1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Test that monitor update failures don't get our channel state out of sync.
11 //! One of the biggest concern with the monitor update failure handling code is that messages
12 //! resent after monitor updating is restored are delivered out-of-order, resulting in
13 //! commitment_signed messages having "invalid signatures".
14 //! To test this we stand up a network of three nodes and read bytes from the fuzz input to denote
15 //! actions such as sending payments, handling events, or changing monitor update return values on
16 //! a per-node basis. This should allow it to find any cases where the ordering of actions results
17 //! in us getting out of sync with ourselves, and, assuming at least one of our recieve- or
18 //! send-side handling is correct, other peers. We consider it a failure if any action results in a
19 //! channel being force-closed.
21 use bitcoin::amount::Amount;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, ScriptBuf};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
26 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
27 use bitcoin::network::Network;
28 use bitcoin::transaction::Version;
30 use bitcoin::WPubkeyHash;
31 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash as TraitImport;
32 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
33 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
34 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
36 use lightning::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
37 use lightning::blinded_path::payment::ReceiveTlvs;
39 use lightning::chain::{BestBlock, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, chainmonitor, channelmonitor, Confirm, Watch};
40 use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, MonitorEvent};
41 use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
42 use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
43 use lightning::sign::{KeyMaterial, InMemorySigner, Recipient, EntropySource, NodeSigner, SignerProvider};
44 use lightning::events;
45 use lightning::events::MessageSendEventsProvider;
46 use lightning::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
47 use lightning::ln::channel_state::ChannelDetails;
48 use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters,ChannelManager, PaymentSendFailure, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
49 use lightning::ln::channel::FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
50 use lightning::ln::msgs::{self, CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, UpdateAddHTLC, Init};
51 use lightning::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
52 use lightning::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
53 use lightning::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
54 use lightning::offers::invoice_request::UnsignedInvoiceRequest;
55 use lightning::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, OnionMessagePath};
56 use lightning::util::test_channel_signer::{TestChannelSigner, EnforcementState};
57 use lightning::util::errors::APIError;
58 use lightning::util::hash_tables::*;
59 use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
60 use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
61 use lightning::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
62 use lightning::routing::router::{InFlightHtlcs, Path, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
64 use crate::utils::test_logger::{self, Output};
65 use crate::utils::test_persister::TestPersister;
67 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Message, PublicKey, SecretKey, Scalar, Secp256k1, self};
68 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
69 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::{RecoverableSignature, Signature};
70 use bitcoin::secp256k1::schnorr;
73 use std::cmp::{self, Ordering};
74 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
75 use std::sync::atomic;
79 const MAX_FEE: u32 = 10_000;
80 struct FuzzEstimator {
81 ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32,
83 impl FeeEstimator for FuzzEstimator {
84 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, conf_target: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
85 // We force-close channels if our counterparty sends us a feerate which is a small multiple
86 // of our HighPriority fee estimate or smaller than our Background fee estimate. Thus, we
87 // always return a HighPriority feerate here which is >= the maximum Normal feerate and a
88 // Background feerate which is <= the minimum Normal feerate.
90 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep => MAX_FEE,
91 ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum|ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee|ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee|ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee|ConfirmationTarget::OutputSpendingFee => 253,
92 ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee => cmp::min(self.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire), MAX_FEE),
99 impl Router for FuzzRouter {
101 &self, _payer: &PublicKey, _params: &RouteParameters, _first_hops: Option<&[&ChannelDetails]>,
102 _inflight_htlcs: InFlightHtlcs
103 ) -> Result<Route, msgs::LightningError> {
104 Err(msgs::LightningError {
105 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
106 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
110 fn create_blinded_payment_paths<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(
111 &self, _recipient: PublicKey, _first_hops: Vec<ChannelDetails>, _tlvs: ReceiveTlvs,
112 _amount_msats: u64, _secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
113 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
118 impl MessageRouter for FuzzRouter {
120 &self, _sender: PublicKey, _peers: Vec<PublicKey>, _destination: Destination
121 ) -> Result<OnionMessagePath, ()> {
125 fn create_blinded_paths<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(
126 &self, _recipient: PublicKey, _peers: Vec<PublicKey>, _secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
127 ) -> Result<Vec<BlindedPath>, ()> {
132 pub struct TestBroadcaster {}
133 impl BroadcasterInterface for TestBroadcaster {
134 fn broadcast_transactions(&self, _txs: &[&Transaction]) { }
137 pub struct VecWriter(pub Vec<u8>);
138 impl Writer for VecWriter {
139 fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
140 self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
145 /// The LDK API requires that any time we tell it we're done persisting a `ChannelMonitor[Update]`
146 /// we never pass it in as the "latest" `ChannelMonitor` on startup. However, we can pass
147 /// out-of-date monitors as long as we never told LDK we finished persisting them, which we do by
148 /// storing both old `ChannelMonitor`s and ones that are "being persisted" here.
150 /// Note that such "being persisted" `ChannelMonitor`s are stored in `ChannelManager` and will
151 /// simply be replayed on startup.
152 struct LatestMonitorState {
153 /// The latest monitor id which we told LDK we've persisted
154 persisted_monitor_id: u64,
155 /// The latest serialized `ChannelMonitor` that we told LDK we persisted.
156 persisted_monitor: Vec<u8>,
157 /// A set of (monitor id, serialized `ChannelMonitor`)s which we're currently "persisting",
158 /// from LDK's perspective.
159 pending_monitors: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
162 struct TestChainMonitor {
163 pub logger: Arc<dyn Logger>,
164 pub keys: Arc<KeyProvider>,
165 pub persister: Arc<TestPersister>,
166 pub chain_monitor: Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<TestChannelSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
167 pub latest_monitors: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, LatestMonitorState>>,
169 impl TestChainMonitor {
170 pub fn new(broadcaster: Arc<TestBroadcaster>, logger: Arc<dyn Logger>, feeest: Arc<FuzzEstimator>, persister: Arc<TestPersister>, keys: Arc<KeyProvider>) -> Self {
172 chain_monitor: Arc::new(chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::new(None, broadcaster, logger.clone(), feeest, Arc::clone(&persister))),
176 latest_monitors: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
180 impl chain::Watch<TestChannelSigner> for TestChainMonitor {
181 fn watch_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>) -> Result<chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, ()> {
182 let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
183 monitor.write(&mut ser).unwrap();
184 let monitor_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
185 let res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_txo, monitor);
186 let state = match res {
187 Ok(chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed) => {
189 persisted_monitor_id: monitor_id, persisted_monitor: ser.0,
190 pending_monitors: Vec::new(),
193 Ok(chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress) =>
194 panic!("The test currently doesn't test initial-persistence via the async pipeline"),
195 Ok(chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError) => panic!(),
198 if self.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().insert(funding_txo, state).is_some() {
199 panic!("Already had monitor pre-watch_channel");
204 fn update_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: &channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus {
205 let mut map_lock = self.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap();
206 let map_entry = map_lock.get_mut(&funding_txo).expect("Didn't have monitor on update call");
207 let latest_monitor_data = map_entry.pending_monitors.last().as_ref().map(|(_, data)| data).unwrap_or(&map_entry.persisted_monitor);
208 let deserialized_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::
209 read(&mut Cursor::new(&latest_monitor_data), (&*self.keys, &*self.keys)).unwrap().1;
210 deserialized_monitor.update_monitor(update, &&TestBroadcaster{}, &&FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) }, &self.logger).unwrap();
211 let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
212 deserialized_monitor.write(&mut ser).unwrap();
213 let res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
215 chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
216 map_entry.persisted_monitor_id = update.update_id;
217 map_entry.persisted_monitor = ser.0;
219 chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
220 map_entry.pending_monitors.push((update.update_id, ser.0));
222 chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => panic!(),
227 fn release_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<(OutPoint, ChannelId, Vec<MonitorEvent>, Option<PublicKey>)> {
228 return self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
233 node_secret: SecretKey,
234 rand_bytes_id: atomic::AtomicU32,
235 enforcement_states: Mutex<HashMap<[u8;32], Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>>>>,
238 impl EntropySource for KeyProvider {
239 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
240 let id = self.rand_bytes_id.fetch_add(1, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
242 let mut res = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 11, self.node_secret[31]];
243 res[30-4..30].copy_from_slice(&id.to_le_bytes());
248 impl NodeSigner for KeyProvider {
249 fn get_node_id(&self, recipient: Recipient) -> Result<PublicKey, ()> {
250 let node_secret = match recipient {
251 Recipient::Node => Ok(&self.node_secret),
252 Recipient::PhantomNode => Err(())
254 Ok(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), node_secret))
257 fn ecdh(&self, recipient: Recipient, other_key: &PublicKey, tweak: Option<&Scalar>) -> Result<SharedSecret, ()> {
258 let mut node_secret = match recipient {
259 Recipient::Node => Ok(self.node_secret.clone()),
260 Recipient::PhantomNode => Err(())
262 if let Some(tweak) = tweak {
263 node_secret = node_secret.mul_tweak(tweak).map_err(|_| ())?;
265 Ok(SharedSecret::new(other_key, &node_secret))
268 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial {
270 let random_bytes = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, self.node_secret[31]];
271 KeyMaterial(random_bytes)
274 fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5], _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> {
278 fn sign_bolt12_invoice_request(
279 &self, _invoice_request: &UnsignedInvoiceRequest
280 ) -> Result<schnorr::Signature, ()> {
284 fn sign_bolt12_invoice(
285 &self, _invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice,
286 ) -> Result<schnorr::Signature, ()> {
290 fn sign_gossip_message(&self, msg: lightning::ln::msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
291 let msg_hash = Message::from_digest(Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..]).to_byte_array());
292 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
293 Ok(secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msg_hash, &self.node_secret))
297 impl SignerProvider for KeyProvider {
298 type EcdsaSigner = TestChannelSigner;
300 type TaprootSigner = TestChannelSigner;
302 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
303 let id = self.rand_bytes_id.fetch_add(1, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed) as u8;
307 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
308 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
309 let id = channel_keys_id[0];
311 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
313 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
314 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
315 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
316 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
317 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
318 [id, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 9, self.node_secret[31]],
319 channel_value_satoshis,
323 let revoked_commitment = self.make_enforcement_state_cell(keys.commitment_seed);
324 TestChannelSigner::new_with_revoked(keys, revoked_commitment, false)
327 fn read_chan_signer(&self, buffer: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> {
328 let mut reader = std::io::Cursor::new(buffer);
330 let inner: InMemorySigner = ReadableArgs::read(&mut reader, self)?;
331 let state = self.make_enforcement_state_cell(inner.commitment_seed);
333 Ok(TestChannelSigner {
336 disable_revocation_policy_check: false,
337 available: Arc::new(Mutex::new(true)),
341 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
342 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
344 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap();
345 let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
346 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
349 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
350 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
352 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap();
353 let pubkey_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &secret_key).serialize());
354 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh(&pubkey_hash))
359 fn make_enforcement_state_cell(&self, commitment_seed: [u8; 32]) -> Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>> {
360 let mut revoked_commitments = self.enforcement_states.lock().unwrap();
361 if !revoked_commitments.contains_key(&commitment_seed) {
362 revoked_commitments.insert(commitment_seed, Arc::new(Mutex::new(EnforcementState::new())));
364 let cell = revoked_commitments.get(&commitment_seed).unwrap();
370 fn check_api_err(api_err: APIError, sendable_bounds_violated: bool) {
372 APIError::APIMisuseError { .. } => panic!("We can't misuse the API"),
373 APIError::FeeRateTooHigh { .. } => panic!("We can't send too much fee?"),
374 APIError::InvalidRoute { .. } => panic!("Our routes should work"),
375 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err } => {
376 // Test the error against a list of errors we can hit, and reject
377 // all others. If you hit this panic, the list of acceptable errors
378 // is probably just stale and you should add new messages here.
380 "Peer for first hop currently disconnected" => {},
381 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - ") => {},
382 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - ") => {},
383 _ => panic!("{}", err),
385 assert!(sendable_bounds_violated);
387 APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress => {
388 // We can (obviously) temp-fail a monitor update
390 APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { .. } => panic!("Cannot send an incompatible shutdown script"),
394 fn check_payment_err(send_err: PaymentSendFailure, sendable_bounds_violated: bool) {
396 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(api_err) => check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated),
397 PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(per_path_results) => {
398 for res in per_path_results { if let Err(api_err) = res { check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated); } }
400 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(per_path_results) => {
401 for api_err in per_path_results { check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated); }
403 PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure { results, .. } => {
404 for res in results { if let Err(api_err) = res { check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated); } }
406 PaymentSendFailure::DuplicatePayment => panic!(),
410 type ChanMan<'a> = ChannelManager<Arc<TestChainMonitor>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, &'a FuzzRouter, Arc<dyn Logger>>;
413 fn get_payment_secret_hash(dest: &ChanMan, payment_id: &mut u8) -> Option<(PaymentSecret, PaymentHash)> {
414 let mut payment_hash;
416 payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[*payment_id; 1]).to_byte_array());
417 if let Ok(payment_secret) = dest.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 3600, None) {
418 return Some((payment_secret, payment_hash));
420 *payment_id = payment_id.wrapping_add(1);
426 fn send_noret(source: &ChanMan, dest: &ChanMan, dest_chan_id: u64, amt: u64, payment_id: &mut u8, payment_idx: &mut u64) {
427 send_payment(source, dest, dest_chan_id, amt, payment_id, payment_idx);
431 fn send_payment(source: &ChanMan, dest: &ChanMan, dest_chan_id: u64, amt: u64, payment_id: &mut u8, payment_idx: &mut u64) -> bool {
432 let (payment_secret, payment_hash) =
433 if let Some((secret, hash)) = get_payment_secret_hash(dest, payment_id) { (secret, hash) } else { return true; };
434 let mut payment_id = [0; 32];
435 payment_id[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_idx.to_ne_bytes());
437 let (min_value_sendable, max_value_sendable) = source.list_usable_channels()
438 .iter().find(|chan| chan.short_channel_id == Some(dest_chan_id))
440 (chan.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, chan.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat))
442 if let Err(err) = source.send_payment_with_route(&Route {
443 paths: vec![Path { hops: vec![RouteHop {
444 pubkey: dest.get_our_node_id(),
445 node_features: dest.node_features(),
446 short_channel_id: dest_chan_id,
447 channel_features: dest.channel_features(),
449 cltv_expiry_delta: 200,
450 maybe_announced_channel: true,
451 }], blinded_tail: None }],
453 }, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_id)) {
454 check_payment_err(err, amt > max_value_sendable || amt < min_value_sendable);
457 // Note that while the max is a strict upper-bound, we can occasionally send substantially
458 // below the minimum, with some gap which is unusable immediately below the minimum. Thus,
459 // we don't check against min_value_sendable here.
460 assert!(amt <= max_value_sendable);
466 fn send_hop_noret(source: &ChanMan, middle: &ChanMan, middle_chan_id: u64, dest: &ChanMan, dest_chan_id: u64, amt: u64, payment_id: &mut u8, payment_idx: &mut u64) {
467 send_hop_payment(source, middle, middle_chan_id, dest, dest_chan_id, amt, payment_id, payment_idx);
471 fn send_hop_payment(source: &ChanMan, middle: &ChanMan, middle_chan_id: u64, dest: &ChanMan, dest_chan_id: u64, amt: u64, payment_id: &mut u8, payment_idx: &mut u64) -> bool {
472 let (payment_secret, payment_hash) =
473 if let Some((secret, hash)) = get_payment_secret_hash(dest, payment_id) { (secret, hash) } else { return true; };
474 let mut payment_id = [0; 32];
475 payment_id[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_idx.to_ne_bytes());
477 let (min_value_sendable, max_value_sendable) = source.list_usable_channels()
478 .iter().find(|chan| chan.short_channel_id == Some(middle_chan_id))
480 (chan.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, chan.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat))
482 let first_hop_fee = 50_000;
483 if let Err(err) = source.send_payment_with_route(&Route {
484 paths: vec![Path { hops: vec![RouteHop {
485 pubkey: middle.get_our_node_id(),
486 node_features: middle.node_features(),
487 short_channel_id: middle_chan_id,
488 channel_features: middle.channel_features(),
489 fee_msat: first_hop_fee,
490 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
491 maybe_announced_channel: true,
493 pubkey: dest.get_our_node_id(),
494 node_features: dest.node_features(),
495 short_channel_id: dest_chan_id,
496 channel_features: dest.channel_features(),
498 cltv_expiry_delta: 200,
499 maybe_announced_channel: true,
500 }], blinded_tail: None }],
502 }, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_id)) {
503 let sent_amt = amt + first_hop_fee;
504 check_payment_err(err, sent_amt < min_value_sendable || sent_amt > max_value_sendable);
507 // Note that while the max is a strict upper-bound, we can occasionally send substantially
508 // below the minimum, with some gap which is unusable immediately below the minimum. Thus,
509 // we don't check against min_value_sendable here.
510 assert!(amt + first_hop_fee <= max_value_sendable);
516 pub fn do_test<Out: Output>(data: &[u8], underlying_out: Out, anchors: bool) {
517 let out = SearchingOutput::new(underlying_out);
518 let broadcast = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{});
519 let router = FuzzRouter {};
521 macro_rules! make_node {
522 ($node_id: expr, $fee_estimator: expr) => { {
523 let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new($node_id.to_string(), out.clone()));
524 let node_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, $node_id]).unwrap();
525 let keys_manager = Arc::new(KeyProvider { node_secret, rand_bytes_id: atomic::AtomicU32::new(0), enforcement_states: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()) });
526 let monitor = Arc::new(TestChainMonitor::new(broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), $fee_estimator.clone(),
527 Arc::new(TestPersister {
528 update_ret: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed)
529 }), Arc::clone(&keys_manager)));
531 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
532 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
533 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
535 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
536 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
538 let network = Network::Bitcoin;
539 let best_block_timestamp = genesis_block(network).header.time;
540 let params = ChainParameters {
542 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
544 (ChannelManager::new($fee_estimator.clone(), monitor.clone(), broadcast.clone(), &router, Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), config, params, best_block_timestamp),
545 monitor, keys_manager)
549 macro_rules! reload_node {
550 ($ser: expr, $node_id: expr, $old_monitors: expr, $keys_manager: expr, $fee_estimator: expr) => { {
551 let keys_manager = Arc::clone(& $keys_manager);
552 let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new($node_id.to_string(), out.clone()));
553 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(TestChainMonitor::new(broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), $fee_estimator.clone(),
554 Arc::new(TestPersister {
555 update_ret: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed)
556 }), Arc::clone(& $keys_manager)));
558 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
559 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
560 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
562 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
563 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
566 let mut monitors = new_hash_map();
567 let mut old_monitors = $old_monitors.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap();
568 for (outpoint, mut prev_state) in old_monitors.drain() {
569 monitors.insert(outpoint, <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
570 &mut Cursor::new(&prev_state.persisted_monitor), (&*$keys_manager, &*$keys_manager)
571 ).expect("Failed to read monitor").1);
572 // Wipe any `ChannelMonitor`s which we never told LDK we finished persisting,
573 // considering them discarded. LDK should replay these for us as they're stored in
574 // the `ChannelManager`.
575 prev_state.pending_monitors.clear();
576 chain_monitor.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().insert(outpoint, prev_state);
578 let mut monitor_refs = new_hash_map();
579 for (outpoint, monitor) in monitors.iter_mut() {
580 monitor_refs.insert(*outpoint, monitor);
583 let read_args = ChannelManagerReadArgs {
584 entropy_source: keys_manager.clone(),
585 node_signer: keys_manager.clone(),
586 signer_provider: keys_manager.clone(),
587 fee_estimator: $fee_estimator.clone(),
588 chain_monitor: chain_monitor.clone(),
589 tx_broadcaster: broadcast.clone(),
592 default_config: config,
593 channel_monitors: monitor_refs,
596 let res = (<(BlockHash, ChanMan)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&$ser.0), read_args).expect("Failed to read manager").1, chain_monitor.clone());
597 for (funding_txo, mon) in monitors.drain() {
598 assert_eq!(chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_txo, mon),
599 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
605 let mut channel_txn = Vec::new();
606 macro_rules! make_channel {
607 ($source: expr, $dest: expr, $dest_keys_manager: expr, $chan_id: expr) => { {
608 let init_dest = Init {
609 features: $dest.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
611 $source.peer_connected(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &init_dest, true).unwrap();
612 let init_src = Init {
613 features: $source.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
615 $dest.peer_connected(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &init_src, false).unwrap();
617 $source.create_channel($dest.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42, 0, None, None).unwrap();
619 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
620 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
621 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
623 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
626 $dest.handle_open_channel(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
627 let accept_channel = {
629 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_events();
630 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
631 if let events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
632 ref temporary_channel_id, ref counterparty_node_id, ..
634 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
635 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&$dest_keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
636 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
637 $dest.accept_inbound_channel(
638 temporary_channel_id,
639 counterparty_node_id,
642 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
644 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
645 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
646 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
648 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
651 $source.handle_accept_channel(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
654 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_events();
655 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
656 if let events::Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } = events[0] {
657 let tx = Transaction { version: Version($chan_id), lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
658 value: Amount::from_sat(*channel_value_satoshis), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
660 funding_output = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
661 $source.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &$dest.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
662 channel_txn.push(tx);
663 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
666 let funding_created = {
667 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
668 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
669 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
671 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
673 $dest.handle_funding_created(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
675 let funding_signed = {
676 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
677 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
678 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
680 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
682 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_events();
683 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
684 if let events::Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } = events[0] {
685 assert_eq!(counterparty_node_id, &$source.get_our_node_id());
686 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
688 $source.handle_funding_signed(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
689 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_events();
690 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
691 if let events::Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } = events[0] {
692 assert_eq!(counterparty_node_id, &$dest.get_our_node_id());
693 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
699 macro_rules! confirm_txn {
701 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash();
702 let mut header = create_dummy_header(chain_hash, 42);
703 let txdata: Vec<_> = channel_txn.iter().enumerate().map(|(i, tx)| (i + 1, tx)).collect();
704 $node.transactions_confirmed(&header, &txdata, 1);
706 header = create_dummy_header(header.block_hash(), 42);
708 $node.best_block_updated(&header, 99);
712 macro_rules! lock_fundings {
713 ($nodes: expr) => { {
714 let mut node_events = Vec::new();
715 for node in $nodes.iter() {
716 node_events.push(node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events());
718 for (idx, node_event) in node_events.iter().enumerate() {
719 for event in node_event {
720 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } = event {
721 for node in $nodes.iter() {
722 if node.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
723 node.handle_channel_ready(&$nodes[idx].get_our_node_id(), msg);
726 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
730 for node in $nodes.iter() {
731 let events = node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
732 for event in events {
733 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = event {
734 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
740 let fee_est_a = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
741 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_a = 253;
742 let fee_est_b = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
743 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_b = 253;
744 let fee_est_c = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
745 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_c = 253;
747 // 3 nodes is enough to hit all the possible cases, notably unknown-source-unknown-dest
749 let (node_a, mut monitor_a, keys_manager_a) = make_node!(0, fee_est_a);
750 let (node_b, mut monitor_b, keys_manager_b) = make_node!(1, fee_est_b);
751 let (node_c, mut monitor_c, keys_manager_c) = make_node!(2, fee_est_c);
753 let mut nodes = [node_a, node_b, node_c];
755 let chan_1_funding = make_channel!(nodes[0], nodes[1], keys_manager_b, 0);
756 let chan_2_funding = make_channel!(nodes[1], nodes[2], keys_manager_c, 1);
758 for node in nodes.iter() {
762 lock_fundings!(nodes);
764 let chan_a = nodes[0].list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap();
765 let chan_b = nodes[2].list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap();
767 let mut p_id: u8 = 0;
768 let mut p_idx: u64 = 0;
770 let mut chan_a_disconnected = false;
771 let mut chan_b_disconnected = false;
772 let mut ab_events = Vec::new();
773 let mut ba_events = Vec::new();
774 let mut bc_events = Vec::new();
775 let mut cb_events = Vec::new();
777 let mut node_a_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
778 nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
779 let mut node_b_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
780 nodes[1].write(&mut node_b_ser).unwrap();
781 let mut node_c_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
782 nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
784 macro_rules! test_return {
786 assert_eq!(nodes[0].list_channels().len(), 1);
787 assert_eq!(nodes[1].list_channels().len(), 2);
788 assert_eq!(nodes[2].list_channels().len(), 1);
793 let mut read_pos = 0;
794 macro_rules! get_slice {
797 let slice_len = $len as usize;
798 if data.len() < read_pos + slice_len {
801 read_pos += slice_len;
802 &data[read_pos - slice_len..read_pos]
808 // Push any events from Node B onto ba_events and bc_events
809 macro_rules! push_excess_b_events {
810 ($excess_events: expr, $expect_drop_node: expr) => { {
811 let a_id = nodes[0].get_our_node_id();
812 let expect_drop_node: Option<usize> = $expect_drop_node;
813 let expect_drop_id = if let Some(id) = expect_drop_node { Some(nodes[id].get_our_node_id()) } else { None };
814 for event in $excess_events {
815 let push_a = match event {
816 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
817 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
820 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => {
821 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
824 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => {
825 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
828 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => continue,
829 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => continue,
830 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
831 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
832 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
835 _ => panic!("Unhandled message event {:?}", event),
837 if push_a { ba_events.push(event); } else { bc_events.push(event); }
842 // While delivering messages, we select across three possible message selection processes
843 // to ensure we get as much coverage as possible. See the individual enum variants for more
846 enum ProcessMessages {
847 /// Deliver all available messages, including fetching any new messages from
848 /// `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` (which may have side effects).
850 /// Call `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` first, and then deliver up to one
851 /// message (which may already be queued).
853 /// Deliver up to one already-queued message. This avoids any potential side-effects
854 /// of `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` (eg freeing the HTLC holding cell), which
855 /// provides potentially more coverage.
859 macro_rules! process_msg_events {
860 ($node: expr, $corrupt_forward: expr, $limit_events: expr) => { {
861 let mut events = if $node == 1 {
862 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
863 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut ba_events);
864 new_events.extend_from_slice(&bc_events[..]);
867 } else if $node == 0 {
868 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
869 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut ab_events);
872 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
873 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut cb_events);
876 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
877 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage {
878 new_events = nodes[$node].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
880 let mut had_events = false;
881 let mut events_iter = events.drain(..).chain(new_events.drain(..));
882 let mut extra_ev = None;
883 for event in &mut events_iter {
886 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee, commitment_signed } } => {
887 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
888 if dest.get_our_node_id() == node_id {
889 for update_add in update_add_htlcs.iter() {
890 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_add_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
891 if !$corrupt_forward {
892 dest.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_add);
894 // Corrupt the update_add_htlc message so that its HMAC
895 // check will fail and we generate a
896 // update_fail_malformed_htlc instead of an
897 // update_fail_htlc as we do when we reject a payment.
898 let mut msg_ser = update_add.encode();
899 msg_ser[1000] ^= 0xff;
900 let new_msg = UpdateAddHTLC::read(&mut Cursor::new(&msg_ser)).unwrap();
901 dest.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &new_msg);
904 for update_fulfill in update_fulfill_htlcs.iter() {
905 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fulfill_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
906 dest.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fulfill);
908 for update_fail in update_fail_htlcs.iter() {
909 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fail_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
910 dest.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fail);
912 for update_fail_malformed in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.iter() {
913 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fail_malformed_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
914 dest.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fail_malformed);
916 if let Some(msg) = update_fee {
917 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fee to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
918 dest.handle_update_fee(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &msg);
920 let processed_change = !update_add_htlcs.is_empty() || !update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() ||
921 !update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() || !update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty();
922 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::AllMessages && processed_change {
923 // If we only want to process some messages, don't deliver the CS until later.
924 extra_ev = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: CommitmentUpdate {
925 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
926 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
927 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
928 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
934 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering commitment_signed to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
935 dest.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
940 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
941 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
942 if dest.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
943 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering revoke_and_ack to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
944 dest.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), msg);
948 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
949 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
950 if dest.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
951 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering channel_reestablish to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
952 dest.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), msg);
956 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => {
957 // Can be generated as a reestablish response
959 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {
960 // Can be generated as a reestablish response
962 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
963 // When we reconnect we will resend a channel_update to make sure our
964 // counterparty has the latest parameters for receiving payments
965 // through us. We do, however, check that the message does not include
966 // the "disabled" bit, as we should never ever have a channel which is
967 // disabled when we send such an update (or it may indicate channel
968 // force-close which we should detect as an error).
969 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0);
971 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
974 panic!("Unhandled message event {:?}", event)
977 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::AllMessages {
982 push_excess_b_events!(extra_ev.into_iter().chain(events_iter), None);
983 } else if $node == 0 {
984 if let Some(ev) = extra_ev { ab_events.push(ev); }
985 for event in events_iter { ab_events.push(event); }
987 if let Some(ev) = extra_ev { cb_events.push(ev); }
988 for event in events_iter { cb_events.push(event); }
994 macro_rules! process_msg_noret {
995 ($node: expr, $corrupt_forward: expr, $limit_events: expr) => { {
996 process_msg_events!($node, $corrupt_forward, $limit_events);
1000 macro_rules! drain_msg_events_on_disconnect {
1001 ($counterparty_id: expr) => { {
1002 if $counterparty_id == 0 {
1003 for event in nodes[0].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
1005 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
1006 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => {},
1007 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => {},
1008 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => {},
1009 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {},
1010 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
1011 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
1013 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
1016 panic!("Unhandled message event")
1020 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(0));
1024 for event in nodes[2].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
1026 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
1027 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => {},
1028 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => {},
1029 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => {},
1030 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {},
1031 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
1032 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
1034 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
1037 panic!("Unhandled message event")
1041 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(2));
1048 macro_rules! process_events {
1049 ($node: expr, $fail: expr) => { {
1050 // In case we get 256 payments we may have a hash collision, resulting in the
1051 // second claim/fail call not finding the duplicate-hash HTLC, so we have to
1052 // deduplicate the calls here.
1053 let mut claim_set = new_hash_map();
1054 let mut events = nodes[$node].get_and_clear_pending_events();
1055 // Sort events so that PendingHTLCsForwardable get processed last. This avoids a
1056 // case where we first process a PendingHTLCsForwardable, then claim/fail on a
1057 // PaymentClaimable, claiming/failing two HTLCs, but leaving a just-generated
1058 // PaymentClaimable event for the second HTLC in our pending_events (and breaking
1059 // our claim_set deduplication).
1060 events.sort_by(|a, b| {
1061 if let events::Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } = a {
1062 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = b {
1064 } else { Ordering::Equal }
1065 } else if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = a {
1066 if let events::Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } = b {
1068 } else { Ordering::Equal }
1069 } else { Ordering::Equal }
1071 let had_events = !events.is_empty();
1072 for event in events.drain(..) {
1074 events::Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, .. } => {
1075 if claim_set.insert(payment_hash.0, ()).is_none() {
1077 nodes[$node].fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
1079 nodes[$node].claim_funds(PaymentPreimage(payment_hash.0));
1083 events::Event::PaymentSent { .. } => {},
1084 events::Event::PaymentClaimed { .. } => {},
1085 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
1086 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } => {},
1087 events::Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {},
1088 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful { .. } | events::Event::ProbeFailed { .. } => {
1089 // Even though we don't explicitly send probes, because probes are
1090 // detected based on hashing the payment hash+preimage, its rather
1091 // trivial for the fuzzer to build payments that accidentally end up
1092 // looking like probes.
1094 events::Event::PaymentForwarded { .. } if $node == 1 => {},
1095 events::Event::ChannelReady { .. } => {},
1096 events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {
1097 nodes[$node].process_pending_htlc_forwards();
1099 events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => {},
1100 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
1103 panic!("Unhandled event")
1111 macro_rules! process_ev_noret {
1112 ($node: expr, $fail: expr) => { {
1113 process_events!($node, $fail);
1117 let complete_first = |v: &mut Vec<_>| if !v.is_empty() { Some(v.remove(0)) } else { None };
1118 let complete_second = |v: &mut Vec<_>| if v.len() > 1 { Some(v.remove(1)) } else { None };
1119 let complete_monitor_update = |
1120 monitor: &Arc<TestChainMonitor>, chan_funding,
1121 compl_selector: &dyn Fn(&mut Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>) -> Option<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
1123 if let Some(state) = monitor.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get_mut(chan_funding) {
1125 state.pending_monitors.windows(2).all(|pair| pair[0].0 < pair[1].0),
1126 "updates should be sorted by id"
1128 if let Some((id, data)) = compl_selector(&mut state.pending_monitors) {
1129 monitor.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(*chan_funding, id).unwrap();
1130 if id > state.persisted_monitor_id {
1131 state.persisted_monitor_id = id;
1132 state.persisted_monitor = data;
1138 let complete_all_monitor_updates = |monitor: &Arc<TestChainMonitor>, chan_funding| {
1139 if let Some(state) = monitor.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get_mut(chan_funding) {
1141 state.pending_monitors.windows(2).all(|pair| pair[0].0 < pair[1].0),
1142 "updates should be sorted by id"
1144 for (id, data) in state.pending_monitors.drain(..) {
1145 monitor.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(*chan_funding, id).unwrap();
1146 if id > state.persisted_monitor_id {
1147 state.persisted_monitor_id = id;
1148 state.persisted_monitor = data;
1154 let v = get_slice!(1)[0];
1155 out.locked_write(format!("READ A BYTE! HANDLING INPUT {:x}...........\n", v).as_bytes());
1157 // In general, we keep related message groups close together in binary form, allowing
1158 // bit-twiddling mutations to have similar effects. This is probably overkill, but no
1159 // harm in doing so.
1161 0x00 => *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress,
1162 0x01 => *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress,
1163 0x02 => *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress,
1164 0x04 => *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed,
1165 0x05 => *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed,
1166 0x06 => *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed,
1168 0x08 => complete_all_monitor_updates(&monitor_a, &chan_1_funding),
1169 0x09 => complete_all_monitor_updates(&monitor_b, &chan_1_funding),
1170 0x0a => complete_all_monitor_updates(&monitor_b, &chan_2_funding),
1171 0x0b => complete_all_monitor_updates(&monitor_c, &chan_2_funding),
1174 if !chan_a_disconnected {
1175 nodes[0].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1176 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id());
1177 chan_a_disconnected = true;
1178 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(0);
1182 if !chan_b_disconnected {
1183 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id());
1184 nodes[2].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1185 chan_b_disconnected = true;
1186 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(2);
1190 if chan_a_disconnected {
1192 features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1194 nodes[0].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &init_1, true).unwrap();
1196 features: nodes[0].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1198 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), &init_0, false).unwrap();
1199 chan_a_disconnected = false;
1203 if chan_b_disconnected {
1205 features: nodes[2].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1207 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), &init_2, true).unwrap();
1209 features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1211 nodes[2].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &init_1, false).unwrap();
1212 chan_b_disconnected = false;
1216 0x10 => process_msg_noret!(0, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages),
1217 0x11 => process_msg_noret!(0, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages),
1218 0x12 => process_msg_noret!(0, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage),
1219 0x13 => process_msg_noret!(0, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage),
1220 0x14 => process_msg_noret!(0, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage),
1221 0x15 => process_msg_noret!(0, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage),
1223 0x16 => process_ev_noret!(0, true),
1224 0x17 => process_ev_noret!(0, false),
1226 0x18 => process_msg_noret!(1, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages),
1227 0x19 => process_msg_noret!(1, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages),
1228 0x1a => process_msg_noret!(1, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage),
1229 0x1b => process_msg_noret!(1, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage),
1230 0x1c => process_msg_noret!(1, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage),
1231 0x1d => process_msg_noret!(1, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage),
1233 0x1e => process_ev_noret!(1, true),
1234 0x1f => process_ev_noret!(1, false),
1236 0x20 => process_msg_noret!(2, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages),
1237 0x21 => process_msg_noret!(2, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages),
1238 0x22 => process_msg_noret!(2, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage),
1239 0x23 => process_msg_noret!(2, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage),
1240 0x24 => process_msg_noret!(2, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage),
1241 0x25 => process_msg_noret!(2, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage),
1243 0x26 => process_ev_noret!(2, true),
1244 0x27 => process_ev_noret!(2, false),
1247 if !chan_a_disconnected {
1248 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id());
1249 chan_a_disconnected = true;
1250 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(0));
1254 let (new_node_a, new_monitor_a) = reload_node!(node_a_ser, 0, monitor_a, keys_manager_a, fee_est_a);
1255 nodes[0] = new_node_a;
1256 monitor_a = new_monitor_a;
1259 if !chan_a_disconnected {
1260 nodes[0].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1261 chan_a_disconnected = true;
1262 nodes[0].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1266 if !chan_b_disconnected {
1267 nodes[2].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1268 chan_b_disconnected = true;
1269 nodes[2].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1273 let (new_node_b, new_monitor_b) = reload_node!(node_b_ser, 1, monitor_b, keys_manager_b, fee_est_b);
1274 nodes[1] = new_node_b;
1275 monitor_b = new_monitor_b;
1278 if !chan_b_disconnected {
1279 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id());
1280 chan_b_disconnected = true;
1281 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(2));
1285 let (new_node_c, new_monitor_c) = reload_node!(node_c_ser, 2, monitor_c, keys_manager_c, fee_est_c);
1286 nodes[2] = new_node_c;
1287 monitor_c = new_monitor_c;
1290 // 1/10th the channel size:
1291 0x30 => send_noret(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1292 0x31 => send_noret(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1293 0x32 => send_noret(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1294 0x33 => send_noret(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1295 0x34 => send_hop_noret(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1296 0x35 => send_hop_noret(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1298 0x38 => send_noret(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1299 0x39 => send_noret(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1300 0x3a => send_noret(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1301 0x3b => send_noret(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1302 0x3c => send_hop_noret(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1303 0x3d => send_hop_noret(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1305 0x40 => send_noret(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 100_000, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1306 0x41 => send_noret(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 100_000, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1307 0x42 => send_noret(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 100_000, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1308 0x43 => send_noret(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 100_000, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1309 0x44 => send_hop_noret(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 100_000, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1310 0x45 => send_hop_noret(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 100_000, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1312 0x48 => send_noret(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1313 0x49 => send_noret(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1314 0x4a => send_noret(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1315 0x4b => send_noret(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1316 0x4c => send_hop_noret(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1317 0x4d => send_hop_noret(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1319 0x50 => send_noret(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1_000, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1320 0x51 => send_noret(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1321 0x52 => send_noret(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1322 0x53 => send_noret(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1_000, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1323 0x54 => send_hop_noret(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1324 0x55 => send_hop_noret(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1326 0x58 => send_noret(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 100, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1327 0x59 => send_noret(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 100, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1328 0x5a => send_noret(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 100, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1329 0x5b => send_noret(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 100, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1330 0x5c => send_hop_noret(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 100, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1331 0x5d => send_hop_noret(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 100, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1333 0x60 => send_noret(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1334 0x61 => send_noret(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1335 0x62 => send_noret(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1336 0x63 => send_noret(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1337 0x64 => send_hop_noret(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1338 0x65 => send_hop_noret(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1340 0x68 => send_noret(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1341 0x69 => send_noret(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1342 0x6a => send_noret(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1343 0x6b => send_noret(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1344 0x6c => send_hop_noret(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1345 0x6d => send_hop_noret(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx),
1348 let mut max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_a;
1350 max_feerate *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1352 if fee_est_a.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1353 fee_est_a.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1355 nodes[0].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1357 0x81 => { fee_est_a.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[0].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1360 let mut max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_b;
1362 max_feerate *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1364 if fee_est_b.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1365 fee_est_b.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1367 nodes[1].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1369 0x85 => { fee_est_b.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[1].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1372 let mut max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_c;
1374 max_feerate *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1376 if fee_est_c.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1377 fee_est_c.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1379 nodes[2].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1381 0x89 => { fee_est_c.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[2].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1383 0xf0 => complete_monitor_update(&monitor_a, &chan_1_funding, &complete_first),
1384 0xf1 => complete_monitor_update(&monitor_a, &chan_1_funding, &complete_second),
1385 0xf2 => complete_monitor_update(&monitor_a, &chan_1_funding, &Vec::pop),
1387 0xf4 => complete_monitor_update(&monitor_b, &chan_1_funding, &complete_first),
1388 0xf5 => complete_monitor_update(&monitor_b, &chan_1_funding, &complete_second),
1389 0xf6 => complete_monitor_update(&monitor_b, &chan_1_funding, &Vec::pop),
1391 0xf8 => complete_monitor_update(&monitor_b, &chan_2_funding, &complete_first),
1392 0xf9 => complete_monitor_update(&monitor_b, &chan_2_funding, &complete_second),
1393 0xfa => complete_monitor_update(&monitor_b, &chan_2_funding, &Vec::pop),
1395 0xfc => complete_monitor_update(&monitor_c, &chan_2_funding, &complete_first),
1396 0xfd => complete_monitor_update(&monitor_c, &chan_2_funding, &complete_second),
1397 0xfe => complete_monitor_update(&monitor_c, &chan_2_funding, &Vec::pop),
1400 // Test that no channel is in a stuck state where neither party can send funds even
1401 // after we resolve all pending events.
1402 // First make sure there are no pending monitor updates and further update
1403 // operations complete.
1404 *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed;
1405 *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed;
1406 *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed;
1408 complete_all_monitor_updates(&monitor_a, &chan_1_funding);
1409 complete_all_monitor_updates(&monitor_b, &chan_1_funding);
1410 complete_all_monitor_updates(&monitor_b, &chan_2_funding);
1411 complete_all_monitor_updates(&monitor_c, &chan_2_funding);
1413 // Next, make sure peers are all connected to each other
1414 if chan_a_disconnected {
1416 features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1418 nodes[0].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &init_1, true).unwrap();
1420 features: nodes[0].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1422 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), &init_0, false).unwrap();
1423 chan_a_disconnected = false;
1425 if chan_b_disconnected {
1427 features: nodes[2].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1429 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), &init_2, true).unwrap();
1431 features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1433 nodes[2].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &init_1, false).unwrap();
1434 chan_b_disconnected = false;
1437 for i in 0..std::usize::MAX {
1438 if i == 100 { panic!("It may take may iterations to settle the state, but it should not take forever"); }
1439 // Then, make sure any current forwards make their way to their destination
1440 if process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1441 if process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1442 if process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1443 // ...making sure any pending PendingHTLCsForwardable events are handled and
1444 // payments claimed.
1445 if process_events!(0, false) { continue; }
1446 if process_events!(1, false) { continue; }
1447 if process_events!(2, false) { continue; }
1451 // Finally, make sure that at least one end of each channel can make a substantial payment
1453 send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx) ||
1454 send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx));
1456 send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx) ||
1457 send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut p_id, &mut p_idx));
1459 last_htlc_clear_fee_a = fee_est_a.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1460 last_htlc_clear_fee_b = fee_est_b.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1461 last_htlc_clear_fee_c = fee_est_c.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1463 _ => test_return!(),
1466 if nodes[0].get_and_clear_needs_persistence() == true {
1467 node_a_ser.0.clear();
1468 nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
1470 if nodes[1].get_and_clear_needs_persistence() == true {
1471 node_b_ser.0.clear();
1472 nodes[1].write(&mut node_b_ser).unwrap();
1474 if nodes[2].get_and_clear_needs_persistence() == true {
1475 node_c_ser.0.clear();
1476 nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
1481 /// We actually have different behavior based on if a certain log string has been seen, so we have
1482 /// to do a bit more tracking.
1484 struct SearchingOutput<O: Output> {
1486 may_fail: Arc<atomic::AtomicBool>,
1488 impl<O: Output> Output for SearchingOutput<O> {
1489 fn locked_write(&self, data: &[u8]) {
1490 // We hit a design limitation of LN state machine (see CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER)
1491 if std::str::from_utf8(data).unwrap().contains("Outbound update_fee HTLC buffer overflow - counterparty should force-close this channel") {
1492 self.may_fail.store(true, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1494 self.output.locked_write(data)
1497 impl<O: Output> SearchingOutput<O> {
1498 pub fn new(output: O) -> Self {
1499 Self { output, may_fail: Arc::new(atomic::AtomicBool::new(false)) }
1503 pub fn chanmon_consistency_test<Out: Output>(data: &[u8], out: Out) {
1504 do_test(data, out.clone(), false);
1505 do_test(data, out, true);
1509 pub extern "C" fn chanmon_consistency_run(data: *const u8, datalen: usize) {
1510 do_test(unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(data, datalen) }, test_logger::DevNull{}, false);
1511 do_test(unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(data, datalen) }, test_logger::DevNull{}, true);