1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Test that no series of bytes received over the wire/connections created/payments sent can
11 //! result in a crash. We do this by standing up a node and then reading bytes from input to denote
12 //! actions such as creating new inbound/outbound connections, bytes to be read from a connection,
13 //! or payments to send/ways to handle events generated.
14 //! This test has been very useful, though due to its complexity good starting inputs are critical.
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
19 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
20 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::deserialize;
21 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash as TraitImport;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::HashEngine as TraitImportEngine;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
30 use lightning::chain::{BestBlock, Confirm, Listen};
31 use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
32 use lightning::chain::chainmonitor;
33 use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
34 use lightning::chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface};
35 use lightning::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
36 use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager};
37 use lightning::ln::peer_handler::{MessageHandler,PeerManager,SocketDescriptor,IgnoringMessageHandler};
38 use lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
39 use lightning::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
40 use lightning::routing::network_graph::{NetGraphMsgHandler, NetworkGraph};
41 use lightning::routing::router::{get_route, Payee};
42 use lightning::routing::scorer::Scorer;
43 use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
44 use lightning::util::errors::APIError;
45 use lightning::util::events::Event;
46 use lightning::util::enforcing_trait_impls::{EnforcingSigner, EnforcementState};
47 use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
48 use lightning::util::ser::Readable;
50 use utils::test_logger;
51 use utils::test_persister::TestPersister;
53 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
54 use bitcoin::secp256k1::recovery::RecoverableSignature;
55 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
57 use std::cell::RefCell;
58 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
60 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
61 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64,AtomicUsize,Ordering};
64 pub fn slice_to_be16(v: &[u8]) -> u16 {
65 ((v[0] as u16) << 8*1) |
66 ((v[1] as u16) << 8*0)
70 pub fn slice_to_be24(v: &[u8]) -> u32 {
71 ((v[0] as u32) << 8*2) |
72 ((v[1] as u32) << 8*1) |
73 ((v[2] as u32) << 8*0)
77 pub fn slice_to_be32(v: &[u8]) -> u32 {
78 ((v[0] as u32) << 8*3) |
79 ((v[1] as u32) << 8*2) |
80 ((v[2] as u32) << 8*1) |
81 ((v[3] as u32) << 8*0)
85 pub fn be64_to_array(u: u64) -> [u8; 8] {
87 v[0] = ((u >> 8*7) & 0xff) as u8;
88 v[1] = ((u >> 8*6) & 0xff) as u8;
89 v[2] = ((u >> 8*5) & 0xff) as u8;
90 v[3] = ((u >> 8*4) & 0xff) as u8;
91 v[4] = ((u >> 8*3) & 0xff) as u8;
92 v[5] = ((u >> 8*2) & 0xff) as u8;
93 v[6] = ((u >> 8*1) & 0xff) as u8;
94 v[7] = ((u >> 8*0) & 0xff) as u8;
100 read_pos: AtomicUsize,
103 fn get_slice(&self, len: usize) -> Option<&[u8]> {
104 let old_pos = self.read_pos.fetch_add(len, Ordering::AcqRel);
105 if self.data.len() < old_pos + len {
108 Some(&self.data[old_pos..old_pos + len])
112 struct FuzzEstimator {
113 input: Arc<InputData>,
115 impl FeeEstimator for FuzzEstimator {
116 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
117 //TODO: We should actually be testing at least much more than 64k...
118 match self.input.get_slice(2) {
119 Some(slice) => cmp::max(slice_to_be16(slice) as u32, 253),
125 struct TestBroadcaster {
126 txn_broadcasted: Mutex<Vec<Transaction>>,
128 impl BroadcasterInterface for TestBroadcaster {
129 fn broadcast_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) {
130 self.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().push(tx.clone());
137 peers_connected: &'a RefCell<[bool; 256]>,
139 impl<'a> SocketDescriptor for Peer<'a> {
140 fn send_data(&mut self, data: &[u8], _resume_read: bool) -> usize {
143 fn disconnect_socket(&mut self) {
144 assert!(self.peers_connected.borrow()[self.id as usize]);
145 self.peers_connected.borrow_mut()[self.id as usize] = false;
148 impl<'a> PartialEq for Peer<'a> {
149 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
153 impl<'a> Eq for Peer<'a> {}
154 impl<'a> std::hash::Hash for Peer<'a> {
155 fn hash<H : std::hash::Hasher>(&self, h: &mut H) {
160 type ChannelMan = ChannelManager<
162 Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<EnforcingSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
163 Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>>;
164 type PeerMan<'a> = PeerManager<Peer<'a>, Arc<ChannelMan>, Arc<NetGraphMsgHandler<Arc<dyn chain::Access>, Arc<dyn Logger>>>, Arc<dyn Logger>, IgnoringMessageHandler>;
166 struct MoneyLossDetector<'a> {
167 manager: Arc<ChannelMan>,
168 monitor: Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<EnforcingSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
169 handler: PeerMan<'a>,
171 peers: &'a RefCell<[bool; 256]>,
172 funding_txn: Vec<Transaction>,
173 txids_confirmed: HashMap<Txid, usize>,
174 header_hashes: Vec<(BlockHash, u32)>,
177 blocks_connected: u32,
179 impl<'a> MoneyLossDetector<'a> {
180 pub fn new(peers: &'a RefCell<[bool; 256]>,
181 manager: Arc<ChannelMan>,
182 monitor: Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<EnforcingSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
183 handler: PeerMan<'a>) -> Self {
190 funding_txn: Vec::new(),
191 txids_confirmed: HashMap::new(),
192 header_hashes: vec![(genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash(), 0)],
199 fn connect_block(&mut self, all_txn: &[Transaction]) {
200 let mut txdata = Vec::with_capacity(all_txn.len());
201 for (idx, tx) in all_txn.iter().enumerate() {
202 let txid = tx.txid();
203 match self.txids_confirmed.entry(txid) {
204 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
205 e.insert(self.height);
206 txdata.push((idx + 1, tx));
212 self.blocks_connected += 1;
213 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: self.header_hashes[self.height].0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: self.blocks_connected, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
215 self.manager.transactions_confirmed(&header, &txdata, self.height as u32);
216 self.manager.best_block_updated(&header, self.height as u32);
217 (*self.monitor).transactions_confirmed(&header, &txdata, self.height as u32);
218 (*self.monitor).best_block_updated(&header, self.height as u32);
219 if self.header_hashes.len() > self.height {
220 self.header_hashes[self.height] = (header.block_hash(), self.blocks_connected);
222 assert_eq!(self.header_hashes.len(), self.height);
223 self.header_hashes.push((header.block_hash(), self.blocks_connected));
225 self.max_height = cmp::max(self.height, self.max_height);
228 fn disconnect_block(&mut self) {
229 if self.height > 0 && (self.max_height < 6 || self.height >= self.max_height - 6) {
230 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: self.header_hashes[self.height - 1].0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: self.header_hashes[self.height].1, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
231 self.manager.block_disconnected(&header, self.height as u32);
232 self.monitor.block_disconnected(&header, self.height as u32);
234 let removal_height = self.height;
235 self.txids_confirmed.retain(|_, height| {
236 removal_height != *height
242 impl<'a> Drop for MoneyLossDetector<'a> {
244 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
245 // Disconnect all peers
246 for (idx, peer) in self.peers.borrow().iter().enumerate() {
248 self.handler.socket_disconnected(&Peer{id: idx as u8, peers_connected: &self.peers});
252 // Force all channels onto the chain (and time out claim txn)
253 self.manager.force_close_all_channels();
259 node_secret: SecretKey,
262 impl KeysInterface for KeyProvider {
263 type Signer = EnforcingSigner;
265 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey {
266 self.node_secret.clone()
269 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
270 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
271 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
272 let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
273 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
276 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
277 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
278 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1]).unwrap();
279 let pubkey_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &secret_key).serialize());
280 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh(&pubkey_hash)
283 fn get_channel_signer(&self, inbound: bool, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> EnforcingSigner {
284 let ctr = self.counter.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed) as u8;
285 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
286 EnforcingSigner::new(if inbound {
289 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, ctr]).unwrap(),
290 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, ctr]).unwrap(),
291 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, ctr]).unwrap(),
292 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, ctr]).unwrap(),
293 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, ctr]).unwrap(),
294 [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, ctr],
295 channel_value_satoshis,
301 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, ctr]).unwrap(),
302 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8, ctr]).unwrap(),
303 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 9, ctr]).unwrap(),
304 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 10, ctr]).unwrap(),
305 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 11, ctr]).unwrap(),
306 [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 12, ctr],
307 channel_value_satoshis,
313 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
314 let ctr = self.counter.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
315 [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
316 (ctr >> 8*7) as u8, (ctr >> 8*6) as u8, (ctr >> 8*5) as u8, (ctr >> 8*4) as u8, (ctr >> 8*3) as u8, (ctr >> 8*2) as u8, (ctr >> 8*1) as u8, 14, (ctr >> 8*0) as u8]
319 fn read_chan_signer(&self, mut data: &[u8]) -> Result<EnforcingSigner, DecodeError> {
320 let inner: InMemorySigner = Readable::read(&mut data)?;
321 let state = Arc::new(Mutex::new(EnforcementState::new()));
323 Ok(EnforcingSigner::new_with_revoked(
330 fn sign_invoice(&self, _invoice_preimage: Vec<u8>) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> {
336 pub fn do_test(data: &[u8], logger: &Arc<dyn Logger>) {
337 let input = Arc::new(InputData {
339 read_pos: AtomicUsize::new(0),
341 let fee_est = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator {
342 input: input.clone(),
345 macro_rules! get_slice {
347 match input.get_slice($len as usize) {
348 Some(slice) => slice,
354 macro_rules! get_pubkey {
356 match PublicKey::from_slice(get_slice!(33)) {
363 let our_network_key = match SecretKey::from_slice(get_slice!(32)) {
368 let broadcast = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{ txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()) });
369 let monitor = Arc::new(chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::new(None, broadcast.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), fee_est.clone(),
370 Arc::new(TestPersister { update_ret: Mutex::new(Ok(())) })));
372 let keys_manager = Arc::new(KeyProvider { node_secret: our_network_key.clone(), counter: AtomicU64::new(0) });
373 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
374 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = slice_to_be32(get_slice!(4));
375 config.channel_options.announced_channel = get_slice!(1)[0] != 0;
376 let network = Network::Bitcoin;
377 let params = ChainParameters {
379 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
381 let channelmanager = Arc::new(ChannelManager::new(fee_est.clone(), monitor.clone(), broadcast.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), config, params));
382 let our_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &keys_manager.get_node_secret());
383 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(network).block_hash());
384 let net_graph_msg_handler = Arc::new(NetGraphMsgHandler::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger)));
385 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
387 let peers = RefCell::new([false; 256]);
388 let mut loss_detector = MoneyLossDetector::new(&peers, channelmanager.clone(), monitor.clone(), PeerManager::new(MessageHandler {
389 chan_handler: channelmanager.clone(),
390 route_handler: net_graph_msg_handler.clone(),
391 }, our_network_key, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 15, 0], Arc::clone(&logger), IgnoringMessageHandler{}));
393 let mut should_forward = false;
394 let mut payments_received: Vec<PaymentHash> = Vec::new();
395 let mut payments_sent = 0;
396 let mut pending_funding_generation: Vec<([u8; 32], u64, Script)> = Vec::new();
397 let mut pending_funding_signatures = HashMap::new();
400 match get_slice!(1)[0] {
404 if !peers.borrow()[i-1] {
409 if new_id == 0 { return; }
410 loss_detector.handler.new_outbound_connection(get_pubkey!(), Peer{id: (new_id - 1) as u8, peers_connected: &peers}).unwrap();
411 peers.borrow_mut()[new_id - 1] = true;
416 if !peers.borrow()[i-1] {
421 if new_id == 0 { return; }
422 loss_detector.handler.new_inbound_connection(Peer{id: (new_id - 1) as u8, peers_connected: &peers}).unwrap();
423 peers.borrow_mut()[new_id - 1] = true;
426 let peer_id = get_slice!(1)[0];
427 if !peers.borrow()[peer_id as usize] { return; }
428 loss_detector.handler.socket_disconnected(&Peer{id: peer_id, peers_connected: &peers});
429 peers.borrow_mut()[peer_id as usize] = false;
432 let peer_id = get_slice!(1)[0];
433 if !peers.borrow()[peer_id as usize] { return; }
434 match loss_detector.handler.read_event(&mut Peer{id: peer_id, peers_connected: &peers}, get_slice!(get_slice!(1)[0])) {
435 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
436 Err(_) => { peers.borrow_mut()[peer_id as usize] = false; }
440 let value = slice_to_be24(get_slice!(3)) as u64;
441 let payee = Payee::new(get_pubkey!());
442 let route = match get_route(&our_id, &payee, &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, None, value, 42, Arc::clone(&logger), &scorer) {
446 let mut payment_hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
447 payment_hash.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&be64_to_array(payments_sent));
448 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
449 sha.input(&payment_hash.0[..]);
450 payment_hash.0 = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
452 match channelmanager.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None) {
458 let value = slice_to_be24(get_slice!(3)) as u64;
459 let payee = Payee::new(get_pubkey!());
460 let mut route = match get_route(&our_id, &payee, &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, None, value, 42, Arc::clone(&logger), &scorer) {
464 route.paths.push(route.paths[0].clone());
465 let mut payment_hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
466 payment_hash.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&be64_to_array(payments_sent));
467 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
468 sha.input(&payment_hash.0[..]);
469 payment_hash.0 = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
471 let mut payment_secret = PaymentSecret([0; 32]);
472 payment_secret.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&be64_to_array(payments_sent));
474 match channelmanager.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) {
480 let peer_id = get_slice!(1)[0];
481 if !peers.borrow()[peer_id as usize] { return; }
482 let their_key = get_pubkey!();
483 let chan_value = slice_to_be24(get_slice!(3)) as u64;
484 let push_msat_value = slice_to_be24(get_slice!(3)) as u64;
485 if channelmanager.create_channel(their_key, chan_value, push_msat_value, 0, None).is_err() { return; }
488 let mut channels = channelmanager.list_channels();
489 let channel_id = get_slice!(1)[0] as usize;
490 if channel_id >= channels.len() { return; }
491 channels.sort_by(|a, b| { a.channel_id.cmp(&b.channel_id) });
492 if channelmanager.close_channel(&channels[channel_id].channel_id).is_err() { return; }
496 channelmanager.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
497 should_forward = false;
501 for payment in payments_received.drain(..) {
502 // SHA256 is defined as XOR of all input bytes placed in the first byte, and 0s
503 // for the remaining bytes. Thus, if not all remaining bytes are 0s we cannot
504 // fulfill this HTLC, but if they are, we can just take the first byte and
505 // place that anywhere in our preimage.
506 if &payment.0[1..] != &[0; 31] {
507 channelmanager.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment);
509 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
510 payment_preimage.0[0] = payment.0[0];
511 channelmanager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
516 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
517 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
518 sha.input(&payment_preimage.0[..]);
519 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner());
520 // Note that this may fail - our hashes may collide and we'll end up trying to
521 // double-register the same payment_hash.
522 let _ = channelmanager.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 1, 0);
525 for payment in payments_received.drain(..) {
526 channelmanager.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment);
530 'outer_loop: for funding_generation in pending_funding_generation.drain(..) {
531 let mut tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
532 value: funding_generation.1, script_pubkey: funding_generation.2,
534 let funding_output = 'search_loop: loop {
535 let funding_txid = tx.txid();
536 if let None = loss_detector.txids_confirmed.get(&funding_txid) {
537 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_txid, index: 0 };
538 for chan in channelmanager.list_channels() {
539 if chan.channel_id == outpoint.to_channel_id() {
541 continue 'search_loop;
547 if tx.version > 0xff {
548 continue 'outer_loop;
551 if let Err(e) = channelmanager.funding_transaction_generated(&funding_generation.0, tx.clone()) {
552 // It's possible the channel has been closed in the mean time, but any other
553 // failure may be a bug.
554 if let APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err } = e {
555 assert_eq!(err, "No such channel");
558 pending_funding_signatures.insert(funding_output, tx);
562 let mut txn = broadcast.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
564 loss_detector.connect_block(&txn[..]);
566 loss_detector.connect_block(&[]);
569 for tx in txn.drain(..) {
570 loss_detector.funding_txn.push(tx);
574 let txlen = slice_to_be16(get_slice!(2));
576 loss_detector.connect_block(&[]);
578 let txres: Result<Transaction, _> = deserialize(get_slice!(txlen));
579 if let Ok(tx) = txres {
580 let mut output_val = 0;
581 for out in tx.output.iter() {
582 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { return; }
583 output_val += out.value;
584 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { return; }
586 loss_detector.connect_block(&[tx]);
593 loss_detector.disconnect_block();
596 let mut channels = channelmanager.list_channels();
597 let channel_id = get_slice!(1)[0] as usize;
598 if channel_id >= channels.len() { return; }
599 channels.sort_by(|a, b| { a.channel_id.cmp(&b.channel_id) });
600 channelmanager.force_close_channel(&channels[channel_id].channel_id).unwrap();
605 loss_detector.handler.process_events();
606 for event in loss_detector.manager.get_and_clear_pending_events() {
608 Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script, .. } => {
609 pending_funding_generation.push((temporary_channel_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script));
611 Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => {
612 //TODO: enhance by fetching random amounts from fuzz input?
613 payments_received.push(payment_hash);
615 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {
616 should_forward = true;
624 pub fn full_stack_test<Out: test_logger::Output>(data: &[u8], out: Out) {
625 let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new("".to_owned(), out));
626 do_test(data, &logger);
630 pub extern "C" fn full_stack_run(data: *const u8, datalen: usize) {
631 let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new("".to_owned(), test_logger::DevNull {}));
632 do_test(unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(data, datalen) }, &logger);
637 use lightning::util::logger::{Logger, Record};
638 use std::collections::HashMap;
639 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
641 struct TrackingLogger {
642 /// (module, message) -> count
643 pub lines: Mutex<HashMap<(String, String), usize>>,
645 impl Logger for TrackingLogger {
646 fn log(&self, record: &Record) {
647 *self.lines.lock().unwrap().entry((record.module_path.to_string(), format!("{}", record.args))).or_insert(0) += 1;
648 println!("{:<5} [{} : {}, {}] {}", record.level.to_string(), record.module_path, record.file, record.line, record.args);
653 fn test_no_existing_test_breakage() {
654 // To avoid accidentally causing all existing fuzz test cases to be useless by making minor
655 // changes (such as requesting feerate info in a new place), we run a pretty full
656 // step-through with two peers and HTLC forwarding here. Obviously this is pretty finicky,
657 // so this should be updated pretty liberally, but at least we'll know when changes occur.
658 // If nothing else, this test serves as a pretty great initial full_stack_target seed.
660 // What each byte represents is broken down below, and then everything is concatenated into
661 // one large test at the end (you want %s/ -.*//g %s/\n\| \|\t\|\///g).
663 // Following BOLT 8, lightning message on the wire are: 2-byte encrypted message length +
664 // 16-byte MAC of the encrypted message length + encrypted Lightning message + 16-byte MAC
665 // of the Lightning message
666 // I.e 2nd inbound read, len 18 : 0006 (encrypted message length) + 03000000000000000000000000000000 (MAC of the encrypted message length)
667 // Len 22 : 0010 00000000 (encrypted lightning message) + 03000000000000000000000000000000 (MAC of the Lightning message)
669 // Writing new code generating transactions and see a new failure ? Don't forget to add input for the FuzzEstimator !
671 // 0100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 - our network key
672 // 00000000 - fee_proportional_millionths
673 // 01 - announce_channels_publicly
675 // 00 - new outbound connection with id 0
676 // 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 - peer's pubkey
677 // 030032 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 50
678 // 00 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 03000000000000000000000000000000 - noise act two (0||pubkey||mac)
680 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
681 // 000a 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 10
682 // 03001a - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 26
683 // 0010 00022000 00022000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - init message (type 16) with static_remotekey (0x2000) and mac
685 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
686 // 0141 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 321
687 // 0300fe - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 254
688 // 0020 7500000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ff4f00f805273c1b203bb5ebf8436bfde57b3be8c2f5e95d9491dbb181909679 000000000000c350 0000000000000000 0000000000000162 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000222 0000000000000000 000000fd 0006 01e3 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000004 - beginning of open_channel message
689 // 030053 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 83
690 // 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000005 020900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01 03000000000000000000000000000000 - rest of open_channel and mac
692 // 00fd00fd00fd - Three feerate requests (all returning min feerate, which our open_channel also uses) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
693 // - client should now respond with accept_channel (CHECK 1: type 33 to peer 03000000)
695 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
696 // 0084 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 132
697 // 030094 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 148
698 // 0022 ff4f00f805273c1b203bb5ebf8436bfde57b3be8c2f5e95d9491dbb181909679 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000210100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - funding_created and mac
699 // - client should now respond with funding_signed (CHECK 2: type 35 to peer 03000000)
701 // 0c005e - connect a block with one transaction of len 94
702 // 020000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000ffffffff0150c3000000000000220020ae0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 - the funding transaction
703 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
704 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
705 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
706 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
707 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
708 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
709 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
710 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
711 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
712 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
713 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
714 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
715 // - by now client should have sent a funding_locked (CHECK 3: SendFundingLocked to 03000000 for chan 3d000000)
717 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
718 // 0043 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 67
719 // 030053 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 83
720 // 0024 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 020800000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - funding_locked and mac
722 // 01 - new inbound connection with id 1
723 // 030132 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 50
724 // 0003000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000703000000000000000000000000000000 - inbound noise act 1
725 // 030142 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 66
726 // 000302000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000300000000000000000000000000000003000000000000000000000000000000 - inbound noise act 3
728 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
729 // 000a 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 10
730 // 03011a - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 26
731 // 0010 00022000 00022000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - init message (type 16) with static_remotekey (0x2000) and mac
733 // 05 01 030200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00c350 0003e8 - create outbound channel to peer 1 for 50k sat
734 // 00fd - One feerate requests (all returning min feerate) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
736 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
737 // 0110 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 272
738 // 0301ff - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 255
739 // 0021 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e05 0000000000000162 00000000004c4b40 00000000000003e8 00000000000003e8 00000002 03f0 0005 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000200 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000300 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000400 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000500 02660000000000000000000000000000 - beginning of accept_channel
740 // 030121 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 33
741 // 0000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - rest of accept_channel and mac
743 // 0a - create the funding transaction (client should send funding_created now)
745 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
746 // 0062 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 98
747 // 030172 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 114
748 // 0023 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000007c0001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - funding_signed message and mac
750 // 0b - broadcast funding transaction
751 // - by now client should have sent a funding_locked (CHECK 4: SendFundingLocked to 03020000 for chan 3f000000)
753 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
754 // 0043 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 67
755 // 030153 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 83
756 // 0024 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 026700000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - funding_locked and mac
758 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
759 // 05ac 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 1452
760 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
761 // 0080 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000003e80 ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 000003f0 00 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000555 0000000e000001000000000000000003e8000000a00000000000000000000000000a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff - beginning of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client
762 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
763 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
764 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
765 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
766 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
767 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
768 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
769 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
770 // 0300c1 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 193
771 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 4e00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - end of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client and mac
773 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
774 // 0064 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
775 // 030074 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 116
776 // 0084 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000300100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
777 // - client should now respond with revoke_and_ack and commitment_signed (CHECK 5/6: types 133 and 132 to peer 03000000)
779 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
780 // 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
781 // 030073 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 115
782 // 0085 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 020b00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
784 // 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
785 // - client now sends id 1 update_add_htlc and commitment_signed (CHECK 7: SendHTLCs event for node 03020000 with 1 HTLCs for channel 3f000000)
787 // - we respond with commitment_signed then revoke_and_ack (a weird, but valid, order)
788 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
789 // 0064 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
790 // 030174 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 116
791 // 0084 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000006a0001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
793 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
794 // 0063 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
795 // 030173 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 115
796 // 0085 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 6600000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 026400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
798 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
799 // 004a 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 74
800 // 03015a - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 90
801 // 0082 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000000 ff00888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888 01000000000000000000000000000000 - update_fulfill_htlc and mac
802 // - client should immediately claim the pending HTLC from peer 0 (CHECK 8: SendFulfillHTLCs for node 03000000 with preimage ff00888888 for channel 3d000000)
804 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
805 // 0064 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
806 // 030174 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 116
807 // 0084 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
809 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
810 // 0063 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
811 // 030173 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 115
812 // 0085 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 6700000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 026500000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
814 // - before responding to the commitment_signed generated above, send a new HTLC
815 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
816 // 05ac 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 1452
817 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
818 // 0080 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000000000003e80 ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 000003f0 00 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000555 0000000e000001000000000000000003e8000000a00000000000000000000000000a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff - beginning of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client
819 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
820 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
821 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
822 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
823 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
824 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
825 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
826 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
827 // 0300c1 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 193
828 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 4e00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - end of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client and mac
830 // - now respond to the update_fulfill_htlc+commitment_signed messages the client sent to peer 0
831 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
832 // 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
833 // 030073 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 115
834 // 0085 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0800000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 020a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
835 // - client should now respond with revoke_and_ack and commitment_signed (CHECK 5/6 duplicates)
837 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
838 // 0064 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
839 // 030074 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 116
840 // 0084 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000c30100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
842 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
843 // 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
844 // 030073 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 115
845 // 0085 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0b00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 020d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
847 // 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
848 // - client now sends id 1 update_add_htlc and commitment_signed (CHECK 7 duplicate)
849 // - we respond with revoke_and_ack, then commitment_signed, then update_fail_htlc
851 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
852 // 0064 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
853 // 030174 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 116
854 // 0084 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000390001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
856 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
857 // 0063 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
858 // 030173 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 115
859 // 0085 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 6400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 027000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
861 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
862 // 002c 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 44
863 // 03013c - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 60
864 // 0083 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - update_fail_htlc and mac
866 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
867 // 0064 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
868 // 030174 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 116
869 // 0084 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000390001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
871 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
872 // 0063 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
873 // 030173 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 115
874 // 0085 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 6500000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 027100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
876 // 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
877 // - client now sends id 0 update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed (CHECK 9)
878 // - now respond to the update_fail_htlc+commitment_signed messages the client sent to peer 0
880 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
881 // 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
882 // 030073 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 115
883 // 0085 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 020c00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
885 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
886 // 0064 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
887 // 030074 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 116
888 // 0084 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000320100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
889 // - client should now respond with revoke_and_ack (CHECK 5 duplicate)
891 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
892 // 05ac 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 1452
893 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
894 // 0080 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000002 00000000000b0838 ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 000003f0 00 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000555 0000000e000001000000000000000927c0000000a00000000000000000000000000a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff - beginning of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client
895 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
896 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
897 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
898 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
899 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
900 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
901 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
902 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
903 // 0300c1 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 193
904 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 4b00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - end of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client and mac
906 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
907 // 00a4 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 164
908 // 0300b4 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 180
909 // 0084 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000750100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0001 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000670500000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000006 03000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
910 // - client should now respond with revoke_and_ack and commitment_signed (CHECK 5/6 duplicates)
912 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
913 // 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
914 // 030073 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 115
915 // 0085 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 020f00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
917 // 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
918 // - client now sends id 1 update_add_htlc and commitment_signed (CHECK 7 duplicate)
920 // 0c007d - connect a block with one transaction of len 125
921 // 02000000013a000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000800258020000000000002200204b0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000014c0000000000000160014280000000000000000000000000000000000000005000020 - the commitment transaction for channel 3f00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
923 // 0c005e - connect a block with one transaction of len 94
924 // 0200000001730000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001a701000000000000220020b20000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 - the HTLC timeout transaction
925 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
926 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
927 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
928 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
929 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
931 // 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
932 // - client now fails the HTLC backwards as it was unable to extract the payment preimage (CHECK 9 duplicate and CHECK 10)
934 let logger = Arc::new(TrackingLogger { lines: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()) });
935 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&(Arc::clone(&logger) as Arc<dyn Logger>));
937 let log_entries = logger.lines.lock().unwrap();
938 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling SendAcceptChannel event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 for channel ff4f00f805273c1b203bb5ebf8436bfde57b3be8c2f5e95d9491dbb181909679".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 1
939 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling SendFundingSigned event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 2
940 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling SendFundingLocked event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 3
941 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling SendFundingLocked event in peer_handler for node 030200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 for channel 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 4
942 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling SendRevokeAndACK event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&4)); // 5
943 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling UpdateHTLCs event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 with 0 adds, 0 fulfills, 0 fails for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&3)); // 6
944 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling UpdateHTLCs event in peer_handler for node 030200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 with 1 adds, 0 fulfills, 0 fails for channel 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&3)); // 7
945 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling UpdateHTLCs event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 with 0 adds, 1 fulfills, 0 fails for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 8
946 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling UpdateHTLCs event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 with 0 adds, 0 fulfills, 1 fails for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&2)); // 9
947 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::chain::channelmonitor".to_string(), "Input spending counterparty commitment tx (0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000073:0) in 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000067 resolves outbound HTLC with payment hash ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 with timeout".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 10