret(recipient)?;
203 if let Some(tweak) = tweak {
204 node_secret = node_secret.mul_tweak(tweak).unwrap();
206 Ok(SharedSecret::new(other_key, &node_secret))
209 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial {
210 KeyMaterial([0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, self.node_id])
213 fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5], _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> {
218 impl SignerProvider for KeyProvider {
219 type Signer = EnforcingSigner;
221 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
222 let id = self.rand_bytes_id.fetch_add(1, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed) as u8;
226 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
227 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
228 let id = channel_keys_id[0];
229 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
231 self.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
232 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, self.node_id]).unwrap(),
233 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, self.node_id]).unwrap(),
234 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, self.node_id]).unwrap(),
235 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, self.node_id]).unwrap(),
236 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8, self.node_id]).unwrap(),
237 [id, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 9, self.node_id],
238 channel_value_satoshis,
241 let revoked_commitment = self.make_enforcement_state_cell(keys.commitment_seed);
242 EnforcingSigner::new_with_revoked(keys, revoked_commitment, false)
245 fn read_chan_signer(&self, buffer: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> {
246 let mut reader = std::io::Cursor::new(buffer);
248 let inner: InMemorySigner = ReadableArgs::read(&mut reader, self.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap())?;
249 let state = self.make_enforcement_state_cell(inner.commitment_seed);
254 disable_revocation_policy_check: false,
258 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
259 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
260 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, self.node_id]).unwrap();
261 let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
262 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
265 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
266 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
267 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, self.node_id]).unwrap();
268 let pubkey_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &secret_key).serialize());
269 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh(&pubkey_hash)
274 fn make_enforcement_state_cell(&self, commitment_seed: [u8; 32]) -> Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>> {
275 let mut revoked_commitments = self.enforcement_states.lock().unwrap();
276 if !revoked_commitments.contains_key(&commitment_seed) {
277 revoked_commitments.insert(commitment_seed, Arc::new(Mutex::new(EnforcementState::new())));
279 let cell = revoked_commitments.get(&commitment_seed).unwrap();
285 fn check_api_err(api_err: APIError) {
287 APIError::APIMisuseError { .. } => panic!("We can't misuse the API"),
288 APIError::FeeRateTooHigh { .. } => panic!("We can't send too much fee?"),
289 APIError::InvalidRoute { .. } => panic!("Our routes should work"),
290 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err } => {
291 // Test the error against a list of errors we can hit, and reject
292 // all others. If you hit this panic, the list of acceptable errors
293 // is probably just stale and you should add new messages here.
295 "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!" => {},
296 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ") => {},
297 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ") => {},
298 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value") => {},
299 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value") => {},
300 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds.") => {},
301 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees.") => {},
302 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at") => {},
303 _ => panic!("{}", err),
306 APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress => {
307 // We can (obviously) temp-fail a monitor update
309 APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { .. } => panic!("Cannot send an incompatible shutdown script"),
313 fn check_payment_err(send_err: PaymentSendFailure) {
315 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(api_err) => check_api_err(api_err),
316 PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(per_path_results) => {
317 for res in per_path_results { if let Err(api_err) = res { check_api_err(api_err); } }
319 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(per_path_results) => {
320 for api_err in per_path_results { check_api_err(api_err); }
322 PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure { results, .. } => {
323 for res in results { if let Err(api_err) = res { check_api_err(api_err); } }
325 PaymentSendFailure::DuplicatePayment => panic!(),
329 type ChanMan<'a> = ChannelManager<Arc<TestChainMonitor>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, &'a FuzzRouter, Arc<dyn Logger>>;
332 fn get_payment_secret_hash(dest: &ChanMan, payment_id: &mut u8) -> Option<(PaymentSecret, PaymentHash)> {
333 let mut payment_hash;
335 payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[*payment_id; 1]).into_inner());
336 if let Ok(payment_secret) = dest.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 3600) {
337 return Some((payment_secret, payment_hash));
339 *payment_id = payment_id.wrapping_add(1);
345 fn send_payment(source: &ChanMan, dest: &ChanMan, dest_chan_id: u64, amt: u64, payment_id: &mut u8, payment_idx: &mut u64) -> bool {
346 let (payment_secret, payment_hash) =
347 if let Some((secret, hash)) = get_payment_secret_hash(dest, payment_id) { (secret, hash) } else { return true; };
348 let mut payment_id = [0; 32];
349 payment_id[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_idx.to_ne_bytes());
351 if let Err(err) = source.send_payment(&Route {
352 paths: vec![vec![RouteHop {
353 pubkey: dest.get_our_node_id(),
354 node_features: dest.node_features(),
355 short_channel_id: dest_chan_id,
356 channel_features: dest.channel_features(),
358 cltv_expiry_delta: 200,
360 payment_params: None,
361 }, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_id)) {
362 check_payment_err(err);
367 fn send_hop_payment(source: &ChanMan, middle: &ChanMan, middle_chan_id: u64, dest: &ChanMan, dest_chan_id: u64, amt: u64, payment_id: &mut u8, payment_idx: &mut u64) -> bool {
368 let (payment_secret, payment_hash) =
369 if let Some((secret, hash)) = get_payment_secret_hash(dest, payment_id) { (secret, hash) } else { return true; };
370 let mut payment_id = [0; 32];
371 payment_id[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_idx.to_ne_bytes());
373 if let Err(err) = source.send_payment(&Route {
374 paths: vec![vec![RouteHop {
375 pubkey: middle.get_our_node_id(),
376 node_features: middle.node_features(),
377 short_channel_id: middle_chan_id,
378 channel_features: middle.channel_features(),
380 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
382 pubkey: dest.get_our_node_id(),
383 node_features: dest.node_features(),
384 short_channel_id: dest_chan_id,
385 channel_features: dest.channel_features(),
387 cltv_expiry_delta: 200,
389 payment_params: None,
390 }, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_id)) {
391 check_payment_err(err);
397 pub fn do_test<Out: Output>(data: &[u8], underlying_out: Out) {
398 let out = SearchingOutput::new(underlying_out);
399 let broadcast = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{});
400 let router = FuzzRouter {};
402 macro_rules! make_node {
403 ($node_id: expr, $fee_estimator: expr) => { {
404 let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new($node_id.to_string(), out.clone()));
405 let keys_manager = Arc::new(KeyProvider { node_id: $node_id, rand_bytes_id: atomic::AtomicU32::new(0), enforcement_states: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()) });
406 let monitor = Arc::new(TestChainMonitor::new(broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), $fee_estimator.clone(),
407 Arc::new(TestPersister {
408 update_ret: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed)
409 }), Arc::clone(&keys_manager)));
411 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
412 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
413 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
414 let network = Network::Bitcoin;
415 let params = ChainParameters {
417 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
419 (ChannelManager::new($fee_estimator.clone(), monitor.clone(), broadcast.clone(), &router, Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), config, params),
420 monitor, keys_manager)
424 macro_rules! reload_node {
425 ($ser: expr, $node_id: expr, $old_monitors: expr, $keys_manager: expr, $fee_estimator: expr) => { {
426 let keys_manager = Arc::clone(& $keys_manager);
427 let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new($node_id.to_string(), out.clone()));
428 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(TestChainMonitor::new(broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), $fee_estimator.clone(),
429 Arc::new(TestPersister {
430 update_ret: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed)
431 }), Arc::clone(& $keys_manager)));
433 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
434 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
435 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
437 let mut monitors = HashMap::new();
438 let mut old_monitors = $old_monitors.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap();
439 for (outpoint, (update_id, monitor_ser)) in old_monitors.drain() {
440 monitors.insert(outpoint, <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&monitor_ser), (&*$keys_manager, &*$keys_manager)).expect("Failed to read monitor").1);
441 chain_monitor.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().insert(outpoint, (update_id, monitor_ser));
443 let mut monitor_refs = HashMap::new();
444 for (outpoint, monitor) in monitors.iter_mut() {
445 monitor_refs.insert(*outpoint, monitor);
448 let read_args = ChannelManagerReadArgs {
449 entropy_source: keys_manager.clone(),
450 node_signer: keys_manager.clone(),
451 signer_provider: keys_manager.clone(),
452 fee_estimator: $fee_estimator.clone(),
453 chain_monitor: chain_monitor.clone(),
454 tx_broadcaster: broadcast.clone(),
457 default_config: config,
458 channel_monitors: monitor_refs,
461 let res = (<(BlockHash, ChanMan)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&$ser.0), read_args).expect("Failed to read manager").1, chain_monitor.clone());
462 for (funding_txo, mon) in monitors.drain() {
463 assert_eq!(chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_txo, mon),
464 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
470 let mut channel_txn = Vec::new();
471 macro_rules! make_channel {
472 ($source: expr, $dest: expr, $chan_id: expr) => { {
473 $source.peer_connected(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: $dest.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
474 $dest.peer_connected(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: $source.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
476 $source.create_channel($dest.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42, 0, None).unwrap();
478 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
479 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
480 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
482 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
485 $dest.handle_open_channel(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
486 let accept_channel = {
487 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
488 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
489 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
491 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
494 $source.handle_accept_channel(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
497 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_events();
498 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
499 if let events::Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } = events[0] {
500 let tx = Transaction { version: $chan_id, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
501 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
503 funding_output = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
504 $source.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &$dest.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
505 channel_txn.push(tx);
506 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
509 let funding_created = {
510 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
511 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
512 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
514 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
516 $dest.handle_funding_created(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
518 let funding_signed = {
519 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
520 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
521 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
523 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
525 $source.handle_funding_signed(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
531 macro_rules! confirm_txn {
533 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash();
534 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: chain_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
535 let txdata: Vec<_> = channel_txn.iter().enumerate().map(|(i, tx)| (i + 1, tx)).collect();
536 $node.transactions_confirmed(&header, &txdata, 1);
538 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
540 $node.best_block_updated(&header, 99);
544 macro_rules! lock_fundings {
545 ($nodes: expr) => { {
546 let mut node_events = Vec::new();
547 for node in $nodes.iter() {
548 node_events.push(node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events());
550 for (idx, node_event) in node_events.iter().enumerate() {
551 for event in node_event {
552 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } = event {
553 for node in $nodes.iter() {
554 if node.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
555 node.handle_channel_ready(&$nodes[idx].get_our_node_id(), msg);
558 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
562 for node in $nodes.iter() {
563 let events = node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
564 for event in events {
565 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = event {
566 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
572 let fee_est_a = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
573 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_a = 253;
574 let fee_est_b = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
575 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_b = 253;
576 let fee_est_c = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
577 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_c = 253;
579 // 3 nodes is enough to hit all the possible cases, notably unknown-source-unknown-dest
581 let (node_a, mut monitor_a, keys_manager_a) = make_node!(0, fee_est_a);
582 let (node_b, mut monitor_b, keys_manager_b) = make_node!(1, fee_est_b);
583 let (node_c, mut monitor_c, keys_manager_c) = make_node!(2, fee_est_c);
585 let mut nodes = [node_a, node_b, node_c];
587 let chan_1_funding = make_channel!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 0);
588 let chan_2_funding = make_channel!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1);
590 for node in nodes.iter() {
594 lock_fundings!(nodes);
596 let chan_a = nodes[0].list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap();
597 let chan_b = nodes[2].list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap();
599 let mut payment_id: u8 = 0;
600 let mut payment_idx: u64 = 0;
602 let mut chan_a_disconnected = false;
603 let mut chan_b_disconnected = false;
604 let mut ab_events = Vec::new();
605 let mut ba_events = Vec::new();
606 let mut bc_events = Vec::new();
607 let mut cb_events = Vec::new();
609 let mut node_a_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
610 nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
611 let mut node_b_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
612 nodes[1].write(&mut node_b_ser).unwrap();
613 let mut node_c_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
614 nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
616 macro_rules! test_return {
618 assert_eq!(nodes[0].list_channels().len(), 1);
619 assert_eq!(nodes[1].list_channels().len(), 2);
620 assert_eq!(nodes[2].list_channels().len(), 1);
625 let mut read_pos = 0;
626 macro_rules! get_slice {
629 let slice_len = $len as usize;
630 if data.len() < read_pos + slice_len {
633 read_pos += slice_len;
634 &data[read_pos - slice_len..read_pos]
640 // Push any events from Node B onto ba_events and bc_events
641 macro_rules! push_excess_b_events {
642 ($excess_events: expr, $expect_drop_node: expr) => { {
643 let a_id = nodes[0].get_our_node_id();
644 let expect_drop_node: Option<usize> = $expect_drop_node;
645 let expect_drop_id = if let Some(id) = expect_drop_node { Some(nodes[id].get_our_node_id()) } else { None };
646 for event in $excess_events {
647 let push_a = match event {
648 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
649 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
652 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => {
653 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
656 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => {
657 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
660 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => continue,
661 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => continue,
662 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
663 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
664 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
667 _ => panic!("Unhandled message event {:?}", event),
669 if push_a { ba_events.push(event); } else { bc_events.push(event); }
674 // While delivering messages, we select across three possible message selection processes
675 // to ensure we get as much coverage as possible. See the individual enum variants for more
678 enum ProcessMessages {
679 /// Deliver all available messages, including fetching any new messages from
680 /// `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` (which may have side effects).
682 /// Call `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` first, and then deliver up to one
683 /// message (which may already be queued).
685 /// Deliver up to one already-queued message. This avoids any potential side-effects
686 /// of `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` (eg freeing the HTLC holding cell), which
687 /// provides potentially more coverage.
691 macro_rules! process_msg_events {
692 ($node: expr, $corrupt_forward: expr, $limit_events: expr) => { {
693 let mut events = if $node == 1 {
694 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
695 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut ba_events);
696 new_events.extend_from_slice(&bc_events[..]);
699 } else if $node == 0 {
700 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
701 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut ab_events);
704 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
705 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut cb_events);
708 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
709 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage {
710 new_events = nodes[$node].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
712 let mut had_events = false;
713 let mut events_iter = events.drain(..).chain(new_events.drain(..));
714 let mut extra_ev = None;
715 for event in &mut events_iter {
718 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee, commitment_signed } } => {
719 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
720 if dest.get_our_node_id() == node_id {
721 for update_add in update_add_htlcs.iter() {
722 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_add_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
723 if !$corrupt_forward {
724 dest.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_add);
726 // Corrupt the update_add_htlc message so that its HMAC
727 // check will fail and we generate a
728 // update_fail_malformed_htlc instead of an
729 // update_fail_htlc as we do when we reject a payment.
730 let mut msg_ser = update_add.encode();
731 msg_ser[1000] ^= 0xff;
732 let new_msg = UpdateAddHTLC::read(&mut Cursor::new(&msg_ser)).unwrap();
733 dest.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &new_msg);
736 for update_fulfill in update_fulfill_htlcs.iter() {
737 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fulfill_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
738 dest.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fulfill);
740 for update_fail in update_fail_htlcs.iter() {
741 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fail_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
742 dest.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fail);
744 for update_fail_malformed in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.iter() {
745 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fail_malformed_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
746 dest.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fail_malformed);
748 if let Some(msg) = update_fee {
749 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fee to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
750 dest.handle_update_fee(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &msg);
752 let processed_change = !update_add_htlcs.is_empty() || !update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() ||
753 !update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() || !update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty();
754 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::AllMessages && processed_change {
755 // If we only want to process some messages, don't deliver the CS until later.
756 extra_ev = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: CommitmentUpdate {
757 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
758 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
759 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
760 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
766 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering commitment_signed to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
767 dest.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
772 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
773 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
774 if dest.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
775 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering revoke_and_ack to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
776 dest.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), msg);
780 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
781 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
782 if dest.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
783 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering channel_reestablish to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
784 dest.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), msg);
788 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => {
789 // Can be generated as a reestablish response
791 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {
792 // Can be generated as a reestablish response
794 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
795 // When we reconnect we will resend a channel_update to make sure our
796 // counterparty has the latest parameters for receiving payments
797 // through us. We do, however, check that the message does not include
798 // the "disabled" bit, as we should never ever have a channel which is
799 // disabled when we send such an update (or it may indicate channel
800 // force-close which we should detect as an error).
801 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0);
803 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
806 panic!("Unhandled message event {:?}", event)
809 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::AllMessages {
814 push_excess_b_events!(extra_ev.into_iter().chain(events_iter), None);
815 } else if $node == 0 {
816 if let Some(ev) = extra_ev { ab_events.push(ev); }
817 for event in events_iter { ab_events.push(event); }
819 if let Some(ev) = extra_ev { cb_events.push(ev); }
820 for event in events_iter { cb_events.push(event); }
826 macro_rules! drain_msg_events_on_disconnect {
827 ($counterparty_id: expr) => { {
828 if $counterparty_id == 0 {
829 for event in nodes[0].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
831 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
832 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => {},
833 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => {},
834 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => {},
835 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {},
836 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
837 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
839 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
842 panic!("Unhandled message event")
846 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(0));
850 for event in nodes[2].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
852 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
853 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => {},
854 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => {},
855 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => {},
856 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {},
857 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
858 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
860 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
863 panic!("Unhandled message event")
867 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(2));
874 macro_rules! process_events {
875 ($node: expr, $fail: expr) => { {
876 // In case we get 256 payments we may have a hash collision, resulting in the
877 // second claim/fail call not finding the duplicate-hash HTLC, so we have to
878 // deduplicate the calls here.
879 let mut claim_set = HashSet::new();
880 let mut events = nodes[$node].get_and_clear_pending_events();
881 // Sort events so that PendingHTLCsForwardable get processed last. This avoids a
882 // case where we first process a PendingHTLCsForwardable, then claim/fail on a
883 // PaymentClaimable, claiming/failing two HTLCs, but leaving a just-generated
884 // PaymentClaimable event for the second HTLC in our pending_events (and breaking
885 // our claim_set deduplication).
886 events.sort_by(|a, b| {
887 if let events::Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } = a {
888 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = b {
890 } else { Ordering::Equal }
891 } else if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = a {
892 if let events::Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } = b {
894 } else { Ordering::Equal }
895 } else { Ordering::Equal }
897 let had_events = !events.is_empty();
898 for event in events.drain(..) {
900 events::Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, .. } => {
901 if claim_set.insert(payment_hash.0) {
903 nodes[$node].fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
905 nodes[$node].claim_funds(PaymentPreimage(payment_hash.0));
909 events::Event::PaymentSent { .. } => {},
910 events::Event::PaymentClaimed { .. } => {},
911 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
912 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } => {},
913 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful { .. } | events::Event::ProbeFailed { .. } => {
914 // Even though we don't explicitly send probes, because probes are
915 // detected based on hashing the payment hash+preimage, its rather
916 // trivial for the fuzzer to build payments that accidentally end up
917 // looking like probes.
919 events::Event::PaymentForwarded { .. } if $node == 1 => {},
920 events::Event::ChannelReady { .. } => {},
921 events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {
922 nodes[$node].process_pending_htlc_forwards();
924 events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => {},
925 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
928 panic!("Unhandled event")
936 let v = get_slice!(1)[0];
937 out.locked_write(format!("READ A BYTE! HANDLING INPUT {:x}...........\n", v).as_bytes());
939 // In general, we keep related message groups close together in binary form, allowing
940 // bit-twiddling mutations to have similar effects. This is probably overkill, but no
943 0x00 => *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress,
944 0x01 => *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress,
945 0x02 => *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress,
946 0x04 => *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed,
947 0x05 => *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed,
948 0x06 => *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed,
951 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_a.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
952 monitor_a.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
953 nodes[0].process_monitor_events();
957 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
958 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
959 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
963 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
964 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
965 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
969 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_c.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
970 monitor_c.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
971 nodes[2].process_monitor_events();
976 if !chan_a_disconnected {
977 nodes[0].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), false);
978 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), false);
979 chan_a_disconnected = true;
980 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(0);
984 if !chan_b_disconnected {
985 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), false);
986 nodes[2].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), false);
987 chan_b_disconnected = true;
988 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(2);
992 if chan_a_disconnected {
993 nodes[0].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: nodes[1].init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
994 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: nodes[0].init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
995 chan_a_disconnected = false;
999 if chan_b_disconnected {
1000 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: nodes[2].init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
1001 nodes[2].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: nodes[1].init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
1002 chan_b_disconnected = false;
1006 0x10 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1007 0x11 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1008 0x12 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1009 0x13 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1010 0x14 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1011 0x15 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1013 0x16 => { process_events!(0, true); },
1014 0x17 => { process_events!(0, false); },
1016 0x18 => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1017 0x19 => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1018 0x1a => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1019 0x1b => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1020 0x1c => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1021 0x1d => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1023 0x1e => { process_events!(1, true); },
1024 0x1f => { process_events!(1, false); },
1026 0x20 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1027 0x21 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1028 0x22 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1029 0x23 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1030 0x24 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1031 0x25 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1033 0x26 => { process_events!(2, true); },
1034 0x27 => { process_events!(2, false); },
1037 if !chan_a_disconnected {
1038 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), false);
1039 chan_a_disconnected = true;
1040 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(0);
1042 if monitor_a.should_update_manager.load(atomic::Ordering::Relaxed) {
1043 node_a_ser.0.clear();
1044 nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
1046 let (new_node_a, new_monitor_a) = reload_node!(node_a_ser, 0, monitor_a, keys_manager_a, fee_est_a);
1047 nodes[0] = new_node_a;
1048 monitor_a = new_monitor_a;
1051 if !chan_a_disconnected {
1052 nodes[0].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), false);
1053 chan_a_disconnected = true;
1054 nodes[0].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1058 if !chan_b_disconnected {
1059 nodes[2].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), false);
1060 chan_b_disconnected = true;
1061 nodes[2].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1065 let (new_node_b, new_monitor_b) = reload_node!(node_b_ser, 1, monitor_b, keys_manager_b, fee_est_b);
1066 nodes[1] = new_node_b;
1067 monitor_b = new_monitor_b;
1070 if !chan_b_disconnected {
1071 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), false);
1072 chan_b_disconnected = true;
1073 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(2);
1075 if monitor_c.should_update_manager.load(atomic::Ordering::Relaxed) {
1076 node_c_ser.0.clear();
1077 nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
1079 let (new_node_c, new_monitor_c) = reload_node!(node_c_ser, 2, monitor_c, keys_manager_c, fee_est_c);
1080 nodes[2] = new_node_c;
1081 monitor_c = new_monitor_c;
1084 // 1/10th the channel size:
1085 0x30 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1086 0x31 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1087 0x32 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1088 0x33 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1089 0x34 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1090 0x35 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1092 0x38 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1093 0x39 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1094 0x3a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1095 0x3b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1096 0x3c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1097 0x3d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1099 0x40 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1100 0x41 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1101 0x42 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1102 0x43 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1103 0x44 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1104 0x45 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1106 0x48 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1107 0x49 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1108 0x4a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1109 0x4b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1110 0x4c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1111 0x4d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1113 0x50 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1114 0x51 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1115 0x52 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1116 0x53 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1117 0x54 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1118 0x55 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1120 0x58 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1121 0x59 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1122 0x5a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1123 0x5b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1124 0x5c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1125 0x5d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1127 0x60 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1128 0x61 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1129 0x62 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1130 0x63 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1131 0x64 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1132 0x65 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1134 0x68 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1135 0x69 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1136 0x6a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1137 0x6b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1138 0x6c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1139 0x6d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1142 let max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_a * FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1143 if fee_est_a.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1144 fee_est_a.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1146 nodes[0].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1148 0x81 => { fee_est_a.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[0].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1151 let max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_b * FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1152 if fee_est_b.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1153 fee_est_b.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1155 nodes[1].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1157 0x85 => { fee_est_b.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[1].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1160 let max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_c * FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1161 if fee_est_c.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1162 fee_est_c.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1164 nodes[2].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1166 0x89 => { fee_est_c.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[2].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1169 // Test that no channel is in a stuck state where neither party can send funds even
1170 // after we resolve all pending events.
1171 // First make sure there are no pending monitor updates, resetting the error state
1172 // and calling force_channel_monitor_updated for each monitor.
1173 *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed;
1174 *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed;
1175 *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed;
1177 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_a.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1178 monitor_a.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1179 nodes[0].process_monitor_events();
1181 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1182 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1183 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1185 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1186 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1187 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1189 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_c.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1190 monitor_c.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1191 nodes[2].process_monitor_events();
1194 // Next, make sure peers are all connected to each other
1195 if chan_a_disconnected {
1196 nodes[0].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: nodes[1].init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
1197 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: nodes[0].init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
1198 chan_a_disconnected = false;
1200 if chan_b_disconnected {
1201 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: nodes[2].init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
1202 nodes[2].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: nodes[1].init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
1203 chan_b_disconnected = false;
1206 for i in 0..std::usize::MAX {
1207 if i == 100 { panic!("It may take may iterations to settle the state, but it should not take forever"); }
1208 // Then, make sure any current forwards make their way to their destination
1209 if process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1210 if process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1211 if process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1212 // ...making sure any pending PendingHTLCsForwardable events are handled and
1213 // payments claimed.
1214 if process_events!(0, false) { continue; }
1215 if process_events!(1, false) { continue; }
1216 if process_events!(2, false) { continue; }
1220 // Finally, make sure that at least one end of each channel can make a substantial payment
1222 send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx) ||
1223 send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx));
1225 send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx) ||
1226 send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx));
1228 last_htlc_clear_fee_a = fee_est_a.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1229 last_htlc_clear_fee_b = fee_est_b.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1230 last_htlc_clear_fee_c = fee_est_c.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1232 _ => test_return!(),
1235 node_a_ser.0.clear();
1236 nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
1237 monitor_a.should_update_manager.store(false, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
1238 node_b_ser.0.clear();
1239 nodes[1].write(&mut node_b_ser).unwrap();
1240 monitor_b.should_update_manager.store(false, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
1241 node_c_ser.0.clear();
1242 nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
1243 monitor_c.should_update_manager.store(false, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
1247 /// We actually have different behavior based on if a certain log string has been seen, so we have
1248 /// to do a bit more tracking.
1250 struct SearchingOutput<O: Output> {
1252 may_fail: Arc<atomic::AtomicBool>,
1254 impl<O: Output> Output for SearchingOutput<O> {
1255 fn locked_write(&self, data: &[u8]) {
1256 // We hit a design limitation of LN state machine (see CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER)
1257 if std::str::from_utf8(data).unwrap().contains("Outbound update_fee HTLC buffer overflow - counterparty should force-close this channel") {
1258 self.may_fail.store(true, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1260 self.output.locked_write(data)
1263 impl<O: Output> SearchingOutput<O> {
1264 pub fn new(output: O) -> Self {
1265 Self { output, may_fail: Arc::new(atomic::AtomicBool::new(false)) }
1269 pub fn chanmon_consistency_test<Out: Output>(data: &[u8], out: Out) {
1274 pub extern "C" fn chanmon_consistency_run(data: *const u8, datalen: usize) {
1275 do_test(unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(data, datalen) }, test_logger::DevNull{});