1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Test that no series of bytes received over the wire/connections created/payments sent can
11 //! result in a crash. We do this by standing up a node and then reading bytes from input to denote
12 //! actions such as creating new inbound/outbound connections, bytes to be read from a connection,
13 //! or payments to send/ways to handle events generated.
14 //! This test has been very useful, though due to its complexity good starting inputs are critical.
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
19 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
20 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::deserialize;
21 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash as TraitImport;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::HashEngine as TraitImportEngine;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
30 use lightning::chain::{BestBlock, Confirm, Listen};
31 use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
32 use lightning::chain::chainmonitor;
33 use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
34 use lightning::chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeyMaterial, KeysInterface};
35 use lightning::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
36 use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager};
37 use lightning::ln::peer_handler::{MessageHandler,PeerManager,SocketDescriptor,IgnoringMessageHandler};
38 use lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
39 use lightning::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
40 use lightning::routing::network_graph::{NetGraphMsgHandler, NetworkGraph};
41 use lightning::routing::router::{find_route, Payee, RouteParameters};
42 use lightning::routing::scoring::Scorer;
43 use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
44 use lightning::util::errors::APIError;
45 use lightning::util::events::Event;
46 use lightning::util::enforcing_trait_impls::{EnforcingSigner, EnforcementState};
47 use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
48 use lightning::util::ser::Readable;
50 use utils::test_logger;
51 use utils::test_persister::TestPersister;
53 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
54 use bitcoin::secp256k1::recovery::RecoverableSignature;
55 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
57 use std::cell::RefCell;
58 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
59 use std::convert::TryInto;
61 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
62 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64,AtomicUsize,Ordering};
65 pub fn slice_to_be16(v: &[u8]) -> u16 {
66 ((v[0] as u16) << 8*1) |
67 ((v[1] as u16) << 8*0)
71 pub fn slice_to_be24(v: &[u8]) -> u32 {
72 ((v[0] as u32) << 8*2) |
73 ((v[1] as u32) << 8*1) |
74 ((v[2] as u32) << 8*0)
78 pub fn slice_to_be32(v: &[u8]) -> u32 {
79 ((v[0] as u32) << 8*3) |
80 ((v[1] as u32) << 8*2) |
81 ((v[2] as u32) << 8*1) |
82 ((v[3] as u32) << 8*0)
86 pub fn be64_to_array(u: u64) -> [u8; 8] {
88 v[0] = ((u >> 8*7) & 0xff) as u8;
89 v[1] = ((u >> 8*6) & 0xff) as u8;
90 v[2] = ((u >> 8*5) & 0xff) as u8;
91 v[3] = ((u >> 8*4) & 0xff) as u8;
92 v[4] = ((u >> 8*3) & 0xff) as u8;
93 v[5] = ((u >> 8*2) & 0xff) as u8;
94 v[6] = ((u >> 8*1) & 0xff) as u8;
95 v[7] = ((u >> 8*0) & 0xff) as u8;
101 read_pos: AtomicUsize,
104 fn get_slice(&self, len: usize) -> Option<&[u8]> {
105 let old_pos = self.read_pos.fetch_add(len, Ordering::AcqRel);
106 if self.data.len() < old_pos + len {
109 Some(&self.data[old_pos..old_pos + len])
113 struct FuzzEstimator {
114 input: Arc<InputData>,
116 impl FeeEstimator for FuzzEstimator {
117 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
118 //TODO: We should actually be testing at least much more than 64k...
119 match self.input.get_slice(2) {
120 Some(slice) => cmp::max(slice_to_be16(slice) as u32, 253),
126 struct TestBroadcaster {
127 txn_broadcasted: Mutex<Vec<Transaction>>,
129 impl BroadcasterInterface for TestBroadcaster {
130 fn broadcast_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) {
131 self.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().push(tx.clone());
138 peers_connected: &'a RefCell<[bool; 256]>,
140 impl<'a> SocketDescriptor for Peer<'a> {
141 fn send_data(&mut self, data: &[u8], _resume_read: bool) -> usize {
144 fn disconnect_socket(&mut self) {
145 assert!(self.peers_connected.borrow()[self.id as usize]);
146 self.peers_connected.borrow_mut()[self.id as usize] = false;
149 impl<'a> PartialEq for Peer<'a> {
150 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
154 impl<'a> Eq for Peer<'a> {}
155 impl<'a> std::hash::Hash for Peer<'a> {
156 fn hash<H : std::hash::Hasher>(&self, h: &mut H) {
161 type ChannelMan = ChannelManager<
163 Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<EnforcingSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
164 Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>>;
165 type PeerMan<'a> = PeerManager<Peer<'a>, Arc<ChannelMan>, Arc<NetGraphMsgHandler<Arc<NetworkGraph>, Arc<dyn chain::Access>, Arc<dyn Logger>>>, Arc<dyn Logger>, IgnoringMessageHandler>;
167 struct MoneyLossDetector<'a> {
168 manager: Arc<ChannelMan>,
169 monitor: Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<EnforcingSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
170 handler: PeerMan<'a>,
172 peers: &'a RefCell<[bool; 256]>,
173 funding_txn: Vec<Transaction>,
174 txids_confirmed: HashMap<Txid, usize>,
175 header_hashes: Vec<(BlockHash, u32)>,
178 blocks_connected: u32,
180 impl<'a> MoneyLossDetector<'a> {
181 pub fn new(peers: &'a RefCell<[bool; 256]>,
182 manager: Arc<ChannelMan>,
183 monitor: Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<EnforcingSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
184 handler: PeerMan<'a>) -> Self {
191 funding_txn: Vec::new(),
192 txids_confirmed: HashMap::new(),
193 header_hashes: vec![(genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash(), 0)],
200 fn connect_block(&mut self, all_txn: &[Transaction]) {
201 let mut txdata = Vec::with_capacity(all_txn.len());
202 for (idx, tx) in all_txn.iter().enumerate() {
203 let txid = tx.txid();
204 match self.txids_confirmed.entry(txid) {
205 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
206 e.insert(self.height);
207 txdata.push((idx + 1, tx));
213 self.blocks_connected += 1;
214 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: self.header_hashes[self.height].0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: self.blocks_connected, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
216 self.manager.transactions_confirmed(&header, &txdata, self.height as u32);
217 self.manager.best_block_updated(&header, self.height as u32);
218 (*self.monitor).transactions_confirmed(&header, &txdata, self.height as u32);
219 (*self.monitor).best_block_updated(&header, self.height as u32);
220 if self.header_hashes.len() > self.height {
221 self.header_hashes[self.height] = (header.block_hash(), self.blocks_connected);
223 assert_eq!(self.header_hashes.len(), self.height);
224 self.header_hashes.push((header.block_hash(), self.blocks_connected));
226 self.max_height = cmp::max(self.height, self.max_height);
229 fn disconnect_block(&mut self) {
230 if self.height > 0 && (self.max_height < 6 || self.height >= self.max_height - 6) {
231 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: self.header_hashes[self.height - 1].0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: self.header_hashes[self.height].1, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
232 self.manager.block_disconnected(&header, self.height as u32);
233 self.monitor.block_disconnected(&header, self.height as u32);
235 let removal_height = self.height;
236 self.txids_confirmed.retain(|_, height| {
237 removal_height != *height
243 impl<'a> Drop for MoneyLossDetector<'a> {
245 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
246 // Disconnect all peers
247 for (idx, peer) in self.peers.borrow().iter().enumerate() {
249 self.handler.socket_disconnected(&Peer{id: idx as u8, peers_connected: &self.peers});
253 // Force all channels onto the chain (and time out claim txn)
254 self.manager.force_close_all_channels();
260 node_secret: SecretKey,
261 inbound_payment_key: KeyMaterial,
264 impl KeysInterface for KeyProvider {
265 type Signer = EnforcingSigner;
267 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey {
268 self.node_secret.clone()
271 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial {
272 self.inbound_payment_key.clone()
275 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
276 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
277 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
278 let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
279 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
282 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
283 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
284 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1]).unwrap();
285 let pubkey_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &secret_key).serialize());
286 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh(&pubkey_hash)
289 fn get_channel_signer(&self, inbound: bool, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> EnforcingSigner {
290 let ctr = self.counter.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed) as u8;
291 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
292 EnforcingSigner::new(if inbound {
295 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, ctr]).unwrap(),
296 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, ctr]).unwrap(),
297 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, ctr]).unwrap(),
298 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, ctr]).unwrap(),
299 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, ctr]).unwrap(),
300 [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, ctr],
301 channel_value_satoshis,
307 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, ctr]).unwrap(),
308 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8, ctr]).unwrap(),
309 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 9, ctr]).unwrap(),
310 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 10, ctr]).unwrap(),
311 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 11, ctr]).unwrap(),
312 [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 12, ctr],
313 channel_value_satoshis,
319 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
320 let ctr = self.counter.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
321 [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
322 (ctr >> 8*7) as u8, (ctr >> 8*6) as u8, (ctr >> 8*5) as u8, (ctr >> 8*4) as u8, (ctr >> 8*3) as u8, (ctr >> 8*2) as u8, (ctr >> 8*1) as u8, 14, (ctr >> 8*0) as u8]
325 fn read_chan_signer(&self, mut data: &[u8]) -> Result<EnforcingSigner, DecodeError> {
326 let inner: InMemorySigner = Readable::read(&mut data)?;
327 let state = Arc::new(Mutex::new(EnforcementState::new()));
329 Ok(EnforcingSigner::new_with_revoked(
336 fn sign_invoice(&self, _invoice_preimage: Vec<u8>) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> {
342 pub fn do_test(data: &[u8], logger: &Arc<dyn Logger>) {
343 let input = Arc::new(InputData {
345 read_pos: AtomicUsize::new(0),
347 let fee_est = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator {
348 input: input.clone(),
351 macro_rules! get_slice {
353 match input.get_slice($len as usize) {
354 Some(slice) => slice,
360 macro_rules! get_pubkey {
362 match PublicKey::from_slice(get_slice!(33)) {
369 let our_network_key = match SecretKey::from_slice(get_slice!(32)) {
374 let inbound_payment_key = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 42];
376 let broadcast = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{ txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()) });
377 let monitor = Arc::new(chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::new(None, broadcast.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), fee_est.clone(),
378 Arc::new(TestPersister { update_ret: Mutex::new(Ok(())) })));
380 let keys_manager = Arc::new(KeyProvider { node_secret: our_network_key.clone(), inbound_payment_key: KeyMaterial(inbound_payment_key.try_into().unwrap()), counter: AtomicU64::new(0) });
381 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
382 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = slice_to_be32(get_slice!(4));
383 config.channel_options.announced_channel = get_slice!(1)[0] != 0;
384 let network = Network::Bitcoin;
385 let params = ChainParameters {
387 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
389 let channelmanager = Arc::new(ChannelManager::new(fee_est.clone(), monitor.clone(), broadcast.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), config, params));
390 let our_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &keys_manager.get_node_secret());
391 let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(network).block_hash()));
392 let net_graph_msg_handler = Arc::new(NetGraphMsgHandler::new(Arc::clone(&network_graph), None, Arc::clone(&logger)));
393 let scorer = Scorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
395 let peers = RefCell::new([false; 256]);
396 let mut loss_detector = MoneyLossDetector::new(&peers, channelmanager.clone(), monitor.clone(), PeerManager::new(MessageHandler {
397 chan_handler: channelmanager.clone(),
398 route_handler: net_graph_msg_handler.clone(),
399 }, our_network_key, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 15, 0], Arc::clone(&logger), IgnoringMessageHandler{}));
401 let mut should_forward = false;
402 let mut payments_received: Vec<PaymentHash> = Vec::new();
403 let mut payments_sent = 0;
404 let mut pending_funding_generation: Vec<([u8; 32], u64, Script)> = Vec::new();
405 let mut pending_funding_signatures = HashMap::new();
408 match get_slice!(1)[0] {
412 if !peers.borrow()[i-1] {
417 if new_id == 0 { return; }
418 loss_detector.handler.new_outbound_connection(get_pubkey!(), Peer{id: (new_id - 1) as u8, peers_connected: &peers}).unwrap();
419 peers.borrow_mut()[new_id - 1] = true;
424 if !peers.borrow()[i-1] {
429 if new_id == 0 { return; }
430 loss_detector.handler.new_inbound_connection(Peer{id: (new_id - 1) as u8, peers_connected: &peers}).unwrap();
431 peers.borrow_mut()[new_id - 1] = true;
434 let peer_id = get_slice!(1)[0];
435 if !peers.borrow()[peer_id as usize] { return; }
436 loss_detector.handler.socket_disconnected(&Peer{id: peer_id, peers_connected: &peers});
437 peers.borrow_mut()[peer_id as usize] = false;
440 let peer_id = get_slice!(1)[0];
441 if !peers.borrow()[peer_id as usize] { return; }
442 match loss_detector.handler.read_event(&mut Peer{id: peer_id, peers_connected: &peers}, get_slice!(get_slice!(1)[0])) {
443 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
444 Err(_) => { peers.borrow_mut()[peer_id as usize] = false; }
448 let final_value_msat = slice_to_be24(get_slice!(3)) as u64;
449 let payee = Payee::from_node_id(get_pubkey!());
450 let params = RouteParameters {
453 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
455 let route = match find_route(&our_id, ¶ms, &network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger), &scorer) {
459 let mut payment_hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
460 payment_hash.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&be64_to_array(payments_sent));
461 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
462 sha.input(&payment_hash.0[..]);
463 payment_hash.0 = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
465 match channelmanager.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None) {
471 let final_value_msat = slice_to_be24(get_slice!(3)) as u64;
472 let payee = Payee::from_node_id(get_pubkey!());
473 let params = RouteParameters {
476 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
478 let mut route = match find_route(&our_id, ¶ms, &network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger), &scorer) {
482 route.paths.push(route.paths[0].clone());
483 let mut payment_hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
484 payment_hash.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&be64_to_array(payments_sent));
485 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
486 sha.input(&payment_hash.0[..]);
487 payment_hash.0 = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
489 let mut payment_secret = PaymentSecret([0; 32]);
490 payment_secret.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&be64_to_array(payments_sent));
492 match channelmanager.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) {
498 let peer_id = get_slice!(1)[0];
499 if !peers.borrow()[peer_id as usize] { return; }
500 let their_key = get_pubkey!();
501 let chan_value = slice_to_be24(get_slice!(3)) as u64;
502 let push_msat_value = slice_to_be24(get_slice!(3)) as u64;
503 if channelmanager.create_channel(their_key, chan_value, push_msat_value, 0, None).is_err() { return; }
506 let mut channels = channelmanager.list_channels();
507 let channel_id = get_slice!(1)[0] as usize;
508 if channel_id >= channels.len() { return; }
509 channels.sort_by(|a, b| { a.channel_id.cmp(&b.channel_id) });
510 if channelmanager.close_channel(&channels[channel_id].channel_id).is_err() { return; }
514 channelmanager.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
515 should_forward = false;
519 for payment in payments_received.drain(..) {
520 // SHA256 is defined as XOR of all input bytes placed in the first byte, and 0s
521 // for the remaining bytes. Thus, if not all remaining bytes are 0s we cannot
522 // fulfill this HTLC, but if they are, we can just take the first byte and
523 // place that anywhere in our preimage.
524 if &payment.0[1..] != &[0; 31] {
525 channelmanager.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment);
527 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
528 payment_preimage.0[0] = payment.0[0];
529 channelmanager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
534 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
535 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
536 sha.input(&payment_preimage.0[..]);
537 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner());
538 // Note that this may fail - our hashes may collide and we'll end up trying to
539 // double-register the same payment_hash.
540 let _ = channelmanager.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 1);
543 for payment in payments_received.drain(..) {
544 channelmanager.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment);
548 'outer_loop: for funding_generation in pending_funding_generation.drain(..) {
549 let mut tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
550 value: funding_generation.1, script_pubkey: funding_generation.2,
552 let funding_output = 'search_loop: loop {
553 let funding_txid = tx.txid();
554 if let None = loss_detector.txids_confirmed.get(&funding_txid) {
555 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_txid, index: 0 };
556 for chan in channelmanager.list_channels() {
557 if chan.channel_id == outpoint.to_channel_id() {
559 continue 'search_loop;
565 if tx.version > 0xff {
566 continue 'outer_loop;
569 if let Err(e) = channelmanager.funding_transaction_generated(&funding_generation.0, tx.clone()) {
570 // It's possible the channel has been closed in the mean time, but any other
571 // failure may be a bug.
572 if let APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err } = e {
573 assert_eq!(err, "No such channel");
576 pending_funding_signatures.insert(funding_output, tx);
580 let mut txn = broadcast.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
582 loss_detector.connect_block(&txn[..]);
584 loss_detector.connect_block(&[]);
587 for tx in txn.drain(..) {
588 loss_detector.funding_txn.push(tx);
592 let txlen = slice_to_be16(get_slice!(2));
594 loss_detector.connect_block(&[]);
596 let txres: Result<Transaction, _> = deserialize(get_slice!(txlen));
597 if let Ok(tx) = txres {
598 let mut output_val = 0;
599 for out in tx.output.iter() {
600 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { return; }
601 output_val += out.value;
602 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { return; }
604 loss_detector.connect_block(&[tx]);
611 loss_detector.disconnect_block();
614 let mut channels = channelmanager.list_channels();
615 let channel_id = get_slice!(1)[0] as usize;
616 if channel_id >= channels.len() { return; }
617 channels.sort_by(|a, b| { a.channel_id.cmp(&b.channel_id) });
618 channelmanager.force_close_channel(&channels[channel_id].channel_id).unwrap();
623 loss_detector.handler.process_events();
624 for event in loss_detector.manager.get_and_clear_pending_events() {
626 Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script, .. } => {
627 pending_funding_generation.push((temporary_channel_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script));
629 Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => {
630 //TODO: enhance by fetching random amounts from fuzz input?
631 payments_received.push(payment_hash);
633 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {
634 should_forward = true;
642 pub fn full_stack_test<Out: test_logger::Output>(data: &[u8], out: Out) {
643 let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new("".to_owned(), out));
644 do_test(data, &logger);
648 pub extern "C" fn full_stack_run(data: *const u8, datalen: usize) {
649 let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new("".to_owned(), test_logger::DevNull {}));
650 do_test(unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(data, datalen) }, &logger);
655 use lightning::util::logger::{Logger, Record};
656 use std::collections::HashMap;
657 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
659 struct TrackingLogger {
660 /// (module, message) -> count
661 pub lines: Mutex<HashMap<(String, String), usize>>,
663 impl Logger for TrackingLogger {
664 fn log(&self, record: &Record) {
665 *self.lines.lock().unwrap().entry((record.module_path.to_string(), format!("{}", record.args))).or_insert(0) += 1;
666 println!("{:<5} [{} : {}, {}] {}", record.level.to_string(), record.module_path, record.file, record.line, record.args);
671 fn test_no_existing_test_breakage() {
672 // To avoid accidentally causing all existing fuzz test cases to be useless by making minor
673 // changes (such as requesting feerate info in a new place), we run a pretty full
674 // step-through with two peers and HTLC forwarding here. Obviously this is pretty finicky,
675 // so this should be updated pretty liberally, but at least we'll know when changes occur.
676 // If nothing else, this test serves as a pretty great initial full_stack_target seed.
678 // What each byte represents is broken down below, and then everything is concatenated into
679 // one large test at the end (you want %s/ -.*//g %s/\n\| \|\t\|\///g).
681 // Following BOLT 8, lightning message on the wire are: 2-byte encrypted message length +
682 // 16-byte MAC of the encrypted message length + encrypted Lightning message + 16-byte MAC
683 // of the Lightning message
684 // I.e 2nd inbound read, len 18 : 0006 (encrypted message length) + 03000000000000000000000000000000 (MAC of the encrypted message length)
685 // Len 22 : 0010 00000000 (encrypted lightning message) + 03000000000000000000000000000000 (MAC of the Lightning message)
687 // Writing new code generating transactions and see a new failure ? Don't forget to add input for the FuzzEstimator !
689 // 0100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 - our network key
690 // 00000000 - fee_proportional_millionths
691 // 01 - announce_channels_publicly
693 // 00 - new outbound connection with id 0
694 // 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 - peer's pubkey
695 // 030032 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 50
696 // 00 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 03000000000000000000000000000000 - noise act two (0||pubkey||mac)
698 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
699 // 000a 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 10
700 // 03001a - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 26
701 // 0010 00022000 00022000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - init message (type 16) with static_remotekey (0x2000) and mac
703 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
704 // 0141 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 321
705 // 0300fe - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 254
706 // 0020 7500000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ff4f00f805273c1b203bb5ebf8436bfde57b3be8c2f5e95d9491dbb181909679 000000000000c350 0000000000000000 0000000000000162 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000222 0000000000000000 000000fd 0006 01e3 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000004 - beginning of open_channel message
707 // 030053 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 83
708 // 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000005 020900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01 03000000000000000000000000000000 - rest of open_channel and mac
710 // 00fd00fd - Two feerate requests (all returning min feerate, which our open_channel also uses) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
711 // - client should now respond with accept_channel (CHECK 1: type 33 to peer 03000000)
713 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
714 // 0084 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 132
715 // 030094 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 148
716 // 0022 ff4f00f805273c1b203bb5ebf8436bfde57b3be8c2f5e95d9491dbb181909679 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000210100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - funding_created and mac
717 // - client should now respond with funding_signed (CHECK 2: type 35 to peer 03000000)
719 // 0c005e - connect a block with one transaction of len 94
720 // 020000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000ffffffff0150c3000000000000220020ae0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 - the funding transaction
721 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
722 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
723 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
724 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
725 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
726 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
727 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
728 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
729 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
730 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
731 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
732 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
733 // - by now client should have sent a funding_locked (CHECK 3: SendFundingLocked to 03000000 for chan 3d000000)
735 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
736 // 0043 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 67
737 // 030053 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 83
738 // 0024 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 020800000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - funding_locked and mac
740 // 01 - new inbound connection with id 1
741 // 030132 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 50
742 // 0003000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000703000000000000000000000000000000 - inbound noise act 1
743 // 030142 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 66
744 // 000302000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000300000000000000000000000000000003000000000000000000000000000000 - inbound noise act 3
746 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
747 // 000a 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 10
748 // 03011a - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 26
749 // 0010 00022000 00022000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - init message (type 16) with static_remotekey (0x2000) and mac
751 // 05 01 030200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00c350 0003e8 - create outbound channel to peer 1 for 50k sat
752 // 00fd - One feerate requests (all returning min feerate) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
754 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
755 // 0110 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 272
756 // 0301ff - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 255
757 // 0021 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e05 0000000000000162 00000000004c4b40 00000000000003e8 00000000000003e8 00000002 03f0 0005 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000200 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000300 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000400 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000500 02660000000000000000000000000000 - beginning of accept_channel
758 // 030121 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 33
759 // 0000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - rest of accept_channel and mac
761 // 0a - create the funding transaction (client should send funding_created now)
763 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
764 // 0062 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 98
765 // 030172 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 114
766 // 0023 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000007c0001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - funding_signed message and mac
768 // 0b - broadcast funding transaction
769 // - by now client should have sent a funding_locked (CHECK 4: SendFundingLocked to 03020000 for chan 3f000000)
771 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
772 // 0043 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 67
773 // 030153 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 83
774 // 0024 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 026700000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - funding_locked and mac
776 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
777 // 05ac 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 1452
778 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
779 // 0080 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000003e80 ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 000003f0 00 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000555 0000000e000001000000000000000003e8000000a00000000000000000000000000a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff - beginning of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client
780 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
781 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
782 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
783 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
784 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
785 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
786 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
787 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
788 // 0300c1 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 193
789 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 4e00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - end of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client and mac
791 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
792 // 0064 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
793 // 030074 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 116
794 // 0084 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000300100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
795 // - client should now respond with revoke_and_ack and commitment_signed (CHECK 5/6: types 133 and 132 to peer 03000000)
797 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
798 // 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
799 // 030073 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 115
800 // 0085 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 020b00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
802 // 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
803 // - client now sends id 1 update_add_htlc and commitment_signed (CHECK 7: SendHTLCs event for node 03020000 with 1 HTLCs for channel 3f000000)
805 // - we respond with commitment_signed then revoke_and_ack (a weird, but valid, order)
806 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
807 // 0064 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
808 // 030174 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 116
809 // 0084 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000006a0001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
811 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
812 // 0063 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
813 // 030173 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 115
814 // 0085 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 6600000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 026400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
816 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
817 // 004a 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 74
818 // 03015a - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 90
819 // 0082 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000000 ff00888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888 01000000000000000000000000000000 - update_fulfill_htlc and mac
820 // - client should immediately claim the pending HTLC from peer 0 (CHECK 8: SendFulfillHTLCs for node 03000000 with preimage ff00888888 for channel 3d000000)
822 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
823 // 0064 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
824 // 030174 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 116
825 // 0084 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
827 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
828 // 0063 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
829 // 030173 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 115
830 // 0085 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 6700000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 026500000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
832 // - before responding to the commitment_signed generated above, send a new HTLC
833 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
834 // 05ac 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 1452
835 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
836 // 0080 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000000000003e80 ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 000003f0 00 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000555 0000000e000001000000000000000003e8000000a00000000000000000000000000a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff - beginning of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client
837 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
838 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
839 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
840 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
841 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
842 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
843 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
844 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
845 // 0300c1 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 193
846 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 4e00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - end of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client and mac
848 // - now respond to the update_fulfill_htlc+commitment_signed messages the client sent to peer 0
849 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
850 // 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
851 // 030073 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 115
852 // 0085 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0800000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 020a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
853 // - client should now respond with revoke_and_ack and commitment_signed (CHECK 5/6 duplicates)
855 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
856 // 0064 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
857 // 030074 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 116
858 // 0084 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000c30100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
860 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
861 // 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
862 // 030073 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 115
863 // 0085 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0b00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 020d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
865 // 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
866 // - client now sends id 1 update_add_htlc and commitment_signed (CHECK 7 duplicate)
867 // - we respond with revoke_and_ack, then commitment_signed, then update_fail_htlc
869 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
870 // 0064 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
871 // 030174 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 116
872 // 0084 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000390001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
874 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
875 // 0063 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
876 // 030173 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 115
877 // 0085 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 6400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 027000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
879 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
880 // 002c 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 44
881 // 03013c - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 60
882 // 0083 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - update_fail_htlc and mac
884 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
885 // 0064 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
886 // 030174 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 116
887 // 0084 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000390001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
889 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
890 // 0063 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
891 // 030173 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 115
892 // 0085 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 6500000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 027100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
894 // 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
895 // - client now sends id 0 update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed (CHECK 9)
896 // - now respond to the update_fail_htlc+commitment_signed messages the client sent to peer 0
898 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
899 // 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
900 // 030073 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 115
901 // 0085 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 020c00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
903 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
904 // 0064 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
905 // 030074 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 116
906 // 0084 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000320100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
907 // - client should now respond with revoke_and_ack (CHECK 5 duplicate)
909 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
910 // 05ac 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 1452
911 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
912 // 0080 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000002 00000000000b0838 ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 000003f0 00 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000555 0000000e000001000000000000000927c0000000a00000000000000000000000000a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff - beginning of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client
913 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
914 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
915 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
916 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
917 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
918 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
919 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
920 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
921 // 0300c1 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 193
922 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 4b00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - end of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client and mac
924 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
925 // 00a4 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 164
926 // 0300b4 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 180
927 // 0084 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000750100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0001 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000670500000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000006 03000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
928 // - client should now respond with revoke_and_ack and commitment_signed (CHECK 5/6 duplicates)
930 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
931 // 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
932 // 030073 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 115
933 // 0085 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 020f00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
935 // 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
936 // - client now sends id 1 update_add_htlc and commitment_signed (CHECK 7 duplicate)
938 // 0c007d - connect a block with one transaction of len 125
939 // 02000000013a000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000800258020000000000002200204b0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000014c0000000000000160014280000000000000000000000000000000000000005000020 - the commitment transaction for channel 3f00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
941 // 0c005e - connect a block with one transaction of len 94
942 // 0200000001730000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001a701000000000000220020b20000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 - the HTLC timeout transaction
943 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
944 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
945 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
946 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
947 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
949 // 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
950 // - client now fails the HTLC backwards as it was unable to extract the payment preimage (CHECK 9 duplicate and CHECK 10)
952 let logger = Arc::new(TrackingLogger { lines: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()) });
953 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&(Arc::clone(&logger) as Arc<dyn Logger>));
955 let log_entries = logger.lines.lock().unwrap();
956 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling SendAcceptChannel event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 for channel ff4f00f805273c1b203bb5ebf8436bfde57b3be8c2f5e95d9491dbb181909679".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 1
957 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling SendFundingSigned event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 2
958 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling SendFundingLocked event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 3
959 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling SendFundingLocked event in peer_handler for node 030200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 for channel 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 4
960 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling SendRevokeAndACK event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&4)); // 5
961 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling UpdateHTLCs event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 with 0 adds, 0 fulfills, 0 fails for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&3)); // 6
962 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling UpdateHTLCs event in peer_handler for node 030200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 with 1 adds, 0 fulfills, 0 fails for channel 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&3)); // 7
963 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling UpdateHTLCs event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 with 0 adds, 1 fulfills, 0 fails for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 8
964 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling UpdateHTLCs event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 with 0 adds, 0 fulfills, 1 fails for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&2)); // 9
965 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::chain::channelmonitor".to_string(), "Input spending counterparty commitment tx (0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000073:0) in 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000067 resolves outbound HTLC with payment hash ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 with timeout".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 10