1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Test that no series of bytes received over the wire/connections created/payments sent can
11 //! result in a crash. We do this by standing up a node and then reading bytes from input to denote
12 //! actions such as creating new inbound/outbound connections, bytes to be read from a connection,
13 //! or payments to send/ways to handle events generated.
14 //! This test has been very useful, though due to its complexity good starting inputs are critical.
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, ScriptBuf};
19 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
21 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::deserialize;
22 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
24 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash as _;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
30 use lightning::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
31 use lightning::blinded_path::payment::ReceiveTlvs;
33 use lightning::chain::{BestBlock, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen};
34 use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
35 use lightning::chain::chainmonitor;
36 use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
37 use lightning::sign::{InMemorySigner, Recipient, KeyMaterial, EntropySource, NodeSigner, SignerProvider};
38 use lightning::events::Event;
39 use lightning::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
40 use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelDetails, ChannelManager, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
41 use lightning::ln::peer_handler::{MessageHandler,PeerManager,SocketDescriptor,IgnoringMessageHandler};
42 use lightning::ln::msgs::{self, DecodeError};
43 use lightning::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
44 use lightning::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
45 use lightning::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
46 use lightning::offers::invoice_request::UnsignedInvoiceRequest;
47 use lightning::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, OnionMessagePath};
48 use lightning::routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph};
49 use lightning::routing::utxo::UtxoLookup;
50 use lightning::routing::router::{InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
51 use lightning::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
52 use lightning::util::errors::APIError;
53 use lightning::util::test_channel_signer::{TestChannelSigner, EnforcementState};
54 use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
55 use lightning::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
57 use crate::utils::test_logger;
58 use crate::utils::test_persister::TestPersister;
60 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Message, PublicKey, SecretKey, Scalar, Secp256k1, self};
61 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
62 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::{RecoverableSignature, Signature};
63 use bitcoin::secp256k1::schnorr;
65 use std::cell::RefCell;
66 use hashbrown::{HashMap, hash_map};
67 use std::convert::TryInto;
69 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
70 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64,AtomicUsize,Ordering};
71 use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
74 pub fn slice_to_be16(v: &[u8]) -> u16 {
75 ((v[0] as u16) << 8*1) |
76 ((v[1] as u16) << 8*0)
80 pub fn slice_to_be24(v: &[u8]) -> u32 {
81 ((v[0] as u32) << 8*2) |
82 ((v[1] as u32) << 8*1) |
83 ((v[2] as u32) << 8*0)
87 pub fn slice_to_be32(v: &[u8]) -> u32 {
88 ((v[0] as u32) << 8*3) |
89 ((v[1] as u32) << 8*2) |
90 ((v[2] as u32) << 8*1) |
91 ((v[3] as u32) << 8*0)
95 pub fn be64_to_array(u: u64) -> [u8; 8] {
97 v[0] = ((u >> 8*7) & 0xff) as u8;
98 v[1] = ((u >> 8*6) & 0xff) as u8;
99 v[2] = ((u >> 8*5) & 0xff) as u8;
100 v[3] = ((u >> 8*4) & 0xff) as u8;
101 v[4] = ((u >> 8*3) & 0xff) as u8;
102 v[5] = ((u >> 8*2) & 0xff) as u8;
103 v[6] = ((u >> 8*1) & 0xff) as u8;
104 v[7] = ((u >> 8*0) & 0xff) as u8;
110 read_pos: AtomicUsize,
113 fn get_slice(&self, len: usize) -> Option<&[u8]> {
114 let old_pos = self.read_pos.fetch_add(len, Ordering::AcqRel);
115 if self.data.len() < old_pos + len {
118 Some(&self.data[old_pos..old_pos + len])
122 struct FuzzEstimator {
123 input: Arc<InputData>,
125 impl FeeEstimator for FuzzEstimator {
126 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
127 //TODO: We should actually be testing at least much more than 64k...
128 match self.input.get_slice(2) {
129 Some(slice) => cmp::max(slice_to_be16(slice) as u32, 253),
137 impl Router for FuzzRouter {
139 &self, _payer: &PublicKey, _params: &RouteParameters, _first_hops: Option<&[&ChannelDetails]>,
140 _inflight_htlcs: InFlightHtlcs
141 ) -> Result<Route, msgs::LightningError> {
142 Err(msgs::LightningError {
143 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
144 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
148 fn create_blinded_payment_paths<
149 ES: EntropySource + ?Sized, T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification
151 &self, _recipient: PublicKey, _first_hops: Vec<ChannelDetails>, _tlvs: ReceiveTlvs,
152 _amount_msats: u64, _entropy_source: &ES, _secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>
153 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
158 impl MessageRouter for FuzzRouter {
160 &self, _sender: PublicKey, _peers: Vec<PublicKey>, _destination: Destination
161 ) -> Result<OnionMessagePath, ()> {
165 fn create_blinded_paths<
166 ES: EntropySource + ?Sized, T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification
168 &self, _recipient: PublicKey, _peers: Vec<PublicKey>, _entropy_source: &ES,
169 _secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>
170 ) -> Result<Vec<BlindedPath>, ()> {
175 struct TestBroadcaster {
176 txn_broadcasted: Mutex<Vec<Transaction>>,
178 impl BroadcasterInterface for TestBroadcaster {
179 fn broadcast_transactions(&self, txs: &[&Transaction]) {
180 let owned_txs: Vec<Transaction> = txs.iter().map(|tx| (*tx).clone()).collect();
181 self.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().extend(owned_txs);
188 peers_connected: &'a RefCell<[bool; 256]>,
190 impl<'a> SocketDescriptor for Peer<'a> {
191 fn send_data(&mut self, data: &[u8], _resume_read: bool) -> usize {
194 fn disconnect_socket(&mut self) {
195 assert!(self.peers_connected.borrow()[self.id as usize]);
196 self.peers_connected.borrow_mut()[self.id as usize] = false;
199 impl<'a> PartialEq for Peer<'a> {
200 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
204 impl<'a> Eq for Peer<'a> {}
205 impl<'a> std::hash::Hash for Peer<'a> {
206 fn hash<H : std::hash::Hasher>(&self, h: &mut H) {
211 type ChannelMan<'a> = ChannelManager<
212 Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<TestChannelSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
213 Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, &'a FuzzRouter, Arc<dyn Logger>>;
214 type PeerMan<'a> = PeerManager<Peer<'a>, Arc<ChannelMan<'a>>, Arc<P2PGossipSync<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<dyn Logger>>>, Arc<dyn UtxoLookup>, Arc<dyn Logger>>>, IgnoringMessageHandler, Arc<dyn Logger>, IgnoringMessageHandler, Arc<KeyProvider>>;
216 struct MoneyLossDetector<'a> {
217 manager: Arc<ChannelMan<'a>>,
218 monitor: Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<TestChannelSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
219 handler: PeerMan<'a>,
221 peers: &'a RefCell<[bool; 256]>,
222 funding_txn: Vec<Transaction>,
223 txids_confirmed: HashMap<Txid, usize>,
224 header_hashes: Vec<(BlockHash, u32)>,
227 blocks_connected: u32,
229 impl<'a> MoneyLossDetector<'a> {
230 pub fn new(peers: &'a RefCell<[bool; 256]>,
231 manager: Arc<ChannelMan<'a>>,
232 monitor: Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<TestChannelSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
233 handler: PeerMan<'a>) -> Self {
240 funding_txn: Vec::new(),
241 txids_confirmed: HashMap::new(),
242 header_hashes: vec![(genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash(), 0)],
249 fn connect_block(&mut self, all_txn: &[Transaction]) {
250 let mut txdata = Vec::with_capacity(all_txn.len());
251 for (idx, tx) in all_txn.iter().enumerate() {
252 let txid = tx.txid();
253 match self.txids_confirmed.entry(txid) {
254 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
255 e.insert(self.height);
256 txdata.push((idx + 1, tx));
262 self.blocks_connected += 1;
263 let header = create_dummy_header(self.header_hashes[self.height].0, self.blocks_connected);
265 self.manager.transactions_confirmed(&header, &txdata, self.height as u32);
266 self.manager.best_block_updated(&header, self.height as u32);
267 (*self.monitor).transactions_confirmed(&header, &txdata, self.height as u32);
268 (*self.monitor).best_block_updated(&header, self.height as u32);
269 if self.header_hashes.len() > self.height {
270 self.header_hashes[self.height] = (header.block_hash(), self.blocks_connected);
272 assert_eq!(self.header_hashes.len(), self.height);
273 self.header_hashes.push((header.block_hash(), self.blocks_connected));
275 self.max_height = cmp::max(self.height, self.max_height);
278 fn disconnect_block(&mut self) {
279 if self.height > 0 && (self.max_height < 6 || self.height >= self.max_height - 6) {
280 let header = create_dummy_header(self.header_hashes[self.height - 1].0, self.header_hashes[self.height].1);
281 self.manager.block_disconnected(&header, self.height as u32);
282 self.monitor.block_disconnected(&header, self.height as u32);
284 let removal_height = self.height;
285 self.txids_confirmed.retain(|_, height| {
286 removal_height != *height
292 impl<'a> Drop for MoneyLossDetector<'a> {
294 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
295 // Disconnect all peers
296 for (idx, peer) in self.peers.borrow().iter().enumerate() {
298 self.handler.socket_disconnected(&Peer{id: idx as u8, peers_connected: &self.peers});
302 // Force all channels onto the chain (and time out claim txn)
303 self.manager.force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn();
309 node_secret: SecretKey,
310 inbound_payment_key: KeyMaterial,
312 signer_state: RefCell<HashMap<u8, (bool, Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>>)>>
315 impl EntropySource for KeyProvider {
316 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
317 let ctr = self.counter.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
318 [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
319 (ctr >> 8*7) as u8, (ctr >> 8*6) as u8, (ctr >> 8*5) as u8, (ctr >> 8*4) as u8, (ctr >> 8*3) as u8, (ctr >> 8*2) as u8, (ctr >> 8*1) as u8, 14, (ctr >> 8*0) as u8]
323 impl NodeSigner for KeyProvider {
324 fn get_node_id(&self, recipient: Recipient) -> Result<PublicKey, ()> {
325 let node_secret = match recipient {
326 Recipient::Node => Ok(&self.node_secret),
327 Recipient::PhantomNode => Err(())
329 Ok(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), node_secret))
332 fn ecdh(&self, recipient: Recipient, other_key: &PublicKey, tweak: Option<&Scalar>) -> Result<SharedSecret, ()> {
333 let mut node_secret = match recipient {
334 Recipient::Node => Ok(self.node_secret.clone()),
335 Recipient::PhantomNode => Err(())
337 if let Some(tweak) = tweak {
338 node_secret = node_secret.mul_tweak(tweak).map_err(|_| ())?;
340 Ok(SharedSecret::new(other_key, &node_secret))
343 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial {
344 self.inbound_payment_key.clone()
347 fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5], _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> {
351 fn sign_bolt12_invoice_request(
352 &self, _invoice_request: &UnsignedInvoiceRequest
353 ) -> Result<schnorr::Signature, ()> {
357 fn sign_bolt12_invoice(
358 &self, _invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice,
359 ) -> Result<schnorr::Signature, ()> {
363 fn sign_gossip_message(&self, msg: lightning::ln::msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
364 let msg_hash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]).map_err(|_| ())?;
365 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
366 Ok(secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msg_hash, &self.node_secret))
370 impl SignerProvider for KeyProvider {
371 type EcdsaSigner = TestChannelSigner;
373 type TaprootSigner = TestChannelSigner;
375 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
376 let ctr = self.counter.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed) as u8;
377 self.signer_state.borrow_mut().insert(ctr, (inbound, Arc::new(Mutex::new(EnforcementState::new()))));
381 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
382 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
383 let ctr = channel_keys_id[0];
384 let (inbound, state) = self.signer_state.borrow().get(&ctr).unwrap().clone();
385 TestChannelSigner::new_with_revoked(if inbound {
388 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, ctr]).unwrap(),
389 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, ctr]).unwrap(),
390 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, ctr]).unwrap(),
391 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, ctr]).unwrap(),
392 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, ctr]).unwrap(),
393 [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, ctr],
394 channel_value_satoshis,
401 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, ctr]).unwrap(),
402 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8, ctr]).unwrap(),
403 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 9, ctr]).unwrap(),
404 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 10, ctr]).unwrap(),
405 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 11, ctr]).unwrap(),
406 [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 12, ctr],
407 channel_value_satoshis,
414 fn read_chan_signer(&self, mut data: &[u8]) -> Result<TestChannelSigner, DecodeError> {
415 let inner: InMemorySigner = ReadableArgs::read(&mut data, self)?;
416 let state = Arc::new(Mutex::new(EnforcementState::new()));
418 Ok(TestChannelSigner::new_with_revoked(
425 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
426 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
427 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
428 let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
429 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
432 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
433 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
434 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1]).unwrap();
435 let pubkey_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &secret_key).serialize());
436 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh(&pubkey_hash))
441 pub fn do_test(data: &[u8], logger: &Arc<dyn Logger>) {
442 let input = Arc::new(InputData {
444 read_pos: AtomicUsize::new(0),
446 let fee_est = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator {
447 input: input.clone(),
449 let router = FuzzRouter {};
451 macro_rules! get_slice {
453 match input.get_slice($len as usize) {
454 Some(slice) => slice,
460 macro_rules! get_pubkey {
462 match PublicKey::from_slice(get_slice!(33)) {
469 let our_network_key = match SecretKey::from_slice(get_slice!(32)) {
474 let inbound_payment_key = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 42];
476 let broadcast = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{ txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()) });
477 let monitor = Arc::new(chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::new(None, broadcast.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), fee_est.clone(),
478 Arc::new(TestPersister { update_ret: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed) })));
480 let keys_manager = Arc::new(KeyProvider {
481 node_secret: our_network_key.clone(),
482 inbound_payment_key: KeyMaterial(inbound_payment_key.try_into().unwrap()),
483 counter: AtomicU64::new(0),
484 signer_state: RefCell::new(HashMap::new())
486 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
487 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = slice_to_be32(get_slice!(4));
488 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
489 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = get_slice!(1)[0] != 0;
490 let network = Network::Bitcoin;
491 let best_block_timestamp = genesis_block(network).header.time;
492 let params = ChainParameters {
494 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
496 let channelmanager = Arc::new(ChannelManager::new(fee_est.clone(), monitor.clone(), broadcast.clone(), &router, Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), config, params, best_block_timestamp));
497 // Adding new calls to `EntropySource::get_secure_random_bytes` during startup can change all the
498 // keys subsequently generated in this test. Rather than regenerating all the messages manually,
499 // it's easier to just increment the counter here so the keys don't change.
500 keys_manager.counter.fetch_sub(3, Ordering::AcqRel);
501 let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, Arc::clone(&logger)));
502 let gossip_sync = Arc::new(P2PGossipSync::new(Arc::clone(&network_graph), None, Arc::clone(&logger)));
504 let peers = RefCell::new([false; 256]);
505 let mut loss_detector = MoneyLossDetector::new(&peers, channelmanager.clone(), monitor.clone(), PeerManager::new(MessageHandler {
506 chan_handler: channelmanager.clone(),
507 route_handler: gossip_sync.clone(),
508 onion_message_handler: IgnoringMessageHandler {},
509 custom_message_handler: IgnoringMessageHandler {},
510 }, 0, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 15, 0], Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone()));
512 let mut should_forward = false;
513 let mut payments_received: Vec<PaymentHash> = Vec::new();
514 let mut payments_sent = 0;
515 let mut pending_funding_generation: Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, u64, ScriptBuf)> = Vec::new();
516 let mut pending_funding_signatures = HashMap::new();
519 match get_slice!(1)[0] {
523 if !peers.borrow()[i-1] {
528 if new_id == 0 { return; }
529 loss_detector.handler.new_outbound_connection(get_pubkey!(), Peer{id: (new_id - 1) as u8, peers_connected: &peers}, None).unwrap();
530 peers.borrow_mut()[new_id - 1] = true;
535 if !peers.borrow()[i-1] {
540 if new_id == 0 { return; }
541 loss_detector.handler.new_inbound_connection(Peer{id: (new_id - 1) as u8, peers_connected: &peers}, None).unwrap();
542 peers.borrow_mut()[new_id - 1] = true;
545 let peer_id = get_slice!(1)[0];
546 if !peers.borrow()[peer_id as usize] { return; }
547 loss_detector.handler.socket_disconnected(&Peer{id: peer_id, peers_connected: &peers});
548 peers.borrow_mut()[peer_id as usize] = false;
551 let peer_id = get_slice!(1)[0];
552 if !peers.borrow()[peer_id as usize] { return; }
553 match loss_detector.handler.read_event(&mut Peer{id: peer_id, peers_connected: &peers}, get_slice!(get_slice!(1)[0])) {
554 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
555 Err(_) => { peers.borrow_mut()[peer_id as usize] = false; }
559 let final_value_msat = slice_to_be24(get_slice!(3)) as u64;
560 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(get_pubkey!(), 42);
561 let params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
562 payment_params, final_value_msat);
563 let mut payment_hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
564 payment_hash.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&be64_to_array(payments_sent));
565 payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&payment_hash.0[..]).to_byte_array();
567 match channelmanager.send_payment(payment_hash,
568 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), params,
576 let final_value_msat = slice_to_be24(get_slice!(3)) as u64;
577 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(get_pubkey!(), 42);
578 let params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
579 payment_params, final_value_msat);
580 let mut payment_hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
581 payment_hash.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&be64_to_array(payments_sent));
582 payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&payment_hash.0[..]).to_byte_array();
584 let mut payment_secret = PaymentSecret([0; 32]);
585 payment_secret.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&be64_to_array(payments_sent));
587 match channelmanager.send_payment(payment_hash,
588 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
589 params, Retry::Attempts(0))
596 let peer_id = get_slice!(1)[0];
597 if !peers.borrow()[peer_id as usize] { return; }
598 let their_key = get_pubkey!();
599 let chan_value = slice_to_be24(get_slice!(3)) as u64;
600 let push_msat_value = slice_to_be24(get_slice!(3)) as u64;
601 if channelmanager.create_channel(their_key, chan_value, push_msat_value, 0, None, None).is_err() { return; }
604 let mut channels = channelmanager.list_channels();
605 let channel_id = get_slice!(1)[0] as usize;
606 if channel_id >= channels.len() { return; }
607 channels.sort_by(|a, b| { a.channel_id.cmp(&b.channel_id) });
608 if channelmanager.close_channel(&channels[channel_id].channel_id, &channels[channel_id].counterparty.node_id).is_err() { return; }
612 channelmanager.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
613 should_forward = false;
617 for payment in payments_received.drain(..) {
618 // SHA256 is defined as XOR of all input bytes placed in the first byte, and 0s
619 // for the remaining bytes. Thus, if not all remaining bytes are 0s we cannot
620 // fulfill this HTLC, but if they are, we can just take the first byte and
621 // place that anywhere in our preimage.
622 if &payment.0[1..] != &[0; 31] {
623 channelmanager.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment);
625 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
626 payment_preimage.0[0] = payment.0[0];
627 channelmanager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
632 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
633 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
634 // Note that this may fail - our hashes may collide and we'll end up trying to
635 // double-register the same payment_hash.
636 let _ = channelmanager.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 1, None);
639 for payment in payments_received.drain(..) {
640 channelmanager.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment);
644 'outer_loop: for funding_generation in pending_funding_generation.drain(..) {
645 let mut tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
646 value: funding_generation.2, script_pubkey: funding_generation.3,
648 let funding_output = 'search_loop: loop {
649 let funding_txid = tx.txid();
650 if let None = loss_detector.txids_confirmed.get(&funding_txid) {
651 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_txid, index: 0 };
652 for chan in channelmanager.list_channels() {
653 if chan.funding_txo == Some(outpoint) {
655 continue 'search_loop;
661 if tx.version > 0xff {
662 continue 'outer_loop;
665 if let Err(e) = channelmanager.funding_transaction_generated(&funding_generation.0, &funding_generation.1, tx.clone()) {
666 // It's possible the channel has been closed in the mean time, but any other
667 // failure may be a bug.
668 if let APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. } = e { } else { panic!(); }
670 pending_funding_signatures.insert(funding_output, tx);
674 let mut txn = broadcast.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
676 loss_detector.connect_block(&txn[..]);
678 loss_detector.connect_block(&[]);
681 for tx in txn.drain(..) {
682 loss_detector.funding_txn.push(tx);
686 let txlen = slice_to_be16(get_slice!(2));
688 loss_detector.connect_block(&[]);
690 let txres: Result<Transaction, _> = deserialize(get_slice!(txlen));
691 if let Ok(tx) = txres {
692 let mut output_val = 0;
693 for out in tx.output.iter() {
694 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { return; }
695 output_val += out.value;
696 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { return; }
698 loss_detector.connect_block(&[tx]);
705 loss_detector.disconnect_block();
708 let mut channels = channelmanager.list_channels();
709 let channel_id = get_slice!(1)[0] as usize;
710 if channel_id >= channels.len() { return; }
711 channels.sort_by(|a, b| { a.channel_id.cmp(&b.channel_id) });
712 channelmanager.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channels[channel_id].channel_id, &channels[channel_id].counterparty.node_id).unwrap();
717 loss_detector.handler.process_events();
718 for event in loss_detector.manager.get_and_clear_pending_events() {
720 Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script, .. } => {
721 pending_funding_generation.push((temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script));
723 Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, .. } => {
724 //TODO: enhance by fetching random amounts from fuzz input?
725 payments_received.push(payment_hash);
727 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {
728 should_forward = true;
736 pub fn full_stack_test<Out: test_logger::Output>(data: &[u8], out: Out) {
737 let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new("".to_owned(), out));
738 do_test(data, &logger);
742 pub extern "C" fn full_stack_run(data: *const u8, datalen: usize) {
743 let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new("".to_owned(), test_logger::DevNull {}));
744 do_test(unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(data, datalen) }, &logger);
749 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
750 use lightning::util::logger::{Logger, Record};
751 use std::collections::HashMap;
752 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
754 struct TrackingLogger {
755 /// (module, message) -> count
756 pub lines: Mutex<HashMap<(String, String), usize>>,
758 impl Logger for TrackingLogger {
759 fn log(&self, record: Record) {
760 *self.lines.lock().unwrap().entry((record.module_path.to_string(), format!("{}", record.args))).or_insert(0) += 1;
761 println!("{:<5} [{} : {}, {}] {}", record.level.to_string(), record.module_path, record.file, record.line, record.args);
766 fn test_no_existing_test_breakage() {
767 // To avoid accidentally causing all existing fuzz test cases to be useless by making minor
768 // changes (such as requesting feerate info in a new place), we run a pretty full
769 // step-through with two peers and HTLC forwarding here. Obviously this is pretty finicky,
770 // so this should be updated pretty liberally, but at least we'll know when changes occur.
771 // If nothing else, this test serves as a pretty great initial full_stack_target seed.
773 // What each byte represents is broken down below, and then everything is concatenated into
774 // one large test at the end (you want %s/ -.*//g %s/\n\| \|\t\|\///g).
776 // Following BOLT 8, lightning message on the wire are: 2-byte encrypted message length +
777 // 16-byte MAC of the encrypted message length + encrypted Lightning message + 16-byte MAC
778 // of the Lightning message
779 // I.e 2nd inbound read, len 18 : 0006 (encrypted message length) + 03000000000000000000000000000000 (MAC of the encrypted message length)
780 // Len 22 : 0010 00000000 (encrypted lightning message) + 03000000000000000000000000000000 (MAC of the Lightning message)
782 // Writing new code generating transactions and see a new failure ? Don't forget to add input for the FuzzEstimator !
784 // 0100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 - our network key
785 // 00000000 - fee_proportional_millionths
786 // 01 - announce_channels_publicly
788 // 00 - new outbound connection with id 0
789 // 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 - peer's pubkey
790 // 030032 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 50
791 // 00 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 03000000000000000000000000000000 - noise act two (0||pubkey||mac)
793 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
794 // 0010 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 16
795 // 030020 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 32
796 // 0010 00021aaa 0008aaaaaaaaaaaa9aaa 03000000000000000000000000000000 - init message (type 16) with static_remotekey required and other bits optional and mac
798 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
799 // 0147 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 327
800 // 0300fe - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 254
801 // 0020 6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000 ff4f00f805273c1b203bb5ebf8436bfde57b3be8c2f5e95d9491dbb181909679 000000000000c350 0000000000000000 0000000000000162 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000222 0000000000000000 000000fd 0006 01e3 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000004 - beginning of open_channel message
802 // 030059 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 89
803 // 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000005 020900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01 0000 01021000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - rest of open_channel and mac
805 // 00fd - Two feerate requests (all returning min feerate, which our open_channel also uses) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
806 // - client should now respond with accept_channel (CHECK 1: type 33 to peer 03000000)
808 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
809 // 0084 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 132
810 // 030094 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 148
811 // 0022 ff4f00f805273c1b203bb5ebf8436bfde57b3be8c2f5e95d9491dbb181909679 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000210100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - funding_created and mac
812 // - client should now respond with funding_signed (CHECK 2: type 35 to peer 03000000)
814 // 0c005e - connect a block with one transaction of len 94
815 // 020000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000ffffffff0150c3000000000000220020ae0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 - the funding transaction
816 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
817 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
818 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
819 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
820 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
821 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
822 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
823 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
824 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
825 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
826 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
827 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
828 // - by now client should have sent a channel_ready (CHECK 3: SendChannelReady to 03000000 for chan 3d000000)
830 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
831 // 0043 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 67
832 // 030053 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 83
833 // 0024 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 020800000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - channel_ready and mac
835 // 01 - new inbound connection with id 1
836 // 030132 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 50
837 // 0003000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000703000000000000000000000000000000 - inbound noise act 1
838 // 030142 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 66
839 // 000302000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000300000000000000000000000000000003000000000000000000000000000000 - inbound noise act 3
841 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
842 // 0010 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 16
843 // 030120 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 32
844 // 0010 00021aaa 0008aaaaaaaaaaaa9aaa 01000000000000000000000000000000 - init message (type 16) with static_remotekey required and other bits optional and mac
846 // 05 01 030200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00c350 0003e8 - create outbound channel to peer 1 for 50k sat
847 // 00fd - One feerate requests (all returning min feerate) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
849 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
850 // 0112 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 274
851 // 0301ff - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 255
852 // 0021 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e05 0000000000000162 00000000004c4b40 00000000000003e8 00000000000003e8 00000002 03f0 0005 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000200 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000300 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000400 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000500 02660000000000000000000000000000 - beginning of accept_channel
853 // 030123 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 35
854 // 0000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - rest of accept_channel and mac
856 // 0a - create the funding transaction (client should send funding_created now)
858 // 00fd00fd - Two feerate requests (calculating max dust exposure) (all returning min feerate) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
860 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
861 // 0062 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 98
862 // 030172 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 114
863 // 0023 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000007c0001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - funding_signed message and mac
865 // 0b - broadcast funding transaction
866 // - by now client should have sent a channel_ready (CHECK 4: SendChannelReady to 03020000 for chan 3f000000)
868 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
869 // 0043 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 67
870 // 030153 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 83
871 // 0024 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 026700000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - channel_ready and mac
873 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
874 // 05ac 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 1452
875 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
876 // 0080 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000003e80 ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 000003f0 00 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000555 11 020203e8 0401a0 060800000e0000010000 0a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff - beginning of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client
877 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
878 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
879 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
880 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
881 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
882 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
883 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
884 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
885 // 0300c1 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 193
886 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff ab00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - end of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client and mac
888 // 00fd - One feerate request (calculating max dust exposure) (all returning min feerate) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
890 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
891 // 0064 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
892 // 030074 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 116
893 // 0084 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000300100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
894 // - client should now respond with revoke_and_ack and commitment_signed (CHECK 5/6: types 133 and 132 to peer 03000000)
896 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
897 // 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
898 // 030073 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 115
899 // 0085 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 020b00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
901 // 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
902 // - client now sends id 1 update_add_htlc and commitment_signed (CHECK 7: UpdateHTLCs event for node 03020000 with 1 HTLCs for channel 3f000000)
904 // 00fd00fd - Two feerate requests (calculating max dust exposure) (all returning min feerate) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
906 // - we respond with commitment_signed then revoke_and_ack (a weird, but valid, order)
907 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
908 // 0064 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
909 // 030174 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 116
910 // 0084 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000006a0001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
912 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
913 // 0063 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
914 // 030173 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 115
915 // 0085 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 6600000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 026400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
917 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
918 // 004a 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 74
919 // 03015a - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 90
920 // 0082 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000000 ff00888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888 01000000000000000000000000000000 - update_fulfill_htlc and mac
921 // - client should immediately claim the pending HTLC from peer 0 (CHECK 8: SendFulfillHTLCs for node 03000000 with preimage ff00888888 for channel 3d000000)
923 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
924 // 0064 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
925 // 030174 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 116
926 // 0084 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
928 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
929 // 0063 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
930 // 030173 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 115
931 // 0085 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 6700000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 026500000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
933 // - before responding to the commitment_signed generated above, send a new HTLC
934 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
935 // 05ac 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 1452
936 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
937 // 0080 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000000000003e80 ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 000003f0 00 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000555 11 020203e8 0401a0 060800000e0000010000 0a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff - beginning of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client
938 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
939 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
940 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
941 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
942 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
943 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
944 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
945 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
946 // 0300c1 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 193
947 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff ab00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - end of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client and mac
949 // 00fd - One feerate request (calculating max dust exposure) (all returning min feerate) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
951 // - now respond to the update_fulfill_htlc+commitment_signed messages the client sent to peer 0
952 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
953 // 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
954 // 030073 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 115
955 // 0085 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0800000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 020a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
956 // - client should now respond with revoke_and_ack and commitment_signed (CHECK 5/6 duplicates)
958 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
959 // 0064 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
960 // 030074 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 116
961 // 0084 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000c30100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
963 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
964 // 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
965 // 030073 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 115
966 // 0085 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0b00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 020d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
968 // 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
969 // - client now sends id 1 update_add_htlc and commitment_signed (CHECK 7 duplicate)
970 // - we respond with revoke_and_ack, then commitment_signed, then update_fail_htlc
972 // 00fd00fd - Two feerate requests (calculating max dust exposure) (all returning min feerate) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
974 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
975 // 0064 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
976 // 030174 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 116
977 // 0084 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000390001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
979 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
980 // 0063 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
981 // 030173 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 115
982 // 0085 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 6400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 027000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
984 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
985 // 002c 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 44
986 // 03013c - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 60
987 // 0083 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - update_fail_htlc and mac
989 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
990 // 0064 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
991 // 030174 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 116
992 // 0084 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000390001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
994 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
995 // 0063 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
996 // 030173 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 115
997 // 0085 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 6500000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 027100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
999 // 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
1000 // - client now sends id 0 update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed (CHECK 9)
1001 // - now respond to the update_fail_htlc+commitment_signed messages the client sent to peer 0
1003 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
1004 // 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
1005 // 030073 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 115
1006 // 0085 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 020c00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
1008 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
1009 // 0064 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
1010 // 030074 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 116
1011 // 0084 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000320100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
1012 // - client should now respond with revoke_and_ack (CHECK 5 duplicate)
1014 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
1015 // 05ac 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 1452
1016 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
1017 // 0080 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000002 00000000000b0838 ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 000003f0 00 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000555 12 02030927c0 0401a0 060800000e0000010000 0a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff - beginning of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client
1018 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
1019 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
1020 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
1021 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
1022 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
1023 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
1024 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
1025 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
1026 // 0300c1 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 193
1027 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 5300000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - end of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client and mac
1029 // 00fd - One feerate request (calculating max dust exposure) (all returning min feerate) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
1031 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
1032 // 00a4 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 164
1033 // 0300b4 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 180
1034 // 0084 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000750100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0001 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000670500000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000006 03000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
1035 // - client should now respond with revoke_and_ack and commitment_signed (CHECK 5/6 duplicates)
1037 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
1038 // 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
1039 // 030073 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 115
1040 // 0085 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 020f00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
1042 // 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
1043 // - client now sends id 1 update_add_htlc and commitment_signed (CHECK 7 duplicate)
1045 // 00fd00fd - Two feerate requests (calculating max dust exposure) (all returning min feerate) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
1047 // 0c007d - connect a block with one transaction of len 125
1048 // 02000000013a000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000800258020000000000002200204b0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000014c0000000000000160014280000000000000000000000000000000000000005000020 - the commitment transaction for channel 3f00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
1050 // 0c005e - connect a block with one transaction of len 94
1051 // 0200000001730000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001a701000000000000220020b20000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 - the HTLC timeout transaction
1052 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
1053 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
1054 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
1055 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
1056 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
1058 // 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
1059 // - client now fails the HTLC backwards as it was unable to extract the payment preimage (CHECK 9 duplicate and CHECK 10)
1061 let logger = Arc::new(TrackingLogger { lines: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()) });
1062 super::do_test(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("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&(Arc::clone(&logger) as Arc<dyn Logger>));
1064 let log_entries = logger.lines.lock().unwrap();
1065 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling SendAcceptChannel event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 for channel ff4f00f805273c1b203bb5ebf8436bfde57b3be8c2f5e95d9491dbb181909679".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 1
1066 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling SendFundingSigned event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 2
1067 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling SendChannelReady event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 3
1068 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling SendChannelReady event in peer_handler for node 030200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 for channel 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 4
1069 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling SendRevokeAndACK event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&4)); // 5
1070 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling UpdateHTLCs event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 with 0 adds, 0 fulfills, 0 fails for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&3)); // 6
1071 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling UpdateHTLCs event in peer_handler for node 030200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 with 1 adds, 0 fulfills, 0 fails for channel 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&3)); // 7
1072 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling UpdateHTLCs event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 with 0 adds, 1 fulfills, 0 fails for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 8
1073 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling UpdateHTLCs event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 with 0 adds, 0 fulfills, 1 fails for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&2)); // 9
1074 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::chain::channelmonitor".to_string(), "Input spending counterparty commitment tx (0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000073:0) in 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000067 resolves outbound HTLC with payment hash ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 with timeout".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 10