1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Test that no series of bytes received over the wire/connections created/payments sent can
11 //! result in a crash. We do this by standing up a node and then reading bytes from input to denote
12 //! actions such as creating new inbound/outbound connections, bytes to be read from a connection,
13 //! or payments to send/ways to handle events generated.
14 //! This test has been very useful, though due to its complexity good starting inputs are critical.
16 use bitcoin::TxMerkleNode;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
19 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::PackedLockTime;
23 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::deserialize;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash as TraitImport;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::HashEngine as TraitImportEngine;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
32 use lightning::chain::{BestBlock, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen};
33 use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
34 use lightning::chain::chainmonitor;
35 use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
36 use lightning::chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, Recipient, KeyMaterial, KeysInterface};
37 use lightning::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
38 use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager};
39 use lightning::ln::peer_handler::{MessageHandler,PeerManager,SocketDescriptor,IgnoringMessageHandler};
40 use lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
41 use lightning::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
42 use lightning::routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph};
43 use lightning::routing::router::{find_route, PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
44 use lightning::routing::scoring::FixedPenaltyScorer;
45 use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
46 use lightning::util::errors::APIError;
47 use lightning::util::events::Event;
48 use lightning::util::enforcing_trait_impls::{EnforcingSigner, EnforcementState};
49 use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
50 use lightning::util::ser::ReadableArgs;
52 use crate::utils::test_logger;
53 use crate::utils::test_persister::TestPersister;
55 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey, Scalar};
56 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
57 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::RecoverableSignature;
58 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
60 use std::cell::RefCell;
61 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
62 use std::convert::TryInto;
64 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
65 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64,AtomicUsize,Ordering};
66 use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
69 pub fn slice_to_be16(v: &[u8]) -> u16 {
70 ((v[0] as u16) << 8*1) |
71 ((v[1] as u16) << 8*0)
75 pub fn slice_to_be24(v: &[u8]) -> u32 {
76 ((v[0] as u32) << 8*2) |
77 ((v[1] as u32) << 8*1) |
78 ((v[2] as u32) << 8*0)
82 pub fn slice_to_be32(v: &[u8]) -> u32 {
83 ((v[0] as u32) << 8*3) |
84 ((v[1] as u32) << 8*2) |
85 ((v[2] as u32) << 8*1) |
86 ((v[3] as u32) << 8*0)
90 pub fn be64_to_array(u: u64) -> [u8; 8] {
92 v[0] = ((u >> 8*7) & 0xff) as u8;
93 v[1] = ((u >> 8*6) & 0xff) as u8;
94 v[2] = ((u >> 8*5) & 0xff) as u8;
95 v[3] = ((u >> 8*4) & 0xff) as u8;
96 v[4] = ((u >> 8*3) & 0xff) as u8;
97 v[5] = ((u >> 8*2) & 0xff) as u8;
98 v[6] = ((u >> 8*1) & 0xff) as u8;
99 v[7] = ((u >> 8*0) & 0xff) as u8;
105 read_pos: AtomicUsize,
108 fn get_slice(&self, len: usize) -> Option<&[u8]> {
109 let old_pos = self.read_pos.fetch_add(len, Ordering::AcqRel);
110 if self.data.len() < old_pos + len {
113 Some(&self.data[old_pos..old_pos + len])
117 struct FuzzEstimator {
118 input: Arc<InputData>,
120 impl FeeEstimator for FuzzEstimator {
121 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
122 //TODO: We should actually be testing at least much more than 64k...
123 match self.input.get_slice(2) {
124 Some(slice) => cmp::max(slice_to_be16(slice) as u32, 253),
130 struct TestBroadcaster {
131 txn_broadcasted: Mutex<Vec<Transaction>>,
133 impl BroadcasterInterface for TestBroadcaster {
134 fn broadcast_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) {
135 self.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().push(tx.clone());
142 peers_connected: &'a RefCell<[bool; 256]>,
144 impl<'a> SocketDescriptor for Peer<'a> {
145 fn send_data(&mut self, data: &[u8], _resume_read: bool) -> usize {
148 fn disconnect_socket(&mut self) {
149 assert!(self.peers_connected.borrow()[self.id as usize]);
150 self.peers_connected.borrow_mut()[self.id as usize] = false;
153 impl<'a> PartialEq for Peer<'a> {
154 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
158 impl<'a> Eq for Peer<'a> {}
159 impl<'a> std::hash::Hash for Peer<'a> {
160 fn hash<H : std::hash::Hasher>(&self, h: &mut H) {
165 type ChannelMan = ChannelManager<
166 Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<EnforcingSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
167 Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>>;
168 type PeerMan<'a> = PeerManager<Peer<'a>, Arc<ChannelMan>, Arc<P2PGossipSync<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<dyn Logger>>>, Arc<dyn chain::Access>, Arc<dyn Logger>>>, IgnoringMessageHandler, Arc<dyn Logger>, IgnoringMessageHandler>;
170 struct MoneyLossDetector<'a> {
171 manager: Arc<ChannelMan>,
172 monitor: Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<EnforcingSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
173 handler: PeerMan<'a>,
175 peers: &'a RefCell<[bool; 256]>,
176 funding_txn: Vec<Transaction>,
177 txids_confirmed: HashMap<Txid, usize>,
178 header_hashes: Vec<(BlockHash, u32)>,
181 blocks_connected: u32,
183 impl<'a> MoneyLossDetector<'a> {
184 pub fn new(peers: &'a RefCell<[bool; 256]>,
185 manager: Arc<ChannelMan>,
186 monitor: Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<EnforcingSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
187 handler: PeerMan<'a>) -> Self {
194 funding_txn: Vec::new(),
195 txids_confirmed: HashMap::new(),
196 header_hashes: vec![(genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash(), 0)],
203 fn connect_block(&mut self, all_txn: &[Transaction]) {
204 let mut txdata = Vec::with_capacity(all_txn.len());
205 for (idx, tx) in all_txn.iter().enumerate() {
206 let txid = tx.txid();
207 match self.txids_confirmed.entry(txid) {
208 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
209 e.insert(self.height);
210 txdata.push((idx + 1, tx));
216 self.blocks_connected += 1;
217 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: self.header_hashes[self.height].0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: self.blocks_connected, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
219 self.manager.transactions_confirmed(&header, &txdata, self.height as u32);
220 self.manager.best_block_updated(&header, self.height as u32);
221 (*self.monitor).transactions_confirmed(&header, &txdata, self.height as u32);
222 (*self.monitor).best_block_updated(&header, self.height as u32);
223 if self.header_hashes.len() > self.height {
224 self.header_hashes[self.height] = (header.block_hash(), self.blocks_connected);
226 assert_eq!(self.header_hashes.len(), self.height);
227 self.header_hashes.push((header.block_hash(), self.blocks_connected));
229 self.max_height = cmp::max(self.height, self.max_height);
232 fn disconnect_block(&mut self) {
233 if self.height > 0 && (self.max_height < 6 || self.height >= self.max_height - 6) {
234 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: self.header_hashes[self.height - 1].0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: self.header_hashes[self.height].1, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
235 self.manager.block_disconnected(&header, self.height as u32);
236 self.monitor.block_disconnected(&header, self.height as u32);
238 let removal_height = self.height;
239 self.txids_confirmed.retain(|_, height| {
240 removal_height != *height
246 impl<'a> Drop for MoneyLossDetector<'a> {
248 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
249 // Disconnect all peers
250 for (idx, peer) in self.peers.borrow().iter().enumerate() {
252 self.handler.socket_disconnected(&Peer{id: idx as u8, peers_connected: &self.peers});
256 // Force all channels onto the chain (and time out claim txn)
257 self.manager.force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn();
263 node_secret: SecretKey,
264 inbound_payment_key: KeyMaterial,
267 impl KeysInterface for KeyProvider {
268 type Signer = EnforcingSigner;
270 fn get_node_secret(&self, _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<SecretKey, ()> {
271 Ok(self.node_secret.clone())
274 fn ecdh(&self, recipient: Recipient, other_key: &PublicKey, tweak: Option<&Scalar>) -> Result<SharedSecret, ()> {
275 let mut node_secret = self.get_node_secret(recipient)?;
276 if let Some(tweak) = tweak {
277 node_secret = node_secret.mul_tweak(tweak).unwrap();
279 Ok(SharedSecret::new(other_key, &node_secret))
282 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial {
283 self.inbound_payment_key.clone()
286 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
287 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
288 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
289 let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
290 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
293 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
294 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
295 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1]).unwrap();
296 let pubkey_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &secret_key).serialize());
297 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh(&pubkey_hash)
300 fn get_channel_signer(&self, inbound: bool, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> EnforcingSigner {
301 let ctr = self.counter.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed) as u8;
302 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
303 EnforcingSigner::new(if inbound {
306 self.node_secret.clone(),
307 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, ctr]).unwrap(),
308 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, ctr]).unwrap(),
309 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, ctr]).unwrap(),
310 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, ctr]).unwrap(),
311 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, ctr]).unwrap(),
312 [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, ctr],
313 channel_value_satoshis,
319 self.node_secret.clone(),
320 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, ctr]).unwrap(),
321 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8, ctr]).unwrap(),
322 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 9, ctr]).unwrap(),
323 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 10, ctr]).unwrap(),
324 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 11, ctr]).unwrap(),
325 [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 12, ctr],
326 channel_value_satoshis,
332 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
333 let ctr = self.counter.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
334 [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
335 (ctr >> 8*7) as u8, (ctr >> 8*6) as u8, (ctr >> 8*5) as u8, (ctr >> 8*4) as u8, (ctr >> 8*3) as u8, (ctr >> 8*2) as u8, (ctr >> 8*1) as u8, 14, (ctr >> 8*0) as u8]
338 fn read_chan_signer(&self, mut data: &[u8]) -> Result<EnforcingSigner, DecodeError> {
339 let inner: InMemorySigner = ReadableArgs::read(&mut data, self.node_secret.clone())?;
340 let state = Arc::new(Mutex::new(EnforcementState::new()));
342 Ok(EnforcingSigner::new_with_revoked(
349 fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5], _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> {
355 pub fn do_test(data: &[u8], logger: &Arc<dyn Logger>) {
356 let input = Arc::new(InputData {
358 read_pos: AtomicUsize::new(0),
360 let fee_est = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator {
361 input: input.clone(),
364 macro_rules! get_slice {
366 match input.get_slice($len as usize) {
367 Some(slice) => slice,
373 macro_rules! get_pubkey {
375 match PublicKey::from_slice(get_slice!(33)) {
382 let our_network_key = match SecretKey::from_slice(get_slice!(32)) {
387 let inbound_payment_key = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 42];
389 let broadcast = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{ txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()) });
390 let monitor = Arc::new(chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::new(None, broadcast.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), fee_est.clone(),
391 Arc::new(TestPersister { update_ret: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed) })));
393 let keys_manager = Arc::new(KeyProvider { node_secret: our_network_key.clone(), inbound_payment_key: KeyMaterial(inbound_payment_key.try_into().unwrap()), counter: AtomicU64::new(0) });
394 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
395 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = slice_to_be32(get_slice!(4));
396 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = get_slice!(1)[0] != 0;
397 let network = Network::Bitcoin;
398 let params = ChainParameters {
400 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
402 let channelmanager = Arc::new(ChannelManager::new(fee_est.clone(), monitor.clone(), broadcast.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), config, params));
403 // Adding new calls to `KeysInterface::get_secure_random_bytes` during startup can change all the
404 // keys subsequently generated in this test. Rather than regenerating all the messages manually,
405 // it's easier to just increment the counter here so the keys don't change.
406 keys_manager.counter.fetch_sub(2, Ordering::AcqRel);
407 let our_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap());
408 let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(network).block_hash(), Arc::clone(&logger)));
409 let gossip_sync = Arc::new(P2PGossipSync::new(Arc::clone(&network_graph), None, Arc::clone(&logger)));
410 let scorer = FixedPenaltyScorer::with_penalty(0);
412 let peers = RefCell::new([false; 256]);
413 let mut loss_detector = MoneyLossDetector::new(&peers, channelmanager.clone(), monitor.clone(), PeerManager::new(MessageHandler {
414 chan_handler: channelmanager.clone(),
415 route_handler: gossip_sync.clone(),
416 onion_message_handler: IgnoringMessageHandler {},
417 }, our_network_key, 0, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 15, 0], Arc::clone(&logger), IgnoringMessageHandler{}));
419 let mut should_forward = false;
420 let mut payments_received: Vec<PaymentHash> = Vec::new();
421 let mut payments_sent = 0;
422 let mut pending_funding_generation: Vec<([u8; 32], PublicKey, u64, Script)> = Vec::new();
423 let mut pending_funding_signatures = HashMap::new();
426 match get_slice!(1)[0] {
430 if !peers.borrow()[i-1] {
435 if new_id == 0 { return; }
436 loss_detector.handler.new_outbound_connection(get_pubkey!(), Peer{id: (new_id - 1) as u8, peers_connected: &peers}, None).unwrap();
437 peers.borrow_mut()[new_id - 1] = true;
442 if !peers.borrow()[i-1] {
447 if new_id == 0 { return; }
448 loss_detector.handler.new_inbound_connection(Peer{id: (new_id - 1) as u8, peers_connected: &peers}, None).unwrap();
449 peers.borrow_mut()[new_id - 1] = true;
452 let peer_id = get_slice!(1)[0];
453 if !peers.borrow()[peer_id as usize] { return; }
454 loss_detector.handler.socket_disconnected(&Peer{id: peer_id, peers_connected: &peers});
455 peers.borrow_mut()[peer_id as usize] = false;
458 let peer_id = get_slice!(1)[0];
459 if !peers.borrow()[peer_id as usize] { return; }
460 match loss_detector.handler.read_event(&mut Peer{id: peer_id, peers_connected: &peers}, get_slice!(get_slice!(1)[0])) {
461 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
462 Err(_) => { peers.borrow_mut()[peer_id as usize] = false; }
466 let final_value_msat = slice_to_be24(get_slice!(3)) as u64;
467 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(get_pubkey!());
468 let params = RouteParameters {
471 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
473 let random_seed_bytes: [u8; 32] = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
474 let route = match find_route(&our_id, ¶ms, &network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger), &scorer, &random_seed_bytes) {
478 let mut payment_hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
479 payment_hash.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&be64_to_array(payments_sent));
480 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
481 sha.input(&payment_hash.0[..]);
482 payment_hash.0 = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
484 match channelmanager.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None) {
490 let final_value_msat = slice_to_be24(get_slice!(3)) as u64;
491 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(get_pubkey!());
492 let params = RouteParameters {
495 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
497 let random_seed_bytes: [u8; 32] = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
498 let mut route = match find_route(&our_id, ¶ms, &network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger), &scorer, &random_seed_bytes) {
502 route.paths.push(route.paths[0].clone());
503 let mut payment_hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
504 payment_hash.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&be64_to_array(payments_sent));
505 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
506 sha.input(&payment_hash.0[..]);
507 payment_hash.0 = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
509 let mut payment_secret = PaymentSecret([0; 32]);
510 payment_secret.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&be64_to_array(payments_sent));
512 match channelmanager.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) {
518 let peer_id = get_slice!(1)[0];
519 if !peers.borrow()[peer_id as usize] { return; }
520 let their_key = get_pubkey!();
521 let chan_value = slice_to_be24(get_slice!(3)) as u64;
522 let push_msat_value = slice_to_be24(get_slice!(3)) as u64;
523 if channelmanager.create_channel(their_key, chan_value, push_msat_value, 0, None).is_err() { return; }
526 let mut channels = channelmanager.list_channels();
527 let channel_id = get_slice!(1)[0] as usize;
528 if channel_id >= channels.len() { return; }
529 channels.sort_by(|a, b| { a.channel_id.cmp(&b.channel_id) });
530 if channelmanager.close_channel(&channels[channel_id].channel_id, &channels[channel_id].counterparty.node_id).is_err() { return; }
534 channelmanager.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
535 should_forward = false;
539 for payment in payments_received.drain(..) {
540 // SHA256 is defined as XOR of all input bytes placed in the first byte, and 0s
541 // for the remaining bytes. Thus, if not all remaining bytes are 0s we cannot
542 // fulfill this HTLC, but if they are, we can just take the first byte and
543 // place that anywhere in our preimage.
544 if &payment.0[1..] != &[0; 31] {
545 channelmanager.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment);
547 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
548 payment_preimage.0[0] = payment.0[0];
549 channelmanager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
554 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
555 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
556 sha.input(&payment_preimage.0[..]);
557 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner());
558 // Note that this may fail - our hashes may collide and we'll end up trying to
559 // double-register the same payment_hash.
560 let _ = channelmanager.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 1);
563 for payment in payments_received.drain(..) {
564 channelmanager.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment);
568 'outer_loop: for funding_generation in pending_funding_generation.drain(..) {
569 let mut tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
570 value: funding_generation.2, script_pubkey: funding_generation.3,
572 let funding_output = 'search_loop: loop {
573 let funding_txid = tx.txid();
574 if let None = loss_detector.txids_confirmed.get(&funding_txid) {
575 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_txid, index: 0 };
576 for chan in channelmanager.list_channels() {
577 if chan.channel_id == outpoint.to_channel_id() {
579 continue 'search_loop;
585 if tx.version > 0xff {
586 continue 'outer_loop;
589 if let Err(e) = channelmanager.funding_transaction_generated(&funding_generation.0, &funding_generation.1, tx.clone()) {
590 // It's possible the channel has been closed in the mean time, but any other
591 // failure may be a bug.
592 if let APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err } = e {
593 assert_eq!(err, "No such channel");
596 pending_funding_signatures.insert(funding_output, tx);
600 let mut txn = broadcast.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
602 loss_detector.connect_block(&txn[..]);
604 loss_detector.connect_block(&[]);
607 for tx in txn.drain(..) {
608 loss_detector.funding_txn.push(tx);
612 let txlen = slice_to_be16(get_slice!(2));
614 loss_detector.connect_block(&[]);
616 let txres: Result<Transaction, _> = deserialize(get_slice!(txlen));
617 if let Ok(tx) = txres {
618 let mut output_val = 0;
619 for out in tx.output.iter() {
620 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { return; }
621 output_val += out.value;
622 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { return; }
624 loss_detector.connect_block(&[tx]);
631 loss_detector.disconnect_block();
634 let mut channels = channelmanager.list_channels();
635 let channel_id = get_slice!(1)[0] as usize;
636 if channel_id >= channels.len() { return; }
637 channels.sort_by(|a, b| { a.channel_id.cmp(&b.channel_id) });
638 channelmanager.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channels[channel_id].channel_id, &channels[channel_id].counterparty.node_id).unwrap();
643 loss_detector.handler.process_events();
644 for event in loss_detector.manager.get_and_clear_pending_events() {
646 Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script, .. } => {
647 pending_funding_generation.push((temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script));
649 Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => {
650 //TODO: enhance by fetching random amounts from fuzz input?
651 payments_received.push(payment_hash);
653 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {
654 should_forward = true;
662 pub fn full_stack_test<Out: test_logger::Output>(data: &[u8], out: Out) {
663 let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new("".to_owned(), out));
664 do_test(data, &logger);
668 pub extern "C" fn full_stack_run(data: *const u8, datalen: usize) {
669 let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new("".to_owned(), test_logger::DevNull {}));
670 do_test(unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(data, datalen) }, &logger);
675 use lightning::util::logger::{Logger, Record};
676 use std::collections::HashMap;
677 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
679 struct TrackingLogger {
680 /// (module, message) -> count
681 pub lines: Mutex<HashMap<(String, String), usize>>,
683 impl Logger for TrackingLogger {
684 fn log(&self, record: &Record) {
685 *self.lines.lock().unwrap().entry((record.module_path.to_string(), format!("{}", record.args))).or_insert(0) += 1;
686 println!("{:<5} [{} : {}, {}] {}", record.level.to_string(), record.module_path, record.file, record.line, record.args);
691 fn test_no_existing_test_breakage() {
692 // To avoid accidentally causing all existing fuzz test cases to be useless by making minor
693 // changes (such as requesting feerate info in a new place), we run a pretty full
694 // step-through with two peers and HTLC forwarding here. Obviously this is pretty finicky,
695 // so this should be updated pretty liberally, but at least we'll know when changes occur.
696 // If nothing else, this test serves as a pretty great initial full_stack_target seed.
698 // What each byte represents is broken down below, and then everything is concatenated into
699 // one large test at the end (you want %s/ -.*//g %s/\n\| \|\t\|\///g).
701 // Following BOLT 8, lightning message on the wire are: 2-byte encrypted message length +
702 // 16-byte MAC of the encrypted message length + encrypted Lightning message + 16-byte MAC
703 // of the Lightning message
704 // I.e 2nd inbound read, len 18 : 0006 (encrypted message length) + 03000000000000000000000000000000 (MAC of the encrypted message length)
705 // Len 22 : 0010 00000000 (encrypted lightning message) + 03000000000000000000000000000000 (MAC of the Lightning message)
707 // Writing new code generating transactions and see a new failure ? Don't forget to add input for the FuzzEstimator !
709 // 0100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 - our network key
710 // 00000000 - fee_proportional_millionths
711 // 01 - announce_channels_publicly
713 // 00 - new outbound connection with id 0
714 // 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 - peer's pubkey
715 // 030032 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 50
716 // 00 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 03000000000000000000000000000000 - noise act two (0||pubkey||mac)
718 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
719 // 000a 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 10
720 // 03001a - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 26
721 // 0010 00022000 00022000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - init message (type 16) with static_remotekey (0x2000) and mac
723 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
724 // 0141 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 321
725 // 0300fe - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 254
726 // 0020 7500000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ff4f00f805273c1b203bb5ebf8436bfde57b3be8c2f5e95d9491dbb181909679 000000000000c350 0000000000000000 0000000000000162 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000222 0000000000000000 000000fd 0006 01e3 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000004 - beginning of open_channel message
727 // 030053 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 83
728 // 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000005 020900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01 03000000000000000000000000000000 - rest of open_channel and mac
730 // 00fd00fd - Two feerate requests (all returning min feerate, which our open_channel also uses) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
731 // - client should now respond with accept_channel (CHECK 1: type 33 to peer 03000000)
733 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
734 // 0084 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 132
735 // 030094 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 148
736 // 0022 ff4f00f805273c1b203bb5ebf8436bfde57b3be8c2f5e95d9491dbb181909679 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000210100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - funding_created and mac
737 // - client should now respond with funding_signed (CHECK 2: type 35 to peer 03000000)
739 // 0c005e - connect a block with one transaction of len 94
740 // 020000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000ffffffff0150c3000000000000220020ae0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 - the funding transaction
741 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
742 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
743 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
744 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
745 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
746 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
747 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
748 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
749 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
750 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
751 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
752 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
753 // - by now client should have sent a channel_ready (CHECK 3: SendChannelReady to 03000000 for chan 3d000000)
755 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
756 // 0043 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 67
757 // 030053 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 83
758 // 0024 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 020800000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - channel_ready and mac
760 // 01 - new inbound connection with id 1
761 // 030132 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 50
762 // 0003000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000703000000000000000000000000000000 - inbound noise act 1
763 // 030142 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 66
764 // 000302000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000300000000000000000000000000000003000000000000000000000000000000 - inbound noise act 3
766 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
767 // 000a 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 10
768 // 03011a - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 26
769 // 0010 00022000 00022000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - init message (type 16) with static_remotekey (0x2000) and mac
771 // 05 01 030200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00c350 0003e8 - create outbound channel to peer 1 for 50k sat
772 // 00fd - One feerate requests (all returning min feerate) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
774 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
775 // 0110 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 272
776 // 0301ff - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 255
777 // 0021 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e05 0000000000000162 00000000004c4b40 00000000000003e8 00000000000003e8 00000002 03f0 0005 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000200 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000300 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000400 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000500 02660000000000000000000000000000 - beginning of accept_channel
778 // 030121 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 33
779 // 0000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - rest of accept_channel and mac
781 // 0a - create the funding transaction (client should send funding_created now)
783 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
784 // 0062 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 98
785 // 030172 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 114
786 // 0023 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000007c0001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - funding_signed message and mac
788 // 0b - broadcast funding transaction
789 // - by now client should have sent a channel_ready (CHECK 4: SendChannelReady to 03020000 for chan 3f000000)
791 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
792 // 0043 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 67
793 // 030153 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 83
794 // 0024 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 026700000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - channel_ready and mac
796 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
797 // 05ac 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 1452
798 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
799 // 0080 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000003e80 ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 000003f0 00 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000555 0000000e000001000000000000000003e8000000a00000000000000000000000000a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff - beginning of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client
800 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
801 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
802 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
803 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
804 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
805 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
806 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
807 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
808 // 0300c1 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 193
809 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 4e00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - end of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client and mac
811 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
812 // 0064 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
813 // 030074 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 116
814 // 0084 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000300100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
815 // - client should now respond with revoke_and_ack and commitment_signed (CHECK 5/6: types 133 and 132 to peer 03000000)
817 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
818 // 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
819 // 030073 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 115
820 // 0085 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 020b00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
822 // 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
823 // - client now sends id 1 update_add_htlc and commitment_signed (CHECK 7: SendHTLCs event for node 03020000 with 1 HTLCs for channel 3f000000)
825 // - we respond with commitment_signed then revoke_and_ack (a weird, but valid, order)
826 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
827 // 0064 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
828 // 030174 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 116
829 // 0084 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000006a0001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
831 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
832 // 0063 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
833 // 030173 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 115
834 // 0085 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 6600000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 026400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
836 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
837 // 004a 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 74
838 // 03015a - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 90
839 // 0082 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000000 ff00888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888 01000000000000000000000000000000 - update_fulfill_htlc and mac
840 // - client should immediately claim the pending HTLC from peer 0 (CHECK 8: SendFulfillHTLCs for node 03000000 with preimage ff00888888 for channel 3d000000)
842 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
843 // 0064 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
844 // 030174 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 116
845 // 0084 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
847 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
848 // 0063 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
849 // 030173 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 115
850 // 0085 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 6700000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 026500000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
852 // - before responding to the commitment_signed generated above, send a new HTLC
853 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
854 // 05ac 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 1452
855 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
856 // 0080 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000000000003e80 ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 000003f0 00 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000555 0000000e000001000000000000000003e8000000a00000000000000000000000000a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff - beginning of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client
857 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
858 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
859 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
860 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
861 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
862 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
863 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
864 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
865 // 0300c1 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 193
866 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 4e00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - end of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client and mac
868 // - now respond to the update_fulfill_htlc+commitment_signed messages the client sent to peer 0
869 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
870 // 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
871 // 030073 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 115
872 // 0085 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0800000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 020a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
873 // - client should now respond with revoke_and_ack and commitment_signed (CHECK 5/6 duplicates)
875 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
876 // 0064 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
877 // 030074 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 116
878 // 0084 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000c30100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
880 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
881 // 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
882 // 030073 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 115
883 // 0085 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0b00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 020d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
885 // 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
886 // - client now sends id 1 update_add_htlc and commitment_signed (CHECK 7 duplicate)
887 // - we respond with revoke_and_ack, then commitment_signed, then update_fail_htlc
889 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
890 // 0064 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
891 // 030174 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 116
892 // 0084 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000390001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
894 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
895 // 0063 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
896 // 030173 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 115
897 // 0085 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 6400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 027000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
899 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
900 // 002c 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 44
901 // 03013c - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 60
902 // 0083 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - update_fail_htlc and mac
904 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
905 // 0064 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
906 // 030174 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 116
907 // 0084 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000390001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
909 // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
910 // 0063 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
911 // 030173 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 115
912 // 0085 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 6500000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 027100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
914 // 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
915 // - client now sends id 0 update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed (CHECK 9)
916 // - now respond to the update_fail_htlc+commitment_signed messages the client sent to peer 0
918 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
919 // 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
920 // 030073 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 115
921 // 0085 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 020c00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
923 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
924 // 0064 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
925 // 030074 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 116
926 // 0084 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000320100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
927 // - client should now respond with revoke_and_ack (CHECK 5 duplicate)
929 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
930 // 05ac 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 1452
931 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
932 // 0080 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000002 00000000000b0838 ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 000003f0 00 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000555 0000000e000001000000000000000927c0000000a00000000000000000000000000a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff - beginning of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client
933 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
934 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
935 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
936 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
937 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
938 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
939 // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
940 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
941 // 0300c1 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 193
942 // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 4b00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - end of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client and mac
944 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
945 // 00a4 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 164
946 // 0300b4 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 180
947 // 0084 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000750100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0001 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000670500000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000006 03000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
948 // - client should now respond with revoke_and_ack and commitment_signed (CHECK 5/6 duplicates)
950 // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
951 // 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
952 // 030073 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 115
953 // 0085 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 020f00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
955 // 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
956 // - client now sends id 1 update_add_htlc and commitment_signed (CHECK 7 duplicate)
958 // 0c007d - connect a block with one transaction of len 125
959 // 02000000013a000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000800258020000000000002200204b0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000014c0000000000000160014280000000000000000000000000000000000000005000020 - the commitment transaction for channel 3f00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
961 // 0c005e - connect a block with one transaction of len 94
962 // 0200000001730000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001a701000000000000220020b20000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 - the HTLC timeout transaction
963 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
964 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
965 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
966 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
967 // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
969 // 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
970 // - client now fails the HTLC backwards as it was unable to extract the payment preimage (CHECK 9 duplicate and CHECK 10)
972 let logger = Arc::new(TrackingLogger { lines: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()) });
973 super::do_test(&::hex::decode("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").unwrap(), &(Arc::clone(&logger) as Arc<dyn Logger>));
975 let log_entries = logger.lines.lock().unwrap();
976 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling SendAcceptChannel event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 for channel ff4f00f805273c1b203bb5ebf8436bfde57b3be8c2f5e95d9491dbb181909679".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 1
977 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling SendFundingSigned event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 2
978 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling SendChannelReady event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 3
979 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling SendChannelReady event in peer_handler for node 030200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 for channel 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 4
980 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling SendRevokeAndACK event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&4)); // 5
981 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling UpdateHTLCs event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 with 0 adds, 0 fulfills, 0 fails for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&3)); // 6
982 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling UpdateHTLCs event in peer_handler for node 030200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 with 1 adds, 0 fulfills, 0 fails for channel 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&3)); // 7
983 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling UpdateHTLCs event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 with 0 adds, 1 fulfills, 0 fails for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 8
984 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling UpdateHTLCs event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 with 0 adds, 0 fulfills, 1 fails for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&2)); // 9
985 assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::chain::channelmonitor".to_string(), "Input spending counterparty commitment tx (0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000073:0) in 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000067 resolves outbound HTLC with payment hash ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 with timeout".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 10