1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Test that monitor update failures don't get our channel state out of sync.
11 //! One of the biggest concern with the monitor update failure handling code is that messages
12 //! resent after monitor updating is restored are delivered out-of-order, resulting in
13 //! commitment_signed messages having "invalid signatures".
14 //! To test this we stand up a network of three nodes and read bytes from the fuzz input to denote
15 //! actions such as sending payments, handling events, or changing monitor update return values on
16 //! a per-node basis. This should allow it to find any cases where the ordering of actions results
17 //! in us getting out of sync with ourselves, and, assuming at least one of our recieve- or
18 //! send-side handling is correct, other peers. We consider it a failure if any action results in a
19 //! channel being force-closed.
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
26 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash as TraitImport;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
33 use lightning::chain::{BestBlock, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, chainmonitor, channelmonitor, Confirm, Watch};
34 use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, MonitorEvent};
35 use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
36 use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
37 use lightning::chain::keysinterface::{KeyMaterial, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
38 use lightning::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
39 use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentSendFailure, ChannelManagerReadArgs};
40 use lightning::ln::channel::FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
41 use lightning::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
42 use lightning::ln::msgs::{CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, UpdateAddHTLC, Init};
43 use lightning::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
44 use lightning::util::enforcing_trait_impls::{EnforcingSigner, EnforcementState};
45 use lightning::util::errors::APIError;
46 use lightning::util::events;
47 use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
48 use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
49 use lightning::util::events::MessageSendEventsProvider;
50 use lightning::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
51 use lightning::routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
53 use utils::test_logger::{self, Output};
54 use utils::test_persister::TestPersister;
56 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
57 use bitcoin::secp256k1::recovery::RecoverableSignature;
58 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
61 use std::cmp::{self, Ordering};
62 use std::collections::{HashSet, hash_map, HashMap};
63 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
64 use std::sync::atomic;
67 const MAX_FEE: u32 = 10_000;
68 struct FuzzEstimator {
69 ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32,
71 impl FeeEstimator for FuzzEstimator {
72 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, conf_target: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
73 // We force-close channels if our counterparty sends us a feerate which is a small multiple
74 // of our HighPriority fee estimate or smaller than our Background fee estimate. Thus, we
75 // always return a HighPriority feerate here which is >= the maximum Normal feerate and a
76 // Background feerate which is <= the minimum Normal feerate.
78 ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority => MAX_FEE,
79 ConfirmationTarget::Background => 253,
80 ConfirmationTarget::Normal => cmp::min(self.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire), MAX_FEE),
85 pub struct TestBroadcaster {}
86 impl BroadcasterInterface for TestBroadcaster {
87 fn broadcast_transaction(&self, _tx: &Transaction) { }
90 pub struct VecWriter(pub Vec<u8>);
91 impl Writer for VecWriter {
92 fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
93 self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
98 struct TestChainMonitor {
99 pub logger: Arc<dyn Logger>,
100 pub keys: Arc<KeyProvider>,
101 pub persister: Arc<TestPersister>,
102 pub chain_monitor: Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<EnforcingSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
103 // If we reload a node with an old copy of ChannelMonitors, the ChannelManager deserialization
104 // logic will automatically force-close our channels for us (as we don't have an up-to-date
105 // monitor implying we are not able to punish misbehaving counterparties). Because this test
106 // "fails" if we ever force-close a channel, we avoid doing so, always saving the latest
107 // fully-serialized monitor state here, as well as the corresponding update_id.
108 pub latest_monitors: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, (u64, Vec<u8>)>>,
109 pub should_update_manager: atomic::AtomicBool,
111 impl TestChainMonitor {
112 pub fn new(broadcaster: Arc<TestBroadcaster>, logger: Arc<dyn Logger>, feeest: Arc<FuzzEstimator>, persister: Arc<TestPersister>, keys: Arc<KeyProvider>) -> Self {
114 chain_monitor: Arc::new(chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::new(None, broadcaster, logger.clone(), feeest, Arc::clone(&persister))),
118 latest_monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
119 should_update_manager: atomic::AtomicBool::new(false),
123 impl chain::Watch<EnforcingSigner> for TestChainMonitor {
124 fn watch_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>) -> Result<(), chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
125 let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
126 monitor.write(&mut ser).unwrap();
127 if let Some(_) = self.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().insert(funding_txo, (monitor.get_latest_update_id(), ser.0)) {
128 panic!("Already had monitor pre-watch_channel");
130 self.should_update_manager.store(true, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
131 self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_txo, monitor)
134 fn update_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
135 let mut map_lock = self.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap();
136 let mut map_entry = match map_lock.entry(funding_txo) {
137 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => entry,
138 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => panic!("Didn't have monitor on update call"),
140 let deserialized_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::
141 read(&mut Cursor::new(&map_entry.get().1), &*self.keys).unwrap().1;
142 deserialized_monitor.update_monitor(&update, &&TestBroadcaster{}, &&FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) }, &self.logger).unwrap();
143 let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
144 deserialized_monitor.write(&mut ser).unwrap();
145 map_entry.insert((update.update_id, ser.0));
146 self.should_update_manager.store(true, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
147 self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update)
150 fn release_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
151 return self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
157 rand_bytes_id: atomic::AtomicU32,
158 enforcement_states: Mutex<HashMap<[u8;32], Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>>>>,
160 impl KeysInterface for KeyProvider {
161 type Signer = EnforcingSigner;
163 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey {
164 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, self.node_id]).unwrap()
167 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial {
168 KeyMaterial([0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, self.node_id])
171 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
172 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
173 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, self.node_id]).unwrap();
174 let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
175 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
178 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
179 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
180 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, self.node_id]).unwrap();
181 let pubkey_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &secret_key).serialize());
182 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh(&pubkey_hash)
185 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> EnforcingSigner {
186 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
187 let id = self.rand_bytes_id.fetch_add(1, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
188 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
190 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, self.node_id]).unwrap(),
191 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, self.node_id]).unwrap(),
192 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, self.node_id]).unwrap(),
193 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, self.node_id]).unwrap(),
194 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8, self.node_id]).unwrap(),
195 [id as u8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 9, self.node_id],
196 channel_value_satoshis,
199 let revoked_commitment = self.make_enforcement_state_cell(keys.commitment_seed);
200 EnforcingSigner::new_with_revoked(keys, revoked_commitment, false)
203 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
204 let id = self.rand_bytes_id.fetch_add(1, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
205 let mut res = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 11, self.node_id];
206 res[30-4..30].copy_from_slice(&id.to_le_bytes());
210 fn read_chan_signer(&self, buffer: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> {
211 let mut reader = std::io::Cursor::new(buffer);
213 let inner: InMemorySigner = Readable::read(&mut reader)?;
214 let state = self.make_enforcement_state_cell(inner.commitment_seed);
219 disable_revocation_policy_check: false,
223 fn sign_invoice(&self, _invoice_preimage: Vec<u8>) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> {
229 fn make_enforcement_state_cell(&self, commitment_seed: [u8; 32]) -> Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>> {
230 let mut revoked_commitments = self.enforcement_states.lock().unwrap();
231 if !revoked_commitments.contains_key(&commitment_seed) {
232 revoked_commitments.insert(commitment_seed, Arc::new(Mutex::new(EnforcementState::new())));
234 let cell = revoked_commitments.get(&commitment_seed).unwrap();
240 fn check_api_err(api_err: APIError) {
242 APIError::APIMisuseError { .. } => panic!("We can't misuse the API"),
243 APIError::FeeRateTooHigh { .. } => panic!("We can't send too much fee?"),
244 APIError::RouteError { .. } => panic!("Our routes should work"),
245 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err } => {
246 // Test the error against a list of errors we can hit, and reject
247 // all others. If you hit this panic, the list of acceptable errors
248 // is probably just stale and you should add new messages here.
250 "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!" => {},
251 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ") => {},
252 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ") => {},
253 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value") => {},
254 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value") => {},
255 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds.") => {},
256 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees.") => {},
257 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at") => {},
258 _ => panic!("{}", err),
261 APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed => {
262 // We can (obviously) temp-fail a monitor update
264 APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { .. } => panic!("Cannot send an incompatible shutdown script"),
268 fn check_payment_err(send_err: PaymentSendFailure) {
270 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(api_err) => check_api_err(api_err),
271 PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(per_path_results) => {
272 for res in per_path_results { if let Err(api_err) = res { check_api_err(api_err); } }
274 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(per_path_results) => {
275 for api_err in per_path_results { check_api_err(api_err); }
277 PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure { results, .. } => {
278 for res in results { if let Err(api_err) = res { check_api_err(api_err); } }
283 type ChanMan = ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, Arc<TestChainMonitor>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>>;
286 fn get_payment_secret_hash(dest: &ChanMan, payment_id: &mut u8) -> Option<(PaymentSecret, PaymentHash)> {
287 let mut payment_hash;
289 payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[*payment_id; 1]).into_inner());
290 if let Ok(payment_secret) = dest.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 3600) {
291 return Some((payment_secret, payment_hash));
293 *payment_id = payment_id.wrapping_add(1);
299 fn send_payment(source: &ChanMan, dest: &ChanMan, dest_chan_id: u64, amt: u64, payment_id: &mut u8) -> bool {
300 let (payment_secret, payment_hash) =
301 if let Some((secret, hash)) = get_payment_secret_hash(dest, payment_id) { (secret, hash) } else { return true; };
302 if let Err(err) = source.send_payment(&Route {
303 paths: vec![vec![RouteHop {
304 pubkey: dest.get_our_node_id(),
305 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
306 short_channel_id: dest_chan_id,
307 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
309 cltv_expiry_delta: 200,
312 }, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) {
313 check_payment_err(err);
318 fn send_hop_payment(source: &ChanMan, middle: &ChanMan, middle_chan_id: u64, dest: &ChanMan, dest_chan_id: u64, amt: u64, payment_id: &mut u8) -> bool {
319 let (payment_secret, payment_hash) =
320 if let Some((secret, hash)) = get_payment_secret_hash(dest, payment_id) { (secret, hash) } else { return true; };
321 if let Err(err) = source.send_payment(&Route {
322 paths: vec![vec![RouteHop {
323 pubkey: middle.get_our_node_id(),
324 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
325 short_channel_id: middle_chan_id,
326 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
328 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
330 pubkey: dest.get_our_node_id(),
331 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
332 short_channel_id: dest_chan_id,
333 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
335 cltv_expiry_delta: 200,
338 }, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) {
339 check_payment_err(err);
345 pub fn do_test<Out: Output>(data: &[u8], underlying_out: Out) {
346 let out = SearchingOutput::new(underlying_out);
347 let broadcast = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{});
349 macro_rules! make_node {
350 ($node_id: expr, $fee_estimator: expr) => { {
351 let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new($node_id.to_string(), out.clone()));
352 let keys_manager = Arc::new(KeyProvider { node_id: $node_id, rand_bytes_id: atomic::AtomicU32::new(0), enforcement_states: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()) });
353 let monitor = Arc::new(TestChainMonitor::new(broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), $fee_estimator.clone(),
354 Arc::new(TestPersister { update_ret: Mutex::new(Ok(())) }), Arc::clone(&keys_manager)));
356 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
357 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
358 config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
359 let network = Network::Bitcoin;
360 let params = ChainParameters {
362 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
364 (ChannelManager::new($fee_estimator.clone(), monitor.clone(), broadcast.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), config, params),
365 monitor, keys_manager)
369 macro_rules! reload_node {
370 ($ser: expr, $node_id: expr, $old_monitors: expr, $keys_manager: expr, $fee_estimator: expr) => { {
371 let keys_manager = Arc::clone(& $keys_manager);
372 let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new($node_id.to_string(), out.clone()));
373 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(TestChainMonitor::new(broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), $fee_estimator.clone(),
374 Arc::new(TestPersister { update_ret: Mutex::new(Ok(())) }), Arc::clone(& $keys_manager)));
376 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
377 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
378 config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
380 let mut monitors = HashMap::new();
381 let mut old_monitors = $old_monitors.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap();
382 for (outpoint, (update_id, monitor_ser)) in old_monitors.drain() {
383 monitors.insert(outpoint, <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&monitor_ser), &*$keys_manager).expect("Failed to read monitor").1);
384 chain_monitor.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().insert(outpoint, (update_id, monitor_ser));
386 let mut monitor_refs = HashMap::new();
387 for (outpoint, monitor) in monitors.iter_mut() {
388 monitor_refs.insert(*outpoint, monitor);
391 let read_args = ChannelManagerReadArgs {
393 fee_estimator: $fee_estimator.clone(),
394 chain_monitor: chain_monitor.clone(),
395 tx_broadcaster: broadcast.clone(),
397 default_config: config,
398 channel_monitors: monitor_refs,
401 let res = (<(BlockHash, ChanMan)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&$ser.0), read_args).expect("Failed to read manager").1, chain_monitor.clone());
402 for (funding_txo, mon) in monitors.drain() {
403 assert!(chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_txo, mon).is_ok());
409 let mut channel_txn = Vec::new();
410 macro_rules! make_channel {
411 ($source: expr, $dest: expr, $chan_id: expr) => { {
412 $source.peer_connected(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
413 $dest.peer_connected(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
415 $source.create_channel($dest.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42, 0, None).unwrap();
417 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
418 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
419 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
421 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
424 $dest.handle_open_channel(&$source.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
425 let accept_channel = {
426 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
427 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
428 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
430 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
433 $source.handle_accept_channel(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
436 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_events();
437 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
438 if let events::Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } = events[0] {
439 let tx = Transaction { version: $chan_id, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
440 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
442 funding_output = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
443 $source.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
444 channel_txn.push(tx);
445 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
448 let funding_created = {
449 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
450 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
451 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
453 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
455 $dest.handle_funding_created(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
457 let funding_signed = {
458 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
459 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
460 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
462 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
464 $source.handle_funding_signed(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
470 macro_rules! confirm_txn {
472 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash();
473 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: chain_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
474 let txdata: Vec<_> = channel_txn.iter().enumerate().map(|(i, tx)| (i + 1, tx)).collect();
475 $node.transactions_confirmed(&header, &txdata, 1);
477 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
479 $node.best_block_updated(&header, 99);
483 macro_rules! lock_fundings {
484 ($nodes: expr) => { {
485 let mut node_events = Vec::new();
486 for node in $nodes.iter() {
487 node_events.push(node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events());
489 for (idx, node_event) in node_events.iter().enumerate() {
490 for event in node_event {
491 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } = event {
492 for node in $nodes.iter() {
493 if node.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
494 node.handle_funding_locked(&$nodes[idx].get_our_node_id(), msg);
497 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
501 for node in $nodes.iter() {
502 let events = node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
503 for event in events {
504 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = event {
505 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
511 let fee_est_a = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
512 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_a = 253;
513 let fee_est_b = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
514 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_b = 253;
515 let fee_est_c = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
516 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_c = 253;
518 // 3 nodes is enough to hit all the possible cases, notably unknown-source-unknown-dest
520 let (node_a, mut monitor_a, keys_manager_a) = make_node!(0, fee_est_a);
521 let (node_b, mut monitor_b, keys_manager_b) = make_node!(1, fee_est_b);
522 let (node_c, mut monitor_c, keys_manager_c) = make_node!(2, fee_est_c);
524 let mut nodes = [node_a, node_b, node_c];
526 let chan_1_funding = make_channel!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 0);
527 let chan_2_funding = make_channel!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1);
529 for node in nodes.iter() {
533 lock_fundings!(nodes);
535 let chan_a = nodes[0].list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap();
536 let chan_b = nodes[2].list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap();
538 let mut payment_id: u8 = 0;
540 let mut chan_a_disconnected = false;
541 let mut chan_b_disconnected = false;
542 let mut ab_events = Vec::new();
543 let mut ba_events = Vec::new();
544 let mut bc_events = Vec::new();
545 let mut cb_events = Vec::new();
547 let mut node_a_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
548 nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
549 let mut node_b_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
550 nodes[1].write(&mut node_b_ser).unwrap();
551 let mut node_c_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
552 nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
554 macro_rules! test_return {
556 assert_eq!(nodes[0].list_channels().len(), 1);
557 assert_eq!(nodes[1].list_channels().len(), 2);
558 assert_eq!(nodes[2].list_channels().len(), 1);
563 let mut read_pos = 0;
564 macro_rules! get_slice {
567 let slice_len = $len as usize;
568 if data.len() < read_pos + slice_len {
571 read_pos += slice_len;
572 &data[read_pos - slice_len..read_pos]
578 // Push any events from Node B onto ba_events and bc_events
579 macro_rules! push_excess_b_events {
580 ($excess_events: expr, $expect_drop_node: expr) => { {
581 let a_id = nodes[0].get_our_node_id();
582 let expect_drop_node: Option<usize> = $expect_drop_node;
583 let expect_drop_id = if let Some(id) = expect_drop_node { Some(nodes[id].get_our_node_id()) } else { None };
584 for event in $excess_events {
585 let push_a = match event {
586 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
587 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
590 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => {
591 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
594 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => {
595 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
598 events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { .. } => continue,
599 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => continue,
600 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
601 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
602 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
605 _ => panic!("Unhandled message event {:?}", event),
607 if push_a { ba_events.push(event); } else { bc_events.push(event); }
612 // While delivering messages, we select across three possible message selection processes
613 // to ensure we get as much coverage as possible. See the individual enum variants for more
616 enum ProcessMessages {
617 /// Deliver all available messages, including fetching any new messages from
618 /// `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` (which may have side effects).
620 /// Call `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` first, and then deliver up to one
621 /// message (which may already be queued).
623 /// Deliver up to one already-queued message. This avoids any potential side-effects
624 /// of `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` (eg freeing the HTLC holding cell), which
625 /// provides potentially more coverage.
629 macro_rules! process_msg_events {
630 ($node: expr, $corrupt_forward: expr, $limit_events: expr) => { {
631 let mut events = if $node == 1 {
632 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
633 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut ba_events);
634 new_events.extend_from_slice(&bc_events[..]);
637 } else if $node == 0 {
638 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
639 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut ab_events);
642 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
643 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut cb_events);
646 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
647 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage {
648 new_events = nodes[$node].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
650 let mut had_events = false;
651 let mut events_iter = events.drain(..).chain(new_events.drain(..));
652 let mut extra_ev = None;
653 for event in &mut events_iter {
656 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee, commitment_signed } } => {
657 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
658 if dest.get_our_node_id() == node_id {
659 for update_add in update_add_htlcs.iter() {
660 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_add_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
661 if !$corrupt_forward {
662 dest.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_add);
664 // Corrupt the update_add_htlc message so that its HMAC
665 // check will fail and we generate a
666 // update_fail_malformed_htlc instead of an
667 // update_fail_htlc as we do when we reject a payment.
668 let mut msg_ser = update_add.encode();
669 msg_ser[1000] ^= 0xff;
670 let new_msg = UpdateAddHTLC::read(&mut Cursor::new(&msg_ser)).unwrap();
671 dest.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &new_msg);
674 for update_fulfill in update_fulfill_htlcs.iter() {
675 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fulfill_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
676 dest.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fulfill);
678 for update_fail in update_fail_htlcs.iter() {
679 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fail_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
680 dest.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fail);
682 for update_fail_malformed in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.iter() {
683 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fail_malformed_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
684 dest.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fail_malformed);
686 if let Some(msg) = update_fee {
687 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fee to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
688 dest.handle_update_fee(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &msg);
690 let processed_change = !update_add_htlcs.is_empty() || !update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() ||
691 !update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() || !update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty();
692 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::AllMessages && processed_change {
693 // If we only want to process some messages, don't deliver the CS until later.
694 extra_ev = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: CommitmentUpdate {
695 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
696 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
697 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
698 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
704 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering commitment_signed to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
705 dest.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
710 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
711 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
712 if dest.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
713 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering revoke_and_ack to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
714 dest.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), msg);
718 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
719 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
720 if dest.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
721 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering channel_reestablish to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
722 dest.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), msg);
726 events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { .. } => {
727 // Can be generated as a reestablish response
729 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {
730 // Can be generated as a reestablish response
732 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
733 // When we reconnect we will resend a channel_update to make sure our
734 // counterparty has the latest parameters for receiving payments
735 // through us. We do, however, check that the message does not include
736 // the "disabled" bit, as we should never ever have a channel which is
737 // disabled when we send such an update (or it may indicate channel
738 // force-close which we should detect as an error).
739 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0);
741 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
744 panic!("Unhandled message event {:?}", event)
747 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::AllMessages {
752 push_excess_b_events!(extra_ev.into_iter().chain(events_iter), None);
753 } else if $node == 0 {
754 if let Some(ev) = extra_ev { ab_events.push(ev); }
755 for event in events_iter { ab_events.push(event); }
757 if let Some(ev) = extra_ev { cb_events.push(ev); }
758 for event in events_iter { cb_events.push(event); }
764 macro_rules! drain_msg_events_on_disconnect {
765 ($counterparty_id: expr) => { {
766 if $counterparty_id == 0 {
767 for event in nodes[0].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
769 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
770 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => {},
771 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => {},
772 events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { .. } => {},
773 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {},
774 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
775 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
777 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
780 panic!("Unhandled message event")
784 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(0));
788 for event in nodes[2].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
790 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
791 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => {},
792 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => {},
793 events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { .. } => {},
794 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {},
795 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
796 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
798 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
801 panic!("Unhandled message event")
805 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(2));
812 macro_rules! process_events {
813 ($node: expr, $fail: expr) => { {
814 // In case we get 256 payments we may have a hash collision, resulting in the
815 // second claim/fail call not finding the duplicate-hash HTLC, so we have to
816 // deduplicate the calls here.
817 let mut claim_set = HashSet::new();
818 let mut events = nodes[$node].get_and_clear_pending_events();
819 // Sort events so that PendingHTLCsForwardable get processed last. This avoids a
820 // case where we first process a PendingHTLCsForwardable, then claim/fail on a
821 // PaymentReceived, claiming/failing two HTLCs, but leaving a just-generated
822 // PaymentReceived event for the second HTLC in our pending_events (and breaking
823 // our claim_set deduplication).
824 events.sort_by(|a, b| {
825 if let events::Event::PaymentReceived { .. } = a {
826 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = b {
828 } else { Ordering::Equal }
829 } else if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = a {
830 if let events::Event::PaymentReceived { .. } = b {
832 } else { Ordering::Equal }
833 } else { Ordering::Equal }
835 let had_events = !events.is_empty();
836 for event in events.drain(..) {
838 events::Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => {
839 if claim_set.insert(payment_hash.0) {
841 assert!(nodes[$node].fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash));
843 assert!(nodes[$node].claim_funds(PaymentPreimage(payment_hash.0)));
847 events::Event::PaymentSent { .. } => {},
848 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
849 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } => {},
850 events::Event::PaymentForwarded { .. } if $node == 1 => {},
851 events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {
852 nodes[$node].process_pending_htlc_forwards();
854 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
857 panic!("Unhandled event")
865 let v = get_slice!(1)[0];
866 out.locked_write(format!("READ A BYTE! HANDLING INPUT {:x}...........\n", v).as_bytes());
868 // In general, we keep related message groups close together in binary form, allowing
869 // bit-twiddling mutations to have similar effects. This is probably overkill, but no
872 0x00 => *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure),
873 0x01 => *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure),
874 0x02 => *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure),
875 0x04 => *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()),
876 0x05 => *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()),
877 0x06 => *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()),
880 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_a.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
881 monitor_a.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
882 nodes[0].process_monitor_events();
886 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
887 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
888 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
892 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
893 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
894 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
898 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_c.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
899 monitor_c.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
900 nodes[2].process_monitor_events();
905 if !chan_a_disconnected {
906 nodes[0].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), false);
907 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), false);
908 chan_a_disconnected = true;
909 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(0);
913 if !chan_b_disconnected {
914 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), false);
915 nodes[2].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), false);
916 chan_b_disconnected = true;
917 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(2);
921 if chan_a_disconnected {
922 nodes[0].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
923 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
924 chan_a_disconnected = false;
928 if chan_b_disconnected {
929 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
930 nodes[2].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
931 chan_b_disconnected = false;
935 0x10 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
936 0x11 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
937 0x12 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
938 0x13 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
939 0x14 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
940 0x15 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
942 0x16 => { process_events!(0, true); },
943 0x17 => { process_events!(0, false); },
945 0x18 => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
946 0x19 => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
947 0x1a => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
948 0x1b => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
949 0x1c => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
950 0x1d => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
952 0x1e => { process_events!(1, true); },
953 0x1f => { process_events!(1, false); },
955 0x20 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
956 0x21 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
957 0x22 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
958 0x23 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
959 0x24 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
960 0x25 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
962 0x26 => { process_events!(2, true); },
963 0x27 => { process_events!(2, false); },
966 if !chan_a_disconnected {
967 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), false);
968 chan_a_disconnected = true;
969 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(0);
971 if monitor_a.should_update_manager.load(atomic::Ordering::Relaxed) {
972 node_a_ser.0.clear();
973 nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
975 let (new_node_a, new_monitor_a) = reload_node!(node_a_ser, 0, monitor_a, keys_manager_a, fee_est_a);
976 nodes[0] = new_node_a;
977 monitor_a = new_monitor_a;
980 if !chan_a_disconnected {
981 nodes[0].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), false);
982 chan_a_disconnected = true;
983 nodes[0].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
987 if !chan_b_disconnected {
988 nodes[2].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), false);
989 chan_b_disconnected = true;
990 nodes[2].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
994 let (new_node_b, new_monitor_b) = reload_node!(node_b_ser, 1, monitor_b, keys_manager_b, fee_est_b);
995 nodes[1] = new_node_b;
996 monitor_b = new_monitor_b;
999 if !chan_b_disconnected {
1000 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), false);
1001 chan_b_disconnected = true;
1002 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(2);
1004 if monitor_c.should_update_manager.load(atomic::Ordering::Relaxed) {
1005 node_c_ser.0.clear();
1006 nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
1008 let (new_node_c, new_monitor_c) = reload_node!(node_c_ser, 2, monitor_c, keys_manager_c, fee_est_c);
1009 nodes[2] = new_node_c;
1010 monitor_c = new_monitor_c;
1013 // 1/10th the channel size:
1014 0x30 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id); },
1015 0x31 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id); },
1016 0x32 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id); },
1017 0x33 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id); },
1018 0x34 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id); },
1019 0x35 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id); },
1021 0x38 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id); },
1022 0x39 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id); },
1023 0x3a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id); },
1024 0x3b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id); },
1025 0x3c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id); },
1026 0x3d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id); },
1028 0x40 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id); },
1029 0x41 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id); },
1030 0x42 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id); },
1031 0x43 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id); },
1032 0x44 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id); },
1033 0x45 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id); },
1035 0x48 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id); },
1036 0x49 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id); },
1037 0x4a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id); },
1038 0x4b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id); },
1039 0x4c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id); },
1040 0x4d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id); },
1042 0x50 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id); },
1043 0x51 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id); },
1044 0x52 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id); },
1045 0x53 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id); },
1046 0x54 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id); },
1047 0x55 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id); },
1049 0x58 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id); },
1050 0x59 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id); },
1051 0x5a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id); },
1052 0x5b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id); },
1053 0x5c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id); },
1054 0x5d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id); },
1056 0x60 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id); },
1057 0x61 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id); },
1058 0x62 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id); },
1059 0x63 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id); },
1060 0x64 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id); },
1061 0x65 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id); },
1063 0x68 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id); },
1064 0x69 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id); },
1065 0x6a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id); },
1066 0x6b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id); },
1067 0x6c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id); },
1068 0x6d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id); },
1071 let max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_a * FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1072 if fee_est_a.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1073 fee_est_a.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1075 nodes[0].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1077 0x81 => { fee_est_a.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[0].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1080 let max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_b * FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1081 if fee_est_b.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1082 fee_est_b.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1084 nodes[1].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1086 0x85 => { fee_est_b.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[1].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1089 let max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_c * FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1090 if fee_est_c.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1091 fee_est_c.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1093 nodes[2].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1095 0x89 => { fee_est_c.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[2].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1098 // Test that no channel is in a stuck state where neither party can send funds even
1099 // after we resolve all pending events.
1100 // First make sure there are no pending monitor updates, resetting the error state
1101 // and calling force_channel_monitor_updated for each monitor.
1102 *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
1103 *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
1104 *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
1106 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_a.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1107 monitor_a.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1108 nodes[0].process_monitor_events();
1110 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1111 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1112 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1114 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1115 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1116 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1118 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_c.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1119 monitor_c.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1120 nodes[2].process_monitor_events();
1123 // Next, make sure peers are all connected to each other
1124 if chan_a_disconnected {
1125 nodes[0].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
1126 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
1127 chan_a_disconnected = false;
1129 if chan_b_disconnected {
1130 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
1131 nodes[2].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
1132 chan_b_disconnected = false;
1135 for i in 0..std::usize::MAX {
1136 if i == 100 { panic!("It may take may iterations to settle the state, but it should not take forever"); }
1137 // Then, make sure any current forwards make their way to their destination
1138 if process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1139 if process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1140 if process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1141 // ...making sure any pending PendingHTLCsForwardable events are handled and
1142 // payments claimed.
1143 if process_events!(0, false) { continue; }
1144 if process_events!(1, false) { continue; }
1145 if process_events!(2, false) { continue; }
1149 // Finally, make sure that at least one end of each channel can make a substantial payment
1151 send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id) ||
1152 send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id));
1154 send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id) ||
1155 send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id));
1157 last_htlc_clear_fee_a = fee_est_a.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1158 last_htlc_clear_fee_b = fee_est_b.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1159 last_htlc_clear_fee_c = fee_est_c.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1161 _ => test_return!(),
1164 node_a_ser.0.clear();
1165 nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
1166 monitor_a.should_update_manager.store(false, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
1167 node_b_ser.0.clear();
1168 nodes[1].write(&mut node_b_ser).unwrap();
1169 monitor_b.should_update_manager.store(false, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
1170 node_c_ser.0.clear();
1171 nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
1172 monitor_c.should_update_manager.store(false, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
1176 /// We actually have different behavior based on if a certain log string has been seen, so we have
1177 /// to do a bit more tracking.
1179 struct SearchingOutput<O: Output> {
1181 may_fail: Arc<atomic::AtomicBool>,
1183 impl<O: Output> Output for SearchingOutput<O> {
1184 fn locked_write(&self, data: &[u8]) {
1185 // We hit a design limitation of LN state machine (see CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER)
1186 if std::str::from_utf8(data).unwrap().contains("Outbound update_fee HTLC buffer overflow - counterparty should force-close this channel") {
1187 self.may_fail.store(true, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1189 self.output.locked_write(data)
1192 impl<O: Output> SearchingOutput<O> {
1193 pub fn new(output: O) -> Self {
1194 Self { output, may_fail: Arc::new(atomic::AtomicBool::new(false)) }
1198 pub fn chanmon_consistency_test<Out: Output>(data: &[u8], out: Out) {
1203 pub extern "C" fn chanmon_consistency_run(data: *const u8, datalen: usize) {
1204 do_test(unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(data, datalen) }, test_logger::DevNull{});