1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Test that monitor update failures don't get our channel state out of sync.
11 //! One of the biggest concern with the monitor update failure handling code is that messages
12 //! resent after monitor updating is restored are delivered out-of-order, resulting in
13 //! commitment_signed messages having "invalid signatures".
14 //! To test this we stand up a network of three nodes and read bytes from the fuzz input to denote
15 //! actions such as sending payments, handling events, or changing monitor update return values on
16 //! a per-node basis. This should allow it to find any cases where the ordering of actions results
17 //! in us getting out of sync with ourselves, and, assuming at least one of our recieve- or
18 //! send-side handling is correct, other peers. We consider it a failure if any action results in a
19 //! channel being force-closed.
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
26 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash as TraitImport;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
33 use lightning::chain::{BestBlock, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, chainmonitor, channelmonitor, Confirm, Watch};
34 use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, MonitorEvent};
35 use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
36 use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
37 use lightning::chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
38 use lightning::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
39 use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentSendFailure, ChannelManagerReadArgs};
40 use lightning::ln::channel::FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
41 use lightning::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
42 use lightning::ln::msgs::{CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, UpdateAddHTLC, Init};
43 use lightning::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
44 use lightning::util::enforcing_trait_impls::{EnforcingSigner, EnforcementState};
45 use lightning::util::errors::APIError;
46 use lightning::util::events;
47 use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
48 use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
49 use lightning::util::events::MessageSendEventsProvider;
50 use lightning::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
51 use lightning::routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
53 use utils::test_logger::{self, Output};
54 use utils::test_persister::TestPersister;
56 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
57 use bitcoin::secp256k1::recovery::RecoverableSignature;
58 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
61 use std::cmp::{self, Ordering};
62 use std::collections::{HashSet, hash_map, HashMap};
63 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
64 use std::sync::atomic;
67 const MAX_FEE: u32 = 10_000;
68 struct FuzzEstimator {
69 ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32,
71 impl FeeEstimator for FuzzEstimator {
72 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, conf_target: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
73 // We force-close channels if our counterparty sends us a feerate which is a small multiple
74 // of our HighPriority fee estimate or smaller than our Background fee estimate. Thus, we
75 // always return a HighPriority feerate here which is >= the maximum Normal feerate and a
76 // Background feerate which is <= the minimum Normal feerate.
78 ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority => MAX_FEE,
79 ConfirmationTarget::Background => 253,
80 ConfirmationTarget::Normal => cmp::min(self.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire), MAX_FEE),
85 pub struct TestBroadcaster {}
86 impl BroadcasterInterface for TestBroadcaster {
87 fn broadcast_transaction(&self, _tx: &Transaction) { }
90 pub struct VecWriter(pub Vec<u8>);
91 impl Writer for VecWriter {
92 fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
93 self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
98 struct TestChainMonitor {
99 pub logger: Arc<dyn Logger>,
100 pub keys: Arc<KeyProvider>,
101 pub persister: Arc<TestPersister>,
102 pub chain_monitor: Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<EnforcingSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
103 // If we reload a node with an old copy of ChannelMonitors, the ChannelManager deserialization
104 // logic will automatically force-close our channels for us (as we don't have an up-to-date
105 // monitor implying we are not able to punish misbehaving counterparties). Because this test
106 // "fails" if we ever force-close a channel, we avoid doing so, always saving the latest
107 // fully-serialized monitor state here, as well as the corresponding update_id.
108 pub latest_monitors: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, (u64, Vec<u8>)>>,
109 pub should_update_manager: atomic::AtomicBool,
111 impl TestChainMonitor {
112 pub fn new(broadcaster: Arc<TestBroadcaster>, logger: Arc<dyn Logger>, feeest: Arc<FuzzEstimator>, persister: Arc<TestPersister>, keys: Arc<KeyProvider>) -> Self {
114 chain_monitor: Arc::new(chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::new(None, broadcaster, logger.clone(), feeest, Arc::clone(&persister))),
118 latest_monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
119 should_update_manager: atomic::AtomicBool::new(false),
123 impl chain::Watch<EnforcingSigner> for TestChainMonitor {
124 fn watch_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>) -> Result<(), chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
125 let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
126 monitor.write(&mut ser).unwrap();
127 if let Some(_) = self.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().insert(funding_txo, (monitor.get_latest_update_id(), ser.0)) {
128 panic!("Already had monitor pre-watch_channel");
130 self.should_update_manager.store(true, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
131 self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_txo, monitor)
134 fn update_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
135 let mut map_lock = self.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap();
136 let mut map_entry = match map_lock.entry(funding_txo) {
137 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => entry,
138 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => panic!("Didn't have monitor on update call"),
140 let deserialized_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::
141 read(&mut Cursor::new(&map_entry.get().1), &*self.keys).unwrap().1;
142 deserialized_monitor.update_monitor(&update, &&TestBroadcaster{}, &&FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) }, &self.logger).unwrap();
143 let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
144 deserialized_monitor.write(&mut ser).unwrap();
145 map_entry.insert((update.update_id, ser.0));
146 self.should_update_manager.store(true, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
147 self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update)
150 fn release_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
151 return self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
157 rand_bytes_id: atomic::AtomicU32,
158 enforcement_states: Mutex<HashMap<[u8;32], Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>>>>,
160 impl KeysInterface for KeyProvider {
161 type Signer = EnforcingSigner;
163 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey {
164 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, self.node_id]).unwrap()
167 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
168 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
169 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, self.node_id]).unwrap();
170 let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
171 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
174 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
175 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
176 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, self.node_id]).unwrap();
177 let pubkey_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &secret_key).serialize());
178 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh(&pubkey_hash)
181 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> EnforcingSigner {
182 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
183 let id = self.rand_bytes_id.fetch_add(1, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
184 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
186 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, self.node_id]).unwrap(),
187 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, self.node_id]).unwrap(),
188 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, self.node_id]).unwrap(),
189 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, self.node_id]).unwrap(),
190 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8, self.node_id]).unwrap(),
191 [id as u8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 9, self.node_id],
192 channel_value_satoshis,
195 let revoked_commitment = self.make_enforcement_state_cell(keys.commitment_seed);
196 EnforcingSigner::new_with_revoked(keys, revoked_commitment, false)
199 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
200 let id = self.rand_bytes_id.fetch_add(1, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
201 let mut res = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 11, self.node_id];
202 res[30-4..30].copy_from_slice(&id.to_le_bytes());
206 fn read_chan_signer(&self, buffer: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> {
207 let mut reader = std::io::Cursor::new(buffer);
209 let inner: InMemorySigner = Readable::read(&mut reader)?;
210 let state = self.make_enforcement_state_cell(inner.commitment_seed);
215 disable_revocation_policy_check: false,
219 fn sign_invoice(&self, _invoice_preimage: Vec<u8>) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> {
225 fn make_enforcement_state_cell(&self, commitment_seed: [u8; 32]) -> Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>> {
226 let mut revoked_commitments = self.enforcement_states.lock().unwrap();
227 if !revoked_commitments.contains_key(&commitment_seed) {
228 revoked_commitments.insert(commitment_seed, Arc::new(Mutex::new(EnforcementState::new())));
230 let cell = revoked_commitments.get(&commitment_seed).unwrap();
236 fn check_api_err(api_err: APIError) {
238 APIError::APIMisuseError { .. } => panic!("We can't misuse the API"),
239 APIError::FeeRateTooHigh { .. } => panic!("We can't send too much fee?"),
240 APIError::RouteError { .. } => panic!("Our routes should work"),
241 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err } => {
242 // Test the error against a list of errors we can hit, and reject
243 // all others. If you hit this panic, the list of acceptable errors
244 // is probably just stale and you should add new messages here.
246 "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!" => {},
247 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ") => {},
248 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ") => {},
249 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value") => {},
250 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value") => {},
251 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds.") => {},
252 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees.") => {},
253 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at") => {},
254 _ => panic!("{}", err),
257 APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed => {
258 // We can (obviously) temp-fail a monitor update
260 APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { .. } => panic!("Cannot send an incompatible shutdown script"),
264 fn check_payment_err(send_err: PaymentSendFailure) {
266 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(api_err) => check_api_err(api_err),
267 PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(per_path_results) => {
268 for res in per_path_results { if let Err(api_err) = res { check_api_err(api_err); } }
270 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(per_path_results) => {
271 for api_err in per_path_results { check_api_err(api_err); }
273 PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure { results, .. } => {
274 for res in results { if let Err(api_err) = res { check_api_err(api_err); } }
279 type ChanMan = ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, Arc<TestChainMonitor>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>>;
282 fn get_payment_secret_hash(dest: &ChanMan, payment_id: &mut u8) -> Option<(PaymentSecret, PaymentHash)> {
283 let mut payment_hash;
285 payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[*payment_id; 1]).into_inner());
286 if let Ok(payment_secret) = dest.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 3600) {
287 return Some((payment_secret, payment_hash));
289 *payment_id = payment_id.wrapping_add(1);
295 fn send_payment(source: &ChanMan, dest: &ChanMan, dest_chan_id: u64, amt: u64, payment_id: &mut u8) -> bool {
296 let (payment_secret, payment_hash) =
297 if let Some((secret, hash)) = get_payment_secret_hash(dest, payment_id) { (secret, hash) } else { return true; };
298 if let Err(err) = source.send_payment(&Route {
299 paths: vec![vec![RouteHop {
300 pubkey: dest.get_our_node_id(),
301 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
302 short_channel_id: dest_chan_id,
303 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
305 cltv_expiry_delta: 200,
308 }, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) {
309 check_payment_err(err);
314 fn send_hop_payment(source: &ChanMan, middle: &ChanMan, middle_chan_id: u64, dest: &ChanMan, dest_chan_id: u64, amt: u64, payment_id: &mut u8) -> bool {
315 let (payment_secret, payment_hash) =
316 if let Some((secret, hash)) = get_payment_secret_hash(dest, payment_id) { (secret, hash) } else { return true; };
317 if let Err(err) = source.send_payment(&Route {
318 paths: vec![vec![RouteHop {
319 pubkey: middle.get_our_node_id(),
320 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
321 short_channel_id: middle_chan_id,
322 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
324 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
326 pubkey: dest.get_our_node_id(),
327 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
328 short_channel_id: dest_chan_id,
329 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
331 cltv_expiry_delta: 200,
334 }, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) {
335 check_payment_err(err);
341 pub fn do_test<Out: Output>(data: &[u8], underlying_out: Out) {
342 let out = SearchingOutput::new(underlying_out);
343 let broadcast = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{});
345 macro_rules! make_node {
346 ($node_id: expr, $fee_estimator: expr) => { {
347 let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new($node_id.to_string(), out.clone()));
348 let keys_manager = Arc::new(KeyProvider { node_id: $node_id, rand_bytes_id: atomic::AtomicU32::new(0), enforcement_states: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()) });
349 let monitor = Arc::new(TestChainMonitor::new(broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), $fee_estimator.clone(),
350 Arc::new(TestPersister { update_ret: Mutex::new(Ok(())) }), Arc::clone(&keys_manager)));
352 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
353 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
354 config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
355 let network = Network::Bitcoin;
356 let params = ChainParameters {
358 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
360 (ChannelManager::new($fee_estimator.clone(), monitor.clone(), broadcast.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), config, params),
361 monitor, keys_manager)
365 macro_rules! reload_node {
366 ($ser: expr, $node_id: expr, $old_monitors: expr, $keys_manager: expr, $fee_estimator: expr) => { {
367 let keys_manager = Arc::clone(& $keys_manager);
368 let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new($node_id.to_string(), out.clone()));
369 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(TestChainMonitor::new(broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), $fee_estimator.clone(),
370 Arc::new(TestPersister { update_ret: Mutex::new(Ok(())) }), Arc::clone(& $keys_manager)));
372 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
373 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
374 config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
376 let mut monitors = HashMap::new();
377 let mut old_monitors = $old_monitors.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap();
378 for (outpoint, (update_id, monitor_ser)) in old_monitors.drain() {
379 monitors.insert(outpoint, <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&monitor_ser), &*$keys_manager).expect("Failed to read monitor").1);
380 chain_monitor.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().insert(outpoint, (update_id, monitor_ser));
382 let mut monitor_refs = HashMap::new();
383 for (outpoint, monitor) in monitors.iter_mut() {
384 monitor_refs.insert(*outpoint, monitor);
387 let read_args = ChannelManagerReadArgs {
389 fee_estimator: $fee_estimator.clone(),
390 chain_monitor: chain_monitor.clone(),
391 tx_broadcaster: broadcast.clone(),
393 default_config: config,
394 channel_monitors: monitor_refs,
397 let res = (<(BlockHash, ChanMan)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&$ser.0), read_args).expect("Failed to read manager").1, chain_monitor.clone());
398 for (funding_txo, mon) in monitors.drain() {
399 assert!(chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_txo, mon).is_ok());
405 let mut channel_txn = Vec::new();
406 macro_rules! make_channel {
407 ($source: expr, $dest: expr, $chan_id: expr) => { {
408 $source.peer_connected(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
409 $dest.peer_connected(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
411 $source.create_channel($dest.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42, 0, None).unwrap();
413 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
414 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
415 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
417 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
420 $dest.handle_open_channel(&$source.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
421 let accept_channel = {
422 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
423 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
424 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
426 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
429 $source.handle_accept_channel(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
432 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_events();
433 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
434 if let events::Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } = events[0] {
435 let tx = Transaction { version: $chan_id, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
436 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
438 funding_output = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
439 $source.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
440 channel_txn.push(tx);
441 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
444 let funding_created = {
445 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
446 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
447 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
449 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
451 $dest.handle_funding_created(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
453 let funding_signed = {
454 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
455 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
456 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
458 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
460 $source.handle_funding_signed(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
466 macro_rules! confirm_txn {
468 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash();
469 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: chain_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
470 let txdata: Vec<_> = channel_txn.iter().enumerate().map(|(i, tx)| (i + 1, tx)).collect();
471 $node.transactions_confirmed(&header, &txdata, 1);
473 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
475 $node.best_block_updated(&header, 99);
479 macro_rules! lock_fundings {
480 ($nodes: expr) => { {
481 let mut node_events = Vec::new();
482 for node in $nodes.iter() {
483 node_events.push(node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events());
485 for (idx, node_event) in node_events.iter().enumerate() {
486 for event in node_event {
487 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } = event {
488 for node in $nodes.iter() {
489 if node.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
490 node.handle_funding_locked(&$nodes[idx].get_our_node_id(), msg);
493 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
497 for node in $nodes.iter() {
498 let events = node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
499 for event in events {
500 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = event {
501 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
507 let fee_est_a = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
508 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_a = 253;
509 let fee_est_b = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
510 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_b = 253;
511 let fee_est_c = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
512 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_c = 253;
514 // 3 nodes is enough to hit all the possible cases, notably unknown-source-unknown-dest
516 let (node_a, mut monitor_a, keys_manager_a) = make_node!(0, fee_est_a);
517 let (node_b, mut monitor_b, keys_manager_b) = make_node!(1, fee_est_b);
518 let (node_c, mut monitor_c, keys_manager_c) = make_node!(2, fee_est_c);
520 let mut nodes = [node_a, node_b, node_c];
522 let chan_1_funding = make_channel!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 0);
523 let chan_2_funding = make_channel!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1);
525 for node in nodes.iter() {
529 lock_fundings!(nodes);
531 let chan_a = nodes[0].list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap();
532 let chan_b = nodes[2].list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap();
534 let mut payment_id: u8 = 0;
536 let mut chan_a_disconnected = false;
537 let mut chan_b_disconnected = false;
538 let mut ab_events = Vec::new();
539 let mut ba_events = Vec::new();
540 let mut bc_events = Vec::new();
541 let mut cb_events = Vec::new();
543 let mut node_a_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
544 nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
545 let mut node_b_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
546 nodes[1].write(&mut node_b_ser).unwrap();
547 let mut node_c_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
548 nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
550 macro_rules! test_return {
552 assert_eq!(nodes[0].list_channels().len(), 1);
553 assert_eq!(nodes[1].list_channels().len(), 2);
554 assert_eq!(nodes[2].list_channels().len(), 1);
559 let mut read_pos = 0;
560 macro_rules! get_slice {
563 let slice_len = $len as usize;
564 if data.len() < read_pos + slice_len {
567 read_pos += slice_len;
568 &data[read_pos - slice_len..read_pos]
574 // Push any events from Node B onto ba_events and bc_events
575 macro_rules! push_excess_b_events {
576 ($excess_events: expr, $expect_drop_node: expr) => { {
577 let a_id = nodes[0].get_our_node_id();
578 let expect_drop_node: Option<usize> = $expect_drop_node;
579 let expect_drop_id = if let Some(id) = expect_drop_node { Some(nodes[id].get_our_node_id()) } else { None };
580 for event in $excess_events {
581 let push_a = match event {
582 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
583 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
586 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => {
587 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
590 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => {
591 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
594 events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { .. } => continue,
595 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => continue,
596 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
597 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
598 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
601 _ => panic!("Unhandled message event {:?}", event),
603 if push_a { ba_events.push(event); } else { bc_events.push(event); }
608 // While delivering messages, we select across three possible message selection processes
609 // to ensure we get as much coverage as possible. See the individual enum variants for more
612 enum ProcessMessages {
613 /// Deliver all available messages, including fetching any new messages from
614 /// `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` (which may have side effects).
616 /// Call `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` first, and then deliver up to one
617 /// message (which may already be queued).
619 /// Deliver up to one already-queued message. This avoids any potential side-effects
620 /// of `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` (eg freeing the HTLC holding cell), which
621 /// provides potentially more coverage.
625 macro_rules! process_msg_events {
626 ($node: expr, $corrupt_forward: expr, $limit_events: expr) => { {
627 let mut events = if $node == 1 {
628 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
629 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut ba_events);
630 new_events.extend_from_slice(&bc_events[..]);
633 } else if $node == 0 {
634 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
635 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut ab_events);
638 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
639 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut cb_events);
642 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
643 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage {
644 new_events = nodes[$node].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
646 let mut had_events = false;
647 let mut events_iter = events.drain(..).chain(new_events.drain(..));
648 let mut extra_ev = None;
649 for event in &mut events_iter {
652 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee, commitment_signed } } => {
653 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
654 if dest.get_our_node_id() == node_id {
655 for update_add in update_add_htlcs.iter() {
656 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_add_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
657 if !$corrupt_forward {
658 dest.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_add);
660 // Corrupt the update_add_htlc message so that its HMAC
661 // check will fail and we generate a
662 // update_fail_malformed_htlc instead of an
663 // update_fail_htlc as we do when we reject a payment.
664 let mut msg_ser = update_add.encode();
665 msg_ser[1000] ^= 0xff;
666 let new_msg = UpdateAddHTLC::read(&mut Cursor::new(&msg_ser)).unwrap();
667 dest.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &new_msg);
670 for update_fulfill in update_fulfill_htlcs.iter() {
671 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fulfill_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
672 dest.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fulfill);
674 for update_fail in update_fail_htlcs.iter() {
675 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fail_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
676 dest.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fail);
678 for update_fail_malformed in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.iter() {
679 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fail_malformed_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
680 dest.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fail_malformed);
682 if let Some(msg) = update_fee {
683 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fee to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
684 dest.handle_update_fee(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &msg);
686 let processed_change = !update_add_htlcs.is_empty() || !update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() ||
687 !update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() || !update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty();
688 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::AllMessages && processed_change {
689 // If we only want to process some messages, don't deliver the CS until later.
690 extra_ev = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: CommitmentUpdate {
691 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
692 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
693 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
694 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
700 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering commitment_signed to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
701 dest.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
706 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
707 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
708 if dest.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
709 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering revoke_and_ack to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
710 dest.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), msg);
714 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
715 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
716 if dest.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
717 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering channel_reestablish to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
718 dest.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), msg);
722 events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { .. } => {
723 // Can be generated as a reestablish response
725 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {
726 // Can be generated as a reestablish response
728 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
729 // When we reconnect we will resend a channel_update to make sure our
730 // counterparty has the latest parameters for receiving payments
731 // through us. We do, however, check that the message does not include
732 // the "disabled" bit, as we should never ever have a channel which is
733 // disabled when we send such an update (or it may indicate channel
734 // force-close which we should detect as an error).
735 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0);
737 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
740 panic!("Unhandled message event {:?}", event)
743 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::AllMessages {
748 push_excess_b_events!(extra_ev.into_iter().chain(events_iter), None);
749 } else if $node == 0 {
750 if let Some(ev) = extra_ev { ab_events.push(ev); }
751 for event in events_iter { ab_events.push(event); }
753 if let Some(ev) = extra_ev { cb_events.push(ev); }
754 for event in events_iter { cb_events.push(event); }
760 macro_rules! drain_msg_events_on_disconnect {
761 ($counterparty_id: expr) => { {
762 if $counterparty_id == 0 {
763 for event in nodes[0].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
765 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
766 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => {},
767 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => {},
768 events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { .. } => {},
769 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {},
770 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
771 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
773 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
776 panic!("Unhandled message event")
780 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(0));
784 for event in nodes[2].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
786 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
787 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => {},
788 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => {},
789 events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { .. } => {},
790 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {},
791 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
792 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
794 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
797 panic!("Unhandled message event")
801 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(2));
808 macro_rules! process_events {
809 ($node: expr, $fail: expr) => { {
810 // In case we get 256 payments we may have a hash collision, resulting in the
811 // second claim/fail call not finding the duplicate-hash HTLC, so we have to
812 // deduplicate the calls here.
813 let mut claim_set = HashSet::new();
814 let mut events = nodes[$node].get_and_clear_pending_events();
815 // Sort events so that PendingHTLCsForwardable get processed last. This avoids a
816 // case where we first process a PendingHTLCsForwardable, then claim/fail on a
817 // PaymentReceived, claiming/failing two HTLCs, but leaving a just-generated
818 // PaymentReceived event for the second HTLC in our pending_events (and breaking
819 // our claim_set deduplication).
820 events.sort_by(|a, b| {
821 if let events::Event::PaymentReceived { .. } = a {
822 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = b {
824 } else { Ordering::Equal }
825 } else if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = a {
826 if let events::Event::PaymentReceived { .. } = b {
828 } else { Ordering::Equal }
829 } else { Ordering::Equal }
831 let had_events = !events.is_empty();
832 for event in events.drain(..) {
834 events::Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => {
835 if claim_set.insert(payment_hash.0) {
837 assert!(nodes[$node].fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash));
839 assert!(nodes[$node].claim_funds(PaymentPreimage(payment_hash.0)));
843 events::Event::PaymentSent { .. } => {},
844 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
845 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } => {},
846 events::Event::PaymentForwarded { .. } if $node == 1 => {},
847 events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {
848 nodes[$node].process_pending_htlc_forwards();
850 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
853 panic!("Unhandled event")
861 let v = get_slice!(1)[0];
862 out.locked_write(format!("READ A BYTE! HANDLING INPUT {:x}...........\n", v).as_bytes());
864 // In general, we keep related message groups close together in binary form, allowing
865 // bit-twiddling mutations to have similar effects. This is probably overkill, but no
868 0x00 => *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure),
869 0x01 => *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure),
870 0x02 => *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure),
871 0x04 => *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()),
872 0x05 => *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()),
873 0x06 => *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()),
876 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_a.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
877 monitor_a.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
878 nodes[0].process_monitor_events();
882 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
883 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
884 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
888 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
889 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
890 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
894 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_c.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
895 monitor_c.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
896 nodes[2].process_monitor_events();
901 if !chan_a_disconnected {
902 nodes[0].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), false);
903 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), false);
904 chan_a_disconnected = true;
905 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(0);
909 if !chan_b_disconnected {
910 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), false);
911 nodes[2].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), false);
912 chan_b_disconnected = true;
913 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(2);
917 if chan_a_disconnected {
918 nodes[0].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
919 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
920 chan_a_disconnected = false;
924 if chan_b_disconnected {
925 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
926 nodes[2].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
927 chan_b_disconnected = false;
931 0x10 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
932 0x11 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
933 0x12 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
934 0x13 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
935 0x14 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
936 0x15 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
938 0x16 => { process_events!(0, true); },
939 0x17 => { process_events!(0, false); },
941 0x18 => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
942 0x19 => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
943 0x1a => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
944 0x1b => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
945 0x1c => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
946 0x1d => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
948 0x1e => { process_events!(1, true); },
949 0x1f => { process_events!(1, false); },
951 0x20 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
952 0x21 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
953 0x22 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
954 0x23 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
955 0x24 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
956 0x25 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
958 0x26 => { process_events!(2, true); },
959 0x27 => { process_events!(2, false); },
962 if !chan_a_disconnected {
963 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), false);
964 chan_a_disconnected = true;
965 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(0);
967 if monitor_a.should_update_manager.load(atomic::Ordering::Relaxed) {
968 node_a_ser.0.clear();
969 nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
971 let (new_node_a, new_monitor_a) = reload_node!(node_a_ser, 0, monitor_a, keys_manager_a, fee_est_a);
972 nodes[0] = new_node_a;
973 monitor_a = new_monitor_a;
976 if !chan_a_disconnected {
977 nodes[0].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), false);
978 chan_a_disconnected = true;
979 nodes[0].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
983 if !chan_b_disconnected {
984 nodes[2].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), false);
985 chan_b_disconnected = true;
986 nodes[2].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
990 let (new_node_b, new_monitor_b) = reload_node!(node_b_ser, 1, monitor_b, keys_manager_b, fee_est_b);
991 nodes[1] = new_node_b;
992 monitor_b = new_monitor_b;
995 if !chan_b_disconnected {
996 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), false);
997 chan_b_disconnected = true;
998 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(2);
1000 if monitor_c.should_update_manager.load(atomic::Ordering::Relaxed) {
1001 node_c_ser.0.clear();
1002 nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
1004 let (new_node_c, new_monitor_c) = reload_node!(node_c_ser, 2, monitor_c, keys_manager_c, fee_est_c);
1005 nodes[2] = new_node_c;
1006 monitor_c = new_monitor_c;
1009 // 1/10th the channel size:
1010 0x30 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id); },
1011 0x31 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id); },
1012 0x32 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id); },
1013 0x33 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id); },
1014 0x34 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id); },
1015 0x35 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id); },
1017 0x38 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id); },
1018 0x39 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id); },
1019 0x3a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id); },
1020 0x3b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id); },
1021 0x3c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id); },
1022 0x3d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id); },
1024 0x40 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id); },
1025 0x41 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id); },
1026 0x42 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id); },
1027 0x43 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id); },
1028 0x44 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id); },
1029 0x45 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id); },
1031 0x48 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id); },
1032 0x49 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id); },
1033 0x4a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id); },
1034 0x4b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id); },
1035 0x4c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id); },
1036 0x4d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id); },
1038 0x50 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id); },
1039 0x51 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id); },
1040 0x52 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id); },
1041 0x53 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id); },
1042 0x54 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id); },
1043 0x55 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id); },
1045 0x58 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id); },
1046 0x59 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id); },
1047 0x5a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id); },
1048 0x5b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id); },
1049 0x5c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id); },
1050 0x5d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id); },
1052 0x60 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id); },
1053 0x61 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id); },
1054 0x62 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id); },
1055 0x63 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id); },
1056 0x64 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id); },
1057 0x65 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id); },
1059 0x68 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id); },
1060 0x69 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id); },
1061 0x6a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id); },
1062 0x6b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id); },
1063 0x6c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id); },
1064 0x6d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id); },
1067 let max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_a * FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1068 if fee_est_a.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1069 fee_est_a.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1071 nodes[0].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1073 0x81 => { fee_est_a.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[0].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1076 let max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_b * FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1077 if fee_est_b.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1078 fee_est_b.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1080 nodes[1].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1082 0x85 => { fee_est_b.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[1].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1085 let max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_c * FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1086 if fee_est_c.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1087 fee_est_c.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1089 nodes[2].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1091 0x89 => { fee_est_c.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[2].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1094 // Test that no channel is in a stuck state where neither party can send funds even
1095 // after we resolve all pending events.
1096 // First make sure there are no pending monitor updates, resetting the error state
1097 // and calling force_channel_monitor_updated for each monitor.
1098 *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
1099 *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
1100 *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
1102 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_a.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1103 monitor_a.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1104 nodes[0].process_monitor_events();
1106 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1107 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1108 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1110 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1111 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1112 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1114 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_c.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1115 monitor_c.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1116 nodes[2].process_monitor_events();
1119 // Next, make sure peers are all connected to each other
1120 if chan_a_disconnected {
1121 nodes[0].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
1122 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
1123 chan_a_disconnected = false;
1125 if chan_b_disconnected {
1126 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
1127 nodes[2].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
1128 chan_b_disconnected = false;
1131 for i in 0..std::usize::MAX {
1132 if i == 100 { panic!("It may take may iterations to settle the state, but it should not take forever"); }
1133 // Then, make sure any current forwards make their way to their destination
1134 if process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1135 if process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1136 if process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1137 // ...making sure any pending PendingHTLCsForwardable events are handled and
1138 // payments claimed.
1139 if process_events!(0, false) { continue; }
1140 if process_events!(1, false) { continue; }
1141 if process_events!(2, false) { continue; }
1145 // Finally, make sure that at least one end of each channel can make a substantial payment
1147 send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id) ||
1148 send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id));
1150 send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id) ||
1151 send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id));
1153 last_htlc_clear_fee_a = fee_est_a.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1154 last_htlc_clear_fee_b = fee_est_b.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1155 last_htlc_clear_fee_c = fee_est_c.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1157 _ => test_return!(),
1160 node_a_ser.0.clear();
1161 nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
1162 monitor_a.should_update_manager.store(false, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
1163 node_b_ser.0.clear();
1164 nodes[1].write(&mut node_b_ser).unwrap();
1165 monitor_b.should_update_manager.store(false, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
1166 node_c_ser.0.clear();
1167 nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
1168 monitor_c.should_update_manager.store(false, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
1172 /// We actually have different behavior based on if a certain log string has been seen, so we have
1173 /// to do a bit more tracking.
1175 struct SearchingOutput<O: Output> {
1177 may_fail: Arc<atomic::AtomicBool>,
1179 impl<O: Output> Output for SearchingOutput<O> {
1180 fn locked_write(&self, data: &[u8]) {
1181 // We hit a design limitation of LN state machine (see CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER)
1182 if std::str::from_utf8(data).unwrap().contains("Outbound update_fee HTLC buffer overflow - counterparty should force-close this channel") {
1183 self.may_fail.store(true, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1185 self.output.locked_write(data)
1188 impl<O: Output> SearchingOutput<O> {
1189 pub fn new(output: O) -> Self {
1190 Self { output, may_fail: Arc::new(atomic::AtomicBool::new(false)) }
1194 pub fn chanmon_consistency_test<Out: Output>(data: &[u8], out: Out) {
1199 pub extern "C" fn chanmon_consistency_run(data: *const u8, datalen: usize) {
1200 do_test(unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(data, datalen) }, test_logger::DevNull{});