1 //! Test that monitor update failures don't get our channel state out of sync.
2 //! One of the biggest concern with the monitor update failure handling code is that messages
3 //! resent after monitor updating is restored are delivered out-of-order, resulting in
4 //! commitment_signed messages having "invalid signatures".
5 //! To test this we stand up a network of three nodes and read bytes from the fuzz input to denote
6 //! actions such as sending payments, handling events, or changing monitor update return values on
7 //! a per-node basis. This should allow it to find any cases where the ordering of actions results
8 //! in us getting out of sync with ourselves, and, assuming at least one of our recieve- or
9 //! send-side handling is correct, other peers. We consider it a failure if any action results in a
10 //! channel being force-closed.
12 use bitcoin::BitcoinHash;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
17 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
19 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash as TraitImport;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
21 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
22 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
24 use lightning::chain::chaininterface;
25 use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
26 use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ConfirmationTarget,ChainListener,FeeEstimator,ChainWatchInterfaceUtil};
27 use lightning::chain::keysinterface::{InMemoryChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
28 use lightning::ln::channelmonitor;
29 use lightning::ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLCUpdate};
30 use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, ChannelManagerReadArgs};
31 use lightning::ln::router::{Route, RouteHop};
32 use lightning::ln::msgs::{CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMessageHandler, ErrorAction, LightningError, UpdateAddHTLC, LocalFeatures};
33 use lightning::util::events;
34 use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
35 use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
36 use lightning::util::events::{EventsProvider, MessageSendEventsProvider};
37 use lightning::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
39 use utils::test_logger;
41 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
42 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
45 use std::cmp::Ordering;
46 use std::collections::{HashSet, hash_map, HashMap};
47 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
48 use std::sync::atomic;
51 struct FuzzEstimator {}
52 impl FeeEstimator for FuzzEstimator {
53 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u64 {
58 pub struct TestBroadcaster {}
59 impl BroadcasterInterface for TestBroadcaster {
60 fn broadcast_transaction(&self, _tx: &Transaction) { }
63 pub struct VecWriter(pub Vec<u8>);
64 impl Writer for VecWriter {
65 fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
66 self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
69 fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
70 self.0.reserve_exact(size);
74 static mut IN_RESTORE: bool = false;
75 pub struct TestChannelMonitor {
76 pub simple_monitor: Arc<channelmonitor::SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint>>,
77 pub update_ret: Mutex<Result<(), channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>>,
78 pub latest_good_update: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, Vec<u8>>>,
79 pub latest_update_good: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, bool>>,
80 pub latest_updates_good_at_last_ser: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, bool>>,
81 pub should_update_manager: atomic::AtomicBool,
83 impl TestChannelMonitor {
84 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<dyn chaininterface::ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<dyn chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<dyn Logger>, feeest: Arc<dyn chaininterface::FeeEstimator>) -> Self {
86 simple_monitor: channelmonitor::SimpleManyChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor, broadcaster, logger, feeest),
87 update_ret: Mutex::new(Ok(())),
88 latest_good_update: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
89 latest_update_good: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
90 latest_updates_good_at_last_ser: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
91 should_update_manager: atomic::AtomicBool::new(false),
95 impl channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor for TestChannelMonitor {
96 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
97 let ret = self.update_ret.lock().unwrap().clone();
99 let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
100 monitor.write_for_disk(&mut ser).unwrap();
101 self.latest_good_update.lock().unwrap().insert(funding_txo, ser.0);
102 match self.latest_update_good.lock().unwrap().entry(funding_txo) {
103 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(true); },
104 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
105 if !e.get() && unsafe { IN_RESTORE } {
106 // Technically we can't consider an update to be "good" unless we're doing
107 // it in response to a test_restore_channel_monitor as the channel may
108 // still be waiting on such a call, so only set us to good if we're in the
109 // middle of a restore call.
114 self.should_update_manager.store(true, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
116 self.latest_update_good.lock().unwrap().insert(funding_txo, false);
118 assert!(self.simple_monitor.add_update_monitor(funding_txo, monitor).is_ok());
122 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
123 return self.simple_monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated();
129 session_id: atomic::AtomicU8,
130 channel_id: atomic::AtomicU8,
132 impl KeysInterface for KeyProvider {
133 type ChanKeySigner = InMemoryChannelKeys;
135 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey {
136 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, self.node_id]).unwrap()
139 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
140 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
141 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, self.node_id]).unwrap();
142 let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
143 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
146 fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
147 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
148 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, self.node_id]).unwrap())
151 fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool) -> InMemoryChannelKeys {
152 InMemoryChannelKeys {
153 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, self.node_id]).unwrap(),
154 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, self.node_id]).unwrap(),
155 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, self.node_id]).unwrap(),
156 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, self.node_id]).unwrap(),
157 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8, self.node_id]).unwrap(),
158 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 9, self.node_id],
162 fn get_onion_rand(&self) -> (SecretKey, [u8; 32]) {
163 let id = self.session_id.fetch_add(1, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
164 (SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, id, 10, self.node_id]).unwrap(),
168 fn get_channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
169 let id = self.channel_id.fetch_add(1, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
170 [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, id, 11, self.node_id]
175 pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
176 let fee_est = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator{});
177 let broadcast = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{});
179 macro_rules! make_node {
180 ($node_id: expr) => { {
181 let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new($node_id.to_string()));
182 let watch = Arc::new(ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Bitcoin, Arc::clone(&logger)));
183 let monitor = Arc::new(TestChannelMonitor::new(watch.clone(), broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), fee_est.clone()));
185 let keys_manager = Arc::new(KeyProvider { node_id: $node_id, session_id: atomic::AtomicU8::new(0), channel_id: atomic::AtomicU8::new(0) });
186 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
187 config.channel_options.fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
188 config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
189 config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis = 0;
190 (ChannelManager::new(Network::Bitcoin, fee_est.clone(), monitor.clone(), broadcast.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), config, 0).unwrap(),
195 macro_rules! reload_node {
196 ($ser: expr, $node_id: expr, $old_monitors: expr) => { {
197 let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new($node_id.to_string()));
198 let watch = Arc::new(ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Bitcoin, Arc::clone(&logger)));
199 let monitor = Arc::new(TestChannelMonitor::new(watch.clone(), broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), fee_est.clone()));
201 let keys_manager = Arc::new(KeyProvider { node_id: $node_id, session_id: atomic::AtomicU8::new(0), channel_id: atomic::AtomicU8::new(0) });
202 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
203 config.channel_options.fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
204 config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
205 config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis = 0;
207 let mut monitors = HashMap::new();
208 let mut old_monitors = $old_monitors.latest_good_update.lock().unwrap();
209 for (outpoint, monitor_ser) in old_monitors.drain() {
210 monitors.insert(outpoint, <(Sha256d, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&monitor_ser), Arc::clone(&logger)).expect("Failed to read monitor").1);
211 monitor.latest_good_update.lock().unwrap().insert(outpoint, monitor_ser);
213 let mut monitor_refs = HashMap::new();
214 for (outpoint, monitor) in monitors.iter() {
215 monitor_refs.insert(*outpoint, monitor);
218 let read_args = ChannelManagerReadArgs {
220 fee_estimator: fee_est.clone(),
221 monitor: monitor.clone(),
222 tx_broadcaster: broadcast.clone(),
224 default_config: config,
225 channel_monitors: &monitor_refs,
228 let res = (<(Sha256d, ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys>)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&$ser.0), read_args).expect("Failed to read manager").1, monitor);
229 for (_, was_good) in $old_monitors.latest_updates_good_at_last_ser.lock().unwrap().iter() {
231 // If the last time we updated a monitor we didn't successfully update (and we
232 // have sense updated our serialized copy of the ChannelManager) we may
233 // force-close the channel on our counterparty cause we know we're missing
234 // something. Thus, we just return here since we can't continue to test.
242 let mut channel_txn = Vec::new();
243 macro_rules! make_channel {
244 ($source: expr, $dest: expr, $chan_id: expr) => { {
245 $source.create_channel($dest.get_our_node_id(), 10000000, 42, 0).unwrap();
247 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
248 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
249 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
251 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
254 $dest.handle_open_channel(&$source.get_our_node_id(), LocalFeatures::new(), &open_channel).unwrap();
255 let accept_channel = {
256 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
257 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
258 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
260 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
263 $source.handle_accept_channel(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), LocalFeatures::new(), &accept_channel).unwrap();
265 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_events();
266 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
267 if let events::Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } = events[0] {
268 let tx = Transaction { version: $chan_id, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
269 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
271 let funding_output = OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0);
272 $source.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
273 channel_txn.push(tx);
274 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
277 let funding_created = {
278 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
279 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
280 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
282 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
284 $dest.handle_funding_created(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created).unwrap();
286 let funding_signed = {
287 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
288 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
289 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
291 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
293 $source.handle_funding_signed(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
296 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_events();
297 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
298 if let events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { .. } = events[0] {
299 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
304 macro_rules! confirm_txn {
306 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
307 let mut txn = Vec::with_capacity(channel_txn.len());
308 let mut posn = Vec::with_capacity(channel_txn.len());
309 for i in 0..channel_txn.len() {
310 txn.push(&channel_txn[i]);
311 posn.push(i as u32 + 1);
313 $node.block_connected(&header, 1, &txn, &posn);
315 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
316 $node.block_connected(&header, i, &Vec::new(), &[0; 0]);
321 macro_rules! lock_fundings {
322 ($nodes: expr) => { {
323 let mut node_events = Vec::new();
324 for node in $nodes.iter() {
325 node_events.push(node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events());
327 for (idx, node_event) in node_events.iter().enumerate() {
328 for event in node_event {
329 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } = event {
330 for node in $nodes.iter() {
331 if node.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
332 node.handle_funding_locked(&$nodes[idx].get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
335 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
339 for node in $nodes.iter() {
340 let events = node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
341 for event in events {
342 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = event {
343 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
349 // 3 nodes is enough to hit all the possible cases, notably unknown-source-unknown-dest
351 let (mut node_a, mut monitor_a) = make_node!(0);
352 let (mut node_b, mut monitor_b) = make_node!(1);
353 let (mut node_c, mut monitor_c) = make_node!(2);
355 let mut nodes = [node_a, node_b, node_c];
357 make_channel!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 0);
358 make_channel!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1);
360 for node in nodes.iter() {
364 lock_fundings!(nodes);
366 let chan_a = nodes[0].list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap();
367 let chan_b = nodes[2].list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap();
369 let mut payment_id = 0;
371 let mut chan_a_disconnected = false;
372 let mut chan_b_disconnected = false;
373 let mut ba_events = Vec::new();
374 let mut bc_events = Vec::new();
376 let mut node_a_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
377 nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
378 let mut node_b_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
379 nodes[1].write(&mut node_b_ser).unwrap();
380 let mut node_c_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
381 nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
383 macro_rules! test_err {
387 Err(LightningError { action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError, .. }) => { },
388 _ => { $res.unwrap() },
393 macro_rules! test_return {
395 assert_eq!(nodes[0].list_channels().len(), 1);
396 assert_eq!(nodes[1].list_channels().len(), 2);
397 assert_eq!(nodes[2].list_channels().len(), 1);
402 let mut read_pos = 0;
403 macro_rules! get_slice {
406 let slice_len = $len as usize;
407 if data.len() < read_pos + slice_len {
410 read_pos += slice_len;
411 &data[read_pos - slice_len..read_pos]
417 macro_rules! send_payment {
418 ($source: expr, $dest: expr) => { {
419 let payment_hash = Sha256::hash(&[payment_id; 1]);
420 payment_id = payment_id.wrapping_add(1);
421 if let Err(_) = $source.send_payment(Route {
422 hops: vec![RouteHop {
423 pubkey: $dest.0.get_our_node_id(),
424 short_channel_id: $dest.1,
426 cltv_expiry_delta: 200,
428 }, PaymentHash(payment_hash.into_inner())) {
429 // Probably ran out of funds
433 ($source: expr, $middle: expr, $dest: expr) => { {
434 let payment_hash = Sha256::hash(&[payment_id; 1]);
435 payment_id = payment_id.wrapping_add(1);
436 if let Err(_) = $source.send_payment(Route {
437 hops: vec![RouteHop {
438 pubkey: $middle.0.get_our_node_id(),
439 short_channel_id: $middle.1,
441 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
443 pubkey: $dest.0.get_our_node_id(),
444 short_channel_id: $dest.1,
446 cltv_expiry_delta: 200,
448 }, PaymentHash(payment_hash.into_inner())) {
449 // Probably ran out of funds
455 macro_rules! process_msg_events {
456 ($node: expr, $corrupt_forward: expr) => { {
457 let events = if $node == 1 {
458 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
459 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut ba_events);
460 new_events.extend_from_slice(&bc_events[..]);
463 } else { Vec::new() };
464 for event in events.iter().chain(nodes[$node].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter()) {
466 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
467 for dest in nodes.iter() {
468 if dest.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
469 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
470 for update_add in update_add_htlcs {
471 if !$corrupt_forward {
472 test_err!(dest.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &update_add));
474 // Corrupt the update_add_htlc message so that its HMAC
475 // check will fail and we generate a
476 // update_fail_malformed_htlc instead of an
477 // update_fail_htlc as we do when we reject a payment.
478 let mut msg_ser = update_add.encode();
479 msg_ser[1000] ^= 0xff;
480 let new_msg = UpdateAddHTLC::read(&mut Cursor::new(&msg_ser)).unwrap();
481 test_err!(dest.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &new_msg));
484 for update_fulfill in update_fulfill_htlcs {
485 test_err!(dest.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill));
487 for update_fail in update_fail_htlcs {
488 test_err!(dest.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &update_fail));
490 for update_fail_malformed in update_fail_malformed_htlcs {
491 test_err!(dest.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_malformed));
493 test_err!(dest.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed));
497 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
498 for dest in nodes.iter() {
499 if dest.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
500 test_err!(dest.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), msg));
504 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
505 for dest in nodes.iter() {
506 if dest.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
507 test_err!(dest.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), msg));
511 events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { .. } => {
512 // Can be generated as a reestablish response
514 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {
515 // Can be generated due to a payment forward being rejected due to a
516 // channel having previously failed a monitor update
518 _ => panic!("Unhandled message event"),
524 macro_rules! drain_msg_events_on_disconnect {
525 ($counterparty_id: expr) => { {
526 if $counterparty_id == 0 {
527 for event in nodes[0].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
529 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
530 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => {},
531 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => {},
532 events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { .. } => {},
533 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
534 _ => panic!("Unhandled message event"),
539 for event in nodes[2].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
541 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
542 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => {},
543 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => {},
544 events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { .. } => {},
545 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
546 _ => panic!("Unhandled message event"),
551 let mut events = nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
552 let drop_node_id = if $counterparty_id == 0 { nodes[0].get_our_node_id() } else { nodes[2].get_our_node_id() };
553 let msg_sink = if $counterparty_id == 0 { &mut bc_events } else { &mut ba_events };
554 for event in events.drain(..) {
555 let push = match event {
556 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
557 if *node_id != drop_node_id { true } else { false }
559 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => {
560 if *node_id != drop_node_id { true } else { false }
562 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => {
563 if *node_id != drop_node_id { true } else { false }
565 events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { .. } => false,
566 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => false,
567 _ => panic!("Unhandled message event"),
569 if push { msg_sink.push(event); }
574 macro_rules! process_events {
575 ($node: expr, $fail: expr) => { {
576 // In case we get 256 payments we may have a hash collision, resulting in the
577 // second claim/fail call not finding the duplicate-hash HTLC, so we have to
578 // deduplicate the calls here.
579 let mut claim_set = HashSet::new();
580 let mut events = nodes[$node].get_and_clear_pending_events();
581 // Sort events so that PendingHTLCsForwardable get processed last. This avoids a
582 // case where we first process a PendingHTLCsForwardable, then claim/fail on a
583 // PaymentReceived, claiming/failing two HTLCs, but leaving a just-generated
584 // PaymentReceived event for the second HTLC in our pending_events (and breaking
585 // our claim_set deduplication).
586 events.sort_by(|a, b| {
587 if let events::Event::PaymentReceived { .. } = a {
588 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = b {
590 } else { Ordering::Equal }
591 } else if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = a {
592 if let events::Event::PaymentReceived { .. } = b {
594 } else { Ordering::Equal }
595 } else { Ordering::Equal }
597 for event in events.drain(..) {
599 events::Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => {
600 if claim_set.insert(payment_hash.0) {
602 assert!(nodes[$node].fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash));
604 assert!(nodes[$node].claim_funds(PaymentPreimage(payment_hash.0), 5_000_000));
608 events::Event::PaymentSent { .. } => {},
609 events::Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {},
610 events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {
611 nodes[$node].process_pending_htlc_forwards();
613 _ => panic!("Unhandled event"),
619 match get_slice!(1)[0] {
620 0x00 => *monitor_a.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure),
621 0x01 => *monitor_b.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure),
622 0x02 => *monitor_c.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure),
623 0x03 => *monitor_a.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()),
624 0x04 => *monitor_b.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()),
625 0x05 => *monitor_c.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()),
626 0x06 => { unsafe { IN_RESTORE = true }; nodes[0].test_restore_channel_monitor(); unsafe { IN_RESTORE = false }; },
627 0x07 => { unsafe { IN_RESTORE = true }; nodes[1].test_restore_channel_monitor(); unsafe { IN_RESTORE = false }; },
628 0x08 => { unsafe { IN_RESTORE = true }; nodes[2].test_restore_channel_monitor(); unsafe { IN_RESTORE = false }; },
629 0x09 => send_payment!(nodes[0], (&nodes[1], chan_a)),
630 0x0a => send_payment!(nodes[1], (&nodes[0], chan_a)),
631 0x0b => send_payment!(nodes[1], (&nodes[2], chan_b)),
632 0x0c => send_payment!(nodes[2], (&nodes[1], chan_b)),
633 0x0d => send_payment!(nodes[0], (&nodes[1], chan_a), (&nodes[2], chan_b)),
634 0x0e => send_payment!(nodes[2], (&nodes[1], chan_b), (&nodes[0], chan_a)),
636 if !chan_a_disconnected {
637 nodes[0].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), false);
638 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), false);
639 chan_a_disconnected = true;
640 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(0);
644 if !chan_b_disconnected {
645 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), false);
646 nodes[2].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), false);
647 chan_b_disconnected = true;
648 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(2);
652 if chan_a_disconnected {
653 nodes[0].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
654 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id());
655 chan_a_disconnected = false;
659 if chan_b_disconnected {
660 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id());
661 nodes[2].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
662 chan_b_disconnected = false;
665 0x13 => process_msg_events!(0, true),
666 0x14 => process_msg_events!(0, false),
667 0x15 => process_events!(0, true),
668 0x16 => process_events!(0, false),
669 0x17 => process_msg_events!(1, true),
670 0x18 => process_msg_events!(1, false),
671 0x19 => process_events!(1, true),
672 0x1a => process_events!(1, false),
673 0x1b => process_msg_events!(2, true),
674 0x1c => process_msg_events!(2, false),
675 0x1d => process_events!(2, true),
676 0x1e => process_events!(2, false),
678 if !chan_a_disconnected {
679 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), false);
680 chan_a_disconnected = true;
681 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(0);
683 let (new_node_a, new_monitor_a) = reload_node!(node_a_ser, 0, monitor_a);
684 node_a = Arc::new(new_node_a);
685 nodes[0] = node_a.clone();
686 monitor_a = new_monitor_a;
689 if !chan_a_disconnected {
690 nodes[0].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), false);
691 chan_a_disconnected = true;
692 nodes[0].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
695 if !chan_b_disconnected {
696 nodes[2].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), false);
697 chan_b_disconnected = true;
698 nodes[2].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
701 let (new_node_b, new_monitor_b) = reload_node!(node_b_ser, 1, monitor_b);
702 node_b = Arc::new(new_node_b);
703 nodes[1] = node_b.clone();
704 monitor_b = new_monitor_b;
707 if !chan_b_disconnected {
708 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), false);
709 chan_b_disconnected = true;
710 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(2);
712 let (new_node_c, new_monitor_c) = reload_node!(node_c_ser, 2, monitor_c);
713 node_c = Arc::new(new_node_c);
714 nodes[2] = node_c.clone();
715 monitor_c = new_monitor_c;
720 if monitor_a.should_update_manager.load(atomic::Ordering::Relaxed) {
721 node_a_ser.0.clear();
722 nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
723 monitor_a.should_update_manager.store(false, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
724 *monitor_a.latest_updates_good_at_last_ser.lock().unwrap() = monitor_a.latest_update_good.lock().unwrap().clone();
726 if monitor_b.should_update_manager.load(atomic::Ordering::Relaxed) {
727 node_b_ser.0.clear();
728 nodes[1].write(&mut node_b_ser).unwrap();
729 monitor_b.should_update_manager.store(false, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
730 *monitor_b.latest_updates_good_at_last_ser.lock().unwrap() = monitor_b.latest_update_good.lock().unwrap().clone();
732 if monitor_c.should_update_manager.load(atomic::Ordering::Relaxed) {
733 node_c_ser.0.clear();
734 nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
735 monitor_c.should_update_manager.store(false, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
736 *monitor_c.latest_updates_good_at_last_ser.lock().unwrap() = monitor_c.latest_update_good.lock().unwrap().clone();
742 pub extern "C" fn chanmon_consistency_run(data: *const u8, datalen: usize) {
743 do_test(unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(data, datalen) });
749 fn duplicate_crash() {
750 super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());