1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Test that monitor update failures don't get our channel state out of sync.
11 //! One of the biggest concern with the monitor update failure handling code is that messages
12 //! resent after monitor updating is restored are delivered out-of-order, resulting in
13 //! commitment_signed messages having "invalid signatures".
14 //! To test this we stand up a network of three nodes and read bytes from the fuzz input to denote
15 //! actions such as sending payments, handling events, or changing monitor update return values on
16 //! a per-node basis. This should allow it to find any cases where the ordering of actions results
17 //! in us getting out of sync with ourselves, and, assuming at least one of our recieve- or
18 //! send-side handling is correct, other peers. We consider it a failure if any action results in a
19 //! channel being force-closed.
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::PackedLockTime;
26 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash as TraitImport;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
34 use lightning::chain::{BestBlock, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, chainmonitor, channelmonitor, Confirm, Watch};
35 use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, MonitorEvent};
36 use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
37 use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
38 use lightning::sign::{KeyMaterial, InMemorySigner, Recipient, EntropySource, NodeSigner, SignerProvider};
39 use lightning::events;
40 use lightning::events::MessageSendEventsProvider;
41 use lightning::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
42 use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelDetails, ChannelManager, PaymentSendFailure, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
43 use lightning::ln::channel::FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
44 use lightning::ln::msgs::{self, CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, UpdateAddHTLC, Init};
45 use lightning::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
46 use lightning::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
47 use lightning::offers::invoice::UnsignedBolt12Invoice;
48 use lightning::offers::invoice_request::UnsignedInvoiceRequest;
49 use lightning::util::test_channel_signer::{TestChannelSigner, EnforcementState};
50 use lightning::util::errors::APIError;
51 use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
52 use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
53 use lightning::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
54 use lightning::routing::router::{InFlightHtlcs, Path, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
56 use crate::utils::test_logger::{self, Output};
57 use crate::utils::test_persister::TestPersister;
59 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Message, PublicKey, SecretKey, Scalar, Secp256k1};
60 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
61 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::{RecoverableSignature, Signature};
62 use bitcoin::secp256k1::schnorr;
65 use std::cmp::{self, Ordering};
66 use hashbrown::{HashSet, hash_map, HashMap};
67 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
68 use std::sync::atomic;
70 use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
72 const MAX_FEE: u32 = 10_000;
73 struct FuzzEstimator {
74 ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32,
76 impl FeeEstimator for FuzzEstimator {
77 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, conf_target: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
78 // We force-close channels if our counterparty sends us a feerate which is a small multiple
79 // of our HighPriority fee estimate or smaller than our Background fee estimate. Thus, we
80 // always return a HighPriority feerate here which is >= the maximum Normal feerate and a
81 // Background feerate which is <= the minimum Normal feerate.
83 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep => MAX_FEE,
84 ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum|ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee|ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee|ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee => 253,
85 ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee => cmp::min(self.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire), MAX_FEE),
92 impl Router for FuzzRouter {
94 &self, _payer: &PublicKey, _params: &RouteParameters, _first_hops: Option<&[&ChannelDetails]>,
95 _inflight_htlcs: InFlightHtlcs
96 ) -> Result<Route, msgs::LightningError> {
97 Err(msgs::LightningError {
98 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
99 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
104 pub struct TestBroadcaster {}
105 impl BroadcasterInterface for TestBroadcaster {
106 fn broadcast_transactions(&self, _txs: &[&Transaction]) { }
109 pub struct VecWriter(pub Vec<u8>);
110 impl Writer for VecWriter {
111 fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
112 self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
117 struct TestChainMonitor {
118 pub logger: Arc<dyn Logger>,
119 pub keys: Arc<KeyProvider>,
120 pub persister: Arc<TestPersister>,
121 pub chain_monitor: Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<TestChannelSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
122 // If we reload a node with an old copy of ChannelMonitors, the ChannelManager deserialization
123 // logic will automatically force-close our channels for us (as we don't have an up-to-date
124 // monitor implying we are not able to punish misbehaving counterparties). Because this test
125 // "fails" if we ever force-close a channel, we avoid doing so, always saving the latest
126 // fully-serialized monitor state here, as well as the corresponding update_id.
127 pub latest_monitors: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, (u64, Vec<u8>)>>,
129 impl TestChainMonitor {
130 pub fn new(broadcaster: Arc<TestBroadcaster>, logger: Arc<dyn Logger>, feeest: Arc<FuzzEstimator>, persister: Arc<TestPersister>, keys: Arc<KeyProvider>) -> Self {
132 chain_monitor: Arc::new(chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::new(None, broadcaster, logger.clone(), feeest, Arc::clone(&persister))),
136 latest_monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
140 impl chain::Watch<TestChannelSigner> for TestChainMonitor {
141 fn watch_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>) -> Result<chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, ()> {
142 let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
143 monitor.write(&mut ser).unwrap();
144 if let Some(_) = self.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().insert(funding_txo, (monitor.get_latest_update_id(), ser.0)) {
145 panic!("Already had monitor pre-watch_channel");
147 self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_txo, monitor)
150 fn update_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: &channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus {
151 let mut map_lock = self.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap();
152 let mut map_entry = match map_lock.entry(funding_txo) {
153 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => entry,
154 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => panic!("Didn't have monitor on update call"),
156 let deserialized_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::
157 read(&mut Cursor::new(&map_entry.get().1), (&*self.keys, &*self.keys)).unwrap().1;
158 deserialized_monitor.update_monitor(update, &&TestBroadcaster{}, &&FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) }, &self.logger).unwrap();
159 let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
160 deserialized_monitor.write(&mut ser).unwrap();
161 map_entry.insert((update.update_id, ser.0));
162 self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update)
165 fn release_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<(OutPoint, Vec<MonitorEvent>, Option<PublicKey>)> {
166 return self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
171 node_secret: SecretKey,
172 rand_bytes_id: atomic::AtomicU32,
173 enforcement_states: Mutex<HashMap<[u8;32], Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>>>>,
176 impl EntropySource for KeyProvider {
177 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
178 let id = self.rand_bytes_id.fetch_add(1, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
179 let mut res = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 11, self.node_secret[31]];
180 res[30-4..30].copy_from_slice(&id.to_le_bytes());
185 impl NodeSigner for KeyProvider {
186 fn get_node_id(&self, recipient: Recipient) -> Result<PublicKey, ()> {
187 let node_secret = match recipient {
188 Recipient::Node => Ok(&self.node_secret),
189 Recipient::PhantomNode => Err(())
191 Ok(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), node_secret))
194 fn ecdh(&self, recipient: Recipient, other_key: &PublicKey, tweak: Option<&Scalar>) -> Result<SharedSecret, ()> {
195 let mut node_secret = match recipient {
196 Recipient::Node => Ok(self.node_secret.clone()),
197 Recipient::PhantomNode => Err(())
199 if let Some(tweak) = tweak {
200 node_secret = node_secret.mul_tweak(tweak).map_err(|_| ())?;
202 Ok(SharedSecret::new(other_key, &node_secret))
205 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial {
206 KeyMaterial([0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, self.node_secret[31]])
209 fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5], _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> {
213 fn sign_bolt12_invoice_request(
214 &self, _invoice_request: &UnsignedInvoiceRequest
215 ) -> Result<schnorr::Signature, ()> {
219 fn sign_bolt12_invoice(
220 &self, _invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice,
221 ) -> Result<schnorr::Signature, ()> {
225 fn sign_gossip_message(&self, msg: lightning::ln::msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
226 let msg_hash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]).map_err(|_| ())?;
227 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
228 Ok(secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msg_hash, &self.node_secret))
232 impl SignerProvider for KeyProvider {
233 type Signer = TestChannelSigner;
235 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
236 let id = self.rand_bytes_id.fetch_add(1, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed) as u8;
240 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
241 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
242 let id = channel_keys_id[0];
243 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
245 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
246 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
247 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
248 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
249 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
250 [id, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 9, self.node_secret[31]],
251 channel_value_satoshis,
255 let revoked_commitment = self.make_enforcement_state_cell(keys.commitment_seed);
256 TestChannelSigner::new_with_revoked(keys, revoked_commitment, false)
259 fn read_chan_signer(&self, buffer: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> {
260 let mut reader = std::io::Cursor::new(buffer);
262 let inner: InMemorySigner = ReadableArgs::read(&mut reader, self)?;
263 let state = self.make_enforcement_state_cell(inner.commitment_seed);
265 Ok(TestChannelSigner {
268 disable_revocation_policy_check: false,
269 available: Arc::new(Mutex::new(true)),
273 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
274 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
275 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap();
276 let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
277 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
280 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
281 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
282 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap();
283 let pubkey_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &secret_key).serialize());
284 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh(&pubkey_hash))
289 fn make_enforcement_state_cell(&self, commitment_seed: [u8; 32]) -> Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>> {
290 let mut revoked_commitments = self.enforcement_states.lock().unwrap();
291 if !revoked_commitments.contains_key(&commitment_seed) {
292 revoked_commitments.insert(commitment_seed, Arc::new(Mutex::new(EnforcementState::new())));
294 let cell = revoked_commitments.get(&commitment_seed).unwrap();
300 fn check_api_err(api_err: APIError, sendable_bounds_violated: bool) {
302 APIError::APIMisuseError { .. } => panic!("We can't misuse the API"),
303 APIError::FeeRateTooHigh { .. } => panic!("We can't send too much fee?"),
304 APIError::InvalidRoute { .. } => panic!("Our routes should work"),
305 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err } => {
306 // Test the error against a list of errors we can hit, and reject
307 // all others. If you hit this panic, the list of acceptable errors
308 // is probably just stale and you should add new messages here.
310 "Peer for first hop currently disconnected" => {},
311 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - ") => {},
312 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - ") => {},
313 _ => panic!("{}", err),
315 assert!(sendable_bounds_violated);
317 APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress => {
318 // We can (obviously) temp-fail a monitor update
320 APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { .. } => panic!("Cannot send an incompatible shutdown script"),
324 fn check_payment_err(send_err: PaymentSendFailure, sendable_bounds_violated: bool) {
326 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(api_err) => check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated),
327 PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(per_path_results) => {
328 for res in per_path_results { if let Err(api_err) = res { check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated); } }
330 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(per_path_results) => {
331 for api_err in per_path_results { check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated); }
333 PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure { results, .. } => {
334 for res in results { if let Err(api_err) = res { check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated); } }
336 PaymentSendFailure::DuplicatePayment => panic!(),
340 type ChanMan<'a> = ChannelManager<Arc<TestChainMonitor>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, &'a FuzzRouter, Arc<dyn Logger>>;
343 fn get_payment_secret_hash(dest: &ChanMan, payment_id: &mut u8) -> Option<(PaymentSecret, PaymentHash)> {
344 let mut payment_hash;
346 payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[*payment_id; 1]).into_inner());
347 if let Ok(payment_secret) = dest.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 3600, None) {
348 return Some((payment_secret, payment_hash));
350 *payment_id = payment_id.wrapping_add(1);
356 fn send_payment(source: &ChanMan, dest: &ChanMan, dest_chan_id: u64, amt: u64, payment_id: &mut u8, payment_idx: &mut u64) -> bool {
357 let (payment_secret, payment_hash) =
358 if let Some((secret, hash)) = get_payment_secret_hash(dest, payment_id) { (secret, hash) } else { return true; };
359 let mut payment_id = [0; 32];
360 payment_id[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_idx.to_ne_bytes());
362 let (min_value_sendable, max_value_sendable) = source.list_usable_channels()
363 .iter().find(|chan| chan.short_channel_id == Some(dest_chan_id))
365 (chan.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, chan.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat))
367 if let Err(err) = source.send_payment_with_route(&Route {
368 paths: vec![Path { hops: vec![RouteHop {
369 pubkey: dest.get_our_node_id(),
370 node_features: dest.node_features(),
371 short_channel_id: dest_chan_id,
372 channel_features: dest.channel_features(),
374 cltv_expiry_delta: 200,
375 maybe_announced_channel: true,
376 }], blinded_tail: None }],
378 }, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_id)) {
379 check_payment_err(err, amt > max_value_sendable || amt < min_value_sendable);
382 // Note that while the max is a strict upper-bound, we can occasionally send substantially
383 // below the minimum, with some gap which is unusable immediately below the minimum. Thus,
384 // we don't check against min_value_sendable here.
385 assert!(amt <= max_value_sendable);
390 fn send_hop_payment(source: &ChanMan, middle: &ChanMan, middle_chan_id: u64, dest: &ChanMan, dest_chan_id: u64, amt: u64, payment_id: &mut u8, payment_idx: &mut u64) -> bool {
391 let (payment_secret, payment_hash) =
392 if let Some((secret, hash)) = get_payment_secret_hash(dest, payment_id) { (secret, hash) } else { return true; };
393 let mut payment_id = [0; 32];
394 payment_id[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_idx.to_ne_bytes());
396 let (min_value_sendable, max_value_sendable) = source.list_usable_channels()
397 .iter().find(|chan| chan.short_channel_id == Some(middle_chan_id))
399 (chan.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, chan.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat))
401 let first_hop_fee = 50_000;
402 if let Err(err) = source.send_payment_with_route(&Route {
403 paths: vec![Path { hops: vec![RouteHop {
404 pubkey: middle.get_our_node_id(),
405 node_features: middle.node_features(),
406 short_channel_id: middle_chan_id,
407 channel_features: middle.channel_features(),
408 fee_msat: first_hop_fee,
409 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
410 maybe_announced_channel: true,
412 pubkey: dest.get_our_node_id(),
413 node_features: dest.node_features(),
414 short_channel_id: dest_chan_id,
415 channel_features: dest.channel_features(),
417 cltv_expiry_delta: 200,
418 maybe_announced_channel: true,
419 }], blinded_tail: None }],
421 }, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_id)) {
422 let sent_amt = amt + first_hop_fee;
423 check_payment_err(err, sent_amt < min_value_sendable || sent_amt > max_value_sendable);
426 // Note that while the max is a strict upper-bound, we can occasionally send substantially
427 // below the minimum, with some gap which is unusable immediately below the minimum. Thus,
428 // we don't check against min_value_sendable here.
429 assert!(amt + first_hop_fee <= max_value_sendable);
435 pub fn do_test<Out: Output>(data: &[u8], underlying_out: Out, anchors: bool) {
436 let out = SearchingOutput::new(underlying_out);
437 let broadcast = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{});
438 let router = FuzzRouter {};
440 macro_rules! make_node {
441 ($node_id: expr, $fee_estimator: expr) => { {
442 let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new($node_id.to_string(), out.clone()));
443 let node_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, $node_id]).unwrap();
444 let keys_manager = Arc::new(KeyProvider { node_secret, rand_bytes_id: atomic::AtomicU32::new(0), enforcement_states: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()) });
445 let monitor = Arc::new(TestChainMonitor::new(broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), $fee_estimator.clone(),
446 Arc::new(TestPersister {
447 update_ret: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed)
448 }), Arc::clone(&keys_manager)));
450 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
451 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
452 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
454 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
455 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
457 let network = Network::Bitcoin;
458 let best_block_timestamp = genesis_block(network).header.time;
459 let params = ChainParameters {
461 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
463 (ChannelManager::new($fee_estimator.clone(), monitor.clone(), broadcast.clone(), &router, Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), config, params, best_block_timestamp),
464 monitor, keys_manager)
468 macro_rules! reload_node {
469 ($ser: expr, $node_id: expr, $old_monitors: expr, $keys_manager: expr, $fee_estimator: expr) => { {
470 let keys_manager = Arc::clone(& $keys_manager);
471 let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new($node_id.to_string(), out.clone()));
472 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(TestChainMonitor::new(broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), $fee_estimator.clone(),
473 Arc::new(TestPersister {
474 update_ret: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed)
475 }), Arc::clone(& $keys_manager)));
477 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
478 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
479 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
481 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
482 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
485 let mut monitors = HashMap::new();
486 let mut old_monitors = $old_monitors.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap();
487 for (outpoint, (update_id, monitor_ser)) in old_monitors.drain() {
488 monitors.insert(outpoint, <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&monitor_ser), (&*$keys_manager, &*$keys_manager)).expect("Failed to read monitor").1);
489 chain_monitor.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().insert(outpoint, (update_id, monitor_ser));
491 let mut monitor_refs = HashMap::new();
492 for (outpoint, monitor) in monitors.iter_mut() {
493 monitor_refs.insert(*outpoint, monitor);
496 let read_args = ChannelManagerReadArgs {
497 entropy_source: keys_manager.clone(),
498 node_signer: keys_manager.clone(),
499 signer_provider: keys_manager.clone(),
500 fee_estimator: $fee_estimator.clone(),
501 chain_monitor: chain_monitor.clone(),
502 tx_broadcaster: broadcast.clone(),
505 default_config: config,
506 channel_monitors: monitor_refs,
509 let res = (<(BlockHash, ChanMan)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&$ser.0), read_args).expect("Failed to read manager").1, chain_monitor.clone());
510 for (funding_txo, mon) in monitors.drain() {
511 assert_eq!(chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_txo, mon),
512 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
518 let mut channel_txn = Vec::new();
519 macro_rules! make_channel {
520 ($source: expr, $dest: expr, $dest_keys_manager: expr, $chan_id: expr) => { {
521 $source.peer_connected(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
522 features: $dest.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
524 $dest.peer_connected(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
525 features: $source.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
528 $source.create_channel($dest.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42, 0, None, None).unwrap();
530 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
531 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
532 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
534 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
537 $dest.handle_open_channel(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
538 let accept_channel = {
540 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_events();
541 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
542 if let events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
543 ref temporary_channel_id, ref counterparty_node_id, ..
545 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
546 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&$dest_keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
547 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
548 $dest.accept_inbound_channel(
549 temporary_channel_id,
550 counterparty_node_id,
553 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
555 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
556 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
557 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
559 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
562 $source.handle_accept_channel(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
565 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_events();
566 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
567 if let events::Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } = events[0] {
568 let tx = Transaction { version: $chan_id, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
569 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
571 funding_output = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
572 $source.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &$dest.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
573 channel_txn.push(tx);
574 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
577 let funding_created = {
578 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
579 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
580 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
582 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
584 $dest.handle_funding_created(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
586 let funding_signed = {
587 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
588 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
589 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
591 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
593 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_events();
594 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
595 if let events::Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } = events[0] {
596 assert_eq!(counterparty_node_id, &$source.get_our_node_id());
597 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
599 $source.handle_funding_signed(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
600 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_events();
601 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
602 if let events::Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } = events[0] {
603 assert_eq!(counterparty_node_id, &$dest.get_our_node_id());
604 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
610 macro_rules! confirm_txn {
612 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash();
613 let mut header = create_dummy_header(chain_hash, 42);
614 let txdata: Vec<_> = channel_txn.iter().enumerate().map(|(i, tx)| (i + 1, tx)).collect();
615 $node.transactions_confirmed(&header, &txdata, 1);
617 header = create_dummy_header(header.block_hash(), 42);
619 $node.best_block_updated(&header, 99);
623 macro_rules! lock_fundings {
624 ($nodes: expr) => { {
625 let mut node_events = Vec::new();
626 for node in $nodes.iter() {
627 node_events.push(node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events());
629 for (idx, node_event) in node_events.iter().enumerate() {
630 for event in node_event {
631 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } = event {
632 for node in $nodes.iter() {
633 if node.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
634 node.handle_channel_ready(&$nodes[idx].get_our_node_id(), msg);
637 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
641 for node in $nodes.iter() {
642 let events = node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
643 for event in events {
644 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = event {
645 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
651 let fee_est_a = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
652 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_a = 253;
653 let fee_est_b = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
654 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_b = 253;
655 let fee_est_c = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
656 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_c = 253;
658 // 3 nodes is enough to hit all the possible cases, notably unknown-source-unknown-dest
660 let (node_a, mut monitor_a, keys_manager_a) = make_node!(0, fee_est_a);
661 let (node_b, mut monitor_b, keys_manager_b) = make_node!(1, fee_est_b);
662 let (node_c, mut monitor_c, keys_manager_c) = make_node!(2, fee_est_c);
664 let mut nodes = [node_a, node_b, node_c];
666 let chan_1_funding = make_channel!(nodes[0], nodes[1], keys_manager_b, 0);
667 let chan_2_funding = make_channel!(nodes[1], nodes[2], keys_manager_c, 1);
669 for node in nodes.iter() {
673 lock_fundings!(nodes);
675 let chan_a = nodes[0].list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap();
676 let chan_b = nodes[2].list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap();
678 let mut payment_id: u8 = 0;
679 let mut payment_idx: u64 = 0;
681 let mut chan_a_disconnected = false;
682 let mut chan_b_disconnected = false;
683 let mut ab_events = Vec::new();
684 let mut ba_events = Vec::new();
685 let mut bc_events = Vec::new();
686 let mut cb_events = Vec::new();
688 let mut node_a_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
689 nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
690 let mut node_b_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
691 nodes[1].write(&mut node_b_ser).unwrap();
692 let mut node_c_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
693 nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
695 macro_rules! test_return {
697 assert_eq!(nodes[0].list_channels().len(), 1);
698 assert_eq!(nodes[1].list_channels().len(), 2);
699 assert_eq!(nodes[2].list_channels().len(), 1);
704 let mut read_pos = 0;
705 macro_rules! get_slice {
708 let slice_len = $len as usize;
709 if data.len() < read_pos + slice_len {
712 read_pos += slice_len;
713 &data[read_pos - slice_len..read_pos]
719 // Push any events from Node B onto ba_events and bc_events
720 macro_rules! push_excess_b_events {
721 ($excess_events: expr, $expect_drop_node: expr) => { {
722 let a_id = nodes[0].get_our_node_id();
723 let expect_drop_node: Option<usize> = $expect_drop_node;
724 let expect_drop_id = if let Some(id) = expect_drop_node { Some(nodes[id].get_our_node_id()) } else { None };
725 for event in $excess_events {
726 let push_a = match event {
727 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
728 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
731 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => {
732 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
735 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => {
736 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
739 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => continue,
740 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => continue,
741 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
742 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
743 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
746 _ => panic!("Unhandled message event {:?}", event),
748 if push_a { ba_events.push(event); } else { bc_events.push(event); }
753 // While delivering messages, we select across three possible message selection processes
754 // to ensure we get as much coverage as possible. See the individual enum variants for more
757 enum ProcessMessages {
758 /// Deliver all available messages, including fetching any new messages from
759 /// `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` (which may have side effects).
761 /// Call `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` first, and then deliver up to one
762 /// message (which may already be queued).
764 /// Deliver up to one already-queued message. This avoids any potential side-effects
765 /// of `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` (eg freeing the HTLC holding cell), which
766 /// provides potentially more coverage.
770 macro_rules! process_msg_events {
771 ($node: expr, $corrupt_forward: expr, $limit_events: expr) => { {
772 let mut events = if $node == 1 {
773 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
774 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut ba_events);
775 new_events.extend_from_slice(&bc_events[..]);
778 } else if $node == 0 {
779 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
780 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut ab_events);
783 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
784 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut cb_events);
787 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
788 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage {
789 new_events = nodes[$node].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
791 let mut had_events = false;
792 let mut events_iter = events.drain(..).chain(new_events.drain(..));
793 let mut extra_ev = None;
794 for event in &mut events_iter {
797 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee, commitment_signed } } => {
798 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
799 if dest.get_our_node_id() == node_id {
800 for update_add in update_add_htlcs.iter() {
801 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_add_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
802 if !$corrupt_forward {
803 dest.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_add);
805 // Corrupt the update_add_htlc message so that its HMAC
806 // check will fail and we generate a
807 // update_fail_malformed_htlc instead of an
808 // update_fail_htlc as we do when we reject a payment.
809 let mut msg_ser = update_add.encode();
810 msg_ser[1000] ^= 0xff;
811 let new_msg = UpdateAddHTLC::read(&mut Cursor::new(&msg_ser)).unwrap();
812 dest.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &new_msg);
815 for update_fulfill in update_fulfill_htlcs.iter() {
816 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fulfill_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
817 dest.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fulfill);
819 for update_fail in update_fail_htlcs.iter() {
820 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fail_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
821 dest.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fail);
823 for update_fail_malformed in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.iter() {
824 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fail_malformed_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
825 dest.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fail_malformed);
827 if let Some(msg) = update_fee {
828 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fee to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
829 dest.handle_update_fee(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &msg);
831 let processed_change = !update_add_htlcs.is_empty() || !update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() ||
832 !update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() || !update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty();
833 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::AllMessages && processed_change {
834 // If we only want to process some messages, don't deliver the CS until later.
835 extra_ev = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: CommitmentUpdate {
836 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
837 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
838 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
839 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
845 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering commitment_signed to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
846 dest.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
851 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
852 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
853 if dest.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
854 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering revoke_and_ack to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
855 dest.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), msg);
859 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
860 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
861 if dest.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
862 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering channel_reestablish to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
863 dest.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), msg);
867 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => {
868 // Can be generated as a reestablish response
870 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {
871 // Can be generated as a reestablish response
873 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
874 // When we reconnect we will resend a channel_update to make sure our
875 // counterparty has the latest parameters for receiving payments
876 // through us. We do, however, check that the message does not include
877 // the "disabled" bit, as we should never ever have a channel which is
878 // disabled when we send such an update (or it may indicate channel
879 // force-close which we should detect as an error).
880 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0);
882 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
885 panic!("Unhandled message event {:?}", event)
888 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::AllMessages {
893 push_excess_b_events!(extra_ev.into_iter().chain(events_iter), None);
894 } else if $node == 0 {
895 if let Some(ev) = extra_ev { ab_events.push(ev); }
896 for event in events_iter { ab_events.push(event); }
898 if let Some(ev) = extra_ev { cb_events.push(ev); }
899 for event in events_iter { cb_events.push(event); }
905 macro_rules! drain_msg_events_on_disconnect {
906 ($counterparty_id: expr) => { {
907 if $counterparty_id == 0 {
908 for event in nodes[0].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
910 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
911 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => {},
912 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => {},
913 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => {},
914 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {},
915 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
916 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
918 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
921 panic!("Unhandled message event")
925 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(0));
929 for event in nodes[2].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
931 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
932 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => {},
933 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => {},
934 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => {},
935 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {},
936 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
937 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
939 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
942 panic!("Unhandled message event")
946 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(2));
953 macro_rules! process_events {
954 ($node: expr, $fail: expr) => { {
955 // In case we get 256 payments we may have a hash collision, resulting in the
956 // second claim/fail call not finding the duplicate-hash HTLC, so we have to
957 // deduplicate the calls here.
958 let mut claim_set = HashSet::new();
959 let mut events = nodes[$node].get_and_clear_pending_events();
960 // Sort events so that PendingHTLCsForwardable get processed last. This avoids a
961 // case where we first process a PendingHTLCsForwardable, then claim/fail on a
962 // PaymentClaimable, claiming/failing two HTLCs, but leaving a just-generated
963 // PaymentClaimable event for the second HTLC in our pending_events (and breaking
964 // our claim_set deduplication).
965 events.sort_by(|a, b| {
966 if let events::Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } = a {
967 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = b {
969 } else { Ordering::Equal }
970 } else if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = a {
971 if let events::Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } = b {
973 } else { Ordering::Equal }
974 } else { Ordering::Equal }
976 let had_events = !events.is_empty();
977 for event in events.drain(..) {
979 events::Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, .. } => {
980 if claim_set.insert(payment_hash.0) {
982 nodes[$node].fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
984 nodes[$node].claim_funds(PaymentPreimage(payment_hash.0));
988 events::Event::PaymentSent { .. } => {},
989 events::Event::PaymentClaimed { .. } => {},
990 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
991 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } => {},
992 events::Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {},
993 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful { .. } | events::Event::ProbeFailed { .. } => {
994 // Even though we don't explicitly send probes, because probes are
995 // detected based on hashing the payment hash+preimage, its rather
996 // trivial for the fuzzer to build payments that accidentally end up
997 // looking like probes.
999 events::Event::PaymentForwarded { .. } if $node == 1 => {},
1000 events::Event::ChannelReady { .. } => {},
1001 events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {
1002 nodes[$node].process_pending_htlc_forwards();
1004 events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => {},
1005 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
1008 panic!("Unhandled event")
1016 let v = get_slice!(1)[0];
1017 out.locked_write(format!("READ A BYTE! HANDLING INPUT {:x}...........\n", v).as_bytes());
1019 // In general, we keep related message groups close together in binary form, allowing
1020 // bit-twiddling mutations to have similar effects. This is probably overkill, but no
1021 // harm in doing so.
1023 0x00 => *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress,
1024 0x01 => *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress,
1025 0x02 => *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress,
1026 0x04 => *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed,
1027 0x05 => *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed,
1028 0x06 => *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed,
1031 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_a.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1032 monitor_a.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1033 nodes[0].process_monitor_events();
1037 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1038 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1039 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1043 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1044 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1045 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1049 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_c.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1050 monitor_c.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1051 nodes[2].process_monitor_events();
1056 if !chan_a_disconnected {
1057 nodes[0].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1058 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id());
1059 chan_a_disconnected = true;
1060 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(0);
1064 if !chan_b_disconnected {
1065 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id());
1066 nodes[2].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1067 chan_b_disconnected = true;
1068 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(2);
1072 if chan_a_disconnected {
1073 nodes[0].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1074 features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1076 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1077 features: nodes[0].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1079 chan_a_disconnected = false;
1083 if chan_b_disconnected {
1084 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1085 features: nodes[2].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1087 nodes[2].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1088 features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1090 chan_b_disconnected = false;
1094 0x10 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1095 0x11 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1096 0x12 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1097 0x13 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1098 0x14 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1099 0x15 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1101 0x16 => { process_events!(0, true); },
1102 0x17 => { process_events!(0, false); },
1104 0x18 => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1105 0x19 => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1106 0x1a => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1107 0x1b => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1108 0x1c => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1109 0x1d => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1111 0x1e => { process_events!(1, true); },
1112 0x1f => { process_events!(1, false); },
1114 0x20 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1115 0x21 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1116 0x22 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1117 0x23 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1118 0x24 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1119 0x25 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1121 0x26 => { process_events!(2, true); },
1122 0x27 => { process_events!(2, false); },
1125 if !chan_a_disconnected {
1126 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id());
1127 chan_a_disconnected = true;
1128 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(0));
1132 let (new_node_a, new_monitor_a) = reload_node!(node_a_ser, 0, monitor_a, keys_manager_a, fee_est_a);
1133 nodes[0] = new_node_a;
1134 monitor_a = new_monitor_a;
1137 if !chan_a_disconnected {
1138 nodes[0].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1139 chan_a_disconnected = true;
1140 nodes[0].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1144 if !chan_b_disconnected {
1145 nodes[2].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1146 chan_b_disconnected = true;
1147 nodes[2].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1151 let (new_node_b, new_monitor_b) = reload_node!(node_b_ser, 1, monitor_b, keys_manager_b, fee_est_b);
1152 nodes[1] = new_node_b;
1153 monitor_b = new_monitor_b;
1156 if !chan_b_disconnected {
1157 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id());
1158 chan_b_disconnected = true;
1159 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(2));
1163 let (new_node_c, new_monitor_c) = reload_node!(node_c_ser, 2, monitor_c, keys_manager_c, fee_est_c);
1164 nodes[2] = new_node_c;
1165 monitor_c = new_monitor_c;
1168 // 1/10th the channel size:
1169 0x30 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1170 0x31 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1171 0x32 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1172 0x33 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1173 0x34 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1174 0x35 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1176 0x38 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1177 0x39 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1178 0x3a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1179 0x3b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1180 0x3c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1181 0x3d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1183 0x40 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1184 0x41 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1185 0x42 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1186 0x43 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1187 0x44 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1188 0x45 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1190 0x48 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1191 0x49 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1192 0x4a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1193 0x4b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1194 0x4c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1195 0x4d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1197 0x50 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1198 0x51 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1199 0x52 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1200 0x53 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1201 0x54 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1202 0x55 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1204 0x58 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1205 0x59 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1206 0x5a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1207 0x5b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1208 0x5c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1209 0x5d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1211 0x60 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1212 0x61 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1213 0x62 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1214 0x63 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1215 0x64 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1216 0x65 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1218 0x68 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1219 0x69 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1220 0x6a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1221 0x6b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1222 0x6c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1223 0x6d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1226 let mut max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_a;
1228 max_feerate *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1230 if fee_est_a.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1231 fee_est_a.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1233 nodes[0].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1235 0x81 => { fee_est_a.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[0].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1238 let mut max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_b;
1240 max_feerate *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1242 if fee_est_b.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1243 fee_est_b.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1245 nodes[1].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1247 0x85 => { fee_est_b.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[1].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1250 let mut max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_c;
1252 max_feerate *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1254 if fee_est_c.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1255 fee_est_c.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1257 nodes[2].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1259 0x89 => { fee_est_c.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[2].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1262 // Test that no channel is in a stuck state where neither party can send funds even
1263 // after we resolve all pending events.
1264 // First make sure there are no pending monitor updates, resetting the error state
1265 // and calling force_channel_monitor_updated for each monitor.
1266 *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed;
1267 *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed;
1268 *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed;
1270 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_a.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1271 monitor_a.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1272 nodes[0].process_monitor_events();
1274 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1275 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1276 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1278 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1279 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1280 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1282 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_c.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1283 monitor_c.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1284 nodes[2].process_monitor_events();
1287 // Next, make sure peers are all connected to each other
1288 if chan_a_disconnected {
1289 nodes[0].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1290 features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1292 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1293 features: nodes[0].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1295 chan_a_disconnected = false;
1297 if chan_b_disconnected {
1298 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1299 features: nodes[2].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1301 nodes[2].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1302 features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1304 chan_b_disconnected = false;
1307 for i in 0..std::usize::MAX {
1308 if i == 100 { panic!("It may take may iterations to settle the state, but it should not take forever"); }
1309 // Then, make sure any current forwards make their way to their destination
1310 if process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1311 if process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1312 if process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1313 // ...making sure any pending PendingHTLCsForwardable events are handled and
1314 // payments claimed.
1315 if process_events!(0, false) { continue; }
1316 if process_events!(1, false) { continue; }
1317 if process_events!(2, false) { continue; }
1321 // Finally, make sure that at least one end of each channel can make a substantial payment
1323 send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx) ||
1324 send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx));
1326 send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx) ||
1327 send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx));
1329 last_htlc_clear_fee_a = fee_est_a.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1330 last_htlc_clear_fee_b = fee_est_b.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1331 last_htlc_clear_fee_c = fee_est_c.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1333 _ => test_return!(),
1336 if nodes[0].get_and_clear_needs_persistence() == true {
1337 node_a_ser.0.clear();
1338 nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
1340 if nodes[1].get_and_clear_needs_persistence() == true {
1341 node_b_ser.0.clear();
1342 nodes[1].write(&mut node_b_ser).unwrap();
1344 if nodes[2].get_and_clear_needs_persistence() == true {
1345 node_c_ser.0.clear();
1346 nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
1351 /// We actually have different behavior based on if a certain log string has been seen, so we have
1352 /// to do a bit more tracking.
1354 struct SearchingOutput<O: Output> {
1356 may_fail: Arc<atomic::AtomicBool>,
1358 impl<O: Output> Output for SearchingOutput<O> {
1359 fn locked_write(&self, data: &[u8]) {
1360 // We hit a design limitation of LN state machine (see CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER)
1361 if std::str::from_utf8(data).unwrap().contains("Outbound update_fee HTLC buffer overflow - counterparty should force-close this channel") {
1362 self.may_fail.store(true, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1364 self.output.locked_write(data)
1367 impl<O: Output> SearchingOutput<O> {
1368 pub fn new(output: O) -> Self {
1369 Self { output, may_fail: Arc::new(atomic::AtomicBool::new(false)) }
1373 pub fn chanmon_consistency_test<Out: Output>(data: &[u8], out: Out) {
1374 do_test(data, out.clone(), false);
1375 do_test(data, out, true);
1379 pub extern "C" fn chanmon_consistency_run(data: *const u8, datalen: usize) {
1380 do_test(unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(data, datalen) }, test_logger::DevNull{}, false);
1381 do_test(unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(data, datalen) }, test_logger::DevNull{}, true);