1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Test that monitor update failures don't get our channel state out of sync.
11 //! One of the biggest concern with the monitor update failure handling code is that messages
12 //! resent after monitor updating is restored are delivered out-of-order, resulting in
13 //! commitment_signed messages having "invalid signatures".
14 //! To test this we stand up a network of three nodes and read bytes from the fuzz input to denote
15 //! actions such as sending payments, handling events, or changing monitor update return values on
16 //! a per-node basis. This should allow it to find any cases where the ordering of actions results
17 //! in us getting out of sync with ourselves, and, assuming at least one of our recieve- or
18 //! send-side handling is correct, other peers. We consider it a failure if any action results in a
19 //! channel being force-closed.
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, ScriptBuf};
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
26 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash as TraitImport;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
33 use lightning::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
34 use lightning::blinded_path::payment::ReceiveTlvs;
36 use lightning::chain::{BestBlock, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, chainmonitor, channelmonitor, Confirm, Watch};
37 use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, MonitorEvent};
38 use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
39 use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
40 use lightning::sign::{KeyMaterial, InMemorySigner, Recipient, EntropySource, NodeSigner, SignerProvider};
41 use lightning::events;
42 use lightning::events::MessageSendEventsProvider;
43 use lightning::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
44 use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelDetails, ChannelManager, PaymentSendFailure, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
45 use lightning::ln::channel::FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
46 use lightning::ln::msgs::{self, CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, UpdateAddHTLC, Init};
47 use lightning::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
48 use lightning::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
49 use lightning::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
50 use lightning::offers::invoice_request::UnsignedInvoiceRequest;
51 use lightning::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, OnionMessagePath};
52 use lightning::util::test_channel_signer::{TestChannelSigner, EnforcementState};
53 use lightning::util::errors::APIError;
54 use lightning::util::hash_tables::*;
55 use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
56 use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
57 use lightning::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
58 use lightning::routing::router::{InFlightHtlcs, Path, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
60 use crate::utils::test_logger::{self, Output};
61 use crate::utils::test_persister::TestPersister;
63 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Message, PublicKey, SecretKey, Scalar, Secp256k1, self};
64 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
65 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::{RecoverableSignature, Signature};
66 use bitcoin::secp256k1::schnorr;
69 use std::cmp::{self, Ordering};
70 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
71 use std::sync::atomic;
73 use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
75 const MAX_FEE: u32 = 10_000;
76 struct FuzzEstimator {
77 ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32,
79 impl FeeEstimator for FuzzEstimator {
80 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, conf_target: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
81 // We force-close channels if our counterparty sends us a feerate which is a small multiple
82 // of our HighPriority fee estimate or smaller than our Background fee estimate. Thus, we
83 // always return a HighPriority feerate here which is >= the maximum Normal feerate and a
84 // Background feerate which is <= the minimum Normal feerate.
86 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep => MAX_FEE,
87 ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum|ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee|ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee|ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee|ConfirmationTarget::OutputSpendingFee => 253,
88 ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee => cmp::min(self.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire), MAX_FEE),
95 impl Router for FuzzRouter {
97 &self, _payer: &PublicKey, _params: &RouteParameters, _first_hops: Option<&[&ChannelDetails]>,
98 _inflight_htlcs: InFlightHtlcs
99 ) -> Result<Route, msgs::LightningError> {
100 Err(msgs::LightningError {
101 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
102 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
106 fn create_blinded_payment_paths<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(
107 &self, _recipient: PublicKey, _first_hops: Vec<ChannelDetails>, _tlvs: ReceiveTlvs,
108 _amount_msats: u64, _secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
109 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
114 impl MessageRouter for FuzzRouter {
116 &self, _sender: PublicKey, _peers: Vec<PublicKey>, _destination: Destination
117 ) -> Result<OnionMessagePath, ()> {
121 fn create_blinded_paths<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(
122 &self, _recipient: PublicKey, _peers: Vec<PublicKey>, _secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
123 ) -> Result<Vec<BlindedPath>, ()> {
128 pub struct TestBroadcaster {}
129 impl BroadcasterInterface for TestBroadcaster {
130 fn broadcast_transactions(&self, _txs: &[&Transaction]) { }
133 pub struct VecWriter(pub Vec<u8>);
134 impl Writer for VecWriter {
135 fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
136 self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
141 struct TestChainMonitor {
142 pub logger: Arc<dyn Logger>,
143 pub keys: Arc<KeyProvider>,
144 pub persister: Arc<TestPersister>,
145 pub chain_monitor: Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<TestChannelSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
146 // If we reload a node with an old copy of ChannelMonitors, the ChannelManager deserialization
147 // logic will automatically force-close our channels for us (as we don't have an up-to-date
148 // monitor implying we are not able to punish misbehaving counterparties). Because this test
149 // "fails" if we ever force-close a channel, we avoid doing so, always saving the latest
150 // fully-serialized monitor state here, as well as the corresponding update_id.
151 pub latest_monitors: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, (u64, Vec<u8>)>>,
153 impl TestChainMonitor {
154 pub fn new(broadcaster: Arc<TestBroadcaster>, logger: Arc<dyn Logger>, feeest: Arc<FuzzEstimator>, persister: Arc<TestPersister>, keys: Arc<KeyProvider>) -> Self {
156 chain_monitor: Arc::new(chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::new(None, broadcaster, logger.clone(), feeest, Arc::clone(&persister))),
160 latest_monitors: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
164 impl chain::Watch<TestChannelSigner> for TestChainMonitor {
165 fn watch_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>) -> Result<chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, ()> {
166 let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
167 monitor.write(&mut ser).unwrap();
168 if let Some(_) = self.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().insert(funding_txo, (monitor.get_latest_update_id(), ser.0)) {
169 panic!("Already had monitor pre-watch_channel");
171 self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_txo, monitor)
174 fn update_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: &channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus {
175 let mut map_lock = self.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap();
176 let map_entry = map_lock.get_mut(&funding_txo).expect("Didn't have monitor on update call");
177 let deserialized_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::
178 read(&mut Cursor::new(&map_entry.1), (&*self.keys, &*self.keys)).unwrap().1;
179 deserialized_monitor.update_monitor(update, &&TestBroadcaster{}, &&FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) }, &self.logger).unwrap();
180 let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
181 deserialized_monitor.write(&mut ser).unwrap();
182 *map_entry = (update.update_id, ser.0);
183 self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update)
186 fn release_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<(OutPoint, ChannelId, Vec<MonitorEvent>, Option<PublicKey>)> {
187 return self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
192 node_secret: SecretKey,
193 rand_bytes_id: atomic::AtomicU32,
194 enforcement_states: Mutex<HashMap<[u8;32], Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>>>>,
197 impl EntropySource for KeyProvider {
198 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
199 let id = self.rand_bytes_id.fetch_add(1, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
200 let mut res = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 11, self.node_secret[31]];
201 res[30-4..30].copy_from_slice(&id.to_le_bytes());
206 impl NodeSigner for KeyProvider {
207 fn get_node_id(&self, recipient: Recipient) -> Result<PublicKey, ()> {
208 let node_secret = match recipient {
209 Recipient::Node => Ok(&self.node_secret),
210 Recipient::PhantomNode => Err(())
212 Ok(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), node_secret))
215 fn ecdh(&self, recipient: Recipient, other_key: &PublicKey, tweak: Option<&Scalar>) -> Result<SharedSecret, ()> {
216 let mut node_secret = match recipient {
217 Recipient::Node => Ok(self.node_secret.clone()),
218 Recipient::PhantomNode => Err(())
220 if let Some(tweak) = tweak {
221 node_secret = node_secret.mul_tweak(tweak).map_err(|_| ())?;
223 Ok(SharedSecret::new(other_key, &node_secret))
226 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial {
227 KeyMaterial([0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, self.node_secret[31]])
230 fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5], _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> {
234 fn sign_bolt12_invoice_request(
235 &self, _invoice_request: &UnsignedInvoiceRequest
236 ) -> Result<schnorr::Signature, ()> {
240 fn sign_bolt12_invoice(
241 &self, _invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice,
242 ) -> Result<schnorr::Signature, ()> {
246 fn sign_gossip_message(&self, msg: lightning::ln::msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
247 let msg_hash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]).map_err(|_| ())?;
248 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
249 Ok(secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msg_hash, &self.node_secret))
253 impl SignerProvider for KeyProvider {
254 type EcdsaSigner = TestChannelSigner;
256 type TaprootSigner = TestChannelSigner;
258 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
259 let id = self.rand_bytes_id.fetch_add(1, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed) as u8;
263 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
264 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
265 let id = channel_keys_id[0];
266 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
268 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
269 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
270 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
271 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
272 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
273 [id, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 9, self.node_secret[31]],
274 channel_value_satoshis,
278 let revoked_commitment = self.make_enforcement_state_cell(keys.commitment_seed);
279 TestChannelSigner::new_with_revoked(keys, revoked_commitment, false)
282 fn read_chan_signer(&self, buffer: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> {
283 let mut reader = std::io::Cursor::new(buffer);
285 let inner: InMemorySigner = ReadableArgs::read(&mut reader, self)?;
286 let state = self.make_enforcement_state_cell(inner.commitment_seed);
288 Ok(TestChannelSigner {
291 disable_revocation_policy_check: false,
292 available: Arc::new(Mutex::new(true)),
296 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
297 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
298 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap();
299 let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
300 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
303 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
304 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
305 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap();
306 let pubkey_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &secret_key).serialize());
307 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh(&pubkey_hash))
312 fn make_enforcement_state_cell(&self, commitment_seed: [u8; 32]) -> Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>> {
313 let mut revoked_commitments = self.enforcement_states.lock().unwrap();
314 if !revoked_commitments.contains_key(&commitment_seed) {
315 revoked_commitments.insert(commitment_seed, Arc::new(Mutex::new(EnforcementState::new())));
317 let cell = revoked_commitments.get(&commitment_seed).unwrap();
323 fn check_api_err(api_err: APIError, sendable_bounds_violated: bool) {
325 APIError::APIMisuseError { .. } => panic!("We can't misuse the API"),
326 APIError::FeeRateTooHigh { .. } => panic!("We can't send too much fee?"),
327 APIError::InvalidRoute { .. } => panic!("Our routes should work"),
328 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err } => {
329 // Test the error against a list of errors we can hit, and reject
330 // all others. If you hit this panic, the list of acceptable errors
331 // is probably just stale and you should add new messages here.
333 "Peer for first hop currently disconnected" => {},
334 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - ") => {},
335 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - ") => {},
336 _ => panic!("{}", err),
338 assert!(sendable_bounds_violated);
340 APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress => {
341 // We can (obviously) temp-fail a monitor update
343 APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { .. } => panic!("Cannot send an incompatible shutdown script"),
347 fn check_payment_err(send_err: PaymentSendFailure, sendable_bounds_violated: bool) {
349 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(api_err) => check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated),
350 PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(per_path_results) => {
351 for res in per_path_results { if let Err(api_err) = res { check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated); } }
353 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(per_path_results) => {
354 for api_err in per_path_results { check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated); }
356 PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure { results, .. } => {
357 for res in results { if let Err(api_err) = res { check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated); } }
359 PaymentSendFailure::DuplicatePayment => panic!(),
363 type ChanMan<'a> = ChannelManager<Arc<TestChainMonitor>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, &'a FuzzRouter, Arc<dyn Logger>>;
366 fn get_payment_secret_hash(dest: &ChanMan, payment_id: &mut u8) -> Option<(PaymentSecret, PaymentHash)> {
367 let mut payment_hash;
369 payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[*payment_id; 1]).to_byte_array());
370 if let Ok(payment_secret) = dest.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 3600, None) {
371 return Some((payment_secret, payment_hash));
373 *payment_id = payment_id.wrapping_add(1);
379 fn send_payment(source: &ChanMan, dest: &ChanMan, dest_chan_id: u64, amt: u64, payment_id: &mut u8, payment_idx: &mut u64) -> bool {
380 let (payment_secret, payment_hash) =
381 if let Some((secret, hash)) = get_payment_secret_hash(dest, payment_id) { (secret, hash) } else { return true; };
382 let mut payment_id = [0; 32];
383 payment_id[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_idx.to_ne_bytes());
385 let (min_value_sendable, max_value_sendable) = source.list_usable_channels()
386 .iter().find(|chan| chan.short_channel_id == Some(dest_chan_id))
388 (chan.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, chan.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat))
390 if let Err(err) = source.send_payment_with_route(&Route {
391 paths: vec![Path { hops: vec![RouteHop {
392 pubkey: dest.get_our_node_id(),
393 node_features: dest.node_features(),
394 short_channel_id: dest_chan_id,
395 channel_features: dest.channel_features(),
397 cltv_expiry_delta: 200,
398 maybe_announced_channel: true,
399 }], blinded_tail: None }],
401 }, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_id)) {
402 check_payment_err(err, amt > max_value_sendable || amt < min_value_sendable);
405 // Note that while the max is a strict upper-bound, we can occasionally send substantially
406 // below the minimum, with some gap which is unusable immediately below the minimum. Thus,
407 // we don't check against min_value_sendable here.
408 assert!(amt <= max_value_sendable);
413 fn send_hop_payment(source: &ChanMan, middle: &ChanMan, middle_chan_id: u64, dest: &ChanMan, dest_chan_id: u64, amt: u64, payment_id: &mut u8, payment_idx: &mut u64) -> bool {
414 let (payment_secret, payment_hash) =
415 if let Some((secret, hash)) = get_payment_secret_hash(dest, payment_id) { (secret, hash) } else { return true; };
416 let mut payment_id = [0; 32];
417 payment_id[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_idx.to_ne_bytes());
419 let (min_value_sendable, max_value_sendable) = source.list_usable_channels()
420 .iter().find(|chan| chan.short_channel_id == Some(middle_chan_id))
422 (chan.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, chan.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat))
424 let first_hop_fee = 50_000;
425 if let Err(err) = source.send_payment_with_route(&Route {
426 paths: vec![Path { hops: vec![RouteHop {
427 pubkey: middle.get_our_node_id(),
428 node_features: middle.node_features(),
429 short_channel_id: middle_chan_id,
430 channel_features: middle.channel_features(),
431 fee_msat: first_hop_fee,
432 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
433 maybe_announced_channel: true,
435 pubkey: dest.get_our_node_id(),
436 node_features: dest.node_features(),
437 short_channel_id: dest_chan_id,
438 channel_features: dest.channel_features(),
440 cltv_expiry_delta: 200,
441 maybe_announced_channel: true,
442 }], blinded_tail: None }],
444 }, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_id)) {
445 let sent_amt = amt + first_hop_fee;
446 check_payment_err(err, sent_amt < min_value_sendable || sent_amt > max_value_sendable);
449 // Note that while the max is a strict upper-bound, we can occasionally send substantially
450 // below the minimum, with some gap which is unusable immediately below the minimum. Thus,
451 // we don't check against min_value_sendable here.
452 assert!(amt + first_hop_fee <= max_value_sendable);
458 pub fn do_test<Out: Output>(data: &[u8], underlying_out: Out, anchors: bool) {
459 let out = SearchingOutput::new(underlying_out);
460 let broadcast = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{});
461 let router = FuzzRouter {};
463 macro_rules! make_node {
464 ($node_id: expr, $fee_estimator: expr) => { {
465 let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new($node_id.to_string(), out.clone()));
466 let node_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, $node_id]).unwrap();
467 let keys_manager = Arc::new(KeyProvider { node_secret, rand_bytes_id: atomic::AtomicU32::new(0), enforcement_states: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()) });
468 let monitor = Arc::new(TestChainMonitor::new(broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), $fee_estimator.clone(),
469 Arc::new(TestPersister {
470 update_ret: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed)
471 }), Arc::clone(&keys_manager)));
473 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
474 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
475 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
477 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
478 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
480 let network = Network::Bitcoin;
481 let best_block_timestamp = genesis_block(network).header.time;
482 let params = ChainParameters {
484 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
486 (ChannelManager::new($fee_estimator.clone(), monitor.clone(), broadcast.clone(), &router, Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), config, params, best_block_timestamp),
487 monitor, keys_manager)
491 macro_rules! reload_node {
492 ($ser: expr, $node_id: expr, $old_monitors: expr, $keys_manager: expr, $fee_estimator: expr) => { {
493 let keys_manager = Arc::clone(& $keys_manager);
494 let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new($node_id.to_string(), out.clone()));
495 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(TestChainMonitor::new(broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), $fee_estimator.clone(),
496 Arc::new(TestPersister {
497 update_ret: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed)
498 }), Arc::clone(& $keys_manager)));
500 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
501 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
502 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
504 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
505 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
508 let mut monitors = new_hash_map();
509 let mut old_monitors = $old_monitors.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap();
510 for (outpoint, (update_id, monitor_ser)) in old_monitors.drain() {
511 monitors.insert(outpoint, <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&monitor_ser), (&*$keys_manager, &*$keys_manager)).expect("Failed to read monitor").1);
512 chain_monitor.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().insert(outpoint, (update_id, monitor_ser));
514 let mut monitor_refs = new_hash_map();
515 for (outpoint, monitor) in monitors.iter_mut() {
516 monitor_refs.insert(*outpoint, monitor);
519 let read_args = ChannelManagerReadArgs {
520 entropy_source: keys_manager.clone(),
521 node_signer: keys_manager.clone(),
522 signer_provider: keys_manager.clone(),
523 fee_estimator: $fee_estimator.clone(),
524 chain_monitor: chain_monitor.clone(),
525 tx_broadcaster: broadcast.clone(),
528 default_config: config,
529 channel_monitors: monitor_refs,
532 let res = (<(BlockHash, ChanMan)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&$ser.0), read_args).expect("Failed to read manager").1, chain_monitor.clone());
533 for (funding_txo, mon) in monitors.drain() {
534 assert_eq!(chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_txo, mon),
535 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
541 let mut channel_txn = Vec::new();
542 macro_rules! make_channel {
543 ($source: expr, $dest: expr, $dest_keys_manager: expr, $chan_id: expr) => { {
544 $source.peer_connected(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
545 features: $dest.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
547 $dest.peer_connected(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
548 features: $source.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
551 $source.create_channel($dest.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42, 0, None, None).unwrap();
553 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
554 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
555 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
557 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
560 $dest.handle_open_channel(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
561 let accept_channel = {
563 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_events();
564 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
565 if let events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
566 ref temporary_channel_id, ref counterparty_node_id, ..
568 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
569 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&$dest_keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
570 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
571 $dest.accept_inbound_channel(
572 temporary_channel_id,
573 counterparty_node_id,
576 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
578 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
579 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
580 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
582 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
585 $source.handle_accept_channel(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
588 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_events();
589 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
590 if let events::Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } = events[0] {
591 let tx = Transaction { version: $chan_id, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
592 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
594 funding_output = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
595 $source.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &$dest.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
596 channel_txn.push(tx);
597 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
600 let funding_created = {
601 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
602 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
603 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
605 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
607 $dest.handle_funding_created(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
609 let funding_signed = {
610 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
611 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
612 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
614 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
616 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_events();
617 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
618 if let events::Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } = events[0] {
619 assert_eq!(counterparty_node_id, &$source.get_our_node_id());
620 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
622 $source.handle_funding_signed(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
623 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_events();
624 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
625 if let events::Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } = events[0] {
626 assert_eq!(counterparty_node_id, &$dest.get_our_node_id());
627 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
633 macro_rules! confirm_txn {
635 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash();
636 let mut header = create_dummy_header(chain_hash, 42);
637 let txdata: Vec<_> = channel_txn.iter().enumerate().map(|(i, tx)| (i + 1, tx)).collect();
638 $node.transactions_confirmed(&header, &txdata, 1);
640 header = create_dummy_header(header.block_hash(), 42);
642 $node.best_block_updated(&header, 99);
646 macro_rules! lock_fundings {
647 ($nodes: expr) => { {
648 let mut node_events = Vec::new();
649 for node in $nodes.iter() {
650 node_events.push(node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events());
652 for (idx, node_event) in node_events.iter().enumerate() {
653 for event in node_event {
654 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } = event {
655 for node in $nodes.iter() {
656 if node.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
657 node.handle_channel_ready(&$nodes[idx].get_our_node_id(), msg);
660 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
664 for node in $nodes.iter() {
665 let events = node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
666 for event in events {
667 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = event {
668 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
674 let fee_est_a = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
675 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_a = 253;
676 let fee_est_b = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
677 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_b = 253;
678 let fee_est_c = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
679 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_c = 253;
681 // 3 nodes is enough to hit all the possible cases, notably unknown-source-unknown-dest
683 let (node_a, mut monitor_a, keys_manager_a) = make_node!(0, fee_est_a);
684 let (node_b, mut monitor_b, keys_manager_b) = make_node!(1, fee_est_b);
685 let (node_c, mut monitor_c, keys_manager_c) = make_node!(2, fee_est_c);
687 let mut nodes = [node_a, node_b, node_c];
689 let chan_1_funding = make_channel!(nodes[0], nodes[1], keys_manager_b, 0);
690 let chan_2_funding = make_channel!(nodes[1], nodes[2], keys_manager_c, 1);
692 for node in nodes.iter() {
696 lock_fundings!(nodes);
698 let chan_a = nodes[0].list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap();
699 let chan_b = nodes[2].list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap();
701 let mut payment_id: u8 = 0;
702 let mut payment_idx: u64 = 0;
704 let mut chan_a_disconnected = false;
705 let mut chan_b_disconnected = false;
706 let mut ab_events = Vec::new();
707 let mut ba_events = Vec::new();
708 let mut bc_events = Vec::new();
709 let mut cb_events = Vec::new();
711 let mut node_a_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
712 nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
713 let mut node_b_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
714 nodes[1].write(&mut node_b_ser).unwrap();
715 let mut node_c_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
716 nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
718 macro_rules! test_return {
720 assert_eq!(nodes[0].list_channels().len(), 1);
721 assert_eq!(nodes[1].list_channels().len(), 2);
722 assert_eq!(nodes[2].list_channels().len(), 1);
727 let mut read_pos = 0;
728 macro_rules! get_slice {
731 let slice_len = $len as usize;
732 if data.len() < read_pos + slice_len {
735 read_pos += slice_len;
736 &data[read_pos - slice_len..read_pos]
742 // Push any events from Node B onto ba_events and bc_events
743 macro_rules! push_excess_b_events {
744 ($excess_events: expr, $expect_drop_node: expr) => { {
745 let a_id = nodes[0].get_our_node_id();
746 let expect_drop_node: Option<usize> = $expect_drop_node;
747 let expect_drop_id = if let Some(id) = expect_drop_node { Some(nodes[id].get_our_node_id()) } else { None };
748 for event in $excess_events {
749 let push_a = match event {
750 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
751 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
754 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => {
755 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
758 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => {
759 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
762 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => continue,
763 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => continue,
764 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
765 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
766 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
769 _ => panic!("Unhandled message event {:?}", event),
771 if push_a { ba_events.push(event); } else { bc_events.push(event); }
776 // While delivering messages, we select across three possible message selection processes
777 // to ensure we get as much coverage as possible. See the individual enum variants for more
780 enum ProcessMessages {
781 /// Deliver all available messages, including fetching any new messages from
782 /// `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` (which may have side effects).
784 /// Call `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` first, and then deliver up to one
785 /// message (which may already be queued).
787 /// Deliver up to one already-queued message. This avoids any potential side-effects
788 /// of `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` (eg freeing the HTLC holding cell), which
789 /// provides potentially more coverage.
793 macro_rules! process_msg_events {
794 ($node: expr, $corrupt_forward: expr, $limit_events: expr) => { {
795 let mut events = if $node == 1 {
796 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
797 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut ba_events);
798 new_events.extend_from_slice(&bc_events[..]);
801 } else if $node == 0 {
802 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
803 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut ab_events);
806 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
807 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut cb_events);
810 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
811 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage {
812 new_events = nodes[$node].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
814 let mut had_events = false;
815 let mut events_iter = events.drain(..).chain(new_events.drain(..));
816 let mut extra_ev = None;
817 for event in &mut events_iter {
820 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee, commitment_signed } } => {
821 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
822 if dest.get_our_node_id() == node_id {
823 for update_add in update_add_htlcs.iter() {
824 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_add_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
825 if !$corrupt_forward {
826 dest.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_add);
828 // Corrupt the update_add_htlc message so that its HMAC
829 // check will fail and we generate a
830 // update_fail_malformed_htlc instead of an
831 // update_fail_htlc as we do when we reject a payment.
832 let mut msg_ser = update_add.encode();
833 msg_ser[1000] ^= 0xff;
834 let new_msg = UpdateAddHTLC::read(&mut Cursor::new(&msg_ser)).unwrap();
835 dest.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &new_msg);
838 for update_fulfill in update_fulfill_htlcs.iter() {
839 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fulfill_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
840 dest.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fulfill);
842 for update_fail in update_fail_htlcs.iter() {
843 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fail_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
844 dest.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fail);
846 for update_fail_malformed in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.iter() {
847 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fail_malformed_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
848 dest.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fail_malformed);
850 if let Some(msg) = update_fee {
851 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fee to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
852 dest.handle_update_fee(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &msg);
854 let processed_change = !update_add_htlcs.is_empty() || !update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() ||
855 !update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() || !update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty();
856 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::AllMessages && processed_change {
857 // If we only want to process some messages, don't deliver the CS until later.
858 extra_ev = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: CommitmentUpdate {
859 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
860 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
861 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
862 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
868 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering commitment_signed to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
869 dest.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
874 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
875 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
876 if dest.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
877 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering revoke_and_ack to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
878 dest.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), msg);
882 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
883 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
884 if dest.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
885 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering channel_reestablish to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
886 dest.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), msg);
890 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => {
891 // Can be generated as a reestablish response
893 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {
894 // Can be generated as a reestablish response
896 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
897 // When we reconnect we will resend a channel_update to make sure our
898 // counterparty has the latest parameters for receiving payments
899 // through us. We do, however, check that the message does not include
900 // the "disabled" bit, as we should never ever have a channel which is
901 // disabled when we send such an update (or it may indicate channel
902 // force-close which we should detect as an error).
903 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0);
905 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
908 panic!("Unhandled message event {:?}", event)
911 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::AllMessages {
916 push_excess_b_events!(extra_ev.into_iter().chain(events_iter), None);
917 } else if $node == 0 {
918 if let Some(ev) = extra_ev { ab_events.push(ev); }
919 for event in events_iter { ab_events.push(event); }
921 if let Some(ev) = extra_ev { cb_events.push(ev); }
922 for event in events_iter { cb_events.push(event); }
928 macro_rules! drain_msg_events_on_disconnect {
929 ($counterparty_id: expr) => { {
930 if $counterparty_id == 0 {
931 for event in nodes[0].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
933 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
934 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => {},
935 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => {},
936 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => {},
937 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {},
938 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
939 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
941 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
944 panic!("Unhandled message event")
948 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(0));
952 for event in nodes[2].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
954 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
955 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => {},
956 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => {},
957 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => {},
958 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {},
959 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
960 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
962 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
965 panic!("Unhandled message event")
969 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(2));
976 macro_rules! process_events {
977 ($node: expr, $fail: expr) => { {
978 // In case we get 256 payments we may have a hash collision, resulting in the
979 // second claim/fail call not finding the duplicate-hash HTLC, so we have to
980 // deduplicate the calls here.
981 let mut claim_set = new_hash_map();
982 let mut events = nodes[$node].get_and_clear_pending_events();
983 // Sort events so that PendingHTLCsForwardable get processed last. This avoids a
984 // case where we first process a PendingHTLCsForwardable, then claim/fail on a
985 // PaymentClaimable, claiming/failing two HTLCs, but leaving a just-generated
986 // PaymentClaimable event for the second HTLC in our pending_events (and breaking
987 // our claim_set deduplication).
988 events.sort_by(|a, b| {
989 if let events::Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } = a {
990 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = b {
992 } else { Ordering::Equal }
993 } else if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = a {
994 if let events::Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } = b {
996 } else { Ordering::Equal }
997 } else { Ordering::Equal }
999 let had_events = !events.is_empty();
1000 for event in events.drain(..) {
1002 events::Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, .. } => {
1003 if claim_set.insert(payment_hash.0, ()).is_none() {
1005 nodes[$node].fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
1007 nodes[$node].claim_funds(PaymentPreimage(payment_hash.0));
1011 events::Event::PaymentSent { .. } => {},
1012 events::Event::PaymentClaimed { .. } => {},
1013 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
1014 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } => {},
1015 events::Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {},
1016 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful { .. } | events::Event::ProbeFailed { .. } => {
1017 // Even though we don't explicitly send probes, because probes are
1018 // detected based on hashing the payment hash+preimage, its rather
1019 // trivial for the fuzzer to build payments that accidentally end up
1020 // looking like probes.
1022 events::Event::PaymentForwarded { .. } if $node == 1 => {},
1023 events::Event::ChannelReady { .. } => {},
1024 events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {
1025 nodes[$node].process_pending_htlc_forwards();
1027 events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => {},
1028 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
1031 panic!("Unhandled event")
1039 let v = get_slice!(1)[0];
1040 out.locked_write(format!("READ A BYTE! HANDLING INPUT {:x}...........\n", v).as_bytes());
1042 // In general, we keep related message groups close together in binary form, allowing
1043 // bit-twiddling mutations to have similar effects. This is probably overkill, but no
1044 // harm in doing so.
1046 0x00 => *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress,
1047 0x01 => *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress,
1048 0x02 => *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress,
1049 0x04 => *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed,
1050 0x05 => *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed,
1051 0x06 => *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed,
1054 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_a.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1055 monitor_a.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1056 nodes[0].process_monitor_events();
1060 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1061 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1062 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1066 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1067 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1068 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1072 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_c.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1073 monitor_c.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1074 nodes[2].process_monitor_events();
1079 if !chan_a_disconnected {
1080 nodes[0].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1081 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id());
1082 chan_a_disconnected = true;
1083 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(0);
1087 if !chan_b_disconnected {
1088 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id());
1089 nodes[2].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1090 chan_b_disconnected = true;
1091 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(2);
1095 if chan_a_disconnected {
1096 nodes[0].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1097 features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1099 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1100 features: nodes[0].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1102 chan_a_disconnected = false;
1106 if chan_b_disconnected {
1107 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1108 features: nodes[2].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1110 nodes[2].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1111 features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1113 chan_b_disconnected = false;
1117 0x10 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1118 0x11 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1119 0x12 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1120 0x13 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1121 0x14 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1122 0x15 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1124 0x16 => { process_events!(0, true); },
1125 0x17 => { process_events!(0, false); },
1127 0x18 => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1128 0x19 => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1129 0x1a => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1130 0x1b => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1131 0x1c => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1132 0x1d => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1134 0x1e => { process_events!(1, true); },
1135 0x1f => { process_events!(1, false); },
1137 0x20 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1138 0x21 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1139 0x22 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1140 0x23 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1141 0x24 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1142 0x25 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1144 0x26 => { process_events!(2, true); },
1145 0x27 => { process_events!(2, false); },
1148 if !chan_a_disconnected {
1149 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id());
1150 chan_a_disconnected = true;
1151 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(0));
1155 let (new_node_a, new_monitor_a) = reload_node!(node_a_ser, 0, monitor_a, keys_manager_a, fee_est_a);
1156 nodes[0] = new_node_a;
1157 monitor_a = new_monitor_a;
1160 if !chan_a_disconnected {
1161 nodes[0].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1162 chan_a_disconnected = true;
1163 nodes[0].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1167 if !chan_b_disconnected {
1168 nodes[2].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1169 chan_b_disconnected = true;
1170 nodes[2].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1174 let (new_node_b, new_monitor_b) = reload_node!(node_b_ser, 1, monitor_b, keys_manager_b, fee_est_b);
1175 nodes[1] = new_node_b;
1176 monitor_b = new_monitor_b;
1179 if !chan_b_disconnected {
1180 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id());
1181 chan_b_disconnected = true;
1182 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(2));
1186 let (new_node_c, new_monitor_c) = reload_node!(node_c_ser, 2, monitor_c, keys_manager_c, fee_est_c);
1187 nodes[2] = new_node_c;
1188 monitor_c = new_monitor_c;
1191 // 1/10th the channel size:
1192 0x30 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1193 0x31 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1194 0x32 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1195 0x33 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1196 0x34 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1197 0x35 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1199 0x38 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1200 0x39 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1201 0x3a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1202 0x3b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1203 0x3c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1204 0x3d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1206 0x40 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1207 0x41 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1208 0x42 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1209 0x43 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1210 0x44 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1211 0x45 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1213 0x48 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1214 0x49 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1215 0x4a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1216 0x4b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1217 0x4c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1218 0x4d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1220 0x50 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1221 0x51 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1222 0x52 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1223 0x53 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1224 0x54 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1225 0x55 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1227 0x58 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1228 0x59 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1229 0x5a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1230 0x5b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1231 0x5c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1232 0x5d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1234 0x60 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1235 0x61 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1236 0x62 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1237 0x63 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1238 0x64 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1239 0x65 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1241 0x68 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1242 0x69 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1243 0x6a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1244 0x6b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1245 0x6c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1246 0x6d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1249 let mut max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_a;
1251 max_feerate *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1253 if fee_est_a.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1254 fee_est_a.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1256 nodes[0].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1258 0x81 => { fee_est_a.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[0].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1261 let mut max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_b;
1263 max_feerate *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1265 if fee_est_b.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1266 fee_est_b.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1268 nodes[1].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1270 0x85 => { fee_est_b.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[1].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1273 let mut max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_c;
1275 max_feerate *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1277 if fee_est_c.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1278 fee_est_c.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1280 nodes[2].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1282 0x89 => { fee_est_c.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[2].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1285 let pending_updates = monitor_a.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_1_funding).unwrap();
1286 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.get(0) {
1287 monitor_a.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id).unwrap();
1289 nodes[0].process_monitor_events();
1292 let pending_updates = monitor_a.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_1_funding).unwrap();
1293 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.get(1) {
1294 monitor_a.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id).unwrap();
1296 nodes[0].process_monitor_events();
1299 let pending_updates = monitor_a.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_1_funding).unwrap();
1300 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.last() {
1301 monitor_a.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id).unwrap();
1303 nodes[0].process_monitor_events();
1307 let pending_updates = monitor_b.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_1_funding).unwrap();
1308 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.get(0) {
1309 monitor_b.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id).unwrap();
1311 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1314 let pending_updates = monitor_b.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_1_funding).unwrap();
1315 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.get(1) {
1316 monitor_b.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id).unwrap();
1318 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1321 let pending_updates = monitor_b.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_1_funding).unwrap();
1322 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.last() {
1323 monitor_b.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id).unwrap();
1325 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1329 let pending_updates = monitor_b.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_2_funding).unwrap();
1330 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.get(0) {
1331 monitor_b.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id).unwrap();
1333 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1336 let pending_updates = monitor_b.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_2_funding).unwrap();
1337 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.get(1) {
1338 monitor_b.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id).unwrap();
1340 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1343 let pending_updates = monitor_b.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_2_funding).unwrap();
1344 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.last() {
1345 monitor_b.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id).unwrap();
1347 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1351 let pending_updates = monitor_c.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_2_funding).unwrap();
1352 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.get(0) {
1353 monitor_c.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id).unwrap();
1355 nodes[2].process_monitor_events();
1358 let pending_updates = monitor_c.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_2_funding).unwrap();
1359 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.get(1) {
1360 monitor_c.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id).unwrap();
1362 nodes[2].process_monitor_events();
1365 let pending_updates = monitor_c.chain_monitor.list_pending_monitor_updates().remove(&chan_2_funding).unwrap();
1366 if let Some(id) = pending_updates.last() {
1367 monitor_c.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id).unwrap();
1369 nodes[2].process_monitor_events();
1373 // Test that no channel is in a stuck state where neither party can send funds even
1374 // after we resolve all pending events.
1375 // First make sure there are no pending monitor updates, resetting the error state
1376 // and calling force_channel_monitor_updated for each monitor.
1377 *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed;
1378 *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed;
1379 *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed;
1381 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_a.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1382 monitor_a.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1383 nodes[0].process_monitor_events();
1385 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1386 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1387 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1389 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1390 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1391 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1393 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_c.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1394 monitor_c.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1395 nodes[2].process_monitor_events();
1398 // Next, make sure peers are all connected to each other
1399 if chan_a_disconnected {
1400 nodes[0].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1401 features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1403 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1404 features: nodes[0].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1406 chan_a_disconnected = false;
1408 if chan_b_disconnected {
1409 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1410 features: nodes[2].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1412 nodes[2].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1413 features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1415 chan_b_disconnected = false;
1418 for i in 0..std::usize::MAX {
1419 if i == 100 { panic!("It may take may iterations to settle the state, but it should not take forever"); }
1420 // Then, make sure any current forwards make their way to their destination
1421 if process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1422 if process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1423 if process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1424 // ...making sure any pending PendingHTLCsForwardable events are handled and
1425 // payments claimed.
1426 if process_events!(0, false) { continue; }
1427 if process_events!(1, false) { continue; }
1428 if process_events!(2, false) { continue; }
1432 // Finally, make sure that at least one end of each channel can make a substantial payment
1434 send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx) ||
1435 send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx));
1437 send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx) ||
1438 send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx));
1440 last_htlc_clear_fee_a = fee_est_a.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1441 last_htlc_clear_fee_b = fee_est_b.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1442 last_htlc_clear_fee_c = fee_est_c.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1444 _ => test_return!(),
1447 if nodes[0].get_and_clear_needs_persistence() == true {
1448 node_a_ser.0.clear();
1449 nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
1451 if nodes[1].get_and_clear_needs_persistence() == true {
1452 node_b_ser.0.clear();
1453 nodes[1].write(&mut node_b_ser).unwrap();
1455 if nodes[2].get_and_clear_needs_persistence() == true {
1456 node_c_ser.0.clear();
1457 nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
1462 /// We actually have different behavior based on if a certain log string has been seen, so we have
1463 /// to do a bit more tracking.
1465 struct SearchingOutput<O: Output> {
1467 may_fail: Arc<atomic::AtomicBool>,
1469 impl<O: Output> Output for SearchingOutput<O> {
1470 fn locked_write(&self, data: &[u8]) {
1471 // We hit a design limitation of LN state machine (see CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER)
1472 if std::str::from_utf8(data).unwrap().contains("Outbound update_fee HTLC buffer overflow - counterparty should force-close this channel") {
1473 self.may_fail.store(true, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1475 self.output.locked_write(data)
1478 impl<O: Output> SearchingOutput<O> {
1479 pub fn new(output: O) -> Self {
1480 Self { output, may_fail: Arc::new(atomic::AtomicBool::new(false)) }
1484 pub fn chanmon_consistency_test<Out: Output>(data: &[u8], out: Out) {
1485 do_test(data, out.clone(), false);
1486 do_test(data, out, true);
1490 pub extern "C" fn chanmon_consistency_run(data: *const u8, datalen: usize) {
1491 do_test(unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(data, datalen) }, test_logger::DevNull{}, false);
1492 do_test(unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(data, datalen) }, test_logger::DevNull{}, true);