1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Test that monitor update failures don't get our channel state out of sync.
11 //! One of the biggest concern with the monitor update failure handling code is that messages
12 //! resent after monitor updating is restored are delivered out-of-order, resulting in
13 //! commitment_signed messages having "invalid signatures".
14 //! To test this we stand up a network of three nodes and read bytes from the fuzz input to denote
15 //! actions such as sending payments, handling events, or changing monitor update return values on
16 //! a per-node basis. This should allow it to find any cases where the ordering of actions results
17 //! in us getting out of sync with ourselves, and, assuming at least one of our recieve- or
18 //! send-side handling is correct, other peers. We consider it a failure if any action results in a
19 //! channel being force-closed.
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
26 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash as TraitImport;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
33 use lightning::chain::{BestBlock, chainmonitor, channelmonitor, Confirm, Watch};
34 use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, MonitorEvent};
35 use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
36 use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
37 use lightning::chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
38 use lightning::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
39 use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentSendFailure, ChannelManagerReadArgs};
40 use lightning::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
41 use lightning::ln::msgs::{CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, UpdateAddHTLC, Init};
42 use lightning::util::enforcing_trait_impls::{EnforcingSigner, INITIAL_REVOKED_COMMITMENT_NUMBER};
43 use lightning::util::errors::APIError;
44 use lightning::util::events;
45 use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
46 use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
47 use lightning::util::events::MessageSendEventsProvider;
48 use lightning::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
49 use lightning::routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
52 use utils::test_logger;
53 use utils::test_persister::TestPersister;
55 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
56 use bitcoin::secp256k1::recovery::RecoverableSignature;
57 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
60 use std::cmp::Ordering;
61 use std::collections::{HashSet, hash_map, HashMap};
62 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
63 use std::sync::atomic;
66 struct FuzzEstimator {}
67 impl FeeEstimator for FuzzEstimator {
68 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
73 pub struct TestBroadcaster {}
74 impl BroadcasterInterface for TestBroadcaster {
75 fn broadcast_transaction(&self, _tx: &Transaction) { }
78 pub struct VecWriter(pub Vec<u8>);
79 impl Writer for VecWriter {
80 fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
81 self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
84 fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
85 self.0.reserve_exact(size);
89 struct TestChainMonitor {
90 pub logger: Arc<dyn Logger>,
91 pub keys: Arc<KeyProvider>,
92 pub chain_monitor: Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<EnforcingSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
93 pub update_ret: Mutex<Result<(), channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>>,
94 // If we reload a node with an old copy of ChannelMonitors, the ChannelManager deserialization
95 // logic will automatically force-close our channels for us (as we don't have an up-to-date
96 // monitor implying we are not able to punish misbehaving counterparties). Because this test
97 // "fails" if we ever force-close a channel, we avoid doing so, always saving the latest
98 // fully-serialized monitor state here, as well as the corresponding update_id.
99 pub latest_monitors: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, (u64, Vec<u8>)>>,
100 pub should_update_manager: atomic::AtomicBool,
102 impl TestChainMonitor {
103 pub fn new(broadcaster: Arc<TestBroadcaster>, logger: Arc<dyn Logger>, feeest: Arc<FuzzEstimator>, persister: Arc<TestPersister>, keys: Arc<KeyProvider>) -> Self {
105 chain_monitor: Arc::new(chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::new(None, broadcaster, logger.clone(), feeest, persister)),
108 update_ret: Mutex::new(Ok(())),
109 latest_monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
110 should_update_manager: atomic::AtomicBool::new(false),
114 impl chain::Watch<EnforcingSigner> for TestChainMonitor {
115 fn watch_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>) -> Result<(), channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
116 let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
117 monitor.write(&mut ser).unwrap();
118 if let Some(_) = self.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().insert(funding_txo, (monitor.get_latest_update_id(), ser.0)) {
119 panic!("Already had monitor pre-watch_channel");
121 self.should_update_manager.store(true, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
122 assert!(self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_txo, monitor).is_ok());
123 self.update_ret.lock().unwrap().clone()
126 fn update_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
127 let mut map_lock = self.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap();
128 let mut map_entry = match map_lock.entry(funding_txo) {
129 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => entry,
130 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => panic!("Didn't have monitor on update call"),
132 let deserialized_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::
133 read(&mut Cursor::new(&map_entry.get().1), &*self.keys).unwrap().1;
134 deserialized_monitor.update_monitor(&update, &&TestBroadcaster{}, &&FuzzEstimator{}, &self.logger).unwrap();
135 let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
136 deserialized_monitor.write(&mut ser).unwrap();
137 map_entry.insert((update.update_id, ser.0));
138 self.should_update_manager.store(true, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
139 assert!(self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update).is_ok());
140 self.update_ret.lock().unwrap().clone()
143 fn release_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
144 return self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
150 rand_bytes_id: atomic::AtomicU32,
151 revoked_commitments: Mutex<HashMap<[u8;32], Arc<Mutex<u64>>>>,
153 impl KeysInterface for KeyProvider {
154 type Signer = EnforcingSigner;
156 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey {
157 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, self.node_id]).unwrap()
160 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
161 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
162 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, self.node_id]).unwrap();
163 let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
164 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
167 fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
168 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
169 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, self.node_id]).unwrap())
172 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> EnforcingSigner {
173 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
174 let id = self.rand_bytes_id.fetch_add(1, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
175 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
177 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, self.node_id]).unwrap(),
178 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, self.node_id]).unwrap(),
179 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, self.node_id]).unwrap(),
180 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, self.node_id]).unwrap(),
181 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8, self.node_id]).unwrap(),
182 [id as u8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 9, self.node_id],
183 channel_value_satoshis,
186 let revoked_commitment = self.make_revoked_commitment_cell(keys.commitment_seed);
187 EnforcingSigner::new_with_revoked(keys, revoked_commitment, false)
190 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
191 let id = self.rand_bytes_id.fetch_add(1, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
192 let mut res = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 11, self.node_id];
193 res[30-4..30].copy_from_slice(&id.to_le_bytes());
197 fn read_chan_signer(&self, buffer: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> {
198 let mut reader = std::io::Cursor::new(buffer);
200 let inner: InMemorySigner = Readable::read(&mut reader)?;
201 let revoked_commitment = self.make_revoked_commitment_cell(inner.commitment_seed);
203 let last_commitment_number = Readable::read(&mut reader)?;
207 last_commitment_number: Arc::new(Mutex::new(last_commitment_number)),
209 disable_revocation_policy_check: false,
213 fn sign_invoice(&self, _invoice_preimage: Vec<u8>) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> {
219 fn make_revoked_commitment_cell(&self, commitment_seed: [u8; 32]) -> Arc<Mutex<u64>> {
220 let mut revoked_commitments = self.revoked_commitments.lock().unwrap();
221 if !revoked_commitments.contains_key(&commitment_seed) {
222 revoked_commitments.insert(commitment_seed, Arc::new(Mutex::new(INITIAL_REVOKED_COMMITMENT_NUMBER)));
224 let cell = revoked_commitments.get(&commitment_seed).unwrap();
230 fn check_api_err(api_err: APIError) {
232 APIError::APIMisuseError { .. } => panic!("We can't misuse the API"),
233 APIError::FeeRateTooHigh { .. } => panic!("We can't send too much fee?"),
234 APIError::RouteError { .. } => panic!("Our routes should work"),
235 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err } => {
236 // Test the error against a list of errors we can hit, and reject
237 // all others. If you hit this panic, the list of acceptable errors
238 // is probably just stale and you should add new messages here.
240 "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!" => {},
241 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ") => {},
242 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ") => {},
243 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value") => {},
244 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value") => {},
245 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds.") => {},
246 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees.") => {},
247 _ => panic!("{}", err),
250 APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed => {
251 // We can (obviously) temp-fail a monitor update
256 fn check_payment_err(send_err: PaymentSendFailure) {
258 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(api_err) => check_api_err(api_err),
259 PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(per_path_results) => {
260 for res in per_path_results { if let Err(api_err) = res { check_api_err(api_err); } }
262 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(per_path_results) => {
263 for api_err in per_path_results { check_api_err(api_err); }
265 PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(per_path_results) => {
266 for res in per_path_results { if let Err(api_err) = res { check_api_err(api_err); } }
271 type ChanMan = ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, Arc<TestChainMonitor>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>>;
274 fn get_payment_secret_hash(dest: &ChanMan, payment_id: &mut u8) -> Option<(PaymentSecret, PaymentHash)> {
275 let mut payment_hash;
277 payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[*payment_id; 1]).into_inner());
278 if let Ok(payment_secret) = dest.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 3600, 0) {
279 return Some((payment_secret, payment_hash));
281 *payment_id = payment_id.wrapping_add(1);
287 fn send_payment(source: &ChanMan, dest: &ChanMan, dest_chan_id: u64, amt: u64, payment_id: &mut u8) -> bool {
288 let (payment_secret, payment_hash) =
289 if let Some((secret, hash)) = get_payment_secret_hash(dest, payment_id) { (secret, hash) } else { return true; };
290 if let Err(err) = source.send_payment(&Route {
291 paths: vec![vec![RouteHop {
292 pubkey: dest.get_our_node_id(),
293 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
294 short_channel_id: dest_chan_id,
295 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
297 cltv_expiry_delta: 200,
299 }, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) {
300 check_payment_err(err);
305 fn send_hop_payment(source: &ChanMan, middle: &ChanMan, middle_chan_id: u64, dest: &ChanMan, dest_chan_id: u64, amt: u64, payment_id: &mut u8) -> bool {
306 let (payment_secret, payment_hash) =
307 if let Some((secret, hash)) = get_payment_secret_hash(dest, payment_id) { (secret, hash) } else { return true; };
308 if let Err(err) = source.send_payment(&Route {
309 paths: vec![vec![RouteHop {
310 pubkey: middle.get_our_node_id(),
311 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
312 short_channel_id: middle_chan_id,
313 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
315 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
317 pubkey: dest.get_our_node_id(),
318 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
319 short_channel_id: dest_chan_id,
320 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
322 cltv_expiry_delta: 200,
324 }, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) {
325 check_payment_err(err);
331 pub fn do_test<Out: test_logger::Output>(data: &[u8], out: Out) {
332 let fee_est = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator{});
333 let broadcast = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{});
335 macro_rules! make_node {
336 ($node_id: expr) => { {
337 let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new($node_id.to_string(), out.clone()));
338 let keys_manager = Arc::new(KeyProvider { node_id: $node_id, rand_bytes_id: atomic::AtomicU32::new(0), revoked_commitments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()) });
339 let monitor = Arc::new(TestChainMonitor::new(broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), fee_est.clone(), Arc::new(TestPersister{}), Arc::clone(&keys_manager)));
341 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
342 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
343 config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
344 let network = Network::Bitcoin;
345 let params = ChainParameters {
347 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
349 (ChannelManager::new(fee_est.clone(), monitor.clone(), broadcast.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), config, params),
350 monitor, keys_manager)
354 macro_rules! reload_node {
355 ($ser: expr, $node_id: expr, $old_monitors: expr, $keys_manager: expr) => { {
356 let keys_manager = Arc::clone(& $keys_manager);
357 let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new($node_id.to_string(), out.clone()));
358 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(TestChainMonitor::new(broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), fee_est.clone(), Arc::new(TestPersister{}), Arc::clone(& $keys_manager)));
360 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
361 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
362 config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
364 let mut monitors = HashMap::new();
365 let mut old_monitors = $old_monitors.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap();
366 for (outpoint, (update_id, monitor_ser)) in old_monitors.drain() {
367 monitors.insert(outpoint, <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&monitor_ser), &*$keys_manager).expect("Failed to read monitor").1);
368 chain_monitor.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().insert(outpoint, (update_id, monitor_ser));
370 let mut monitor_refs = HashMap::new();
371 for (outpoint, monitor) in monitors.iter_mut() {
372 monitor_refs.insert(*outpoint, monitor);
375 let read_args = ChannelManagerReadArgs {
377 fee_estimator: fee_est.clone(),
378 chain_monitor: chain_monitor.clone(),
379 tx_broadcaster: broadcast.clone(),
381 default_config: config,
382 channel_monitors: monitor_refs,
385 let res = (<(BlockHash, ChanMan)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&$ser.0), read_args).expect("Failed to read manager").1, chain_monitor.clone());
386 for (funding_txo, mon) in monitors.drain() {
387 assert!(chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_txo, mon).is_ok());
393 let mut channel_txn = Vec::new();
394 macro_rules! make_channel {
395 ($source: expr, $dest: expr, $chan_id: expr) => { {
396 $source.create_channel($dest.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42, 0, None).unwrap();
398 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
399 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
400 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
402 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
405 $dest.handle_open_channel(&$source.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
406 let accept_channel = {
407 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
408 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
409 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
411 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
414 $source.handle_accept_channel(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
417 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_events();
418 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
419 if let events::Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } = events[0] {
420 let tx = Transaction { version: $chan_id, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
421 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
423 funding_output = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
424 $source.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
425 channel_txn.push(tx);
426 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
429 let funding_created = {
430 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
431 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
432 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
434 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
436 $dest.handle_funding_created(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
438 let funding_signed = {
439 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
440 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
441 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
443 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
445 $source.handle_funding_signed(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
451 macro_rules! confirm_txn {
453 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash();
454 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: chain_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
455 let txdata: Vec<_> = channel_txn.iter().enumerate().map(|(i, tx)| (i + 1, tx)).collect();
456 $node.transactions_confirmed(&header, &txdata, 1);
458 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
460 $node.best_block_updated(&header, 99);
464 macro_rules! lock_fundings {
465 ($nodes: expr) => { {
466 let mut node_events = Vec::new();
467 for node in $nodes.iter() {
468 node_events.push(node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events());
470 for (idx, node_event) in node_events.iter().enumerate() {
471 for event in node_event {
472 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } = event {
473 for node in $nodes.iter() {
474 if node.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
475 node.handle_funding_locked(&$nodes[idx].get_our_node_id(), msg);
478 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
482 for node in $nodes.iter() {
483 let events = node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
484 for event in events {
485 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = event {
486 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
492 // 3 nodes is enough to hit all the possible cases, notably unknown-source-unknown-dest
494 let (node_a, mut monitor_a, keys_manager_a) = make_node!(0);
495 let (node_b, mut monitor_b, keys_manager_b) = make_node!(1);
496 let (node_c, mut monitor_c, keys_manager_c) = make_node!(2);
498 let mut nodes = [node_a, node_b, node_c];
500 let chan_1_funding = make_channel!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 0);
501 let chan_2_funding = make_channel!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1);
503 for node in nodes.iter() {
507 lock_fundings!(nodes);
509 let chan_a = nodes[0].list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap();
510 let chan_b = nodes[2].list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap();
512 let mut payment_id: u8 = 0;
514 let mut chan_a_disconnected = false;
515 let mut chan_b_disconnected = false;
516 let mut ab_events = Vec::new();
517 let mut ba_events = Vec::new();
518 let mut bc_events = Vec::new();
519 let mut cb_events = Vec::new();
521 let mut node_a_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
522 nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
523 let mut node_b_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
524 nodes[1].write(&mut node_b_ser).unwrap();
525 let mut node_c_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
526 nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
528 macro_rules! test_return {
530 assert_eq!(nodes[0].list_channels().len(), 1);
531 assert_eq!(nodes[1].list_channels().len(), 2);
532 assert_eq!(nodes[2].list_channels().len(), 1);
537 let mut read_pos = 0;
538 macro_rules! get_slice {
541 let slice_len = $len as usize;
542 if data.len() < read_pos + slice_len {
545 read_pos += slice_len;
546 &data[read_pos - slice_len..read_pos]
552 // Push any events from Node B onto ba_events and bc_events
553 macro_rules! push_excess_b_events {
554 ($excess_events: expr, $expect_drop_node: expr) => { {
555 let a_id = nodes[0].get_our_node_id();
556 let expect_drop_node: Option<usize> = $expect_drop_node;
557 let expect_drop_id = if let Some(id) = expect_drop_node { Some(nodes[id].get_our_node_id()) } else { None };
558 for event in $excess_events {
559 let push_a = match event {
560 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
561 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
564 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => {
565 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
568 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => {
569 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
572 events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { .. } => continue,
573 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => continue,
574 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => continue,
575 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
576 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
577 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
580 _ => panic!("Unhandled message event {:?}", event),
582 if push_a { ba_events.push(event); } else { bc_events.push(event); }
587 // While delivering messages, we select across three possible message selection processes
588 // to ensure we get as much coverage as possible. See the individual enum variants for more
591 enum ProcessMessages {
592 /// Deliver all available messages, including fetching any new messages from
593 /// `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` (which may have side effects).
595 /// Call `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` first, and then deliver up to one
596 /// message (which may already be queued).
598 /// Deliver up to one already-queued message. This avoids any potential side-effects
599 /// of `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` (eg freeing the HTLC holding cell), which
600 /// provides potentially more coverage.
604 macro_rules! process_msg_events {
605 ($node: expr, $corrupt_forward: expr, $limit_events: expr) => { {
606 let mut events = if $node == 1 {
607 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
608 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut ba_events);
609 new_events.extend_from_slice(&bc_events[..]);
612 } else if $node == 0 {
613 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
614 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut ab_events);
617 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
618 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut cb_events);
621 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
622 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage {
623 new_events = nodes[$node].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
625 let mut had_events = false;
626 let mut events_iter = events.drain(..).chain(new_events.drain(..));
627 let mut extra_ev = None;
628 for event in &mut events_iter {
631 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee, commitment_signed } } => {
632 for dest in nodes.iter() {
633 if dest.get_our_node_id() == node_id {
634 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
635 for update_add in update_add_htlcs.iter() {
636 if !$corrupt_forward {
637 dest.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_add);
639 // Corrupt the update_add_htlc message so that its HMAC
640 // check will fail and we generate a
641 // update_fail_malformed_htlc instead of an
642 // update_fail_htlc as we do when we reject a payment.
643 let mut msg_ser = update_add.encode();
644 msg_ser[1000] ^= 0xff;
645 let new_msg = UpdateAddHTLC::read(&mut Cursor::new(&msg_ser)).unwrap();
646 dest.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &new_msg);
649 for update_fulfill in update_fulfill_htlcs.iter() {
650 dest.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fulfill);
652 for update_fail in update_fail_htlcs.iter() {
653 dest.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fail);
655 for update_fail_malformed in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.iter() {
656 dest.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fail_malformed);
658 let processed_change = !update_add_htlcs.is_empty() || !update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() ||
659 !update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() || !update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty();
660 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::AllMessages && processed_change {
661 // If we only want to process some messages, don't deliver the CS until later.
662 extra_ev = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: CommitmentUpdate {
663 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
664 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
665 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
666 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
672 dest.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
677 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
678 for dest in nodes.iter() {
679 if dest.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
680 dest.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), msg);
684 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
685 for dest in nodes.iter() {
686 if dest.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
687 dest.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), msg);
691 events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { .. } => {
692 // Can be generated as a reestablish response
694 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {
695 // Can be generated as a reestablish response
697 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {
698 // Can be generated due to a payment forward being rejected due to a
699 // channel having previously failed a monitor update
701 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
702 // When we reconnect we will resend a channel_update to make sure our
703 // counterparty has the latest parameters for receiving payments
704 // through us. We do, however, check that the message does not include
705 // the "disabled" bit, as we should never ever have a channel which is
706 // disabled when we send such an update (or it may indicate channel
707 // force-close which we should detect as an error).
708 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0);
710 _ => panic!("Unhandled message event {:?}", event),
712 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::AllMessages {
717 push_excess_b_events!(extra_ev.into_iter().chain(events_iter), None);
718 } else if $node == 0 {
719 if let Some(ev) = extra_ev { ab_events.push(ev); }
720 for event in events_iter { ab_events.push(event); }
722 if let Some(ev) = extra_ev { cb_events.push(ev); }
723 for event in events_iter { cb_events.push(event); }
729 macro_rules! drain_msg_events_on_disconnect {
730 ($counterparty_id: expr) => { {
731 if $counterparty_id == 0 {
732 for event in nodes[0].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
734 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
735 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => {},
736 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => {},
737 events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { .. } => {},
738 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {},
739 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
740 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
741 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
743 _ => panic!("Unhandled message event"),
746 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(0));
750 for event in nodes[2].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
752 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
753 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => {},
754 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => {},
755 events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { .. } => {},
756 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {},
757 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
758 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
759 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
761 _ => panic!("Unhandled message event"),
764 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(2));
771 macro_rules! process_events {
772 ($node: expr, $fail: expr) => { {
773 // In case we get 256 payments we may have a hash collision, resulting in the
774 // second claim/fail call not finding the duplicate-hash HTLC, so we have to
775 // deduplicate the calls here.
776 let mut claim_set = HashSet::new();
777 let mut events = nodes[$node].get_and_clear_pending_events();
778 // Sort events so that PendingHTLCsForwardable get processed last. This avoids a
779 // case where we first process a PendingHTLCsForwardable, then claim/fail on a
780 // PaymentReceived, claiming/failing two HTLCs, but leaving a just-generated
781 // PaymentReceived event for the second HTLC in our pending_events (and breaking
782 // our claim_set deduplication).
783 events.sort_by(|a, b| {
784 if let events::Event::PaymentReceived { .. } = a {
785 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = b {
787 } else { Ordering::Equal }
788 } else if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = a {
789 if let events::Event::PaymentReceived { .. } = b {
791 } else { Ordering::Equal }
792 } else { Ordering::Equal }
794 let had_events = !events.is_empty();
795 for event in events.drain(..) {
797 events::Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => {
798 if claim_set.insert(payment_hash.0) {
800 assert!(nodes[$node].fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash));
802 assert!(nodes[$node].claim_funds(PaymentPreimage(payment_hash.0)));
806 events::Event::PaymentSent { .. } => {},
807 events::Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {},
808 events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {
809 nodes[$node].process_pending_htlc_forwards();
811 _ => panic!("Unhandled event"),
818 match get_slice!(1)[0] {
819 // In general, we keep related message groups close together in binary form, allowing
820 // bit-twiddling mutations to have similar effects. This is probably overkill, but no
823 0x00 => *monitor_a.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure),
824 0x01 => *monitor_b.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure),
825 0x02 => *monitor_c.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure),
826 0x04 => *monitor_a.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()),
827 0x05 => *monitor_b.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()),
828 0x06 => *monitor_c.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()),
831 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_a.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
832 nodes[0].channel_monitor_updated(&chan_1_funding, *id);
836 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
837 nodes[1].channel_monitor_updated(&chan_1_funding, *id);
841 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
842 nodes[1].channel_monitor_updated(&chan_2_funding, *id);
846 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_c.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
847 nodes[2].channel_monitor_updated(&chan_2_funding, *id);
852 if !chan_a_disconnected {
853 nodes[0].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), false);
854 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), false);
855 chan_a_disconnected = true;
856 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(0);
860 if !chan_b_disconnected {
861 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), false);
862 nodes[2].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), false);
863 chan_b_disconnected = true;
864 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(2);
868 if chan_a_disconnected {
869 nodes[0].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
870 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
871 chan_a_disconnected = false;
875 if chan_b_disconnected {
876 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
877 nodes[2].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
878 chan_b_disconnected = false;
882 0x10 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
883 0x11 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
884 0x12 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
885 0x13 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
886 0x14 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
887 0x15 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
889 0x16 => { process_events!(0, true); },
890 0x17 => { process_events!(0, false); },
892 0x18 => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
893 0x19 => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
894 0x1a => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
895 0x1b => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
896 0x1c => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
897 0x1d => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
899 0x1e => { process_events!(1, true); },
900 0x1f => { process_events!(1, false); },
902 0x20 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
903 0x21 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
904 0x22 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
905 0x23 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
906 0x24 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
907 0x25 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
909 0x26 => { process_events!(2, true); },
910 0x27 => { process_events!(2, false); },
913 if !chan_a_disconnected {
914 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), false);
915 chan_a_disconnected = true;
916 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(0);
918 if monitor_a.should_update_manager.load(atomic::Ordering::Relaxed) {
919 node_a_ser.0.clear();
920 nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
922 let (new_node_a, new_monitor_a) = reload_node!(node_a_ser, 0, monitor_a, keys_manager_a);
923 nodes[0] = new_node_a;
924 monitor_a = new_monitor_a;
927 if !chan_a_disconnected {
928 nodes[0].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), false);
929 chan_a_disconnected = true;
930 nodes[0].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
934 if !chan_b_disconnected {
935 nodes[2].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), false);
936 chan_b_disconnected = true;
937 nodes[2].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
941 let (new_node_b, new_monitor_b) = reload_node!(node_b_ser, 1, monitor_b, keys_manager_b);
942 nodes[1] = new_node_b;
943 monitor_b = new_monitor_b;
946 if !chan_b_disconnected {
947 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), false);
948 chan_b_disconnected = true;
949 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(2);
951 if monitor_c.should_update_manager.load(atomic::Ordering::Relaxed) {
952 node_c_ser.0.clear();
953 nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
955 let (new_node_c, new_monitor_c) = reload_node!(node_c_ser, 2, monitor_c, keys_manager_c);
956 nodes[2] = new_node_c;
957 monitor_c = new_monitor_c;
960 // 1/10th the channel size:
961 0x30 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id); },
962 0x31 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id); },
963 0x32 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id); },
964 0x33 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id); },
965 0x34 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id); },
966 0x35 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id); },
968 0x38 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id); },
969 0x39 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id); },
970 0x3a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id); },
971 0x3b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id); },
972 0x3c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id); },
973 0x3d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id); },
975 0x40 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id); },
976 0x41 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id); },
977 0x42 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id); },
978 0x43 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id); },
979 0x44 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id); },
980 0x45 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id); },
982 0x48 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id); },
983 0x49 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id); },
984 0x4a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id); },
985 0x4b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id); },
986 0x4c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id); },
987 0x4d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id); },
989 0x50 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id); },
990 0x51 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id); },
991 0x52 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id); },
992 0x53 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id); },
993 0x54 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id); },
994 0x55 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id); },
996 0x58 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id); },
997 0x59 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id); },
998 0x5a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id); },
999 0x5b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id); },
1000 0x5c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id); },
1001 0x5d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id); },
1003 0x60 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id); },
1004 0x61 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id); },
1005 0x62 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id); },
1006 0x63 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id); },
1007 0x64 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id); },
1008 0x65 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id); },
1010 0x68 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id); },
1011 0x69 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id); },
1012 0x6a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id); },
1013 0x6b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id); },
1014 0x6c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id); },
1015 0x6d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id); },
1018 // Test that no channel is in a stuck state where neither party can send funds even
1019 // after we resolve all pending events.
1020 // First make sure there are no pending monitor updates, resetting the error state
1021 // and calling channel_monitor_updated for each monitor.
1022 *monitor_a.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
1023 *monitor_b.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
1024 *monitor_c.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
1026 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_a.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1027 nodes[0].channel_monitor_updated(&chan_1_funding, *id);
1029 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1030 nodes[1].channel_monitor_updated(&chan_1_funding, *id);
1032 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1033 nodes[1].channel_monitor_updated(&chan_2_funding, *id);
1035 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_c.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1036 nodes[2].channel_monitor_updated(&chan_2_funding, *id);
1039 // Next, make sure peers are all connected to each other
1040 if chan_a_disconnected {
1041 nodes[0].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
1042 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
1043 chan_a_disconnected = false;
1045 if chan_b_disconnected {
1046 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
1047 nodes[2].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
1048 chan_b_disconnected = false;
1051 for i in 0..std::usize::MAX {
1052 if i == 100 { panic!("It may take may iterations to settle the state, but it should not take forever"); }
1053 // Then, make sure any current forwards make their way to their destination
1054 if process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1055 if process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1056 if process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1057 // ...making sure any pending PendingHTLCsForwardable events are handled and
1058 // payments claimed.
1059 if process_events!(0, false) { continue; }
1060 if process_events!(1, false) { continue; }
1061 if process_events!(2, false) { continue; }
1065 // Finally, make sure that at least one end of each channel can make a substantial payment.
1067 send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id) ||
1068 send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id));
1070 send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id) ||
1071 send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id));
1073 _ => test_return!(),
1076 node_a_ser.0.clear();
1077 nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
1078 monitor_a.should_update_manager.store(false, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
1079 node_b_ser.0.clear();
1080 nodes[1].write(&mut node_b_ser).unwrap();
1081 monitor_b.should_update_manager.store(false, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
1082 node_c_ser.0.clear();
1083 nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
1084 monitor_c.should_update_manager.store(false, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
1088 pub fn chanmon_consistency_test<Out: test_logger::Output>(data: &[u8], out: Out) {
1093 pub extern "C" fn chanmon_consistency_run(data: *const u8, datalen: usize) {
1094 do_test(unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(data, datalen) }, test_logger::DevNull{});