1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level network map tracking logic lives here.
12 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
13 use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
19 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
23 use crate::chain::Access;
24 use crate::ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript;
25 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures, InitFeatures};
26 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
27 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, GossipTimestampFilter};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
30 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, MaybeReadable};
31 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Level};
32 use crate::util::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
33 use crate::util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
34 use crate::util::string::PrintableString;
37 use crate::io_extras::{copy, sink};
38 use crate::prelude::*;
39 use alloc::collections::{BTreeMap, btree_map::Entry as BtreeEntry};
41 use crate::sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
42 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
43 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
44 use crate::sync::Mutex;
45 use core::ops::{Bound, Deref};
46 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
48 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
49 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
51 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
53 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
55 /// We stop tracking the removal of permanently failed nodes and channels one week after removal
56 const REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7;
58 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
59 /// refuse to relay the message.
60 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
62 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
63 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
64 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
66 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
67 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
68 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
71 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
72 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
73 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
76 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
77 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
82 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
83 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
84 write!(f, "NodeId({})", log_bytes!(self.0))
88 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
89 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
96 impl PartialEq for NodeId {
97 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
98 self.0[..] == other.0[..]
102 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
103 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
104 Some(self.cmp(other))
108 impl Ord for NodeId {
109 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
110 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
114 impl Writeable for NodeId {
115 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
116 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
121 impl Readable for NodeId {
122 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
123 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
124 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
129 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
130 pub struct NetworkGraph<L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
131 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
132 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex<Option<u32>>,
133 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
135 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
136 channels: RwLock<BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
137 nodes: RwLock<BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
138 // Lock order: removed_channels -> removed_nodes
140 // NOTE: In the following `removed_*` maps, we use seconds since UNIX epoch to track time instead
141 // of `std::time::Instant`s for a few reasons:
142 // * We want it to be possible to do tracking in no-std environments where we can compare
143 // a provided current UNIX timestamp with the time at which we started tracking.
144 // * In the future, if we decide to persist these maps, they will already be serializable.
145 // * Although we lose out on the platform's monotonic clock, the system clock in a std
146 // environment should be practical over the time period we are considering (on the order of a
149 /// Keeps track of short channel IDs for channels we have explicitly removed due to permanent
150 /// failure so that we don't resync them from gossip. Each SCID is mapped to the time (in seconds)
151 /// it was removed so that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
152 removed_channels: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Option<u64>>>,
153 /// Keeps track of `NodeId`s we have explicitly removed due to permanent failure so that we don't
154 /// resync them from gossip. Each `NodeId` is mapped to the time (in seconds) it was removed so
155 /// that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
156 removed_nodes: Mutex<HashMap<NodeId, Option<u64>>>,
159 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
160 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
161 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
162 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
165 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
166 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
168 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
169 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
170 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
171 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
172 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
173 ChannelUpdateMessage {
174 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
177 /// An error indicating that a channel failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
178 /// [`NetworkGraph::channel_failed`].
180 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
181 short_channel_id: u64,
182 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
183 /// `channel_update` message is received.
186 /// An error indicating that a node failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
187 /// [`NetworkGraph::node_failed_permanent`] if permanent.
189 /// The node id of the failed node.
191 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
192 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
197 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
198 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
201 (2, ChannelFailure) => {
202 (0, short_channel_id, required),
203 (2, is_permanent, required),
205 (4, NodeFailure) => {
206 (0, node_id, required),
207 (2, is_permanent, required),
211 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
212 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
213 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
214 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
215 /// serving historical announcements.
216 pub struct P2PGossipSync<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref>
217 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
220 chain_access: Option<C>,
221 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
222 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
223 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
227 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
228 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
230 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
231 /// assuming an existing Network Graph.
232 /// Chain monitor is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain,
233 /// channel data is correct, and that the announcement is signed with
234 /// channel owners' keys.
235 pub fn new(network_graph: G, chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L) -> Self {
238 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
239 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
241 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
246 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
247 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
248 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
249 pub fn add_chain_access(&mut self, chain_access: Option<C>) {
250 self.chain_access = chain_access;
253 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
254 /// [`P2PGossipSync::new`].
256 /// (C-not exported) as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
257 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
261 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
262 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
263 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
264 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
265 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
266 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
267 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
275 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
276 /// Handles any network updates originating from [`Event`]s.
278 /// [`Event`]: crate::util::events::Event
279 pub fn handle_network_update(&self, network_update: &NetworkUpdate) {
280 match *network_update {
281 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
282 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
283 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
284 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
285 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating channel with channel_update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
286 let _ = self.update_channel(msg);
288 NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
289 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
290 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, short_channel_id);
291 self.channel_failed(short_channel_id, is_permanent);
293 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
295 log_debug!(self.logger,
296 "Removed node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", log_pubkey!(node_id));
297 self.node_failed_permanent(node_id);
304 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
305 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
306 match $secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
309 return Err(LightningError {
310 err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
311 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
312 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
314 data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
316 log_level: Level::Trace,
324 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
325 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
327 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
328 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg)?;
329 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
330 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
331 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
334 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
335 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.chain_access)?;
336 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if !msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
337 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
340 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
341 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg)?;
342 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
345 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
346 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
347 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(starting_point..) {
348 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
349 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
350 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
351 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
352 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
353 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
355 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
356 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
358 return Some((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
360 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
361 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
367 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement> {
368 let nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.read().unwrap();
369 let iter = if let Some(pubkey) = starting_point {
370 nodes.range((Bound::Excluded(NodeId::from_pubkey(pubkey)), Bound::Unbounded))
374 for (_, ref node) in iter {
375 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
376 if let Some(msg) = node_info.announcement_message.clone() {
384 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
385 /// using gossip_queries. The default strategy used by this implementation
386 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
388 /// We should expect one or more reply_channel_range messages in response
389 /// to our query_channel_range. Each reply will enqueue a query_scid message
390 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
391 /// when the final reply_scids_end message is received, though we are not
392 /// tracking this directly.
393 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
394 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
395 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
396 // Don't disconnect peers for not supporting gossip queries. We may wish to have
397 // channels with peers even without being able to exchange gossip.
401 // The lightning network's gossip sync system is completely broken in numerous ways.
403 // Given no broadly-available set-reconciliation protocol, the only reasonable approach is
404 // to do a full sync from the first few peers we connect to, and then receive gossip
405 // updates from all our peers normally.
407 // Originally, we could simply tell a peer to dump us the entire gossip table on startup,
408 // wasting lots of bandwidth but ensuring we have the full network graph. After the initial
409 // dump peers would always send gossip and we'd stay up-to-date with whatever our peer has
412 // In order to reduce the bandwidth waste, "gossip queries" were introduced, allowing you
413 // to ask for the SCIDs of all channels in your peer's routing graph, and then only request
414 // channel data which you are missing. Except there was no way at all to identify which
415 // `channel_update`s you were missing, so you still had to request everything, just in a
416 // very complicated way with some queries instead of just getting the dump.
418 // Later, an option was added to fetch the latest timestamps of the `channel_update`s to
419 // make efficient sync possible, however it has yet to be implemented in lnd, which makes
420 // relying on it useless.
422 // After gossip queries were introduced, support for receiving a full gossip table dump on
423 // connection was removed from several nodes, making it impossible to get a full sync
424 // without using the "gossip queries" messages.
426 // Once you opt into "gossip queries" the only way to receive any gossip updates that a
427 // peer receives after you connect, you must send a `gossip_timestamp_filter` message. This
428 // message, as the name implies, tells the peer to not forward any gossip messages with a
429 // timestamp older than a given value (not the time the peer received the filter, but the
430 // timestamp in the update message, which is often hours behind when the peer received the
433 // Obnoxiously, `gossip_timestamp_filter` isn't *just* a filter, but its also a request for
434 // your peer to send you the full routing graph (subject to the filter). Thus, in order to
435 // tell a peer to send you any updates as it sees them, you have to also ask for the full
436 // routing graph to be synced. If you set a timestamp filter near the current time, peers
437 // will simply not forward any new updates they see to you which were generated some time
438 // ago (which is not uncommon). If you instead set a timestamp filter near 0 (or two weeks
439 // ago), you will always get the full routing graph from all your peers.
441 // Most lightning nodes today opt to simply turn off receiving gossip data which only
442 // propagated some time after it was generated, and, worse, often disable gossiping with
443 // several peers after their first connection. The second behavior can cause gossip to not
444 // propagate fully if there are cuts in the gossiping subgraph.
446 // In an attempt to cut a middle ground between always fetching the full graph from all of
447 // our peers and never receiving gossip from peers at all, we send all of our peers a
448 // `gossip_timestamp_filter`, with the filter time set either two weeks ago or an hour ago.
450 // For no-std builds, we bury our head in the sand and do a full sync on each connection.
451 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
452 let mut gossip_start_time = 0;
453 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
455 gossip_start_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
456 if self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id) {
457 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2; // 2 weeks ago
459 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60; // an hour ago
463 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
464 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter {
465 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
466 msg: GossipTimestampFilter {
467 chain_hash: self.network_graph.genesis_hash,
468 first_timestamp: gossip_start_time as u32, // 2106 issue!
469 timestamp_range: u32::max_value(),
475 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
476 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
477 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
478 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
482 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
483 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
484 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
485 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
489 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
490 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
491 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
492 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
493 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
494 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
495 /// memory constrained systems.
496 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
497 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
499 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
501 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
502 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
503 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
505 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
506 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.genesis_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
507 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
508 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
509 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
510 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
511 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
512 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
513 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
515 short_channel_ids: vec![],
518 return Err(LightningError {
519 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
520 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
524 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
525 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
526 // exists even if its not yet routable.
527 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
528 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
529 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
530 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
531 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
532 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
533 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
536 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
537 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
542 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
543 let batch_count = batches.len();
544 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
545 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
546 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
547 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
549 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
550 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
551 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
552 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
553 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
554 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
555 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
557 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
558 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
559 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
561 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
562 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
563 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
565 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
566 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
567 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
568 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
570 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
571 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
573 (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
576 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
578 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
579 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
580 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
581 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
585 short_channel_ids: batch,
593 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
596 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
597 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
601 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
602 let mut features = NodeFeatures::empty();
603 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
607 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
608 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
609 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
614 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
616 C::Target: chain::Access,
619 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
620 let mut ret = Vec::new();
621 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
622 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
627 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
628 /// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
629 pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
630 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
631 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
632 pub last_update: u32,
633 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
635 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
636 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
637 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
638 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
639 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
640 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
641 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
642 pub fees: RoutingFees,
643 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
644 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
645 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
646 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
647 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
650 impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
651 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
652 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
657 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
658 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
659 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
660 (0, self.last_update, required),
661 (2, self.enabled, required),
662 (4, self.cltv_expiry_delta, required),
663 (6, self.htlc_minimum_msat, required),
664 // Writing htlc_maximum_msat as an Option<u64> is required to maintain backwards
665 // compatibility with LDK versions prior to v0.0.110.
666 (8, Some(self.htlc_maximum_msat), required),
667 (10, self.fees, required),
668 (12, self.last_update_message, required),
674 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
675 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
676 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update, required);
677 _init_tlv_field_var!(enabled, required);
678 _init_tlv_field_var!(cltv_expiry_delta, required);
679 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_minimum_msat, required);
680 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_maximum_msat, option);
681 _init_tlv_field_var!(fees, required);
682 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update_message, required);
684 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
685 (0, last_update, required),
686 (2, enabled, required),
687 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
688 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
689 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
690 (10, fees, required),
691 (12, last_update_message, required)
694 if let Some(htlc_maximum_msat) = htlc_maximum_msat {
695 Ok(ChannelUpdateInfo {
696 last_update: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update, required),
697 enabled: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(enabled, required),
698 cltv_expiry_delta: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(cltv_expiry_delta, required),
699 htlc_minimum_msat: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_minimum_msat, required),
701 fees: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(fees, required),
702 last_update_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update_message, required),
705 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
710 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
711 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
712 /// Received within a channel announcement.
713 pub struct ChannelInfo {
714 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
715 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
716 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
717 pub node_one: NodeId,
718 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
719 pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
720 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
721 pub node_two: NodeId,
722 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
723 pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
724 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
725 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
726 /// An initial announcement of the channel
727 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
728 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
729 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
730 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
731 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
732 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
733 /// network graph in memory!).
734 announcement_received_time: u64,
738 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
739 /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
740 pub fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
741 let (direction, source) = {
742 if target == &self.node_one {
743 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
744 } else if target == &self.node_two {
745 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
750 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir), source))
753 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
754 /// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
755 pub fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
756 let (direction, target) = {
757 if source == &self.node_one {
758 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
759 } else if source == &self.node_two {
760 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
765 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir), target))
768 /// Returns a [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] based on the direction implied by the channel_flag.
769 pub fn get_directional_info(&self, channel_flags: u8) -> Option<&ChannelUpdateInfo> {
770 let direction = channel_flags & 1u8;
772 self.one_to_two.as_ref()
774 self.two_to_one.as_ref()
779 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
780 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
781 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
782 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), log_bytes!(self.node_one.as_slice()), self.one_to_two, log_bytes!(self.node_two.as_slice()), self.two_to_one)?;
787 impl Writeable for ChannelInfo {
788 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
789 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
790 (0, self.features, required),
791 (1, self.announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
792 (2, self.node_one, required),
793 (4, self.one_to_two, required),
794 (6, self.node_two, required),
795 (8, self.two_to_one, required),
796 (10, self.capacity_sats, required),
797 (12, self.announcement_message, required),
803 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of ChannelUpdateInfo. Utilizing this is
804 // necessary to maintain backwards compatibility with previous serializations of `ChannelUpdateInfo`
805 // that may have no `htlc_maximum_msat` field set. In case the field is absent, we simply ignore
806 // the error and continue reading the `ChannelInfo`. Hopefully, we'll then eventually receive newer
807 // channel updates via the gossip network.
808 struct ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper(Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>);
810 impl MaybeReadable for ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper {
811 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
812 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
813 Ok(channel_update_option) => Ok(Some(Self(channel_update_option))),
814 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(None),
815 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) => Ok(None),
816 Err(err) => Err(err),
821 impl Readable for ChannelInfo {
822 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
823 _init_tlv_field_var!(features, required);
824 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0));
825 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_one, required);
826 let mut one_to_two_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
827 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_two, required);
828 let mut two_to_one_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
829 _init_tlv_field_var!(capacity_sats, required);
830 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_message, required);
831 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
832 (0, features, required),
833 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
834 (2, node_one, required),
835 (4, one_to_two_wrap, ignorable),
836 (6, node_two, required),
837 (8, two_to_one_wrap, ignorable),
838 (10, capacity_sats, required),
839 (12, announcement_message, required),
843 features: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(features, required),
844 node_one: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_one, required),
845 one_to_two: one_to_two_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
846 node_two: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_two, required),
847 two_to_one: two_to_one_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
848 capacity_sats: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(capacity_sats, required),
849 announcement_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_message, required),
850 announcement_received_time: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
855 /// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
856 /// source node to a target node.
858 pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
859 channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
860 direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo,
861 htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
862 effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity,
865 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
867 fn new(channel: &'a ChannelInfo, direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo) -> Self {
868 let mut htlc_maximum_msat = direction.htlc_maximum_msat;
869 let capacity_msat = channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
871 let effective_capacity = match capacity_msat {
872 Some(capacity_msat) => {
873 htlc_maximum_msat = cmp::min(htlc_maximum_msat, capacity_msat);
874 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat: htlc_maximum_msat }
876 None => EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat: htlc_maximum_msat },
880 channel, direction, htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity
884 /// Returns information for the channel.
886 pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
888 /// Returns the maximum HTLC amount allowed over the channel in the direction.
890 pub fn htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
891 self.htlc_maximum_msat
894 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
896 /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
897 /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
899 pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
900 self.effective_capacity
903 /// Returns information for the direction.
905 pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.direction }
908 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
909 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
910 f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo")
911 .field("channel", &self.channel)
916 /// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
918 /// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
919 /// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
920 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)]
921 pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
922 /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
925 /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
929 /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
931 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
934 /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
936 /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
938 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
939 htlc_maximum_msat: u64
941 /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
944 /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
945 /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
949 /// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
950 /// use when making routing decisions.
951 pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
953 impl EffectiveCapacity {
954 /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
955 pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
957 EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
958 EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
959 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, .. } => *capacity_msat,
960 EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
961 EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
966 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
967 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash)]
968 pub struct RoutingFees {
969 /// Flat routing fee in satoshis
971 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
972 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
973 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
976 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
977 (0, base_msat, required),
978 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
981 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
982 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
983 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
984 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
985 pub features: NodeFeatures,
986 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
987 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
988 pub last_update: u32,
989 /// Color assigned to the node
991 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
992 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
993 /// should not be exposed to the user.
994 pub alias: NodeAlias,
995 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
996 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
997 /// An initial announcement of the node
998 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
999 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
1000 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
1001 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
1004 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeAnnouncementInfo, {
1005 (0, features, required),
1006 (2, last_update, required),
1008 (6, alias, required),
1009 (8, announcement_message, option),
1010 (10, addresses, vec_type),
1013 /// A user-defined name for a node, which may be used when displaying the node in a graph.
1015 /// Since node aliases are provided by third parties, they are a potential avenue for injection
1016 /// attacks. Care must be taken when processing.
1017 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1018 pub struct NodeAlias(pub [u8; 32]);
1020 impl fmt::Display for NodeAlias {
1021 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1022 let first_null = self.0.iter().position(|b| *b == 0).unwrap_or(self.0.len());
1023 let bytes = self.0.split_at(first_null).0;
1024 match core::str::from_utf8(bytes) {
1025 Ok(alias) => PrintableString(alias).fmt(f)?,
1027 use core::fmt::Write;
1028 for c in bytes.iter().map(|b| *b as char) {
1029 // Display printable ASCII characters
1030 let control_symbol = core::char::REPLACEMENT_CHARACTER;
1031 let c = if c >= '\x20' && c <= '\x7e' { c } else { control_symbol };
1040 impl Writeable for NodeAlias {
1041 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1046 impl Readable for NodeAlias {
1047 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1048 Ok(NodeAlias(Readable::read(r)?))
1052 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1053 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
1054 pub struct NodeInfo {
1055 /// All valid channels a node has announced
1056 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
1057 /// Lowest fees enabling routing via any of the enabled, known channels to a node.
1058 /// The two fields (flat and proportional fee) are independent,
1059 /// meaning they don't have to refer to the same channel.
1060 pub lowest_inbound_channel_fees: Option<RoutingFees>,
1061 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
1062 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
1063 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
1064 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
1067 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
1068 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1069 write!(f, "lowest_inbound_channel_fees: {:?}, channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
1070 self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees, &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
1075 impl Writeable for NodeInfo {
1076 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1077 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1078 (0, self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1079 (2, self.announcement_info, option),
1080 (4, self.channels, vec_type),
1086 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of `NodeAnnouncementInfo`. Utilizing this is
1087 // necessary to maintain compatibility with previous serializations of `NetAddress` that have an
1088 // invalid hostname set. We ignore and eat all errors until we are either able to read a
1089 // `NodeAnnouncementInfo` or hit a `ShortRead`, i.e., read the TLV field to the end.
1090 struct NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper(NodeAnnouncementInfo);
1092 impl MaybeReadable for NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper {
1093 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
1094 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
1095 Ok(node_announcement_info) => return Ok(Some(Self(node_announcement_info))),
1097 copy(reader, &mut sink()).unwrap();
1104 impl Readable for NodeInfo {
1105 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1106 _init_tlv_field_var!(lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option);
1107 let mut announcement_info_wrap: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
1108 _init_tlv_field_var!(channels, vec_type);
1110 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1111 (0, lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1112 (2, announcement_info_wrap, ignorable),
1113 (4, channels, vec_type),
1117 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1118 announcement_info: announcement_info_wrap.map(|w| w.0),
1119 channels: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(channels, vec_type),
1124 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1125 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1127 impl<L: Deref> Writeable for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1128 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1129 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1131 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
1132 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1133 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1134 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.iter() {
1135 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
1136 chan_info.write(writer)?;
1138 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1139 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1140 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.iter() {
1141 node_id.write(writer)?;
1142 node_info.write(writer)?;
1145 let last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp = self.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp();
1146 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1147 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1153 impl<L: Deref> ReadableArgs<L> for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1154 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: L) -> Result<NetworkGraph<L>, DecodeError> {
1155 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1157 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1158 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1159 let mut channels = BTreeMap::new();
1160 for _ in 0..channels_count {
1161 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1162 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1163 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
1165 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1166 let mut nodes = BTreeMap::new();
1167 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
1168 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
1169 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1170 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
1173 let mut last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Option<u32> = None;
1174 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1175 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1179 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1182 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
1183 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
1184 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp),
1185 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1186 removed_channels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1191 impl<L: Deref> fmt::Display for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1192 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1193 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
1194 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().iter() {
1195 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
1197 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
1198 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().iter() {
1199 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", log_bytes!(node_id.as_slice()), val)?;
1205 impl<L: Deref> Eq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {}
1206 impl<L: Deref> PartialEq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1207 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
1208 self.genesis_hash == other.genesis_hash &&
1209 *self.channels.read().unwrap() == *other.channels.read().unwrap() &&
1210 *self.nodes.read().unwrap() == *other.nodes.read().unwrap()
1214 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1215 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
1216 pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash, logger: L) -> NetworkGraph<L> {
1218 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1221 channels: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
1222 nodes: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
1223 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(None),
1224 removed_channels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1225 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1229 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
1230 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1231 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1232 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1233 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
1239 /// The unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1240 /// It will be set by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1241 pub fn get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1242 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().clone()
1245 /// Update the unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1246 /// This should be done automatically by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1247 pub fn set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: u32) {
1248 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().replace(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp);
1251 /// Clears the `NodeAnnouncementInfo` field for all nodes in the `NetworkGraph` for testing
1254 pub fn clear_nodes_announcement_info(&self) {
1255 for node in self.nodes.write().unwrap().iter_mut() {
1256 node.1.announcement_info = None;
1260 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1261 /// given node announcement.
1263 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1264 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1265 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1266 pub fn update_node_from_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1267 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1268 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement");
1269 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
1272 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1273 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
1274 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
1276 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1277 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
1280 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1281 match self.nodes.write().unwrap().get_mut(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id)) {
1282 None => Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1284 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1285 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
1286 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
1287 // that it be at least the current time.
1288 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1289 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1290 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1291 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1296 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1297 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1298 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
1299 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1300 features: msg.features.clone(),
1301 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1303 alias: NodeAlias(msg.alias),
1304 addresses: msg.addresses.clone(),
1305 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1313 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1315 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1316 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1317 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1319 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1320 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1321 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<C: Deref>(
1322 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>,
1323 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1325 C::Target: chain::Access,
1327 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1328 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement");
1329 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement");
1330 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement");
1331 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement");
1332 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), chain_access)
1335 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
1336 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
1337 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
1339 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1340 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1341 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<C: Deref>(
1342 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>
1343 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1345 C::Target: chain::Access,
1347 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, chain_access)
1350 /// Update channel from partial announcement data received via rapid gossip sync
1352 /// `timestamp: u64`: Timestamp emulating the backdated original announcement receipt (by the
1353 /// rapid gossip sync server)
1355 /// All other parameters as used in [`msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement`] fields.
1356 pub fn add_channel_from_partial_announcement(&self, short_channel_id: u64, timestamp: u64, features: ChannelFeatures, node_id_1: PublicKey, node_id_2: PublicKey) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1357 if node_id_1 == node_id_2 {
1358 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1361 let node_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1);
1362 let node_2 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2);
1363 let channel_info = ChannelInfo {
1365 node_one: node_1.clone(),
1367 node_two: node_2.clone(),
1369 capacity_sats: None,
1370 announcement_message: None,
1371 announcement_received_time: timestamp,
1374 self.add_channel_between_nodes(short_channel_id, channel_info, None)
1377 fn add_channel_between_nodes(&self, short_channel_id: u64, channel_info: ChannelInfo, utxo_value: Option<u64>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1378 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1379 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1381 let node_id_a = channel_info.node_one.clone();
1382 let node_id_b = channel_info.node_two.clone();
1384 match channels.entry(short_channel_id) {
1385 BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1386 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
1387 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
1389 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1390 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1391 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1392 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1394 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1395 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1397 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1398 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), short_channel_id);
1399 *entry.get_mut() = channel_info;
1401 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1404 BtreeEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1405 entry.insert(channel_info);
1409 for current_node_id in [node_id_a, node_id_b].iter() {
1410 match nodes.entry(current_node_id.clone()) {
1411 BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1412 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(short_channel_id);
1414 BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1415 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1416 channels: vec!(short_channel_id),
1417 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
1418 announcement_info: None,
1427 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<C: Deref>(
1428 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, chain_access: &Option<C>
1429 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1431 C::Target: chain::Access,
1433 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
1434 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1437 let node_one = NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1);
1438 let node_two = NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2);
1441 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1443 if let Some(chan) = channels.get(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1444 if chan.capacity_sats.is_some() {
1445 // If we'd previously looked up the channel on-chain and checked the script
1446 // against what appears on-chain, ignore the duplicate announcement.
1448 // Because a reorg could replace one channel with another at the same SCID, if
1449 // the channel appears to be different, we re-validate. This doesn't expose us
1450 // to any more DoS risk than not, as a peer can always flood us with
1451 // randomly-generated SCID values anyway.
1453 // We use the Node IDs rather than the bitcoin_keys to check for "equivalence"
1454 // as we didn't (necessarily) store the bitcoin keys, and we only really care
1455 // if the peers on the channel changed anyway.
1456 if node_one == chan.node_one && node_two == chan.node_two {
1457 return Err(LightningError {
1458 err: "Already have chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1459 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1462 } else if chain_access.is_none() {
1463 // Similarly, if we can't check the chain right now anyway, ignore the
1464 // duplicate announcement without bothering to take the channels write lock.
1465 return Err(LightningError {
1466 err: "Already have non-chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1467 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1474 let removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1475 let removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1476 if removed_channels.contains_key(&msg.short_channel_id) ||
1477 removed_nodes.contains_key(&node_one) ||
1478 removed_nodes.contains_key(&node_two) {
1479 return Err(LightningError{
1480 err: format!("Channel with SCID {} or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently", &msg.short_channel_id),
1481 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1485 let utxo_value = match &chain_access {
1487 // Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
1490 &Some(ref chain_access) => {
1491 match chain_access.get_utxo(&msg.chain_hash, msg.short_channel_id) {
1492 Ok(TxOut { value, script_pubkey }) => {
1493 let expected_script =
1494 make_funding_redeemscript(&msg.bitcoin_key_1, &msg.bitcoin_key_2).to_v0_p2wsh();
1495 if script_pubkey != expected_script {
1496 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announcement key ({}) didn't match on-chain script ({})", expected_script.to_hex(), script_pubkey.to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1498 //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
1499 //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
1502 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownChain) => {
1503 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announced on an unknown chain ({})", msg.chain_hash.encode().to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1505 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx) => {
1506 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1512 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
1513 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
1514 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1516 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1519 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
1520 features: msg.features.clone(),
1525 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
1526 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1527 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1528 announcement_received_time,
1531 self.add_channel_between_nodes(msg.short_channel_id, chan_info, utxo_value)
1534 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
1535 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
1536 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
1537 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
1538 pub fn channel_failed(&self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool) {
1539 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1540 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1541 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1542 let current_time_unix = None;
1544 self.channel_failed_with_time(short_channel_id, is_permanent, current_time_unix)
1547 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
1548 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
1549 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
1550 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
1551 fn channel_failed_with_time(&self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool, current_time_unix: Option<u64>) {
1552 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1554 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1555 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1556 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(short_channel_id, current_time_unix);
1557 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1560 if let Some(chan) = channels.get_mut(&short_channel_id) {
1561 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_mut() {
1562 one_to_two.enabled = false;
1564 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_mut() {
1565 two_to_one.enabled = false;
1571 /// Marks a node in the graph as permanently failed, effectively removing it and its channels
1572 /// from local storage.
1573 pub fn node_failed_permanent(&self, node_id: &PublicKey) {
1574 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1575 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1576 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1577 let current_time_unix = None;
1579 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(node_id);
1580 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1581 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1582 let mut removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1583 let mut removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1585 if let Some(node) = nodes.remove(&node_id) {
1586 for scid in node.channels.iter() {
1587 if let Some(chan_info) = channels.remove(scid) {
1588 let other_node_id = if node_id == chan_info.node_one { chan_info.node_two } else { chan_info.node_one };
1589 if let BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut other_node_entry) = nodes.entry(other_node_id) {
1590 other_node_entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1593 if other_node_entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1594 other_node_entry.remove_entry();
1597 removed_channels.insert(*scid, current_time_unix);
1600 removed_nodes.insert(node_id, current_time_unix);
1604 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1605 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1606 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1609 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1610 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1611 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1613 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1614 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1616 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1617 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1619 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1620 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1621 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking(&self) {
1622 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1623 self.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(time);
1626 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1627 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1630 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1631 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1632 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1634 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1635 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1637 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1638 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`] may be preferable.
1639 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1640 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1641 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1642 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1643 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1644 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1645 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1647 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1648 for (scid, info) in channels.iter_mut() {
1649 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1650 info.one_to_two = None;
1652 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1653 info.two_to_one = None;
1655 if info.one_to_two.is_none() || info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1656 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1657 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1658 // channel_update for.
1659 if info.announcement_received_time < min_time_unix as u64 {
1660 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1664 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1665 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1666 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1667 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1668 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1669 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(scid, Some(current_time_unix));
1673 let should_keep_tracking = |time: &mut Option<u64>| {
1674 if let Some(time) = time {
1675 current_time_unix.saturating_sub(*time) < REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS
1677 // NOTE: In the case of no-std, we won't have access to the current UNIX time at the time of removal,
1678 // so we'll just set the removal time here to the current UNIX time on the very next invocation
1679 // of this function.
1680 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
1682 let mut tracked_time = Some(current_time_unix);
1683 core::mem::swap(time, &mut tracked_time);
1686 #[allow(unreachable_code)]
1690 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1691 self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1694 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1697 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1698 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1699 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1701 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1702 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1703 pub fn update_channel(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1704 self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature))
1707 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1708 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
1709 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
1711 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1712 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1713 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1714 self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None)
1717 fn update_channel_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig: Option<&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1719 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
1720 let chan_was_enabled;
1722 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
1724 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
1725 // disable this check during tests!
1726 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1727 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
1728 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1730 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
1731 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1735 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1736 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1737 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1739 if msg.htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1740 return Err(LightningError{err:
1741 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(),
1742 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1745 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
1746 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
1747 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
1748 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || msg.htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
1749 return Err(LightningError{err:
1750 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(),
1751 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1754 macro_rules! check_update_latest {
1755 ($target: expr) => {
1756 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
1757 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
1758 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
1759 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
1760 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
1761 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
1762 // but only in the non-normative section.
1763 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1764 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1765 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1766 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1768 chan_was_enabled = existing_chan_info.enabled;
1770 chan_was_enabled = false;
1775 macro_rules! get_new_channel_info {
1777 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1778 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
1780 let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
1781 enabled: chan_enabled,
1782 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1783 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
1784 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1785 htlc_maximum_msat: msg.htlc_maximum_msat,
1787 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
1788 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
1792 Some(updated_channel_update_info)
1796 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
1797 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
1798 dest_node_id = channel.node_one.clone();
1799 check_update_latest!(channel.two_to_one);
1800 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1801 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1802 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
1803 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1804 })?, "channel_update");
1806 channel.two_to_one = get_new_channel_info!();
1808 dest_node_id = channel.node_two.clone();
1809 check_update_latest!(channel.one_to_two);
1810 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1811 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1812 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
1813 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1814 })?, "channel_update");
1816 channel.one_to_two = get_new_channel_info!();
1821 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1823 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1824 let mut base_msat = msg.fee_base_msat;
1825 let mut proportional_millionths = msg.fee_proportional_millionths;
1826 if let Some(fees) = node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees {
1827 base_msat = cmp::min(base_msat, fees.base_msat);
1828 proportional_millionths = cmp::min(proportional_millionths, fees.proportional_millionths);
1830 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = Some(RoutingFees {
1832 proportional_millionths
1834 } else if chan_was_enabled {
1835 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1836 let mut lowest_inbound_channel_fees = None;
1838 for chan_id in node.channels.iter() {
1839 let chan = channels.get(chan_id).unwrap();
1841 if chan.node_one == dest_node_id {
1842 chan_info_opt = chan.two_to_one.as_ref();
1844 chan_info_opt = chan.one_to_two.as_ref();
1846 if let Some(chan_info) = chan_info_opt {
1847 if chan_info.enabled {
1848 let fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees.get_or_insert(RoutingFees {
1849 base_msat: u32::max_value(), proportional_millionths: u32::max_value() });
1850 fees.base_msat = cmp::min(fees.base_msat, chan_info.fees.base_msat);
1851 fees.proportional_millionths = cmp::min(fees.proportional_millionths, chan_info.fees.proportional_millionths);
1856 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
1862 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
1863 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
1864 ($node_id: expr) => {
1865 if let BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
1866 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1867 short_channel_id != *chan_id
1869 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1870 entry.remove_entry();
1873 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
1878 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
1879 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
1883 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1884 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
1886 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1887 pub fn channels(&self) -> &BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
1891 /// Returns information on a channel with the given id.
1892 pub fn channel(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<&ChannelInfo> {
1893 self.channels.get(&short_channel_id)
1896 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `channels`
1897 /// Returns the list of channels in the graph
1898 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<u64> {
1899 self.channels.keys().map(|c| *c).collect()
1902 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
1904 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1905 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
1909 /// Returns information on a node with the given id.
1910 pub fn node(&self, node_id: &NodeId) -> Option<&NodeInfo> {
1911 self.nodes.get(node_id)
1914 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `nodes`
1915 /// Returns the list of nodes in the graph
1916 pub fn list_nodes(&self) -> Vec<NodeId> {
1917 self.nodes.keys().map(|n| *n).collect()
1920 /// Get network addresses by node id.
1921 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
1922 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
1923 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<NetAddress>> {
1924 if let Some(node) = self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey)) {
1925 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1926 return Some(node_info.addresses.clone())
1936 use crate::ln::channelmanager;
1937 use crate::ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript;
1938 use crate::ln::features::InitFeatures;
1939 use crate::routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, NodeAlias, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY, NodeId, RoutingFees, ChannelUpdateInfo, ChannelInfo, NodeAnnouncementInfo, NodeInfo};
1940 use crate::ln::msgs::{RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
1941 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
1942 ReplyChannelRange, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
1943 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
1944 use crate::util::test_utils;
1945 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
1946 use crate::util::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
1947 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
1949 use crate::routing::gossip::REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1950 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1952 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
1953 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
1954 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1955 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
1956 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
1957 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
1961 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
1962 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
1965 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
1966 use crate::prelude::*;
1967 use crate::sync::Arc;
1969 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>> {
1970 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1971 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1972 NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, logger)
1975 fn create_gossip_sync(network_graph: &NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) -> (
1976 Secp256k1<All>, P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
1977 Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
1979 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1980 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1981 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1982 (secp_ctx, gossip_sync)
1986 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1987 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
1988 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1989 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
1990 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
1992 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1993 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1994 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1995 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1996 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1997 assert!(!gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2000 fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
2001 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key);
2002 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2003 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
2008 addresses: Vec::new(),
2009 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2010 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2012 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2013 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2015 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2016 contents: unsigned_announcement
2020 fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
2021 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
2022 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
2023 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2024 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2026 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2027 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&UserConfig::default()),
2028 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
2029 short_channel_id: 0,
2032 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
2033 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
2034 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2036 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2037 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2038 ChannelAnnouncement {
2039 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_key),
2040 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_key),
2041 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
2042 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
2043 contents: unsigned_announcement,
2047 fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Script {
2048 let node_1_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2049 let node_2_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2050 make_funding_redeemscript(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_1_btckey),
2051 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_2_btckey)).to_v0_p2wsh()
2054 fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
2055 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2056 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
2057 short_channel_id: 0,
2060 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
2061 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
2062 htlc_maximum_msat: 1_000_000,
2063 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
2064 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
2065 excess_data: Vec::new()
2067 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
2068 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
2070 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2071 contents: unsigned_channel_update
2076 fn handling_node_announcements() {
2077 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2078 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2080 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2081 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2082 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2084 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2085 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2087 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
2091 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2092 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2093 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2094 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2099 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2100 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2104 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2105 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(
2107 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
2108 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
2111 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
2114 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2115 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
2116 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2117 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2118 // Return false because contains excess data.
2119 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
2120 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2124 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2125 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
2126 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2127 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
2128 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2129 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
2131 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
2136 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
2137 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2138 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2140 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2141 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2143 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2144 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2146 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
2147 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2148 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2149 let mut gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, None, &logger);
2150 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2151 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2156 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2162 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
2163 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
2164 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2166 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have non-chain-validated channel")
2169 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
2170 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2171 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
2172 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2173 gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2175 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2176 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
2177 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2178 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2180 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
2183 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
2184 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
2185 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2186 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
2187 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2188 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2189 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2194 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2200 // If we receive announcement for the same channel, once we've validated it against the
2201 // chain, we simply ignore all new (duplicate) announcements.
2202 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script });
2203 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2205 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have chain-validated channel")
2208 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2210 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2212 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2213 // Mark a node as permanently failed so it's tracked as removed.
2214 gossip_sync.network_graph().node_failed_permanent(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2216 // Return error and ignore valid channel announcement if one of the nodes has been tracked as removed.
2217 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2218 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
2219 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2220 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2222 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel with SCID 3 or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently")
2225 gossip_sync.network_graph().remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2227 // The above channel announcement should be handled as per normal now.
2228 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2229 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2234 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
2235 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2236 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 4;
2237 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2238 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2239 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2240 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2244 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
2245 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
2246 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
2248 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
2251 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2252 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
2254 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
2259 fn handling_channel_update() {
2260 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2261 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2262 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2263 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2264 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2265 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2267 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2268 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2270 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
2271 let short_channel_id;
2274 // Announce a channel we will update
2275 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2276 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
2278 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2279 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2280 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2287 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2288 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2289 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2294 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2296 Some(channel_info) => {
2297 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
2298 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
2303 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2304 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2305 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2306 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2307 // Return false because contains excess data
2308 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2309 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2313 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2314 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2315 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
2316 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2317 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2319 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
2322 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2323 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1;
2324 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2325 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2326 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2328 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
2331 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2332 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = amount_sats * 1000 + 1;
2333 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2334 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2335 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2337 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
2340 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2341 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
2342 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2343 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2344 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2345 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2347 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
2350 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2351 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
2352 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2353 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2354 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2355 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
2356 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
2358 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
2363 fn handling_network_update() {
2364 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2365 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2366 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2367 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2369 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2370 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2371 let node_2_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2374 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
2375 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2378 let short_channel_id;
2380 // Announce a channel we will update
2381 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2382 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2383 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2384 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2385 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2387 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2388 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2390 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2391 msg: valid_channel_update,
2394 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2397 // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
2399 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2401 Some(channel_info) => {
2402 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2406 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2408 is_permanent: false,
2411 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2413 Some(channel_info) => {
2414 assert!(!channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2419 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
2420 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2425 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2426 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
2427 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2430 // Get a new network graph since we don't want to track removed nodes in this test with "std"
2431 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2433 // Announce a channel to test permanent node failure
2434 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2435 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2436 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2437 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2438 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2440 // Non-permanent node failure does not delete any nodes or channels
2441 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2443 is_permanent: false,
2446 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2447 assert!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_2_id)).is_some());
2449 // Permanent node failure deletes node and its channels
2450 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2455 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2456 // Channels are also deleted because the associated node has been deleted
2457 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2462 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
2463 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`.
2464 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2465 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2466 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2467 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2468 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2469 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2471 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2472 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2474 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2475 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2476 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2477 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2478 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2480 // Submit two channel updates for each channel direction (update.flags bit).
2481 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2482 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2483 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2485 let valid_channel_update_2 = get_signed_channel_update(|update| {update.flags |=1;}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2486 gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update_2).unwrap();
2487 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().two_to_one.is_some());
2489 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2490 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2491 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2493 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2494 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))] {
2495 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2496 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2498 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2499 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2501 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2503 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
2504 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
2505 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks.
2506 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2507 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2509 // Note that the directional channel information will have been removed already..
2510 // We want to check that this will work even if *one* of the channel updates is recent,
2511 // so we should add it with a recent timestamp.
2512 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2513 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2514 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2515 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2516 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = (announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
2517 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2518 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2519 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2520 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2521 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2522 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2523 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2524 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2525 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2528 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2529 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2530 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2532 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2534 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2536 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2538 // Clear tracked nodes and channels for clean slate
2539 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2540 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2542 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2543 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2544 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2545 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2547 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2548 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2549 network_graph.channel_failed_with_time(short_channel_id, true, Some(tracking_time));
2551 // Should not remove from tracking if insufficient time has passed
2552 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2553 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS - 1);
2554 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1, "Removed channel count ≠1 with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2556 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2557 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2558 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2559 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed channels with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2560 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed nodes with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2563 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
2565 // When we don't have access to the system clock, the time we started tracking removal will only
2566 // be that provided by the first call to `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`. Hence,
2567 // only if sufficient time has passed after that first call, will the next call remove it from
2569 let removal_time = 1664619654;
2571 // Clear removed nodes and channels for clean slate
2572 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2573 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2575 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2576 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2577 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2578 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2580 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2581 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2582 network_graph.channel_failed(short_channel_id, true);
2584 // The first time we call the following, the channel will have a removal time assigned.
2585 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(removal_time);
2586 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2588 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2589 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2590 removal_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2591 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2592 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2597 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
2598 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2599 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2600 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2601 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2603 // Channels were not announced yet.
2604 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(0);
2605 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2607 let short_channel_id;
2609 // Announce a channel we will update
2610 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2611 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2612 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2618 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
2619 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2620 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2621 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2622 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2623 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2629 // Valid channel update
2630 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2631 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
2632 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2633 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2639 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
2640 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2641 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2642 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2643 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
2644 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2650 // Channel update with excess data.
2651 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2652 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
2653 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2654 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2655 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2661 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
2662 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2663 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2664 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2665 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2666 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2671 // Further starting point have no channels after it
2672 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id + 1000);
2673 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2677 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
2678 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2679 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2680 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2681 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2682 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
2685 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2686 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2689 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
2690 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2691 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2697 // Nodes were never announced
2698 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2699 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2702 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2703 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2708 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2709 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2715 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2716 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2718 // Skip the first node.
2719 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2720 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2723 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
2724 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2725 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
2726 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2727 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2728 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2729 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2734 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2735 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2739 fn network_graph_serialization() {
2740 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2741 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2743 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2744 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2746 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2747 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2748 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2749 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2753 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2754 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2759 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2760 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
2761 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
2762 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2764 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2765 assert!(<NetworkGraph<_>>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap() == network_graph);
2769 fn network_graph_tlv_serialization() {
2770 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2771 network_graph.set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(42);
2773 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2774 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2776 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2777 let reassembled_network_graph: NetworkGraph<_> = ReadableArgs::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap();
2778 assert!(reassembled_network_graph == network_graph);
2779 assert_eq!(reassembled_network_graph.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp().unwrap(), 42);
2783 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2784 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
2785 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2786 use crate::ln::msgs::Init;
2788 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2789 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2790 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2791 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2793 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2795 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
2797 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None };
2798 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg).unwrap();
2799 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2800 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2803 // It should send a gossip_timestamp_filter with the correct information
2805 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
2806 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
2807 let init_msg = Init { features, remote_network_address: None };
2808 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg).unwrap();
2809 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2810 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2812 MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter{ node_id, msg } => {
2813 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2814 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2815 let expected_timestamp = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2816 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) >= expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2);
2817 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) < expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2 + 10);
2818 assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value());
2820 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
2826 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
2827 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2828 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2830 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2831 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2832 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2833 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2835 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
2836 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
2837 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
2840 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
2841 for block in 100000..=108001 {
2842 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
2845 // used for testing resumption on same block
2846 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
2849 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2850 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
2851 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2852 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2858 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
2859 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2863 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2865 number_of_blocks: 0,
2868 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2869 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2871 number_of_blocks: 0,
2872 sync_complete: true,
2873 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2877 // Error when wrong chain
2878 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2882 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2884 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2887 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2888 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2890 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2891 sync_complete: true,
2892 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2896 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
2897 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2901 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2902 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2903 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2906 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2907 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2908 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2909 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2910 sync_complete: true,
2911 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2915 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
2916 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2920 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2921 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2922 number_of_blocks: 1,
2927 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2928 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2929 number_of_blocks: 1,
2930 sync_complete: true,
2931 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2936 // No results in valid query range
2937 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2941 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2942 first_blocknum: 1000,
2943 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2948 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2949 first_blocknum: 1000,
2950 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2951 sync_complete: true,
2952 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2957 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
2958 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2962 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2963 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2964 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
2969 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2970 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2971 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
2972 sync_complete: true,
2973 short_channel_ids: vec![
2974 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
2980 // Single block exactly full
2981 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2985 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2986 first_blocknum: 100000,
2987 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2992 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2993 first_blocknum: 100000,
2994 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2995 sync_complete: true,
2996 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2997 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3003 // Multiple split on new block
3004 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3008 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3009 first_blocknum: 100000,
3010 number_of_blocks: 8001,
3015 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3016 first_blocknum: 100000,
3017 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3018 sync_complete: false,
3019 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
3020 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3024 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3025 first_blocknum: 107999,
3026 number_of_blocks: 2,
3027 sync_complete: true,
3028 short_channel_ids: vec![
3029 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
3035 // Multiple split on same block
3036 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3040 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3041 first_blocknum: 100002,
3042 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3047 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3048 first_blocknum: 100002,
3049 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3050 sync_complete: false,
3051 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
3052 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3056 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3057 first_blocknum: 108001,
3058 number_of_blocks: 1,
3059 sync_complete: true,
3060 short_channel_ids: vec![
3061 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
3068 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
3069 gossip_sync: &P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
3070 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
3071 msg: QueryChannelRange,
3073 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
3075 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
3076 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
3077 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
3078 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
3081 assert!(result.is_ok());
3083 assert!(result.is_err());
3086 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3087 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
3089 for i in 0..events.len() {
3090 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
3092 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
3093 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
3094 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
3095 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
3096 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
3097 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
3098 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
3100 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
3101 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
3102 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
3103 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
3104 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
3106 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
3107 if i == events.len() - 1 {
3108 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
3111 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
3117 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
3118 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3119 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3120 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3121 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
3123 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
3125 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
3127 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
3129 assert!(result.is_err());
3133 fn displays_node_alias() {
3134 let format_str_alias = |alias: &str| {
3135 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3136 bytes[..alias.as_bytes().len()].copy_from_slice(alias.as_bytes());
3137 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3140 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}");
3141 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\0\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!");
3142 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\t\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!\u{FFFD}\u{26A1}");
3144 let format_bytes_alias = |alias: &[u8]| {
3145 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3146 bytes[..alias.len()].copy_from_slice(alias);
3147 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3150 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart> LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart> LDK!");
3151 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\0LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>");
3152 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\tLDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>\u{FFFD}LDK!");
3156 fn channel_info_is_readable() {
3157 let chanmon_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3158 let node_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3159 let node_chanmgrs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
3160 let nodes = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3161 let config = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::test_default_channel_config();
3163 // 1. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelUpdateInfo
3164 let chan_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
3167 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
3168 htlc_minimum_msat: 1234,
3169 htlc_maximum_msat: 5678,
3170 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 9, proportional_millionths: 10 },
3171 last_update_message: None,
3174 let mut encoded_chan_update_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3175 assert!(chan_update_info.write(&mut encoded_chan_update_info).is_ok());
3177 // First make sure we can read ChannelUpdateInfos we just wrote
3178 let read_chan_update_info: ChannelUpdateInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_update_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3179 assert_eq!(chan_update_info, read_chan_update_info);
3181 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3182 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3183 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_update_info, legacy_chan_update_info_with_some);
3185 // Check we fail if htlc_maximum_msat is not present in either the ChannelUpdateInfo itself
3186 // or the ChannelUpdate enclosed with `last_update_message`.
3187 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("b40004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c8181d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f00083a840000034d013413a70000009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap();
3188 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice());
3189 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3191 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3192 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_none.as_slice());
3193 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3195 // 2. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelInfo
3196 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo without ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3197 let chan_info_none_updates = ChannelInfo {
3198 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3199 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3201 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3203 capacity_sats: None,
3204 announcement_message: None,
3205 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3208 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3209 assert!(chan_info_none_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3211 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3212 assert_eq!(chan_info_none_updates, read_chan_info);
3214 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo with ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3215 let chan_info_some_updates = ChannelInfo {
3216 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3217 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3218 one_to_two: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3219 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3220 two_to_one: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3221 capacity_sats: None,
3222 announcement_message: None,
3223 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3226 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3227 assert!(chan_info_some_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3229 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3230 assert_eq!(chan_info_some_updates, read_chan_info);
3232 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3233 let legacy_chan_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ca00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88043636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23083636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3234 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_info, legacy_chan_info_with_some);
3236 // Check we can decode legacy ChannelInfo, even if the `two_to_one` / `one_to_two` /
3237 // `last_update_message` fields fail to decode due to missing htlc_maximum_msat.
3238 let legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
3239 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice()).unwrap();
3240 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3241 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3242 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3244 let legacy_chan_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ba00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88042e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23082e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3245 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_none.as_slice()).unwrap();
3246 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3247 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3248 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3252 fn node_info_is_readable() {
3253 use std::convert::TryFrom;
3255 // 1. Check we can read a valid NodeAnnouncementInfo and fail on an invalid one
3256 let valid_netaddr = crate::ln::msgs::NetAddress::Hostname { hostname: crate::util::ser::Hostname::try_from("A".to_string()).unwrap(), port: 1234 };
3257 let valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo {
3258 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
3261 alias: NodeAlias([0u8; 32]),
3262 addresses: vec![valid_netaddr],
3263 announcement_message: None,
3266 let mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info = Vec::new();
3267 assert!(valid_node_ann_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info).is_ok());
3268 let read_valid_node_ann_info: NodeAnnouncementInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3269 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info, valid_node_ann_info);
3271 let encoded_invalid_node_ann_info = hex::decode("3f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d2").unwrap();
3272 let read_invalid_node_ann_info_res: Result<NodeAnnouncementInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_ann_info.as_slice());
3273 assert!(read_invalid_node_ann_info_res.is_err());
3275 // 2. Check we can read a NodeInfo anyways, but set the NodeAnnouncementInfo to None if invalid
3276 let valid_node_info = NodeInfo {
3277 channels: Vec::new(),
3278 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
3279 announcement_info: Some(valid_node_ann_info),
3282 let mut encoded_valid_node_info = Vec::new();
3283 assert!(valid_node_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_info).is_ok());
3284 let read_valid_node_info: NodeInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3285 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_info, valid_node_info);
3287 let encoded_invalid_node_info_hex = hex::decode("4402403f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d20400").unwrap();
3288 let read_invalid_node_info: NodeInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_info_hex.as_slice()).unwrap();
3289 assert_eq!(read_invalid_node_info.announcement_info, None);
3293 #[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
3301 fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
3302 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3303 let mut d = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3304 let mut v = Vec::new();
3305 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
3307 let _ = NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(&v), &logger).unwrap();
3312 fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
3313 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3314 let mut d = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3315 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d, &logger).unwrap();
3317 let _ = net_graph.encode();