1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Test that monitor update failures don't get our channel state out of sync.
11 //! One of the biggest concern with the monitor update failure handling code is that messages
12 //! resent after monitor updating is restored are delivered out-of-order, resulting in
13 //! commitment_signed messages having "invalid signatures".
14 //! To test this we stand up a network of three nodes and read bytes from the fuzz input to denote
15 //! actions such as sending payments, handling events, or changing monitor update return values on
16 //! a per-node basis. This should allow it to find any cases where the ordering of actions results
17 //! in us getting out of sync with ourselves, and, assuming at least one of our recieve- or
18 //! send-side handling is correct, other peers. We consider it a failure if any action results in a
19 //! channel being force-closed.
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, ScriptBuf};
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
26 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash as TraitImport;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
33 use lightning::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
34 use lightning::blinded_path::payment::ReceiveTlvs;
36 use lightning::chain::{BestBlock, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, chainmonitor, channelmonitor, Confirm, Watch};
37 use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, MonitorEvent};
38 use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
39 use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
40 use lightning::sign::{KeyMaterial, InMemorySigner, Recipient, EntropySource, NodeSigner, SignerProvider};
41 use lightning::events;
42 use lightning::events::MessageSendEventsProvider;
43 use lightning::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
44 use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelDetails, ChannelManager, PaymentSendFailure, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
45 use lightning::ln::channel::FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
46 use lightning::ln::msgs::{self, CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, UpdateAddHTLC, Init};
47 use lightning::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
48 use lightning::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
49 use lightning::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
50 use lightning::offers::invoice_request::UnsignedInvoiceRequest;
51 use lightning::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, OnionMessagePath};
52 use lightning::util::test_channel_signer::{TestChannelSigner, EnforcementState};
53 use lightning::util::errors::APIError;
54 use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
55 use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
56 use lightning::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
57 use lightning::routing::router::{InFlightHtlcs, Path, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
59 use crate::utils::test_logger::{self, Output};
60 use crate::utils::test_persister::TestPersister;
62 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Message, PublicKey, SecretKey, Scalar, Secp256k1, self};
63 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
64 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::{RecoverableSignature, Signature};
65 use bitcoin::secp256k1::schnorr;
68 use std::cmp::{self, Ordering};
69 use hashbrown::{HashSet, hash_map, HashMap};
70 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
71 use std::sync::atomic;
73 use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
75 const MAX_FEE: u32 = 10_000;
76 struct FuzzEstimator {
77 ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32,
79 impl FeeEstimator for FuzzEstimator {
80 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, conf_target: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
81 // We force-close channels if our counterparty sends us a feerate which is a small multiple
82 // of our HighPriority fee estimate or smaller than our Background fee estimate. Thus, we
83 // always return a HighPriority feerate here which is >= the maximum Normal feerate and a
84 // Background feerate which is <= the minimum Normal feerate.
86 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep => MAX_FEE,
87 ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum|ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee|ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee|ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee => 253,
88 ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee => cmp::min(self.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire), MAX_FEE),
95 impl Router for FuzzRouter {
97 &self, _payer: &PublicKey, _params: &RouteParameters, _first_hops: Option<&[&ChannelDetails]>,
98 _inflight_htlcs: InFlightHtlcs
99 ) -> Result<Route, msgs::LightningError> {
100 Err(msgs::LightningError {
101 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
102 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
106 fn create_blinded_payment_paths<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(
107 &self, _recipient: PublicKey, _first_hops: Vec<ChannelDetails>, _tlvs: ReceiveTlvs,
108 _amount_msats: u64, _secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
109 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
114 impl MessageRouter for FuzzRouter {
116 &self, _sender: PublicKey, _peers: Vec<PublicKey>, _destination: Destination
117 ) -> Result<OnionMessagePath, ()> {
121 fn create_blinded_paths<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(
122 &self, _recipient: PublicKey, _peers: Vec<PublicKey>, _secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
123 ) -> Result<Vec<BlindedPath>, ()> {
128 pub struct TestBroadcaster {}
129 impl BroadcasterInterface for TestBroadcaster {
130 fn broadcast_transactions(&self, _txs: &[&Transaction]) { }
133 pub struct VecWriter(pub Vec<u8>);
134 impl Writer for VecWriter {
135 fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
136 self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
141 struct TestChainMonitor {
142 pub logger: Arc<dyn Logger>,
143 pub keys: Arc<KeyProvider>,
144 pub persister: Arc<TestPersister>,
145 pub chain_monitor: Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<TestChannelSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
146 // If we reload a node with an old copy of ChannelMonitors, the ChannelManager deserialization
147 // logic will automatically force-close our channels for us (as we don't have an up-to-date
148 // monitor implying we are not able to punish misbehaving counterparties). Because this test
149 // "fails" if we ever force-close a channel, we avoid doing so, always saving the latest
150 // fully-serialized monitor state here, as well as the corresponding update_id.
151 pub latest_monitors: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, (u64, Vec<u8>)>>,
153 impl TestChainMonitor {
154 pub fn new(broadcaster: Arc<TestBroadcaster>, logger: Arc<dyn Logger>, feeest: Arc<FuzzEstimator>, persister: Arc<TestPersister>, keys: Arc<KeyProvider>) -> Self {
156 chain_monitor: Arc::new(chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::new(None, broadcaster, logger.clone(), feeest, Arc::clone(&persister))),
160 latest_monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
164 impl chain::Watch<TestChannelSigner> for TestChainMonitor {
165 fn watch_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>) -> Result<chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, ()> {
166 let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
167 monitor.write(&mut ser).unwrap();
168 if let Some(_) = self.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().insert(funding_txo, (monitor.get_latest_update_id(), ser.0)) {
169 panic!("Already had monitor pre-watch_channel");
171 self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_txo, monitor)
174 fn update_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: &channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus {
175 let mut map_lock = self.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap();
176 let mut map_entry = match map_lock.entry(funding_txo) {
177 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => entry,
178 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => panic!("Didn't have monitor on update call"),
180 let deserialized_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::
181 read(&mut Cursor::new(&map_entry.get().1), (&*self.keys, &*self.keys)).unwrap().1;
182 deserialized_monitor.update_monitor(update, &&TestBroadcaster{}, &&FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) }, &self.logger).unwrap();
183 let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
184 deserialized_monitor.write(&mut ser).unwrap();
185 map_entry.insert((update.update_id, ser.0));
186 self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update)
189 fn release_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<(OutPoint, Vec<MonitorEvent>, Option<PublicKey>)> {
190 return self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
195 node_secret: SecretKey,
196 rand_bytes_id: atomic::AtomicU32,
197 enforcement_states: Mutex<HashMap<[u8;32], Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>>>>,
200 impl EntropySource for KeyProvider {
201 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
202 let id = self.rand_bytes_id.fetch_add(1, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
203 let mut res = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 11, self.node_secret[31]];
204 res[30-4..30].copy_from_slice(&id.to_le_bytes());
209 impl NodeSigner for KeyProvider {
210 fn get_node_id(&self, recipient: Recipient) -> Result<PublicKey, ()> {
211 let node_secret = match recipient {
212 Recipient::Node => Ok(&self.node_secret),
213 Recipient::PhantomNode => Err(())
215 Ok(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), node_secret))
218 fn ecdh(&self, recipient: Recipient, other_key: &PublicKey, tweak: Option<&Scalar>) -> Result<SharedSecret, ()> {
219 let mut node_secret = match recipient {
220 Recipient::Node => Ok(self.node_secret.clone()),
221 Recipient::PhantomNode => Err(())
223 if let Some(tweak) = tweak {
224 node_secret = node_secret.mul_tweak(tweak).map_err(|_| ())?;
226 Ok(SharedSecret::new(other_key, &node_secret))
229 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial {
230 KeyMaterial([0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, self.node_secret[31]])
233 fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5], _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> {
237 fn sign_bolt12_invoice_request(
238 &self, _invoice_request: &UnsignedInvoiceRequest
239 ) -> Result<schnorr::Signature, ()> {
243 fn sign_bolt12_invoice(
244 &self, _invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice,
245 ) -> Result<schnorr::Signature, ()> {
249 fn sign_gossip_message(&self, msg: lightning::ln::msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
250 let msg_hash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]).map_err(|_| ())?;
251 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
252 Ok(secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msg_hash, &self.node_secret))
256 impl SignerProvider for KeyProvider {
257 type EcdsaSigner = TestChannelSigner;
259 type TaprootSigner = TestChannelSigner;
261 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
262 let id = self.rand_bytes_id.fetch_add(1, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed) as u8;
266 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
267 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
268 let id = channel_keys_id[0];
269 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
271 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
272 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
273 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
274 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
275 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
276 [id, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 9, self.node_secret[31]],
277 channel_value_satoshis,
281 let revoked_commitment = self.make_enforcement_state_cell(keys.commitment_seed);
282 TestChannelSigner::new_with_revoked(keys, revoked_commitment, false)
285 fn read_chan_signer(&self, buffer: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> {
286 let mut reader = std::io::Cursor::new(buffer);
288 let inner: InMemorySigner = ReadableArgs::read(&mut reader, self)?;
289 let state = self.make_enforcement_state_cell(inner.commitment_seed);
291 Ok(TestChannelSigner {
294 disable_revocation_policy_check: false,
295 available: Arc::new(Mutex::new(true)),
299 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
300 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
301 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap();
302 let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
303 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
306 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
307 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
308 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap();
309 let pubkey_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &secret_key).serialize());
310 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh(&pubkey_hash))
315 fn make_enforcement_state_cell(&self, commitment_seed: [u8; 32]) -> Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>> {
316 let mut revoked_commitments = self.enforcement_states.lock().unwrap();
317 if !revoked_commitments.contains_key(&commitment_seed) {
318 revoked_commitments.insert(commitment_seed, Arc::new(Mutex::new(EnforcementState::new())));
320 let cell = revoked_commitments.get(&commitment_seed).unwrap();
326 fn check_api_err(api_err: APIError, sendable_bounds_violated: bool) {
328 APIError::APIMisuseError { .. } => panic!("We can't misuse the API"),
329 APIError::FeeRateTooHigh { .. } => panic!("We can't send too much fee?"),
330 APIError::InvalidRoute { .. } => panic!("Our routes should work"),
331 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err } => {
332 // Test the error against a list of errors we can hit, and reject
333 // all others. If you hit this panic, the list of acceptable errors
334 // is probably just stale and you should add new messages here.
336 "Peer for first hop currently disconnected" => {},
337 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - ") => {},
338 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - ") => {},
339 _ => panic!("{}", err),
341 assert!(sendable_bounds_violated);
343 APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress => {
344 // We can (obviously) temp-fail a monitor update
346 APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { .. } => panic!("Cannot send an incompatible shutdown script"),
350 fn check_payment_err(send_err: PaymentSendFailure, sendable_bounds_violated: bool) {
352 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(api_err) => check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated),
353 PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(per_path_results) => {
354 for res in per_path_results { if let Err(api_err) = res { check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated); } }
356 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(per_path_results) => {
357 for api_err in per_path_results { check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated); }
359 PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure { results, .. } => {
360 for res in results { if let Err(api_err) = res { check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated); } }
362 PaymentSendFailure::DuplicatePayment => panic!(),
366 type ChanMan<'a> = ChannelManager<Arc<TestChainMonitor>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, &'a FuzzRouter, Arc<dyn Logger>>;
369 fn get_payment_secret_hash(dest: &ChanMan, payment_id: &mut u8) -> Option<(PaymentSecret, PaymentHash)> {
370 let mut payment_hash;
372 payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[*payment_id; 1]).to_byte_array());
373 if let Ok(payment_secret) = dest.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 3600, None) {
374 return Some((payment_secret, payment_hash));
376 *payment_id = payment_id.wrapping_add(1);
382 fn send_payment(source: &ChanMan, dest: &ChanMan, dest_chan_id: u64, amt: u64, payment_id: &mut u8, payment_idx: &mut u64) -> bool {
383 let (payment_secret, payment_hash) =
384 if let Some((secret, hash)) = get_payment_secret_hash(dest, payment_id) { (secret, hash) } else { return true; };
385 let mut payment_id = [0; 32];
386 payment_id[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_idx.to_ne_bytes());
388 let (min_value_sendable, max_value_sendable) = source.list_usable_channels()
389 .iter().find(|chan| chan.short_channel_id == Some(dest_chan_id))
391 (chan.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, chan.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat))
393 if let Err(err) = source.send_payment_with_route(&Route {
394 paths: vec![Path { hops: vec![RouteHop {
395 pubkey: dest.get_our_node_id(),
396 node_features: dest.node_features(),
397 short_channel_id: dest_chan_id,
398 channel_features: dest.channel_features(),
400 cltv_expiry_delta: 200,
401 maybe_announced_channel: true,
402 }], blinded_tail: None }],
404 }, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_id)) {
405 check_payment_err(err, amt > max_value_sendable || amt < min_value_sendable);
408 // Note that while the max is a strict upper-bound, we can occasionally send substantially
409 // below the minimum, with some gap which is unusable immediately below the minimum. Thus,
410 // we don't check against min_value_sendable here.
411 assert!(amt <= max_value_sendable);
416 fn send_hop_payment(source: &ChanMan, middle: &ChanMan, middle_chan_id: u64, dest: &ChanMan, dest_chan_id: u64, amt: u64, payment_id: &mut u8, payment_idx: &mut u64) -> bool {
417 let (payment_secret, payment_hash) =
418 if let Some((secret, hash)) = get_payment_secret_hash(dest, payment_id) { (secret, hash) } else { return true; };
419 let mut payment_id = [0; 32];
420 payment_id[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_idx.to_ne_bytes());
422 let (min_value_sendable, max_value_sendable) = source.list_usable_channels()
423 .iter().find(|chan| chan.short_channel_id == Some(middle_chan_id))
425 (chan.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, chan.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat))
427 let first_hop_fee = 50_000;
428 if let Err(err) = source.send_payment_with_route(&Route {
429 paths: vec![Path { hops: vec![RouteHop {
430 pubkey: middle.get_our_node_id(),
431 node_features: middle.node_features(),
432 short_channel_id: middle_chan_id,
433 channel_features: middle.channel_features(),
434 fee_msat: first_hop_fee,
435 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
436 maybe_announced_channel: true,
438 pubkey: dest.get_our_node_id(),
439 node_features: dest.node_features(),
440 short_channel_id: dest_chan_id,
441 channel_features: dest.channel_features(),
443 cltv_expiry_delta: 200,
444 maybe_announced_channel: true,
445 }], blinded_tail: None }],
447 }, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_id)) {
448 let sent_amt = amt + first_hop_fee;
449 check_payment_err(err, sent_amt < min_value_sendable || sent_amt > max_value_sendable);
452 // Note that while the max is a strict upper-bound, we can occasionally send substantially
453 // below the minimum, with some gap which is unusable immediately below the minimum. Thus,
454 // we don't check against min_value_sendable here.
455 assert!(amt + first_hop_fee <= max_value_sendable);
461 pub fn do_test<Out: Output>(data: &[u8], underlying_out: Out, anchors: bool) {
462 let out = SearchingOutput::new(underlying_out);
463 let broadcast = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{});
464 let router = FuzzRouter {};
466 macro_rules! make_node {
467 ($node_id: expr, $fee_estimator: expr) => { {
468 let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new($node_id.to_string(), out.clone()));
469 let node_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, $node_id]).unwrap();
470 let keys_manager = Arc::new(KeyProvider { node_secret, rand_bytes_id: atomic::AtomicU32::new(0), enforcement_states: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()) });
471 let monitor = Arc::new(TestChainMonitor::new(broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), $fee_estimator.clone(),
472 Arc::new(TestPersister {
473 update_ret: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed)
474 }), Arc::clone(&keys_manager)));
476 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
477 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
478 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
480 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
481 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
483 let network = Network::Bitcoin;
484 let best_block_timestamp = genesis_block(network).header.time;
485 let params = ChainParameters {
487 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
489 (ChannelManager::new($fee_estimator.clone(), monitor.clone(), broadcast.clone(), &router, Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), config, params, best_block_timestamp),
490 monitor, keys_manager)
494 macro_rules! reload_node {
495 ($ser: expr, $node_id: expr, $old_monitors: expr, $keys_manager: expr, $fee_estimator: expr) => { {
496 let keys_manager = Arc::clone(& $keys_manager);
497 let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new($node_id.to_string(), out.clone()));
498 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(TestChainMonitor::new(broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), $fee_estimator.clone(),
499 Arc::new(TestPersister {
500 update_ret: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed)
501 }), Arc::clone(& $keys_manager)));
503 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
504 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
505 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
507 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
508 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
511 let mut monitors = HashMap::new();
512 let mut old_monitors = $old_monitors.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap();
513 for (outpoint, (update_id, monitor_ser)) in old_monitors.drain() {
514 monitors.insert(outpoint, <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&monitor_ser), (&*$keys_manager, &*$keys_manager)).expect("Failed to read monitor").1);
515 chain_monitor.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().insert(outpoint, (update_id, monitor_ser));
517 let mut monitor_refs = HashMap::new();
518 for (outpoint, monitor) in monitors.iter_mut() {
519 monitor_refs.insert(*outpoint, monitor);
522 let read_args = ChannelManagerReadArgs {
523 entropy_source: keys_manager.clone(),
524 node_signer: keys_manager.clone(),
525 signer_provider: keys_manager.clone(),
526 fee_estimator: $fee_estimator.clone(),
527 chain_monitor: chain_monitor.clone(),
528 tx_broadcaster: broadcast.clone(),
531 default_config: config,
532 channel_monitors: monitor_refs,
535 let res = (<(BlockHash, ChanMan)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&$ser.0), read_args).expect("Failed to read manager").1, chain_monitor.clone());
536 for (funding_txo, mon) in monitors.drain() {
537 assert_eq!(chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_txo, mon),
538 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
544 let mut channel_txn = Vec::new();
545 macro_rules! make_channel {
546 ($source: expr, $dest: expr, $dest_keys_manager: expr, $chan_id: expr) => { {
547 $source.peer_connected(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
548 features: $dest.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
550 $dest.peer_connected(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
551 features: $source.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
554 $source.create_channel($dest.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42, 0, None, None).unwrap();
556 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
557 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
558 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
560 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
563 $dest.handle_open_channel(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
564 let accept_channel = {
566 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_events();
567 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
568 if let events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
569 ref temporary_channel_id, ref counterparty_node_id, ..
571 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
572 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&$dest_keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
573 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
574 $dest.accept_inbound_channel(
575 temporary_channel_id,
576 counterparty_node_id,
579 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
581 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
582 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
583 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
585 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
588 $source.handle_accept_channel(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
591 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_events();
592 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
593 if let events::Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } = events[0] {
594 let tx = Transaction { version: $chan_id, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
595 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
597 funding_output = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
598 $source.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &$dest.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
599 channel_txn.push(tx);
600 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
603 let funding_created = {
604 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
605 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
606 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
608 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
610 $dest.handle_funding_created(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
612 let funding_signed = {
613 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
614 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
615 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
617 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
619 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_events();
620 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
621 if let events::Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } = events[0] {
622 assert_eq!(counterparty_node_id, &$source.get_our_node_id());
623 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
625 $source.handle_funding_signed(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
626 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_events();
627 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
628 if let events::Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } = events[0] {
629 assert_eq!(counterparty_node_id, &$dest.get_our_node_id());
630 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
636 macro_rules! confirm_txn {
638 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash();
639 let mut header = create_dummy_header(chain_hash, 42);
640 let txdata: Vec<_> = channel_txn.iter().enumerate().map(|(i, tx)| (i + 1, tx)).collect();
641 $node.transactions_confirmed(&header, &txdata, 1);
643 header = create_dummy_header(header.block_hash(), 42);
645 $node.best_block_updated(&header, 99);
649 macro_rules! lock_fundings {
650 ($nodes: expr) => { {
651 let mut node_events = Vec::new();
652 for node in $nodes.iter() {
653 node_events.push(node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events());
655 for (idx, node_event) in node_events.iter().enumerate() {
656 for event in node_event {
657 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } = event {
658 for node in $nodes.iter() {
659 if node.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
660 node.handle_channel_ready(&$nodes[idx].get_our_node_id(), msg);
663 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
667 for node in $nodes.iter() {
668 let events = node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
669 for event in events {
670 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = event {
671 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
677 let fee_est_a = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
678 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_a = 253;
679 let fee_est_b = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
680 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_b = 253;
681 let fee_est_c = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
682 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_c = 253;
684 // 3 nodes is enough to hit all the possible cases, notably unknown-source-unknown-dest
686 let (node_a, mut monitor_a, keys_manager_a) = make_node!(0, fee_est_a);
687 let (node_b, mut monitor_b, keys_manager_b) = make_node!(1, fee_est_b);
688 let (node_c, mut monitor_c, keys_manager_c) = make_node!(2, fee_est_c);
690 let mut nodes = [node_a, node_b, node_c];
692 let chan_1_funding = make_channel!(nodes[0], nodes[1], keys_manager_b, 0);
693 let chan_2_funding = make_channel!(nodes[1], nodes[2], keys_manager_c, 1);
695 for node in nodes.iter() {
699 lock_fundings!(nodes);
701 let chan_a = nodes[0].list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap();
702 let chan_b = nodes[2].list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap();
704 let mut payment_id: u8 = 0;
705 let mut payment_idx: u64 = 0;
707 let mut chan_a_disconnected = false;
708 let mut chan_b_disconnected = false;
709 let mut ab_events = Vec::new();
710 let mut ba_events = Vec::new();
711 let mut bc_events = Vec::new();
712 let mut cb_events = Vec::new();
714 let mut node_a_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
715 nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
716 let mut node_b_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
717 nodes[1].write(&mut node_b_ser).unwrap();
718 let mut node_c_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
719 nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
721 macro_rules! test_return {
723 assert_eq!(nodes[0].list_channels().len(), 1);
724 assert_eq!(nodes[1].list_channels().len(), 2);
725 assert_eq!(nodes[2].list_channels().len(), 1);
730 let mut read_pos = 0;
731 macro_rules! get_slice {
734 let slice_len = $len as usize;
735 if data.len() < read_pos + slice_len {
738 read_pos += slice_len;
739 &data[read_pos - slice_len..read_pos]
745 // Push any events from Node B onto ba_events and bc_events
746 macro_rules! push_excess_b_events {
747 ($excess_events: expr, $expect_drop_node: expr) => { {
748 let a_id = nodes[0].get_our_node_id();
749 let expect_drop_node: Option<usize> = $expect_drop_node;
750 let expect_drop_id = if let Some(id) = expect_drop_node { Some(nodes[id].get_our_node_id()) } else { None };
751 for event in $excess_events {
752 let push_a = match event {
753 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
754 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
757 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => {
758 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
761 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => {
762 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
765 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => continue,
766 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => continue,
767 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
768 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
769 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
772 _ => panic!("Unhandled message event {:?}", event),
774 if push_a { ba_events.push(event); } else { bc_events.push(event); }
779 // While delivering messages, we select across three possible message selection processes
780 // to ensure we get as much coverage as possible. See the individual enum variants for more
783 enum ProcessMessages {
784 /// Deliver all available messages, including fetching any new messages from
785 /// `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` (which may have side effects).
787 /// Call `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` first, and then deliver up to one
788 /// message (which may already be queued).
790 /// Deliver up to one already-queued message. This avoids any potential side-effects
791 /// of `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` (eg freeing the HTLC holding cell), which
792 /// provides potentially more coverage.
796 macro_rules! process_msg_events {
797 ($node: expr, $corrupt_forward: expr, $limit_events: expr) => { {
798 let mut events = if $node == 1 {
799 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
800 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut ba_events);
801 new_events.extend_from_slice(&bc_events[..]);
804 } else if $node == 0 {
805 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
806 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut ab_events);
809 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
810 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut cb_events);
813 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
814 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage {
815 new_events = nodes[$node].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
817 let mut had_events = false;
818 let mut events_iter = events.drain(..).chain(new_events.drain(..));
819 let mut extra_ev = None;
820 for event in &mut events_iter {
823 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee, commitment_signed } } => {
824 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
825 if dest.get_our_node_id() == node_id {
826 for update_add in update_add_htlcs.iter() {
827 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_add_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
828 if !$corrupt_forward {
829 dest.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_add);
831 // Corrupt the update_add_htlc message so that its HMAC
832 // check will fail and we generate a
833 // update_fail_malformed_htlc instead of an
834 // update_fail_htlc as we do when we reject a payment.
835 let mut msg_ser = update_add.encode();
836 msg_ser[1000] ^= 0xff;
837 let new_msg = UpdateAddHTLC::read(&mut Cursor::new(&msg_ser)).unwrap();
838 dest.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &new_msg);
841 for update_fulfill in update_fulfill_htlcs.iter() {
842 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fulfill_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
843 dest.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fulfill);
845 for update_fail in update_fail_htlcs.iter() {
846 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fail_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
847 dest.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fail);
849 for update_fail_malformed in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.iter() {
850 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fail_malformed_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
851 dest.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fail_malformed);
853 if let Some(msg) = update_fee {
854 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fee to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
855 dest.handle_update_fee(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &msg);
857 let processed_change = !update_add_htlcs.is_empty() || !update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() ||
858 !update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() || !update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty();
859 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::AllMessages && processed_change {
860 // If we only want to process some messages, don't deliver the CS until later.
861 extra_ev = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: CommitmentUpdate {
862 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
863 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
864 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
865 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
871 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering commitment_signed to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
872 dest.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
877 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
878 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
879 if dest.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
880 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering revoke_and_ack to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
881 dest.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), msg);
885 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
886 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
887 if dest.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
888 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering channel_reestablish to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
889 dest.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), msg);
893 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => {
894 // Can be generated as a reestablish response
896 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {
897 // Can be generated as a reestablish response
899 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
900 // When we reconnect we will resend a channel_update to make sure our
901 // counterparty has the latest parameters for receiving payments
902 // through us. We do, however, check that the message does not include
903 // the "disabled" bit, as we should never ever have a channel which is
904 // disabled when we send such an update (or it may indicate channel
905 // force-close which we should detect as an error).
906 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0);
908 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
911 panic!("Unhandled message event {:?}", event)
914 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::AllMessages {
919 push_excess_b_events!(extra_ev.into_iter().chain(events_iter), None);
920 } else if $node == 0 {
921 if let Some(ev) = extra_ev { ab_events.push(ev); }
922 for event in events_iter { ab_events.push(event); }
924 if let Some(ev) = extra_ev { cb_events.push(ev); }
925 for event in events_iter { cb_events.push(event); }
931 macro_rules! drain_msg_events_on_disconnect {
932 ($counterparty_id: expr) => { {
933 if $counterparty_id == 0 {
934 for event in nodes[0].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
936 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
937 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => {},
938 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => {},
939 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => {},
940 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {},
941 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
942 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
944 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
947 panic!("Unhandled message event")
951 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(0));
955 for event in nodes[2].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
957 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
958 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => {},
959 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => {},
960 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => {},
961 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {},
962 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
963 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
965 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
968 panic!("Unhandled message event")
972 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(2));
979 macro_rules! process_events {
980 ($node: expr, $fail: expr) => { {
981 // In case we get 256 payments we may have a hash collision, resulting in the
982 // second claim/fail call not finding the duplicate-hash HTLC, so we have to
983 // deduplicate the calls here.
984 let mut claim_set = HashSet::new();
985 let mut events = nodes[$node].get_and_clear_pending_events();
986 // Sort events so that PendingHTLCsForwardable get processed last. This avoids a
987 // case where we first process a PendingHTLCsForwardable, then claim/fail on a
988 // PaymentClaimable, claiming/failing two HTLCs, but leaving a just-generated
989 // PaymentClaimable event for the second HTLC in our pending_events (and breaking
990 // our claim_set deduplication).
991 events.sort_by(|a, b| {
992 if let events::Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } = a {
993 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = b {
995 } else { Ordering::Equal }
996 } else if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = a {
997 if let events::Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } = b {
999 } else { Ordering::Equal }
1000 } else { Ordering::Equal }
1002 let had_events = !events.is_empty();
1003 for event in events.drain(..) {
1005 events::Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, .. } => {
1006 if claim_set.insert(payment_hash.0) {
1008 nodes[$node].fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
1010 nodes[$node].claim_funds(PaymentPreimage(payment_hash.0));
1014 events::Event::PaymentSent { .. } => {},
1015 events::Event::PaymentClaimed { .. } => {},
1016 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
1017 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } => {},
1018 events::Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {},
1019 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful { .. } | events::Event::ProbeFailed { .. } => {
1020 // Even though we don't explicitly send probes, because probes are
1021 // detected based on hashing the payment hash+preimage, its rather
1022 // trivial for the fuzzer to build payments that accidentally end up
1023 // looking like probes.
1025 events::Event::PaymentForwarded { .. } if $node == 1 => {},
1026 events::Event::ChannelReady { .. } => {},
1027 events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {
1028 nodes[$node].process_pending_htlc_forwards();
1030 events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => {},
1031 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
1034 panic!("Unhandled event")
1042 let v = get_slice!(1)[0];
1043 out.locked_write(format!("READ A BYTE! HANDLING INPUT {:x}...........\n", v).as_bytes());
1045 // In general, we keep related message groups close together in binary form, allowing
1046 // bit-twiddling mutations to have similar effects. This is probably overkill, but no
1047 // harm in doing so.
1049 0x00 => *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress,
1050 0x01 => *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress,
1051 0x02 => *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress,
1052 0x04 => *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed,
1053 0x05 => *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed,
1054 0x06 => *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed,
1057 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_a.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1058 monitor_a.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1059 nodes[0].process_monitor_events();
1063 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1064 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1065 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1069 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1070 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1071 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1075 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_c.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1076 monitor_c.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1077 nodes[2].process_monitor_events();
1082 if !chan_a_disconnected {
1083 nodes[0].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1084 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id());
1085 chan_a_disconnected = true;
1086 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(0);
1090 if !chan_b_disconnected {
1091 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id());
1092 nodes[2].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1093 chan_b_disconnected = true;
1094 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(2);
1098 if chan_a_disconnected {
1099 nodes[0].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1100 features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1102 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1103 features: nodes[0].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1105 chan_a_disconnected = false;
1109 if chan_b_disconnected {
1110 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1111 features: nodes[2].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1113 nodes[2].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1114 features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1116 chan_b_disconnected = false;
1120 0x10 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1121 0x11 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1122 0x12 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1123 0x13 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1124 0x14 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1125 0x15 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1127 0x16 => { process_events!(0, true); },
1128 0x17 => { process_events!(0, false); },
1130 0x18 => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1131 0x19 => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1132 0x1a => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1133 0x1b => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1134 0x1c => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1135 0x1d => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1137 0x1e => { process_events!(1, true); },
1138 0x1f => { process_events!(1, false); },
1140 0x20 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1141 0x21 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1142 0x22 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1143 0x23 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1144 0x24 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1145 0x25 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1147 0x26 => { process_events!(2, true); },
1148 0x27 => { process_events!(2, false); },
1151 if !chan_a_disconnected {
1152 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id());
1153 chan_a_disconnected = true;
1154 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(0));
1158 let (new_node_a, new_monitor_a) = reload_node!(node_a_ser, 0, monitor_a, keys_manager_a, fee_est_a);
1159 nodes[0] = new_node_a;
1160 monitor_a = new_monitor_a;
1163 if !chan_a_disconnected {
1164 nodes[0].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1165 chan_a_disconnected = true;
1166 nodes[0].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1170 if !chan_b_disconnected {
1171 nodes[2].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1172 chan_b_disconnected = true;
1173 nodes[2].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1177 let (new_node_b, new_monitor_b) = reload_node!(node_b_ser, 1, monitor_b, keys_manager_b, fee_est_b);
1178 nodes[1] = new_node_b;
1179 monitor_b = new_monitor_b;
1182 if !chan_b_disconnected {
1183 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id());
1184 chan_b_disconnected = true;
1185 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(2));
1189 let (new_node_c, new_monitor_c) = reload_node!(node_c_ser, 2, monitor_c, keys_manager_c, fee_est_c);
1190 nodes[2] = new_node_c;
1191 monitor_c = new_monitor_c;
1194 // 1/10th the channel size:
1195 0x30 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1196 0x31 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1197 0x32 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1198 0x33 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1199 0x34 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1200 0x35 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1202 0x38 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1203 0x39 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1204 0x3a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1205 0x3b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1206 0x3c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1207 0x3d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1209 0x40 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1210 0x41 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1211 0x42 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1212 0x43 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1213 0x44 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1214 0x45 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1216 0x48 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1217 0x49 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1218 0x4a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1219 0x4b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1220 0x4c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1221 0x4d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1223 0x50 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1224 0x51 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1225 0x52 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1226 0x53 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1227 0x54 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1228 0x55 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1230 0x58 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1231 0x59 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1232 0x5a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1233 0x5b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1234 0x5c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1235 0x5d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1237 0x60 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1238 0x61 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1239 0x62 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1240 0x63 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1241 0x64 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1242 0x65 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1244 0x68 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1245 0x69 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1246 0x6a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1247 0x6b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1248 0x6c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1249 0x6d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1252 let mut max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_a;
1254 max_feerate *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1256 if fee_est_a.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1257 fee_est_a.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1259 nodes[0].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1261 0x81 => { fee_est_a.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[0].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1264 let mut max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_b;
1266 max_feerate *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1268 if fee_est_b.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1269 fee_est_b.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1271 nodes[1].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1273 0x85 => { fee_est_b.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[1].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1276 let mut max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_c;
1278 max_feerate *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1280 if fee_est_c.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1281 fee_est_c.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1283 nodes[2].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1285 0x89 => { fee_est_c.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[2].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1288 let pending_updates = monitor_a.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_1_funding).unwrap();
1289 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.get(0) {
1290 monitor_a.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id).unwrap();
1292 nodes[0].process_monitor_events();
1295 let pending_updates = monitor_a.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_1_funding).unwrap();
1296 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.get(1) {
1297 monitor_a.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id).unwrap();
1299 nodes[0].process_monitor_events();
1302 let pending_updates = monitor_a.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_1_funding).unwrap();
1303 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.last() {
1304 monitor_a.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id).unwrap();
1306 nodes[0].process_monitor_events();
1310 let pending_updates = monitor_b.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_1_funding).unwrap();
1311 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.get(0) {
1312 monitor_b.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id).unwrap();
1314 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1317 let pending_updates = monitor_b.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_1_funding).unwrap();
1318 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.get(1) {
1319 monitor_b.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id).unwrap();
1321 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1324 let pending_updates = monitor_b.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_1_funding).unwrap();
1325 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.last() {
1326 monitor_b.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id).unwrap();
1328 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1332 let pending_updates = monitor_b.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_2_funding).unwrap();
1333 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.get(0) {
1334 monitor_b.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id).unwrap();
1336 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1339 let pending_updates = monitor_b.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_2_funding).unwrap();
1340 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.get(1) {
1341 monitor_b.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id).unwrap();
1343 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1346 let pending_updates = monitor_b.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_2_funding).unwrap();
1347 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.last() {
1348 monitor_b.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id).unwrap();
1350 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1354 let pending_updates = monitor_c.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_2_funding).unwrap();
1355 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.get(0) {
1356 monitor_c.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id).unwrap();
1358 nodes[2].process_monitor_events();
1361 let pending_updates = monitor_c.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_2_funding).unwrap();
1362 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.get(1) {
1363 monitor_c.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id).unwrap();
1365 nodes[2].process_monitor_events();
1368 let pending_updates = monitor_c.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_2_funding).unwrap();
1369 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.last() {
1370 monitor_c.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id).unwrap();
1372 nodes[2].process_monitor_events();
1376 // Test that no channel is in a stuck state where neither party can send funds even
1377 // after we resolve all pending events.
1378 // First make sure there are no pending monitor updates, resetting the error state
1379 // and calling force_channel_monitor_updated for each monitor.
1380 *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed;
1381 *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed;
1382 *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed;
1384 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_a.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1385 monitor_a.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1386 nodes[0].process_monitor_events();
1388 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1389 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1390 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1392 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1393 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1394 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1396 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_c.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1397 monitor_c.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1398 nodes[2].process_monitor_events();
1401 // Next, make sure peers are all connected to each other
1402 if chan_a_disconnected {
1403 nodes[0].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1404 features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1406 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1407 features: nodes[0].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1409 chan_a_disconnected = false;
1411 if chan_b_disconnected {
1412 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1413 features: nodes[2].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1415 nodes[2].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1416 features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1418 chan_b_disconnected = false;
1421 for i in 0..std::usize::MAX {
1422 if i == 100 { panic!("It may take may iterations to settle the state, but it should not take forever"); }
1423 // Then, make sure any current forwards make their way to their destination
1424 if process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1425 if process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1426 if process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1427 // ...making sure any pending PendingHTLCsForwardable events are handled and
1428 // payments claimed.
1429 if process_events!(0, false) { continue; }
1430 if process_events!(1, false) { continue; }
1431 if process_events!(2, false) { continue; }
1435 // Finally, make sure that at least one end of each channel can make a substantial payment
1437 send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx) ||
1438 send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx));
1440 send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx) ||
1441 send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx));
1443 last_htlc_clear_fee_a = fee_est_a.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1444 last_htlc_clear_fee_b = fee_est_b.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1445 last_htlc_clear_fee_c = fee_est_c.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1447 _ => test_return!(),
1450 if nodes[0].get_and_clear_needs_persistence() == true {
1451 node_a_ser.0.clear();
1452 nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
1454 if nodes[1].get_and_clear_needs_persistence() == true {
1455 node_b_ser.0.clear();
1456 nodes[1].write(&mut node_b_ser).unwrap();
1458 if nodes[2].get_and_clear_needs_persistence() == true {
1459 node_c_ser.0.clear();
1460 nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
1465 /// We actually have different behavior based on if a certain log string has been seen, so we have
1466 /// to do a bit more tracking.
1468 struct SearchingOutput<O: Output> {
1470 may_fail: Arc<atomic::AtomicBool>,
1472 impl<O: Output> Output for SearchingOutput<O> {
1473 fn locked_write(&self, data: &[u8]) {
1474 // We hit a design limitation of LN state machine (see CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER)
1475 if std::str::from_utf8(data).unwrap().contains("Outbound update_fee HTLC buffer overflow - counterparty should force-close this channel") {
1476 self.may_fail.store(true, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1478 self.output.locked_write(data)
1481 impl<O: Output> SearchingOutput<O> {
1482 pub fn new(output: O) -> Self {
1483 Self { output, may_fail: Arc::new(atomic::AtomicBool::new(false)) }
1487 pub fn chanmon_consistency_test<Out: Output>(data: &[u8], out: Out) {
1488 do_test(data, out.clone(), false);
1489 do_test(data, out, true);
1493 pub extern "C" fn chanmon_consistency_run(data: *const u8, datalen: usize) {
1494 do_test(unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(data, datalen) }, test_logger::DevNull{}, false);
1495 do_test(unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(data, datalen) }, test_logger::DevNull{}, true);